



CONFLICT ❖ IN ANCIENT GREECE ❖ AND ROME

THE DEFINITIVE POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND MILITARY ENCYCLOPEDIA



Sara E. Phang, Iain Spence, Douglas Kelly, and Peter Londeg, Editors

Conflict in Ancient Greece and Rome

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THE DEFINITIVE POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND
MILITARY ENCYCLOPEDIA

Volume 1: A–R, Greek Section

IAIN SPENCE, DOUGLAS KELLY, AND
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Christine Spence, Anne Kelly, and Christina Spittel

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Preface

Conflict in Ancient Greece and Rome: The Definitive Political, Social, and Military Encyclopedia is a wide-ranging encyclopedia on ancient Greek and Roman warfare and the closely related political, cultural, and religious institutions of Greek and Roman society that supported or otherwise affected warfare. However, *Conflict in Ancient Greece and Rome* includes articles on forms of conflict other than pitched battle, including low-intensity conflict and civil and social conflict. The encyclopedia also provides biographical articles on major leaders and rulers, and articles on major ancient historians and other types of sources, including inscriptions and coins. The temporal scope is from Archaic Greece to the Roman conquest of the Greek world, and from early Rome to the fall of the western Roman Empire in 476 CE. The focus is on central institutions (political, social, cultural, and military) and historical and biographical narrative rather than on literary analysis or archaeology.

Conflict in Ancient Greece and Rome is intended to fill a gap in current reference works. It meets the need for a standard reference work on Greek and Roman military history and related institutions that is accessible to nonspecialists. The intended audience includes undergraduates and advanced secondary school students in survey courses and the general reader who is interested in Greek and Roman history. General interest encyclopedias do not usually cover the Classical Period in depth. Most other encyclopedias and reference works are intended for academic specialists, so students and nonspecialists who use them can be left confused or even discouraged. There is often a marked gap between popular works and academic classical scholarship, a discipline with many barriers to accessing it. These barriers include reading knowledge of not just two ancient

languages (Latin and Greek) but several European modern languages (usually French, German, and Italian). Classical scholarship is an international discipline. Its foundations, including major reference works still consulted, were laid by German scholars in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The heritage of these foundations is a devotion to the exhaustive citation of primary and secondary sources in classical studies and Greco-Roman history.

The aim of this encyclopedia is to use the great depth in the discipline of classical scholarship but to keep it in the background. In this way, classical scholarship becomes a firm base to help, rather than hinder, the general or nonspecialist reader. Our contributors include academic experts in Greek and Roman history who have specialized in the area of their selected topics and who can guide the general reader to a better understanding of often complex events and institutions. With the goal of being more accessible, the further readings suggested for each entry and in the general bibliography are almost entirely in English and feature many works written for a general audience. When academic articles have been cited, they are generally from journals relatively easy to access through university or other databases. The encyclopedia's own articles include selective citations of primary sources to guide readers to the most important passages, rather than exhaustive citation.

Conflict in Ancient Greece and Rome is organized for ease of consultation. The work is divided into two halves, Greek and Roman; because the Romans conquered the Hellenistic Greek world, there is some inevitable overlap, but this has been kept to a minimum with cross-referencing. Both halves have the same structural organization, with individual Greek and Roman introductions, followed by general chronologies, and guides to Greek and Roman nomenclature. The entries in each half are in alphabetical order. Entries on major wars or conflicts are longer than the others and are divided into three sections each—the causes of the conflict, the course of the conflict, and the consequences of the conflict. The entry sections are preceded by a Guide to Related Topics and followed by maps, glossaries of Greek and Latin terms, topically organized bibliographies, and collections of primary source documents in translation. Appendices listing memorable quotations by Greek and Roman historical personages are also included.

Within each entry, the main body is followed by a list of cross-

references and a selected bibliography termed Further Reading. The cross-references are principally to other entries in the same half of the work, but do include references to entries in the other half. The Further Reading sections, in keeping with the general mission of the encyclopedia, include recent and current works, that, with few exceptions, are in English and journal articles that are relatively accessible. The Further Reading sections with the entries are more specific than the general, topically arranged general bibliography for each section.

The demand for a work like *Conflict in Ancient Greece and Rome* continues to grow with the popularity of the Greek and Roman world in popular media, including the History Channel and other television programs that focus on classical and biblical history and archaeology, historical fiction, Hollywood historical films and TV series such as HBO's *Rome*, role-playing games such as *Age of Empires*, and wholly fictional works of fantasy, such as George R. R. Martin's *Game of Thrones* series, inspired by the Classical as well as Medieval Period. We hope that readers will find the content of *Conflict in Ancient Greece and Rome* both entertaining and stimulating.

Acknowledgments

Greek Section

The Greek section of this work was produced under particularly interesting circumstances, starting with the ill-health of Matthew Trundle, the original editor, and the transfer of his duties part-way into the project to the three of us. Since then, we have been persistently dogged by a series of major issues affecting family and health, as well as strong competing priorities from our academic and military careers. It became a standing joke among the Greek editors that the project was, in fact, “cursed.” However, we made it, and hope that the final product meets with the reader’s approval. If it does, a large part of the credit must go to those whose help has proved invaluable in completing the project.

First and foremost we would like to thank our wives—Christine, Anne, and Christina, to whom this work is dedicated. They, more than anyone else, made the most sacrifices during the production of this book, and their constant support, and advice, ensured not only its completion but also that we retained some vestiges of sanity at the end of it.

Next, the contributors (too many to name individually) should be thanked for the quality of their product and the equanimity with which they endured the lengthy process. James Spence carried out careful editing of our material before we submitted it to the publisher. He did so under considerable pressure—especially toward the end—both from the volume of work generated in a short timeframe and the “minor” distraction of a very lively three-year-old at home. Mary Dearden produced all the maps, for both the Greek and Roman halves of the work. She also did the four original illustrations of the helmets included in the Greek half. This was all achieved very efficiently and, just as importantly, very cheerfully, despite an illness at

a particularly inopportune moment for her.

Three ABC-CLIO staff also deserve a special mention: Barbara Patterson, John Wagner, and Ellen Rasmussen. Barbara helped guide us smoothly and efficiently through the ABC-CLIO database and contract management system to ensure all the contributors were properly recorded and rewarded. John had the onerous task of dealing with three senior academics with fairly fixed views and no reluctance in expressing them. His unfailing courtesy, professionalism, and patience made a difficult task much easier and has made a major contribution to the quality of the work. Ellen made the task of organizing the illustrations not only as smooth as it could possibly be but also enjoyable.

Finally, we should also acknowledge the contribution of the Roman editor, Dr. Sara Phang. The Greek half of this work benefitted considerably from our interaction with her—especially from her drive and her broad variety of skills and knowledge—and we hope it was not entirely a one-way street.

Iain Spence, Douglas Kelly, Peter Londey

Postscript

Unfortunately, our coeditor Douglas Kelly did not live to see the final production of these volumes. Doug died on December 15, 2015, after a lengthy battle with cancer, endured with characteristic grace and fortitude. A New Zealander by birth, he taught for many years at Macquarie University in Sydney and the Australian National University in Canberra, loved and respected by generations of students. Doug was a superb scholar, with knowledge and interests spread across the Classical world, but with particular focus on Greek history; his Cambridge PhD was on fourth century Sparta. Before he became too ill to continue with this project, Doug contributed to it mightily, both in helping shape the encyclopedia as a whole and in writing many of the entries. As his coeditors, we valued very highly both his knowledge of the subject and his wisdom as a historian, and it is a matter of great sadness to us that he did not live to see the fruits of his labors. We hope that these volumes will form a fitting, though partial, memorial to a man of great talent and great humanity; working with him was always both a pleasure and an honor.

Iain Spence, Peter Londey

Roman Section

The organization, writing, editing, and production of *Conflict in Ancient Greece and Rome: The Definitive Political, Social, and Military Encyclopedia* has been a long project, which I commenced upon in the fall of 2011 with Matthew Trundle, then the Greek editor. The work was then titled the *Encyclopedia of Conflict in Greece and Rome*. Unfortunately, due to health difficulties and academic pressures, Matthew was unable to continue his editing responsibilities, and the Greek editorship passed to Peter Londey, Iain Spence, and Douglas Kelly. Though the encyclopedia is not jointly written in that the Greek and Roman halves have had separate editors, and for the most part separate contributors, I have worked closely with Iain and Peter on the general scope, organization, and features of the project. I regret not having been able to work closely with Douglas Kelly, who developed a serious illness, and I appreciate the expert knowledge he showed in our initial communications. Iain Spence has been indefatigable and enthusiastic. Given the time zone difference between U.S. Eastern Standard Time and the Australian Capital Territory, I could always reach him in the middle of the night (U.S. Eastern).

I particularly want to thank ABC-CLIO's John Wagner and Barbara Patterson. As the project editor, Wagner listened to our arguments about the direction of the work and kindly met requests for additional time to meet deadlines. Barbara Patterson assisted us with the ABC-CLIO Author Center site for managing the elements of a complex project. I also want to thank Pat Carlin for enabling *Conflict in Ancient Greece and Rome* to come to fruition. I hope that *Conflict in Ancient Greece and Rome* will be a valuable addition to ABC-CLIO's series of military history encyclopedias.

I also want to thank our contributors, particularly Lee L. Brice for his experience working with ABC-CLIO, and the other authors of series of articles on major wars and conflicts, Adam Anders, Jeremy Armstrong, Colin Bailey, Paul J. Burton, Stephen Chappell, Dustin Cranford, Timothy Doran, Christopher J. Fuhrmann, Patrick Kent, Christopher Malone, Bruce Marshall, Blanka Misic, Rosemary Moore, John Poirot, Saskia T. Roselaar, Gareth Sampson, Gracie Self, David R. Smith, Nathan Schumer, and Annamarie Vallis, for cooperating with major revisions (in some cases, two rounds) as the scope and length of the project changed.

Finally, I express gratitude to my father, James M. Phang, for providing

intellectual and moral support through four long years of editing this work and through some of the darkest times my family has experienced. My mother, Ruth Ann Phang, passed away from cancer in the summer of 2014. She had always supported my academic work, and I regret that she will not see *Conflict in Ancient Greece and Rome* in print.

Sara E. Phang

Part 1

Conflict in Ancient Greece

Introduction: Conflict in Ancient Greece

Conflict in Ancient Greek Society

Conflict—social, political, and military—was an endemic aspect of Greek life. This partly arose from the agonal or competitive nature of Greek society. Competition for and concern over personal status drove social interactions at every level, though nowhere more than among the upper classes. They constantly strove as much for status within their communities as for wealth or even power—although status and wealth and power are clearly closely linked.

The competitive nature of Greek society not only influenced internal conflict, but could also drive interstate conflict in two important ways. As in Rome, upper-class leaders might seek personal prestige (and profit) from leading their states to war. One example, according to the contemporary historian Thucydides (5.43–47), was Alcibiades, the aristocratic late fifth-century Athenian general, who brought Athens into an alliance with Argos because he had felt personally slighted by the behavior of some Spartan envoys. This led directly to the battle of Mantinea in 418, a battle in which 200 Athenians died fighting the Spartans who had so offended Alcibiades. Three years later, seeking glory and the money to pay off his debts, Alcibiades successfully urged his fellow Athenians to invade Sicily, a decision that led to utter disaster.

The second way is that the people of each *polis* (city-state) saw themselves as being in a competition for status with the people of neighboring cities. This explains some of the characteristic tactics of Greek warfare, such as ravaging another city's agricultural land, seemingly less to do economic damage than to humiliate and annoy their opponents. Wars could be sparked by competition for borderlands of limited value, or by

personal slight. There was one view, recorded by Plutarch, that Sparta was keen for war with Thebes in 395 because a few years before the Thebans had scattered the Spartan king Agesilaus' sacrifices at Aulis (in Boeotia). In sacrificing at Aulis, Agesilaus himself had been emulating the mythical king Agamemnon, who had sacrificed there on his way to Troy.

Status was therefore a major influence on Greek conflict—probably more so than traditional explanations such as the acquisition of territory. It is a notable fact that no Greek state before Macedonia in the fourth century created a large territorial empire. Sparta did in some way come to control both Laconia and Messenia, two-fifths of the Peloponnese; Argos conquered the Argolid. But generally powerful states built up their dominion by forcing weaker states into unequal alliances. The classic example is the Athenian Empire of the fifth century. Athens seemingly left its allies as independent states, but intruded so much on their sense of sovereignty and dignity that many came to see their relationship with Athens as one of “slavery.” The Athenians forced them to pay tribute and did not allow them to exit from the alliance. But just as important, it seems, was the fact that that tribute was paid over in a humiliatingly public setting at a major Athenian religious festival, the fact that Athens forced the allies to stop minting their own coinage, and the general arrogance with which Athenian citizens comported themselves about the Aegean, backed up by the fact that any legal disputes between themselves and allied citizens would be heard in Athenian courts with Athenian juries.

All this might seem trivial, but it is quite possible to argue that Athens lost the Second Peloponnesian War to Sparta because in the later stages of the war, with Athens weakened especially by the loss in Sicily, many allies (and eventually almost the whole empire) took the opportunity to revolt. Resentment over slights to status could have very concrete results.

Greek warfare was brutal and highly destructive. Heavy armed infantry, hoplites, fought face-to-face with a thrusting spear as their main weapon. Casualties were appalling: a losing side might easily suffer 10 percent of their number killed within two or three hours' fighting. There were no formal rules relating to the treatment of prisoners or civilians. Populations of captured cities were often sold into slavery, or sometimes the women and children might be enslaved while the adult men were killed in cold blood.

The importance of competition with neighbors was so great that wars, on a small scale at least, were frequent. Among theorists, this led to the

view that war was the natural state of mankind. Clinias the Cretan, a character in Plato's *Laws* (1.525–526), suggests that because states are in a perpetual state of war with each other, peacetime institutions should prepare citizens for war: “For as to what most men term peace (*eirene*), this is simply a name—the reality is that by nature, all states are in a continual state of undeclared war (*polemos akeryktos*) with each other.”

Despite this gloomy view, by the fourth century the Greeks were making some efforts to restrict and avoid war. There was never a Greek United Nations, but in some respects the ideas were there. States had always made bilateral treaties with each other, often for 30, 50, or even 100 years but in the fourth century there was a series of Common Peace agreements. These tried to create, in effect, a multilateral and permanent truce, with some notions of collective security thrown in. However, these did not work, in part because of the tendency noted above for more powerful states to create unequal relationships. Sparta, for example, used, or tried to use these treaties to weaken potential opponents by breaking up their leagues or other attempts at cooperative groupings.

More successfully, the growth of federal states, such as the Boeotian, Aetolian, and Achaean Leagues, had the effect of greatly reducing conflict among the cities that made up each federal state. Ultimately, the issue was taken out of the hands of the city-states, as they found the world after Alexander the Great dominated by a small number of large territorial empires. Leagues of city-states continued to exist and play a role, especially in mainland Greece, but in many ways the nature of the game had changed. Hellenistic kings competed in ways which to us may seem more familiar. Tragically, because of the huge resources on which these kings could draw, the human costs of war were probably even greater than they had been before.

Structure and Features of This Section

Although war forms a prominent part of the Greek section of this Encyclopedia, the coverage extends to a larger part of the entire spectrum of conflict within the institutional or state context. Excluding personal or domestic conflict, this spectrum begins with low-level political conflict—solid disagreement or argument, with the associated name-calling and finger-pointing. It then moves through political conflicts involving the

threat of violence or isolated real violence and then faction fighting with the real threat of regular or high-level violence, or the occurrence of this violence. Next comes high-level civil strife (*stasis*), the upper end of which is civil war and then the lower levels of interstate military conflict (including insurgency, guerrilla war, or, in the Greek case, agricultural ravaging). The high end of the spectrum is full-scale war between states or groups of states. Banditry and piracy also inhabit this spectrum. They are distributed along much of its length from small-scale piracy or banditry at the lower end to large-scale bandit and pirate activity—the latter perhaps sometimes even equaling insurgency or guerrilla activity.

For reasons of space, the Greek section of the Encyclopedia focuses on the middle and upper end of the spectrum, from serious faction fighting through to full-scale military conflict. For the same reasons, it also has a particular focus on sixth- to fourth-century mainland Greece, while also providing reasonable coverage of Greek Italy and Sicily and also the post-Alexander Greco-Macedonian monarchies in the east. Although it also includes some aspects of earlier Greek political and military conflict, full coverage really begins with the late eighth century—noting that the evidence can be very patchy before the sixth.

The Encyclopedia is structured around the entries. Each entry covers an aspect of conflict including battles, campaigns, wars, prominent military and political figures, political institutions, and movements—all designed to help understand civil and military conflict in ancient Greece. The entries also include cross references to other entries in both the Greek and the Roman halves of the Encyclopedia and a selection of suggested further reading in ancient and modern works relevant to the topic. A detailed set of notes for using the entries follows this Introduction. These notes explain the conventions used for dates, Greek words and names, Hellenistic monarchs, and measurements, and include a list of abbreviations used in the “Further Reading” part of the entries.

The entries as a whole are supported by maps, a glossary of key terms, and a chronology listing the key dates from the eighth century to the end of the last Hellenistic monarchy in the late first century (all dates in the Greek section of this work are BCE unless otherwise indicated). Following the entries are collections of Greek quotations on war and ancient documents, both designed to give the reader a better feel for aspects of ancient Greek conflict. A bibliography, organized by topic, is also provided to direct the

interested reader to further reading.

In short, this work is structured to allow the reader to quickly find specific items of interest across a wide range of types and periods of Greek (and Roman) conflict, and various tools to assist them to better understand the material. However, this inevitably means that the reader focuses on specific entries at the expense of the broader picture of ancient conflict. For those who want to understand the broad framework of Greek conflict to place their use of this Encyclopedia in context—or simply want a handy overview of Greek conflict—we have provided this in the Historical Outline at the end of this Introduction.

This starts with a short overview of the physical and cultural influences on Greek conflict, and then adopts a chronological approach, outlining the key developments in both civil and military conflict in ancient Greece down to the battle of Actium in 30 BCE. This battle, and its aftermath, effectively brought Egypt, the last real Hellenistic kingdom, under Roman control. The outline is divided into the broad periods generally accepted for ancient Greek history, although the comment which can be made about conflict in the first two, the Mycenaean Period and the Dark Age is severely limited by the lack of written evidence.

Historical Outline of Ancient Greek Conflict

Physical and Cultural Environment

As early as the Mycenaean Period (ca. 1600–1100) there is evidence of Greek settlement in, or at least regular trade contact with, many other parts of the Mediterranean World. However, a major burst of colonization in the eighth to the sixth centuries (especially ca. 750–550) spread Greeks, and Greek culture, from the Crimea and the Black Sea in the northeast, along the coast of Asia Minor and Egypt in the east, to parts of Africa in the south, and in the west, to Italy and Sicily, and even to parts of France and Spain. The Greek world was therefore very much more than mainland Greece and Greeks, and its conflict inhabited a wide variety of physical landscapes and was subjected to an equally wide variety of external cultural influences.

Greece proper, though, provided the original formative influence. Mountains occupy about 80 percent of mainland Greece and there are few plains. Thessaly is the main exception to this, although smaller plains also

exist in Boeotia, Attica, and the Peloponnese. The climate, as for most of the Mediterranean, generally consists of hot, dry summers followed by mild and wet winters. The winter climate, with its rain and swollen rivers tended to accentuate the already difficult land communication caused by the mountainous terrain. The geography of mainland Greece therefore encouraged settlements relatively isolated from each other—both physically and in some respects culturally. The main occupation, probably involving 80–90 percent of the population, was subsistence farming; trade was mainly a maritime occupation.

Although the Greeks (or the “Hellenes” as they called themselves) developed a clear sense of “Greek” identity, particularly when contrasting themselves with non-Greek speakers, the *barbaroi*, individual settlements and later *poleis* or city-states developed as separate entities. Regional dialects existed (Aristophanes, for example, pokes fun at the Dorian dialect of Megara and Sparta in the *Acharnians* and the *Peace*) and different cities had their local deities, festivals, and customs. All this led to a well-developed sense of local identity, and a hostile relationship with neighbors was not uncommon—especially where there was competition for good agricultural land (and the status that went with it). This can be seen, for example, in the generally poor relationships over many years between Sparta and Argos, and Chalcis and Eretria on the island of Euboea.

These factors influenced Greek warfare, and therefore major conflict, along particular lines. Given the extent of the Greek world and its variety, there were exceptions. However, in Greece proper in general light troops developed in the more mountainous and wilder areas, for example, Aetolia and Crete, while south of Thessaly, Greek communities tended to develop heavier infantry focused around protection of settlements and their agriculture. Cavalry, except in Thessaly and Macedonia (and later to some extent Athens and Boeotia), was not a major arm—although the Greek settlements in Sicily were another exception to this. Although this changed over time, for much of the period covered in this work land warfare was essentially a summer occupation. It generally consisted of short campaigns fought by citizen soldiers who had to get back to tend their own farms. These campaigns were often decided by (or indeed even consisted of) a single pitched hoplite battle.

Conflict occasionally occurred around maritime trade routes. The naval warfare associated with this, or more frequently with colonization, or the

simple acquisition of overseas territory, power, and influence was often subordinate in the Greek view to land warfare. Yet Greeks had a very close relationship to the sea. Almost every Greek colony was sited on or close to the coast. The sea was a bridge, not a barrier: it remained for Greeks the preferred means of communication and a sense of connectedness. The Greeks developed good maritime skills, initially through fishing and trade. This led to the early development of piracy and then naval power.

Mycenaean Period (ca. 1600–1100)

Although outside the scope of this Encyclopedia, and hampered by the lack of the sort of literary evidence crucial for analyzing conflict and its place in society, the Mycenaean Period does have some hints of the earliest recoverable Greek conflict. Homer's epic poems, the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, have in the past been used to try to recreate a picture of Mycenaean society, but it is increasingly less believed that they actually contain folk memories of even very late Mycenaean society. This means that our evidence is basically restricted to the visible physical remains and what can be excavated from Bronze Age sites, including a limited number of Linear B tablets, mainly palace inventories and associated material.

There is no evidence whatsoever to allow any conclusions about internal conflict in Mycenaean times. However, human nature being what it is, it is possible to speculate that from time to time there must have been issues between the nobles and even disputed successions for the kingship. Fortunately, the surviving evidence does shed a bit more light on military conflict.

Although this has been challenged more recently on the basis that the Linear B evidence for it comes almost entirely from only one site, Ano Englianos (Pylos), the evidence has generally been interpreted as indicating that the independent Mycenaean kingdoms were probably rather autocratic, centrally controlled entities, led in many cases by a single ruler. Armed conflict is depicted on frescoes at several sites, including Mycenae, Tiryns, and Orchomenus, and Mycenaean palaces did have stores of weapons, including light chariots. The spectacular defenses at sites like Mycenae and Tiryns (see illustrations in the Mycenae and Tiryns entries) suggest a credible and constant threat larger than small raiding parties intent on plunder. The common pattern was to fortify a central citadel, using large blocks to construct massive walls that later Greeks believed were built by

the Cyclops (because of this, they are now referred to as “cyclopean walls”). Tiryns is a good example of restricting access to the citadel with limited entrances designed to funnel attackers into a narrow area and expose their unshielded side—again suggesting conflict was more than just raids.

It seems entirely possible that nonaristocrats participated in warfare, and perhaps provided the bulk of the forces, but leadership was certainly the domain of the aristocracy. At Pylos, the Linear B tablets record the names of officers, the number of men they commanded, and their location. This suggests some sort of military organization, probably decentralized, with local commanders supplying troops to a central authority. Although it is quite possible this system was widespread, there are insufficient equivalent tablet finds available to confirm it for other palace sites.

The number of chariots attested in some sites suggests that they may have played an important role in warfare, although the mountainous terrain of much of Greece must have restricted this to a limited range of locations. Arms and armor, including those recorded on inventories and items buried with warriors, suggest a mix of heavy and light infantry, including archers, existed. Heavy infantry had bronze spears and swords and large “figure eight” or “tower” shields and body armor. Complete panoplies such as the Dendra armor exist, but were probably too heavy for dismounted fighting and were therefore either for use by chariot-borne warriors or ceremonial. There is some slight evidence to suggest that toward the end of the Mycenaean Period fighting involved more organized formations. However, this is largely based on a limited range of pictorial and archaeological evidence—predominantly changes to spearheads—and must remain speculative.

Mycenaean society seems to have been in decline from around the thirteenth century, with Thebes and Orchomenus in Boeotia both destroyed ca. 1250. Some sites further south seem to have survived attacks around the same time, and strengthened their fortifications as a result. The common view for some time was that final destruction, or destruction to the point that the settlements were a mere shadow of their former selves, occurred early in the twelfth century. Conflict between the settlements, and even natural disaster, possibly played a part, but for many years the scale and timeframe of the destruction, and changes to pottery and other goods, caused scholars to favor the explanation of external invasion. The later Greeks certainly believed that Greece was invaded from the north, by the

Dorians, who replaced the existing society, reducing many of the original inhabitants to either subordinate or subject status. However, more recent excavations have suggested that some sites were reoccupied, changes to pottery could be from importation rather than conquest, and that the picture of a concentrated series of military destructions is not as clear cut as once believed. The available evidence is currently insufficient to allow an informed judgment of what really happened.

Dark Age (ca. 1100–700)

As the name suggests, even less evidence is available for this period of Greek history than for the Mycenaean Period, although the picture starts to improve from the eighth century onward. There is evidence for some continuity of weaponry after the “collapse” of Mycenaean society. If the evidence of the Pylos tablets is accurate, and the military force available to a ruler was provided by commanders spread around the region, then the destruction of the palaces may not have profoundly affected military power. It would, however, certainly have fragmented it to some degree and probably considerably reduced the size of forces that could be gathered by any one individual. For a century or so after the palace destructions, recognizably Mycenaean culture persisted, though showing signs of economic impoverishment and significant reduction in population. But then there seems to have been a very significant cultural break, as memories of the Bronze Age past were lost. The resurgence of Greek culture in the eighth century was profoundly influenced by non-Greek cultures, such as those of Egypt, Phoenicia, and Assyria, far more than by any surviving Mycenaean traditions.

Homer’s *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, probably dating to the early seventh century, can provide some assistance in reconstructing conflict in the latter part of Dark Age Greece. While the epics are unlikely to contain memories of Mycenaean Greece, it is quite possible that they preserve elements, particularly “heroic” elements, from the end of the Dark Age. Conflict clearly continued, both between Greeks and, with the surge of colonization from ca. 750, with local populations around the Mediterranean. The Homeric literature suggests that warfare was dominated by chieftains commanding groups of followers. Although raids must have been common, pitched battles were also a feature, but the numbers involved cannot have been large by later Greek standards. Toward the end of the period it seems

that, despite the literary emphasis on the chieftains and aristocratic heroes, much of the fighting was done by men of average rank in some sort of infantry formation. The men in these formations probably used equipment close to, or even identical to, the later hoplite panoply, although they may well have carried a javelin as well as the thrusting spear so characteristic of the hoplite in succeeding centuries.

As discussed in the following section, the phenomenon of colonization, which began right at the end of the Dark Age, is indicative of internal conflict. Colonization often resulted from the stresses induced by land shortages caused by overpopulation, drought, or other influences, or, perhaps most frequently, from internal faction-fighting. Given the nature of aristocratic society, particularly the “honor society” depicted in Homer, internal clashes between individual aristocrats or between aristocratic families must have been relatively common. The strong links between aristocrats from different cities or regions, including the common practice of intermarriage between their families, must also on occasion have given rise to external conflict.

Archaic Period (ca. 700–480)

In many respects the Archaic Period was one of emerging social strains and internal conflict, but it also saw major developments in interstate conflict. Internal conflict was reflected in the phenomena of colonization and tyranny, while the development of hoplite warfare both influenced and was influenced by these.

The Archaic Period saw a continuation of the wave of colonization apparent in the last half century or so of the Dark Age. This could be a cause of conflict—with the locals in those areas chosen for colonies, and also from time to time between colonizing powers over prime sites, or even between colonies. However, it was also often a release valve or even a preventative for conflict in the colonizing state. Competition for scarce land, and in particular conflict between aristocratic factions or between rich and poor, could all be ameliorated by groups of citizens leaving, or being sent, to found a colony overseas.

Other manifestations of, and sometimes solutions for, internal conflict were tyranny and the associated phenomenon of the *nomothetes* or lawgiver (often an alternative to tyranny). Tyranny and lawgivers/reformers existed in all other periods of Greek history, but were arguably more

frequent in the Archaic Period. The period from the rise of Pheidon of Argos (ca. 675) to the end of the Peisistratids in Athens (510) has been called the “Age of Tyrants” because of the number of tyrannies, and dynasties of tyrants. Tyrannies occurred in Argos, Corinth, Sicyon, Athens, other mainland states, and, toward the end of the period, in Sicily. Although, as with colonization, there were strong local causes, many tyrannies seem to have occurred because of tension between aristocratic factions or between rich and poor. A tyrant, often with a proven track record of military success and some popular support was one solution. In quite a few cases tyrants initially solved, or at least suppressed, internal conflict and, although there are exceptions, generally tended to avoid external conflict. They emphasized internal security measures to suppress opposition, and it was not uncommon for regimes to become harsher over time—especially when there was more than one generation of a tyrant in a location. This often led to internal, aristocrat-led uprisings to kill or expel tyrants. In the late sixth century, Sparta seems to have developed a deliberate policy of expelling tyrants from other states.

An alternative preventative for internal conflict was the appointment of an individual to reform the laws. Lycurgus, reputedly responsible for establishing the Spartan constitution, is an interesting example, but especially problematic. He may never have existed at all and if he did his date is quite uncertain, although some place him toward the end of the Dark Age/start of the Archaic Period. However, others are well attested, including Zaleucus of Locri in Italy (ca. 650) and Charondas of Catana and Pittacus of Mytilene (both sixth century). Perhaps the most famous of them all is Solon of Athens, whose reforms at the start of the sixth century seem designed to resolve serious internal conflict, apparently with a largely economic basis, within Athens. A slightly earlier attempt to resolve this tension, a codification of laws under Dracon, had failed—the laws were so harsh that they were described as being “written in blood” and may actually have contributed to further discontent. Solon’s reforms were not entirely successful. While they seem to have solved many of the economic issues, aristocratic faction fighting continued until the various tyrannies of Peisistratus and his sons. At the end of that century violent factional strife in Athens between two aristocrats, Isagoras and Cleisthenes, and their supporters led to Spartan military intervention which failed in the face of popular resistance. The result (ca. 506) was Cleisthenes’ suite of major

reforms which built on Solon's work to lay the basis for the famous fifth-century Athenian democracy.

In the military sphere, the Archaic Period saw the rise of the hoplite phalanx as the mainstay of mainland Greek warfare (see illustration in "Chigi Vase" entry). Although massed infantry formations predated the Archaic Period, they really came into their own during it. The hoplite, or heavy-armed infantryman, became the arm of choice during this period. The associated devolution of military service further down into Greek communities than before is probably one of the sources of tension in this period which helped lead to colonization, tyranny, and reform. This was because of the long-standing Greek view that the men responsible for the defense of a *polis* should have some say in major decisions—even if only concerning peace and war.

The hoplite became the central arm in most of Greece and was the basis of the rise (and sometimes fall) of major powers. Pheidon of Argos (ca. 720–660?) may well have (temporarily) made Argos the leading power in the Peloponnese because of his early adoption of hoplite warfare. The hoplite was certainly the basis of Sparta's sixth-century domination of the Peloponnese and the creation of its Peloponnesian League.

The early part of this period saw several traditionally attested wars which are of doubtful existence and for which we have few details. These include the First Messenian War, the Lelantine War, and the First Sacred War. Whether they actually occurred or not, they seem to preserve an early tradition of wars fought over land. This would fit with the element of population-pressure present in some of the explanations for colonization, but also with the explanation of status and honor as a motive for conflict. Better attested conflicts are the Spartan conquest and subjugation of Messenia, and Spartan conflict with Argos and Tegea. In the second half of the sixth century, Sparta used its new-found power to suppress tyrannies in neighboring areas, including expelling the Peisistratids from Athens (511–510).

In the west, toward the end of the period, interstate conflict led to the destruction of several cities, including Siris (ca. 550, or possibly ca. 570), Camarina (ca. 550), and Sybaris (ca. 510). The battle of Alalia (ca. 540) demonstrates the pressure on Greek colonies in the west from Carthage and Etruria; in a continuation of this conflict, in 524 Cumae had to fight off an Etruscan invasion.

In the east, in the mid-sixth century Cyrus the Great of Persia conquered the Ionian Greeks, laying the seeds for the Persian Wars with mainland Greece. Cyprus fell to Persia ca. 525 and ca. 512 Darius I of Persia extended his control to Thrace and the Hellespont, including the Thracian Chersonese, causing the withdrawal of Athenian colonists from the area. At the same time as the Persian threat was increasing, the main conflict in Greece revolved around the internal Athenian conflict noted above which drew in first Sparta and then Boeotia and Chalcis. Athens fought off all these threats.

The failure of the Ionian Revolt (499–493) led to the two Persian invasions of Greece in 490 and 480–479. A minority of Greek states created the Hellenic League, uniting under overall Spartan leadership (although Athens made a major contribution in the naval sphere). The Greek land victories at Marathon (490) and Plataea (479) demonstrated the superiority of Greek heavy infantry over Persian infantry that ultimately ended with Alexander the Great's conquest of the Persian Empire (334–327). The Greek naval victory at Salamis (480), and the combined land and sea victory at Mycale (479), led to Athenian domination of the Aegean for the remainder of the fifth century. At the end of the Second Persian War, Athens was established as a new major power, setting the scene for the establishment of the Delian League/Athenian Empire and major conflict with Sparta.

Classical Period (ca. 480–323)

Conflict in the Classical Period is characterized by relative Greek unity at the start, followed by intense conflict between two major powers, Athens and Sparta, at the head of two major alliance systems—the Peloponnesian League and the Delian League/Athenian Empire. Following this, the fourth century saw Thebes and a variety of other states challenge, and ultimately overthrow, Spartan hegemony. The period ended with Macedonian hegemony over Greece and Alexander the Great's conquest of the entire Persian Empire. Internal conflict, often fueled by, or fueling, external conflict, centered around the struggle for power, sometimes manifested in the competing ideologies of democracy and oligarchy. A feature of internal conflict during this period, no doubt heavily influenced by the almost endless succession of wars, is the increasing brutality of *stasis* or civil strife, and a readiness to call in external powers to intervene in domestic dispute.

In a famous passage (Document 9), Thucydides describes the bloody *stasis* in Corcyra and general breakdown in morality and law and order in Greece—both of which he ascribes to the intensity and duration of the Second Peloponnesian War (431–404).

The situation at the start of the Classical Period looked promising for reducing conflict in Greece. The Persian threat to the mainland had been removed and the victory at Mycale had signaled the Greeks going onto the offensive. Post-invasion operations were carried out by the Hellenic League, with Athens and Sparta working together to remove Persian influence in Thrace and the Hellespont. Medizers (those cities and individuals who had gone over to the Persians) were punished in Boeotia and—less successfully—in Thessaly. Success in the northeast ultimately led to the Aegean islands and Greek cities in parts of Asia Minor regaining their independence from Persia.

However, the unity was short-lived—the Spartans were never comfortable campaigning far from home because of the persistent threat of Helot revolt (a continual internal source of conflict that explains much about Spartan society and history). This, coupled with allied resentment, and then mutiny, over the Spartan Pausanias' high-handed treatment of them led to Sparta withdrawing from the anti-Persian operations and leaving the task to Athens. Although Sparta was initially willing to let Athens take the lead, the resulting Spartan/Athenian divergence over time helped cause a deterioration in relations and two wars between them, including the very destructive Second Peloponnesian War at the end of the century.

To further anti-Persian operations, Athens created a maritime alliance system, the Delian League (478/7). Initially designed to exact revenge on the Persians, the League became in turn a mechanism for freeing Greek states from Persian control and then the source of increasing power for Athens. The stunning victory over Persia at Eurymedon (ca. 467/6) gave the League naval supremacy in the Aegean and significantly reduced the need to focus on Persia—Athens increasingly now looked at the League as a means of competing with Sparta's dominance on land and achieving power in Greece. Over time, states were forced to join, or remain in, the League and contributions for its military shifted from the provision of ships and men to money. Although the allies were often pleased to provide money instead of going to the effort of providing ships and men, this practice increased

Athens' military power while reducing that of her allies. They often only realized the implications of this when considering revolt. All revolts were suppressed—often swiftly and ruthlessly—and those attempting it were reduced to the status of subject members. This transformation of the Delian League into an Athenian Empire brought vast financial resources to Athens that, for the first time in the history of Greek conflict, enabled large fleets and armies to be kept on campaign for long periods. This was matched within Athens by the total dominance of the people and democratic politicians, although oligarchic sentiment among the upper classes was never too far below the surface.

Growing tension between Athens and Sparta was kept in check for a while by the Athenian Statesman, Cimon. His “yokefellow policy” envisaged Sparta and Athens working together as the major land and sea powers to protect Greece. This foundered in 462 with Sparta's premature dismissal of Athenian forces helping them suppress a Helot revolt (sometimes called the Third Messenian War) following an earthquake ca. 465/4.

From this point, tension between Athens and Sparta increased, resulting in the First Peloponnesian War (460/59–445). This pitted Sparta and the Peloponnesian League against Athens and the Delian League, although for much of the war there were no direct military engagements between Athens and Sparta themselves. Despite early successes, Athens overreached itself during the conflict with a disastrous expedition to assist the Egyptians to revolt from Persia. In 446/5, with both sides exhausted, the Thirty Years' Peace was signed.

However, relief from conflict was only temporary. Under Pericles, Athens spent the next 20 or so years rebuilding, and strengthening its grip on its allies. Eventually, the pressure on Sparta's allies, especially maritime ones like Corinth, and Spartan concern at the rise in Athenian power, led to war again in 431—despite attempts at arbitration. Thucydides argued (1.23) that Spartan fear of Athenian power was the underlying cause (or “truest explanation”) and that what most others took to be the causes (e.g., tension over Corcyra, the revolt of Potidaea, and the Megarian decrees) were in fact triggers, not the real cause. This analysis of cause was adopted by later historians such as Polybius, and remains an influential view today. But some would disagree with Thucydides, and see Sparta's fundamental grievance—over which it was willing to fight a costly and protracted war—as Athens'

failure to acknowledge Sparta's position of leadership in the Greek world. Questions of status were never far away in ancient Greece.

The Second Peloponnesian War (431–404) was the ancient Greek equivalent of a World War. Its length and intensity unsurprisingly caused immense loss of life, heightened internal conflict in many cities, led to the professionalization of many aspects of warfare, and destroyed the Athenian Empire. Although Athens made strenuous attempts to recreate its fifth-century position, it was never fully able to do so. After a relatively short period of Spartan domination, Greece slipped into a period where several states contested for hegemony, but none was powerful enough to maintain its dominance for long. The first attempt was the Corinthian War (395–387/6); this left Sparta somewhat weakened but still in control.

One of the driving reasons for this stage of Greek conflict was the Greek ideal of *autonomia* (from which we get the modern term “autonomy”). *Autonomia* is literally the freedom of a state or group to determine its own laws, but essentially meant the ability to determine one's own future without control by others. The fourth century arguably saw an increase in the tendency to take this to its logical conclusion—that true autonomy for a city, or a group of cities united in a league, lay in controlling everyone else so they were not a threat to one's own independence. Paradoxically, this meant that *autonomia* was an ideal taken by the population of many states or leagues to apply only to themselves and not the rest of Greece. In addition, if no state—or even league—was powerful enough to really achieve this ultimate form of *autonomia*, the outcome was continual conflict. This is exactly what occurred and a side effect of this was in the attempt by various states to break the deadlock by using Persian money and/or the threat of Persian intervention to support their attempts at hegemony.

Spartan domination was ended by defeat at the hands of a Theban-led Boeotia at the battle of Leuctra in 371. The subsequent independence of Messenia permanently ended Sparta's role as a dominant power, even in the Peloponnese—although it did remain an occasionally important player. Athens' attempt to recreate the Delian League with its Second Athenian Confederacy (378/7) ended with its loss of the Social War (357–355) against several of its key allies.

Meanwhile, in Macedonia, King Philip II had fought off numerous attacks, allowing him to first rebuild and then expand Macedonian power. Over several years he extended control over the Chalcidice, the Thracian

Chersonese, and Thessaly. Interstate conflict in central and southern Greece afforded Philip the opportunity to intervene in the Third and Fourth Sacred Wars (356–346 and 340–338) and to use Macedon's superior resources and military power to establish hegemony over Greece. He achieved this with his decisive victory in the land battle of Chaeronea (338). Philip was assassinated by another Macedonian in 336 and succeeded by his son, Alexander the Great. Alexander first reestablished control, destroying the recalcitrant city of Thebes in the process, and then fulfilled a long-held panhellenic dream—the conquest of Persia.

The end of the Classical Period saw Greece for the most part united under Macedon, and Macedonian/Greek control over the old enemy, Persia. However, the death of Alexander in 323 saw the fragmentation of his empire and a whole new era of conflict between his Successors (the *diadochoi*). In the west, the conflict between local Greek cities and Carthage centered on Sicily had continued. Timoleon's stunning victory over Carthage at the Crimisus River (341) kept things quiet for a while, but the Carthaginian and Greek struggle for supremacy on Sicily remained a continual source of conflict until the Roman conquest.

While internal conflict in Greece always had specific local causes, in the fifth century it had often revolved around factions supporting Athens or Sparta, frequently with a democratic versus oligarchic ideological overlay. In the fourth century, internal conflict initially tended to revolve around pro- and anti-Spartan camps but later tended to revolve around pro- and anti-Macedonian parties.

In terms of military developments, the professionalization noted during the Second Peloponnesian War continued. Many states created standing forces of hoplites, paid for at public expense. These *epilektoi* ("chosen ones") formed the core of many armies and this helps explain why Sparta no longer had such a qualitative edge over its opponents. This, and new tactics, helped Thebes defeat Sparta in 371 and 362, but developments reached their peak under Philip and Alexander. Philip created a true combined arms army, based on the combination of an essentially professional infantry phalanx (see second illustration in Phalanx entry) equipped with *sarissae*—spears longer than the traditional hoplite weapon—and a very high quality cavalry arm. This enabled the conquest of Persia and remained a potent system until the Roman conquest in the second and first centuries. In the naval sphere, the tendency was to replace the trireme with larger ships and

to focus less on naval maneuver and more on the less technically demanding tactic of boarding (although the latter was more costly in human life for the victor).

Hellenistic Period (323–30)

The temporary unity imposed by force of Macedonian arms rapidly disintegrated on the death of Alexander the Great in 323. Attempts to preserve his dynasty, and his empire, quickly failed in the face of the ambition of his senior commanders. The wars of the Successors (*diadochoi*) dominate the first part of the Hellenistic Period, and ongoing conflict between the kingdoms they established continued to be important down to the first century. The other feature of this period is the conflict between Italian and Sicilian Greek cities and Rome and Carthage. Wars between the Sicilian Greeks and Carthage eventually brought Rome into Sicily, ultimately into Greece proper, and then into the Greek east. External conflict was largely ended by the Roman annexation of Sicily, Greece, and the Greek east and the imposition of *pax romana*. In addition to the usual local causes, broadly speaking internal conflict in this period initially tended to center around pro- and anti-Macedonian camps, then between the supporters of the various *diadochoi*, and finally around pro-and anti-Roman camps.

Conflict in Greece and the Greek east largely revolved around the *diadochoi*. The key initial players were Ptolemy (later Ptolemy I Soter) who established the Ptolemaic dynasty based in Egypt, Seleucus (later Seleucus I Nicator) who established the Seleucid dynasty based in Syria, and Antigonus and his son Demetrius (later Antigonus I Monophthalmus and Demetrius I Poliorcetes) who established the Antigonid dynasty, based on Macedonia and Asia Minor. Others of temporary importance (usually ended by their death in war) included Cassander, Lysimachus, and Eumenes of Cardia.

Once the situation had stabilized with the creation of the three main successor kingdoms based in Macedonia, Syria, and Egypt, these settled into a fairly regular pattern of conflict. Seleucid Syria and Ptolemaic Egypt, for example, fought six wars, predominantly over control of the region of Coele-Syria. In Greece itself, the Ptolemies in particular, but also the Seleucids, initially fomented unrest to destabilize Antigonus I

Monophthalmus and his successors. As a result, local conflicts soon re-emerged in Greece proper.

A decline in mainland Macedonian power for a time allowed the emergence of leagues whose combined military power far exceeded that of individual city-states in the Classical Period. The Aetolian and Achaean Leagues, for example, contested for power, generally against Macedon but occasionally with its assistance. The Achaean League became one of the leading powers in Greece for almost 150 years from the collapse of Demetrius I Poliorcetes' power in Greece ca. 288. It maintained its position by a mixture of military force and careful diplomacy—including supporting the Romans during the Second Macedonian War (200–196)—until it miscalculated and went to war with Rome in 146 (the Achaean War). The resulting short campaign ended with the sack of Corinth and the incorporation of Achaea into the Roman Empire.

The Aetolian League had a similar fate, although somewhat earlier. After some successes, the Aetolians were eventually curbed by Philip V of Macedon in the Social War (220–217). The Aetolians responded by joining Rome against Philip in the First Macedonian War (215–205). Despite doing most of Rome's fighting by proxy, the League was left empty-handed at the end of this war and its lukewarm support for Rome in the Second Macedonian War (200–196) meant that most of its post-war demands for how Rome should treat the defeated Macedon were ignored. As a result, to counter Roman influence a disgruntled Aetolia invited Antiochus II the Great, the Seleucid monarch, to invade Greece in 192. This led both to Rome's first direct involvement in the Hellenistic near east and the effective destruction of the Aetolian League's power. It became a subject ally of Rome in 189.

Rome had by now well and truly occupied the place Persia had held in the Classical Period—serving initially as the big external threat and ally that Greeks could use against their enemies. The difference was that Rome possessed real military power and from its involvement in the First Macedonian War (caused by Philip V of Macedon's alliance with Hannibal against Rome during the Second Punic War) it steadily became an increasingly important influence in Greek conflict. Rome gradually annexed Greece proper, culminating with the absorption of Macedon, Thessaly, and Epirus in 148 at the end of the Fourth Macedonian War (150–148) and then of Achaea in 146. A similar process was followed in the Greek east.

However, Rome was not the only external threat—in 279 Greece was invaded by Celts (Gauls, later called Galatians). After considerable devastation, by 277 the Greeks (largely the Aetolian League and then Antigonos II Gonatas of Macedon) eventually repelled the incursion. The Gauls, however, crossed into Asia Minor where they settled Galatia. They caused considerable local disruption, both in their own right and by serving as mercenaries for various regional dynasts, until the Romans conquered them after the battle of Magnesia (190).

But Rome remained the major threat. When Antiochus III was invited to Greece to counter Rome, his invasion force was rapidly defeated (in 191) and the Romans crossed over into Asia Minor to finish the task. Roman victory at the battle of Magnesia (190) and the resulting treaty of Apamea (188) seriously reduced Seleucid power and Rome quickly became the arbiter between the Ptolemaic and Seleucid kingdoms, often protecting Egypt from Seleucid pressure. In 133 Attalus of Pergamum died and bequeathed his kingdom to Rome, which established its first territorial foothold in the east—the province of Asia. Tigranes I of Armenia took over Syria in 83 but lost it to Rome in 69. A series of wars with Mithridates VI Eupator of Pontus (88–85, 83–82, and 74–63) also led to further Roman acquisitions. In 48 Caesar became involved in the civil war between Cleopatra VII and Ptolemy XIII in Egypt and the process was completed in 31–30 when Octavian defeated Mark Antony and Cleopatra VII at Actium and then annexed Egypt—the last of the monarchies established by the Successors of Alexander.

In the west, internal and external conflict produced a series of tyrants, such as Agathocles, particularly in Syracuse, and the continuation of an ongoing series of wars with Carthage (409–367 and 345–275). The continual struggle with Carthage eventually embroiled Sicily in the First Punic War (264–241) and then the Second Punic War (218–201) at the end of which Sicily was annexed as a Roman province.

The Hellenistic Period saw several military developments. Naval warfare, against the backdrop of a continued trend toward bigger warships, often now mounted with catapults, saw the development of lighter warships, especially the *lembos*, used for raiding the coasts and interfering with merchant shipping.

On land, there were no major new reforms, but the Macedonian-style phalanx was generally adopted across Greece. The infantry phalanx was the

dominant arm as few of the successor kingdoms were able to employ cavalry to the same deadly effect as Philip and Alexander of Macedon had. This was partly because in the east local arms and troop types were adopted—for example, chariots, archers, light cavalry, and elephants, so the Successor armies gradually took on a more eastern character. The Macedonian-style phalanx was conclusively demonstrated to be inferior to the Roman legion during the Third Macedonian War (171–168). At the hard-fought battle of Pydna (168), the phalanx was unable to succeed against the more mobile and flexible Roman maniples.

Reader Information and Abbreviations

Entries

The body of an entry is followed by two sections. “See also” directs the readers to associated entries which either provide background context or additional detail on the main topic, or to separate entries on individuals, places or events, mentioned in the entry. Where there is no possibility of confusion, the headwords in the “See also” may be abbreviated—for example, just “Archers” rather than the full “Archers (*Toxotai*)” or “Marathon, Battle of” rather than “Marathon, Battle of (480).” However, where there were two wars or battles of the same name, to aid the reader the dates are always supplied in the “See also” headword. Most of the cross references are to other entries in the Greek half of this work; where they are to the Roman section of this Encyclopedia it is clearly indicated.

“Further Reading” directs the reader to additional reading on the topic. The first part of this (if appropriate) lists the relevant ancient sources. These supply the main references for the topic, and the evidence to support any statements made in the body of the entry. (Direct quotations and paraphrased statements from an ancient author are generally given a reference at the relevant point in the body of the entry.)

The ancient works are in chronological order, which means that the source closest in time to the topic, which is usually the most useful, is listed first. However, this is not always the case; for example, Arrian is generally regarded as a better source for Alexander the Great, but as he was later than the other two main sources, Diodorus Siculus and Curtius Rufus, he is not the first listed.

The ancient references follow the standard book/chapter/section system, which is more precise than a page number in a translation and allows the

reader to check any available version of the text. Prose works, such as histories or biographies, were divided in antiquity into books, chapters, and sometimes also sections. However, in some cases short works are just divided into chapter and sections or even just chapters. For example, “Thucydides 2.27.15” or “Xenophon, *Hellenica* 4.5.12–17” mean, respectively, “Thucydides Book 2, chapter 27, section 15” and “Xenophon, *Hellenica* Book 4, chapter 5, sections 12–17.” References to poetry or drama are by line number, so “Aristophanes, *Frogs* 1123–1130” indicates “Aristophanes, *Frogs*, lines 1123–1130.”

References to ancient speeches can be by number of the speech or its title, plus the section. To avoid confusion, in this work we have listed speeches by both number and title. So, for example “Isocrates 6 (*Archidamus*) 27” indicates Isocrates’ speech number 6 titled *Archidamus*, section 27. The speech numbers are from the traditional numbering system, and unfortunately some speeches are numbered differently in other systems. So, if you are chasing up a translation and in any doubt, we suggest focusing on the title.

In the ancient source section of the “Further Reading” the authors are separated by “;”, with internal separation within an author, or between works by the same author, indicated by “.” So, “Herodotus 1.21, 23, 5.16; Thucydides 2.27, 31, 5.19; Plutarch, *Agessilaus* 12, *Pericles* 21–27” indicates “Herodotus Book 1 chapter 21 and chapter 23, Book 5 chapter 16; Thucydides Book 2 chapter 27 and chapter 31, Book 5 chapter 19; Plutarch, *Agessilaus* chapter 12 and Plutarch, *Pericles* chapters 21–27.”

The list of ancient references is followed by modern works. These are listed alphabetically and concentrate on the most important and accessible English-language works on the topic. Non-English works are only listed where they are the most important work on the topic and/or there is no appropriate English-language work on the topic.

Greek Words and Names—Pronunciation and Spelling

There is no one correct way to pronounce Greek names. Pronunciation is generally a compromise between attempting to pronounce it as an ancient Greek would have and coming up with an anglicized version which is a bit easier. The main rules to remember are that all vowels are pronounced (so, for example, Perikles = “Periklees”), and that generally C, CH, and G are

pronounced “hard” (as in “come,” “Murdoch” and “go”), but that it is conventional to pronounce TH like English “th” (as in “thing”) and PH like the English “f” (as in “photo”), although in reality both these pronunciations were only adopted in late antiquity.

There are several ways of rendering Greek words and names. One method is to anglicize the word or name, usually by dropping its ending (e.g., Athens, Corinth, Peloponnese). The tendency for the past 50 or so years has been to use a simple transliteration of the original Greek. Prior to that, and still in common use, the practice was to render Greek words and names into English using their latinized form. For example, Greek has no letter “c” and uses “ai” where Latin has “ae.” The Latin endings for many names are “us,” “o,” or “um” while the equivalent Greek endings are “os,” “o-n,” and “on.” This means that the transliterated and latinized systems have differences, sometimes significant. Examples are: “Alkibiades” and “Alcibiades”; “Peisistratidai” and “Peisistratidae”; “Parmenion” and “Parmenio”; “Hipparkhos” and “Hipparchus”; and “Kounaxa” and “Cunaxa.”

For names, the traditional system is generally the most familiar to the general reader and a strict system of transliteration can produce some very unfamiliar looking forms (e.g., “Aiskhylos,” “Akhilleus,” and “Ploutarkhos” for the more familiar “Aeschylus,” “Achilles,” and “Plutarch”). This work therefore uses the traditional Latinized system for names.

For Greek terms that are likely to be new or less familiar to the reader, we have generally used the transliterated system (e.g., *ekdromos* not *ecdromus* for a soldier who runs out from a battle line). In the text, transliterated Greek words (except for proper names) are denoted by italics. However, even this can occasionally appear inconsistent to the non-Greek speaker. For example, the Greek term for a “hoplite” or heavy infantryman is *hoplites*, which looks the same as the English plural of hoplite. (The Greek plural is *hoplitai*.)

The main practical effect for the reader is that if you are looking up a Greek name you have come across elsewhere which starts with “K” (e.g., “Kleon”) you will find it under “C” (e.g., “Cleon”). In most other cases it should be reasonably apparent that, for example, “Hiero” and “Hieron,” refer to the same man, as do “Dionysius” and “Dionysios,” and “Antigonus” and “Antigonos.” However, the table titled “Spelling of Greek Names” will provide further assistance to the reader in this area.

English Spelling

Thermopylae

Aristides

Boeotia

Delphi

Chrysippus

Barnes

Thucydides

Thronion

Cleisthenes

Pericles

Alexandros

Athenae

Korinthos

Peloponnesos

Spelling of Greek Names

Dates and Dating

All dates in the entries in the Greek section are BCE (Before the Common Era) unless otherwise indicated as CE (Common Era). This is a relatively new system, replacing the traditional BC (Before Christ) and AD (*Anno Domini*, “[in the] Year of our Lord”). In terms of the dating, “BCE” exactly equates to “BC” and “CE” to “AD.” Although becoming more widespread, the new system has not been universally accepted by ancient historians. This means that many of the titles of works in the “Further Reading” listed for the entries and in the Bibliography use the earlier BC/AD system.

Dating is a perennial problem in ancient Greek history, and in general the earlier the date the less secure it is. This is because of the lack of detailed record keeping and the fact that different cities used different calendars. The lunar cycle was used in ancient Greece, which from time to time required omitting dates—or adding extra dates—to bring it into line with the solar cycle. With some exceptions, unless for example linked to an eclipse or some other absolutely datable occurrence, it is almost always very difficult to establish an exact date for a specific event. Often the best achievable is a season (or sometimes month) and year (e.g., “summer 418”).

This is compounded by the different local dating systems. Although

some commonality could be achieved by dating using Olympic years, most states used a system based on a particular office holder, or the year in a monarch's reign. The latter was presumably used at Sparta from early times and it became more widespread in the Hellenistic Period with the proliferation of monarchies after Alexander the Great.

In Athens, for example, the year was dated by the name of the chief *archon* or magistrate, sometimes referred to by historians as the "eponymous *archon*" (i.e., the magistrate who gave his name to the year). So, an event could be described as occurring "in the year of Chares" or "the year of Philocrates." However, the official year often did not coincide with the calendar year—at Athens it began in the month Hekatombaion (usually mid-summer) and ended in Skirophorion the following year. This means that an archon-year date in an ancient Greek source could indicate a date in either of two years in our modern system. These dates are traditionally given in the following form: 480/79 or 432/1 and this is the system used in the Greek section of this work. Where a date is given as 480–79 or 432–28, this indicates a span of time.

Ancient Greek history is traditionally divided into several broad periods. Agreement is not universal on their dates as start and end points are approximate, but they are useful shorthand aids to broad dating. Noting that in most cases start and end dates are approximate only, the following apply in this work:

Mycenaean Period:	ca. 1600–1100
Dark Age:	ca. 1100–700
Archaic Period:	ca. 700–480
Classical Period:	ca. 480–323
Hellenistic Period:	323–30

Greek history prior to the Dark Age is also commonly called the "Bronze Age" and further divided into Early, Middle, and Late Bronze Age, with subdivisions in each of these categories. However, these vary from region to region (e.g., mainland Greece, the Cyclades, and Crete) and are relative chronologies (i.e., they show a sequence but not fixed or absolute dates)—often based on pottery.

The broader terms Early, Middle, and Late Bronze Age are occasionally used in the entries and for mainland Greece they are roughly as follows:

Early Bronze Age:	ca. 3200–2000
Middle Bronze Age:	ca. 2000–1600
Late Bronze Age:	ca. 1600–1100 (equates to the ‘Mycenaean Period’ used in this Encyclopedia)

Another term readers might encounter is the “Early Iron Age”—this equates to the “Dark Age” used in this Encyclopedia (ca. 1100–700).

Hellenistic Rulers

In ancient Greece an epithet or nickname was frequently used to distinguish between monarchs of the same name. This was necessary as some dynasties (as some monarchies do today) used a limited range of names. As in more modern times, a numbering system was also used. Confusingly, the monarchs of Hellenistic Greece can be referred to by either system, and this can be compounded when an epithet such as “Euergetes” is given in translation—in this case “Benefactor.” So, the third king in the Ptolemaic dynasty of Egypt can appear as “Ptolemy III,” “Ptolemy Euergetes,” or “Ptolemy the Benefactor.” To avoid confusion, the Greek section of this Encyclopedia uses both number and epithet for Hellenistic monarchs, so Ptolemy in the above example appears as “Ptolemy III Euergetes.” There is a further issue with the first member, or sometimes the first two members, of those dynasties created by the *diadochoi*, or Alexander the Great’s Successors. The first of these proclaimed themselves kings in ca. 306/5—before that they were simply known by name or by name and epithet. To avoid confusion this Encyclopedia refers to the first generation of kings, the Antigonids Antigonus I Monophthalmus and Demetrius I Poliorcetes and the founders of the Seleucid and Ptolemaic dynasties, Seleucus I Nicator and Ptolemy I Soter, by their full royal title even for the period before they crowned themselves.

Measurements

Individual Greek states used different measurement systems, which sometimes makes accurate conversions difficult. Where measurements in

the entries appear as both imperial and metric, the figure in brackets is often rounded to the nearest whole number.

Abbreviations

The following abbreviations are used in the entries in the Greek section of this Encyclopedia.

-
- Aelian**, *Tactics* (*On the Military Arrangements of the Greeks*)
- Aeneas Tacticus**, *On Sieges*
- Appian**, *Roman History* (NB in some editions/translations, Book 9 is referred to as the *Macedonian Wars*, Book 11 as the *Syrian Wars*, and Book 12 the *Mithridatic Wars*)
- Arrian**, *Anabasis/Indica* (NB *Indica* is Book 8, but in some editions/translations appears as a separate work)
- Arrian**, *After Alexander/History of the Successors*: Goralski, Walter J. 1989. "Arrian's Events after Alexander: Summary of Photius and Selected Fragments." *Ancient World* 19: 81–108 (with translation)
- Athenaeus**, *Deipnosophistae* (*Sophists at Dinner*)
- Compare**
- Curtius Rufus**, *History of Alexander*
- Died**
- Dio Cassius**, *Roman History*
- Diodorus Siculus**, *Library of History*
- Diogenes Laertius**, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*
- editor(s)/edited/edition**
- Fragment**
- Fragments**
- Jacoby, Felix et al. ed. 1923–. *Fragmente der griechischen Historiker*. Berlin; Leiden: Brill**
- Frontinus**, *Stratagems*
- Meiggs, Russell, and David M. Lewis. 1969. *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions to the End of the Fifth Century B.C.* Oxford: Clarendon Press**
- Harding, Philip. 1985. *From the End of the Peloponnesian War to the Battle of Ipsus*. Translated Documents of Greece and Rome, 2.**

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

~~Hellenica~~ *Oxyrhynchia* (Oxyrhynchus Historian, *Hellenica*)

Herodotus, *Histories*

~~Inscriptiones Graecae~~

Die Inschriften von Olympia (Dittenberger, Wilhelm, and Karl Purgold.

1896. *Die Inschriften von Olympia*. Berlin: Asher)

Justin, *Epitome of The Philippic History of Pompeius Trogus*
literally

Livy, *History of Rome*

~~Orientis Graeci Inscriptiones Selectae~~ (Dittenberger, Wilhelm. 1903–1905,
Orientis Graeci Inscriptiones Selectae. 2 vols. Leipzig: S. Hirzel)

Pausanias, *Description of Greece* (or *Guide to Greece*)

~~Plural~~

Polyaenus, *Strategemata* (*Stratagems*)

Polybius, *History*

~~Pseudea Xenophoni~~ *Athenaion Politeia* (*Constitution of Athens*, incorrectly
ascribed to Xenophon; also called the “Old Oligarch”)

Quotable Quotes: Greeks on War (Appendix)

~~Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum~~ (Various editors. 1923–present.)

~~Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum~~ (Dittenberger, Wilhelm. ed. 1915–1924.

Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum, 3rd ed., edited by Friedrich Hiller
von Gaertringen, Johannes Kirchner, Hans Rudolf Pomtow, and Erich
Ziebarth. 4 vols. Leipzig: S. Hirzel)

~~Singular~~

Strabo, *Geography*

Thucydides, *Peloponnesian War*

translator(s)/translated

Chronology of Conflict in Ancient Greece

The following chronology lists major events in Greek military conflict. An asterisk (*) is used to mark the names of people and events with entries in the body of the work. Names of places which have an entry are *not* asterisked. In the entries, battles are listed alphabetically under the name of the battle, not under “battle” (e.g., “Marathon, Battle of”). Series of wars are listed by the name of the war not by the number (e.g., “Messenian War, First”). All dates in the chronology are BC/BCE.

ca. 745	Greek migrations overseas; a major wave of colonization begins
ca. 736–716	*First Messenian War (traditional date)
ca. 700	*Lelantine War (traditional date)
ca. 669	*Battle of Hysiae between Argos and Sparta
ca. 660	First recorded major Greek sea battle, between Corinth and Corcyra (*Corcyra and Corinth, Sea-Battle)
ca. 650–630	*Second Messenian War (traditional date)
ca. 632	Cylon’s unsuccessful coup at Athens
ca. 595–590	*First Sacred War (traditional date)
ca. 570	Egypt gains control of Cyprus War between Sparta and Tegea (*Sparta, Attack on Tegea [Fetters, Battle of])
ca. 561/60	First tyranny of *Peisistratus (Athens)

ca. 559–556	*Miltiades I establishes Athenian control in the Thracian Chersonese (Gallipoli Peninsula)
ca. 556/5	*Peisistratus' tyranny ended, followed by his second (short-lived) tyranny
ca. 550	Croton, Metapontum, and Sybaris together destroy Siris (possibly ca. 570)
ca. 547	Syracuse destroys Camarina *Battle of the Champions between Argos and Sparta Lydia incorporated into the *Persian (Achaemenid) Empire
ca. 546	*Cyrus the II of Persia conquers the Ionian Greeks
ca. 545	Third tyranny of *Peisistratus (Athens)
ca. 540	*Battle of Alalia (Corsica), between Carthage, Etruria, Phocaea, and Massilia
528/7	Death of *Peisistratus
ca. 525	Persia gains control of Cyprus and Cyrene
524	Cumae defeats Etruscan invaders
ca. 519	Athens assists Plataea against Thebes (*Athens, External Conflicts [519–506])
ca. 512	*Darius I of Persia conquers Thrace and the Hellespont
511–510	Spartan expeditions against the *Peisistratidae of Athens (*Athens, External Conflicts [519–506])
ca. 510	Croton destroys Sybaris
508/7	Athenian power struggle between *Cleisthenes and Isagoras (*Athens, External Conflicts [519–506])
ca. 506	Reforms of *Cleisthenes at Athens;

	conflict with Sparta, Thebes and Chalcis (*Athens, External Conflicts [519–506])
ca. 505	Aristodemus, tyrant of Cumae, defeats Etruscans at Aricia
ca. 500	Persian expedition fails to take Naxos *War between Athens and Aegina (intermittently fought down to 457)
499–493	*Ionian Revolt against Persia
494	*Battle of Lade between Ionians and Persians Sack of Miletus (*Miletus, Siege of) *Battle of Sepeia between Sparta and Argos
493	*Ionian Revolt ends in failure
492	Persia establishes control over Thrace, Thasos, and Macedon
491	Persian embassies demand the submission of Greek states (*Persian Wars) *Gelon becomes tyrant of Gela (Sicily)
490	Persia invades Greece by sea (*Persian Wars) Siege and destruction of Eretria Persians defeated at the *battle of Marathon
ca. 489	*Miltiades II leads Athenian naval expedition to the Cyclades, but dies from wounds received at Paros
487	Egypt revolts against Persia
486	*Darius I of Persia dies and is succeeded by *Xerxes I
485	*Gelon becomes tyrant of Syracuse
484	Babylon revolts against Persia
ca. 483	Athens expands navy. Persians prepare to invade Greece

482	* Aristides ostracized
481	Greeks meet at the Isthmus of Corinth to discuss resistance to Persia (*Hellenic League [against Persians], *Persian Wars)
480	*Persian War: Persia invades Greece *Battle of Thermopylae (Greek loss) *Battle of Artemisium (draw) Persians sack Athens Greeks defeat Persian navy at the *battle of Salamis Carthage invades Sicily (*Carthaginian War, First)
479	Greeks defeat Persians at the *battle of Plataea Greeks defeat Persians at the *battle of Mycale
479/8	Rebuilding of Athens' city walls
478	Combined Greek expedition against Persians in Cyprus and Byzantium
478/7	Foundation of the *Delian League
476/5	*Pausanias (son of Cleombrotus) recalled to Sparta in disgrace *Cimon leads the Greek campaign against Persians in Thrace
474	*Hieron I and Cumae defeat Etruscans in a naval battle off Cumae
ca. 471	*Themistocles ostracized
ca. 470–469	War between Sparta and Argos
ca. 468/7	*Delian League crushes revolt of Naxos (*Athens, Revolts of Allies)
ca. 467/6	Athenian land/naval victory over Persia at *Eurymedon
ca. 465	Thasos revolts from *Delian League and is besieged Destruction of Athenian colonizing expedition at Drabescus in Thrace

	(near Amphipolis)
ca. 465–456	*Third Messenian War
ca. 465/4	Earthquake at Sparta, *Helots revolt, siege of Ithôme (*Third Messenian War)
ca. 463/2	Thasos surrenders to *Delian League Egypt revolts against Persia (perhaps on death of Xerxes, 465)
462	Athenian force under *Cimon helping Sparta against *Helots is sent home early (*Third Messenian War) Constitutional reforms of Ephialtes (Athens)
ca. 462/1	Athens allies with Argos and Thessaly
461	Ostracism of *Cimon and murder of Ephialtes in Athens
ca. 460	Death of *Themistocles
460	Athens sends force to help Egypt (*Athens, intervention in Egypt) Death of Themistocles Athens allies with Megara and builds Long Walls there
460/59–445	*Peloponnesian War, First
459	Athenian/Delian League fleet captures Memphis (Egypt)
459/8	Corinth and Epidaurus defeat Athens at Halieis Athens defeats Peloponnesian fleet at Cecryphalea Aegina joins in the war against Athens
458	*First Peloponnesian War continues: Athens blockades Aegina by land and sea *Battle of Megara
458/7	Athenian alliance with Segesta (Sicily)

457	<p>*Long Walls built at Athens</p> <p>Sparta intervenes against Phocians, re-establishes *Boeotian League</p> <p>*Peloponnesian League defeats Athens at the *battle of Tanagra</p> <p>Athens defeats *Boeotian League at the *battle of Oenophyta</p>
457/6	<p>Aegina surrenders to Athens, enrolled in *Delian League</p> <p>Athens acquires Troezen?</p>
456	<p>*Tolmides ravages Peloponnesian coast, burns Spartan dockyards, captures Chalcis in Aetolia, defeats Sicyon</p> <p>*Delian League force in Egypt trapped (*Athens, Intervention in Egypt)</p>
455	<p>*Pericles' campaign in Corinthian Gulf</p> <p>Achaea allies with Athens</p>
454	<p>*Delian League force in Egypt surrenders</p> <p>Treasury of the Delian League moved to Athens for safety</p>
454/3	<p>Athens helps Phocis gain control of Delphi</p>
451	<p>Five Years' Truce between Athens and Peloponnesians</p> <p>Thirty Years' Peace between Sparta and Argos</p>
ca. 450	<p>Athenian cleruchies on Naxos, Andros, and possibly Carystus</p>
450–449	<p>*Cimon leads naval expedition to Cyprus, defeats a Persian fleet, but dies from illness; Athens defeats Persians on land and sea near Salamis in Cyprus (*Athens, Expedition to</p>

	Cyprus)
449/8	*Peace of Callias
448	Sparta frees Delphi from Phocian control (*Sacred War, Second)
	Athenian alliances with Leontini and Rhegium?
447	*Boeotian League defeats Athens at the *battle of Coronea
	Athens restores Phocian control over Delphi
447	Pericles intervenes in the Chersonese, settles cleruchs
	Athenian cleruchies on Imbros and Lemnos?
446	Peloponnesians invade Attica (*Peloponnesian War, First)
	Euboea and Megara revolt against Athens; Euboea regained by *Pericles, Megara remains free
446/5	Thirty Years' Peace between Athens and Peloponnesians; end of *First Peloponnesian War
445	Athenian cleruchies on Euboea and at Brea (Thrace)
441/40	War between Samos and Miletus over Priene (Ionia); Milesians appeal to Athens, which orders Samos to stop fighting; Samos revolts
440	*Siege of Samos
	Byzantium revolts against Athens
439	Samos and Byzantium surrender
437/6	Foundation of Amphipolis
	*Phormio leads expedition to Corinthian Gulf and Ambracia
	*Pericles' expedition to the Black Sea
435	Conflict between Corinth and Corcyra (*Corcyra, Conflict with

	Epidamnus and Corinth)
	Corcyra defeats Corinth at the *battle of Leucimme
433	Athens allies with Corcyra
	*Battle of Sybota
433/2	Athens renews treaties with Leontini (Sicily) and Rhegium (Italy)
432–429	*Siege of Potidaea
432	“Megarian decree,” restricting Megarian access to Athenian markets
432/1	Peloponnesian League conferences at Sparta decide in favor of war
431–404	*Peloponnesian War, Second
431–421	*Peloponnesian War: Archidamian War
431	Theban attack on Plataea
	First Peloponnesian invasion of Attica
430	Second Peloponnesian invasion of Attica
	Plague at Athens
	*Pericles fined after failed attack on Epidaurus
	*Phormio at Naupactus
	Surrender of Potidaea
429–427	*Siege of Plataea
429	*Pericles dies
	Athens loses *battle of Spartolus (Chalcidice)
	*Phormio’s naval victories, Corinthian Gulf
428	Third Peloponnesian invasion of Attica. Revolt of Mytilene against Athens
428–427	Revolt and *siege of Mytilene
427	Fourth Peloponnesian invasion of Attica
	Fall of Mytilene to Athens and

	Plataea to Peloponnesians
	<i>Stasis</i> at Corcyra (*Corcyra, <i>Stasis</i> at)
	Athenian expedition to Sicily under Laches
426	*Demosthenes campaigns in northwest Greece: Athens wins *battle of Olpae *Demosthenes loses to Aetolians at Aegyrium
425	Fifth Peloponnesian invasion of Attica *Battle of Pylos (Sphacteria), capture of 292 Spartans *Delian League tribute rates reassessed
425	Corcyraean democrats massacre oligarchs
424–422	*Amphipolis campaign
424	Boeotian League defeats Athens at the *battle of Delium *Brasidas captures Amphipolis and Torone (Chalcidice) *Thucydides (the historian) exiled Congress at Gela removes Athenian excuse for action in Sicily
423	One-year armistice between Athens and Sparta
422	Battle of Amphipolis: *Cleon and *Brasidas killed Peace negotiations between Athens and Sparta
421	Peace of Nicias between Athens and Sparta; Corinth and Thebes refuse to sign; 50-year alliance between Athens and Sparta begins
421/20	Sparta and Boeotia ally
420	Alliance between Athens, Argos,

	Mantineia, and Elis
418	*Battle of Mantineia (Spartan victory over Argive coalition) Oligarchy established at Argos, 50-year alliance with Sparta
417	Alliance between Athens and Argos renewed
416/5	Athens besieges Melos, kills adult males, enslaves women and children
415–413	*Sicilian expedition
415	*Alcibiades flees to Sparta
413	Athenian force in Sicily destroyed Spartans invade Attica, seize and fortify Decelea
413–404	*Peloponnesian War: Decelean War
412	Revolts against Athens at Chios, Erythrae, Clazomenae, Miletus, Lebedus, Erae, and Lesbos; Teos forced to defect Mytilene (Lesbos) recaptured Democratic coup in Samos backed by Athens
412/11	Sparta secures Persian assistance against Athens. Cyme and Phocaea defect to the Peloponnesian side; Clazomenae refuses to accept Spartan orders; Cnidus revolts against Athens Athens besieges Chios
411	Oligarchy of the Four Hundred at Athens, succeeded by broader oligarchy of Five Thousand (*Athens, Oligarchic Movements) Athenian army and fleet at Samos remain democratic Revolts against Athens at Rhodes, Abydus, Lampsacus, Byzantium Revolt of Euboea

	*Alcibiades recalled and elected general
	Athenian naval victories at Cynossema and Abydos
411/10	*Evagoras regains Cyprus from the Phoenicians
410	Athenian naval victory at battle of Cyzicus
	Full democracy restored at Athens
	Athens refuses Spartan offers of peace
	War between Segesta and Selinus (Sicily); Segesta appeals to Carthage
409–367	*Carthaginian Wars (409–367) (Sicily)
409	Carthaginian expedition to Sicily destroys Selinus and Himera
	Athenian naval victory at Abydos
408	Athens recovers Byzantium
407	*Alcibiades returns to Athens
406	Athenian naval defeat at the *battle of Notium
	*Alcibiades exiled again
	Athenian naval victory at the *battle of Arginusae
	Carthaginians capture and raze Acragas
406/5	*Dionysius I seizes Syracuse, beaten by Carthaginians (Gela)
405	*Battle of Aegospotami, Athenian navy destroyed
	Carthaginians capture Gela and Camarina
	Dionysius I makes peace with Carthage
405–404	Siege of Athens by Peloponnesians
404/3	Athens surrenders to Sparta, ending the Peloponnesian War
	Athens' *Long Walls demolished

	<p>“Thirty Tyrants” take power at Athens (*Athens, Oligarchic Movements)</p> <p>*Alcibiades murdered</p> <p>Athenian democratic exiles seize Phyle and Piraeus; Athenian democrats defeat oligarchs at Munychia (*Athens, Restoration of Democracy)</p>
403	Restoration of democracy at Athens (*Athens, Restoration of Democracy)
402	War between Sparta and Elis
401	<p>*Battle of Cunaxa, death of *Cyrus the Younger</p> <p>*March of the Ten Thousand</p>
400/399	<p>Sparta sends *Thibron to fight against *Tissaphernes in Asia Minor</p> <p>Sparta ravages Elis</p>
398	<p>Spartan *Dercylidas campaigns in Asia Minor</p> <p>*Dionysius I of Syracuse captures Motya, starting a war between Syracuse and Carthage (*Carthaginian Wars [409–367])</p>
397	Carthaginians recapture Motya, defeat Syracusan fleet
396	<p>Spartan king *Agesilaus II campaigns in Asia Minor</p> <p>Carthaginians besiege Syracuse</p> <p>Plague in Carthaginian army; *Dionysius I wins naval and land victories</p>
395–387/6	*Corinthian War
395	<p>*Battle of Haliartus, *Lysander killed; widespread anti-Spartan alliance</p> <p>*Agesilaus II attacks Sardis and Phrygia</p>

394	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> *Agesilaus II recalled to Sparta *Battle of Cnidus, Spartan naval power ended *Battle of Nemea *Battle of Coronea
ca. 393	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Athens begins to rebuild *Long Walls Athens recovers Lemnos, Imbros, Scyros; allies with Chios
392	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Union of Corinth and Argos Death of *Conon *Dionysius I and Sicels defeat Carthaginians
391	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> *Thibron's success and then defeat in Asia Minor *Agesilaus II attacks Corinth, invades Acarnania *Dionysius I defeated at sea by Italiote coalition
390	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> *Battle of Lechaeum
389	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Athens assists *Evagoras of Cyprus' revolt against Persia *Thrasybulus campaigns in northern Aegean; Athens regains control of Dardanelles and route to the Black Sea
389	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> *Dionysius I defeats Italiote coalition at the Elleporus River
388	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> *Thrasybulus killed at Aspendus *Iphicrates ambushes and defeats Spartan army near Abydos *Dionysius I gains control of both sides of the Straits of Messina
387	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> *Antalcidas cuts off Athenian grain supply through the Dardanelles *Dionysius I captures Rhegium
387/6	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> *King's Peace (Peace of Antalcidas), the first *Common Peace, backed by

	Persia, ends the *Corinthian War Sparta reduces Theban power in Boeotia and undoes Corinthian- Argive union
385–384	Sparta captures Mantinea and breaks it up into its original four villages Persians defeat *Evagoras at sea at Citium and besiege Salamis (Cyprus)
384	*Dionysius I raids Etruria
383	*Dionysius I wins battle at Cabala, Sicily, against Carthaginians under Mago
382	*Spartan campaign against Olynthus Spartan Phoebeidas seizes the Cadmea at Thebes Plataea rebuilt by Sparta as counterweight to Thebes Persians attack Cyprus
381	Sparta besieges Phlius Spartans defeated at Olynthus
380	*Evagoras makes peace with Persia, retaining his rule but paying tribute
379	Phlius surrenders to Sparta Olynthus surrenders to Sparta, *Chalcidian Confederacy dissolved With Athenian help, *Pelopidas expels Spartans from Thebes *Dionysius I captures Croton, but defeated at Cronium (Sicily) and makes peace with Carthaginians
378	Spartan Sphodrias leads abortive raid on Athens; Athens allies with Thebes Spartans under *Agesilaus invade Boeotia but achieve little
378/7	*Second Athenian Confederacy formed
376–374	*Athens, naval war with Sparta

376	Athenian fleet under *Chabrias defeats Spartans near Naxos
375	Athenians under *Timotheus sail around Peloponnese, enrolling new members in the *Second Athenian Confederacy; defeat Peloponnesian fleet *Chabrias commands Athenian force in Thrace and northern Aegean *Battle of Tegyra
374	Athens and Sparta make peace, but war breaks out again Thebes invades Phocis but blocked by Spartans under *Cleombrotus I *Jason of Pherae forces Pharsalus to submit, controls all of Thessaly *Evagoras assassinated in Cyprus
374/3	Sparta captures island of Corcyra, besieges city
373	Athens allies with *Jason of Pherae Athenians under *Timotheus, then *Iphicrates, go to help Corcyra Corcyraeans defeat Peloponnesian force, which withdraws Thebes seizes and destroys Plataea (again) *Jason of Pherae allies with King Amyntas III of Macedon
371	Restatement of *King's Peace; Thebes withdraws from the treaty
371	Spartans invade Boeotia, demanding dissolution of *Boeotian League *Battle of Leuctra, Sparta defeated *Jason of Pherae captures Heraclea and attacks Phocis
371/70	Anti-Spartan unrest in the Peloponnese; some states ally with

	Athens
	Euboea and Acarnania join Boeotian coalition
370	*Jason of Pherae assassinated; collapse of Thessalian unity Mantineia rebuilt *Arcadian League founded
370/69	*Epaminondas' first Peloponnesian campaign (*Thebes, Invasions of the Peloponnese)
369	Liberation of Messenia from Sparta Athens allies with Sparta, sends troops under *Iphicrates *Alexander II invades Thessaly, prompting Theban intervention *Iphicrates fails to take Amphipolis *Epaminondas' second Peloponnesian campaign *Dionysius I of Syracuse sends troops to help Sparta
368	Megalopolis is founded as *Arcadian League capital (date uncertain) Boeotians under *Pelopidas free Larissa (Thessaly) from Macedon and check *Alexander of Pherae Future Macedonian king *Philip II hostage at Thebes *Alexander II of Macedon is murdered; intervention of Athens Theban *Pelopidas imprisoned by *Alexander of Pherae (freed in 367) Negotiations at Delphi fail to establish a common peace Syracuse and Carthage wage war again (*Carthaginian Wars [409–367]) **“Tearless Battle”
367	Death of *Dionysius I of Syracuse

	ends fighting with Carthage (*Carthaginian Wars [409–367]) *Dionysius II comes to power in Syracuse
366	*Epaminondas' third Peloponnesian campaign (*Thebes, invasions of the Peloponnese) Thebes recovers Oropus from Athens *Dionysius II sends troops to help Sparta and Athens against Thebes Satraps' revolt in Persia (approximate date)
365	Elis at war with Arcadian League (*Elis, War with Arcadia) *Timotheus settles Athenian cleruchs on Samos Perdiccas III succeeds to the Macedonian throne Future *Philip II of Macedon returns home from Thebes (approximate date)
364	Thebes destroys Orchomenus in Boeotia *Battle of Cynoscephalae, death of *Pelopidas *Timotheus active in the Chalcidice Theban fleet under *Epaminondas wins Byzantium and Rhodes from Athens
ca. 363/2	*Arcadian League splits after quarrels between Mantinea and Tegea
362	*Battle of Mantinea, death of *Epaminondas
362/1	General peace in Greece, but Sparta refuses to join
361	Athens allies with Thessalian League against *Alexander of Pherae
361	Boeotian army sent to Arcadia to

	maintain control of Megalopolis
360	*Agesilaus II of Sparta campaigns in Egypt, assisting the satraps' revolt Satraps' revolt ends, restoring Persian authority in most of Asia Minor Death of *Agesilaus II (approximate date)
359	Death of Perdiccas III of Macedon, fighting Illyrians; accession of *Philip II (initially as regent?)
358/7	*Alexander of Pherae assassinated Philip II defeats Paeonians and Illyrians (*Philip II, Campaigns in Illyria and Thrace); makes peace with Athens
357–355	*Social War between Athens and its allies
357	Athens recovers Euboea and the Chersonese *Philip II besieges and captures Amphipolis Chios, Rhodes, Byzantium, and Cos revolt against Athens *Chabrias dies
356	*Dion invades Sicily to overthrow *Dionysius II; captures Syracuse *Philip II captures Potidaea, sells the inhabitants into slavery *Alexander the Great born Allied coalition defeats Athenian fleet at Embata (or Embatum) near Chios *Timotheus and *Iphicrates tried at Athens for failures: Iphicrates acquitted; Timotheus fined, exiled, dies soon afterward *Philip II defeats Illyrians, forces submission of Paeonians (*Philip II,

	Campaigns in Illyria and Thrace)
	Italiote coalition attacks Greek cities in southern Italy
356–346	*Third Sacred War Phocians under *Philomelus seize Delphi
355	End of the *Social War
354	Phocians defeat the Thessalians in Opuntian Locris Battle of Neon, death of *Philomelus *Dion assassinated in Syracuse
353	Phocian *Onomarchus campaigns in western Locris, Doris, and Thermopylae; rebuilds Orchomenus; allies with tyrants of Pherae *Philip II captures Methone *Onomarchus defeats *Philip in two battles in Thessaly
353/2	Athenians under *Chares reoccupy Sestos *Philip II decisively defeats Phocians at the *battle of Crocus Field, *Onomarchus killed
352	*Philip II gains control of Thessaly Sparta unsuccessfully attacks Megalopolis *Philip II helps Greek cities against the Thracian *Cersobleptes
352–351	Athenians *Chares and *Charidemus campaign in Hellespont
351	*Philip II defeats Cersobleptes (*Philip II, campaigns in Illyria and Thrace) Cyprus revolts against Persia Sparta defeats Megalopolis in battle
350	Thebes obtains help from *Artaxerxes II of Persia
349	Athenian alliance with Olynthus

	against Philip
	*Philip II campaigns against
	*Chalcidian Confederacy
	*Cersobleptes rebels against Macedon
349	Euboea revolts against Athens
348	*Battle of Tamynae; Athens recognizes independence of Euboea
	*Philip II captures and destroys Olynthus
347	*Dionysius II recovers Syracuse Boeotia appeals to Philip II for help in
	*Third Sacred War
346	*Peace of Philocrates between Philip, Athens and allies
	*Cersobleptes submits to Philip Thebes destroys Orchomenus in Boeotia (again)
	*Philip II occupies Thermopylae and Phocis, ending *Third Sacred War
	*Philip II becomes a member of the *Delphic Amphictyony
345–275	*Carthaginian Wars (345–275)
345/4	Sicilian Greeks appeal to Corinth for help against tyrants and Carthaginians
344	*Philip II campaigns in Illyria and reorganizes Thessaly Corinthian *Timoleon campaigns in Sicily, liberates Syracuse
343	*Timoleon resettles Syracuse
343/2	Persia reconquers Egypt *Philip II places *Alexander I on throne of Molossia in Epirus; Corinth, Athens and other states ally in opposition
	*Archidamus III of Sparta helps Taras against Italians

342	Athens sends troops to Ambracia; *Philip II withdraws *Philip dethrones *Cersobleptes, receives tribute from Thrace *Timoleon campaigns in Sicily.
341	Carthaginians decisively defeated by *Timoleon at Crimissus River
340	*Philip II besieges Perinthus and Byzantium; Athens declares war Philip II seizes Athenian grain fleet in the Hellespont Persia allies with Athens and provides financial assistance against Philip II
340–338	*Fourth Sacred War:
339	Philip II campaigns in Thrace (*Philip II, Campaigns in Illyria and Thrace) *Philip II as Amphictyonic commander occupies Elatea in Phocis Athens and Boeotia ally against Macedon *Timoleon overthrows tyrannies in Sicily and makes peace with Carthage
338	*Philip II ends *Fourth Sacred War; Athens and Boeotia reject peace offer *Philip II defeats Greek coalition at the *battle of Chaeronea *Boeotian League and *Second Athenian Confederacy dissolved *Philip II ravages Laconia, imposes control over Peloponnese *Hellenic League (League of Corinth) formed under Philip II *Archidamus III defeated and killed by Lucanians in Italy
337	*League of Corinth under Philip II declares war on Persia
336	Vanguard of about 10,000 men under

	*Parmenion crosses over to Persia
	*Philip II assassinated, succeeded by
	*Alexander III the Great
	*Alexander recognized by the Delphic Amphictyony, elected as general of the League of Corinth
335	*Alexander campaigns in Thrace and Illyria
335	Thebes revolts, is captured by
	*Alexander and destroyed
334–327	*Alexander, invasion of Persian Empire
334	*Alexander crosses into Persia
	Persian western army defeated at the
	*battle of Granicus
	*Alexander subdues western Asia Minor, taking Miletus and Halicarnassus after sieges
	*Alexander I of Epirus assists Taras against Italians
334/3	*Alexander conquers Lycia, Pamphylia, and western Pisidia; winters in Gordium
333	*Alexander conquers Cilicia
	*Alexander defeats *Darius III at the
	*battle of Issus
	*Agis III of Sparta secures Persian support and starts working against Macedon
332	*Siege of Tyre, Persian naval threat ended
	*Alexander secures Syria, Palestine, and Egypt
	Non-aggression pact between Rome and *Alexander I of Epirus
331	Foundation of Alexandria, Egypt; Cyrene surrenders

	*Alexander defeats *Darius III at the *battle of Gaugamela
	*Alexander occupies Babylon and Susa
	*Agis III organizes Peloponnesian revolt against Macedon, but is killed by *Antipater at the *Battle of Megalopolis, ending revolt
	War in Italy between Taras and allied cities and *Alexander I of Epirus, who is killed at the battle of Pandosia
330	*Alexander invades Persia, defeats Ariobarzanes at the “Persian Gates”
	*Alexander occupies and burns Persian palace at Persepolis
	*Alexander sends home Greek troops who wish to leave
	*Darius III, the defeated Persian king, assassinated
	*Alexander executes Philotas and *Parmenion
330–328/7	*Alexander campaigns in Bactria (*Alexander, Bactrian Campaign)
328	*Alexander conquers Bactria, captures Bessus, crosses the Oxus River, and takes Sogdiana
	*Alexander kills *Cleitus the Black Pages’ Conspiracy against Alexander results in execution of *Callisthenes of Olynthus and others
327–325	*Alexander campaigns in India (*Alexander, Indian Campaign), entering via Afghanistan
327/6	Rome allies with Neapolis.
326	*Alexander crosses the Indus *Battle of the Hydaspes, defeated Indian king *Porus left as client king

	At River Hyphasis, *Alexander's army refuses to proceed and he abandons hopes of further eastward conquest
	*Nearchus voyages down the Jhelum
	Siege of Sangala
	*Alexander seriously wounded taking town of the Malli
325	*Alexander crosses Gedrosian desert, suffering many casualties
	*Nearchus returns by sea to the Persian Gulf
324	*Alexander reaches Susa
	*Alexander orders Greek cities to restore *exiles
324	Macedonian army mutinies at Opis; veterans sent home under *Craterus
	*Alexander's treasurer *Harpalus flees with mercenaries, ships, and money; attempts to court Athens, implicates *Demosthenes, but is later murdered
323	Death of *Alexander III at Babylon on June 10
	Army elects *Philip III Arrhidaeus and (the unborn) Alexander IV kings of Macedon
	*Perdiccas made regent and commander in Asia, *Antipater commander in Macedon and Greece
	Senior members of Alexander's court appointed as satraps: *Lysimachus in Thrace, *Antigonus I Monophthalmus in Phrygia, *Ptolemy I Soter in Egypt, *Eumenes of Cardia in Cappadocia (not yet under Macedonian control)
323–322	*Lamian War, as Greek states rebel against Macedonian domination
322–301	*Wars of the Successors (<i>diadochoi</i>)

322

*Perdiccas invades Cappadocia and Pisidia

*Lysimachus defeats Seuthes III of Thrace in battle

Greeks defeated at sea in Malian Gulf and on land at Crannon

Macedon garrisons Athens

*Demosthenes commits suicide

321

*Philip III Arrhidaeus and *Eurydice marry

*Antipater and *Craterus attack

*Perdiccas

*Craterus defeated and killed in

Cappadocia by *Eumenes of Cardia

320

*Perdiccas invades Egypt but killed by his own troops

*Antipater appointed regent, makes

*Seleucus satrap of Babylonia and

*Antigonus satrap of Phrygia, Lycia, and Pamphylia

*Ptolemy annexes Palestine and Syria

319

*Antigonus I Monophthalmus defeats Eumenes

Death of *Antipater

*Polyperchon elected regent but

opposed by *Antipater's son,

*Cassander

*Polyperchon declares the Greek cities free

318

*Eumenes submits to *Antigonus I Monophthalmus

*Polyperchon appoints *Eumenes to command against *Antigonus

*Phocion executed at Athens

*Antigonus defeats *Polyperchon's fleet, under *Cleitus (the admiral) near Byzantium

- 317 *Agathocles seizes power at Syracuse
 *Eumenes captures Babylon
 *Eurydice appoints *Cassander regent
 for *Philip III Arrhidaeus; *Olympias
 (mother of *Alexander the Great)
 executes *Philip III Arrhidaeus and
 *Eurydice
- 316 *Battle of Paraetacene
 *Battle of Gabiene, *Eumenes
 captured and executed
 *Antigonus I Monophthalmus
 consolidates power in Media and
 Persia
 *Cassander takes over Macedon,
 executes *Olympias, rebuilds Thebes
 *Agathocles expands Syracusan
 power in Sicily
- 315 *Antigonus I Monophthalmus
 occupies Syria, leading to war with
 *Ptolemy,
 *Cassander, *Lysimachus, and
 *Seleucus
- 314 *Antigonus I Monophthalmus
 occupies Phoenicia, besieges Tyre,
 builds a navy, and declares the Greek
 cities free
- 313 *Antigonus I Monophthalmus
 captures Tyre
- 312 *Demetrius I Poliorcetes, son of
 *Antigonus I Monophthalmus,
 defeated at Gaza by *Ptolemy I Soter
 *Seleucus recaptures Babylon and
 Media from *Antigonus
 Carthage invades Sicily to attack
 Agathocles (*Carthaginian Wars
 [345–275])
- 311 *Ptolemy, *Cassander, and

	*Lysimachus make peace with
	*Antigonus I Monophthalmus;
	*Seleucus carries war on alone
	*Battle of Himeras; Carthaginians
310	besiege Syracuse
	*Agathocles invades Africa to attack
	Carthaginians
	*Cassander murders Alexander IV
	and his mother Roxane (date
	uncertain)
309	*Antigonus I Monophthalmus makes
	peace with *Seleucus
	*Polyperchon supports pretenders to
	Macedonian throne against
	*Cassander, but is bought off and kills
	them
309/8	*Agathocles allies with Ophellas of
	Cyrene and then murders him
308	*Antigonus I Monophthalmus
	murders Cleopatra, Alexander the
	Great's sister
	*Antigonus and *Seleucus sign non-
	aggression pact
	*Ptolemy fails in invasion of
	Peloponnese
307	Carthaginians defeat *Agathocles in
	Africa
	*Demetrius I Poliorcetes frees Athens
	from *Cassander
306	Peace declared between Syracuse and
	Carthage (*Carthaginian Wars [345–
	275])
	*Demetrius I Poliorcetes defeats
	*Ptolemy at sea off Salamis, captures
	Cyprus
	*Antigonus I Monophthalmus and
	*Demetrius are proclaimed kings

305	<p>*Demetrius unsuccessfully besieges Rhodes, earning the epithet "Poliorcetes" (the Besieger)</p> <p>*Agathocles defeats Sicilian coalition and controls most of Sicily</p>
305/4	<p>*Ptolemy, *Seleucus, *Lysimachus, and *Cassander declared kings</p>
304	<p>Rhodes makes peace with *Antigonus I Monophthalmus</p> <p>Demetrius I Poliorcetes saves Athens from *Cassander's siege</p> <p>*Agathocles proclaimed king of Syracuse</p>
304/3	<p>*Demetrius I Poliorcetes secures Corinth, Sicyon, Achaia, and most of Arcadia</p>
302	<p>*Demetrius I Poliorcetes restores Hellenic League, embarks on a war against *Cassander, but then recalled to Asia to deal with threat from *Ptolemy, *Seleucus, and *Lysimachus</p> <p>Mithridates I Ctistes founds kingdom of Pontus</p>
301	<p>*Battle of Ipsus, death of *Antigonus I Monophthalmus</p> <p>Antigonus' kingdom divided:</p> <p>*Seleucus gains Syria, *Lysimachus most of Asia Minor; *Ptolemy retains Egypt, *Cassander Macedon, and Greece</p>
301–299	<p>Many dynastic marriages between Successor kings' families</p>
297	<p>Death of *Cassander and his son Philip IV; Macedon divided between Antipater I and Alexander V</p> <p>*Ptolemy I Soter restores *Pyrrhus I as king in Epirus</p>

296	*Demetrius I Poliorcetes besieges Athens
295–294	*Ptolemy captures Cyprus, *Seleucus I Nicator Cilicia, and *Lysimachus the Ionian ports
294	Athens surrenders to *Demetrius I Poliorcetes who garrisons the Piraeus Dynastic struggles in Macedon; *Demetrius I Poliorcetes intervenes and becomes king of Macedon
293	*Demetrius I Poliorcetes conquers Thessaly
292	Aetolia and Boeotia revolt, but *Demetrius I retakes Thebes
291	Second revolt of Boeotia against *Demetrius I fails
290	*Demetrius I garrisons Corcyra *Aetolian League captures Delphi and parts of central Greece
289	Death of *Agathocles of Syracuse *Demetrius I Poliorcetes invades Aetolia and Epirus *Pyrrhus I of Epirus defeats Macedonian army under Pantauchus
288	*Lysimachus and *Pyrrhus I of Epirus combine to invade Macedonia, and become joint kings after *Demetrius I is deserted by his army
287	*Demetrius I Poliorcetes reestablishes himself in central Greece and the Peloponnese Athens revolts against *Demetrius I, supported by *Ptolemy I Soter Truce between warring parties, but *Demetrius I goes to Asia, leaving Greek possessions in hands of his son, *Antigonus II Gonatas

286	<p>*Pyrrhus seizes Thessaly</p> <p>*Demetrius I Poliorcetes campaigns in Ionia, but chased into Cilicia by</p> <p>*Lysimachus' son, Agathocles</p>
285	<p>*Demetrius I Poliorcetes surrenders to</p> <p>*Seleucus I Nicator</p> <p>*Lysimachus becomes king of Macedon and Thessaly</p> <p>*Ptolemy I Soter makes *Ptolemy II Philadelphus joint ruler; *Ptolemy Ceraunus flees Egypt and joins</p> <p>*Lysimachus.</p>
284	*Lysimachus conquers Paeonia
283	<p>Death of *Demetrius I Poliorcetes;</p> <p>*Antigonus II Gonatas becomes king.</p> <p>Demetrius' admiral in Miletus surrenders his fleet and Phoenicia to</p> <p>*Ptolemy I Soter, who now has undisputed naval superiority.</p>
283/2	<p>*Death of Ptolemy I Soter; *Ptolemy II Philadelphus becomes sole king of Egypt</p> <p>*Lysimachus executes his son, Agathocles, whose family and supporters flee to *Seleucus I Nicator</p>
282	<p>*Seleucus I Nicator attacks</p> <p>*Lysimachus, who is deserted by most of Anatolia</p>
281	<p>*Battle of Corupedium, death of</p> <p>*Lysimachus</p> <p>*Antigonus II Gonatas takes Athens</p> <p>Areus I reconstitutes the Peloponnesian League</p>
281/80	<p>*Seleucus I Nicator invades Thrace but is murdered by *Ptolemy Ceraunus, who takes over</p> <p>*Lysimachus' kingdom</p>

	*Seleucus' son, *Antiochus I Soter, succeeds to Syrian throne
281/80	War between *Ptolemy Ceraunus, *Antigonus II Gonatas, and *Pyrrhus I
280	*Ptolemy Ceraunus becomes king of Macedon *Pyrrhus I invades Italy to help Greek cities against Rome (possibly 282); *Pyrrhus defeats Romans at the Siris River
279	Gauls (*Galatians) under *Brennus invade Thrace and Macedon *Ptolemy Ceraunus defeated, captured, and killed Gauls invade Macedonia and central Greece, but are defeated near Delphi and suffer heavy casualties while retreating north *Pyrrhus I defeats Romans at the battle of Asculum but suffers heavy casualties
278	Carthage blockades Syracuse *Pyrrhus I crosses to Sicily, expels Carthaginians except at Lilybaeum Gallic bands ravage Thrace and Byzantium
277	Gauls (*Galatians) ravage Thrace and the Chersonese but *Antigonus II Gonatas defeats them at the *battle of Lysimacheia, then invades Macedon
276	*Antigonus II Gonatas becomes king of Macedon *Pyrrhus returns to Italy and winters in Taras
275	Romans defeat *Pyrrhus I at Beneventum, he withdraws to Epirus and prepares to attack Macedon.

	*Antiochus I Soter defeats the Gauls at the “Elephant Battle” and drives them into Phrygia (date uncertain)
274	*Pyrrhus I attacks Macedonia and defeats *Antigonus II Gonatas in battle at Aous
274–271	*First Syrian-Egyptian War
274/3	*Pyrrhus I’s son defeats *Antigonus II Gonatas in battle and secures control of Thessaly
272	*Pyrrhus I invades the Peloponnese but is killed in street fighting in Argos *Antigonus II Gonatas now dominant in Greece
	Romans capture Taras/Tarentum
270	Romans capture Rhegium
267/6–263/2	*Chremonidean War between Athens, Sparta, and *Ptolemy II Philadelphus allied against *Antigonus II Gonatas
265	Death of Areus I; Peloponnesian alliance collapses; *Antigonus II besieges Athens
264–241	First Punic War
ca. 264–262	Alexander II of Epirus’ invasion of Macedon fails
263	*Eumenes I of Pergamum declares independence from Seleucid rule
263/2	*Antigonus II Gonatas captures Athens; end of the *Chremonidean War
262	Romans campaign in Sicily and take Acragas (Agrigentum) *Eumenes I of Pergamum defeats *Antiochus I Soter in battle near Sardis
261	Death of *Antiochus I Soter; accession of Antiochus II Theos

260/59–ca. 253	*Second Syrian-Egyptian War
ca 262–256	*Battle of Cos (date uncertain)
255	Peace between *Ptolemy II Philadelphus and *Antigonus II Gonatas
251	*Aratus frees Sicyon from Macedon; it joins the *Achaean League
246	Death of *Ptolemy II Philadelphus; accession of *Ptolemy III Euergetes. Death of Antiochus II Theos; accession of Seleucus II Callinicus
246–241	*Third Syrian-Egyptian War (the “Laodicean War”)
245	*Aratus elected general of *Achaean League
244/3	*Diodotus I detaches Bactria from Seleucid rule (gradual process, completed around this date)
243	*Agis IV becomes king of Sparta *Aratus captures Corinth from *Antigonus II Gonatas and expands *Achaean League, sparking the revolt of Megara and war with Antigonus. *Antiochus Hierax made king of Asia Minor (date uncertain)
242	*Achaean League allies with Sparta, elects *Ptolemy III Euergetes admiral.
241	Rome occupies Sicily following end of First Punic War Death of *Eumenes I of Pergamum, succeeded by *Attalus I *Agis IV of Sparta executed by political opponents
241/40	*Antigonus II Gonatas makes peace with the *Achaean League
240/39	*Antigonus II Gonatas and *Aetolian League ally against *Achaean League

	Death of *Antigonus II Gonatas, succeeded by Demetrius II
	Death of Alexander II of Epirus
238	War between *Antiochus Hierax, with Gallic allies, and *Attalus of Pergamum.
	*Attalus I defeats the Gauls (date uncertain)
236	“War of the Brothers” ends between Seleucus II Callinicus and *Antiochus Hierax
235	*Cleomenes III king of Sparta (date uncertain)
	*Aratus defeats Aristippus of Argos in battle at Cleonae
	Megalopolis joins Achaean League (*Achaean League, Wars of)
	*Attalus I campaigns against *Antiochus Hierax
231	*Attalus I campaigns against *Antiochus Hierax
230	*Illyrians ravage western Greece, defeat an Epirote army; *Aetolian and *Achaean Leagues come to aid of Greek cities
229	First Illyrian War between Rome and Illyrians
	*Antigonus III Doson becomes regent of Macedon (king ca. 227)
	*Attalus I defeats *Antiochus Hierax at Coele and again (229/8) at Harpasus in Caria
228	Illyrians surrender to Rome
	War between Sparta, under *Cleomenes III, and *Achaean League (*Achaean League, Wars of)
227	Roman provinces of Sardinia-Corsica

	and Sicily created
	*Cleomenes III defeats *Aratus at Lycaenum near Megalopolis
	*Aratus captures Mantinea
	*Cleomenes III defeats *Aratus at Ladocaea near Megalopolis
	*Cleomenes III reforms Spartan constitution along "Lycurgan" lines
226	Gauls (*Galatians) murder *Antiochus Hierax (Thrace)
	*Cleomenes III retakes Mantinea, invades Achaia, defeats *Achaean League army at Hecatombaeum
224	*Aratus becomes dictator of the Achaean League, allies with Macedon
	*Cleomenes III unsuccessfully besieges Sicyon
224	*Antigonus III Doson restores Macedonian influence in Greece
223	*Antigonus III Doson invades Arcadia, takes Tegea and destroys Mantinea; *Cleomenes III pillages Megalopolis
	Death of Seleucus III Soter, succeeded by *Antiochus III the Great.
223–220	*Achaia recovers most of Seleucid Asia Minor from *Attalus I of Pergamum.
222	Spartans defeated at the *battle of Sellasia
	*Antigonus III Doson captures Sparta; *Cleomenes III escapes to Egypt.
221–217	*Fourth Syrian-Egyptian War
221	Death of *Antigonus III Doson, succeeded by *Philip V
	Death of *Ptolemy III Euergetes, succeeded by *Ptolemy IV Philopator

	*Antiochus III starts *Fourth Syrian-Egyptian War but has to suspend hostilities to deal with Molon's rebellion
220–217	*Social War, between *Philip V and allies and *Aetolian League, Sparta, and Elis
220	*Achaëus revolts against *Antiochus III the Great
220/19	*Ptolemy IV Philopator survives coup by *Cleomenes III, who commits suicide
219	Second Illyrian War started by *Demetrius of Pharos' piracy; Roman fleet defeats Demetrius War between Rhodes and Byzantium Lycurgus of Sparta invades Argos, declares war on *Achaean League *Philip V defeats Dardanians, invades Aetolia and Acarnania *Fourth Syrian-Egyptian war resumes
218–201	Second Punic War
218	*Philip V invades Aetolia and Sparta *Attalus I campaigns against *Achaëus
217	*Ptolemy IV Philopator defeats *Antiochus III the Great at Raphia, ending the *Fourth Syrian-Egyptian War Peace of Naupactus between *Philip V and Aetolia ends *Social War
216	*Antiochus III the Great and *Attalus I campaign against the rebel *Achaëus
215–205	*First Macedonian War
215	Death of *Hieron II; Syracuse allies with Carthage against Rome (during the Second Punic War)

	*Philip V allies with Hannibal against Rome
214	*Antiochus III the Great captures Sardis, besieges *Achaeus Marcus Valerius Laevinus forces *Philip V to withdraw *Philip V campaigns in the Peloponnese *Demetrius of Pharos killed in assault on Mount Ithôme
213	Marcus Claudius Marcellus besieges Syracuse Death of *Aratus of Sicyon *Philip V campaigns in Illyria *Antiochus III the Great captures and executes *Achaeus
212/11	Rome allies with *Aetolian League and *Attalus I against *Philip V Romans capture and sack Syracuse, killing *Archimedes
210	Rome recovers all of Sicily *Ptolemy V Epiphanes joint ruler of Egypt with *Ptolemy IV Philopator Publius Sulpicius Galba campaigns in Greece against *Philip V, captures Aegina
210	*Antiochus III the Great campaigns to recover Parthia and Bactria (210–206)
209	Peace negotiations between *Philip V and *Aetolian League fail
208	*Attalus I and Publius Sulpicius Galba fight naval campaign against *Philip V
207	*Achaean League general *Philopoemen defeats Sparta at Mantinea *Philip V raids Aetolia, sacks

	Thermum
206	*Aetolian League makes peace with *Philip V *Antiochus III the Great makes peace with *Euthydemus I of Bactria; Antiochus advances into north India and subdues it
205	Rome and *Philip V negotiate Peace of Phoenice
204	Death of *Ptolemy IV Philopator *Antiochus III the Great returns to Syria *Ptolemy V Epiphanes sole ruler of Egypt
203/2	*Philip V captures Thasos, raids the Hellespont *Philip V and *Antiochus III the Great ally against *Ptolemy V Epiphanes
202–195	*Fifth Syrian-Egyptian War
201	*Attalus I and Rhodes appeal for Roman help against *Philip V
201/200	*Philip V campaigns in Asia Minor, but defeated in naval battle off Chios
200–196	*Second Macedonian War
200	*Philip V attacks Athens and Hellespont; Romans establish base at Apollonia (Illyria) Death of *Euthydemus I of Bactria; accession of *Demetrius I, who over time extends Greek rule in northern India
199	*Aetolian League joins Rome against *Philip V
198	Flaminius forces *Philip V to withdraw to Macedon *Achaean League joins Rome against *Philip V

198/7	Peace between the *Achaean League and Nabis of Sparta
197	Romans win the *battle of Cynoscephalae, end of fighting in *Second Macedonian War *Antiochus III the Great occupies southern Asia Minor Death of *Attalus I of Pergamum, succeeded by *Eumenes II
196	Flamininus proclaims Greek freedom Roman delegation meets *Antiochus III the Great at Lysimacheia, but Antiochus ignores demands he withdraw from Europe
195	*Antiochus III the Great campaigns in Chersonese Hannibal joins *Antiochus End of *Fifth Syrian-Egyptian War
194	Romans withdraw all troops from Greece
193	Relations between Rome and *Antiochus III the Great break down.
192–188	*Syrian-Roman War
192	*Aetolian League seizes Demetrias for *Antiochus III the Great, who lands there and declares Greece free Rome, *Philip V, and *Achaean League declare war on *Antiochus III
191	*Antiochus III the Great captures Chalcis, but defeated by Romans and *Philip V at Thermopylae he withdraws to Ephesus Romans march against *Aetolian League
191	*Eumenes II and Rhodes join Romans against *Antiochus III's fleet off Corycus

190	<p>*Antiochus III the Great's fleet defeated at Side/Eurymedon and Myonessus</p> <p>Roman army crosses to Asia Minor</p> <p>Romans win the *battle of Magnesia</p>
189	*Aetolian League surrenders to Rome, ending its power in Greece
188	<p>Treaty of Apamea between Rome and allies and *Antiochus III the Great, ends *Syrian-Roman War and seriously reduces the power of the Seleucid Empire</p> <p>*Achaean League destroys Sparta's constitution and walls</p>
187	*Antiochus III the Great of Syria killed while plundering a temple; succeeded by Seleucus IV Philopator
186	Bithynia and Pergamum at war
183/2	*Philopoemen captured and killed
180	Pontus and Pergamum at war
179	*Ptolemy V Epiphanes of Egypt dies, succeeded by *Ptolemy VI Philometor
175	*Philip V of Macedon dies, succeeded by *Perseus
172:	<p>Seleucus IV Philopator of Syria dies, succeeded by *Antiochus IV Epiphanes</p> <p>*Eumenes II complains to Rome about *Perseus</p>
171–168	*Third Macedonian War
170–168	*Sixth Syrian-Egyptian War
168	<p>Romans defeat *Perseus at the *battle of Pydna</p> <p>Jewish revolt against *Antiochus IV Epiphanes</p>
167	Romans enslave 150,000 people in Epirus

	End of *Third Macedonian War: Rome deposes *Perseus, splits Macedon into four republics and Illyria into three *Antiochus IV Epiphanes sacks Jerusalem; outbreak of the *Maccabean revolt
166	Rome declares Galatia free from Pergamum
164	Judas Maccabaeus recaptures Jerusalem and purifies temple
164/3	*Antiochus IV Epiphanes dies, leaving Lysias as regent for Antiochus V
163	Rome further weakens Syrian military power Egypt partitioned between Ptolemy VIII Physcon and *Ptolemy VI (Philometor)
161	Rome supports Ptolemy VIII Physcon's attempts to take Cyprus Demetrius I Soter overthrows and kills Antiochus V of Syria Judas Maccabaeus defeats Demetrius I Soter's army, attempts to ally with Rome
160	Seleucid army defeats and kills Judas Maccabaeus
159	*Eumenes II of Pergamum dies; succeeded by *Attalus II
156–154	*Prusias II of Bithynia invades and ravages Pergamum
153/2	*Attalus II supports *Alexander I Balas claim to Syrian throne
152/1	*Alexander I Balas invades Syria Jonathan becomes high priest and military commander in Judaea
151/50	*Alexander I Balas succeeds to Syrian

	throne after defeating and killing Demetrius I Soter in battle
150–148	*Fourth Macedonian War
149–146	Third Punic War
148	After ending *Fourth Macedonian War, Rome creates a province from Macedon, Thessaly, and Epirus
146	*Achaean War Romans brutally sack Corinth; *Achaean League dissolved
145	Deaths of *Alexander I Balas and *Ptolemy VI Philometor
140	*Demetrius II Nicator grants independence to Judaea
139–138	*Antiochus VII Sidetes succeeds to Syrian throne *Attalus II of Pergamum dies, succeeded by *Attalus III *Antiochus VII Sidetes captures and kills usurper *Tryphon/Diodotus
133/2	Death of *Attalus III, who bequeaths Pergamum to Rome; revolt of *Aristonicus
129	Rome ends *Aristonicus' revolt and creates the province of Asia *Antiochus VII Sidetes defeated and killed in battle against Parthia; *Demetrius II Nicator becomes king of Syria again
128	Ptolemy VII Euergetes installs a pretender as King *Alexander II Zabinas in Syria
125	*Demetrius II Nicator defeated by *Alexander II Zabinas in Lebanon and subsequently executed; Seleucus V briefly secures the throne but is quickly murdered

	Antiochus VIII Grypus becomes coruler of Syria with his mother, Cleopatra Thea
123/2	Antiochus VIII Grypus captures and executes *Alexander Zabinas
121/20	Cleopatra Thea poisoned; Antiochus VIII Grypus sole ruler in Syria
ca. 113	*Mithridates VI Eupator seizes power in Pontus, embarks on policy of territorial expansion
ca. 101	*Mithridates VI Eupator occupies Galatia and Cappadocia
96/95	Rome orders *Mithridates VI Eupator out of Paphlagonia and Cappadocia (possibly 92)
88	*Mithridates VI Eupator overruns Asia Minor, instigating a massacre of Romans and Italians (the “Asiatic Vespers”), starting the First Mithridatic War
87	Lucius Cornelius Sulla lands in Greece and besieges Athens
86	Sulla sacks Athens *Mithridates VI Eupator sacks Chios
86–85	Sulla defeats *Mithridates VI Eupator’s forces in Greece, at Chaeronea and then Orchomenus (Boeotia)
85	Roman army defeats *Mithridates VI Eupator in battle, ending First Mithridatic War
83–82	Second Mithridatic War
ca. 76–75	*Mithridates VI Eupator allies with Sertorius, rebel Roman leader in Spain
74	Nicomedes IV Philopator dies and bequeaths Bithynia to Rome

74–70	Third Mithridatic War begins Lucius Licinius Lucullus defeats *Mithridates VI Eupator at sea and on land, forcing him to flee
69	Lucullus invades Armenia, defeats Tigranes II the Great
68	Lucullus retires after his army mutinies; *Mithridates VI Eupator returns to Pontus and resumes hostilities
66	Gnaeus Pompeius (Pompey) destroys Mithridates' army at Nicopolis
65	*Mithridates VI Eupator regains the Crimea and raises a new army
64	Pompey annexes Syria; end of Seleucid monarchy
63	Suicide of *Mithridates VI Eupator ends Third Mithridatic War
62	Pompey establishes Roman provinces and client kingdoms in Asia
51	Ptolemy XII Auletes dies, succeeded by Ptolemy XIII and *Cleopatra VII (joint rulers)
49	Civil war in Egypt
48	Alexandrine War between *Cleopatra VII, supported by Caesar, and Ptolemy XIII and his supporters; Caesar is besieged in Alexandria
47	Ptolemy XIII dies; *Cleopatra VII and Ptolemy XIV joint rulers of Egypt
44	Murder of Ptolemy XIV; *Cleopatra VII rules with three-year-old son, Ptolemy XV Caesar (Caesarion)
41	Marcus Antonius (Mark Antony) arrives in Egypt
31	Octavian defeats Mark Antony and *Cleopatra VII at Actium.

Octavian enters Alexandria. Suicide
of Mark Antony and *Cleopatra VII,
execution of Ptolemy XV Caesar
(Caesarion)
Egypt made a Roman province

Guide to Related Topics: Greek Section

Art and Culture

Art (Ancient), Greek Warfare in
“Chigi Vase”

Comics and Graphic Novels, Greek Warfare in
Music

Athens

Aegospotami, Battle of (405)

Aeschines (ca. 390–322)

Aeschylus (525–456)

Alcibiades (ca. 450–404)

Alcmaeonidae

Andocides (ca. 440–ca. 391)

Antiphon (ca. 480–410)

Arginusae, Battle of (406)

Aristides (d. post-467)

Aristophanes (Second Half of Fifth Century)

Artemisium, Battle of (480)

Athenian Confederacy, Second

Athens

Athens, Alliance with Plataea (ca. 519)

Athens, Campaigns in Thrace

Athens, Expedition to Cyprus (450–449)

Athens, External Conflicts (519–506)

Athens, Intervention in Egypt (460–454)

Athens, Naval War with Sparta (376–374)

Athens, Oligarchic Movements
Athens, Restoration of Democracy (403)
Athens, Revolts of Allies (Fifth Century)
Athens, War with Aegina (ca. 500–458)
Callimachus (d. 490)
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Chaeronea, Battle of (338)
Chares (Active ca. 367–325)
Charidemus (d. 333)
Chremonidean War (267/6–263/2)
Chremonides (Active 270–240)
Cimon (ca. 510–449)
Cleisthenes (ca. 570–after ca. 506)
Cleon (d. 422)
Cnidus, Battle of (394)
Conon (ca. 444–392)
Coronea, Battle of (447)
Coronea, Battle of (394)
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Demetrius of Phalerum (ca. 350–280)
Demosthenes (General) (d. 413)
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Ephebes, *Ephebeia*
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Hellenic League (against Persians)
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Lamachus (d. 414)
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Gylippus (d. after 403)
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Peloponnesian League

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Peloponnesian War, First (460/59–445), Course

Peloponnesian War, First (460/59–445), Consequences

Peloponnesian War, Second (431–404), Causes

Peloponnesian War, Second (431–404), Course

Peloponnesian War, Second (431–404), Consequences

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Persian Wars (490–479), Course

Persian Wars (490–479), Consequences

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Sparta, Attack on Tegea (Fetters, Battle of) (ca. 570)

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Peloponnesian War, Second (431–404), Course
Peloponnesian War, Second (431–404), Consequences
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Sacred War, Fourth (340–338)
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Social War (357–355)
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Sparta, Wars in Arcadia (370–362)
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Syracuse, Campaigns in Italy under Dionysius I (391–367)
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Syrian-Egyptian War, Second (260/59–ca. 253)
Syrian-Egyptian War, Third (246–241)
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Syrian-Egyptian War, Fifth (202–195)
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Syrian-Roman War (192–188)
Ten Thousand, March of the (401–400)
Thebes, Invasions of the Peloponnese

Trojan War, Causes

Trojan War, Course

Trojan War, Consequences

A

Abdera

Abdera was originally a Clazomenian colony, founded in the mid-seventh century on the Thracian coast, almost opposite the island of Thasos. Known for its grain and as an access port for trade with Thrace, Abdera's prosperity dates from its refounding by the inhabitants of Teos who relocated there in 544 to avoid Persian rule.

Abdera was taken by the Persians in 513/12 and again in 492 and joined the Delian League after the Second Persian War. After initial success against the Triballi in 376, Abdera suffered major losses in an ambush. Saved by the Athenian Chabrias, the city joined the Second Athenian Confederacy. Attacked by Philip (ca. 352), Abdera later (late 340s?) came under his control. These successive setbacks caused a decline in Abdera's importance; it was subsequently taken by Lysimachus, the Seleucids, and the Ptolemies and (in 170) by the Romans and Eumenes II of Pergamum.

Iain Spence

See also Delian League/Athenian Empire; Persian Wars; Philip II of Macedon; Thasos; Thrace, Thracians

Further Reading

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Abydus

Abydus (located near modern Canakkale) was a Milesian colony, founded in the late eighth/early seventh century. It was strategically located on the Asian side of the narrowest part of the Hellespont (the Dardanelles) and became the usual military transit point between Asia and Europe. In 480, Xerxes invaded Europe across a temporary bridge built from Abydus to the vicinity of Sestos on the European side. Later, armies were ferried across the strait at this point by ships, as, for example by Agesilaus in 394, Alexander in 334, Lysimachus in 301, and Seleucus in 281.

After the Second Persian War, Abydus joined the Delian League. Its location was important to Athenian control of the vital grain route from the Black Sea and when the city revolted from Athens in 411 (during the Peloponnesian War of 431–404), it became a focal point of campaigning in the region. Athenian naval victories at Cynossema and, later in 411, Abydus, and a land victory outside the city in 409 failed to detach Abydus from the Peloponnesian alliance.

In the Corinthian War (395–387/6), Abydus was the only city in the Hellespont region that remained loyal to Sparta after the battle of Cnidus (394). The Spartan commander Dercylidas rallied there the Spartan governors expelled from other cities in Asia Minor and continued resistance until replaced by Anaxibius in about 390. Around 389/8, Iphicrates carried out a highly successful ambush of Anaxibius' forces, killing him, but Abydus remained the key port for Spartan naval forces when in 388 with Persian help they trapped the Athenian fleet inside the Hellespont and ended the Corinthian War.

Abydus' strategic position saw its return to Persian control in 387/6 and entered by Alexander the Great in 334. Philip V of Macedon captured the city, by then heavily fortified, in a bitterly contested siege in 200, contributing to war with Rome (the Second Macedonian War). Later (192/1), Antiochus III the Great refortified the city as a precaution against a Roman invasion, although in the end he did not oppose the crossing.

Iain Spence

See also Alcibiades; Delian League/Athenian Empire; Dercylidas; Hellespont; Hellespont Campaign (411–410); Persian Wars; Pharnabazus; Philip V

Further Reading

Herodotus 7.43–46, 95; Thucydides 8.101–106; Xenophon, *Hellenica* 1.2.16; Polybius 16.30–34; Appian 11.21; Livy 31.16–18.

Acarnania, Acarnanians

The region of Acarnania was located in northwestern Greece on the coasts of the Ambracian Gulf and the Ionian Sea, with the Achelous River forming its eastern boundary with Aetolia. Acarnania had developed into a federal state with its capital at Stratus by the fifth century. Corinthian colonies on the coast (e.g., Ambracia, Anactorium, and Leucas) were outside of this federation and often hostile to it. Thucydides commented that in his time (ca. 450–395) Acarnania was one of the backward regions that preserved the old practices that had vanished from the more civilized parts of Greece, such as raiding neighbors and carrying weapons in everyday life.

Acarnania was an ally of Athens during the Peloponnesian War and with Athenian help, and especially the skillful leadership of the Athenian general Demosthenes, was able to defeat an invasion by a Spartan-led force (426). In the Corinthian War (395–387/6), Acarnania was allied with Athens but successive attacks by Agesilaus (about 390–389) forced it to submit to Sparta. In 375, Acarnania joined the Second Athenian League and remained an ally of Athens down to the battle of Chaeronea in 338.

From then on Acarnania was dominated by Macedonia and by its neighbors, Aetolia to the east and Epirus to the north. In 314, Cassander induced the Acarnanians to coalesce into larger urban centers, of which Stratus became the most populous. Constant conflict over border territories led to the partition of Acarnania by Aetolia and Epirus in about 250. When the Epirote monarchy collapsed in about 230, the northern portion of Acarnania regained its independence and established a new federal state with its capital at Leucas. Acarnania was an ally of the Macedonian king Philip V in his second war against Rome (200–196). After his defeat Acarnania was partitioned, with its new capital at Thyrraeum, and became a dependent of Rome. After 146, Acarnania was part of the Roman province of Achaëa.

Douglas Kelly

See also Aetolia, Aetolian League; Agesilaus II; Athenian Confederacy,

Second; Cassander; Chaeronea, Battle of; Corinthian War; Demosthenes (General); Epirus, Epirotes; Peloponnesian War, Second; Philip V

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Achaea, Achaeans

Homer's *Iliad* frequently uses the term “Achaeans” to mean the Greeks as a whole, and there are two regions in Greece with that name. The less important was in southern Thessaly and called Achaea Phthiotis (Phthiotic Achaea). The more important, and the subject of this article, was Achaea in the northern part of the Peloponnese. It was bounded to the north by the Corinthian Gulf, Sicyon on the east, the Larissos River to the west, and to the south the Erymanthus and Cyllene ranges, which formed the boundary with Arcadia. Apart from plains in the east or the coastal strip, the region is largely hilly or mountainous. The region (and the original Achaean League) comprised 12 cities, with a common sanctuary to Poseidon at Helice. However, after Helice disappeared into the sea during an earthquake in 373, the League body generally met at Aegium.

Despite its fame in Homer, Achaea was not particularly important until the Achaean League was restored in the third century and accepted other Peloponnesian cities into its ranks. It was a minor participant in colonization, focusing on South Italy (Sybaris, Croton, Caulonia, Metapontum, and Poseidonia) and stayed neutral during the Persian Wars.

Like the rest of the Peloponnese, the main Achaean troop type was the hoplite, although as might be expected from a predominantly mountainous country, the area also produced *psiloi* (light troops). Until the third century, Achaea generally aligned itself with Sparta, although it was allied to Athens for a while in the mid-fifth century and with Boeotia in the mid-fourth. The region was forcibly brought into the Roman Empire in 146.

Iain Spence

See also Achaean League; Achaean War (146); Aratus of Sicyon; Callicrates; Philopoemen. *Roman Section*: Achaean Revolt

Further Reading

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Achaea Phthiotis

Achaea Phthiotis was an area south of Thessaly, constituting Mount Othrys together with areas to the east (along the Gulf of Pagasae) and the south (on the Malian Gulf). It should not be confused with Achaea, in the northern Peloponnese, or Phthiotis, one of the subdivisions of Thessaly proper. Its major cities were Larisa Cremaste in the south (to be distinguished from Larissa in Thessaly), Melitaea, Halos, and Phthiotic Thebes in the north (not to be confused with Thebes in Boeotia).

The Achaeans of Phthiotis formed one of the member *ethne* (tribes) of the Delphic Amphictyony, but for much of their history seem to have been in some form of dependent relationship with the Thessalians to the north. With the Perrhaebians and Magnesians, the Achaeans were often grouped as Thessalian *perioikoi* (dwellers around). With the Thessalians, the Achaeans medized in 480, and Xerxes' army passed through the area. In 363, however, Achaea broke away from Thessaly and allied with Boeotia. Achaeans of Phthiotis fought for Alexander, but all except Phthiotic Thebes joined the Greek alliance against Macedonia in the Lamian War. For much of the Hellenistic Period, the area was part of the Aetolian League. In 196, the Romans declared Achaea free and incorporated it into Thessaly.

Peter Londey

See also Delphic Amphictyony; Lamian War; Persian Wars; Thessaly,

Thessalians

Further Reading

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Achaean League

The term “Achaean League” applies to two distinct phases in the history of the state of this name. In the first, during the Classical Period, the Achaean League (also known as the Achaean Confederacy) was a federal state consisting of only the 12 cities of Achaea on the northern coast of the Peloponnese. In the second phase, during the Hellenistic Period from 281/80 to 146, the Achaean League extended its membership beyond the boundaries of Achaea proper in an important new extension of the principle of federalism. This wider Achaean League became the leading power in Greece down to 146.

The Achaean League is first mentioned (Thucydides 1.115) as an ally of Athens in about 453. In the Thirty Years Peace (446/5) it was left neutral. By the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War (431), only one city, Pellene, had joined Sparta but the rest soon followed. Achaea remained in alliance with Sparta throughout the Peloponnesian War (431–404) and the Corinthian War (395–387/6). Its loyalty to Sparta persisted even after Sparta’s defeat at Leuctra (371) but during the third Boeotian invasion of the Peloponnese in 366 Epaminondas persuaded the ruling oligarchy to break with Sparta and enter into alliance with Boeotia as an autonomous state keeping its own oligarchic institutions. However, Boeotia overturned his policy and expelled by force the ruling elites, replacing them in power with pro-Boeotian democracies supported by Boeotian governors (“harmosts”). Internal conflict followed and by the late 360s Achaea was back in alliance with Sparta.

In the second part of the fourth century, Achaea seems to have followed a policy of prudent neutrality as far as possible but there is little evidence for its activities at this time. At some point, the federal organization

disintegrated. In 281/80, the federation was revived and, exploiting the confused situation left by the collapse of Demetrius I Poliorcetes' power in Greece, Achaëa took the important step of incorporating into the League other cities in the Peloponnese. Crucial leadership was provided by Aratus, a statesman from Sicyon, the first city to join the extended Achaean League. At first, the League opposed Macedonian imperialism in the Peloponnese but in 224, it allied with Antigonos III Doson to defeat the threat from a resurgent Sparta under King Cleomenes III.

In return for Macedonian help against Aetolia and other enemies, the League remained loyal to Macedonia in its first war with Rome (215–205). In 198, during the Second Macedonian War (200–196), under strong pressure the League joined Rome, with which it soon had a formal treaty of alliance. Support for Rome against Antiochus III and Perseus at first brought further Roman favor. Under the leadership of Philopoemen, the League had expanded to include the whole of the Peloponnese, including the former enemies Sparta, Messenia, and Elis. Increasing friction with Rome led, immediately after the defeat of Perseus, to a split and Rome ordered the deportation to Italy of 1,000 upper class hostages, who were not returned till 151. Callicrates led the League in a policy of increasing subservience to Rome but anti-Roman feeling grew. In 149, when the League attempted to reverse the defection of Sparta, Rome ordered it to allow independence to Sparta and also Argos and Corinth, which did not want it. In the resulting war with Rome (the Achaean War, 146), the League forces were easily defeated and Roman troops sacked and razed Corinth.

The historian Polybius (one of the 1,000 hostages) wrote with enthusiasm about the League's policies and institutions, taking too lenient a view of its failings and not confronting adequately some of its weaknesses. These included the ban on holding the supreme federal office of general (*strategos*) for more than one year at a time and the limitation of the supreme governing body, a combined council and assembly, to four regular meetings a year. In other respects, the Achaean League was a carefully worked-out compromise between a centralized authority and internal autonomy for the constituent cities. Federal laws prevailed throughout the League over the law of individual cities. The League had uniform weights and measures. Its principal federal silver coinage was minted in individual cities on a uniform weight-standard and pattern, with each city adding its own monogram to the federal monogram on the reverse. The Achaean

League has been regarded as the best solution devised in ancient Greece to the problems of particularism and endemic conflict.

Douglas Kelly

See also Antigonus III Doson; Antiochus III (the Great); Aratus of Sicyon; Callicrates; Cleomenes III; Perseus of Macedon; Philopoemen; Polybius.
Roman Section: Achaean Revolt

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Achaean League, Wars of

The history of the Achaean League (also known as the Achaean Confederacy) is rather patchy and so is the evidence for its major wars. This is compounded by the fact that it is sometimes difficult to tell if the League or individual Achaean states had committed the troops. The evidence at other times, though, is good, especially during its third century high point under leaders such as Aratus, Lydiadas, and Philopoemen—extensively covered in both Polybius and Plutarch. Never strong enough on its own to dominate Greece, Achaean League wars were initially (and generally) coalition wars, characterized for much of the fifth and fourth centuries by alliance with Sparta and the Peloponnesian league.

A short flirtation with a Boeotian alliance in the mid-fourth century was replaced by an apparent policy of neutrality (although the evidence for this period is limited) that continued when the League dissolved sometime in the second half of the fourth century. When the League was refounded in the early third century, its wars were characterized initially by an anti-Macedonian stance, later reversed to meet the threat of a resurgent Sparta. The Achaean League fought as a Macedonian ally until the Second Macedonian War (200–196), after which it was an ally of Rome. Although Rome supported the League's extension of control in the Peloponnese

through a series of local conflicts, a falling out with Rome led to its defeat (146) in the Achaean War, Roman control, and the end of independent League military action.

Earlier, in the fifth century, the League was allied to Athens ca. 453, when Achaean troops serving under Pericles fought at Sicyon and in Acarnania. Little else is known of their activities in the First Peloponnesian War (460/59–445). Apparently neutral after the war, the League allied with Sparta in the Second Peloponnesian War (431–404) but apparently played a minor role. The Achaeans also fought on the Spartan side during the Corinthian War (395–387/6), including at the battle of Nemea (394). Sometime before 389 the Achaeans had seized Calydon and in that year threatened to leave the alliance unless Sparta helped in their campaign against the Acarnanians and their Athenian and Boeotian allies. The Achaeans clearly wanted to achieve control over Acarnania and were not happy that, despite a major victory, Agesilaus and the Achaeans did not capture a single Acarnanian city.

Achaeans served in the Spartan fleet near Corcyra (373/2) and contributed troops before and after the defeat at Leuctra (371). In 366, with Sparta largely neutralized and threatened by Boeotian invasion, the League allied with the Boeotian League. In the mid-360s, the Achaeans successfully helped Elis resist the Arcadians and fought as part of the anti-Boeotian coalition at Mantinea (362). The Achaean League supported the Phocians with troops during the Third Sacred War (356–346) and for the remainder of the fourth century took an anti-Macedonian stance. In 338, as part of the Greek coalition Philip II heavily defeated them at Chaeronea, and in 331 they joined Agis III's unsuccessful revolt against Macedon. Unsurprisingly, given Macedonian domination, there is no record of independent Achaean military activity until after the League was revived in 281/80.

The third century was the high point of Achaean League power and it fought several wars, often simultaneously. It expelled Macedonian garrisons and asserted its independence between 281 and 275. In 251, Sicyon joined the League and Aratus of Sicyon became one of its most famous generals. In succession, Corinth (243), Megalopolis (235), and Argos (229) were brought in, increasing the League's wealth and the size of its army. The capture of Corinth (attacked with no declaration of war) seriously damaged Macedonian influence in the Peloponnese and in 241 Aratus heavily defeated the invading Aetolian League army. Antigonos II Gonatas made

peace with the Achaeans. Only a couple of years later, the two Leagues (temporarily) allied against Gonatas' successor, Demetrius II (Nicator) in a war that dragged on until his death in 229. Their alliance effectively constrained Demetrius, but in 233 Aratus was defeated by Macedon at Phylacia but Demetrius was distracted by events elsewhere. Demetrius' death in battle against the Dardanians ended the war, but the Achaeans meanwhile had been dragged into a war against Illyria (ended by Rome in 228).

Despite Aratus' successes, when the League started a war against Sparta (229), it underestimated the degree to which Cleomenes III had reinvigorated Sparta. Raided in 229, the League lost two major battles in 227 and in 226 and, with Argos defeated and Corinth besieged, was in serious trouble. Aratus called in Antigonos III Doson and after a further setback at Megalopolis (223), Cleomenes was defeated at Sellasia (222).

League influence in the Peloponnese was curtailed by its defeats prior to Sellasia and the renewed Macedonian presence after it. However, again assisted by Macedon (under Philip V), the League fought the Second Social War (220–217) against the Aetolian League, Elis, and Sparta. The Aetolians were defeated, largely because of energetic Macedonian efforts, but the Achaean League ultimately gained the benefits when Philip V was drawn into conflict with Rome and soundly defeated in the Second Macedonian War (200–196). Although the First Macedonian War (215–205) was fought by proxy with no combat between Macedon and Rome, Achaea was allied with Philip and did contribute troops against Rome's allies, the Aetolian League.

Following the Second Macedonian War, Achaea became the dominant power in the Peloponnese, although careful to maintain good relations with Rome. For example, the Achaean League committed troops to assist the Romans put down the pretender Andriscus in the Fourth Macedonian War (150–148). Ironically, the final war of an independent Achaean League was its revolt against, and fairly swift defeat by, Rome (146). The League went to war over a Roman decision to allow Sparta to leave the League, and to make Corinth and Argos independent. The League's forces were simply no match for the Romans and although the League was probably reconstituted in some form soon afterward, no further independent military action is known.

Iain Spence

See also Achaea, Achaeans; Achaean League; Achaean War (146); Agis III, Revolt against Macedon; Antigonus III Doson; Antiochus III (the Great); Aratus of Sicyon; Callicrates; Chaeronea, Battle of; Cleomenes III; Corinthian War; Megalopolis; Perseus of Macedon; Philopoemen; Polybius; Sellasia, Battle of; Social War (220–217). *Roman Section*: Achaean Revolt

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Achaean War (146)

Causes

The Achaean War arose from a combination of Roman attempts to rein in Achaean League aggression, particularly against a recalcitrant member state of the League, Sparta, and the League's falling under the sway of anti-Roman politicians.

In 150, the Achaean politician Diaeus of Athens forced Sparta to sentence 24 men of Diaeus' choosing to death. The condemned men went into exile in Italy and complained to the Roman Senate. Diaeus and Callicrates of Leontium responded to the Spartan complaints but were dismissed by the senators, who told them to await their decision by return embassy. The embassy was not dispatched until over a year later. In the meantime, Sparta detached itself from the Achaean League, and despite calls by Quintus Caecilius Metellus, the consul in charge of Macedonia, for the preservation of peace, the Achaeans tried to force Sparta back into the confederacy. Several Roman embassies followed between summer 147 and spring 146. Of these, one led by Lucius Aurelius Orestes (consul 157), barely escaped violation after it mandated the detachment of Sparta and other cities from the league. Another, led by Sextus Julius Caesar (consul 157),

was insulted by the anti-Roman League *strategos*, Critolaus of Athens, who told Caesar that a final settlement with Sparta would have to await the regularly scheduled League meeting six months hence.

Further attempts by Metellus to resolve the situation peacefully followed. He dispatched another embassy to the League, meeting at Corinth, in spring 146. The Romans addressed the Achaeans courteously but were shouted down and driven from the city. Critolaus harangued the assembly into voting for war, nominally against Sparta, but actually against Rome.

Course

The new Roman consul, Lucius Mummius, arrived soon afterward. The Romans defeated the Achaeans at Scarphea, where Critolaus was killed. Diaeus was then defeated at Chaeronea in Boeotia. He armed slaves and levied special taxes throughout Achaea, and assembled his forces at Corinth. Following a successful Achaean night attack on the Roman camp outside the walls of Corinth, Diaeus was emboldened to offer battle. The Achaean cavalry fled before the battle began, but the infantry held off the Roman legions for a while, before succumbing to a flanking attack by 1,000 picked Roman infantry. Diaeus fled to Arcadia with his family and committed suicide. Corinth, now defenseless, was sacked and razed by the Romans; all the surviving Corinthian males were executed, and the women and children were sold into slavery.

Consequences

In the settlement that followed, the Achaean League was dismantled. It lived on as a purely religious association, or *koinon*, but its political importance was at an end.

Paul J. Burton

See also Achaean League; Achaean League, Wars of; Corinth, Corinthians.
Roman Section: Achaean Revolt

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Achaeus (ca. 250–213)

Achaeus was the son of Andromachus, who was a relative of King Seleucus III (reigned 225–223) and served him as general. Andromachus was captured in a war (225/224) against Attalus I of Pergamum, who was in alliance with King Ptolemy III of Egypt. When Seleucus III himself was assassinated on campaign in Asia Minor, Achaeus took command of the army and loyally ensured the succession of Seleucus' young son, Antiochus III (reigned 223–187). Appointed viceroy of Asia Minor, Achaeus successfully continued the war against Attalus, whom he defeated and besieged in his capital (222–221).

At this point, Achaeus was persuaded to rebel by Molon, a rebel in the Seleucid territories in Mesopotamia, and by King Ptolemy III, who held Achaeus' father as a hostage. Achaeus declared himself king, issuing coinage in his own name. He marched on the Seleucid capital Antioch but his troops refused to fight against the army of the legitimate king, Antiochus III. This diversion enabled Attalus to regain the ground he had earlier lost to Achaeus.

After this failure, Achaeus maintained himself in Asia Minor. Antiochus was able to mount an attack against him only after he had suppressed Molon and ended a conflict with Egypt (the Fourth Syrian-Egyptian War, 221–217). Antiochus ensured Attalus' neutrality and out-generalled Achaeus. Achaeus was driven into his capital Sardis and besieged there for two years. Antiochus eventually penetrated the steep hill fortifications of Sardis by using troops from the mountains of Crete. Achaeus was caught attempting to escape and executed with extreme brutality (213).

Achaeus' rebellion is another illustration of the insecure Seleucid hold on Asia Minor and the lack of enduring family loyalty in the dynasty.

Douglas Kelly

See also Antiochus III (the Great); Antiochus Hierax; Attalus I of Pergamum; Seleucids; Syrian-Egyptian War, Fourth

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Acragas (Agrigentum)

Acragas (in Roman times, Agrigentum) was the only Sicilian Greek city matching Syracuse in population and power and was often in conflict with it. Settlers from Gela and Rhodes (Gela's mother city) founded Acragas about 580. From about 570 to 554, the tyrant Phalaris ruled Acragas. He seized territory from the native inhabitants in the hinterland, as well as from Selinus to the west. The city grew rapidly because of its rich agricultural land and the extensive export of produce to Carthage and elsewhere. Like other Sicilian cities, Acragas was prone to political instability and frequently fell under tyrannical rule, which was sometimes benign and efficient but not always so. Tyrants of Acragas were lavish patrons of the arts and competed ostentatiously in the Olympic and other games. In ancient times its population, wealth, and luxury were spoken of in the highest terms. The city's wealth is, however, evident from the extent of the urban area (ca. 625 hectares) and the remains of the massive temples there. The city was situated on an elevated plateau about 4 kilometers from the sea, a naturally strong position further strengthened by good fortification.

From about 488 to 472 the tyrant, Theron ruled Acragas. His seizure of Himera in 483 provoked a Carthaginian attempt to control the whole of Sicily. Theron allied with Gelon, tyrant of Syracuse, who became his son-in-law. The victory they won over the Carthaginians at Himera in 480 was said (Herodotus 7.166) to have taken place on the same day as the battle of Salamis, and, in the eyes of western Greeks at least, matched that battle as a brilliant victory of Greeks over barbarians. Theron continued his close relationship with Syracuse under Gelon's successor Hieron.

Theron's son Thrasydaeus ruled for only a year (about 472), illustrating the common weakness of succession in a tyranny. His brutal regime ended

after a crushing defeat by Hieron in an attack on Syracuse. According to a problematic later tradition (Diogenes Laertius 8.63–68), the oligarchic regime of “The Thousand” then took power and was overthrown by a movement led by the famous philosopher from Acragas, Empedocles, who refused power and established a democracy.

Acragas and Syracuse together opposed Ducetius’ indigenous revolt, but the two cities fell out over the settlement of the war and Syracuse defeated Acragas in about 446 at the River Himeras (in southern Sicily, not to be confused with the city Himera). When Athens began to intervene in Sicily during the Second Peloponnesian War (431–404), Acragas made an alliance in 422 but remained unhelpfully neutral during the Athenian invasion of Sicily (415–413). The big Carthaginian invasion of Sicily beginning in 408 forced the previously hostile Greek states to combine. Greek resistance was concentrated at Acragas in 406 but poor coordination and dubious command decisions led to the allies abandoning the city during the siege. The Carthaginians entered and destroyed the city, massacring those left within it. Survivors and squatters apparently occupied the site afterward and for over 60 years Acragas had no recognized existence as a city.

After Timoleon’s victories over the Carthaginians, Acragas was formally resettled (ca. 340) and soon regained something of its former prosperity. In 314, it combined with Gela and Messana against the rising power of Agathocles, tyrant of Syracuse, but in the next year the imported Spartan leader Acrotatus failed and Acragas was forced to acknowledge Syracusan supremacy. In the confused state of Sicily after Agathocles’ death, Acragas was ruled by a tyrant Phintias (about 287–279). Phintias extended his power beyond the city’s territory and followed the practice of Hellenistic rulers in taking the title of king (*basileus*). In 278, Acragas under its next tyrant Sosistratus was besieging Syracuse when Pyrrhus of Epirus brought his army into Sicily from Italy. Sosistratus joined Pyrrhus’ war against the Carthaginians and was his most important Sicilian ally but when he withdrew Acragas’ forces from the prolonged siege of Lilybaeum, Pyrrhus had to abandon his Sicilian venture.

After the outbreak of the First Punic War between Rome and Carthage (264–241), the Carthaginian force sent to Sicily to oppose Rome’s support of the Mamertini occupied Acragas. In 262, the Romans captured Acragas after a siege of some six months. The city was sacked and the population enslaved. Later in the war, the Carthaginian general Carthalo seized the site

but set fire to what remained when he could not hold it (254).

In 215, during the Second Punic War (218–201) Acragas, which had revived to some degree, joined the anti-Roman movement. The city was a key position for the Carthaginian campaigns in Sicily and was garrisoned by them. In 210, Numidian mercenaries betrayed it to Rome. Again destroyed, the city revived later, as it had done before, and became the second city in the Roman province of Sicily. Its naturally strong position and its fertile territory ensured that the city could rise again after disaster.

Douglas Kelly

See also Acrotatus; Agathocles; Carthage, Carthaginians; Gelon; Pyrrhus; Syracuse; Timaeus; Timoleon. *Roman Section:* Agrigentum, Battle of; Punic War, First; Punic War, Second

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Acrotatus I (Active 330s)

A Spartan of the Agiad dynasty, Acrotatus was the elder son of Cleomenes II; he predeceased his own father and so was never actually king. A harsh disciplinarian, Acrotatus opposed state forgiveness toward Spartiates accused of cowardice in the battle of Megalopolis (331). Extremely unpopular for this, he suffered plots against him, and even a beating. In addition, Sparta's low military profile in the age of Alexander and the *diadochoi* offered him very little chance to use his military training. Thus, he responded positively when, around 315, the Sicilian cities Acragas, Gela, and Messana asked Sparta for a commander of mercenaries to lead troops against the threat of Agathocles, tyrant of Syracuse. Acrotatus accepted the offer without the consent of the Spartan ephors. He settled an unrelated dispute in Apollonia in the Adriatic and then was voted 20 ships from

Sparta's old colony of Taras/Tarentum in Italy, and sailed to Acragas to assume the role of general of the anti-Agathocles forces. However, like Pausanias son of Cleombrotus at the end of the Persian Wars, and in keeping with his sternness after Megalopolis, Acrotatus began to act tyrannically. He executed a distinguished commander and mistreated people on his own side, enraging them until they attempted to stone him. He fled to Sparta (313?) but died soon afterward. His son Areus I became successor to Cleomenes II, Acrotatus' father.

Timothy Doran

See also Acragas; Agathocles; Agis III; Megalopolis, Battle of; Pausanias, Son of Cleombrotus

Further Reading

Diodorus 19.70–71; Plutarch, *Agis* 3.

Acrotatus II (d. 262)

Acrotatus II, son of Areus I, was a member of the Agiad royal family at Sparta who reigned from 265 to 262. His uncle Cleonymus, who believed he should have inherited the throne instead of Areus, was further alienated by the love affair between his young wife, Chilonis and Acrotatus. In 272, he called in Pyrrhus to support his claim and Acrotatus particularly distinguished himself in repelling the first attack. With only 300 men he routed a force of 2,000 Gauls and Chaeonians by a clever attack on their rear. The city was then saved by the arrival of reinforcements from Antigonus II Gonatas and the return of Areus I with 2,000 men.

Acrotatus succeeded his father in 265 but in 262 he was killed in battle at Megalopolis against its tyrant, Aristodemus the Good (Pausanias' account of the battle mistakenly calls Acrotatus the son of Cleomenes). His wife was pregnant at the time but the child, Areus, died as a boy and Acrotatus' cousin Leonidas (son of Cleonymus) became king.

Iain Spence

See also Pyrrhus

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Actium, Battle of. See Roman Section: *Actium, Battle of*

Aegina, Aeginetans

An island in the Saronic Gulf approximately 29.6 kilometers from the Piraeus (the port of Athens); the name is also used for the island's main *polis*. Its position lent it considerable strategic importance as a naval base for conducting piracy or fleet-scale naval raids on mainland Greece, especially Attica. Much of its history is defined by conflict with its close neighbor, Athens, most likely beginning with Aeginetan piracy but escalating into an intermittent state of warfare that shaped Aeginetan policy through the fifth and fourth centuries.

The island of Aegina is 85.9 square kilometers, and at its height during the fifth century, it had a population probably in the 35,000–45,000 range. Of that number, probably 1,500–2,500 were male citizens of the hoplite class, and 7,000–10,000 were slaves or freedmen (Aegina had a reputation even in antiquity for a large slave population). Aegina's size and its location encouraged its elite to develop commercial interests: the island had two or three harbors and an *emporion* (trading-post), and Aeginetans practiced long-range, nonintermediated trade on the same model as the Ionian cities.

During the first half of the seventh century, Aegina operated under the hegemony of Argos, as expressed both through inclusion in the "lot of Temenos" (the portion of the Peloponnesus assigned to Temenos, the legendary Heraclid founder of Argos) and Aegina's membership in the cult league of Apollo Pythaeus. Around 700, Aegina was a charter member of the Calaurian Amphictyony, a sacred league of *poleis* centered on the island of Calauria. In the second half of the seventh century, Aegina was dominated by Epidaurus, until it gained its independence by force during the conflict between the tyrants Periander of Corinth and Procles of Epidaurus.

The earliest silver coinage was Aeginetan (ca. 560–540), the so-called turtles, which circulated unusually widely. Aegina's connections to Argos

and commerce are embodied in the anachronism that Pheidon, the tyrant of Argos, minted the first silver coins there (ca. 700–650). From 570–550, the Aeginetans had their own sanctuary at the Egyptian trading post of Naucratis (a privilege shared only by Miletus and Samos), indicating their commercial prominence. In 519, they expelled Samian exiles from Cydonia, a way station in western Crete for trade with Egypt, and recolonized the site.

In ca. 506, Aegina attacked Athens in support of a Theban and Chalcidian incursion, beginning the “Heraldless War.” Controversy surrounds Aeginetan membership in the Peloponnesian League, but the evidence stands against it. At the same time Athens founded a hero shrine of Aeacus, the founding hero of Aegina, for the purpose of claiming ownership of Aegina through appropriation of its founder. Amid intermittent combat, dramatic events occurred: Aegina submitted to Persia (491), only to be forced into a position of neutrality by Spartan king Cleomenes I’s exaction of hostages and their deposition at Athens; Aegina then abducted an Athenian sacred embassy; Athens supported (ca. 488) a dissident Aeginetan aristocrat, Nicodromus, whose attempt to overthrow the Aeginetan oligarchy was brutally suppressed, with survivors settled in Attica; and Aegina harbored ostracized Athenian politicians like Aristides (480s). The Themistoclean naval bill (483/2) used silver from the mines at Laurium to build many triremes against Aegina, ships deployed instead against Xerxes. Aegina and Athens were reconciled in 481 as Hellenic League members.

Despite its earlier Medism, Aegina was an important member of the Hellenic League, fighting at Artemisium, Plataea, and Salamis. Aegina seems to have avoided provoking Athens after 479. Some Aeginetan aristocrats began to make personal connections with the Athenian elite, detectable in the victory odes of Pindar. During the First Peloponnesian War, Pericles made Aegina a major target of Athenian aggression. In 457–456, Aegina was besieged, conquered, and reduced to tributary status within the Delian League; its fortifications and harbor facilities destroyed, and ships confiscated. After secret appeals from Aegina in 432–431, Sparta demanded Aeginetan autonomy as one of their final ultimatums preceding the Peloponnesian War. In retaliation Athens expelled the Aeginetans and resettled the island, perhaps partially with the families of earlier exiles, and later killed their Aeginetan prisoners. Many Aeginetan refugees settled in

the Thyreatis or at Cydonia, which Athens subsequently attacked.

Lysander restored the Aeginetans in 405, but numbers and prosperity never recovered. During the fourth century Aegina's policies were resolutely anti-Athenian: Aeginetans raided Athens regularly, first with Spartan and then with Macedonian collaboration. The Athenians made several unsuccessful attempts to reconquer Aegina during the first half of the fourth century. Hellenistic Aegina was aligned with (or dominated by) Cassander, the Antigonids, and the Aetolians, before joining the Achaean League in 229. This proved to be a mistake, as the Achaeans could provide no naval support and Aegina was conquered by the Romans in 210, the inhabitants possibly enslaved, and the island sold to Attalus I. Subsequently, Aegina was an Attalid naval station until its incorporation in the Roman Empire.

Aaron Hershkowitz

See also Athens, External Conflicts (519–506); Athens, War with Aegina; Cleomenes I; Delian League/Athenian Empire; Hellenic League (against Persians); Naval Warfare; Peloponnesian War, First; Peloponnesian War, Second; Pheidon of Argos; Pindar; Piracy; Salamis, Battle of (480); Sepeia, Battle of; Thalassocracy

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Aegospotami, Battle of (405)

A decisive Peloponnesian naval victory over Athens in the Hellespont (Dardanelles) during the Second Peloponnesian War (431–404), directly leading to Athens' loss of the war. The 180 Athenian triremes took station

off a beach at Aegospotami (“Goat’s Rivers”) on the European side of the Hellespont. On the Asian side, from Lampsacus—a better anchorage—Lysander was operating against the Black Sea grain route vital to Athens’ food supply. The Athenian anchorage was open and lacked nearby supplies of food—which the exiled Athenian general Alcibiades vainly pointed out.

The Athenians sailed out for four days in a row to tempt Lysander to fight. When he refused they returned, landed, and the ships’ crews went in search of food. In an excellent example of deception, throughout this Lysander kept his anchored ships fully crewed, but with the men concealed. When the Athenians left, fast ships shadowed them and Lysander kept his fleet manned until they reported. On the fifth day, when the scout ships signaled from mid-channel the Athenian crews were scattered looking for food, Lysander attacked. Only the state trireme, the *Paralus*, and eight ships under Conon escaped—the rest of the Athenian ships were captured, along with most of the sailors. In retaliation for recent atrocities, Lysander executed all the Athenians, except Adeimantus (who had argued against them), and apparently freed all non-Athenian captives. The loss of 171 triremes and skilled crew crippled Athens—Byzantium and Chalcedon deserted, Lysander closed the grain route to Athens and later blockaded the city, a major factor in its surrender (404).

Iain Spence

See also Alcibiades; Conon; Lysander; Peloponnesian War, Second

Further Reading

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Aelian (Aelianus Tacticus) (Active ca. 100 CE)

The late first/early second century CE author of a treatise on military tactics, *On the Military Arrangements of the Greeks*, which influenced warfare for 16 centuries. Aelian dedicated his work to Hadrian (117–138 CE), although he

confesses he began the work for the previous emperor, Trajan (98–117 CE). Some manuscripts indicate work actually began during Nerva's reign (96–98 CE). Aelian's contact with Frontinus, the author of a volume of military anecdotes (the *Strategemata*) inspired him to study tactical manuals and other military writings. The work has a comprehensive list of texts Aelian examined while researching (most do not survive). The result was a 53-book analysis of the tactical systems used by Alexander the Great and the Successors of half a millennium earlier. Aelian may have drawn heavily upon the earlier work of Asclepiodotus as the two have similarities. Arrian later drew on Aelian's work for the first 33 books of his own examination of tactics—the "Tactical Handbook." Aelian's work would also be copied or abridged in tactical manuals in the Byzantine Era, for Muslim armies of the Crusades, and Renaissance Italy. The pike and musket armies of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Europe were heavily modeled on the Macedonian army outlined by Aelian, with English editions of his work first appearing in 1616 and 1631.

Christopher Matthew

See also Arrian; Asclepiodotus; Frontinus; Treatises, Military

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Aeneas Tacticus (Active ca. 350)

Aeneas was the author of the earliest extant Greek military treatise. The epithet *Tacticus*, "the tactician," was coined by seventeenth-century scholarship to distinguish him from other authors with the same name. He is commonly identified with Aeneas of Stymphalus, a contemporary

Arcadian general mentioned in Xenophon's *Hellenica*, though this cannot be demonstrated. Aeneas wrote several books on diverse topics, which apparently constituted a comprehensive manual of warfare. Only one book survives, conventionally entitled *Poliorketika* (*Siegecraft*), concerning defensive measures for safeguarding a *polis* against various forms of attack. The extant text refers to some of the lost books: *Paraskeuastike* (*Preparations*), which included fire-signaling, provisions, and procedures for putting a city and its territory into a state of defense; *Poristike* (*Procurement*), on military finances and logistics; and apparently a book about plots; while Aeneas signals his intention to write a further book entitled *Stratopedeutike* (*Encampments*). Some scholars have also seen a vague allusion to *akousmata*, "oral instructions," as indicating a separate book on military oratory, though others see it as an internal cross-reference. The text breaks off where a discussion of naval matters begins, so it is impossible to determine whether this was an independent treatise or short appendix. References to Aeneas in later military manuals suggest that he also wrote on tactics.

The *Poliorketika* is a unique technical source on Classical Greek siege warfare. Aeneas provides practical recommendations on averting external and internal threats and surviving a siege. These include the selection and stationing of troops; maintaining the population's morale, and preventing revolutions or betrayal; preempting and repelling surprise attacks; guarding the walls and gates, detection of smuggled arms, and methods of sending secret messages; and resisting assaults against the fortifications by enemy machines and engineering. Aeneas exhibits particular concern for factional strife and potential treachery within the city, and his work is an important witness to the socio-political dimensions of warfare. Aeneas appears to have combined firsthand experience of the realities of a city under siege with a broader knowledge of recent military developments. He illustrates his principles with historical examples, some derived from written sources, including Herodotus and Thucydides. Other examples relating to more recent events narrow the date of composition to the period of political instability in the 350s.

Aeneas' work was well regarded by Hellenistic military writers. Cineas of Thessaly, Pyrrhus' minister, prepared a summary, presumably for his king. Polybius cites Aeneas as an authority on fire-signals, and later recognized him as a pioneering figure in the genre. His *Poliorketika* (and

possibly lost books) was an important model for Philo of Byzantium, who became the main conduit for the reception of Aeneas' writings into Byzantine literature on siege warfare.

Philip Rance

See also Fortifications; Philo of Byzantium; Pyrrhus; Siege Warfare; Treatises, Military

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Aeschines (ca. 390–322)

Aeschines was an Athenian orator and statesman. He had a distinguished military record, serving at Mantinea (362) and Tamynae (348) and worked as an actor and minor public servant before becoming a politician. Aeschines' extant speeches (*Against Timarchus*, *On the Embassy*, and *Against Ctesiphon*), provide considerable evidence for the rise of Philip II of Macedon and internal Athenian political conflict.

In 347, while on a peace embassy to Philip, Aeschines was won over by him. His actions on another embassy (346) later caused Demosthenes to accuse him of treachery. Aeschines has suffered, probably unfairly, by comparison with Demosthenes, but his policy of friendship with Philip was arguably a viable alternative.

In 343, Demosthenes prosecuted Aeschines for treason. Both speeches (*False Embassy* and *On the Embassy*) survive. Aeschines was narrowly acquitted, but in 340 played a part in events leading to Philip's intervention and victory at Chaeronea (338). In 336, when Ctesiphon proposed awarding Demosthenes a gold crown, Aeschines took him to court. The real target was Demosthenes and his anti-Macedonian policy. The case, finally heard in 330,

was a vote on their respective policies. Aeschines was resoundingly defeated and went into voluntary exile, teaching rhetoric in Rhodes. A skilled orator, if not quite in the same league as Demosthenes, Aeschines' policies were realistic and arguably may have better preserved Athens' safety and prosperity than Demosthenes'.

Iain Spence

See also Demosthenes (Orator); Chaeronea, Battle of; Philip II of Macedon; Philocrates; Philocrates, Peace of; Mantinea, Battle of (362); Sacred War, Fourth; Tamynae, Battle of

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Aeschylus (525–456)

One of the most famous Athenian tragedians, Aeschylus is a good example of the expectation that all able-bodied citizens who could afford the equipment would defend their *polis*. Tradition records he requested his tombstone state only that he had fought at Marathon (his brother was killed there). Aeschylus probably also fought at Salamis. The oldest of his seven surviving plays, *The Persians* (produced in 472), describes Xerxes' return to Susa after Salamis. It is the only extant Greek tragedy covering an historical event and, apart from its literary merit, provides useful evidence for Athenian attitudes to Persia, the war, and to the events of Salamis.

Iain Spence

See also Marathon, Battle of; Persian Wars; Salamis, Battle of (480)

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Aetolia, Aetolian League

Aetolia was the rugged, mountainous region in northwest Greece on the north coast of the Gulf of Corinth. It was bounded by Acarnania across the River Achelous to the west and the eastern (Ozolian) Locris to the east. Thucydides described the region as backward and uncivilized, retaining the practices of raiding neighbors and bearing arms in everyday life that had vanished elsewhere in Greece. Thucydides also emphasized, and may well have overestimated, the savagery of the inhabitants of the remote Aetolian hinterland. The Aetolians lived in scattered, unfortified villages and walled towns only developed toward the end of the fourth century. From earliest times the Aetolians had a sense of unity as an *ethnos* ("people" rather than "tribe"), with their cult-center and meeting place at Thermum. Communications between Aetolia and the outside world were difficult and the Aetolians played little part in Greek affairs until the time of Alexander the Great, and even after then were regarded as lagging behind the standards of Greek civilization.

By the time of the Second Peloponnesian War (431–404), Aetolia had gone beyond constantly raiding its neighbors to attempting to secure the cities along the northern fringe of the Corinthian Gulf, especially the port of Naupactus. A failed Athenian invasion of Aetolia under Demosthenes in 426 reveals the harshness of the terrain and the ability of the light-armed Aetolians to fight a devastatingly effective guerrilla-style war against a hoplite army. (A similar disaster befell the Spartans under King Areus in 280.) Some rudimentary form of Aetolia-wide organization is suggested in a 426 Aetolian embassy with a representative from each main Aetolian region requesting Spartan and Corinthian troops to attack Naupactus.

Early fourth century Aetolia developed into a more elaborate federal state with individual communities represented according to their population on a standing federal council. The supreme body was an assembly of all Aetolian citizens. This assembly, which elected the single federal general, met twice a year. Although opinion is divided, it seems that assembly decisions were made by a majority of votes of the individual citizens

attending, not by a majority of groups voting as separate communities.

An Athenian inscription of 367 (Harding 54) shows that by then the *koinon* (state or community) of Aetolia participated in the routine diplomatic courtesies of interstate festivals. In 338, Philip II of Macedon gave Naupactus to Aetolia, apparently to win its support for his settlement of Greece. Fearful that Alexander's "Exiles Decree" would force them to give up recent gains in Acarnania, the Aetolians joined in the failed revolt against Macedon (the Lamian War, 323–322). Aetolia was fortunate that Antipater and Craterus had too many other pressing concerns and granted Aetolia a separate peace. From now on, Aetolia was drawn into Greek affairs, first siding with Antigonus I Monophthalmus against Cassander and Polyperchon, and later usually an enemy of Macedon. The confusion caused by the ongoing power struggles of the Successors and their heirs created opportunities for expansion.

During the Gallic invasion of Greece in 279, Aetolia did much of the fighting and achieved a spectacular, but perhaps overrated, success in defending Delphi against the invaders. As a result, Aetolia expanded its territory, taking over eastern Locris, pushing further into Acarnania and western Phocis, as well as controlling the important and prestigious panhellenic shrine at Delphi. Aetolia went on to dispute possession of Thessaly and its neighboring territories with Macedonia. Aetolia's acquisition of Pagasae on the Saronic Gulf by about 225 opened a way into the Aegean. Aetolia also made alliances in the Peloponnese, with Elis, Messenia, and some Arcadian cities, giving it an important role in this key area, and bringing it into conflict with the Achaean League.

From the outset of this expansion, contrary to general Greek practice, Aetolia included newly acquired cities into its own federal structure. The people of such cities that bordered on or were close enough to Aetolia became full Aetolian citizens while retaining their original citizenship (*sympoliteia*). In the case of more distant cities, citizens of newly acquired cities could obtain full Aetolian citizenship if they moved to Aetolia (*isopoliteia*).

The Aetolian League eventually included peoples and cities from the Adriatic to Lysimacheia on the Hellespont and Chalcedon on the Bosphorus, a number of island states in the Aegean Sea (e.g., Chios) and even some cities in Crete. This widespread expansion was largely due to membership of the Aetolian League being seen as the best protection against Aetolian raids

by land and sea. Individual Aetolians had never given up the old practices of brigandage and piracy against other peoples. Also when Aetolians had a grievance against a citizen of any other state, they could resort to the practice of indiscriminate reprisals against any citizen from that state by way of compensation. The Aetolian state saw no reason to restrain such activities, in which leading Aetolians naturally took part. The Aetolians had also developed the custom of "Plundering the Plunder." This was the practice, peculiar to Aetolia, of raids and piracy by individual Aetolians against any states fighting wars in which the Aetolian state was not itself involved. In wars waged by the Aetolian state, its forces commonly lived up to their reputation for brutality and rapacity. Plundering and war, whether by individuals or the state, seem to have been for Aetolia as much a source of income as the mercenary service popular there and in other poor regions in Greece.

In 272, Antigonus II Gonatas astutely ended hostility between Macedon and Aetolia with a peace treaty leaving Aetolia in control of Delphi. Later, in 241, Gonatas made an alliance with Aetolia against the Achaean League. This policy of cooperation between the two strongest military powers in Greece ended after Gonatas' death. In 239, an Aetolian move to gain control of northern Acarnania led to a prolonged war between the two, the "War of Demetrius" (238–229).

In the Social War (220–217), Philip V of Macedon attempted to curb the traditional Aetolian activities in his sphere and forced a peace on Aetolia in 217. When Philip's alliance with Hannibal (215) provoked Roman intervention in Greece (Rome's First Macedonian War, 215–205), Aetolia was ready to take the Roman side. An alliance with Rome in 212 promised Aetolia any territory it won in the war, while Rome was to take the moveable booty. In the event Aetolia lost Thessaly, Phocis, and other territories to Philip and was left disappointed and empty-handed when Philip made peace, first with his Greek enemies (206), and then with Rome (205).

In the Second Macedonian War (200–196), Aetolia was an unhelpful Roman ally and was further alienated by Flamininus' refusal to hand over to all the territories it had lost to Philip and his rejection of their demand that Philip be deposed. In spring 192, Aetolia sent an invitation to the Seleucid king, Antiochus III, to carry out "the liberation of Greece." The expectation that Roman influence in Greece would inhibit the Aetolians' old

ways of plundering may also have played a part. Aetolia's contribution to Antiochus' war in Greece was limited to a diversionary expedition to Sparta in 192, where their forces murdered their ally Nabis and pillaged the town, and to the ineffective holding of the mountain route that allowed Roman forces to turn the Pass of Thermopylae in 191.

Left stranded after Antiochus' rapid retreat from Greece, Aetolia was able to defy Rome for two years in the fastness of its mountainous territory, while Roman forces were needed elsewhere. Rome's first demand for complete surrender was followed in 189 by more moderate terms, under which Aetolia became a subject-ally of Rome and lost the right to make war at its choosing. It also had to pay an indemnity, heavy for such a state, of 200 talents, and give up Delphi. Under Roman dominance of Greece, Aetolian raiding and piracy also now became a thing of the past. As a result, there was bitter and murderous conflict in Aetolia between impoverished debtors and the wealthy, unsolved by an appeal to Rome in 174. Suspicious of King Perseus' popularity among the poor, Rome garrisoned Aetolia during the Third Macedonian War (171–168). After Perseus' defeat Rome did not object to the massacre by the pro-Roman faction of 550 opponents and the expulsion of more. Aetolia did not take part in the Achaean Revolt (146).

Aetolia's history is largely filtered through the views of the historian, and Achaean League politician, Polybius. However much his bias against Aetolia may be compensated for, Aetolia remains an odd combination of primitive methods of warfare with advanced political institutions.

Douglas Kelly

See also Antigonus II Gonatas; Antigonus III Doson; Antiochus III (the Great); Antipater; Macedonian War, First, Second and Third; Olpae, Battle of; Philip V; Polybius; Social War (220–217)

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Aetolian League. See Aetolia, Aetolian League

Agathocles (ca. 361–289)

Agathocles was born in Thermae Himeraeae, on the north coast of Sicily, ca. 361. His father was a potter from Rhegium, who settled in Syracuse when Agathocles was a child. Agathocles served with the Syracusan military under Timoleon, and later fought with some distinction against the Brutii in southern Italy.

Agathocles was exiled from Syracuse twice following failed coups, but in 317 seized power as *strategos autokrator* (general with autocratic power). In reality, he ruled as a tyrant until eventually declaring himself king. Agathocles' successful coup was due to a combination of the military support of his army of mercenary soldiers and his denouncement of the city's oligarchic faction: this won the support of the Syracusan masses. On seizing power, Agathocles is alleged to have banished or murdered some 10,000 of his opponents. Agathocles then embarked on military campaigns to subjugate the Greek cities of Sicily (316–313). The expansion of his power westward provoked war with Carthage which, fearful for its own possessions on the island, sent a large army to Sicily.

In 311, Agathocles' army held the stronghold at Phalarium while the Carthaginians occupied the stronghold of Ecnomius on the other side of the River Himeras. When the armies met in battle, Agathocles was defeated and soon Syracuse itself was under siege. The following year Agathocles landed an army in Libya to threaten Carthage and relieve the pressure on Syracuse, the bold move catching the Carthaginians by surprise. Agathocles defeated a Carthaginian army at Tunis. A second battle at Tunis in 309 resulted in another Greek victory, but Agathocles' cause in Sicily was going badly and he returned to Syracuse in 308 to take charge of affairs there, leaving his son Archagathus in command in Libya.

Managing to slip through the Carthaginian blockade unnoticed, he took charge of 17 warships and with the aid of a naval contingent of another 18 ships from his Etruscan allies defeated the Carthaginian naval blockading force, ending the siege of Syracuse. He returned to Libya but was forced to abandon both his army and his two sons. He concluded a peace treaty with Carthage in 306 giving him control of all Greek Sicily (Carthaginian possessions were bounded by the River Halycus).

In 304, emulating the behavior of the *diadochoi*, Agathocles took the title of king. He extended his territorial possessions by his military control

over southern Italy and also conquered Corcyra. He died in 289, allegedly poisoned, declaring Syracuse a democracy before he died.

Our main primary source for the life and career of Agathocles is the later writer Diodorus. His main source for Agathocles was Timaeus of Tauromenium, a contemporary opponent of Agathocles.

David Harthen

See also Acragas (Agrigentum); Carthage, Carthaginians; Carthaginian Wars (345–275); Corcyra, Corcyraeans; Himera, Battle of; Italy, Greek Cities in; Mercenaries; Sicily; Syracuse; Timaeus; Timoleon

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Agesilaus II (Reigned ca. 401–ca. 360)

Agesilaus II, a Spartan king of the Eurypontid dynasty from about 401 until his death ca. 360, reigned through extreme turnabouts in Spartan history. Probably born around 445/4, Agesilaus seemed not destined for the Spartan throne: his brother King Agis II had a son, whereas Agesilaus had a limp, and a prophecy had warned that a limping Spartan king would bring disaster to the Spartan state. However, the Spartan admiral Lysander (Agesilaus' *erastes* or older lover) accused Agis' son of being Alcibiades' bastard. Thus Agesilaus ascended to the Spartan throne. Perhaps a year after he became king, the conspiracy of Cinadon occurred, uniting Helots, *Perioikoi*, and members of several marginal groups in Sparta against the Spartiates. The Spartan authorities successfully quelled this danger.

Agesilaus and Lysander next embarked upon a panhellenic invasion of the Persian Empire, which was demanding tribute from the Greek cities of Asia Minor. Before setting off, Agesilaus attempted to sacrifice at Aulis in the style of Agamemnon, but was stopped by a group of Thebans. He took his army to Asia, reaching Ephesus in 396, and announced to Tissaphernes that he had come to make the Greek cities of Asia autonomous. Agesilaus'

plan involved breaking off portions of the Empire rather than taking it over as a whole, urging Pharnabazus to revolt, and entertaining embassies from many nations in the Persian Empire desirous of secession. He raided Phrygia and Lydia (396/5), seized spoils at Sardis, and may have intended to attack the Persian king himself.

However, Agesilaus was recalled by the administration at Sparta when Persia bribed men in Corinth, Athens, Argos, and Thebes to attack Spartan holdings, beginning the Corinthian War. He fought at Coronea in Boeotia in 394, sustaining an injury requiring his withdrawal, and could only helplessly stand by while Conon's Persian-financed fleet defeated the Spartan navy at Cnidus (394), expelled Spartan harmosts and garrisons in many Greek cities, raided Laconia's coast, and occupied Cythera, destroying Sparta's Aegean empire.

Soon Agesilaus recovered sufficiently to raid the Argolid, Lechaenum, and the Piraeus in Attica (393–392), returning to Sparta only after Iphicrates destroyed a division of the Lacedaemonian army at Lechaenum (390). Agesilaus fought in Acarnania in 389 and tolerated, but took no part in, the invasion and dissolution of Mantinea, shortly after which the King's Peace occurred. Agesilaus also refrained from taking part in Sparta's invasion of Olynthus and its side-effect, Sparta's invasion of Thebes, although he justified that invasion in speeches (382). He besieged Phlius for over a year to punish its recalcitrance in supporting the invasion of Olynthus. Upon its surrender in 379 his reprisals included establishing a Lacedaemonian garrison and new law code, and executing certain individuals.

This was a high point in the might of the Spartan state during Agesilaus' reign. However, the 379 coup in Thebes led to the expulsion of its Spartan garrison. King Cleombrotus of the Agiad house of Sparta invaded Boeotia in response; Athens' assistance to Thebes caused the Spartiate Sphodrias to raid part of Attica as a punishment, at which point the Second Athenian Confederacy was created. Agesilaus raided Thebes over the following two years, but was injured again and was out of commission while Pelopidas' reorganized Thebans beat the Spartan army, the Athenian navy defeated a Spartan fleet at Alyzia, Jason of Pherae began strengthening himself, and the Thebans attacked Phocis. A renewal of the King's Peace in 375/4 failed to prevent war between Athens and Sparta at Zacynthus and Corcyra.

Negotiations for another renewal in 371 provoked Agesilaus to deny Thebes' claim to represent all Boeotia, causing King Cleombrotus then to

attack Boeotia: the Spartan defeat at Leuctra constituted a terrible, permanent setback to Spartan power and reputation. Neither Agesilaus nor Sparta could hinder Mantinea's reunification in 370, nor could Agesilaus halt the creation of an aggressive Arcadian federalism. Agesilaus may have been instrumental in preventing the Theban army from invading Spartatown itself during the subsequent Theban invasions of Laconia in 370 and 369. However, when the Theban army detached Messenia, freed the Messenian Helots, and fortified the city of Messene as a new capital at Mount Ithôme, Agesilaus was blamed for Sparta being deprived of half its economic base. The foundation of Arcadian Megalopolis shortly afterward, which included former possessions of Sparta, sapped Spartan regional power further. All of this provoked the aged Agesilaus to perform mercenary work to regain funds for the Spartan state. He died in around 360 while serving Egypt, which was attempting to rebel from the Persian Empire. His body was encased in wax and sent back to Sparta.

Timothy Doran

See also Agesipolis I; Arcadian League; Boeotian League; Corinthian War; King's Peace; Lechaem, Battle of; Lysander; Pharnabazus; Sacred Band; Thebes, Invasions of the Peloponnese; Tissaphernes

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Agesipolis I (d. 381)

Agesipolis I, of Sparta's Agiad dynasty in the early fourth century, was the son of Pausanias, and reigned alongside Agesilaus II. Agesipolis' kingship began during the Corinthian War (395–387/6). In 388, after oracular consultations, young Agesipolis led a successful campaign against Argive territory, undaunted by an earthquake and desirous of surpassing Agesilaus' destructions three years earlier.

He campaigned next in 385 to force Mantinea to destroy its walls, punishment for its disloyalty toward Sparta during the Corinthian War. He besieged Mantinea and dammed and rerouted its river to damage the city's

infrastructure. The Mantineans agreed at this point to tear down their walls, but the Spartans further demanded that Mantinea be divided into its five constituent villages in keeping with the autonomy principles of the King's Peace.

Agisipolis also took part in Sparta's campaign against Olynthus and the Chalcidian League. In 381, he took over the campaign. The Spartiate population crisis meant that his army consisted of only 30 Spartiates but many *Perioikoi*, *nothoi* or illegitimate sons of Spartiates, and foreigners raised along with the Spartiates. He fell sick after seizing Torone and died at the Temple of Dionysus at Aphytis. His corpse was sent back to Sparta for a royal funeral. Agesilaus mourned, having come to appreciate his younger colleague greatly. His death, mercifully for him, occurred a decade before Sparta's terrible defeat at Leuctra.

Timothy Doran

See also Agesilaus II; King's Peace; Lysander; Sparta, Campaign against Olynthus

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Agis II (ca. 460–ca. 399)

Agis was from the Eurypontid house and succeeded his father Archidamus II as king of Sparta in winter 427/6. In the following two years, he commanded the annual Peloponnesian invasion of Attica that was Sparta's routine strategy in the first phase of the Second Peloponnesian War. In 419 and 418, he held commands in the Peloponnese against Argos and the states allied with it. His conduct in these campaigns drew some severe criticism at Sparta but in the late summer of 418 he was given a further chance, assisted by 10 advisors (a first for a Spartan king). More by good luck than good management, he inflicted a severe defeat on the forces of Mantinea, Argos, and Athens at the battle of Mantinea.

In the spring of 413, when Sparta resumed hostilities against Athens, Agis commanded the forces sent to Decelea in Attica to establish a permanent post (the Greek term is *epiteichismos*) to inflict systematic damage on enemy territory. This strategy had been discussed at Sparta

before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War in 431 but was only now put into action, not through Agis but largely because of the urging of the Athenian Alcibiades, then a renegade. Agis commanded at Decelea until the end of the war in 404 and, while the raiding from Decelea did considerable damage to the Athenian economic resources, it was never enough to bring about an end to the war. Agis' two attempts to move against the city of Athens from Decelea achieved nothing. Agis himself recognized that the war could only be won by challenging Athens at sea but he himself played no direct part in these operations in the Aegean. His dispatch of a force under Clearchus (later the commander of Cyrus' "Ten Thousand" Greek mercenaries) to occupy the key city of Byzantium was the right strategy but unfortunately miscarried.

Agis, along with his fellow king Pausanias, commanded forces in the final siege of Athens in the winter of 405/4 but played only a minor part in the negotiations leading to the Athenian surrender and he played no part in the conflicts in Athens in 403–402, in which Lysander and King Pausanias were in turn heavily involved. In about 400, he carried out an extensive raiding campaign in Sparta's war against Elis and brought this war to an end by establishing a permanent raiding post. He died ca. 399 on his way back to Sparta from making victory offerings at Delphi. In an unexpected turn of events, his son Leotychidas was judged to be illegitimate and Agis' bother Agesilaus came to the throne.

As a commander Agis showed on some but not all occasions a routine competence. However, not even his victory at Mantinea in one of the few big set-piece hoplite battles of the Peloponnesian War induced Sparta to entrust him with any other decisively important role calling for a commander of genius.

Douglas Kelly

See also Agesilaus II; Alcibiades; Decelea; Elis; *Epiteichismos*; Mantinea, Battle of (418); Peloponnesian War, Second

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Agis III (d. 331)

Agis III, son of Archidamus and grandson of Agesilaus II, was a king of Sparta's Eurypontid dynasty. From 338 to 331, he ruled a Sparta radically reduced in territorial size by the Theban liberation of Messenia in 370/69 and by Philip II's seizure of Spartan borderlands.

Opposition to Macedon defined Agis' career. Around 333, Agis requested and received sufficient assistance from Darius III to capture many Cretan cities. He hired mercenaries who had backed Persia against Alexander at Issus and many mercenaries from Crete.

In 331, when Thrace rebelled against Macedon, Agis attempted a general Greek revolt. Arcadia, Elis, the Achaean League, and some northern Greeks joined without Athens, whose contributions (including 392 triremes) might have been decisive. Nonetheless, Agis led an army of 20,000 infantry plus some 10,000 mercenaries. Antipater left Thrace and moved south to the Peloponnese leading 40,000 men including mercenaries paid by a 3,000 talent fund sent by Alexander. The two armies clashed near Megalopolis in Arcadia, which had remained loyal to Alexander. Agis and his coalition reportedly fought bravely, but lost. Some 5,300 in the Spartan-led coalition died, and 3,500 of the Macedonian alliance.

Agis was mortally wounded. After his death, Sparta could only beg forgiveness from Macedon and give elite hostages to Antipater.

Timothy Doran

See also Agesilaus II; Agis III, Revolt against Macedon; Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon; Antipater; Darius III; Megalopolis, Battle of; Philip II of Macedon

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Agis III, Revolt against Macedon (331)

Agis III, king of Sparta, sought in the mid-330s a way to counter Macedonian domination of Greece, especially in the Peloponnese. Our sources for his revolt are limited and confusing. Curtius' narrative at the end of Book 5 is missing and Arrian gives it only a brief mention. Diodorus provides some useful details, but confuses the chronology. As a result, debate over the dating remains unresolved.

Agis conceived a plan to invade Greece from Crete using Persian wealth to raise an army. In 333 Autophradates, a Persian officer at Halicarnassus, provided ships and cash, which Agis used to hire mercenaries who were available following the battle of Issus. His insurgency began in the same year on Crete where he successfully took control of the island for Persia and continued recruiting. He seems to have bided his time building his army in Crete.

Two years later, Agis, working with anti-Macedonian groups on the mainland, took advantage of Macedonian difficulties in the north (a revolt in Thrace) to move into the Peloponnese with his army, reportedly more than 20,000 strong, and initiate the military revolt. There he defeated the local Macedonian commander, Corrhagus. Agis gained allies including the Arcadians (except Megalopolis), Elis, Tegea, and the Achaeans (except Pellene). They seem to have had support from some other Greek *poleis*, but Athens declined to support the revolt. That Alexander still held numerous Athenian hostages no doubt contributed to their decision. Several other important members of the Corinthian League also did not support the revolt. The insurgents then laid siege to Megalopolis.

Antipater first made a deal to end the revolt in Thrace, then started to raise a larger army. At about the same time, Alexander dispatched his admiral Amphoterus against Crete, where he was successful, with orders to follow-up against the rebellion in the Peloponnese. When Alexander learned after departing Babylon that Agis' revolt continued, he dispatched Menes with 3,000 talents of silver to Antipater to pay for the war efforts.

Regardless of the funds, which may have been too late anyway, Antipater's army reportedly grew to 40,000 men, including troops from various Corinthian League cities including Athens, Corinth, Argos, and Messene. He moved against the insurgents, who continued the siege. In the ensuing battle of Megalopolis, Agis III died and the revolt dissipated.

(probably in late 331). Antipater put the punishment before the League of Corinth assembly, which imposed a fine on Elis and the Achaeans and banished the Tegeans, but left the punishment of Sparta to Alexander. The revolt was defeated, but some of the same forces came together nine years later in the Lamian War.

Lee L. Brice

See also Agis III; Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon; Antipater; Athens; Issus, Battle of; Lamian War; Megalopolis, Battle of; Mercenaries; Sparta

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Agis IV (ca. 265–241)

Agis was from the Eurypontid house at Sparta and became king ca. 243. He was a young idealist and aimed to restore Sparta’s military power. At that time Sparta was barely able to withstand Macedonian intervention or contend with enemies in the Peloponnese. An extreme concentration of wealth among a small number of Spartiates (and in particular among Spartiate women) had intensified Sparta’s weakness by severely reducing the number of citizen landowners qualified for hoplite service. Impoverishment was accompanied by widespread indebtedness, and the old Spartiate way of life had crumbled.

Once king, Agis proposed revolutionary reform. The Spartiate way of life would be revived by a cancellation of all debts and a redistribution of all land among the citizen body and a larger number of persons to be recruited from among the *Perioikoi* and suitable foreigners. This program was justified as the only way to restore the traditional austerity that had been the basis of Sparta’s military power.

Such radical policies provoked bitter opposition and Agis and his

supporters had to resort to threats of violence, violations of Spartan constitutional practice and expulsion of opponents, including his fellow-king Leonidas. The debt cancellation was carried out but the land distribution stalled.

Agis then led a Spartan force to Corinth, to assist the Achaean League against the Aetolians. In his absence, with the return of Leonidas, opposition to his policies had intensified. There was growing alarm at the upheaval to date, as well as resentment over the non-implementation of the land redistribution. Some of his former supporters were unwilling to go beyond the debt cancellation, from which they had benefited greatly, to a land redistribution, from which they would lose heavily.

After a violent clash on his return, Agis was driven to seek sanctuary in a temple but was trapped while outside it and, after a show trial, was executed, along with his mother and grandmother. His proposed land redistribution lapsed, to be taken up some 15 years later by King Cleomenes III.

Douglas Kelly

See also Achaean League; *Agoge*; Cleomenes III; Hoplites; *Perioikoi*; Sparta

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Agoge

The Greek term *agoge* may describe various forms of education or “upbringing,” but most commonly refers to the system of communal upbringing practiced in Sparta. This was perceived as a defining aspect of Spartan culture, and involved a degree of state involvement that was exceptional among contemporary Greek societies.

A Spartan boy’s formal education began around age seven, as in other Greek states. However, rather than being instructed by a private tutor, he

was assigned to a troop of boys his age, under the command of an older boy, and under the ultimate authority of a state-appointed official, the *paidonomos*.

The boys underwent a harsh regimen. They were expected to behave modestly and obediently, walk barefoot, wear a single type of clothing for all seasons, and subsist upon limited rations. At the same time, they were tacitly encouraged to steal food. Xenophon (*Constitution of Lacedaemonians* 2.8) comments that those who were discovered were punished not for stealing, but for being caught. They also took part in a range of athletic activities, including the ritualized theft of cheeses from the altar of Artemis Orthia. At least some boys participated in the enigmatic *crypteia*.

Traditionally, we have combined all of our evidence for the *agoge* to provide the fullest possible picture. However, much of that evidence comes from late sources, such as Plutarch, who was writing in the Roman period, some 400 years after Sparta's heyday. Some scholars (notably Kennell) have argued that the *agoge* underwent numerous changes during its long history, and so we cannot take later testimony as evidence for the *agoge* of the Classical Period; for that, we should rely upon contemporary authors, such as Xenophon.

In another debate, it has commonly been assumed that the *agoge* provided a comprehensive education, but scholars now suggest that it may have represented only one aspect of a youth's education, with more academic learning remaining within the private sphere. There is similar debate regarding the private or public nature of the education of Spartan women, which, although limited in comparison to that of boys, was also notable among contemporary Greek societies.

The activities of the *agoge* have often been connected, more or less explicitly, to the reputed militarism of Spartan society. Yet activities such as stealing and the *crypteia* emphasize self-reliance and cunning, rather than the disciplined mass-phalanx for which the Spartans were famous. However, whether or not the *agoge* contributed directly to the Spartans' battlefield performance, it was certainly a major formative experience for any Spartan boy. Completion of the *agoge* was a prerequisite of citizenship. Furthermore, at around age 12, when a boy customarily entered into a pederastic relationship with a young man already in military service, and from the age of 20, when he was eligible for election to the elite *hippeis*, his performance in the *agoge* was undoubtedly a major factor in determining his success or

failure.

Philip J. V. Davies

See also Crypteia; Hippeis; Phalanx; Plutarch; Sparta; Xenophon

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Ai Khanoum

Ai Khanoum was an impressive Hellenistic city in northern Afghanistan, on the border with Tajikistan. It is important as the only significant Hellenistic Greek site in the region that has been excavated (albeit partially because of ongoing local conflicts).

Its location at the junction of the Rivers Kokcha and Amu Darya (Oxus) has prompted its identification as Alexandria on the Oxus, one of the cities founded by Alexander to help pacify the region during his Bactrian campaign (330–328/7).

However, there is no firm evidence to link the site with Alexandria on the Oxus, and several things militate against it. First, it was not a grid-style city of the sort expected from a new foundation. It grew irregularly, probably on top of an Achaemenid Persian site. Second, although the earliest phase of Greek settlement appears to be late fourth century, a third-century inscription mentions a “*temenos* (shrine) of Cineas.” This appears to have been set up during renovation of the shrine to the city’s founder—Cineas, not Alexander or one of his well-known generals.

On balance then, the city is very probably not Alexandria on the Oxus, but it is an important site built on an agricultural plain at a strategic location—both military and commercial (it was astride the main trade route for lapis lazuli). Around 170, it may have been the capital of Eucratides the Great, although again there is little direct evidence. From the numismatic evidence it may already have been in decline when destroyed by invading

nomads ca. 145.

Iain Spence

See also Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon, Bactrian Campaign; Bactria, Bactrians; Eucratides the Great

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Alalia, Battle of (ca. 540)

Alalia (modern Aleria) was a colony in Corsica established by settlers from Phocaea in Ionia ca. 566. The Phocaeans abandoned their city when it was besieged by the Persians (ca. 546). Fewer than half of them carried through with the project of settling in their colony in Corsica. For five years the new and old settlers carried on raids against Etruscan and Carthaginian shipping and ports. These retaliated by each contributing 60 warships to a fleet sent against Alalia.

The Phocaeans of Alalia engaged this fleet in the open sea and won what Greeks called a “Cadmean victory” (later a “Pyrrhic victory”): technically the victors, they lost 40 of their warships and the other 20 were disabled. The Phocaeans then abandoned the colony at Alalia and moved to Rhegium in southern Italy.

The Phocaeans, among the first to use penteconters (50-oared warships), excelled at this time in long-distant trading voyages and in piracy. Their settlement at Alalia is a rare instance of a Greek colony failing because of opposition from civilized states.

Douglas Kelly

See also Carthage, Carthaginians; Etruria, Etruscans; Italy, Greek Cities in; Naval Warfare

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Alcaeus (b. ca. 620)

Alcaeus was an aristocrat and noted lyric poet from Mytilene on Lesbos. His poetry, surviving only in fragments, includes hymns, drinking songs, love poetry, and political polemic. Perhaps his most famous poem is Fragment 6, the first known example of the “ship of state” metaphor.

Alcaeus played an active part in early sixth century Mytilenean politics and warfare, although probably too young (ca. 612–609) to help his older brothers kill the tyrant Melanchrus. However, around the turn of the century he fought against Athens in the war over Sigeum, apparently discarding his shield in one action. Like Archilochus, he wrote a poem about it.

With his brothers and Pittacus, Alcaeus plotted to overthrow Melanchrus’ successor, Myrsilus. Although the details are obscure, Pittacus may have betrayed the plot—at any rate Alcaeus and his brothers went into exile. During his exile, Alcaeus may well have traveled to Egypt and perhaps Thrace and Boeotia. He may also have served as a mercenary (in Lydia?), like his brother Antimenidas, whose exploits under Nebuchadnezzar Alcaeus records (fr. 350). Alcaeus wrote a poem celebrating Myrsilus’ death, but he and his faction may have been prevented from returning because Pittacus was elected as *aisymnetes* (supreme ruler) “against the exiles.” According to tradition, Pittacus, who ruled ca. 590–580, eventually allowed Alcaeus to return.

Iain Spence

See also Archilochus; Mercenaries

Further Reading

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Alcetas (ca. 420–ca. 360)

Alcetas was king of Molossia, the northern region of Epirus. By 384, he was living in exile in Syracuse and was brought back by a force of Illyrians organized, and in part equipped with Greek hoplite weapons, by the tyrant Dionysius I of Syracuse. The invaders defeated the Molossians in a battle in which 15,000 Molossians were reportedly killed. Sparta then intervened to drive out the Illyrians but Alcetas apparently regained his throne. In about 375, he and his son Neoptolemus (who later succeeded him) joined the Second Athenian Confederacy. By 374, he was also in alliance with, and perhaps subject to, Jason, the tyrant of Pherae. In 373, Alcetas assisted in bringing peltasts by land across his kingdom for the Athenian campaign to raise the Spartan siege of Corcyra.

Alcetas was the first ruler to create a state of some consequence in what was a backward region until this time. The kingdom was later linked closely with Macedonia. Alcetas was the grandfather of Olympias, mother of Alexander the Great.

Douglas Kelly

See also Athenian Confederacy, Second; Corcyra, Corcyraeans; Dionysius I of Syracuse; Epirus, Epirotes; Jason of Pherae

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Alcibiades (ca. 450–404)

Alcibiades, son of Cleinias, was a wealthy Athenian political and military leader in the Second Peloponnesian War (431–404). Charismatic and controversial, Alcibiades illustrates the lack of delineation between the civil and military spheres in ancient Greece and how political conflict could affect military operations.

Alcibiades moved in the highest social and intellectual circles; Pericles was his guardian and he knew Socrates. In 416, he entered an unprecedented seven chariot teams in the Olympic games. This lavish lifestyle, along with dubious personal conduct made him unpopular with

many in democratic Athens and provided excellent ammunition for his political opponents.

Alcibiades served at Potidaea in 432 and in the cavalry at Delium in 424, but first appears in Thucydides—our major source for him—after the Peace of Nicias (421). Alcibiades persuaded the Athenians to join Argos' anti-Spartan alliance—a risky undertaking, but offering the potential to neutralize Sparta. Although Alcibiades later claimed he had made the Spartans stake everything on one battle, allied defeat at Mantinea (418) ended the venture. The only result was increased Spartan hatred and distrust, helping lead to renewed war in 413 after the destruction of Athens' Sicilian expedition—in which Alcibiades also played an instrumental role.

In 415, Alcibiades urged an expedition against Sicily. Thucydides' account of the debate between Nicias and Alcibiades suggests Alcibiades was influential in the Athenian decision to do so. Unfortunately for Alcibiades (and ultimately Athens) just before sailing, he was accused of involvement in the mutilation of the Hermae (sacred statues located all over Athens) and also of sacrilegious parodies of the cult of Demeter at Eleusis. Despite requesting resolution before he left, the expedition was dispatched anyway and Alcibiades' political enemies kept the issue inflamed while he was away.

The Sicilian campaign began reasonably well but Alcibiades was recalled to stand trial before momentum was achieved. This left a major gap in the command of the expedition, exposing Athens to considerable risk. Worried his enemies had made it impossible for him to successfully defend himself (or perhaps because he was guilty), Alcibiades fled to Sparta. Alcibiades had family links with Sparta, was adept at fitting into new environments, and soon influenced Sparta's policies. He successfully recommended that Sparta send out a general to Sicily to stiffen local resistance, renew the Peloponnesian War, and occupy Decelea in Attica. Although all this was successful, Alcibiades soon fell under suspicion in Sparta (including of having affair with the wife of Archidamus II, one of the Spartan Kings). In 412, during a trip to Ionia that caused several Athenian allies to change sides, he defected again, this time to Persia.

Working at the court of the satrap Tissaphernes, Alcibiades recommended a policy of keeping both Athens and Sparta weak. To regain influence at Athens, Alcibiades then advocated a pro-Athenian policy. Although his maneuverings undermined his position with Tissaphernes and

led to an oligarchic coup at Athens, it eventually ended his exile. When the democracy was overthrown in Athens (411), the Athenian force at Samos refused to participate and elected Alcibiades *strategos* (general), hoping this would secure Persian financial support. Alcibiades' major service to Athens at this point was to prevent the fleet at Samos sailing against Athens. This would certainly have led to the loss of the Athenian hold in Ionia and the Hellespont and probably also to a general Athenian collapse. For the next three years, Alcibiades was active in the war in Ionia and the Hellespont. He never delivered on his promises of Persian support and in 410 was arrested by Tissaphernes, but escaped. Later that year he won a decisive naval victory off Cyzicus. On the restoration of democracy at Athens (also 410), Alcibiades was elected general *in absentia* to conduct the war in the northeast. In 407, he triumphantly returned to Athens and was reelected *strategos* in person. However, suspicion and political enmity continued to dog him. In a lapse of judgment in 406, Alcibiades left his steersman, Antiochus, in charge of the fleet. Despite strict instructions, Antiochus precipitated a naval battle at Notium, and was soundly defeated. Alcibiades' enemies pounced and he was exiled again, moving to the Hellespont. The Athenian generals at Aegospotami ignored his good advice and in 404 Alcibiades was murdered in Phrygia. Alcibiades was a brilliant but flawed character whose undoubted political and military talents consistently failed to deliver for Athens because of hostility from his political enemies and suspicions about his extravagant lifestyle and personal conduct.

Iain Spence

See also Aegospotami, Battle of; Agesilaus II; Agis II; Decelea; Delium, Battle of; Mantinea, Battle of (418); Nicias; Notium, Battle of; Peloponnesian War, Second; Pericles; Sicilian Expedition; Tissaphernes

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Alcidas (Active ca. 428/7)

Alcidas was Spartan navarch for 428/7. Commanding the Spartan fleet sent in spring 427 to relieve the Athenian siege of Mytilene, he had only reached Delos when informed of Mytilene's surrender. Alcidas then went to the coast of Asia Minor but anxiously avoiding any encounter with Athenian warships returned home as soon as possible. The revolt of Mytilene was the first big challenge to Athenian imperial control of the Aegean but Alcidas was not the man to exploit this opportunity. Even after the collapse of Mytilene, he rejected pleas from Spartan sympathizers to attempt to raise further revolts in the eastern Aegean. He did, though, capture neutral shipping and execute the crews, for no good reason.

The same timidity and incompetence were apparent later in 427 when Alcidas ineffectually commanded a Spartan squadron sent to intervene in Corcyra, then in turmoil through internal conflict. Despite this worse-than-mediocre record, Alcidas was one of the commissioners sent out by Sparta in 426 to establish the Spartan colony of Heraclea in Trachiniae.

Douglas Kelly

See also Brasidas; Corcyra, Corcyraeans; Mytilene, Siege of; Peloponnesian War, Second

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Alcmaeonidae

The Alcmaeonidae were a wealthy and unconventional aristocratic family

in Athens. They were at the height of their influence in the sixth century, but important Athenians of the fifth century, Pericles and Alcibiades, had Alcmaeonid ancestry on their mothers' side.

The first known member of the family is Megacles, who was archon (the chief magistrate in Athens in this period) in around 632. He was connected with a very shadowy event, the killing of the supporters of a would-be tyrant, Cylon, on the Acropolis. Sometime after the event the family's opponents, who were in control of major religious cults, succeeded in having the Alcmaeonidae exiled for sacrilege on the grounds that they had killed Cylon's supporters while they were in religious sanctuary.

Plutarch claims that he saw Delphic records naming Megacles' son, Alcmaeon, as Athenian commander during the First Sacred War at Delphi. The records, like the war, were probably spurious. More plausible is the story that Alcmaeon acquired wealth through connections with Lydia, though Herodotus' story involving Croesus has chronological problems. Alcmaeon's son, another Megacles, married Agariste, daughter of Cleisthenes of Sicyon. Megacles was, according to Herodotus, one of the three major political leaders in Athens, leading a group of families associated with the "coast," probably the southern part of the agricultural plain around Athens. Megacles at various times supported and opposed the rise of the tyrant Peisistratus. For at least part of the Peisistratid tyranny, the family was in exile.

Megacles' son Cleisthenes acquired influence at Delphi, helping rebuild the temple of Apollo in the late sixth century, and apparently used his influence to get the Delphic oracle to urge the Spartans to overthrow the Peisistratid tyranny. Returning to Athens, and fending off various challenges, in about 508/7 Cleisthenes introduced reforms that set the basis for the Athenian democratic system over the next two centuries. After Cleisthenes, who simply disappears from history, the family lost influence, and a number of members and supporters were ostracized in the 480s, suspected of being too friendly to the tyrants and to Persia. There was a rumor, rather implausible, that they had been ready to hand Athens over to the Persians in 490.

In the fifth century the family was less prominent, but Pericles' mother Agariste and Alcibiades' mother Deinomache were both daughters of Alcmaeonids. This connection was sufficient in 432 for the Spartans to suggest that, given the family curse incurred with the killing of Cylon's

supporters, the Athenians should expel Pericles. The Athenians did not comply.

Peter Londey

See also Alcibiades; Cleisthenes; Cleisthenes of Sicyon; Croesus of Lydia; Delphi; Lydia; Marathon, Battle of; Peisistratidae; Peisistratus; Pericles; Sacred War, First

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Alcohol

“Water is best” (*ariston men hydor*): these lines open the first Olympian Ode of Pindar. Indeed, the evidence for Greeks drinking heavily before battle is limited to one incident. Xenophon relates that before the battle of Leuctra in 371, Cleombrotus the Lacedaemonian king held his last council after the morning meal, and there was a rumor that because they had been drinking wine, they were somewhat spurred on. Wine was consumed on a daily basis in the ancient Mediterranean. Two *kotylai* (about a pint) of wine was the allowance permitted by the Athenians to the Lacedaemonian soldiers stranded on the island of Sphacteria.

In his *Cyropaedia*, Xenophon recommends the general should order wine to be carried on campaign only in sufficient quantity to wean the soldiers off their dependence on it, and this seems to have been normal Greek (and Carthaginian) practice. Wine was rather to be drunk after battle. Hecuba brings her son Hector a cup of wine “a great comfort to a weary man; you must be exhausted after fighting as hard for your loved ones” (Homer, *Iliad* 6.261–262). Greek soldiers of the Classical Period were generally responsible for supplying their own rations, wine included.

Nicholas Sekunda

See also Cleombrotus I; Discipline, Military; Leuctra, Battle of

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Alexander I Balas (b. ca. 173; Reigned 150–145)

Balas was a youth of allegedly obscure, low-class origins who ca. 152 was used by the kings of Pergamum and Egypt against their common enemy, the Seleucid Demetrius I. He was purportedly a son of Antiochus IV (reigned 175–164) and had earlier secured the backing of Rome. In a two-year war, using foreign troops, Balas won the support of the population of Antioch, the Seleucid capital, and defeated and killed Demetrius, who was deserted in battle by his own troops. At the age of 23, he took the regal name of Alexander, and among other titles, styled himself Theopater Euergetes (“With a God for his Father, Benefactor”). To the populace however he remained Balas.

His reign was discredited by factionalism and intrigue at court. Genial and pleasure-loving, Balas did not command respect. When Demetrius, son of the late king, invaded with an army of mercenaries (ca. 147) Balas’ only solid support was from the Jewish leader Jonathan. Successes won by Jewish forces and concessions Balas granted to Jonathan alienated his Greek subjects even more. Balas also lost the support of his former backer Ptolemy VI, who was instrumental in having Demetrius accepted as king. After Balas was driven out of the capital, he attempted an assault on Antioch with an army raised in Cilicia but was defeated, betrayed, and murdered.

Balas (the name may be Semitic in origin) is a puzzling figure—his origins remain an unsolved mystery. Before becoming king he showed remarkable diplomatic persuasiveness but in the event was unable to secure the loyalty of the army or the population of Antioch, both essential for a Seleucid ruler.

Douglas Kelly

See also Antiochus IV Epiphanes; Demetrius II Nicator; Maccabean Revolt;

Ptolemy VI Philometor; Seleucids

Further Reading

Polybius 23.18; Appian 11.67; Josephus, *Jewish Antiquities* 13; Athenaeus 5.211a; Justin 35.1.

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Alexander I of Epirus (370–331)

A Molossian king of the Aeacid dynasty in Epirus, Alexander, the son of King Neoptolemus I, was born in 370. Upon his death, Neoptolemus was succeeded by his brother Arybbas in 359, likely due to Alexander's youth. Arybbas formed a diplomatic alliance with Philip II of Macedon, sealed by the marriage of Alexander's sister, Olympias, to Philip. This marriage resulted in the birth of Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon. To curry favor with the Macedonians Alexander was sent to be educated at Philip's court. He seized the throne from Arybbas in 350 with the help of Philip II of Macedon. Alexander is credited with the unification of the Epirote tribes under the Molossians. When Olympias fell out of favor with Philip in 337, Alexander offered her asylum in Epirus. Alexander secured his ties with Macedon by marrying Cleopatra, Philip and Olympias' daughter, in 336.

Alexander was responsible for the Epirotes' involvement in the Samnite Wars. The inhabitants of Tarentum were under attack by the Samnites in 334 and sent a call for aid to Alexander. The Samnites had begun to raid and invade the territory of the other Greek colonies in Italy as well. Alexander secured an alliance with Rome against the Samnites and Lucanians in 332. Alexander's campaigns freed Heraclea, Sipontum, Consentia, and Terina. Despite his initial successes in Italy, Alexander was killed in 331 at Pandosia near the River Acheron, as was foretold by the oracle at Delphi. As he had no heirs, Epirus became a protectorate of Macedon.

M. Falconer

See also Epirus, Epirotes; Olympias; Philip II of Macedon

Further Reading

Livy 8.24; Justin 7.6, 8.6, 9.6, 12.2.

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Alexander I of Macedon (d. ca. 452)

Alexander I of Macedon (reigned ca. 495–452) first appears in our sources as a prince who killed Persian ambassadors because they mistreated Macedonian women at a banquet. Despite this, as king, Alexander provided tangible help to Xerxes' invasion in 480. He led Macedon's adherence to Persia and garrisoned Boeotian cities to ensure they supported Xerxes. In winter 480/79, Xerxes selected Alexander to try to bring Athens over to Persia.

According to Herodotus, the night before the battle of Plataea Alexander personally warned the Athenians of the impending Persian attack. If this occurred, then Alexander may have been insuring himself against a Persian defeat. However, the whole tenor of Herodotus' favorable treatment of Alexander seems tinged by his attempts to be regarded as a Greek. This involved Hellenizing his court, emphasizing (or inventing) his Argive ancestry, and participating in Greek festivals like the Olympic Games.

After the war, Alexander added considerable parts of Thrace to Macedon, including valuable mines (478–476). Although Alexander seems to have lost them for some time by ca. 462, his temporary control laid the economic foundation for prosperity and future expansion. However, his moves into the upper Strymon River ended previously good relations with the Athenians, who also wanted the region. He apparently lost ground there because of Thracian and Athenian opposition. Despite his apparent loss of the mines after ca. 460, when Alexander died (ca. 452)—either killed in battle or murdered, he left Macedon in a much stronger economic and military position than when he came to the throne.

Iain Spence

See also Macedon, Macedonia; Plataea, Battle of; Persian Wars; Thrace, Thracians

Further Reading

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Alexander II of Macedon (d. 368)

Alexander II of Macedon's short reign (370–368) was marked by military reform, which helped create the basis for Philip II (his younger brother) and Alexander the Great's successes, and an over-ambitious attempt to control Thessaly. To remedy Macedonia's long-standing weakness in heavy infantry, Alexander II seems to have established the Foot Companions and introduced hoplite training. In 369, having seized Crannon and Larissa Alexander was forced to withdraw from Thessaly by Ptolemy's rebellion at home. Pelopidas expelled the Macedonian garrisons, forced a settlement between Alexander and Ptolemy, and secured an alliance with Alexander, which involved Philip going to Thebes as a hostage. Alexander was assassinated in 368, probably by Ptolemy.

Iain Spence

See also Macedon, Macedonia; Pelopidas; Philip II of Macedon

Further Reading

- Diodorus 15.60–61, 67, 71; Plutarch, *Pelopidas* 26; Justin 7.4–5, 11.6.
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Alexander II Zabinas (Reigned 128–122)

In 128, the new Seleucid king, Demetrius II's invasion of Egypt to restore his exiled mother-in-law Cleopatra II failed. Cleopatra's brother, King Ptolemy VII Euergetes capitalized on the discontent in the Seleucid kingdom by putting forward a youth named Alexander as supposedly related to the Seleucid royal line and the adopted son of Antiochus VII Sidetes (reigned 139–129). An Egyptian force installed him in the capital Antioch, where the populace gave him the derisory nickname Zabinas (Aramaic for the "Bought-One"). He held the surrounding territory in the Orontes valley but

Demetrius II held the coast, including the city of Seleucia.

In a battle fought near Damascus, Demetrius II was badly beaten by Zabinas' forces and later killed, very probably on Cleopatra's orders. Zabinas, however, was soon eclipsed by Cleopatra, who installed as king one of Demetrius II's sons, Antiochus VIII Grypus (reigned 125–96), and she was the real power behind him. In a civil war that went on for six years neither side prevailed, until finally in 122 Ptolemy VII intervened in force to support Cleopatra and Antiochus VIII. Zabinas was defeated and fled to Antioch. His plundering of the Temple of Zeus at Daphne provoked a riot that drove him out of the city. He was captured by Antiochus VIII and committed suicide by poison.

Dynastic conflict was a constant weakness in the Seleucid kingdom, with no one contender able to impose stability. Intermarriage between the Seleucid and Ptolemaic royal houses gave the latter pretexts for interfering in Seleucid affairs to impose a weak or amenable ruler. Zabinas was a pawn in this ongoing struggle.

Douglas Kelly

See also Antiochus VII Sidetes; Demetrius II Nicator; Ptolemies; Seleucids

Further Reading

Josephus, *Jewish Antiquities* 13; Appian 11.68; Justin 39.1.

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Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon (356–323)

Alexander became the Macedonian king when his father, Philip II, was assassinated (October 336), reigning until 323. In 338, Philip's plan to marry Cleopatra estranged Alexander's mother, Olympias, and also caused problems with Alexander. Although this was apparently resolved by the time of Philip's assassination (during the marriage ceremony with Cleopatra), Alexander has been considered a suspect. However, there is no ancient evidence to support this and quite a few others had similar, or even stronger, motives to kill Philip.

Reconstructing Alexander's history can be difficult as his huge successes led to later embellishments and we have no surviving contemporary accounts. Most of the substantial ancient works (Arrian, Curtius Rufus,

Plutarch, and Diodorus) are from around 300–500 years after Alexander. The stories of those who served with him (Callisthenes, Ptolemy, Nearchus, and Aristobulus) survive only as fragments preserved in later writers.

At 14, Alexander began the standard four-year academic and military training for sons of the nobility in the school of Royal Pages. Aristotle was one of Alexander's teachers and a major influence on him. Alexander's first "independent" command (under the guidance of senior officers) was in 340 (aged 16)—a successful subjugation of the Thracian Maedi. In 339, Alexander campaigned with his father in Scythia. A year later, aged 18, Alexander commanded the cavalry on the left wing at the crucial battle of Chaeronea.

Proclaimed king by the Macedonian assembly, Alexander held Philip's funeral and marched south against rebellious movements in various Greek states (including Thessaly, Thebes, and Athens). Alexander's typically rapid and decisive action was completely successful. He was appointed *tagos* (commander in chief) of the Thessalian League and *hegemon* of the Hellenic League. He forgave Thebes and Athens and in Macedon, appointed his own officers and officials, removing or executing those of suspect loyalty. In 335, Alexander reasserted control over the rebellious Triballi, Getae, Dardanians, and Talauntians in the tribal north. He defeated them in a lightning campaign demonstrating his personal bravery, boldness, and great tactical skill. Thebes revolted during this campaign but was captured and destroyed on Alexander's return.

With Greece and the north secured, in 334, Alexander joined the Macedonian forces already in Asia. Alexander's army included important contributions from the Hellenic League, including most of his fleet. Alexander's first success in his seven-year campaign against Persia was destroying its western army at Granicus. Alexander secured the coastline of Asia Minor, liberating the Greek cities there, then disbanded his heavily outnumbered fleet (planning to destroy Persian naval power by capturing its ports) and invaded Caria.



Marble bust of Alexander the Great, dated to ca. 325–300, soon after his death. The bust's pose, with the head tilted up and to the right, is typical of a style popularized by Lysippus, Alexander's favorite portraitist, and typifies the degree to which Alexander was successful in managing his own image. Located in the Archaeological Museum, Pella, Greece. (Jupiterimages)

Ignoring Persian maritime successes in the Aegean Sea, during winter 334/3, Alexander took southern Asia Minor and advanced north to Phrygia (via Pisidia). Alexander next advanced through Cilicia. At Issus (November 333) Alexander destroyed a large Persian army under Darius III. He then took the coast of Syria and Phoenicia. Persian naval resistance was ended when the final major port, Tyre, fell in July 332. Rejecting Darius' offer to make peace, Alexander moved on to Palestine and Egypt, securing them by November 332. Egypt welcomed him as a liberator.

After making appropriate arrangements to govern his conquests (and

secure his rear), in spring 331 Alexander invaded Mesopotamia. At Gaugamela, Darius was again defeated decisively and fled to Media. Assyria and Persia proper surrendered soon after. That same year, belated risings in mainland Greece (including Agis III of Sparta's) failed. In July 330, Bessus, the satrap of Bactria, murdered Darius III but resistance and a subsequent revolt there delayed Alexander's complete control of the Persian Empire until spring 327. However, Alexander's insatiable desire for conquest and glory immediately led him to invade modern-day Afghanistan and then India.

Pacifying local tribes in the north, Alexander entered India and in his last major battle defeated King Porus at the Hydaspes River (326). Continuing east, his army's refusal to proceed stopped him at the Hyphasis (modern Beas) River. Unable to persuade them to continue, Alexander reluctantly turned around. His route back (south down the Indus River), involved brutal fighting against the local tribes, characterized by severe repression and massacre of resisters. In mid-325, Alexander traveled northwest along the coast, subjecting his army to a frightful crossing of the Gedrosian desert—large numbers of men and camp followers died. The army reached Susa in spring 324, 10 years after it had crossed to Asia. Alexander died, apparently of natural causes, in June 323 before finalizing the reorganization of his conquests.

Alexander's success rested firmly on his father's foundations: the wealth and stability of Macedonia, its dominant position in Greece, an excellent army and some very high quality and experienced senior officers. However, there is no doubting Alexander's military genius and it seems highly unlikely that Philip II would have won the victory over Persia so quickly and completely. Alexander's army gave him a decided advantage, but he consistently displayed mastery at the tactical and strategic levels and was particularly skilled with cavalry attacks. He won every major battle he fought against Illyrians, Greeks, Persians, and Indians, despite often being considerably outnumbered. In addition to the quality of his army, success stemmed from sound planning (including close reconnaissance), an excellent ability to read the course of a battle and act accordingly, and strong elements of personal bravery, inspirational leadership, and a willingness to take calculated risks. Alexander's sieges demonstrate both persistence and innovation. His strategic ability is attested by the sequencing of his Persian invasion, avoiding naval battle in favor of taking

the Persian ports from land, and his rejection of Darius' offer of peace after Issus.

Alexander's military skill was complemented by sound administrative and organizational instincts, although his results here were relatively untested at the time he died. He often preferred to win people over rather than use force and was often generous toward enemies. This was a particular feature of the early part of his career, but Porus is a late example. When opposed, he was quite prepared to make use of massacre and enslavement. This also extended to his personal retinue and his army, where dissent and opposition were often met by execution (or personal violence as in the murder of Cleitus). In later years, he became more authoritarian, evidenced by his demand the Greek states deify him, and his order to restore all exiles. In Asia, Alexander generally adopted local administrative and governance arrangements because they preserved continuity and secured the support of the conquered. However, this did cause unrest among his troops and officers, who were much less comfortable with the adoption of local customs (including dress). Despite this, his policy of founding new cities and settling veterans spread Greek culture and language throughout the east. At the time of his death, he was reputedly planning to conquer the western Mediterranean. His early death and the fragmentation of his conquests under the *diadochoi* (Successors) before his organizational arrangements to govern the empire were consolidated mean that we shall never know if Alexander would have been as successful a ruler as he was a conqueror.

Iain Spence

See also Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon, Bactrian Campaign; Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon, Destruction of Thebes; Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon, Indian Campaign; Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon, Invasion of Persian Empire; Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon, Thrace and Illyria Campaigns; Aornus, Siege of; Arrian; Callisthenes of Olynthus; Cleitus the Black; Command Structures, Army; Curtius Rufus; Darius III; Gaugamela, Battle of; Granicus, Battle of; Hellenic League (under Philip); Hydaspes, Battle of; Issus, Battle of; Philip II of Macedon; Sogdian Rock, Siege of

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Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon, Bactrian Campaign (330–328/7)

Alexander's campaign in Bactria/Sogdiana/Areia was the final stage of his invasion of the Persian Empire and lasted from mid-330 to the winter of 328/7. These satrapies formed the far northeastern portion of the Persian Empire and shared a common culture and language (with local dialects). Together they covered the present-day areas of northern Afghanistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. The region was wealthy from gold and silver and the silk route, but was largely tribal, often restless, and not always firmly under Persian control. The local tribes were known for their prowess as light cavalry. The campaign was characterized by mobile operations, bitter guerrilla fighting, and frequent uprisings. It also saw increasing opposition to Alexander from within his own ranks—Philotas, Parmenion, several Royal Pages, and the historian Callisthenes were executed after plots to kill Alexander, and Alexander killed his friend Cleitus in a drunken argument. However, Alexander was ultimately successful because of his careful preparation (he had reorganized his army, placing more emphasis on light cavalry and mounted infantry), by restricting hostile movement with new cities settled with Greeks and Macedonians, and by cowing the enemy through a mix of brutality and generosity.

When Alexander reached Areia in summer 330, the satrap, Satibarzanes, surrendered but shortly after raised a general revolt. Satibarzanes escaped Alexander's rapid counter-move but died in a subsequent rebellion. Alexander then campaigned southward into Arachosia and Drangiana,

down to the northern edge of the Gedrosian Desert, and then returned north to present day Kabul. In March 329, he pressed north to Kunduz, surprising Bessus (who had proclaimed himself king of Persia). Crossing the Oxus River (April/May 329), Alexander quickly overran Bactria and Sogdiana; Bessus was surrendered by his own men and Alexander executed him.

However, the region was far from pacified; fierce localized resistance turned into a general uprising in Bactria and Sogdiana, led by Spitamenes and supported by Scythians. Alexander used harsh measures (including massacre and enslavement) to deal with this, while neutralizing the Scythian threat with military settlements and defeating them in a major cavalry engagement. The Scythians made peace but resistance continued around Samarkand.

This pattern of warfare continued with successes on both sides in what was an increasingly bitter struggle. However, by summer 328 Alexander's settlements and mobile tactics led to increasing stability and attracted a flow of Bactrian and Sogdian recruits. Early in 327, Alexander took two major and reputedly impregnable enemy strongholds: the "Sogdian Rock" and the "Rock of Chorienes," thus effectively ending resistance.

The Bactrian campaign completed Alexander's conquest of the Persian Empire and provided a base for invading India. During the course of the campaign, Alexander was wounded twice, and may never have fully recovered. The way he not only adapted to but also anticipated the different type of warfare encountered in the region is further testament to his military skills. Alexander's practice of founding Greco-Macedonian settlements (and training local youths as Macedonian-style soldiers), also significantly reinforced the Greek presence and culture in the region, which remained down to the first century.

Iain Spence

See also Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon; Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon, Invasion of Persian Empire; Callisthenes of Olynthus; Cleitus the Black; Darius III; Parmenion; Sogdian Rock, Siege of

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Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon, Destruction of Thebes (335)

During his 335 northern campaign, Alexander's recently affirmed domination of Greece began to unravel. Returning exiles spread a rumor of Alexander's death and persuaded Thebes to revolt. If other disaffected states like Aetolia, Athens, and the Peloponnese (including Sparta) followed suit, this would be a serious threat to Alexander's control of Greece. Alexander marched at great speed to Thebes, arriving before the Thebans could raise external support. Gathering his local allies, he waited for the Thebans to make terms.

Although there was some division inside Thebes, the diplomatic option was ended (according to Arrian) when Perdiccas, a Macedonian commander, attacked without orders but was wounded and pushed back by a sortie. Alexander counterattacked the Thebans who were pursuing Perdiccas' men, routed them, and entered the city gates hot on their heels. Alexander's Greek allies had old scores to settle with Thebes and many civilians were killed during the capture. Thebes' punishment was left to the Hellenic League. Old hatreds, stemming back to Thebes' medizing during the 480-479 Persian invasion and harsh action over the years against neighboring Boeotian states, resulted in a vote to destroy Thebes.

The city was razed (except, on Alexander's initiative, for the house of Pindar and his descendants), the survivors enslaved, and all Theban exiles declared outlaws. The Cadmean garrison was retained and the walls of Orchomenus and Plataea (destroyed by Thebes) were rebuilt. The severity of this punishment quickly ended any open unrest elsewhere in Greece.

Iain Spence

See also Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon; Hellenic League (under Philip); Persian Wars; Pindar; Plataea; Siege Warfare; Thebes, Thebans

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Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon, Indian Campaign (327–325)

Alexander's invasion of India (327–325) was his final campaign. It involved the conquest of a large part of what is now Pakistan, Kashmir, and the Punjab; only part of this had been subject to Persia. Alexander had no idea of the size of the Indian sub-continent—the Greeks thought India was the easternmost peninsula extending into the Ocean (the sea believed to encircle earth's landmass). The campaign was characterized by hard fighting, the harsh treatment of those who resisted (especially those who had previously agreed to submit), the use of river transport, and the foundation of new cities to cement control. As elsewhere, Alexander appointed trustworthy locals to govern conquered areas while using Macedonians in particularly important regions.

Alexander set off in summer 327, leading part of the army by a more northern route; the larger part under Hephaestion and Perdikkas took the main route via the Khyber Pass. The “Indi” had numerous cities and were militarily strong. Divided into tribes under kings, with a history of internal warfare, they were not united against Alexander. Although the tribes between the border and the Indus River had pledged their allegiance to Alexander's ambassadors, several resisted when he arrived. Alexander treated harshly as rebels the first few cities captured, granting clemency to the next groups who surrendered. The message that he punished resistance soon spread. He subdued, in succession, the Aspasiens, Guraei, and Assaceni. He made a particular point of capturing the “impregnable” Rock of Aornus.

Alexander then moved south and, in spring 326, linked up with Hephaestion and Perdiccas, who had subdued the tribes at the head of the Indus River. Supported by the local ruler Taxiles, Alexander moved east of the Indus; at the same time Kashmir came to terms. Alexander first defeated King Porus, an enemy of Taxiles, at the Hydaspes River. Porus was treated leniently and confirmed as client king in his region. Moving further east Alexander crossed the Chenab River and (near modern Lahore) captured Sangala against stiff opposition. Pressing on, Alexander reached the Hyphasis River (modern Beas)—supposedly the end of India. When they learned that beyond the river was a heavily populated region with large numbers of particularly big and brave war elephants Alexander's troops refused to advance. Alexander tried impassioned speeches and sulking in his tent, but the troops were unmoved and Alexander reluctantly turned back.

Alexander moved south in November 326, transporting his army along the three major rivers, Hydaspes, Indus, and Acesines. This was quicker than land movement and easier for resupply. Alexander moved quickly to prevent his two main threats, the Malli and the Oxydracae, joining together against him. He captured the first Mallian city by surprise, caught the fleeing inhabitants of a second in the open, and took the third after a heavy fight. Anyone who did not quickly surrender was killed. At the next city, Alexander was first over the wall and left isolated there with three others when the ladder broke. Alexander survived, although seriously wounded (an arrow punctured his lung). The enemy garrison was massacred. The Malli's heavy losses and brutal treatment caused almost all the other peoples in the region to come to terms. Moving south down the Indus, Alexander accepted further surrenders and excavated ports. A revolt in his rear by the Brahman religious caste and King Musicanus was rapidly put down. Several cities were enslaved and Musicanus and any Brahmins taken were executed.

Alexander built a large naval base at the mouth of the Indus and in mid-325 set off for Persia, along the coastline. Alexander chose the arid coastal route, the southern part of the Gedrosian desert, partly because no army had successfully done it before. However, the army was also to provide important support to Nearchus' fleet, which was to establish a sea route to Persia. This offered a significant time saving on the overland route via Bactria, would assist in maintaining control over India, and would open up trade. Alexander's army was to march along the coast ensuring the fleet

was not subject to attack, and also to prepare supply dumps and locate water. Although the sea route was successfully opened, the army suffered badly from the heat and lack of water; many died. Alexander reached Susa in spring 324.

The Indian campaign completed Alexander's conquests. His Indian excursion led to no permanent occupation by any of his Successors (the *diadochoi*). However, it did lead to independent Greco-Indian kingdoms that lasted into the first century.

Iain Spence

See also Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon; Aornus, Siege of; Hydaspes, Battle of; Nearchus; Porus

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Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon, Invasion of Persian Empire (334–327)

Causes

The idea of invading the Persian Empire and exacting reprisals stemmed from the Persian invasions in 490 and 480–479. The initial view was that the Persians should be punished for the destruction of Greek cities; revenge for the destruction of Greek temples also became an issue. Recompense for these losses was the main stated reason behind the Delian League. However, this soon became inextricably bound up with the idea of freeing the Greeks of Asia Minor from Persian domination. Over his long career, the political writer Isocrates in turn appealed to Athens, Sparta, and Philip II to lead a

panhellenic attack on the natural enemy, Persia, and free the Greeks. Jason of Pherae also considered the idea. Success in this venture would bring Greek gratitude and, more practically, gain recognition as the most powerful state in Greece, and considerable wealth from Persian booty. It would also remove Persia's long-term interference in Greek affairs. Persian policy had been to use money and the threat of force to support whichever Greek states were less likely to focus their attention on Persia (these varied over time). At various points in the fifth and fourth centuries, this had tipped the balance of power in Greece toward those favored by Persia—sometimes Sparta, sometimes its opponents, such as Athens or Thebes. The successes of the Greek mercenaries under Cyrus the Younger (401–399) also encouraged the belief that the Persian Empire was militarily weak. At the time of his death, Alexander's father, Philip II, was preparing an attack on the Persian Empire, in part to unite Greece under him and cement his position as hegemon. Although Alexander the Great's motives are unrecoverable, the desire to achieve this holy grail of panhellenic sentiment, demonstrating his ability to exceed his father's exploits, and put his place as hegemon of Greece beyond question almost certainly played their part. However, Alexander's huge ambition was probably the driving motive and it is highly likely that the scale and speed of his victory far exceeded anything his more cautious father would have attempted.

Course

In 335, Philip II had sent Parmenion, with a force of 10,000 men, across the Hellespont and into Asia Minor. In 334, Alexander joined Parmenion with 32,000 infantry and 5,100 cavalry. The majority of these troops were Macedonian, supplemented by 5,000 mercenary hoplites along with 2,100 cavalry and 7,000 hoplites from the Hellenic League. Assuming that Parmenion's advance force was largely intact in 334, this gave Alexander a land force of around 47,000 men—a large army by Greek standards, but very small compared with Darius III's forces. However, many of Alexander's troops, and officers, were experienced and battle-hardened veterans. A chronic lack of good quality heavy infantry had hampered Persian clashes with Greek armies since 490—solved only by employing Greek mercenaries. With the exception of the Greek mercenary hoplites in Persian pay, the quality of Alexander's Greek and Macedonian infantry far surpassed any infantry fielded by the Persians. Although the Persians had good quality

cavalry, including mounted archers, far outnumbering Alexander's horse, they also lacked the experience, and in many cases the protective armor, of Alexander's troops. Although Alexander's supporting fleet of 160 triremes was heavily outnumbered by the 400-strong Persian fleet (which was backed by a considerable depth of naval resources), it was also of good quality. However, as his Greek allies supplied most of his ships, Alexander had to be careful with their use—a major naval defeat could cause unrest back in Greece.

The risk of problems in Greece influenced Alexander's approach to the invasion. His personal character, already demonstrated prior to the invasion, clearly inclined toward bold and aggressive action. He was a general with big ideas—matched by an ability to clearly read strategic and tactical situations—and an experienced army and officer corps able to execute his plans. This tendency toward bold and swift action was accentuated by the need for quick wins in Asia Minor to ensure no uprising against him in Greece. The small forces he left to secure his position at home in the event proved adequate, but could not have coped against a general revolt.

After absorbing Parmenion's force and securing one month's provisions, Alexander advanced inland, leaving Parmenion in command of his support base. His first major engagement was against the local Persian army of the Hellespont at Granicus. His victory here demonstrated the superiority of his troops and his abilities as a general and opened the way for his advance south down the Ionian coastline. Although some places resisted, in some respects the march down the coastline consisted of bloodlessly liberating Greek cities from Persian rule. Once they were liberated, Alexander enrolled these cities in the Hellenic League. He occupied Sardis, a symbolic blow to the Persians, but had to capture Miletus by force. At Miletus, he disbanded most of his fleet. The main reasons were a lack of money to pay for it and the risk of defeat by the much larger Persian fleet. Alexander kept a small naval contingent for tasks such as securing communications across the Hellespont and ferrying siege engines to Halicarnassus for the next stage of his campaign—the conquest of Caria—but had effectively abandoned the sea to the Persians. His plan was quite simple—he had decided to neutralize the Persian navy by capturing all its ports. However, in the interim this handed control of the Aegean to the Persians who occupied Samos and then Chios.

A feature of this part of the campaign was replacing the ruling oligarchies in many liberated Greek cities with democracies (there were

some exceptions, for example Rhodes), and sending spoils of captured Persian arms and armor home to Greece. Sacrifices to key Greek gods at important sites such as Troy also helped emphasize to those back home the panhellenic aspect of his invasion. In Persian areas, Alexander retained the existing Persian system, supplanting the Great King as supreme authority and generally appointing Macedonians as satraps, although in some case retaining locals in this role. In Caria, for example, the queen mother, Ada, adopted Alexander as her son and was appointed as satrap. Although he had little time to change the existing system, retaining it also had considerable advantages—it was what the locals were used to and gave him the same prestige, power, and authority enjoyed by the Persian king. As he conquered more Persian territory, Alexander generally employed this same methodology in administering his conquests, although in some cases a local satrap was coupled with a Macedonian who commanded the military forces.

Alexander overcame stiff resistance at Halicarnassus, the main city of Caria, but the leaders there, Memnon (a Greek in Persian service) and Orontopates, the satrap of Caria, escaped. This was unfortunate as Memnon took over command of the Persian naval effort, proving a vigorous opponent until his death from illness and Orontopates continued to oppose the Macedonian occupation until 332. Alexander continued to press his attack over the winter of 334/3, conquering southern Asia Minor and moving north through Pisidia into Phrygia. At this time the Persian success at sea faltered, not only with the death of Memnon but also because the Greek mercenaries with the fleet were ordered back to the mainland to stiffen the Persian army. Alexander's advance was delayed by an illness but he then pressed on through Cilicia. At this point he was keen to defeat the Persian army, and hopefully Darius himself if he led it personally. This would confirm his success to date, and allow him to either move against the Persian heartland to the east or south to Phoenicia and Syria. By moving south he could eliminate the main source of Persian naval power, Phoenicia, relieving the pressure on the island states and, as a bonus, open the route to Egypt. He could do neither without inflicting a major defeat on the Persian land forces in Cilicia—these barred his way east and would be a major threat to his rear if he moved south.



Mosaic ca. 100, perhaps based on a fourth-century Greek painting, depicting Alexander the Great's victory over the Persians at Issus in 333, House of the Faun, Pompeii. Reflecting Greek views of the Persians, it shows Darius III in some panic trying to flee from the Macedonian phalanx behind him (represented by the sarissae [long spears] in the background) while Alexander the Great is desperately trying to reach him from the flank. Located in the National Archaeological Museum, Naples, Italy. (Jupiterimages)

In November 333, Alexander achieved his immediate aim by destroying a large Persian army, led by Darius, at the battle of Issus (see illustration). Although Darius had outmaneuvered Alexander by appearing in his rear, he was unable to capitalize on this. Issus opened up Alexander's way south and Alexander decided to move down the Phoenician and Syrian coastline. One factor here was to complete his strategy of neutralizing Persian naval power by capturing its major ports and sources of ships and seamen—the maritime cities of Phoenicia (modern Lebanon). News of his victory over the far larger Persian army and the Great King himself preceded him and he occupied most of the coast, including the port-cities of Byblos and Sidon, without real opposition. The exception to this was Tyre, the most important port in Phoenicia. Relying on its fleet, strong walls, and its secure position on an island just off the coast, the city refused to surrender. However, the ships from Byblos and Sidon, and another 120 from Cyprus (which joined him after Issus) gave Alexander control of the sea. The city fell in July 332 after a bitter seven-month siege, during which the Macedonians attacked

from both the landward side, using a stone causeway they had constructed, and from the seaward side with siege engines mounted on ships. Although Alexander generally treated cities that surrendered leniently, serious resistance, as at Tyre, was often harshly punished. At Tyre, many of the citizens were killed in the assault and the rest sold as slaves. The loss of Tyre meant the end of any effective Persian naval resistance, ending the threat to the Greek islands and the risk of direct Persian interference in mainland Greece. During the siege, Darius offered Alexander a large cash payment (10,000 talents) and all Persian territory west of the Euphrates in return for peace and the return of the Persian royal women captured after Issus. This was a very generous offer but Alexander famously rejected it (Quotable Quote 8). Despite his success to date, this was a bold move, but the rest of the campaign justified his confidence.

Alexander pressed on south and by November 332, a year after Issus, had captured Palestine, taking the main city of Gaza after another hard-fought siege (see illustration in Art (Ancient), Greek Warfare in) —the survivors were sold into slavery—and then occupying Egypt. The satrap of Egypt surrendered without a fight—the Egyptians had a long history of rebellion from the Persians and welcomed Alexander as a liberator. In return he treated them well, respecting their cults, sacrificing to their gods, and building a temple to Isis. This was typical of how he secured loyalty in his conquests and the Egyptian priests crowned him pharaoh. However, he also divided power in Egypt between six governors. Two, with military power, were Macedonian, while two Greek and two Egyptian governors exercised civil power. He also founded the city of Alexandria. The combination of measures to secure loyalty—respect for local religion and customs, maintaining Macedonian control of military power, and new settlements were features of his successful control of conquered regions. His travel through Egypt included a visit to the shrine of Re, whom the Greeks regarded as Zeus, at Ammon. There the rumor spread that the god had recognized Alexander as his son.

By spring 331, Alexander was back in Tyre. To secure his rear before he advanced to finish Darius and take Persia proper, he finalized the arrangements (administrative, military, and financial) necessary to smoothly run his conquests to date. The next stage of his invasion went completely according to plan. Alexander's army was now 40,000 infantry and 7,000 cavalry, while Darius' military sources had shrunk to what he could draw

on from Mesopotamia and the western parts of his empire, such as Bactria. Although Darius' forces still outnumbered his opponent, Alexander had a major qualitative edge. This, and Darius' loss of access to Greek mercenary infantry, led to the third major Persian defeat at Gaugamela in October 331. This was a decisive defeat, although Darius again managed to elude capture. Alexander followed him up, first accepting the surrender of Babylon, ending the long link between the Assyrians and Persians, the core of the Persian Empire, and then occupied the Persian capital, Susa. There, the center of government, including the Persian treasury came under his control. The rest of the Persian heartland followed, including the royal palace at Persepolis, which Alexander burned (an act he later regretted). Too late for the Persians (or for any real chance of success), trouble erupted back in Greece, where Antipater, Alexander's commander had to put down two rebellions. The first was a rising by the Odrysians in Thrace, the second a rebellion, financed by Persian gold, centered on Sparta and led by King Agis III.

Alexander did not catch up with Darius until July 330, deep in the northeast of the Persian Empire. The pursuit ended in the Persian king's assassination by Bessus, the satrap of Bactria. Bessus led resistance in Bactria until his capture and execution in 328. Even this, though, did not give Alexander full control of the entire Persian Empire. This had to wait until spring 327 when Alexander finally suppressed a serious revolt led by Spitamenes in Bactria and Sogdiana. Once this was done, Alexander decided to extend the boundaries of the empire east and in summer 327 crossed into modern-day Afghanistan to invade India.

Consequences

The outcome of this invasion was the destruction of the Achaemenid Persian Empire and its removal as a factor in internal Greek relations. It resulted in the spread of Greek/Macedonian culture and language deep into Asia Minor and the removal of Greek states in Asia Minor from Persian control. In the short term, it led Alexander on to further conquests in the east—Afghanistan and India. In the long term, it saw the Persian Empire replaced by a range of Macedonian-led successor states. None of the *diadochoi* (Alexander's Successors) was ever able to control the whole empire, which was essentially divided between the Antigonids, Seleucids, Ptolemies, and a variety of smaller states.

Iain Spence

See also Agis III, Revolt against Macedon; Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon; Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon, Bactrian Campaign; Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon, Indian Campaign; Darius III; Gaugamela, Battle of; Granicus, Battle of; Hellenic League (under Philip); Hydaspes, Battle of; Issus, Battle of; Memnon and Mentor of Rhodes; Successors (*Diadochoi*), Wars of; Tyre, Siege of

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Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon, Thrace and Illyria Campaigns (336)

After becoming king of Macedon, Alexander III's first operation was to subdue the Thracian and Illyrian tribes to the north of Macedon. This campaign pacified the borders of Macedon so Alexander could invade Persia without worry.

The first opposition to Alexander's advance in spring 336 was from Thracians on Mount Haemus who had prepared wagons to send down at Alexander's army and disrupt his phalanx. Alexander had the phalanx make lanes for the wagons to pass through and the hypaspists lie under their shields and allow the wagons to bounce over them. Once the wagons had passed, the missile troops on the flanks harassed the Thracians to give time for the phalanx to re-form. The whole army then assaulted the Thracians at

the summit, easily forcing them into retreat. Alexander then came upon the Triballi camped by a river and arrayed for battle in a glen. Alexander's missile infantry drew the Triballi out into the open and then the cavalry attacked on the wings and the phalanx in the center; the enemy quickly fled. At the Danube, Alexander was opposed by some Thracians across the river. After an initial attack was repulsed, that night Alexander led 4,000 infantry and 1,500 cavalry across the river on improvised boats and rafts. Alexander attacked the enemy camp at dawn and the Thracians fled. Most of the local tribes quickly submitted.

In Illyria, Alexander formed a lasting alliance with the king of the Agrianians, who subdued his neighbors and provided a force of javelin men that became one of Alexander's most trusted units. Alexander marched against two Illyrian kings, Cleitus and Glaucias. Cleitus was besieged but Glaucias arrived with a strong force threatening to trap Alexander between them. Alexander, unable to face both forces at the same time, drew up his army and drilled them silently on the plain below the heights. The enemy came out to watch and fled when the Macedonians attacked them. The Illyrians still commanded the heights, threatening Alexander's ability to ford the nearby river. Alexander ordered his cavalry to attack the enemy horsemen, and fight on foot if they stood their ground. The Illyrians simply moved to hills on either side so Alexander, from the captured hill, sent light infantry across the river followed by hypaspists and the phalanx. When the Illyrians attacked the rear, Alexander's cavalry charged from the hill and the phalanx turned back to trap the Illyrians in between. The Illyrians fled and Alexander succeeded in crossing the river under the cover of missiles from the artillery on the bank and the archers midstream. The two Illyrian forces then merged thinking that Alexander had retreated. Alexander advanced rapidly with his best light troops and attacked the undefended camp at night finding the enemy still in their beds. This decisive defeat ended the campaign, allowing Alexander to focus his attention on Persia.

Graham Wrightson

See also Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon; Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon, Invasion of Persian Empire; Arrian; Illyria, Illyrians; Thrace, Thracians

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Alexander of Pherae (d. ca. 357)

Alexander of Pherae took on the roles, as tyrant of Pherae and *tagos* (commander in chief) of Thessaly, earlier held by Jason of Pherae. As tyrant, he acquired in our surviving sources a notable reputation for brutality—perhaps exaggerated by his opponents. Alexander became tyrant by murdering his predecessor, Polyphron, and cemented his position by marrying Jason's daughter, Thebe. The other Thessalian cities bitterly contested his efforts to take over Jason's position as ruler of Thessaly, and the powerful Aleuadae of Larissa enlisted Macedonian intervention against him. Alexander's reputation for brutality partly rested on having slaughtered the men of military age of two small Thessalian towns, Meliboea and Scotussa.

Alexander's Thessalian opponents also sought help from the Thebans, who sent diplomatic missions and small forces against him. These were ineffectual, and the Theban general Pelopidas spent time as a prisoner in Pherae after Alexander seized him during a meeting. The mid-360s saw Alexander at the height of his power, in alliance with Athens. Finally in 364, Pelopidas led a force that combined with Thebes' Thessalian allies to defeat Alexander at Cynoscephalae. Losses in Alexander's army were considerable, but Pelopidas himself was killed trying to reach the tyrant.

Now finally a new, larger Theban expedition forced Alexander to withdraw from most of his possessions and ally with Thebes. He was subsequently found fighting the Athenians in the Aegean, but his power was by then greatly truncated. In around 357, for motives that remain unclear, Thebe enlisted her three brothers to help her murder Alexander

while he was in his bed drunk and asleep.

Peter Londey

See also Cynoscephalae, Battle of (364); Jason of Pherae; Pelopidas; Pherae; Thessaly, Thessalians

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Alexandria, Egypt

A coastal city in the Nile Delta, founded by Alexander the Great in 332/1 immediately after his conquest of Egypt. Accounts vary—from the romantic to the sober—about how much of the city was planned by Alexander personally, although he did employ the architect Deinocrates as an urban planner for the site. At the least, Alexander recognized the need for the Mediterranean coast of Egypt to have a better port, large enough to berth his fleet, and the importance of connections with Europe via the sea.

It was not until Ptolemy I Soter controlled Egypt and buried the body of Alexander at Alexandria that the city became the *de facto* capital of Ptolemaic Egypt, in place of Memphis. It became one of the most important sites of Hellenism in the ancient world and remained the most important city in Egypt until its conquest by the Arabs in 641 CE. In Hellenistic and Roman times, it was a great center for education, culture, and commerce.

The lengthy occupation of the site has made the original plan of Alexandria difficult to discern. The city was built on a narrow spit of land between the Mediterranean and Lake Mareotis, to the west of the Nile’s westernmost mouth. The island of Pharos was joined to the mainland by an artificial mole, which formed two well-protected and spacious harbors; the city was arranged along the eastern one.

The city quickly grew in size, and despite having a mixture of Egyptians and Greeks, and a sizable Jewish population, the city’s culture remained firmly Greek in its outlook. Greek festivals, religion, and culture were

asserted over those of the Egyptians. Unsurprisingly, Alexandria was the epicenter for many revolts under the Ptolemies, especially during the reign of Ptolemy IV Philopator.

Russell Buzby

See also Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon; Egypt, Egyptians; Ptolemies; Ptolemy I Soter; Ptolemy IV Philopator

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Alexandria on the Oxus. See Ai Khanoum

Alliances/Allies (*Symmachiai/Symmachoi*)

The word *symmachos*, “ally” (plural *symmachoi*) literally means “one who fights with,” though alliances (*symmachiai*, sing. *symmachia*) eventually had a wider meaning. It probably originally referred to a friend who joined an aristocrat in his personal feuding and war-making. Often such friends would be aristocrats from other cities, and eventually the word came to refer to a friendly state. *Symmachia* had its origins in older, broader, reciprocal relationships of *philia* (“friendship”) and *xenia* (“guest friendship”). The earliest *symmachia* of which we hear was between Miletus and the Lydian king Alyattes, around 550. An early *symmachia* between states for which we have documentary evidence is one inscribed on a bronze tablet from Olympia, dating to around 500. It was between Elis and Heraea (an Arcadian town), who agreed to stand with each other in everything, but especially in war: if either failed, they were to pay a talent of silver to Olympian Zeus (*GHI*, no. 17).

A *symmachia* between unequal allies could easily become a form of imperialism. Sparta’s Peloponnesian League was constructed out of a series of bilateral alliances between Sparta and individual allied states: ancient sources commonly refer to it as “the Lacedaemonians and their allies.” The

allies voted on common action (perhaps seen as a necessary precursor after the Corinthians pulled out of Cleomenes' expedition against Athens in 506), but Sparta had the final say on League action, as seen in Thucydides' account of the decision in 432 to fight the Second Peloponnesian War. Thucydides has the Corinthians speak very frankly to the Spartans, but like all Thucydides' speeches this is probably largely made up, so it may be that in reality relations were somewhat more obsequious. Fifth century examples of Spartan treaties include provisions that the allied state will follow the Spartans wherever they lead, have the same friends and enemies, and not shirk in fighting Sparta's enemies. Sparta would promise to defend the other state, but not to take part in its offensive wars: the relationship was fundamentally unequal. Treaties may also have included clauses about not receiving exiles from the other state, or, in the case of one from Crete, a clause about the division of spoils from any war fought (*GHI*, no. 42).

In 481, the Greeks who refused to submit to Persia by offering earth and water made an informal alliance with each other, swearing oaths that they would force the medizing Greeks to pay a tithe to Delphi. Only as the threat became more real, when Xerxes arrived in Sardis, did they further agree to end wars between themselves (such as that between Aegina and Athens). Even in such desperate times, the question of leadership (*hegemonia*) of the alliance remained an issue: most states supported Sparta as leader, but Argos refused to join unless it shared the *hegemonia*; the Spartans refused, and the Argives remained neutral. A similar story is told about a failed approach for support to Gelon, tyrant of Syracuse. These stories are illustrative of the way the relative status of cities was a constant factor in alliance-making.

Athens' Delian League, set up in 478/7, was known in antiquity as "the Athenians and their allies" and initially the allies entered freely into, it seems, individual alliances with Athens. Athens decided which allies should provide ships and which should make monetary contributions, and assessed the latter, but the allies had a say in the League's activities through meetings held at Delos. However, it soon became clear that Athens would not allow allies to leave the alliance, which steadily became more oppressive, so that by the later fifth century the league was commonly referred to as the Athenian *arche*, "rule" (but commonly translated as "empire"). In the fourth century, the Second Athenian Confederacy was set up along similar lines, though with more safeguards built in to protect allied

rights.

By Thucydides' time, a distinction was sometimes made between a *symmachia* and an *epimachia*. A *symmachia* implied an obligation to take part in campaigns together, including offensive ones against a third party, while an *epimachia* was a purely defensive alliance (but *symmachia*, as the more general term, could sometimes retain the latter meaning). For example, in 433 when the Athenians wanted Corcyra as an ally, but did not want to offend Corinth, they were careful to form an *epimachia* with Corcyra, meaning that they would come to each other's aid if attacked. This was not entirely successful, as Athenian ships still fought against Corinthians at the battle of Sybota. In 420 the Corinthians, unwilling to be drawn into offensive war against Sparta, explicitly agreed only to a defensive alliance with Elis, Argos, and Mantinea. Alliances between equals were most often only defensive; the Delian League, notionally among equals, was an exception.

In 338, Philip II of Macedon set up a generally similar alliance to prosecute his foreshadowed campaign against Persia. Known as the Hellenic League or, from the city where it was set up, the League of Corinth, it was a *symmachia* within which allied states sat in a common council and contributed militarily. It differed from earlier alliances in that it incorporated a Common Peace agreement, banning member states from fighting each other and requiring all members to come to the aid of one who was attacked.

In the period after Alexander alliances became far less stable, as the *diadochoi* (Successors) to Alexander and the Hellenistic kings who followed them made and broke alliances repeatedly for short-term gain. In reality, of course, alliances had always tended to break down once the parties' interests differed significantly. In earlier periods, treaties were generally made for a specific length of time, though this could be as long as a century; in the fourth century, however, it became increasingly common to draw up treaties that were supposed to last forever (as indeed had been the intention with the Delian League in the fifth century). Clearly, when an alliance was made the exact wording was important. One side or the other might produce a draft treaty, which could then be the basis for negotiations. The Greeks often liked to have a preliminary stage of informal negotiations. At Athens, for example, foreign envoys might first consult the *Boule* (Council of 500), and then if negotiations proceeded satisfactorily, more specific

proposals would be put before the Assembly. In 346, the first Athenian embassy to Philip II of Macedon was sent “to converse with Philip regarding peace and the common interests of the Athenians and Philip” (Aeschines 2 [*On the Embassy*] 18).

The Greeks did not have an extensive vocabulary to describe treaties and treaty-making. In fact, the most common word for a treaty was *spondai*, “libations.” To make a libation was to pour a small quantity of wine onto the ground as an offering to the gods; this was a normal part of the ritual of swearing to a new treaty, and thus came to refer to the treaty itself. Treaties were presumably always in Classical times kept in a written format, and in many states they would be inscribed on a durable material, as in the case of the bronze tablet from Olympia referred to above. In the Peace of Nicias in 421, Athens and Sparta agreed to set up inscribed versions of the terms (on stone) at Olympia, Delphi, and Isthmia (a sanctuary at the Isthmus of Corinth). Many inscribed treaties have been found in Athens, but examples are also known from other places, especially the great sanctuaries.

When one party wished to renounce an alliance, they might simply take action such as revolting. But sometimes there was an explicit repudiation of a treaty: for example, in 340 when the Athenians wished to renounce their alliance with Philip II, they voted to pull down the pillar on which the Peace of Philocrates of 346 was inscribed.

Peter Londey

See also Antigonus I Monophthalmus; Athenian Confederacy, Second; Athens, Revolts of Allies (Fifth Century); Common Peace (*Koine Eirene*); Corcyra, Conflict with Epidamnus and Corinth; Corinth, Corinthians; Delian League/Athenian Empire; Diplomacy; Hellenic League (against Persians); Hellenic League (under Philip); Peloponnesian League; Sybota, Battle of

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Alyattes, King of Lydia (ca. 610–560)

Alyattes, the son of Sadyattes, father of Croesus of Lydia, and father-in-law of Astyages (Cyrus' grandfather), continued a war Sadyattes had begun six years previously with the Ionian city of Miletus. Because Miletus had direct access to the sea, Alyattes did not besiege the city, but wore it down for five years by constant depredations on its crops. In the twelfth year, Alyattes became ill and wished to arrange a truce with Thrasybulus, the tyrant of Miletus. A Lydian herald arrived at Miletus to find that, contrary to Alyattes' expectations, food supplies seemed abundant. This was a ruse devised by Thrasybulus to deceive the Lydians. As a result, peace terms were reached.

Herodotus relates the circumstances of Alyattes' illness, which was believed to have been a divine punishment for the destruction of a temple of Athena. Alyattes is said to have built two temples to Athena in Assesus.

Alyattes also fought against Cyaxares of the Medes. Alyattes harbored some Scythian fugitives from Cyaxares. The war lasted for five years, and ended in the middle of a battle because of an eclipse, the timing of which Thales of Miletus had calculated. Alyattes' daughter, Aryenis, married Cyaxares' son, Astyages, to strengthen ties between the Lydians and Medes.

Alyattes was also renowned for having a large tomb in Lydia, and for receiving prospective eunuchs in Sardis.

Abigail Dawson

See also Croesus of Lydia; Cyrus II; Miletus

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Amazons

The Amazons were a mythical tribe of female warriors. Formidable and dangerous figures: the Amazon fought, hunted, and gloried in war. Underlying the Amazons' martial preeminence is a Greek anxiety about social boundaries: Amazons are women who undermine the conventional Greek model of women's proper roles. Inevitably they are defeated in every encounter against the Greeks.

Amazons are scarce in Greek literature (exceptions are accounts by Herodotus and Hippocrates). They are however immensely popular in art, particularly in Athens. Several mythical heroes encounter the Amazons; three (Heracles, Achilles, and Theseus) appear in art. All Amazonomachies (battles between Greeks and Amazons) are assumed to depict one of these three battles, although it is often impossible to tell which. Amazons always lose, although individual Amazons may be shown as victorious within this overall context of defeat.

Amazons in literature are usually described as light-armed cavalry—a reversal of the Greek hoplite. Art is more varied. At first they are depicted as heavy-armed hoplites. Later, elements of Thracian or Scythian armor appear. After the Persian Wars, Persian costume is also shown.

The ideology of the battle changes over time. The earliest Amazonomachies reflect the prowess of Greeks against outsiders generally. After the Persian Wars, the Amazonomachy is used to evoke Athens' part in the defeat of the Persians; consequently, the Amazons' attack on Athens, seeking revenge on Theseus, largely supplants other representations. Persians and Amazons were considered to share multiple characteristics, such as their method of fighting, Eastern origins, and (more controversially) lack of *sophrosyne* (restraint). The scope of the theme is debated. By the fourth century, the Amazonomachy also represents the defensive use of righteous violence by the Athenians against other Greeks.

Diana Burton

See also Arms and Armor; Art (Ancient), Greek Warfare in; Persian Wars

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Ambracia and Amphilochia

The Ambracian Gulf, near the mouth of which the battle of Actium was fought in 31, separates Acarnania to the south from Epirus to the north. At its eastern end was a mountainous area known as Amphilochia, with its largest city, Amphilochian Argos, near the eastern end of the gulf. Ambracia was a city dominating a large plain north of the gulf.

Ambracia was a Corinthian colony, and remained close to its mother city. In 480, it joined the fight against the Persians, sending seven ships to Salamis and 500 men to Plataea. The Amphilochians, on the other hand, were considered non-Greek in origin. According to Thucydides, sometime perhaps around 440 the people of Amphilochian Argos accepted Ambraciot settlers and the city became Hellenized. In Thucydides’ own day, the historian tells us, the people of Argos spoke Greek while the rest of the Amphilochians were still non-Greek-speakers. But the new settlers took over the town, and the Amphilochians brought in Acarnanian and Athenian help. The Athenian Phormio arrived with 30 ships, took the town, and enslaved the Ambraciot settlers. The town was now repopulated with Amphilochians and Acarnanians.

The Second Peloponnesian War was a period of further conflict. Ambracia supported Corinth against Corcyra, and consistently supported Sparta during the war. In 430, the Ambraciots, with help from unspecified barbarians, tried but failed to take Argos. In winter 426/5, the Ambraciots arranged with a Spartan commander, Eurylochus, to make a joint attack on Argos, to get rid of Acarnanian and Athenian influence in the area altogether. For their part, the Amphilochians called in Athenian help, and the Athenians arrived with 20 ships and 600 Messenian hoplites from

Naupactus. The Athenian general Demosthenes took command of the Amphilochians and their allies. The resulting battle of Olpae ended disastrously for the Spartans and Ambraciots, and Eurylochus was killed. Demosthenes then surprised and destroyed a relief force sent out from Ambracia. Thucydides comments that Ambracia had suffered the greatest disaster over a few days of any city in the war. Wary of the Athenians obtaining a foothold in the area, the Acarnanians and Amphilochians refrained from capturing Ambracia, and the three parties agreed to a 100-year defensive alliance. The sequence of events is a good example of the sort of local disasters that the conflict of the great powers, Athens and Sparta, inflicted on many parts of Greece.

Ambracia remained loyal to Corinth in the Corinthian War. In the third century, the area came under the rule of Pyrrhus, king of Epirus, and he made Ambracia his capital. From about 229 to 167, it was part of the Aetolian League, before coming under Roman rule. After the battle of Actium, fought near the mouth of the Ambracian Gulf in 31, Ambracia helped provide the population of Augustus' new foundation, Nicopolis, which became the dominant city in the area.

Peter Londey

See also Acarnania, Acarnanians; Corcyra, Conflict with Epidamnus and Corinth; Corinth, Corinthians; Corinthian War; Demosthenes (General); Olpae, Battle of

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Amompharetus (d. 479?)

Amompharetus played a central role in the battle of Plataea (479). According to Herodotus, who presents rather a confused account of the battle, Amompharetus disrupted the Greek night withdrawal to better

positions ahead of a general Persian attack. The Greek center, the bulk of the army, withdrew further than agreed and on the right, Amompharetus, who commanded the Pitanate *lochos* (one of the five Spartan *lochoi*) refused to withdraw. Herodotus records a heated debate, during which Amompharetus threw a rock at Pausanias' feet, stating he was casting a vote to stay. Pausanias eventually withdrew, presuming (correctly) that Amompharetus would follow when he realized his *lochos* was alone. Amompharetus had almost caught up to the rest at daybreak when the Persians attacked. Despite the Greek confusion, the Persians were decisively beaten. Herodotus implies that Amompharetus was killed in the battle.

There are some issues with the details of Herodotus' depiction of Amompharetus. The Athenians, not Spartans, used pebbles to vote and Thucydides claims there was no such Spartan unit as the "Pitanate *lochos*." This may have been the case in his time, but not necessarily at the time of Plataea, and Herodotus had certainly visited Pitane. Although certainly dramatized, it is quite possible that the core of Herodotus' story is correct.

Iain Spence

See also Pausanias, son of Cleombrotus; Persian Wars; Plataea, Battle of

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Amorgos, Battle of (322). See Lamian War

Amphipolis

An important city on the River Strymon, about 4 kilometers (2.5 miles) inland and controlling the coastal route from Greece and Macedonia to Asia Minor and a good trade route inland to the Thracian tribes. Nearby were gold and silver mines at Mount Pangaeum and good timber for shipbuilding. Traces of much earlier habitation exist and a fifth-century Thracian settlement of the Edonians is known there—Amphipolis was Greek only from 437/6. In that year an Athenian, Hagnon, founded a colony there that included many non-Athenians. It replaced the existing Edonian settlement of Ennea Hodoi (Nine Ways) and was the third known Greek

attempt to colonize the region. The first, led by Aristagoras of Miletus, was defeated by the Edonians in 497. A later 10,000-strong Athenian expedition had initial success but in 465 was destroyed north of Amphipolis at a place called Drabescus.

Located on a plateau above a bend in the river, which surrounded it on three sides, and with a port, Eion, at the mouth of the Strymon, Amphipolis was a prosperous and important part of the Athenian Empire. When it was lost during the Peloponnesian War of 431–404 the Athenian obsession with regaining it, first from Sparta and then as an independent city, dominated their policy in the region for over 70 years. In the mid-fourth century, Athens and Philip II of Macedon struggled for control of a still independent Amphipolis.

Despite the fact that Amphipolis had an Athenian founder, and was part of the Athenian Empire, by 424 the non-Athenian elements were in a majority and it fell bloodlessly to the Spartans under Brasidas. From that point, Amphipolis enthusiastically supported the Peloponnesians. An Athenian army under Cleon was defeated while attempting to recover Amphipolis in 422 and although it was returned to Athens under the terms of the Peace of Nicias (421) the inhabitants refused to comply. An alliance with neighboring Olynthus helped Amphipolis remain free from Athens, despite intermittent but vigorous efforts to retrieve it. The last major military attempt under Timotheus (360) failed and in 357 the city was taken by Philip II of Macedon. It remained Macedonian until 167, when Rome freed it as part of its dismemberment of Macedon after the Third Macedonian War. Amphipolis was a naval base under Alexander the Great—his fleet sailed from there against Persia and three of his admirals, Nearchus, Androstenes, and Laomedon, were from or associated with the city. Alexander's wife Roxane, and infant son, Alexander IV were murdered at Amphipolis on Cassander's orders.

Iain Spence

See also Amphipolis, Campaign of; Brasidas; Cleon; Macedonian War, Third; Nearchus; Nicias; Peloponnesian War, Second; Philip II of Macedon; Thrace, Greek Cities in; Thrace, Thracians; Timotheus



Remains of the ancient timber bridge over the River Strymon at Amphipolis. Thucydides describes the capture of the bridge as a key moment in Brasidas' successful assault on the town in 424. Its location at the crossing point of the river added to Amphipolis' value as a center of communications. The bridge, whose antiquity has been confirmed by radiocarbon dating, was 13 to 19 feet wide. (Photo by Peter Londey)

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Amphipolis, Campaign of (424–422)

The Amphipolis campaign of the Peloponnesian War of 431–404 led to the Peace of Nicias (421) and Athenian loss of control in the region. The campaign stemmed from Athenian threats to execute the Spartans captured on Sphacteria if Sparta invaded Attica again. Looking for an alternative theater of operations, Sparta selected Amphipolis because of its prosperity

and importance to the Athenian Empire, and its accessibility by land. Strategically situated astride the coastal route to Asia Minor it was also economically important, both for its trade route to inland Thrace and its natural resources.

Despite the fact it was an Athenian-led colony (founded 437–436), by 424 the Athenians were in a minority there and Amphipolis surrendered without a fight to a Spartan army under Brasidas. Brasidas' arrival was a complete surprise—the Athenian commander in the region, Thucydides (the historian), was at Thasos with his ships and the inhabitants had no time to move their animals and other possessions that were outside the walls to safety. The threats to their external property, including crops and fruit trees, and Brasidas' moderate terms persuaded them to surrender.

Although Thucydides managed to secure Eion and repelled Brasidas' attack on it, the loss of Amphipolis was so important that in 423 the Athenians agreed to a truce with Sparta. However, hostilities continued in the north as Scione and Mende revolted from Athens after the truce was signed. Athens sent north a force of 50 ships with 1,000 Athenian hoplites plus 600 archers, and 1,000 Thracian mercenaries. Reinforced with peltasts from their local allies, the Athenians recaptured Mende while Brasidas was campaigning with Perdiccas of Macedon against the Lyncestians.

The following year (422), Cleon persuaded the Athenian assembly to send reinforcements to recover Amphipolis and the other states in the region. Thucydides provides the principal account of the campaign. Thucydides was a contemporary of Cleon's who clearly disliked him and this has led to modern attempts to portray the expedition as more successful than Thucydides allows. However, it was a failure. Cleon had 1,200 hoplites, 300 cavalry, and 30 ships plus an unknown but large number of allies. Joining the troops in Mende, Cleon had some good initial successes, recovering Galepsus and Torone. It is also possible he recaptured another half-dozen or so places, which Thucydides chose not to record—although many of these were pretty small and the evidence for their revolt and recapture is open to debate.

However, when Cleon conducted a reconnaissance in force to Amphipolis with his entire army he apparently mishandled the withdrawal. Brasidas seized the opportunity to launch a sortie, catching the Athenians in mid-maneuver. The army collapsed and Cleon was killed—along with Brasidas. Brasidas' victory and the retention of Amphipolis gave Sparta the

ability to negotiate peace from a position of greater strength. Under the terms of the Peace of Nicias (421) Amphipolis was to be handed back to Athens, but the inhabitants refused to comply. Athens never regained control of the city or surrounding areas.

Iain Spence

See also Amphipolis; Brasidas; Cleon; Nicias; Peloponnesian War, Second; Thucydides

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Anabasis (of Xenophon). *See Ten Thousand, March of the (401–400)*

Andocides (ca. 440–ca. 391)

The aristocratic Athenian Andocides was an orator and politician. Three of his speeches survive (a fourth, *Against Alcibiades*, is almost certainly a forgery). In 415, Andocides and other young aristocrats were accused of mutilating the statues of Hermes the night before the Sicilian expedition sailed during the Second Peloponnesian War. The charges expanded to include profaning the Eleusinian Mysteries and the whole incident was seen as an attack on the democracy (which ultimately caused Alcibiades’ exile). Andocides confessed and informed on others (later claiming he did so to save his father). Some of these were executed, and although he survived, the decree of Isotimides effectively banned him from public life. Unpopular with the democrats for attacking the democracy, his peers saw him as a coward who had betrayed his friends; Andocides went into self-imposed exile.

In 410, his speech *On his Return* failed to get his rights restored and he only returned under the general amnesty at war's end (403). In 400/399, his *On the Mysteries* successfully prevented an attempt to reapply the decree of Isotimides. However, his career ended in 392/1 after his participation in an Athenian peace mission to Sparta. Despite his speech *On the Peace*, the Athenians rejected the terms negotiated. Andocides went into exile again to avoid a prosecution of the envoys and nothing more is heard of him. Andocides' career illustrates the underlying tensions between the democrats and upper classes in Athens exacerbated under wartime stresses.

Iain Spence

See also Alcibiades; Peloponnesian War, Second; Sicilian Expedition

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Andrapodismos

Andrapodismos is a Greek word meaning “enslavement,” from the word *andrapoda*, “slaves” or “man-footed beasts” (formed on analogy with *tetrapoda*, “four-footed beasts”). In the context of war, it refers to the mass enslavement of captives or whole civilian populations, sometimes accompanied by the massacre of adult males. W. K. Pritchett lists some 140 cases where the sources mention such mass enslavements by Greek victors in the Archaic, Classical, and Hellenistic Periods. The purpose of such total destruction or dispersal of a population was chiefly the unambiguous display of power that it entailed.

Peter Londey

See also Achaean War (146); Caria, Greek Cities in; Civilian Populations in War; Laws of War; Melos; Plunder and Booty; Prisoners of War and Slavery

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Androtion (ca. 410–340)

Androtion, the Athenian historian, orator, and politician was from a prominent family (his father was probably a member of the Four Hundred, who seized power in 411) and a student of Isocrates. His history—an *Atthis* or narrative history of Athens down to 343—does not survive. It was used by Philochorus to construct his history of Athens and by the author of the *Athenian Constitution* ascribed to Aristotle. He may also be the same Androtion who wrote a book on agriculture.

Androtion was prominent in Athenian politics from around 386, taking an anti-Persian line and opposing Demosthenes' idea of an alliance with Persia against Philip II of Macedon. Demosthenes prosecuted him for an illegal proposal (354/3) and he was in exile in Megara from 350–340, writing his history.

Androtion's career is an interesting mix of intellectual endeavor and practical politics, unusual, but not unknown in Athens.

Iain Spence

See also Aeschines; Athens, Oligarchic Movements; Demosthenes (Orator); Philip II of Macedon

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Animals in War

Animals served an important role in the armies of the ancient world, functioning as baggage and transport animals, as well as carrying soldiers

into combat. They were undoubtedly also used for food, particularly when an army found itself in dire straits.

Horses were the most important animal for combat itself, both in chariot forces and cavalry. Horses were not as useful off the battlefield when on campaign, as they were less suitable as baggage or transport animals. These tasks fell the other equids—donkeys and mules, who were more surefooted and sturdier than horses, and therefore capable of carrying and pulling heavier loads than a horse. Mules were held in great value by the Roman army, particularly the Reatine breed, which could command a very high price (Varro, *On Agriculture* 2.8, also Columella, *On Agriculture* 37.3–11). Mules are the result of breeding a horse and a donkey—usually an equine mare and a donkey stallion—and as such are sterile. On the rare occasion a fertile mule was born, it was held to be a powerful portent (Livy, *History of Rome* 37.3). On the one hand, this made keeping large numbers of mules together easier, as there was no issue with hormones. However, it also made the breeding process more expensive, as the studs housed their mules as well as horses and donkeys. The mules of antiquity were generally larger and more robust than their equine relatives, a mule foal generally growing to be 1–2 inches taller than its mother. Mules are extremely intelligent and have a reputation for being difficult to work with (Pliny recommends giving wine to a mule to stop kicking—*Natural History* 8.173) so the muleteer held a key place in managing baggage and transport trains within the army.

Elephants were also used in war (see illustration in Elephants entry), although their combat potential did not come to the attention of the Greeks until the fourth century and Alexander the Great's campaign in the east. These animals became especially important in the armies of the Hellenistic east. Hannibal brought his Carthaginian elephants to Europe during the Punic Wars, in one of the most famous instances involving that animal in war.

The camel—both the Bactrian and Dromedary—were also used in war. The Bactrian two humped variety was the original type, with the single humped Dromedary likely developing as a mutation as the camel moved further south into the hot, arid climate of the Near East and Arabia. The Bactrian is the shorter of the two varieties, with stockier legs and longer hair, but a considerably more massive body. The Dromedary is lighter in color with shorter hair, longer legs and a leaner body. Both breeds are capable of carrying heavy loads and going long periods without food or

water by using the fat stores built up in their hump. The Bactrian and Dromedary were used in the armies of the Arabian Peninsula and the Near East as baggage animals and in combat. Bactrian camels are portrayed as tribute given to the Persian king on the Apadana Staircase reliefs at Persepolis. Arabian camel cavalry mounted on Dromedaries are depicted in a series of reliefs from the Assyrian palace at Nineveh ca. 645.

Both camels and elephants offered a particular advantage to the armies of the eastern Mediterranean when they faced more traditional cavalry: camels and elephants are terrifying to horses who have never encountered them before. Cyrus' camels caused chaos among Croesus' Lydian cavalry (Herodotus 1.80.4); while Porus' elephants caused significant tactical issues for Alexander the Great before the battle at the Hydaspes (Arrian 5.10.2).

Carolyn Willekes

See also Cataphractoi; Cavalry; Elephants; Hippotoxotai

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Antalcidas (d. ca. 367)

Antalcidas was a Spartiate sent in 392/1 during the Corinthian War as ambassador to Tiribazus, the supreme Persian satrap in Asia Minor. His mission was to make peace between Sparta and Persia because Conon's fleet was being used to further Athenian imperial interests. Antalcidas was prepared to concede Persian rule over the Greek cities of Asia Minor but the peace offer failed. However, Tiribazus did stop supporting Conon and privately supplied Antalcidas with money to support the Spartan fleet.

In 388/7, Antalcidas held the office of navarch and was able to negotiate peace and an alliance with Persia by conceding Persian rule over the Greek cities of Asia Minor. He commanded the naval operations blockading the Hellespont and forced Athens to admit defeat, ending the Corinthian War. The resulting treaty, often known as the Peace of Antalcidas as well as the King's Peace, guaranteed Sparta's Greek supremacy.

Antalcidas was ephor in 371/70 and as a guest and friend of Ariobarzanes, satrap of Phrygia, and King Artaxerxes II, had an unusual ability for a Spartiate to conduct diplomacy with Persia. He probably originated the policy he implemented to make Persia Sparta's ally and so is attested to have been a political enemy of Agesilaus; some modern researchers deny this. After Sparta's defeat at Leuctra in 371, when Boeotia successfully cultivated Persian support, Antalcidas failed to counter this on another mission to Persia and committed suicide.

Douglas Kelly

See also Agesilaus II; Artaxerxes II; Common Peace; Corinthian War; Leuctra, Battle of

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Antalcidas, Peace of. See King's Peace

Antigonus I Monophthalmus (382–301)

Antigonus Monophthalmus ("One-eye"), a Macedonian noble served under Alexander the Great and became one of the *diadochoi* (Successors) competing for supremacy after Alexander's death. During Alexander's invasion of Persia, as satrap of Phrygia from 333, Antigonus repelled several Persian attacks. In 323, the regent Perdiccas also allocated him Lycia and Pamphylia. Two years later, though, he fled when Perdiccas threatened him for not following orders. Antigonus played a major role in creating the wars that followed when he persuaded Antipater and Cassander that Perdiccas was plotting against them too. The following year (320) Antipater appointed Antigonus to command against Eumenes of Cardia in Asia Minor. In 319, Antigonus overran Eumenes' territory, besieged him in Nora, and defeated a relief force. On Antipater's death (also 319), Antigonus allied with

Cassander, Lysimachus, and Ptolemy I Soter to fight Polyperchon, Antipater's successor. His immediate task was to defeat Eumenes, now Polyperchon's commander in Asia Minor. Antigonus fought two indecisive battles against Eumenes—Paraetacene (317) and Gabiene (316), but at the latter Eumenes was betrayed to him and executed.

Antigonus seized the treasury at Susa and occupied Babylon—its satrap, Seleucus, fled to join Ptolemy in Egypt. Antigonus' success in securing most of Alexander's Asian possessions led the other *diadochoi* (Cassander, Lysimachus, Ptolemy, and Seleucus) to join forces against him. Despite this, Antigonus enjoyed several years of success against them. He sent money to Polyperchon to allow him to fight Cassander and secured local support in Asia Minor and the Aegean, respectively, by declaring all Greek cities free and establishing the "League of Islanders." This League was a maritime league, which had the additional benefit of remedying his weakness in naval power. Antigonus also conducted successful campaigns in Phoenicia and Syria. However, in 312 Antigonus' son, Demetrius (later Demetrius I Poliorcetes) was defeated by Ptolemy at the battle of Gaza.

This defeat led to peace with Cassander, Lysimachus, and Ptolemy (311) but also allowed Seleucus to regain his satrapy and rebuild his power base. Seleucus not only held out but decisively defeated Antigonus' forces at an unknown location (309). Antigonus turned his attention west, to the Aegean Sea and mainland Greece, leading to a long-running naval conflict with Ptolemy. In 307, Demetrius liberated Athens, and in 306 Antigonus defeated Ptolemy's navy off Cyprus and seized the island. Antigonus then proclaimed himself and Demetrius as kings—the other *diadochoi* soon followed suit.

However, Demetrius famously failed to take Rhodes and in 304 had to return to Greece to prevent Cassander from occupying Athens. Building on this successful operation, in 302 Antigonus reestablished the Hellenic League of Philip II and came close to defeating Cassander. Once again, Antigonus' success caused Cassander, Lysimachus, Ptolemy, and Seleucus to band together. In 301, the 80-year old and very overweight Antigonus was killed at the battle of Ipsus, left in the lurch when Demetrius' over-eager cavalry pursuit took him too far from the battlefield.

Iain Spence

See also Antipater; Cassander; Demetrius I Poliorcetes; Eumenes of Cardia;

Gabiene, Battle of; Hellenic League (under Philip); Ipsus, Battle of; Lysimachus; Paraetacene, Battle of; Perdiccas; Ptolemy I Soter; Successors (*Diadochoi*), Wars of

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Antigonus II Gonatas (ca. 320–239)

Antigonus II Gonatas was king of Macedon from 276 to 239. He was the son of Demetrius I Poliorcetes who was king until Pyrrhus and Lysimachus deposed him in 288. Demetrius died in Asia in 283, from which date Antigonus formally dated his reign. However, Antigonus was not able to enter Macedonia and begin effective rule until 276 and then suffered an immediate invasion by the combined forces of Pyrrhus and Lysimachus, which was eventually repelled. There were no subsequent threats to his long reign.

As with other Hellenistic kings, there were various marriage alliances, and Antigonus was related to several of the Seleucids and Ptolemies. All of the kings in the third century knew each other, and quite well. The first generation were men from the army of Alexander the Great, the next generation (including Gonatas) were their sons, who had grown up often enough in army camps and garrisoned cities.

The youth of Antigonus was spent primarily in Athens, where he was a student of Zeno the Stoic. The two men remained close friends for the rest of their lives. Although Antigonus was philosophically schooled, it would not be accurate to call him any kind of a “philosopher king.” He was apparently a very practical, hardheaded realist, capable of doing whatever needed to be done to maintain himself and his kingdom safely.

He arranged very early to exert a strong control over the nominally independent Greek cities to his south. At one time or another, he placed

garrisons within cities; in other cases he managed control by supporting (often financially) friendly politicians. He passed this control on to his successors.

His relationship with the other great powers differed. He was bound to the Seleucids by marriage alliances, although that may not fully account for the long-term friendly relationship. There was never any real hostility between them. It was a different story with the Ptolemies of Egypt. The hostility was constant, in part perhaps because both had large navies and sought sea control in the Aegean and adjacent areas (the Seleucids did not). There are at least two known great naval battles between Ptolemy and Antigonus, but neither can be dated with any certainty and even the context is unclear. Antigonus won the battle of Cos, and it is not clear who won the battle of Andros (probably Antigonus).

Ptolemy II was clearly behind the Chremonidean War (267/6–263/2), in which Chremonides, a prominent Athenian who may already have had connections with Egypt, persuaded his city to start a war with Macedonia. There were no major battles; Antigonus immediately brought the city under siege and Athens eventually surrendered. A Macedonian garrison was placed within the city and stayed for five years. There was no formal abrogation of the democracy, but Antigonus controlled all elections and officials. Athens presented no problem for the rest of his reign and beyond.

Janice J. Gabbert

See also Achaean League; Achaean League, Wars of; Aratus of Sicyon; Athens; Chalcis; Chremonidean War; Chremonides; Cos, Battle of; Demetrius I Poliorcetes; Fetters of Greece; Macedon, Macedonia; Ptolemy II Philadelphus; Pyrrhus; Successors (*Diadochoi*), Wars of

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Antigonus III Doson (ca. 263–221)

Born around 263, Antigonus III Doson was the son of Demetrius the Fair, half-brother of Antigonus II Gonatas, and paternal grandson of Demetrius I Poliorcetes. When his nephew Demetrius II of Macedon died in 229, Doson became guardian and regent for Demetrius' son, the future Philip V of Macedon.

Antigonus Doson defeated and repelled the Dardanian invaders who had defeated and killed his nephew, put down a Thessalian rebellion, and regained control of the region. In 227, he assumed the title of king. Choosing to exert Macedonian domination through diplomacy rather than military might, Doson formed alliances with Epirus and the Achaean League. The threat of Cleomenes III and a resurgent Sparta, supported by Ptolemy III Euergetes, led to Aratus of Sicyon, who had previously long been an opponent of Macedon, inviting Antigonus to intervene against Sparta in 226. To ensure Antigonus' support against Cleomenes, Aratus handed him control of the Acrocorinth, one of the strategic "Fetters of Greece."

In 224, Antigonus took possession of the Acrocorinth, stopping only long enough to install a garrison prior to pressing quickly on to Argos and then Arcadia, ejecting Cleomenes' garrisons in these areas as he did so. He then made his way to Aegium to meet with the Achaean League and, just before the allied army went into winter quarters, was appointed commander-in-chief of the forces opposing Cleomenes.

The following spring, in 223, Antigonus took Tegea after a short siege, and then marched on Laconia. He had to change plans, however, when news came that Arcadian Orchomenus had sided with Cleomenes. He stormed Orchomenus and then besieged Mantinea, which quickly surrendered, as did Heraea and Telphusa. With winter approaching, he kept his mercenaries but sent his other troops home to Macedon, while he attended another meeting with the Achaean League at Aegium. Seizing his chance, Cleomenes took Megalopolis, so Antigonus had to winter in Argos. At the battle of Sellasia in 222, Antigonus' victory over Cleomenes was so decisive that Cleomenes escaped with nothing more than a few close companions and fled to Egypt. Antigonus spared Sparta, claiming that Cleomenes himself was the enemy and not the city of Sparta.

During Antigonus' campaign in the Peloponnese the Illyrians had invaded Macedonia, and Antigonus now hurried north to meet them; as he passed through Tegea and Argos he stopped to attend the Nemean Games, where he was honored by the Achaean League, among others. Upon

reaching Macedonia he defeated the Illyrian invaders, but during the battle became sick and died shortly afterward, leaving the Macedonian throne to Philip V.

David Harthen

See also Achaean League; Antigonus II Gonatas; Aratus of Sicyon; Cleomenes III; Epirus, Epirotes; Fetters of Greece; Illyria, Illyrians; Macedon, Macedonia; Philip V; Philopoemen; Polybius; Ptolemy III Euergetes; Sellasia, Battle of; Sparta; Thessaly, Thessalians

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Antiochus I Soter (ca. 324–261)

Antiochus I Soter was a king of the Hellenistic Seleucid Empire. He reigned from 292 to 261 (as co-regent until 281). Antiochus I was the son of King Seleucus I Nicator and the Sogdian princess Apama. Soon after Seleucus' assassination in 281, Antiochus had to restore his father's empire by force of arms because of revolts in Syria and northern Anatolia, and a war led by Antigonus II Gonatas of Macedon. In addition, some 20,000 Galatians entered Asia Minor in 278, creating havoc. The victory Antiochus won over them three years later, with the systematic use of war elephants (see illustration in Elephants entry), led to his title of Soter ("savior"). Antiochus also founded many new cities in Asia Minor and modern-day Iran, while at Babylon he rebuilt the ancient Esagila shrine.

At the end of 275, the continuous friction between the Seleucids and the Ptolemies over the regions of Coele-Syria and Phoenicia, led to full-scale war (known as the First Syrian War). The war did not change the borders of the two kingdoms dramatically, and Coele-Syria and Phoenicia remained under Ptolemaic rule. Around 262, Antiochus tried to put an end to the growing power of Eumenes I of Pergamum by military force, but he was defeated near the city of Sardis and died soon afterward. Antiochus was succeeded in 261 by his second son, Antiochus II Theos.

See also Antigonus II Gonatas; Eumenes I of Pergamum; Galatians; Seleucids; Seleucus I Nicator; Syrian-Egyptian War, First

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Antiochus III (the Great) (d. 187)

Antiochus III Megas (“the Great”) ruled the Seleucid kingdom between 223 and 187. Antiochus succeeded to the throne at the age of 20, after the death of his elder brother, the previous king, Seleucus III. He put his cousin Achaeus in charge of Asia Minor west of the Taurus Mountains, with the specific task of reconquering Seleucid lands seized by Attalus I, founder of the breakaway kingdom of Pergamum. Falsely accused by Antiochus’ minister Hermeias of planning a rebellion, Achaeus had himself made king in 221/20. At this time, Antiochus was busy putting down the rebellion of Molon, the Seleucid satrap of Media and governor-general of the Upper Satrapies. Between 219 and 217, Antiochus fought the Fourth Syrian War against Ptolemy IV over Coele-Syria. He succeeded in conquering Tyre and Seleucia Pieria, among other places, but these acquisitions were lost when he was defeated at the battle of Raphia in 217. Antiochus then turned to Achaeus and the war in Asia Minor. With the help of Attalus, he reconquered the Seleucid domains west of the Taurus, and captured and executed Achaeus in 213.



Silver tetradrachm of Antiochus III (the Great), minted at Antioch, 222–210. Antiochus' attempts to expand the Seleucid Empire were relatively successful until he clashed with Rome. Defeated in the Syrian-Roman War (192–188), Antiochus was forced to surrender Asia Minor west of the Taurus Mountains, all his war elephants, and most of his navy. (Yale University Art Gallery)

In 212, Antiochus began his *anabasis*, a massive military expedition across his eastern empire to recover areas lost during the Seleucid civil wars of 245–225. He brought Parthia and its king, Arsaces II, to heel. He next attacked the rebellious kingdom of Bactria, under the rule of Euthydemus I. Antiochus defeated Euthydemus in the battle of Arius in 209, but was forced to make peace with him after the unsuccessful siege of the Bactrian capital, Bactra. Antiochus then pressed on into Afghanistan and India, crossing the Hindu Kush and renewing his friendship with Sophagasen (Subhashsena) before returning west. It was probably during his *anabasis*, which

resembled that of Alexander the Great, that Antiochus began styling himself “The Great,” in conscious imitation of Alexander.

After his return to the west, Antiochus resumed hostilities with the Ptolemaic kingdom over Coele-Syria. The throne was now occupied by “a helpless infant,” the five-year-old Ptolemy V Epiphanes, and Polybius records the striking of a secret pact by Antiochus and Philip V of Macedon in winter 203/2 to attack and dismember the Ptolemaic kingdom. The Fifth Syrian War (202–195) saw Antiochus recover Coele-Syria from Ptolemy and a major Seleucid victory at the battle of Panium (200).

Beginning in 196, Antiochus began consolidating what he regarded as ancestral Seleucid territory in Asia Minor, attacking various Greek cities and Rhodian and Pergamene territory, and crossing the Hellespont into European Thrace. Antiochus’ relentless aggression, especially against Rome’s eastern friends, and his formidable reputation as a “new Alexander” drew the attention of the Romans, beginning in the late 200s. The Republic established friendship with him in 200 during a failed Roman attempt to mediate the Fifth Syrian War. In 198, the Romans successfully intervened in the conflict between Antiochus and Attalus of Pergamum. After the Roman victory over Philip V in the Second Macedonian War, the Romans warned Antiochus not to harm the autonomous Greek cities of Asia Minor, and to evacuate the former possessions of Ptolemy and Philip there. At a conference at Lysimacheia in September 196, Antiochus effectively outmaneuvered the Romans, responding to their complaints point for point. Now firmly established in Thrace and Coele-Syria, Antiochus requested a treaty of alliance with Rome to clarify his status and authority relative to Rome’s in the east. The Romans refused and demanded that the king abandon Thrace. Antiochus simply ignored the ultimatum.

In 192, the Aetolians, disgruntled by Roman treatment of them in the settlement of the Second Macedonian War, made Antiochus *strategos* of their League, and the king crossed to Greece in 192. The Syrian-Roman War (192–188) broke out when Antiochus’ soldiers attacked some Roman soldiers at Delium. The Romans defeated Antiochus twice in battle, at Thermopylae (191) and Magnesia in Asia Minor (190/89). The subsequent Peace of Apamea (188) compelled Antiochus to give up all his territory west and north of the Taurus. Antiochus was killed in 187 while plundering the Temple of Baal at Susa.

Paul J. Burton

See also Achaeus; Aetolia, Aetolian League; Attalus I of Pergamum; Euthydemus I of Bactria; Macedonian War, Second; Magnesia, Battle of; Pergamum; Philip V; Ptolemy IV Philopator; Ptolemy V Epiphanes; Raphia, Battle of; Syria; Syrian-Egyptian War, Fourth; Syrian-Egyptian War, Fifth; Syrian-Roman War

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Antiochus IV Epiphanes (ca. 215–164)

Antiochus IV Epiphanes was king of the Hellenistic Seleucid Empire from 175 to 164. He was the son of Antiochus III and Laodice III. After his father's defeat by the Romans in 189, Antiochus was sent to Rome as a political hostage. He remained there until 175, when his brother Seleucus III managed to release him. Soon afterward, Seleucus was assassinated, and Antiochus claimed the throne.

In 170, the Ptolemies demanded the return of Coele Syria, Palestine, and Phoenicia, which had been recently conquered by the Seleucids. Antiochus responded swiftly and with a preemptive attack took control of Egypt and Cyprus (the Sixth Syrian-Egyptian War). Because of Roman intervention, however, Antiochus was unable to keep those newly gained territories.

On his way back from Egypt (167), Antiochus sacked the city of Jerusalem. The Jewish religion was outlawed and Antiochus enforced the establishment of an imperial cult; a statue of him portrayed as Zeus was erected in the Jewish temple. This move, in connection to a general effort for the Hellenization of the Jews, eventually led to the Maccabean Revolt.

Antiochus returned in triumph to Antioch (166) but soon had to turn his

attention to more serious problems on his eastern borders, where he was forced to face the Armenians and the Parthians. Antiochus fell ill and died in 164 while in Persia.

Ioannis Georganas

See also Antiochus III (the Great); Judaea, Jews; Maccabean Revolt; Ptolemies; Ptolemy VI Philometor; Seleucids; Syrian-Egyptian War, Sixth

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Antiochus VII Sidetes (b. ca. 159; Reigned 139–129)

Antiochus VII Sidetes was the last Seleucid king who might have held the empire together. When his older brother Demetrius II was captured in Parthia in 139, Antiochus occupied the northern part of the empire with a mercenary army and was then invited into the capital Antioch by Demetrius II's wife Cleopatra. He then married her and took the title King Antiochus Euergetes ("Benefactor"). However, he was more commonly known by the nickname "Sidetes" ("the Sidonian") from his early life in Side in southern Asia Minor.

Antiochus vigorously suppressed the usurper Diodotus Tryphon who had been in control of the southern parts of the empire since Demetrius II's reign. He also reasserted Seleucid control over Judea-Palestine (135–134). With the western empire restored to its full extent, in 129 Antiochus launched an ambitious campaign to win back territory in present-day Iraq and Iran that had been lost to Parthia. He won several victories across these regions but could not bring the Parthian king to accept subjection to Seleucid rule. His army, wintering in scattered camps, was surprised by local uprisings. The main Parthian force shattered Antiochus' army near Ecbatana. He was killed and most of his army taken prisoner.

This disaster, and the loss of manpower, made permanent the loss of the eastern territories. The Seleucid realm was now confined to Syria and the immediately adjacent territories.

See also Demetrius II Nicator; Seleucids; Tryphon/Diodotus.

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Antiochus Hierax (ca. 260–226)

Antiochus Hierax (“The Hawk”) was the younger brother of King Seleucus II (reigned 246–225). Placed in charge of Seleucid territory in Asia Minor with the backing of his mother Laodice, the late king’s widow, he acted as a virtually independent ruler, supplying reinforcements in the Third Syrian War (246–241) only on condition of being recognized by his brother as joint king.

When Seleucus II moved against Hierax in the “War of the Brothers” (237–236), he defeated him in two battles but failed to capture Sardis, where Hierax had taken refuge. Hierax then made alliances with the Seleucids’ enemies in Asia Minor: Ziaelas of Bithynia, Mithridates II of Pontus, and the Galatians. This coalition defeated Seleucus II heavily at Ancyra and forced him to make peace.

Hierax had to pay indemnities to the Galatians and even so could not prevent them from plundering his territory. King Attalus I of Pergamum undertook a defensive war against the Galatians and building on his successes drove a discredited Hierax out of Asia Minor. Hierax fled to King Arsames of Armenia and induced him to provide forces for an attack on his brother. Hierax was defeated by a Seleucid reserve army in Mesopotamia, commanded by Seleucus II’s uncle Andromachus and his cousin Achaeus. Seleucus II himself was forced to break off his campaign against the Parthians and drove Hierax out of Asia Minor, where he had attempted to reestablish himself, into Thrace. There he was murdered by some Galatians.

Hierax’s turbulent career illustrates how tenuous the Seleucids’ hold on

Asia Minor was and how prone the Seleucid family was to internal conflict.
Douglas Kelly

See also Achaeus; Attalus I of Pergamum; Galatians; Parthia; Seleucids

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Antipater (399/8–319)

Antipater was Alexander's regent in Macedon during the king's conquest of Asia. He suppressed two significant uprisings against Macedonian hegemony. The first was led by the Spartan king Agis III in 331, and the second—a largely Athenian revolt under Leosthenes—occurred after Alexander's death in 323. Plutarch records the rumor that Antipater and his son Iollas were part of a plot to poison Alexander in 323.

Born in 399/8, Antipater had a long history of military and political service to Macedon, and his role at court probably extended back to the time of Perdiccas III. He may have participated in the Illyrian campaign of Perdiccas, and, according to the *Suda*, composed a history of the campaign. He is also thought to have written a collection of letters in two books. A number of letters of Antipater are cited by Cicero and Plutarch. Antipater had been a friend of Aristotle and probably a follower of the Aristotelian school of philosophy, as the *Suda* also reports. Aristotle resided at the Macedonian court in the reign of Philip II, so it is possible that Antipater forged his friendship with the philosopher during this period. Later writers quote Aristotle's correspondence with Antipater, and Aristotle appointed Antipater the executor of his will. Antipater may well have supported the emerging Lyceum as a school for Aristotelian philosophy.

Antipater, along with Parmenion, played a significant role in negotiating the peace settlement (Peace of Philocrates) between Athens and Macedonia in 346. In 342, Antipater assumed the first of what would be several roles acting as a royal representative in various capacities. He represented Philip

at the Pythian games as a religious state ambassador (*theoros*), and was appointed as regent of Macedonia before Alexander's coming of age.

While Antipater served Philip as a general and foreign diplomat, helping the often undiplomatic Philip deal with especially subtle Greek affairs, it was after Philip's assassination that he revealed his keen political insight and judgment. In the chaotic aftermath of Philip's murder, Alexander's accession owed much of its success to Antipater's early support, and this support was rewarded with increased influence in the court.

During the Lamian War Antipater defeated the Athenians at the battle of Crannon in September 323, then suspended the Athenian democracy and was responsible for the death of Demosthenes. After the Triparadisus settlement in 321, he retained control over Greece and Alexander's son (Alexander IV). At his death in 319, following an illness, Antipater left his kingdom to Polyperchon, rather than his own son Cassander.

John Walsh

See also Agis III, Revolt against Macedon; Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon; Cassander; Demosthenes (Orator); Lamian War; Parmenion; Philip II of Macedon; Philocrates, Peace of; Polyperchon

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Antiphon (ca. 480–410)

Antiphon was an Athenian aristocrat, orator and oligarchic politician. Six of his speeches, representing very early examples of Attic oratory, survive. Antiphon disliked the democracy and rarely if ever spoke in public—his speeches were written for others. In 411, Antiphon emerged from the shadows as a leader of the oligarchs known as the Four Hundred, who overthrew the democracy. Antiphon was regarded as the intellectual force

behind the group and led the ideologically extreme faction against Theramenes and the moderates.

When the Four Hundred were overthrown (410) Antiphon was one of its few members who remained at Athens. He was tried and, despite Thucydides' assessment (8.68) that "he made the best defense speech of all up to that time," was executed.

Antiphon's career illustrates the underlying resistance of some members of the upper classes to the democracy. Although generally buried below the surface (the upper classes profited from the empire) they did emerge under the stresses of the latter stages of the Second Peloponnesian War (431–404).

Iain Spence

See also Athens, Oligarchic Movements; Peloponnesian War, Second; Theramenes

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Aornus, Siege of (327/6)

Aornus, sometimes called Aornis, was besieged and captured in winter 327/6, in the early stages of Alexander the Great's Indian campaign. Aornus was one of the last of Alexander's major sieges and Alexander is supposed to have been driven to take this seemingly impregnable fort on top of a mountain spur because his ancestor Hercules had failed to take it. However, the site also threatened his long supply line back over the Hindu Kush. Using local guides to find the best approach, Alexander secured a hilltop on it, built a mound to engage the defenders with archers and siege engines and built a ramp to the site. Although his initial assault was repulsed, his tenacity in continuing terrified the defenders and they negotiated a truce on the pretense of surrendering but intending to withdraw that night. Alexander anticipated this and ambushed the retreating enemy, causing

major casualties.

Iain Spence

See also Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon; Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon, Indian Campaign; Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon, Invasion of Persian Empire; Siege Warfare

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Apamea, Peace of. See Syrian-Roman War (192–188)

Appian of Alexandria (ca. 95–165 CE)

Appian wrote a series of historical works dealing thematically with the various wars of the Roman state down to the early first century CE. The parts of his surviving work that are relevant to Greek history are from his Roman History: Book 9 *Macedonica* (fragmentary), Book 11 *Syriaca* (on the Seleucids) and Book 12 *Mithridatica* (on Rome's wars with Mithridates of Pontus). These are sometimes referred to as if they are discrete works under the titles: *Macedonian Wars*, *Syrian Wars*, and *Mithridatic Wars*. Appian was at his best a reasonably competent historian but his chosen method led at times to error and excessive compression.

Douglas Kelly

See also Roman Section: Appian

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Aratus of Sicyon (271–213)

Aratus was an Achaean League political and military commander, instrumental in uniting much of the Peloponnese against Macedon, and then against Sparta and the Aetolian league. When his father, Cleineas, was assassinated (ca. 264) Aratus was exiled and completed his education in Argos. Returning in 251, aged 20, Aratus expelled the tyrant Nicocles. He soon brought Sicyon into the Achaean League, an innovative policy both for Sicyon and the League, and from 245, at the very young age of 26, he was usually elected general (*strategos*) of the Achaean League every second year. Incumbents could not hold the post two years in a row, so continued reelection (he held office 17 times) was the closest to permanent tenure possible.

Aratus' ancient reputation was of a man lacking physical bravery and with mixed ability as a general. Polybius (4.8) describes him as preeminent in military enterprises involving building alliances, stratagems, intrigue, and surprise attacks but because he lacked personal valor and was slow and timid in action in normal campaigning: "the Peloponnese was filled with trophies that marked his defeats." If accurate, Polybius' account (4.9.14) of the battle of Caphyae (220, against the Aetolians, in Elis)—the only extant detailed account of one of Aratus' set-piece battles—suggests Aratus had limitations in the field. On this occasion, he dismissed most of his army before the enemy intentions were clear and then precipitated a battle on terrain favoring the Aetolians.

However, Aratus' reputation was vigorously attacked by his contemporary enemies and the surviving records may reflect this; Plutarch (*Aratus* 29) describes the criticisms as arising from "flatterers of tyrants." If he had been as consistently flawed as suggested, his regular reelection as Achaean League *strategos* seems strange.

Overall, his career was successful. His initial policy was to expel tyrants from Peloponnesian cities and unite the area against external interference—principally Macedonian. This involved a mixture of diplomacy and military action. In 243, he seized the Acrocorinth from Macedon by a brilliant surprise night attack, bringing Corinth into the Achaean League. This was an important move, allowing the League to interfere with the movement of troops into the Peloponnese by land. In 239, Aratus organized an anti-Macedonian alliance with the Aetolian League and over the next 10 years

brought in other major cities, including Megalopolis (235) and Argos (229). However, this increase in the Achaean League's power and influence triggered local opposition. In 228, Cleomenes III of Sparta and the Aetolian League joined forces, triggering the so-called Cleomenic War with the Achaean League.

Aratus obtained approval from the League for Megalopolis to appeal for assistance to their old foe, Macedon. After a series of military reverses—Lycaenum and Ladochea (227), and Hecatombeum (226)—and losses, including Argos, Phlius, and Corinth (225), the League activated the agreement in 224, surrendering the Acrocorinth to Macedon. At the time, Sicyon was under siege. Antigonos III Doson responded by invading the Peloponnese, aided by the Achaean retrieval of Argos. Cleomenes' defeat at Sellasia in 222 ended the war. Aratus and the League later transferred their allegiance to Antigonos' successor, Philip V. In 220, Aratus called upon the Hellenic League set up by Doson to assist against Aetolian aggression and with Philip's help successfully ended the Social War (220–217). However, Aratus later disagreed with Philip over his attempts to dominate the Peloponnese and his anti-Roman policy. Aratus died in 213 and while the recorded symptoms suggest tuberculosis, the belief at the time was that he had been poisoned by Philip V. It is unfortunate that Aratus' own history of the Achaean League (*Hypomnēumata*, usually called "Memoirs") does not survive, although Polybius based his account of the Cleomenic War on it, preferring it to the rival account of Phylarchus.

Iain Spence

See also Achaean League; Achaean League, Wars of; Antigonos III Doson; Cleomenes III; Philip V; Polybius; Social War (220–217)

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Greeks were well used to using arbitration to settle disputes. In Athens, where we know the system best, there were public arbitrators, citizens all in their sixtieth year, who adjudicated on small disputes. This was an alternative to taking matters to a full-scale trial, where the disputants had to speak before a jury often of 501 citizens. It is very likely that the great majority of disputes were settled by arbitration, though a person unhappy with the arbitrator's verdict could still resort to a jury trial. An arbitrator would try to decide a case in terms of equity, rather than by strict adherence to law. To some extent the jury-courts were similar, since there were no lawyers *per se*, the presiding magistrate had no role in advising the jurors on the law, and jurors were free to cast a secret vote according to their own sense of the justice of the case.

Similarly, states might try to resolve their disputes through arbitration, perhaps in order to avoid the heavy costs of war, but perhaps also to arrive at an equitable outcome rather than simply letting the stronger state prevail. The majority of cases are known from inscriptions, but some also from historical texts. Herodotus describes the earliest case of which we know, when sometime around 600 the Corinthian tyrant Periander arbitrated a dispute between Athens and Mytilene over possession of Sigeum in the Troad. He decided that each city should retain the territory they controlled at the time of the arbitration, thus giving Sigeum itself to the Athenians. According to Plutarch, when Athens and Megara were fighting for control of the island of Salamis in the same period, they had the case heard by a group of five Spartan arbitrators. Plutarch's account envisages a situation where each side could make their case before the arbitrators, and quotes versions of the story in which the Athenian Solon either invented lines of Homer to suit the Athenian cause, brought up mythical genealogies, discussed the way the early inhabitants of Salamis buried their dead, or cited an alleged pronouncement by the Delphic oracle. The evidence for this case is not reliable, but Solon's arguments may well reflect some types of "evidence" that might be used in real arbitrations.

Arbitrators might be men from powerful states, such as in the examples above, perhaps because they had power to enforce judgments (in 421, Sparta garrisoned the Elean town of Lepreum after the Eleans refused arbitration in a dispute over Lepreum's independence), but perhaps more often because of their prestige. Even higher powers could be invoked: when the Corcyraeans were in dispute with Corinth over their colony Epidamnus in the late 430s,

they suggested arbitration either by mutually acceptable Peloponnesian cities or by the Delphic oracle. Neutrality was, of course, important. It has been suggested that Pausanias' generally unlikely claim that in the early sixth century 16 women of Elis arbitrated a dispute between Elis and Pisa may make sense on the basis that, being women, they were not technically citizens of either state.

Treaties might often make provision for future use of arbitration in cases of dispute, sometimes at the behest of more powerful states. Thus, for example, at the end of the Ionian Revolt the Persian satrap Artaphrenes summoned representatives of the Ionian cities to Sardis and instructed them to make treaties with each other that they would not ravage each other's territory but would submit disputes to arbitration. In both their one-year truce in 423 and in the Peace of Nicias in 421, Athens and Sparta resolved to settle any disputes not through force of arms but through *dike*, here "lawsuit" or "trial" (in 423) or trials and oaths (421). Taking a matter to arbitration could, where it was possible, be invoked as a moral duty. Thucydides has the Spartan king Archidamus, a speaker of whom he generally approves, say (speaking about the dispute over Potidaea) that in a case like this, where the other side has offered arbitration, it was positively unlawful not to take up the offer. Later, Thucydides tells us that in 413 the Spartans felt that their failures in the first half of the war had perhaps been justified punishment for their refusal to go to arbitration in 431, despite the provisions of the Thirty Years Peace of 445.

Many inscriptions attest to the continued use of arbitration in the fourth century and the Hellenistic Period. Around 450, Argos adjudicated on a dispute between two Cretan cities, possibly on the basis that some Cretan cities were believed to be Argive colonies. In the Hellenistic Period, Antigonos I Monophthalmus had Mytilene arbitrate disputes between the small states of Teos and Lebedus, while an inscription from Priene indicates that a dispute with Samos was successively arbitrated (without much success, it seems) by Alexander the Great, Antigonos I Monophthalmus, Lysimachus, Antiochus (probably III), Philip V of Macedon, and the Rhodians. Finally, the Romans settled the matter. Indeed, the Romans were no strangers to the practice of arbitration. For example, at the start of the Second Macedonian War in 200 they demanded that Philip V have his disputes with Rhodes and Attalus settled by arbitration. Philip refused, and war proceeded; no doubt this happened quite often.

See also Alliances/Allies (*Symmachiai/Symmachoi*); Archidamus II; Corcyra, Conflict with Epidamnus and Corinth; Diplomacy; Elis; Ionia, Ionians; Ionian Revolt; Macedonian War, Second; Peloponnesian War, First; Peloponnesian War, Second; Periander; Potidaea, Siege of; Solon; Troad

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Arcadia, Arcadians

Arcadia is a mountainous region in the central Peloponnese. From the Archaic down to the Hellenistic Periods, Arcadia was composed of numerous separate communities. The major Arcadian *poleis* were Mantinea, Tegea, Orchomenus, and, from 371, the *polis* of Megalopolis. However, by the sixth century, a sentiment of common regional identity was apparent in the various fragmented communities of Arcadia.

In the mid-sixth century, after a long war (ca. 580–550), the Spartans were able to force an unequal alliance on Tegea, the chief *polis* of Arcadia. The Tegeans were not enslaved like the Spartan Helots, but they were required to pay a monetary tribute to Sparta and their administrative system came under Spartan political control. The Spartans followed the same domineering policy with other Arcadian *poleis*, which like Tegea were forced to join the Peloponnesian League.

Sometime in the fifth century, when Sparta's control in the Peloponnese had weakened, Tegea allied with Argos against the Spartans. In the aftermath of the Persian Wars, after the battles of Tegea (473) and Dipaea

(471), the Spartans forcefully defeated the Tegeans, Argives, and the combined forces of the First Arcadian League. Afterward, despite their huge losses and fragile position, the Spartans compelled the Arcadians to rejoin the Peloponnesian League. From that time the Arcadians remained subject allies of the Spartans, except for a brief rebellion during the Second Peloponnesian War: this ended with the battle of Mantinea in 418.

After the defeat of the Spartans by the Theban Epaminondas at Leuctra in 371, the alliance between Sparta and Arcadia was permanently broken. In 371, after the foundation of Megalopolis, the “great city,” Arcadia achieved its first political independence. In the same year, under Theban guidance, the Second Arcadian League was formed and played a major role in overthrowing Spartan hegemony over Arcadia.

Later, in 234, Arcadia joined the Achaean League, which eventually became subject to the Romans. In 168, after the defeat of the Macedonians at the battle of Pydna, the Romans took 1,000 upper-class Achaeans as hostages, and transferred them to Italy; one of them was the historian Polybius. In 146, after the destruction of Corinth, Arcadian liberty came to an end.

Aikaterini-Iliana Rassia

See also Achaean League; Arcadian League; Epaminondas; Mantinea, Battle of (418); Mantinea, Mantineans; Megalopolis; Persian Wars; Peloponnesian War, Second; Polybius; Sparta; Sparta, Attack on Tegea (Fetters, Battle of); Sparta, Wars in Arcadia; Tegea

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Arcadian League

By the late 470s, it is clearly evident that Arcadia was anti-Spartan. Fifth-century silver Arcadian coinage bearing the word *Arkadikon* (in full or abbreviated form) is considered as solid evidence for the existence of the First Arcadian Confederacy or League by the late 490s. The architect behind the formation of this league was Cleomenes I, the fugitive king of Sparta who had been exiled after allegedly bribing the Delphic Oracle. Many *poleis* and tribes (Cynurians, Parrhasii, Mainalians) composed the Arcadian *ethnos* (tribe) during the fifth century, but Arcadia did not form a clear political unit. The precise functions of the fifth century First Arcadian League are not clear.

After the defeat of the Spartans at the battle of Leuctra in 371, Lycomedes of Mantinea with the help of Tegea organized the unification of many anti-Spartan, democratic Arcadian *poleis* into one federal state. By late 370 or early 369, most of the Arcadian cities had joined this Second Arcadian League. The capital of the League was Megalopolis, a synoecism composed by the unification of many small groups in southern Arcadia. Their ambitious strategy was to regain lost territory and overthrow the hegemonic leadership of Sparta and in the early years of its operation it was successful. The League had a large primary assembly, known as the Ten Thousand, a council composed of varying numbers of representatives of the various cities, proportional to their size, and a standing army, the *eparitoi* contributed by the member states. The most important magistrate was a powerful *strategos* (general).

The democratically inclined League, with help from its Athenian allies, soon became involved in war in and with Elis. However, by the late 360s, relations with Thebes led to internal conflict, especially between Mantinea and Tegea, which weakened the League and led to the battle of Mantinea in 362, where member cities fought against each other. After Mantinea, discord between members and especially among the federal forces, the *eparitoi*, crippled the League. By the time of Alexander the Great, the Second Arcadian League had apparently disappeared. By the late third century the Arcadian *poleis* had joined the Achaean League.

Aikaterini-Iliana Rassia

See also Arcadia, Arcadians; Cleomenes I; Elis; Elis, War with Arcadia;

Mantineia, Battle of (362); Mantineia, Mantineans; Sparta; Tegea

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Archelaus (d. 399)

Archelaus I, the son of Perdiccas II, succeeded his father as king of Macedon and ruled from 413 to 399. This was a period of territorial consolidation for the Macedonian kingdom. He was a beneficent king, known for his philhellenic rule and in-depth strategies in state and military administration. Xenophon mentions that Archelaus contributed financially to the rebuilding of the Athenian naval fleet after its destruction at Syracuse. As a way of thanking him for his financial assistance, in 406, the Athenians publicly honored Archelaus as ambassador and benefactor. Thucydides also praises Archelaus for his military initiatives and commercial reforms, which aimed to strengthen the economy and military defense of his kingdom. This included road-building, reorganizing the Macedonian cavalry arm, and improving the arms and equipment of the infantry. In 400, Archelaus transferred the capital of his kingdom from Aegae to Pella, where both Philip II and Alexander the Great were later born. In 399, Archelaus was assassinated by his lover Craterus, although an alternative version recorded in Diodorus Siculus states he died by accident during a hunt. By the time of his death, Macedon was transformed into a strong military kingdom.

Aikaterini-Iliana Rassia

See also Athens; Macedon, Macedonia

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Archers (*Toxotai*)

Archers appear in Homer where they are frequently described as shooting from the protection of shield-bearing troops. This style of fighting is shown on Geometric and Archaic Greek pottery. These representations date to times before the formation of the Classical Greek *polis*, when individual warriors were entirely responsible for their own equipment and training, unregulated by the state.

The only area in Greece where the young men were systematically trained to fight as archers was Crete, and Cretan archers were employed as mercenaries by other Greek states from the earliest times. Other Greek states had to employ mercenaries, from Crete or further afield, or to pay their own citizens to train “to shoot in the bow.”

Attic vases dating to the times of the tyrant Peisistratus show Scythian mercenary archers operating from behind the shields of (Athenian?) hoplites in this way. Both the tyrants Polycrates of Samos and Gelon of Syracuse are known to have retained forces of archers, 1,000 and 2,000, respectively, but it is not known in either case whether they were foreign mercenaries or native troops retained by the tyrants and trained as archers.

Other states, such as democratic Athens, had to vote the funds to pay their own citizens a subsidy to compensate them for their time spent in training. Athens is not mentioned as fielding a force of archers at Marathon,

but they are present at Salamis, where every trireme had its complement of four archers, and present at Plataea. On the eve of the Peloponnesian War (431–404) Athens had 200 horse-archers and 1,600 foot-archers. The Athenians took 480 archers with them to Sicily, 80 of them Cretans.

Their Lacedaemonian adversaries did not have the funds to pay for a force of archers on a regular basis. The archers raised in 424 were probably Cretan mercenaries, and Cretan archers, probably recruited from Knossos and west Cretan states allied to Lacedaemon, are mentioned as fighting in Lacedaemonian armies throughout the first half of the fourth century, like the 300 Cretan archers who fought at Nemea in 394. The 200 Cretan archers who are mentioned as taking part in the *Anabasis* recorded by Xenophon were probably recruited through Lacedaemonian agency.



Scythian archer in a hunting scene from the “François Vase,” ca. 570, from Fonte Rotella, Chiusi, Italy. Archers were generally regarded as inferior to hoplites (heavy

infantry) but could play a useful role in battle. Although archers were available in Greece, especially from Crete, Scythian mercenary archers were particularly highly regarded. Located in the Archaeological Museum, Florence, Italy. (Gianni Dagli Orti/ The Art Archive at Art Resource, NY)

One incident during the *Anabasis* helps to explain the popularity of Cretan mercenary archers. In forming a false ambush against the Drilae, the bronze *peltae* (shields) held by the Cretan archers “would now and then gleam through the bushes,” deterring the Drilae from advancing (Xenophon, *Anabasis* 5.2.28-32). It was the additional ability of Cretan archers to fight at close quarters, thanks to their bronze peltae that made them much sought after. Almost all the armies of the Hellenistic kings included regiments of Cretans, which were raised in two different ways. “Retained regiments” were recruited and paid directly by the king on an individual basis. “Symmachic contingents” were forces that individual Cretan city-states agreed to send to the king in time of war according to an alliance (*symmachia*) contracted between the two.

The Macedonian army under Philip and Alexander had both a regiment of Macedonian archers (commanded by one Briso) as well as a regiment of Cretan mercenaries, who presumably initially trained the Macedonians.

The Asian conquests of Alexander made available further pools of manpower trained to fight as archers, and at his death Alexander was preparing a plan to form a mixed fighting formation consisting of Macedonian pikemen and Persian missile troops. It was from the Persians that combined units of archers and slingers were principally recruited during the age of the *diadochoi*, and thereafter it was the Seleucids who inherited the Asian recruiting areas for archers.

Archers and slingers (probably Persians) are mentioned in the forces commanded by the rebel satrap Molon. The forces commanded by Antiochus at Raphia included 2,000 Agrianian and Persian archers and slingers, as well as 1,500 Cretans under Eurylochos and 1,000 Neocretans under Zelys of Gortyn. The forces on the Ptolemaic side included Cretans as well, commanded by Cnopias of Allaria, 1,000 being Neocretans under Philo of Knossos. The “Neocretans” mentioned by Polybius are probably Cretan young soldiers (*neoi*). The situation where Cretans faced one another in battle was repeated at Magnesia in 190, where 12,000 Dahae mounted archers, 2,500 Mysian archers and Elymian archers, and Cretans faced, on

the Roman side, Cretans sent by Eumenes, who later accompanied Manlius Vulso on his campaign against the Galatians in 189. These forces are Cretan “symmachic contingents” sent by rival city-states on Crete.

Nicholas Sekunda

See also Crete, Cretans; *Hippotoxotai*; Homeric Warfare; Light Troops; Magnesia, Battle of; Peisistratus; Plataea, Battle of; Raphia, Battle of; Salamis, Battle of (480); Scythia, Scythians; Slingers

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Archidamian War (431–421). See Peloponnesian War, Second

Archidamus II (d. ca. 427/6)

Archidamus was a king from the Eurypontid royal house of Sparta. His father Zeuxidamus had died before Archidamus’ grandfather Leotychidas (II) was exiled in the mid-470s, so Archidamus came to the throne then. It is not known if he played any part in Sparta’s badly attested wars in Arcadia in the next 10 or so years. His first known achievement was to rally the survivors after the catastrophic earthquake that devastated Sparta in the 460s and to lead the first counter-measures against Helot rebels who attempted to take advantage of the situation. He presumably played an important role in the 10-year war against the rebels that followed.

In the immediate lead-up to the Second Peloponnesian War some 15 or so years later, Archidamus appears in Thucydides as an experienced military commander who unsuccessfully advised delay and careful planning in the formidable task of an aggressive war against the Athenian Empire. He commanded the first Peloponnesian invasion of Attica in 431, at the head of the largest Greek army assembled to date (said to be 60,000 strong, Plutarch, *Pericles* 33.4). His cautious conduct of the campaign, aimed at avoiding any self-inflicted disaster, provoked discontent from allies, but Archidamus realized that the chances were slight of forcing the Athenians to a decisive battle on land, which the Spartans and their allies were most likely going to win.

Archidamus commanded the allied invasions of Attica again in 430 and in 428, with the same lack of any positive outcome. In 429, the plague raging in Athens led him to divert the invasion army to Plataea, which he failed to coerce into abandoning Athens. He then subjected it to the standard Greek method of siege by surrounding it with a double-line of fortifications to starve it out.

Archidamus was a competent enough commander but was incapable of devising any strategic breakthrough to avoid the stalemate into which the Peloponnesian War was developing. That called for the genius of Brasidas, who was atypical of Sparta. Archidamus shows both the capabilities and the limitations of Sparta's conventional methods of waging war.

Douglas Kelly

See also Alcibiades; Brasidas; Helots; Peloponnesian League; Peloponnesian War, Second; Plataea, Siege of; Sparta, Wars in Arcadia

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Archidamus III (ca. 400–338)

Archidamus III, son of Agesilaus II, was a king of Sparta from about 360 till his death in 338. In 371, he led a relief force from Sparta to support the army defeated at Leuctra. Archidamus is the first known son of a Spartan king to have held such a military command in the king's lifetime, probably because of his father's prestige. Archidamus also held commands in Sparta's wars against the Arcadians in the 360s, winning a notable success that revived Spartan morale, the "Tearless Battle" (i.e., one in which no Spartan fell), in about 368 or 367. He played an important role in the desperate defense of the town of Sparta against Epaminondas' forces in 362 and campaigned against Megalopolis in 352.

In about 356, Archidamus supported the Phocian leaders in their determination to resist Boeotia. He was thus blamed for the Third Sacred War and accused of sacrilege by acquiring some precious objects from the temple treasures. Whether he actually did so is now beyond discovery. Sparta remained an ally of Phocis throughout this war. In early 346, Archidamus led a force to help defend the pass of Thermopylae against Philip of Macedon but withdrew because of his well-based mistrust of the Phocian leaders.

Late in the 340s, Archidamus followed in his father's footsteps by taking up mercenary service abroad to raise money for Sparta's wars at home. After recruiting mercenaries who had served in the Sacred War, he sailed first to a war in Crete. He then went on to Taras (Tarentum) in southern Italy, to fight against the Lucanians. After two or more years of campaigning, he was defeated and killed, reportedly on the same day as the battle of Chaeronea (338). His reputed sacrilege was thought responsible for his bad end.

Douglas Kelly

See also Agesilaus II; Epaminondas; Leuctra, Battle of; Megalopolis; Messenia; Sacred War, Third; Sparta, Wars in Arcadia; Taras/Tarentum; Tearless Battle

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Archilochus (ca. 680–640)

Archilochus was a notable poet, highly regarded in antiquity behind only Homer and Hesiod. His poetry, now surviving only in fragments, is the earliest extant written in the first person. He covers many topics: love, melancholy, enmity, and life as a soldier, including the enigmatic: “My spear is my bread, my spear is my wine, which I drink, leaning on my spear.” Reputedly born to a wealthy father and a slave girl on Paros, Archilochus’ poverty drove him to live in Thasos and to serve, at least for a time, as a mercenary. He fought in Thrace and was killed in battle on Naxos.

In the third century, a hero-shrine honoring Archilochus was built on Paros. A first-century expansion of this building added more inscribed text, including quotations from his poems.

Iain Spence

See also Alcaeus; Mercenaries; Naxos, Naxians; Thasos

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Archimedes (ca. 287–212)

Archimedes was one of the most famous mathematicians and military engineers of antiquity. The few factual details of his life and accomplishments must be separated from diverse popular legends that accumulated in Greco-Roman, Byzantine, and Renaissance literature. A native of Syracuse, he reportedly visited Egypt and possibly studied there; he later corresponded with mathematicians at Alexandria. His extant writings, some preserved only in Arabic translation, deal mostly with

mathematics, particularly geometrical methods for finding the area or volume of complex plane and solid objects, as well as arithmetical calculation. Reported works on mechanics and optics have not survived. His writings seem to have attracted relatively little interest until late antiquity, when they were first compiled and inspired extensive commentaries. Assessment of his contribution to the principles and practice of mechanics in the Hellenistic era is hampered by subsequent accretions to the Archimedean tradition, which typically comprise anecdotal reports of appliances he invented, constructed and/or demonstrated, notably a compound pulley for launching large ships and a hydraulic screw, though the extent and nature of his innovation remains unclear.

To ancient authors, however, Archimedes' claim to fame was largely or exclusively as an inventor of military machinery, a reputation that rests primarily on his role in the defense of Syracuse against a protracted Roman siege in 214–212 during the Second Punic War. Some years earlier, Hieron II of Syracuse (270–215) had commissioned Archimedes to design and supervise a comprehensive system of urban defense, which drew on a long-established Sicilian tradition of artillery construction and his own scientific expertise, and possibly included structural modifications to the city's fortifications. His mechanical devices figure prominently in Polybius' well-informed account of the siege, composed around 70 years afterward, and its later adaptations by Livy and Plutarch. Written from a face-saving Roman perspective, all accounts seek to attribute the temporary Roman reverse to the technological wizardry of a single exceptional genius rather than Syracusan military prowess. Archimedes had constructed and sited a large number of torsion-powered stone-throwing machines, graded in size and range, which maintained a continuous moving barrage as the Roman ships approached the seawall. At closer range, the Romans encountered torsion-powered bolt-projecting catapults or *scorpiones* firing from loopholes. On the seawall, Archimedes mounted large swing-beam cranes fitted with complex pulley mechanisms, which could drop and raise heavy weights or lift and capsize vessels using a kind of grapnel. Similar machinery employed on the land-walls repelled assaults by Roman infantry. Costly failure on both land and sea induced the Romans to resort to a lengthy blockade. When the city eventually fell to treachery in 212, Archimedes died in the subsequent sack.

The story that Archimedes burned the Roman fleet by reflecting the

sun's rays using one or several plane or parabolic mirrors first emerges around the mid-second century CE and was greatly elaborated in late antique and Byzantine literature. Despite scientific and popular attempts from the mid-seventeenth century onward to substantiate this feat experimentally, the military application of burning-mirrors must be considered unhistorical, impracticable, and unnecessary.

Philip Rance

See also Catapult; Hieron II of Syracuse; Fortifications; Siege Warfare; Syracuse. *Roman Section*: Punic War, Second

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Arête

Arête is the ancient Greek term used widely for physical and moral excellence. In ethical philosophy, it was the standard term for “virtue” but in the everyday world it was commonly used for the good qualities esteemed and even demanded in the citizen of a *polis*, principally courage.

In Athens in the fifth century, there was a lively debate on whether *arête* was a natural endowment or could be transmitted by positive teaching. Philosophers were concerned with the related problem that, if *arête* was to be taught, it had to be adequately defined. However, to the ordinary person, *arête* was not problematic. It consisted of the qualities that the community admired most in male citizens, and in this context attention was mostly focused on courage in war. *Arête* also included moral goodness and the term could be applied in that sense to women, but in the ancient Greek world there was usually something paradoxical in applying *arête* in the sense of “courage” to women, who did not normally take part in active war.

Arête could also be used in the concrete sense of a highly praiseworthy action, almost always with reference to distinguished act of bravery in war. That the same term referred in common use to moral goodness and to bravery in combat shows how the whole ancient Greek way of thinking and acting assumed that war was a normal and natural part of human life.

Douglas Kelly

See also Democracy and War; Women in War

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Arginusae, Battle of (406)

A major Athenian naval victory over the Peloponnesians near the Arginusae Islands (southeast of Lesbos) during the Second Peloponnesian War (431–404). Although the Athenians won, the execution of six of the victorious generals after the battle for failing to recover survivors created considerable ill-feeling in Athens. The battle was fought to relieve Conon, who was blockaded in Mytilene with 40 triremes. At this stage of the war, still badly affected by their huge losses in Sicily, the Athenians could not afford to lose either Mytilene or the ships and crew there.

With something of their old energy, the Athenians launched a fleet of 110 triremes, manned by scratch crews. These included metics (resident aliens), freed slaves, and even cavalrymen (who normally did not serve on ships). These were supplemented in theater with 10 Samian ships and 30 from other allies. In response, Callicratidas, the Spartan admiral, left his army besieging Samos and sailed out against the Athenians. With only 90 triremes, Callicratidas was apparently heavily outnumbered (although Diodorus 13.97.3 states he had 140, this seems unlikely). His initial plan, presumably to mitigate his lack of numbers, a night attack, was thwarted by bad weather. The next day he deployed in a single line against the Athenians who, because of their inexperienced sailors, were drawn up in a double line to prevent the *diekplous* maneuver. Although the

Peloponnesians put up a good fight, resistance collapsed when Callicratidas was killed and they fled with the loss of 75 ships. Athenian losses were light in comparison—13 sunk and 12 disabled. Two subordinate commanders, Theramenes and Thrasybulus, were deputized to retrieve survivors while the rest of the fleet sailed to Mytilene to relieve it. Both of these moves were prevented by a thunderstorm. However, the Spartan commander at Mytilene abandoned the siege on learning of Callicratidas' defeat. Although the fleet had won a great victory and successfully achieved its mission, the postbattle aftermath left a very sour taste at Athens. The victorious generals were accused of not having recovered the Athenians in the water after the battle and were recalled to Athens. Six of the eight returned and were put on trial. What exactly happened is not entirely certain—Xenophon's account, though detailed, has been seen as an apologia for the generals—but instead of presenting a united front over the bad weather as the cause for not recovering the men in the water, the generals appear to have ended up in conflict with Theramenes and Thrasybulus over who was responsible. The six generals who had returned were executed, although the Athenians later turned on their accusers.

Iain Spence

See also Callicratidas; Conon; *Diekplous*; Peloponnesian War, Second; Naval Tactics; Theramenes; Thrasybulus; Xenophon

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The Argolid was a region north and east of the Argolic Gulf, comprising a rich 100-square-mile alluvial plain, the hills to the west, and the mountainous peninsula (the Argolic Acte) to the east. In the Bronze Age, it was a major center of Mycenaean civilization, with the sites of Mycenae and Tiryns on the eastern side of the plain. In the Classical Period, the dominant city was Argos on the western side. In the Archaic Period, there were a number of independent *poleis* in the area, but from the sixth century onward Argos steadily subdued them and extended its territory to include the entire plain. The cities thus annexed included Oenoe, Nauplia (in the nineteenth century the first capital of modern Greece), Asine, Hysiae, Tiryns, Mycenae, Cleonae, and Nemea. The Argives no doubt felt that, to match the strength of Athens and Sparta with their large swathes of territory in Attica and Laconia, Argos needed to control its region; Thebes tried to solve the same problem with a tight federal structure in Boeotia. The Argive Heraion (sanctuary of Hera), which had been an independent sanctuary midway between Mycenae and Tiryns, became the great religious center of the Argive state. But the towns on the east side of the Argolic Acte, such as Hermione, Troezen, and Epidauros, generally remained independent, and the healing sanctuary of Asclepius at Epidauros became a major place of pilgrimage within the Greek world.

Peter Londey

See also Argos, Argives; Boeotian League; Mycenae; Tiryns

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Argos, Argives

Argos, one of the major cities of ancient Greece, was located in the northeastern Peloponnese. It was notable for its long-standing rivalry with

and enmity toward Sparta, which led to a series of wars and battles.

As early as the eighth century, Argos aspired to leadership within the Peloponnese, and formed alliances with Troezen, Aegina, Phlius, and Sicyon. By the early seventh century, Argos was ruled by a powerful tyrant, Pheidon. After gaining control of Messenia in the shadowy first Messenian War, the Spartans decided to contest control of the Thyreatis, a territory on the borders with Argos. In 669, Sparta challenged Argive control of the territory at the battle of Hysiae, but lost. It has been suggested that the Argive victory was due to the newly created hoplites who fought heroically under the leadership of Pheidon, but this is largely speculative. Nevertheless, the result seems to indicate that in the first half of the seventh century Argos was the dominant state in the Peloponnese.

During the second Messenian War (ca. 650–630), Argos is supposed to have allied with the Arcadians, Pisatans, and Messenians against Sparta, but was defeated. By the sixth century, Sparta dominated the Peloponnese and Argos was reduced to the status of a regional power. In about 547, another battle between the Argives and the Spartans (the so-called Battle of the Champions) allowed Sparta to secure control of Thyreatis. A generation or two later, in about 494, the Argives were again defeated, at the battle of Sepeia near Tiryns—the defeated Argive army sought refuge in a grove sacred to the hero Argos. According to Herodotus, Cleomenes I, the Spartan king, ordered the complete destruction of the sacred precinct and the massacre of the suppliants. All told, Herodotus claims, around 6,000 Argive soldiers were killed.

When Xerxes invaded Greece in 480, Argos remained neutral, partly because of the painful memory of the battle of Sepeia and partly because the Argives were unwilling to take a subordinate role to Sparta, while the Spartans were unwilling to treat them as equals, with a share of the command. After the Persian Wars, the Argives allied with Corinth, Elis, and Mantinea for support against Sparta. During the First Peloponnesian War, at the battle of Tanagra in 457, more than 1,000 Argives fought on the Athenian side. Although both sides suffered heavy casualties, the Spartans were victorious. During the Second Peloponnesian War, in 418, at the battle of Mantinea, the Spartan king Agis II defeated the combined forces of Argos, Mantinea, and Athens. The following year, the Argives initiated the construction of long fortification walls, which ran from the city down to the Argolic Gulf, but the Spartans destroyed them before they were completed.

Despite its problems with Sparta, during the fifth century Argos steadily destroyed or annexed the small towns of the central Argolid, until by the end of the century it controlled the whole of the plain.

After the Second Peloponnesian War, in the Corinthian War (395–387/6) Argos allied with Corinth, Athens, and Thebes to fight against Spartan authoritative control and power. In this period Corinth and Argos joined in some close form of political union, though this was broken up at the end of the war. In the end, Sparta was victorious, but its hegemony had been shaken. Later in the fourth century, after the battle of Chaeronea in 338, the Argives allied with Philip II of Macedon, who claimed descent from Argive ancestors. After the death of Alexander the Great, Argos did not join in the Lamian War against Macedonia, but remained loyal to Macedonia into the reign of Antigonos II Gonatas. In 229, Argos joined the Achaean League; during the Roman period, the territory of Argos became part of the province of Achaia.

Aikaterini-Iliana Rassia

See also Antigonos II Gonatas; Argolid; Champions, Battle of; Corinth, Corinthians; Corinthian War; Hysiae, Battle of; Long Walls; Mantinea, Battle of (418); Messenian War, First; Mycenae; Peloponnesian War, First; Persian Wars; Pheidon of Argos; Territory and War; Tiryns

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Aristagoras (Late Sixth–Early Fifth Century)

Aristagoras was governor of Miletus, while the tyrant, his father-in-law and cousin, Histiaeus, was detained in Susa by Darius. Aristagoras was an instigator of the Ionian Revolt, which led to the First Persian War. Herodotus' main account is in Book 5.

Asked by some exiled aristocrats of Naxos for assistance against those who had exiled them, Aristagoras saw an opportunity to become the ruler of Naxos himself. He promised to obtain aid from the Persians to reinstate the exiled Naxians. He convinced Darius and Darius' brother, Artaphrenes, to mount an expedition to subdue Naxos, with the further prospect of bringing nearby islands into the Persian Empire.

Aristagoras accompanied the Persian fleet of 200 ships but argued with the Persian commander before they arrived. The commander thereupon sent word to the people of Naxos, warning them about the coming attack. As a result, the Naxians were well prepared, and the attack failed.

In serious debt to the Persians, Aristagoras (encouraged by Histiaeus) revolted from Persian rule, inciting rebellions around the area and establishing *isonomia* (equality before the law) instead of puppet tyranny (499). He failed to involve the Spartans in the Ionian Revolt, but convinced the Athenians to send aid consisting of 20 ships. These troops conquered and burnt down Sardis. The Persians pursued the retreating Ionians, defeated them in Ephesus, but only finally put an end to the revolt in 493. Aristagoras fled to Thrace and was killed by the locals.

Abigail Dawson

See also Darius I; Histiaeus; Ionian Revolt; Miletus

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Aristides (d. post-467)

Aristides was an Athenian soldier and statesman of the first half of the fifth century. He played a prominent role during the Persian Wars, was

influential in the foundation of the Delian League, and is a good example of early fifth century Athenian aristocratic political and military leadership.

Aristides was the *strategos* (general) in command of the contingent of his tribe, Antiochis, at the battle of Marathon in 490, apparently performing well enough to become *archon* in 489/8. In the ensuing years he clashed with Themistocles, perhaps opposing Themistocles' emphasis of naval over land power—although political conflict in Athens at that time was often family-based and involved multiple rather than single issues. As a result of this, Aristides was ostracized (exiled) in 482.

Aristides was recalled early from his 10-year ostracism to assist in the Second Persian War. He served as *strategos* from 480 to 479, and at Salamis (480) brought the Greeks the news that the Persians had blocked their retreat and then led the hoplite contingent that cleared the Persians from the island of Psyttaleia. Aristides also commanded the Athenians at Plataea (479).

Aristides took part in the postwar campaign in the Hellespont and alongside his fellow conservative colleague Cimon, seems to have been instrumental in persuading the Ionian and island Greeks to follow Athens rather than Sparta. Aristides was famous for his honesty and was nicknamed “the Just.” Because of this he was asked to assess the tribute contributions for the members of the newly formed Delian League. Tradition records that he died of natural causes, in very modest financial circumstances, having refused to capitalize on the opportunities for corruption offered by his public offices.

Iain Spence

See also Cimon; Delian League/Athenian Empire; Marathon, Battle of; Persian Wars; Plataea, Battle of; Salamis, Battle of (480)

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Aristogeiton. *See* ***Peisistratidae***

Aristonicus (d. ca. 129)

Aristonicus was a pretender to the throne of Pergamum. After the death in 133 of the Pergamene king Attalus III, who bequeathed the kingdom to the Roman people, Aristonicus claimed the kingdom for himself, asserting that he was a son of Eumenes II (reigned 197–160/59), and taking the dynastic name Eumenes III.

Although the Roman tribune of the plebs Tiberius Gracchus quickly secured the Pergamene treasury by legal means to fund his land redistribution scheme in Italy, Roman military control of Pergamum took a long time to establish. Aristonicus took advantage of Rome's inaction, trying to entice the Greek cities of Asia Minor to his cause with promises of freedom from Roman control. He was defeated in battle by the Ephesians near Cyme. Aristonicus then turned to the interior of Asia Minor, appealing to the rural poor and enslaved, whom he dubbed Heliopolitae, citizens of Sun-city, to rise up against the urban Greeks. Massacres ensued in the cities until a coalition of urban Greeks and local kings united against the movement.

In 131, a Roman army under praetor Publius Licinius Crassus arrived, but was defeated at Leucaea in 130; Crassus was captured and killed. Crassus' successor, the consul Marcus Perperna, surrounded and captured Aristonicus in 129 at Stratonicea on the Caicus. Aristonicus was taken to Rome and executed. Perperna's successor, Manius Aquilius, mopped up the revolt's remnants.

Paul J. Burton

See also Pergamum. *Roman Section: Gracchan Land Conflict*

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Aristophanes (Second Half of Fifth Century)

Aristophanes, son of Philippus, was the master of Old Attic Comedy. Born sometime between 457 and 445 and dead by 385, he seems to have been of

hoplite status, possibly owning property on Aegina. Eleven of his plays survive, along with numerous fragments from 30 or so lost works. All but two of his plays—*Ecclesiazusae* (*The Parliament of Women*) and the second *Plutus* (*Wealth*)—were produced during the Second Peloponnesian War (431–404). If used with caution appropriate to the exaggeration inherent in comedy, the plays provide valuable insights into Athenian attitudes and reactions to the war, as well as occasional insight into its details, course, and effects. Plays with a particular war focus are: *Acharnians* (425), *Knights* (424), *Peace* (421), and *Lysistrata* (411).

Iain Spence

See also Cleon; Lamachus; Peloponnesian War, Second

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Arms and Armor

The arms and armor of the infantry and cavalry of ancient Greece varied considerably over time, and to a lesser extent by region. However, it is broadly true to say that the general trend for infantry was to move toward lighter armor, sacrificing protection for mobility, while cavalry seems to have moved toward more protection. Weapons and armor naturally developed in concert with developments in tactics and techniques, although at times it is difficult to decide which influenced the other more.

Archaic Period (ca. 700–480)

At the beginning of the Archaic Period, the nature of warfare in ancient Greece was moving toward the widespread employment of the massed phalanx formation. Unfortunately, there is a lack of contemporary source material for the study of Archaic Period warfare and even less for the preceding period. Much of our understanding comes from artistic representations of combat—such as the famous Chigi vase (ca. 650; see illustration in “Chigi Vase” entry), the archaeological record, and Homer’s

Iliad.

The warrior of the Archaic Period was the predecessor of the later classical hoplite but with variations in much of the armament reflecting the technological abilities and combat of the time. The earliest Archaic helmet found in Greece (ca. 700) is of the *Kegelhelm* (“cone” or “kettle”) type. The *Kegelhelm* was a bronze conical, open-faced, helmet, made from five separate pieces riveted together, with elongated “sideburns” that extended down to protect the side of the face and head. On top of this helmet sat an elaborate semicircular crest mounted on a high stilt. The *Kegelhelm* was succeeded around 650 by the “Illyrian style” (see illustration)—a type that still incorporated the open face and elongated sideburns of the *Kegelhelm*, but was made in two separate halves and had a metal ridge running front-to-back across the helmet instead of a crest (although some examples seem to have carried crests as well). Advances in manufacturing techniques by the mid-sixth century allowed the Illyrian style helmet to be made from a single sheet of beaten bronze.

The early “Corinthian style” helmet developed independently from the *Kegelhelm* and Illyrian helmet. It was an all-encompassing bronze helmet, approximately 2-millimeters thick in this period, with only a “T”-shaped opening for the eyes, nose, and mouth (see illustration). Early Corinthian helmets were made in two separate halves riveted together down a central ridge. The earliest examples of the Corinthian helmet lack the elongated cheek pieces of its later versions and are generally flat along the bottom. Rudimentary cheek pieces begin to appear ca. 550—although as early as the seventh century small notches were cut into the lower edge of the helmet to distinguish the jaw-line from the neck.



The Illyrian helmet first appeared ca. 650 and was originally made from two pieces of bronze—an advance on the five pieces of its predecessor, the *Kegelhelm*. It combined reasonable protection with good vision. (Illustration by Mary Dearden)



The Corinthian helmet first appeared in the Archaic Period, but only developed the extended cheek pieces ca. 550. It provided much better protection than the Illyrian helmet, but sacrificed hearing and vision to do so. (Illustration by Mary Dearden)

Many early Corinthian helmets were also adorned with crests of stiffened horse hair, with a stilt style of mounting—similar to those on the *Kegelhelm*—being one of the most common. However, a crest running from front to back and that sat flush on the surface of the helmet was also common. The crest served a number of purposes: it demonstrated wealth (horses were expensive to maintain); it made the wearer look taller and more imposing; and the crest removed the crown of the head (the point where an incoming, downward, impact was most likely to pierce the plate) as a possible place of attack. The use of crests in this manner continued throughout the development of the Greek helmet into the Classical Period.

There were two main types of shield in early Archaic Greece. The first was the “Dipylon shield”—an oval shaped shield with a semi-circular scallop cut out from either side—apparently a development from the Mycenaean Era “Figure 8” shield (see illustration in Trojan War, Course entry). From the artistic portrayals, the Mycenaean shield seems to have been made from a hide-covered wicker framework—the supporting struts, or “stretchers,” of which created its unique shape. However, what the Dipylon shield was made of is unknown—there are no surviving examples. The other type of shield was a round bronze shield with a central handgrip. Herodotus attributes the invention of shields with handles (as well as the first use of crests on helmets and painted shield designs) to the Carians of Asia Minor—although round shields may have originated in central Europe like much of the weaponry introduced in the late Mycenaean Period. Examples of this kind of shield from Delphi have either a pronounced central boss covering a hand-grip flush with the surface of the shield, or no boss that suggests a protruding grip. Such shields were replaced by the hoplite *aspis* in the seventh century.

Body armor developed considerably during the Archaic Period. The eighth century “Argos Panoply” includes (along with a *Kegelhelm*) a cuirass of plate bronze, shaped and decorated to represent a human torso. The cuirass has two plates (front and back) held together with a pin and hinge system on the sides, and pegs and holes on the shoulders. This meant that assistance would have been required to put this armor on. The armor also had a raised collar to protect the throat, and ended in an outwardly angled flange at the base, which sat on the hips. From the front-lower edge of the corselet a semicircular plate of armor (*mitra*) could be suspended to provide protection for the groin. By the second half of the sixth century, the popularity of the “bell corselet” had declined as other forms of armor came into fashion, such as the bronze “muscle cuirass” and the composite *linothorax*.

One element of defensive armor that remained in constant use across the Archaic Period was the greave. Coming into use in the seventh century, greaves originally only protected the shins and were basic in shape. However, greaves developed to cover the knee and conform to the shape of the lower leg, allowing them to be held in place by the elasticity of the metal instead of straps. The Archaic Period also saw the development, and then abandonment, of armor for the upper arm, thigh, and foot. Much of

this extra armor fell out of fashion by the mid-sixth century as Greek warfare changed from the open form of missile-based warfare and individual combats to the densely packed thrusting combat of the phalanx.

In many images the Archaic Greek warrior carries two spears—one noticeably shorter and thinner than the other. The longer weapon is a thrusting spear, the smaller one a javelin (indicated by the depiction of a throwing loop (*angkylos*) used to gain greater leverage when the weapon was thrown). The javelin possessed a small iron head, (around 95 grams) attached to a shaft around 20 millimeters in diameter and had a small “butt-cap” (*styrakion*) (around 90 grams) on the other end. This gave the javelin a central point of balance perfect for a thrown weapon. The thrusting spear was about 2.5 meters in length, with an iron spearhead mounted on a shaft approximately 25 millimeters in diameter, and with a large bronze spike (*sauroter*) on the other end. This weapon would have had a point of balance 90 centimeters from the rearward tip—giving the bearer a considerable reach. The javelin weighed around 900 grams, the thrusting spear around 1.5 kilograms.

The Archaic Period hoplite also carried a sword. The most common form was the Mycenaean II type, of Central European origin—a long, straight, double-edged sword of bronze or iron around 75-centimeters long. The sword possessed a small, tapered hand-grip covered with wood or bone and was weighted toward the front—making it ideal for slashing or thrusting.

The full panoply of an Archaic Period warrior would have been cumbersome—exceeding 25 kilograms. As fighting styles changed, elements of the panoply were altered or discarded to make the hoplite lighter.

The issue of Archaic cavalry arms and armor is more complex. Archaic art regularly depicts cavalrymen as fully equipped hoplites, but there is considerable debate over whether these are true cavalry or mounted infantry. Riders equipped with javelins and no armor (like the later Greek cavalry) are also depicted, although less commonly. The only item of horse armor attested is the *champhrein* or protection for a horse’s face, which appears in both the artistic and archaeological record.

Classical Period (ca. 480–323)

Herodotus (2.152) records an Egyptian oracle about “men of bronze” who turned out to be Greek hoplites in bronze armor. The arms and armor of the Classical Period were designed for frontal, hand-to-hand, combat. To fight

as a hoplite only the large hoplite shield (*aspis* or *hoplon*) and the long thrusting spear (*doru*) were mandatory—everything else was an optional extra. This was because most city-states fielded only part-time citizen militias who were responsible for supplying their own equipment. Considerable variety probably existed in the equipment of city-state hoplites because of differences in wealth and personal taste and whether older armor was handed down from father to son.

The hoplite may have worn a bronze helmet (*kranos*). During the early Classical Period, the most common form of helmet was the “Corinthian style.” Better manufacturing techniques allowed these helmets to be made thinner than previously while still providing similar protection. The Corinthian helmet, while enclosing most of the head, still provided the wearer with a natural range of vision. However, the helmet did restrict the hearing of the wearer until the later fourth century when openings for the ears were incorporated. The Corinthian style helmet took considerable time and skill to manufacture and during the Peloponnesian War (431–404), helmet design took a radical turn with the widespread adoption of the basic conical *pilos* (see illustration). While still made of bronze, the *pilos* sacrificed the protection to the face and throat provided by the Corinthian helmet in exchange for speed and ease of manufacture—no doubt because the city-states needed to rapidly equip and deploy larger armies. The conical shape replicated the protection provided by the crest of other helmets by placing a cone of plate bronze over the crown of the wearer’s head to deflect blows.

The hoplite shield (*aspis* or *hoplon*) was 90 centimeters in diameter (see illustrations in Hoplites entry). Constructed from a wooden core, occasionally faced with bronze, the *aspis* had a bowl-like shape 10-centimeters deep with an offset rim 5–7-centimeters wide around its circumference. The shield was carried by inserting the left forearm through a central armband (*porpax*) and grasping with the left hand a cord (*antilabe*), which ran around the inner circumference of the shield (see the illustration in Chigi Vase entry and the first illustration in Phalanx entry). The concave shape allowed for some of the shield’s weight (7–8 kilograms) to be supported on the shoulder. When held for battle the shield protected the bearer from cheek to knee and allowed for the creation of different combat formations, including the close-order shield wall. Shields were decorated with a variety of blazons ranging from geometric designs, religious symbols, representations of personal characteristics, national

emblems, or images to intimidate opponents. This made Greek arms and armor in the Classical Period very individual and the armies very colorful—except for those with a standard “uniform” like the Spartans.



The *pilos* helmet was originally made of felt or leather. The bronze version was popular in Sparta and widely adopted during the Second Peloponnesian War (431–404). Although lacking the same level of protection as the Corinthian or Chalcidian helmets, the *pilos* was cheaper and easier to produce in quantity. (Illustration by Mary Dearden)

The body armor (*thorax*) of the hoplite could have been one of two types: a bronze plate cuirass approximately 1 millimeter thick, or the composite *linothorax*—made from gluing several layers of linen and/or hide together to make a material not unlike modern Kevlar. From the bottom of the *linothorax* hung a series of flaps (*pteryges*), which protected the groin

and thighs without restricting the movement of the upper legs. The bronze “muscle cuirass” of the fifth century (see illustration) was shaped to represent a naked torso and served a number of purposes: it demonstrated wealth (this type of armor was costly); it made the wearer look more imposing; and it reduced the number of flat surfaces on the armor—the stylized muscles helped deflect incoming strikes. The total weight of either bronze or linen armor was around 5.6 kilograms. The hoplite’s legs could have been protected with a set of bronze greaves, weighing around 1 kilogram, shaped to fit onto the lower leg, and held in place by the elasticity of the metal.

The thrusting spear (*doru*) remained relatively unchanged from its Archaic predecessors: 2.5 meters in length and with a leaf-shaped iron head (around 150 grams), a shaft 25 millimeters in diameter, and a large bronze butt-spike (around 330 grams)—giving the *doru* a point of balance 90 centimeters from the rear end. The total weight of the *doru* was about 1.5 kilograms. Swords could have been either a large, single-edged, curved hacking sword (*kopis* or *machaira*) or a double-edged thrusting sword with a leaf-shaped blade (*xiphos*)—carried at the left hip suspended from a strap over the right shoulder (see first illustration in Phalanx entry). Depending upon style and size, the hoplite sword could weigh up to 2 kilograms.

When the hoplite’s tunic, footwear, and any padding worn under armor and helmet are considered, the total weight of a classical hoplite panoply was around 20 kilograms. Despite this encumbrance, the hoplite was very well protected. When positioned for battle, around only 5.5 percent of his body remained exposed (the right arm, left knee, left foot, and those areas exposed by the openings of the helmet). This made the hoplite exceptionally well suited to hand-to-hand combat and made him one of the most sought after fighting men of the ancient world.



A late-fourth-century bronze “muscled” cuirass, from Canosa, Ipogeo Varrese. This is a particularly elaborate item from Magna Graecia, but like its mainland Greek equivalents, it was probably custom-fitted for the owner and therefore too expensive for the ordinary soldier. Located in the Archaeological Museum, Bari, Italy. (Leemage/Corbis)

Cavalry did not follow the general infantry trend to sacrifice some protection for enhanced mobility (and mass-production). Mobility came from the horse, not lighter armor, and cavalymen were generally drawn from the wealthier classes so cost was not such an issue. In general, cavalymen wore a helmet, usually of an open-faced design, a breastplate (often bell-shaped to permit freedom of leg movement while mounted), and heavy boots to protect the lower legs and feet. No shield was carried (except

in some parts of Greek Italy). As with the infantry, resources and personal preference resulted in considerable variation. The standard armament was two javelins, or two javelins and a thrusting spear, supplemented by a sword, generally the *machaira*.

Hellenistic Period (ca. 323–30)

Aelian describes the pikeman of the Hellenistic Period (the *phalangites* or *peltastes*) as “medium infantry” (*Tactics* 2). The arms and armor of the phalangite were designed for fighting in the massed formation of the Macedonian phalanx (see second illustration in Phalanx entry). To fight as a phalangite only the small phalangite shield (the *pelte*—hence the term peltast, meaning “one who carries the *pelte*”) and the two-handed great spear (*sarissa*) were mandatory. The forerunner to the Hellenistic phalangite may have been created by the Athenian Iphicrates in 374 when, according to Diodorus, hoplites were rearmed with a longer spear, smaller shield, and renamed peltasts. The Macedonian military became a professional institution under Alexander II and Philip II between 371 and 350, and adopted the *sarissa*-wielding phalangite as the core of the army. During this period, many elements of the phalangite’s offensive and defensive equipment became standardized.

Body armor could include greaves to protect the legs, and Hellenistic phalangites commonly wore the composite *linothorax* to protect their torso. The most common form of helmet worn by the Hellenistic phalangite was the conical *pilos*—probably because the Macedonian army was equipped by the state—although other styles of open-faced helmet, such as the Thracian, Phrygian, and Chalcidian (see illustration) also seem to have been worn. Some of these helmets could have been adorned with crests, which may have indicated rank. The more open nature of many of the helmets worn by the Hellenistic phalangite not only provided better ventilation for the wearer but was also indicative of the differences in fighting style between the phalangite and the classical hoplite.

Asclepiodotus describes the *pelte* as being about 65 centimeters in diameter. Constructed from a wooden core and faced with a metallic covering (anything from bronze to silver to gold), the *pelte* had a shallow bowl-like shape less than 10-centimeters deep. The *pelte* was carried by inserting the left forearm through a central armband and then passing the left wrist through a strap on the outer edge of the shield. The shield was

further supported by a strap that went across the body and sat on the right shoulder—allowing the weight (5–6 kilograms) to be partially taken by the shoulder rather than solely on the left arm. The *pelte* provided protection from shoulder to thigh when it was held in a defensive position. Importantly, the smaller diameter, and the use of a wrist strap rather than a hand grip, allowed the left hand to extend beyond the rim of the shield to grip the phalangite's lengthy and weighty *sarissa*.



The Chalcidian helmet replaced the Corinthian helmet as the most popular helmet in Greece and Magna Graecia in the mid-fifth century. Combining good protection with better hearing and vision than the Corinthian helmet, the Chalcidian helmet was better suited to the increasingly fluid warfare from the Second Peloponnesian

War (431–404) onward. (Illustration by Mary Dearden)

The *pelte* was decorated with motifs indicative of the professional nature of Hellenistic armies and the standardization of equipment. Some suggest that many units within a Hellenistic army carried shields bearing emblems representing that unit. The sources show a variety of central motifs including portrait busts, rosettes, lightning bolts, monograms, and elephants, generally surrounded by a series of concentric semi-circle and pellet decorations. Whether these symbols were representative of particular commanders, individual units, or whole armies is uncertain.

The primary offensive weapon of the phalangite was the *sarissa*, which varied in length across the Hellenistic Period. Although there is some debate, the Iphicratean peltast was probably armed with a long spear about 500 centimeters in length. In the second half of the fourth century, the *sarissa* varied between around 480 centimeters and 580 centimeters. By the mid-Hellenistic Period (ca. 300) the length of the *sarissa* appears to have increased to about 770 centimeters. However, by the late Hellenistic Period (ca. 168), the length of the *sarissa* seems to have been reduced again to about 670 centimeters. There is some debate over whether the *sarissa* came in two separate pieces for ease of transportation. A cylindrical metal tube found outside a grave at Vergina, Macedonia has been interpreted by some as a connecting tube for the two separate halves of a segmented *sarissa*. Other scholars dismiss this hypothesis, arguing that the *sarissa* came with a single-piece shaft.

Regardless of the length and configuration of the weapon, the *sarissa* was tipped with a small iron head (174 grams)—Grattius (*Cynegetica*, 117–120) describes *sarissae* as having “small teeth.” On the rear end of the shaft sat a hefty butt-spike (1.5 kilograms). This gave the *sarissa* a point of balance 96 centimeters from its rearward end. When presented for combat, the vast majority of the weapon projected forward of the person bearing it. The total weight of the *sarissa* was around 5 kilograms and required both hands to wield—hence the importance of allowing the left hand to extend beyond the rim of the shield.

The phalangite’s sword seems to have primarily been the double-edged thrusting *xiphos*—carried at the left hip and suspended from a strap that ran across the body and sat on the right shoulder. This sword could weigh up to 2 kilograms.

The total weight of a phalangite panoply, including the longest *sarissa*, was around 23 kilograms. Despite the smaller *pelte*, the phalangite was still well protected. When positioned for battle, additional protection was provided by the length of the *sarissa*. Plutarch (*Aemelianus* 19) states that at Pydna (168) the Macedonians pressed the tips of their *sarissae* against the shields of the Romans and kept them at bay. Thus the length of the *sarissa* could be used to keep an enemy at a distance where he could not attack. This gave the phalangite a distinct advantage over other warriors armed with shorter-reach weapons so long as the phalanx was maintained, and made him one of the most effective types of soldier for over 150 years.

There was a significant trend toward heavy cavalry in the Hellenistic Period. Padded or even scale armor was used to protect the horse's chest and sides—and sometimes also the rider's legs. Equipment was more standardized, the thrusting spear became more common, and the *machaira* or similar slashing sword remained as the secondary weapon.

Christopher Matthew

See also Alexander II of Macedon; Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon; Art (Ancient), Greek Warfare in; *Cataphractoï*; Hoplites; Iphicrates; Peltast; Phalanx; Philip II of Macedon; Pydna, Battle of

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Arrian (ca. 89–ca. 180 CE)

Arrian (full name Lucius [or Aulus] Flavius Arrianus) was from a distinguished family of Nicomedia in Bithynia with Roman citizenship. Arrian was consul at Rome in (probably) 129 CE and governed Cappadocia 132–137 CE. Arrian was among the first Roman citizens from the eastern

provinces to reach the top of the Roman elite.

Late in life Arrian retired to Athens, the center of culture. He held the archonship there (148/9 CE) and devoted himself to writing. He was one the leading Greek writers of his day and was known as the “New Xenophon” after his chosen model as a historian and philosopher.

Arrian’s works are numerous and varied. Four out of eight books survive of his record of the *Discourses* of the Stoic moralist Epictetus, with whom Arrian had studied in his youth. He also produced a *Handbook* (*Enchiridion*) of Epictetus’ teaching. From his time in Cappadocia came his *Voyage around the Black Sea* (based on an official inspection of Roman forts), *Deployment against the Alani* (based on his experience of an invasion by this tribe) and *Tactica* in the tradition of military treatises.

Arrian wrote a number of historical works. One, *A History of Events after Alexander* in 10 books, covering 323–321 in great detail, survives only in excerpts. Others are lost: *A History of Parthia* in 17 books and *A History of Bithynia* in eight. The title of his surviving historical work, *The Anabasis of Alexander*, self-consciously reflects his model, Xenophon’s *Anabasis*. The *Anabasis* is supplemented by a short *Indica* on the geography of India.

Arrian’s *Anabasis of Alexander* stands out among ancient writers on Alexander the Great as the most detailed, coherent and serious-minded. Arrian based himself on the (lost) works of two contemporaries of Alexander, Ptolemy I and Aristobulus. He prided himself on being the first to create a historical work on Alexander that was in keeping with his fame and importance (1.12). Arrian idealizes Alexander as a heroic figure and there are lapses and misunderstandings, but his work is the bedrock on which the study of Alexander must rest.

Douglas Kelly

See also Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon; Ptolemy I Soter; Treatises, Military; Xenophon

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Art (Ancient), Greek Warfare in

War was a hugely popular subject in ancient art across all media. Images pertaining to warfare and warriors appeared almost as soon as the Greeks began to put figures on their pottery; among the first figured scenes in the Geometric period (eighth century) are scenes of battles on land and sea. Scenes of arming and departure as well as scenes of conflict, both mythical and non-mythical, form a substantial part of the surviving corpus. Rarely, however, can scenes of warfare in art be taken as straightforward depictions, and care must be taken when using them as historical sources. As Tonio Hölscher notes, “war in art is not war, but art” (Hölscher 2003, 2). Yet such art was created to evoke the nature of war, even if it did not do so through accurate factual depiction. In all periods and despite all the difficulties in its interpretation, the importance of art as a social document cannot be overstated. As Hölscher goes on to point out, “images in war are no mere visual fictions; they refer to hard, profound, and complex experiences in real life.” Images present a nuanced and selective expression of a variety of cultural perceptions and allow us an unparalleled insight into ancient Greek constructions of warfare.

Media

The artistic media available to us have been drastically reduced by the accidents of survival. Losses include wall paintings, textiles, and works in perishable materials such as wood. These are mainly known from scattered descriptions in literary sources, although tomb-paintings lately unearthed in Macedonia indicate that the paraphernalia of war were probably a commonplace theme. Freestanding sculpture has a higher survival rate. Although most bronze sculptures (the favored medium) have been melted down, many lost Greek bronzes are more or less accurately preserved in Roman copies (see illustrations in Pericles and Themistocles entries). In terms of the depiction of conflict, however, freestanding sculpture is of limited importance—statues or groups rarely depicted actual conflict even when they were erected in commemoration of specific battles or events. A notable exception to this is the Tyrannicide group of the slayers of

Hipparchus (one of the Peisistratidae), erected in Athens ca. 480. This shows the two attackers lunging forward; their target was not included in the group, but viewing it from its most effective angle places the viewer in the position of their victim. It is not until the Hellenistic Period, however, that action groups became more popular in freestanding sculpture, and the theatrical, grandiose style known as Hellenistic baroque was used to characterize the heroic drama of martial conflict.

To the end of the Classical Period, therefore, the most useful media for the historian are relief sculpture from major public buildings (mostly temples), which often did show complex struggling groups, and, in the sixth to fourth centuries, vase-paintings. Relief sculpture is public art, and therefore reflects a carefully constructed public identity and is usually conservative in its subject. This is generally true even of privately commissioned pieces such as grave *stelae*. Vase-painting, by contrast, was made for private consumption; its approach is far more flexible and varied. Nonetheless, however personal, it also reflects themes of broader social relevance at the time it was produced. Consequently, when vase-painting and sculpture depict the same subject, they often take radically different approaches. All these concerns qualify attempts to recover the realities of ancient warfare from ancient art. In addition, while surviving sculpture is from all over the Greek world, relevant figured vases are predominantly Athenian. Though they were widely exported, it is not clear how this affected their content, and with few exceptions Attic vase-painting should be viewed as reflecting Athenian society.

In the Hellenistic Period the picture changed. Vase-painting is no longer relevant to our subject and monuments commemorating wars were more likely to depict conflict or its aftermath (see illustration). Most of the monuments that had been state-sponsored were now the donations of wealthy individuals—and of Hellenistic rulers. The underlying ideology therefore shifted to emphasize individual power and prestige. Links to the classical past were also underlined. A gift to Athens from the Attalid rulers in Pergamum of four statue groups of battles is a good example. These groups, erected on the Acropolis, underlined Attalid military supremacy, with one group depicting their victory over the Gauls, but also equated their victories to Athens' by-now legendary defeat of the Persians, which was depicted in another group.

Conventions

For the Greek Archaic and Classical Periods (seventh–fifth centuries), at a time when warfare increasingly involved mass fighting in a hoplite phalanx, artistic media focused almost exclusively on the one-on-one duel. This is true even of long narrow sculptural friezes showing armies at war: the battle was still generally shown as a series of duels between individuals. This is often explained by a desire to depict the protagonists as heroic, placing the contemporary warrior in the context of Homeric valor and fame, or presenting an idealized epic view of warfare more generally. Another consideration in the preference for depicting the duel rather than the phalanx is the isolation of the crucial moment at which battle is joined. This is the moment when every man must fear, fight, and die alone, and when his world is narrowed down to only those companions or enemies who are right next to him. The assertion of the nobility and heroism of war thus stood alongside a recognition of its cost.

The pathos of loss associated with war becomes increasingly evident in art from the late sixth century (see illustration in Naval Warfare entry). One of the most effective expressions of it is found in the many scenes of departing warriors in vase-painting, in which a young warrior bids farewell to his family (often his wife and/or his father) who pour a libation for him or assist him with his armor. Classical Athenian grave *stelae*, even those apparently erected for warriors, often dwell on this familial aspect in quiet scenes of family greeting rather than active scenes of conflict. In contrast, *stelae* erected by the state for war graves show the deceased as triumphant in battle, heroizing the service of the dead to the state. From an early stage, this sympathy for the deceased is extended to outsiders: already sixth-century vase-paintings show dead Amazons carried from the field by their companions. Even more noteworthy in this context, in some mythical conflict scenes, not every Greek defeated his opponent. The Parthenon metopes (relief panels) include depictions of Greeks vanquished or killed in battle with centaurs. All these factors perhaps contribute to the lack of bloodthirstiness in most combat scenes: a warrior may be shown bleeding and dying but mutilation and cruelty are avoided in art unless the traditions of a mythical scene specifically call for it.

Scenes of conflict in Greek art are often broadly divided by modern scholars into those with identifiable mythical protagonists as opposed to the many unlabeled and unidentifiable scenes of warfare, generally described as

contemporary generic or “daily life” scenes. Both follow similar conventions and undoubtedly include realistic elements. The identification of specific mythical scenes in art depends on repeated formulae for particular actions (Greek art employs a sophisticated language of gesture and pose), characteristic attributes (e.g., Heracles’ lion skin, the Amazons as female warriors), and (far more rarely) identifying inscriptions. Without the aid of inscriptions, few warriors in mythical combat scenes are readily identifiable since little distinguishes one warrior in armor from another, nor is it always evident whether the scene is intended as mythical or generic. Many scenes of course operated as both, an ambivalence that was probably deliberate, as attributes that could have been made distinctive such as helmet type or shield device vary according to the artist’s preference. It is unlikely, in any case, that the ancient viewer would draw the modern distinction between mythical and generic scenes; he could identify as readily with Achilles killing Hector as with an anonymous hoplite killing his adversary.

Aspects of contemporary warfare are clearly apparent even in the case of the mythical images. Warriors are often shown in hoplite panoply and pose, legs spread wide and braced, shields held at an angle in front of them and resting against their left shoulders, spears at the ready. Although artists often depicted protagonists as dead, defeated, or on the verge of defeat—that is, as wounded or fleeing or at a disadvantage—it was also common for them to represent a combat between equals, in which it is not immediately clear who has the upper hand. Conventionally, the loser was placed on the viewer’s right, and if the combat was over a dead body, the head of the deceased pointed toward his friends (see the first illustration in *Hoplites* entry).

Art as a Source for Armor and Military Technique

Notwithstanding the conventions and ideological biases that affect ancient art, depictions of conflict are frequently utilized as sources for historical aspects of warfare. Scholarship in this area is wide-ranging but two areas in which ancient art offers a rich trove of factual detail are the details of ancient armor and the evolution and fighting technique of the hoplite phalanx.

Depictions of armor are frequently precise and detailed. Recent reconstructions of the *linothorax* (a cuirass made from layers of linen) by Gregory Aldrete and his colleagues have been made possible by over 900

representations of the *linothorax* on 486 artworks, which give sufficient detail to materially assist its modern reconstruction. Images of shields show the development from the single hand-grip shield to that with an armband in the center (*porpax*—see the first illustration in Phalanx entry) and a hand-grip at the rim (*antilabe*), and may also include details such as the shield-aprons that hang below the shield to protect the legs from arrows, and a cord strung around the inside of the shield, the purpose of which is still unclear. Often a warrior appears in the complete and historically accurate hoplite panoply including corselet, helmet (usually Corinthian), and greaves, along with the hoplite shield, spear, and sword (see the first illustration in Hoplites entry).

Nonetheless, dress, too, is subjective. Types of shield, armor, and helmet may vary, and combatants are frequently shown armed yet naked—even though in reality the Greeks never went into battle naked (see second illustration in Hoplites entry). Nakedness in Greek art has multiple meanings and is contentious. However, in the representation of the warrior it is often taken to signify strength, courage, skill, and manliness—or in the case of the warrior killed and stripped by his enemy, the futility or negation of these traits. It may also demonstrate the high value placed upon physical strength and agility.

While details of armor or weaponry could be used to distinguish one side from another (e.g., Attic versus Corinthian helmets), opposing combatants often are equipped identically, reflecting the internecine nature of the wars fought by the Greek *poleis*. Until the Persian Wars, the primary threat to any mainland Greek *polis* came from other Greeks, and the ground between allies and enemies could shift rapidly.

Depictions in art are also an important source for the study of the development of the hoplite phalanx, for which our literary sources are sketchy and unclear. There are only eight depictions of the hoplite phalanx, all from the Archaic Period. Although these are often used to investigate the development of the phalanx, it is far from clear how best to interpret them.

In the only relief sculpture depicting the phalanx in action (see first illustration for Phalanx entry), the relief frieze depicting a Gigantomachy (the myth of the gods defeating primordial giants) from the north side of the Siphnian Treasury at Delphi (ca. 525), the phalanx is negatively portrayed. It is the giants who are depicted as hoplites, in full armor, faces hidden by helmets, some advancing in step, whereas the gods—including females—

have diverse clothing and armor and fight as individuals or pairs rather than as a group. The significance of this is debated, but has been thought to relate to Siphnos' commitment to aristocratic (i.e., Homeric and heroic) privilege, and its lack of interest in the kind of centralized military organization that produced an effective hoplite phalanx. A simpler explanation is that the giants are depicted as mortals, exhibiting the kind of hubris that inevitably invites retribution. In any case, the importance of local context—the Siphnian origin of the treasury as well as its location in the sanctuary of Apollo—has certainly influenced the artist's choices, and any interpretation needs to recognize the ramifications of the tension between accuracy and ideology in Greek art.

Myth and History

The rarity of the phalanx in ancient art is due in part to the fact that until the end of the sixth century, Greek artists avoided depicting scenes of specific historical battles. Artists preferred to reflect on specific historic events by way of an appropriate mythical scene, although at the same time they often depicted precisely correct details of dress and fighting technique. This approach remained popular down through the Hellenistic Period. Thus a change in the iconography of the Amazonomachy (battle between Greeks and Amazons) is usually associated with the Persian Wars: early fifth-century Amazons often wear the elaborate Persian trousers, tunic, and cap, whereas their earlier counterparts were dressed in Greek *chiton* and armor. This association is thought to stem from shared factors such as Amazon and Persian skill as cavalry, their love of ornamentation, and the proximity of the mythical Amazon homelands to Persia. It is also significant that the Amazons always ultimately lose the fight against the Greeks. Lately, however, this approach has been questioned, both in its specifics—the garb of the Amazons has been seen as Scythian—and more broadly, most recently, and radically by Suzanne Muth.

Although mythical parallels along these lines were common in Greek art, they remain complex and controversial. In addition to the Amazonomachy, artists also made use of three other great myths of Greek superiority: the Gigantomachy, the Centauromachy (the defeat of predatory centaurs by Greek heroes), and—a perennial favorite—the Trojan War. After the Persian Wars any or all of them may be read as a reference to the Greeks' victory over the Persians, although debate persists over the extent

of the Persian Wars' influence on Greek art. More importantly, however, these canonical battles defined male Greek citizen identity against outsiders. In sharp contrast (for example), the incidence of scenes showing the sack of Troy rises in the early fifth century, around the time of the Persian Wars. In these scenes, the Trojans are shown as the noble defenders of their households whereas the Greeks are shown in a bad light, killing children and the elderly, raping women, and committing sacrilege: Troy's fall is illustrated through the brutal destruction of its ruling family. The popularity of these scenes around the time of the sack of Athens by the Persians is unlikely to be coincidental, but the interpretations here are not straightforward.

The choice of subjects for scenes of conflict in temple sculpture is more restricted, but battles are particularly favored for pediments since dying men fit nicely into the awkward corners. The favored conflicts for temple sculpture are the four already mentioned: the Gigantomachy, the Centauromachy, the Amazonomachy, and the Trojan War—often two or more on the same temple. These embodied universal themes of the supremacy of the gods and of Greek civilization and law, and the victory and superiority—both military and cultural—of Greeks (specifically, Greek male citizens) over monsters, hybrids, women, and foreigners. But the location, date, deity, and context of a temple also determine the viewer's understanding of its sculpture. These four conflicts on the fifth-century Athenian Parthenon doubtless celebrate victory over the Persians. The Gigantomachy on the Attalid Great Altar in Pergamum, ca. 175, however, commemorates a victory over the Gauls. At the same time, by "quoting" from the figures on the Parthenon, it asserts Pergamene claims to Greek ideals of civilization.

The Persian War marks a distinct break in approach to historical depictions. Scenes showing clashes between Greeks and Persians appear in the early fifth century alongside mythical depictions. The Persian warrior is identified by realistic details such as his *anaxyrides* (trousers), sleeved *chiton*, distinctive cap, curved sword, and *pelte* (crescent-shaped shield). While the pattern of the one-on-one duel is retained, fights against Persians are not fights between equals; rather, the artists depicted a series of Greeks killing their opponents, with an increased level of violence. These are not equal Greek enemies, but a far more unsettling threat that needs to be unequivocally defeated. The Greeks are armed with the thrusting spear or

sword for fighting at close quarters, whereas the favored Persian weapon in these depictions is the bow, contrasting Greek bravery with Persian cowardice, Greek simplicity in dress (or nakedness) with elaborately decorated Persian dress, Greek victory with Persian defeat. The contrast between very elaborate Persian dress and equipment and Greek simplicity is one between effeminacy and hardiness.



A Greek soldier killing a Persian in a scene from one of Alexander the Great's battles (possibly at Gaza) on the "Alexander Sarcophagus." The late-fourth-century sarcophagus, a masterpiece of Greek art, was found in the royal necropolis at Sidon, but is now in the Archaeological Museum in Istanbul, Turkey. (Robert Harding Picture Library Ltd/Alamy Stock Photo)

Although these are still generalized depictions rather than allusions to specific battles, it seems clear that the Greeks occasionally made an

exception and depicted specific events where the Persian Empire was concerned. The most famous instance of this is the painting of the battle of Marathon in the *Stoa Poikile* in Athens (perhaps ca. 460). This seems to have combined a pictorial schema derived from Amazonomachies (one of which was also painted in the *stoa*) with accurately depicted historical details of dress: the viewer would recognize both the immediate context of the Persian invasions and the broader mythical context of enemies who are always defeated. Another step in this direction comes with the Temple of Athena Nike at the end of the fifth century, which appears to depict not only Greeks fighting Persians (possibly the battle of Marathon) but also Greeks fighting Greeks, representing, it has been argued, the contemporary Second Peloponnesian War. Such historical scenes do not replace mythical ones, but add another string to the artist's bow. The degree to which even historical scenes are culturally constructed is made clear by the schema's reversal in the Hellenistic Period. By the time that the Gauls come into focus as the primary opponents, the ideal Greek lifestyle has become less abstemious, and the contrast becomes one between the sophisticated Greeks, defenders of civilization, and the uncultured Gauls, proponents of a very different brand of barbarian threat from the Persians.

In sum, depictions of warfare in Greek art are illuminating in both specifics and as a more general tool for insight into Greek ways of thinking about conflict. The sheer volume of material depicting war and the warrior mirrors war's significance in other sources for Greek culture. These images provide us with invaluable evidence, but they are not snapshots of military realities, and need careful interpretation in their own context and on their own terms.

Diana Burton

See also Amazons; Arms and Armor; "Chigi Vase"; Dedications, Military; Homeric Warfare; Hoplites; Peisistratidae; Pergamum; Persian Wars; Trojan War

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Artaxerxes I (Reigned 465–424)

Xerxes’ murder, initially blamed on his son Darius and then on a conspiratorial favorite Artabanus (whom Artaxerxes eliminated) left Artaxerxes as king. (His own death in 424 left a disputed succession.) Notable aspects of his reign include Themistocles’ defection (464), an Egyptian rebellion (460–454), the Peace of Callias (of debatable authenticity), Persian interference in Samos (440) and Colophon (before 428), satrapal revolts in Transeuphratene (440s) and Bactria (465/4), the Jerusalem missions of Ezra (458) and Nehemiah (445), and building-work at Persepolis. Nicknamed “Longhand”—perhaps a tribute to the extent of his power—he had a reputation for fair-mindedness.

Christopher Tuplin

See also Callias, Peace of; Darius II; Themistocles

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Artaxerxes II (Reigned 405/4–359/8)

The longest Achaemenid reign produced a new palace at Susa, a remarkable ideological novelty (Artaxerxes' inscriptions named Anahita and Mithra alongside Ahuramazda as special divine patrons), and mixed politico-military fortunes. Artaxerxes defeated his brother Cyrus' insurrection (401) and, by trading support to Sparta (Persia's enemy since 400) for surrender of the Greeks of Asia Minor, recovered full control of western Anatolia in 386—a dispensation intact until Alexander. By contrast, all efforts to recover Egypt, which revolted in ca. 404, were wholly (even embarrassingly) unsuccessful, the Cypriot rebel Evagoras negotiated terms rather than being crushed, and the reign ended amidst bloody court intrigue.

Christopher Tuplin

See also Cunaxa, Battle of; Cyrus the Younger; Evagoras; King's Peace

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Artaxerxes III (Reigned 358–338)

Artaxerxes became king after the death of three brothers (respectively executed for treason, driven to suicide, and murdered) and consolidated his position by eliminating other members of the royal family. Eventually he himself fell victim to assassination, but the intervening 20 years saw various

successes. Satrapal dissidence in Anatolia was curbed and the prospect of Persian retaliation for an incursion into the Great King's land forced Athens to make peace with its rebellious allies: both achievements reflect threats rather than military action and reveal the fear induced by a new and ruthless ruler. Rebellions in Cyprus and Phoenicia in the early 340s were suppressed with military force, though the fall of Sidon was achieved by a sordid mixture of Sidonian treachery and Persian double-cross.

The reign's crowning achievement was in Egypt. After a failure in 351 (which perhaps helped to prompt the Cypriot and Phoenician revolts), a renewed attack in 343—the seventh attempt since Egypt's rebellion in 404—was successful. A substantial army, drawn from imperial heartlands and Asia Minor, was supplemented by Greek mercenary forces, including some who, with their commander Mentor, had been involved in the treacherous surrender of Sidon to the Persians. When the attackers penetrated the Egyptian defensive line in the Eastern Delta in separate coordinated operations, the pharaoh Nectanebo II retreated to Memphis and then fled to Ethiopia, and further resistance was at best local. As at Sidon, Persian victory was followed by extensive destruction and looting. In Artaxerxes' final years, a perceived Macedonian threat to Persian control of western Anatolia led to Mentor being appointed regional commander and the local satraps supporting Perinthus when it was besieged by Philip II. Artaxerxes was dead before Philip's forces landed in northwest Anatolia and began the process that Alexander would so triumphantly complete.

Christopher Tuplin

See also Artaxerxes II; Darius III; Egypt, Egyptians; Memnon and Mentor of Rhodes; Persian (Achaemenid) Empire

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Artemisia (Active ca. 480)

Artemisia was the local ruler of Halicarnassus, Cos, Nisyra, and Calydna during the reign of King Xerxes and served in his invasion of Greece in 480. She was the daughter of Lygdamis of Halicarnassus and a Cretan. She has a reasonably prominent supporting part in Herodotus' *Histories*, perhaps because of the relative novelty of a female commander but also because Herodotus also came from Halicarnassus. Herodotus portrays Artemisia sympathetically as one of those who provided Xerxes with good quality honest advice that he failed to follow.

Herodotus claims (7.99) that she chose to personally command the five-ship contingent from her territories on the expedition because of her “manly courage.” Prior to the battle of Salamis, she advised Xerxes not to attack but to wait for the Greek fleet opposing him to disintegrate from internal dissension. In the battle, she fought well but at one point came close to capture. To escape she rammed one of her own ships, causing the pursuer to think her ship was either Greek or a defector. From his hilltop vantage point, Xerxes and his staff observed the incident and assumed she had bravely rammed a Greek ship. Herodotus (8.93) notes that the Athenians offered a price for her capture because they were so upset a woman was fighting against them. Artemisia survived the battle and was selected to escort Xerxes' children home.

Iain Spence

See also Gender in War; Persian Wars; Salamis, Battle of (480); Women in War; Xerxes

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Artemisium, Battle of (480)

Artemisium is the northwestern promontory of the island of Euboea, opposite Thermopylae, and the site of the first naval battle in the Second Persian War when the Persians tried to force the Greeks' joint land and sea defensive line at Thermopylae and Artemisium. Despite Sparta's lack of naval experience and Athens' contribution of by far the largest number of triremes (127), the Spartan Eurybiades commanded the naval contingent of 271 triremes and 9 penteconters—later reinforced by a further 53 Athenian triremes. The Persian fleet had lost a third of its strength in a storm and now had 800 warships, which anchored at Aphetae on the mainland.

The battle was a scrappy affair, fought in a series of actions of various scale over three days. The Persians started badly, losing 15 ships that on arrival mistook the Greek fleet for their own and tried to join it. They lost a further 30 ships in a skirmish the next day and that night lost to a storm a squadron of 200 sent around Euboea to attack the Greek rear. The Persians mounted a serious attack the following day but despite inflicting considerable casualties, suffered even more themselves and were unable to force the Greeks from Artemisium. This stalemate was only broken when the Persian army took the pass at Thermopylae—if the Persian army could simply march south there was no point in the fleet remaining and it made an orderly withdrawal.

Iain Spence

See also Eurybiades; Persian Wars; Naval Warfare; Omens and Portents; Themistocles; Thermopylae

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Asclepiodotus (First Century)

Asclepiodotus was the author of a short, 12-chapter treatise transmitted under the heading *Main Points of Tactics of Asclepiodotus, Philosopher*. This work is the earliest surviving specimen of an originally late Hellenistic tradition of Greco-Roman military writing, which aimed to explain the terminology, organization, and tactical evolutions of a hypothetical army, based on a highly schematized infantry phalanx, with supporting light infantry and cavalry. Chariots and elephants are also included, but considered obsolete. The terse style and elementary content suggest a summary or abridgement. In the absence of internal indications of date or authorship, Asclepiodotus is commonly identified with a scientific author of that name, whom Seneca describes as a pupil of the Stoic philosopher Poseidonius of Apamea (ca. 135–51). As Poseidonius reportedly wrote a tactical treatise that has not survived, it is accordingly assumed that Asclepiodotus' text is an adaptation of his teacher's lost work. Later treatises by Aelian and Arrian were derived from the same tradition.

Philip Rance

See also Aelian; Arrian; Phalanx; Treatises, Military

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Asia Minor

A term first used around 400 CE to describe the geographic region, also known as Anatolia, comprising most of modern Turkey from the Aegean Sea in the west to the Euphrates River in the east, bounded by the Black Sea to the north, and the Mediterranean to the south. The cultures and peoples of this region have been influenced by their neighbors on all sides, although Asia Minor is popularly seen as the "bridge" between Europe and the Near

East. Greek colonists settled along the Aegean and the Black Sea coasts from 1,000 until 500. Persian influence grew inland to match the spread of the Greeks along the coast, and after the conquests of Alexander the Great, Asia Minor was fought over during the wars of the *diadochoi* (Successors) who strove to control the region's lucrative resources and wealth. By the second century, the region was home to the Attalid dynasty based in Pergamum and the Mithridatids in Pontus. By 63, all the kingdoms of Asia Minor had become Roman provinces.

Russell Buzby

See also Bithynia; Caria, Carians; Caria, Greek cities in; Colonies, Colonization; Ionia, Ionians; Pergamum; Persian (Achaemenid) Empire; Pontus; Propontis, Greek Cities of; Seleucids; Troad

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“Asiatic Vespers.” See Mithridates VI Eupator

Assassination

Assassination (there is no corresponding ancient Greek term) may be defined as the disruption of the normal political process by the deliberate killing of a specific opponent or opponents for political ends. This happened once under the democracy in Athens in a bitter but otherwise nonviolent political dispute: in 461 the popular leader Ephialtes was assassinated. This assassination did not stop the passing or the consolidation of the reforms Ephialtes proposed and may have been no more than revenge arising out of frustration.

Some assassinations that occurred in Athens in 411 were rather different, as they occurred when the constitution was being subverted. Conspirators in the Athenian fleet stationed at Samos, working for the oligarchic faction in Athens, assassinated the Athenian demagogue Hyperbolus, then living on Samos during his period of ostracism (Thucydides 8.73). This killing was apparently intended to commit the conspirators to carrying out their plans: there could be no turning back after

so heinous a crime. The same applies to the killing in the same year of the demagogue Androcles in Athens (Thucydides 8.65). The oligarchs also carried out a systematic program of killing outspoken opponents of their movement and the state's organs of justice were helpless against such violent intimidation. However, the assassination of Phrynichus, one of the leaders of the Four Hundred, was a sign that opposition to the oligarchy was growing (Thucydides 8.92).

Political conflict in other Greek states could be far more savage than in the relatively stable Athenian democracy. Assassination was the obvious resort of those aiming at regime change. Thus oligarchic conspirators in Elis ca. 398 aimed to kill the democratic leader Thrasydaeus but got the wrong man, who happened to resemble him (Xenophon, *Hellenica* 3.3.27). A more spectacular example was the carefully contrived killing of the leading Theban oligarchs in winter 379/8 by a group of democratic exiles who were brought into their opponents' drinking party disguised as respectable married women being prostituted to the oligarchs (Xenophon, *Hellenica* 5.4.2–7). Less colorful, and far more brutal, was the mass murder in Corinth in ca. 392 on the day of a religious festival. This was a concerted attack in public places, such as the *agora* and the theater, by supporters of a democratic union with Argos against a large number of opponents. Taking refuge at an altar was no protection for some victims (Xenophon, *Hellenica* 4.4.2–3).

Such large-scale acts of indiscriminate killing, such as the notorious incident in Corcyra in 427 (Thucydides 3.69–85, see Document 9), may be better classed as massacre rather than assassination. Assassination, defined as an act directed against an individual, is most commonly seen in Greek history in the form of tyrannicide: the killing of an individual who could be regarded as having put himself outside the law by his illegal assumption of one-man rule. Assassination was the common fear of all tyrants: Dionysius I of Syracuse was legendary for the elaborate precautions he took to avoid it, although such a story as having his daughters shave him because he did not trust barbers is probably exaggerated.

Those who succeeded in assassinating a tyrant could be assured of high honors, such as were awarded in many cities of Greece outside of Thessaly to the young men who survived their successful assassination of Jason tyrant of Thessaly in 370 (Xenophon, *Hellenica* 6.4.32). Of Jason's relatives who followed him in the tyranny, all except one died at the hands of other

family members. A list of the tyrants and monarchs whose lives were ended by assassination would be a long one: the Macedonian royal house alone can contribute Alexander I, Archelaus, Amyntas II, Pausanias, Alexander II, Perdiccas III, and Philip II. It was only natural that many contemporaries believed that Alexander the Great had been poisoned.

The assassins of Phrynichus in Athens in 411 (see above) were liberally rewarded, but there was much legal wrangling over who actually deserved the credit. The descendants of Harmodius and Aristogeiton enjoyed hereditary honors at Athens, even though their ancestors had assassinated only Hipparchus, brother of the tyrant Hippias who was their intended victim (514/13). Even so, Athenian sentiment made them into heroic liberators. A series of Athenian laws, including one attributed to Solon, made the assassination of a tyrant at Athens justifiable homicide, adding the promise of rewards and in effect laying such an act as a positive duty on any right-thinking Athenian. This provision was reinforced in a law of 337/6 directed against any subversion by the Areopagus.

Some exiles from Sicyon assassinated Euphron the tyrant of Sicyon when he was about to address the Council on the Cadmea at Thebes (ca. 365). They were immediately indicted for murder and sacrilege (the Cadmea included much sacred space). All except one denied they had done it, but one man pleaded that such an act was justifiable on legal and moral grounds. Xenophon reported both the speech by prosecution and this man's defense (he was acquitted), because of the perennial interest for Greeks of this matter of assassination as justifiable homicide (*Hellenica* 7.3.4–12).

Douglas Kelly

See also Archelaus; Jason of Pherae; Peisistratidae; Pericles; Philip II of Macedon

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Astyochus (Active 412/11)

Astyochus, a Spartiate, was *nauarchos* (admiral) of the Spartan fleet

appointed in the summer of 412, active in the Aegean Sea during the Ionian War phase of the Peloponnesian War. His activities began after the Spartan's first treaty with the Persian Empire and a bloody democratic revolt at Samos, and during attempts by Alcibiades and the Peloponnesians to draw Ionian cities away from Athens' empire. Winter 412/11 saw Astyochus in ineffective actions at Pteleum, Clazomenae, and Lesbos. He was accused of wrongdoing for refusing to assist the Chians against Athenian forces: the Spartan government sent a board of official commissioners with the power to replace him. Ordered to execute Alcibiades, he failed in this and became involved in epistolary machinations between Alcibiades, the Persian commander Tissaphernes, and the Athenian democrat Phrynichus. In summer 411, Tissaphernes' refusal to pay Sparta's allies well, and Astyochus' insistence on waiting for a phantom Phoenician fleet, caused the Peloponnesian-allied fleet to remain inactive. This led frustrated Syracusan and Thurian sailors at Miletus to demand pay from Astyochus. He threatened them, and they almost lynched him. Mindarus succeeded him as *nauarchos*. Astyochus' lack of intelligent resolve seems fairly typical of Spartan lack of will and vision before Lysander to earnestly undertake an overseas administration.

Timothy Doran

See also Alcibiades; Lysander; Peloponnesian League; Peloponnesian War, Second; Persian (Achaemenid) Empire; Pharnabazus; Tissaphernes

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Athenian Confederacy, Second

The Second Athenian Confederacy (or League) was a maritime alliance formed by Athens in 378/7 and abolished only at the formation of Philip II of Macedon's League of Corinth 40 years later. The League's founding charter, the Aristoteles Decree, contains a series of commitments on the part

of Athens to other member-states: a central decision-making body, no interference in allied constitutions, and no cleruchies or tribute. Evaluation of the League has depended to a great extent on whether Athens is seen as having failed to honor these commitments.

The explicit purpose of the League at its foundation was to combat the influence of Sparta, still the major Greek power after the Peloponnesian and Corinthian Wars. More specifically, the League endeavored to preserve the autonomy of the *poleis* that had been mandated in the King's Peace of 387 (although it might have been unclear to many outside the Athenian sphere of influence why the League did not itself violate that autonomy). After the crushing victory of Thebes at Leuctra in 371, the Spartan threat receded, but the League continued to exist, defending Athenian and allied interests against not only Thebes, but also the rising power of Macedon. The revolts of Rhodes, Chios, and Byzantium led to the so-called Social War (from Latin *socii*, allies) in 357–355; but the final dissolution of the League would have to wait until after Philip's decisive defeat of Athens and Thebes at Chaeronea in 338.

Although the League was never as powerful or as large as its predecessor, the Athenian Empire (the League had around 60 members, compared with the Empire's 100 to 200 members), many observers have seen in the history of the fourth-century League an eventual reversion to the imperial habits of the fifth-century Empire. In most cases, however, though it is hard to deny that Athens sometimes acted against the spirit of the promises it made in the Decree of Aristoteles, it is also difficult to assert that it broke the letter of its commitments. Though the fifth-century word for tribute, *phoros*, was never used in the fourth, contributions were solicited, and granted, under a new label, *syntaxis*. Though cleruchies were imposed on Samos and Potidaea in the late 360s, neither of these states were members of the League. And though the campaigns of Athenian generals such as Timotheus, Chabrias, and (especially) Chares may well have had an impact on the political alignment of Aegean *poleis*, there is no clear evidence that Athens directly violated the autonomy of allied states. Whatever limitations membership in the Second Athenian League imposed on its member-states, the eclipse of the alliance by the Macedonian-led League of Corinth was soon to usher in a new world in which the independence of small *poleis* in the Aegean was to be ever more precarious.

James Kierstead

See also Athens; Chabrias; Chares; Delian League/Athenian Empire; Diplomacy; Social War (357–355); Timotheus

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Athenian Empire. See Delian League/Athenian Empire

Athens

After relatively humble beginnings, Athens rose to be one of the dominant military forces of the Classical Greek world, before being eclipsed by larger polities such as Macedon and Rome. A regional power by the late Archaic Period, and a force to be reckoned with soon after its transition to democracy in 508/7, the city was an indispensable member of the Greek alliance in the Persian Wars, a position that soon morphed into leadership of the anti-Persian Delian League. The League, in turn, morphed into an Athenian Empire, making conflict with Sparta inevitable; two Peloponnesian Wars ended with Athens' surrender in 404. It soon recovered, holding its own against both Sparta and Thebes for much of the fourth century, but Athens was unable to deal successfully with the rising threat of Philip II of Macedon. After defeat at Chaeronea in 338, the city was condemned to watch passively as the conquests of Alexander resulted in an explosion of Macedonian power. A revolt against the new order was crushed in the Lamian War (323–322), after which the democracy was dismantled. A few more short-lived uprisings followed, but by the late third century Athens was content to withdraw from the entanglements of international conflict, and during the Roman period the city proved on several occasions to be vulnerable to assailants. During its classical ascendancy, Athens' power was mainly a function of its large navy, although its citizen army could also be a considerable force, and a series of fortifications helped secure home territory. Explanations for Athens' rise to military preeminence in the fifth century, and for its later decline, vary, but both geographical and political factors seem to have played some role.

Settled in prehistoric times, Athens was a moderately important

Mycenaean center; so much is suggested by fourteenth-century tombs and by fortifications on the Acropolis dated to the following century. After the Bronze Age collapse, Athens was *synoikized* (united as a *polis*) probably sometime in the ninth or eighth century, when settlement seems to have expanded into the Attic countryside. The earliest datable episode in Athenian history, Cylon's attempted coup in 632, is also the earliest datable episode in Athenian military history: Thucydides tells us (1.126) that after Cylon had seized the Acropolis with Megarian troops, "the Athenians came together *en masse* from the fields to resist them and settled down to lay siege," though they later grew tired of the siege and handed over operations to the city's governing board of nine archons. Athens in this early period was a regional power, but by no means a dominant one; it had difficulty asserting control over the nearby island of Salamis against local rivals Megara and Aegina. In the sixth century, Peisistratus (who had distinguished himself in fighting against Megara) finally succeeded in establishing himself as tyrant after three attempts; his final attempt climaxed in the victory of his force (composed largely of Argive mercenaries) at Pallene ca. 546/5. The increase in state capacity associated with Peisistratid rule allowed Athens to tighten its grip on Salamis and even to make its presence felt in the Cyclades.



The Athenian acropolis today, dominated by the remains of the Parthenon, a temple dedicated to Athena. Fortified early in Athenian history, the Acropolis was captured and its buildings were demolished by the Persians in 480. Forty years later, Pericles initiated a major building program, using funds drawn from the Athenian Empire, to

build new temples of great beauty to adorn the religious heart of Athens. (Pedre/[iStockphoto.com](https://www.iStockphoto.com))

But Athens' military capacities were about to be transformed. In 508/7, the Athenians again rose up *en masse* and besieged the Acropolis, this time to expel the reactionary politician Isagoras, who had occupied it with the support of Spartan troops. Isagoras had intended to block the reforms of his rival Cleisthenes; after the Athenian Revolution that ensued, Cleisthenes was given a free hand to redesign the political system. Cleisthenes' reforms also had a military component, providing for a national citizen army with units drawn from each of the 10 new *phylai* or tribes and commanded by 10 generals (*strategoï*) elected by the tribesmen. This new system was immediately put to the test when in 506 armies from Sparta, Chalcis, and Boeotia converged on Athens. After the Spartans turned back, Athens defeated both the Boeotians and the Chalcidians, a victory that led Herodotus to speculate (5.78) that it was the new democracy that had made the Athenians "preeminent by some distance" in war.

But a greater test was on the horizon. After Athens supported the Ionian Revolt in the 490s, the Persian king Darius dispatched a punitive expedition. In 490, the Athenians, probably with around 10,000 men to the Persians' 30,000, won a famous victory at Marathon, one that many later citizens would look back on as their finest hour. In the Greek resistance to the subsequent invasion of Xerxes, Athens played a leading role, even though formal leadership was given to Sparta: at the crucial battle of Salamis in 480, the Athenian fleet was arguably the decisive factor that tilted the balance in favor of a Greek victory. Herodotus, writing half a century later, could not suppress his by then unpopular conviction that the Athenians had been the "saviors of Greece" (7.139).

The prestige that Athens enjoyed as a result of its performance in the Persian Wars made it the natural choice to take over the leadership of the alliance after the Spartan Pausanias had alienated the Ionian member-states. The alliance—now called the Delian League—immediately took aggressive measures to clear Persian influence from the eastern Mediterranean, an endeavor whose zenith was the victory at Eurymedon in 467/6, and whose nadir was reached in 454, with the destruction of the allied fleet in Egypt. By that year—the year that the League treasury was moved to Athens itself—it was the conviction of many observers that the alliance had become an

Athenian Empire, an impression that was fortified by the city's crushing responses to attempted defections. The first revolt was that of Naxos in 470; the most difficult to repress perhaps that of Samos in 441. The obvious and continuing increase in Athenian power led to conflict with Sparta in the First Peloponnesian War from around 460/59; a Thirty Years' Peace in 446/5 left the Empire intact. But Spartan fears continued to grow alongside Athens' influence, and in 431 the Second Peloponnesian War erupted.

The war began well for the Athenians, with the Spartans under their king Archidamus unable to provoke a decisive hoplite battle, and with the superior Athenian fleet winning a series of easy victories such as Naupactus (429). This was in accordance with Pericles' strategic vision, which recommended avoidance of infantry engagements along with sporadic naval raids of the Peloponnese. One such raid in 425 resulted in the Athenian victory at Pylos and Sphacteria, but the ensuing campaigns of Brasidas in the north resulted in a number of Spartan victories, including the capture of Amphipolis. An Athenian bid to recapture the city resulted in the deaths of both Brasidas and Cleon in 422, after which the way was open for the Peace of Nicias of the following year. The signing of the peace did not prevent a mixed force (mainly of Athenians and Argives) challenging Sparta at Mantinea at 418 (the result confirming Spartan preeminence in hoplite warfare); nor did it prevent the launching of the enormously ambitious Athenian expedition to Sicily in 415. After some initial successes, the Athenians failed in their attempts to build an encircling wall around Syracuse, the largest city in Sicily, and were subsequently defeated at sea in the city's great harbor in 413. Despite these apparently devastating losses, Athens recovered, winning improbable victories at Cynossema in 411, Cyzicus a year later, and Arginusae in 406. Lysander's victory at Aegospotami the following year prevented Athens from either collecting tribute or securing the grain-route from the Black Sea. The city finally surrendered in 404.

The settlement imposed by Sparta mandated the dissolution of both Athens' empire and its fleet. Despite this, by the end of the first few decades of the fourth century, Athens was resurgent both as a naval and as a diplomatic power. Naval superiority was reasserted (thanks partly to Persian funding) at Cnidus in 394; the battle was part of the anti-Spartan Corinthian War (395–387/6). After the (Persian) King's Peace in 387/6 left Sparta in possession of considerable privileges, Athens was allowed to form the

Second Athenian Confederacy in 378/7. This led to further victories at sea in the 370s (Naxos and Alyzia). Thebes' victory at Leuctra in 371 severely diminished the Spartan threat, but by 357–355, Athens had its hands full in the Social War (a war with allied members of the Confederacy). Athenian involvement in the Sacred War in the late 350s and in a number of engagements with Macedonian forces in the early 340s only hastened the rise of Philip II; Philip's victory over a joint Theban and Athenian army at Chaeronea in 338 marked the end of Athens as a military power of the first rank.

It did not, of course, mark the end of Athens as a *polis*, though the conquests of Philip's son Alexander in the east were ushering in a new world dominated by large territorial states. In the wake of Alexander's death, Athens rebelled against the new order in the Lamian War (323–322); after some initial successes it was defeated at sea at Amorgos and on land at Crannon, both in 322. The Macedonian regent Antipater put an end to the classical democracy, but democracy of a sort was restored in 318, though later in the same year Cassander (Antipater's son) was able to install the tyrant-philosopher Demetrius of Phalerum. Democracy of a sort was again restored in 307 but Cassander was again able to install a regent, the tyrant Lachares, in 300. After Cassander's death in 297, Athens continued to be dominated by Macedon, now ruled by Demetrius I Poliorcetes; an attempt to escape this domination in the Chremonidean War (from 267/6) ended in failure five years later. Athens was "free" again by 229, after which it pursued the policy of nonengagement recommended by the politicians Eurycleides and Micion.

This policy of nonengagement coincided with the rise of the monopolistic power of Rome. Athens was formally allied with Rome from around 200, and Roman protection allowed the city to flourish economically. But an uncharacteristic decision under the tyrant Aristion to align itself with the anti-Roman war of Mithridates of Pontus led to Athens being sacked by Sulla in 86. Though the city recovered its economic and cultural vibrancy, it had long ceased to be a military power; further sackings by the Herulians (267 CE) and by the Goths (396 CE) only accelerated a decline that would prove terminal (at least until the modern period).

In its Classical heyday, Athens' military strength depended mainly on its navy. The presence of Athenian triremes was the decisive consideration at Salamis and Eurymedon; the loss of triremes was what made the defeats

in Egypt and Sicily so devastating. Athenian hoplites were never as feared as Spartiates, but could hold their own, and occasionally distinguished themselves (as at Marathon and Mycale). A cavalry force drawn from wealthier citizens often struggled to make its presence felt. The territory of Athens was defended by a circuit wall and the Long Walls that linked the city to its harbor at Piraeus; these Classical fortifications were the brainchild of Themistocles. A system of border forts was defended by a force of *ephebes* or cadets on compulsory military service.

Any explanation for the military prowess of Classical Athens should start with natural endowments, including a strategic position affording easy access both to central Greece and to the Aegean; an exceptionally large citizen population (up to 60,000 in the fifth century); and an exceptionally large territory (around 2,400 square kilometers) protected by mountains. This territory also encompassed the abundant silver deposits at Laurium, and it was the discovery of a particularly rich vein of silver there that enabled the construction of the fleet that proved decisive in the Persian Wars. At the same time, the decision to spend the money on triremes was made only after Themistocles had persuaded the Assembly of the wisdom of this course of action; so we should perhaps not rule out a role for Athens' political system. Though Athens' strength was in the fifth century clearly linked to its Empire in some way, the city's military performance was already impressive before the formation of the Empire, and it continued to be formidable long after the Empire had been broken up. Historians are unsure about the relationship between the political involvement of the lower classes and their military participation: was Athens democratic because it had a powerful navy that employed lower-class rowers, or did it have a powerful navy because the lower classes were happy to serve at sea on its behalf? Whatever the truth is, it would seem clear that Athens' democratic system at least allowed it to mobilize considerable numbers of citizens in the defense of its interests for nearly 200 years. In the end, the city's power declined not because it was out-competed by other *poleis* with superior constitutions, but because it was unable to match the manpower and resources of the much larger states that emerged in the Hellenistic and Roman Periods.

James Kierstead

See also Athenian Confederacy, Second; Athens, External Conflicts (519–

506); Athens, Intervention in Egypt; Athens, Oligarchic Movements; Athens, Revolts of Allies (Fifth Century); Command Structures, Army; Delian League/Athenian Empire; Democracy and War; Peloponnesian War, First; Peloponnesian War, Second; Sport and War

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Athens, Alliance with Plataea (ca. 519)

The Plataeans requested this alliance to counter pressure from Thebes. Herodotus (6.108) records that (ca. 519) the Plataeans asked Cleomenes I (who was in the region with an army) for protection, offering in return to make themselves subject to Sparta. Noting that Sparta was too far away to offer timely aid, Cleomenes suggested that Athens would make a better protector. Herodotus adds the comment, no doubt extrapolated from later events, that Cleomenes did so to ensure that Athens and Thebes were hostile to each other. The Plataeans gave themselves over to Athens for protection. The Athenians forcibly extended Plataean territory up to the River Asopus, moving the boundary between Plataea and Thebes recently arbitrated by Corinth. The alliance also resulted in the Plataeans serving alongside Athens at Marathon (490) and remaining loyal to the Greek cause in the Second Persian War, but did not prevent Plataea's destruction by Thebes during the Second Peloponnesian War.

Iain Spence

See also Cleomenes I; Marathon, Battle of; Peloponnesian War, Second; Persian Wars; Plataea; Plataea, Battle of; Thebes, Thebans

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Athens, Campaigns in Thrace

Athens developed a marked interest in Thrace, the territory to the north and northeast of the Aegean, in the mid-sixth century. Thrace thereafter figured prominently in Athenian foreign policy and military activity until at least 338. Particularly in the vicinity of the Strymon River in the north Aegean, Thrace was very rich in gold and other precious metals and afforded an abundance of timber, enriching Athens and many of its leading figures, as well as providing the raw materials to build and finance the ships of Athens' fifth-century navy. In addition to regions providing natural resources, the Thracian Chersonese, today's Gallipoli Peninsula in Turkey, lay on the northern shore of the Hellespont, or Dardanelles, and therefore was strategically located along the vital shipping route between the Aegean and Black Sea. The Chersonese itself abounded in arable land, rendering it a prime location for Athenian settlements, or *cleruchies*. All these factors ensured that Athens would focus much of its military energies on acquiring and defending access to and territory in Thrace.

The first major Athenian campaign in Thrace took place in the 550s, when Miltiades I led an expedition of Athenians to settle the Chersonese at the invitation of a local Thracian tribe, the Dolonci. Miltiades drove out the enemies of the Dolonci, and ruled the territory as a tyrant until his death, about 525. Control of the area remained in his family's hands, passing eventually to his nephew, Miltiades II, who conducted many further campaigns before returning to Athens in 493. The Athenian Empire of the fifth century had much territory in Thrace. In 476/5, Cimon, son of Miltiades II, led an expedition to Eion, on the mouth of the Strymon, where he drove out the Persians and then handed the fertile territory over to Athens. Cimon also put down an anti-Athenian revolt on Thasos, an island lying off the Thracian coast, in 463/2. In 437/6, Hagnon established the city of

Amphipolis on the Strymon, after several previous failed Athenian attempts to gain a foothold in the region. Athenian interest in Thrace was a major factor in the Second Peloponnesian War. Athens sent generals to cooperate with the Thracian king Sitalces in 429/8, lost Amphipolis to the Spartans in 424, and failed to retake the city in 422. The Spartans decisively defeated the Athenians in 405 at Aegospotami, in the Chersonese, after several years of Athens trying to maintain its possessions in the region. In the fourth century, Athens attempted to protect its interests in Thrace, forming alliances with several Thracian rulers, sending Iphicrates on an unsuccessful mission to retake Amphipolis in the 360s, and continuing to send expeditions to the Chersonese and other areas. Athens eventually lost its influence in Thrace to the expanding power of Philip of Macedon.

Matthew A. Sears

See also Amphipolis; Amphipolis, Campaign of; Cersobleptes; Chersonese, Thracian; Cotys; Iphicrates; Miltiades I; Miltiades II; Peltast; Seuthes; Thrace, Thracians; Thrace, Greek Cities in

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Athens, Expedition to Cyprus (450–449)

The Athenian expedition to clear the Persians from Cyprus in 450–449 was one of several in the fifth century demonstrating continuing Athenian interest in the island. In 478, the Hellenic League fleet had freed a large part of Cyprus from Persia, and in 460 a 200-strong fleet headed for Cyprus was diverted to Egypt to take advantage of Inaros' revolt there. Probably in 450 (although some historians, Meiggs for example, have argued for 451) Cimon, recently returned from exile, led a 200-strong fleet to Cyprus. The details of the expedition are difficult to recover—Thucydides', Plutarch's, and Diodorus' accounts have irreconcilable differences. The most plausible reconstruction of events is that Cimon captured Marium and raided Phoenicia in the first year of the campaign. In the second, he died (probably

of illness) while besieging Citium—either just before or just after a major victory over the Persians on land and sea that resulted in the capture of 100 Persian ships.

There were sound strategic reasons for Athens' interest in a friendly, or Athenian dominated Cyprus. This would provide a check on the resurgence of Persian naval power and give Athens a firm base in the eastern Mediterranean to assist their influence over the Greek cities of Asia Minor and also Egypt. The earlier expeditions suggest this was an ongoing Athenian interest after the Second Persian War (480–479).

Iain Spence

See also Athens, Intervention in Egypt; Cimon; Cyprus

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Athens, External Conflicts (519–506)

In 519, under the Peisistratidae, the Athenian alliance with Plataea caused war with Thebes. The resultant Athenian victory brought both Plataea and Hysiae under Athenian control. In 516, Miltiades II extended Athenian rule in the Thracian Chersonese and seized Lemnos. However, many of the settlers returned home when the Persians advanced in the area (514–513), and the Chersonese was abandoned in 511. The same year, the Spartan and the Peloponnesian League attack on Athens that overthrew the Peisistratidae was precipitated by internal Athenian conflict.

The exiled Alcmaeonid, Cleisthenes, was claimed to have bribed the Delphic oracle to persuade the Spartans to expel the Peisistratidae. In 511/10, taking advantage of internal unrest, the Spartans attacked. Their surprise landing at Phalerum was defeated by the Peisistratidae with Thessalian help. A second attack, under Cleomenes I, supported by Athenian opponents of the tyranny, trapped the Peisistratids on the Acropolis. They surrendered (510) when their sons were captured.

Defeated in the political struggle that followed, Cleisthenes' opponent, Isagoras, called in Cleomenes and the Spartans again occupied Athens. But Cleomenes had misjudged—the Athenians attacked and penned his small

force up in the Acropolis. Cleomenes withdrew under a safe conduct and Cleisthenes enacted fundamental changes to the Athenian constitution.

In 506, Cleomenes led a Peloponnesian League army against Attica, coordinated with a landing by forces from Chalcis (Euboea) in northeast Attica, and a Boeotian attack that seized Oenoe and Hysiae. Cleomenes reached Eleusis but when the Athenian army deployed to meet them, his allies and his fellow king, Demaratus, refused to fight and the army retired. The Athenians then defeated the Boeotians and, crossing to Chalcis, defeated it and settled 4,000 cleruchs, or military settlers in its territory. These stunning victories cemented Cleisthenes' constitution, boosted Athenian confidence and established it as a major power in Greece.

Iain Spence

See also Athens, Alliance with Plataea; Cleisthenes; Cleomenes I; Miltiades II; Peisistratidae; Peisistratus

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Athens, Intervention in Egypt (460–454)

The Athenian expedition to Egypt in 460–454 was part of Athens' aim to extend its influence in the eastern Mediterranean. The fleet was originally bound for Cyprus and diverted to capitalize on Inaros' revolt in Egypt. The 200-ship Athenian fleet (including perhaps 100 allied ships from the Delian League) eliminated the Persian naval presence in the Nile. Memphis was captured—except for its citadel, the White Tower. Continuing military action occurred over the next few years, although the first Persian counter-offensive was diplomatic.

Megabazus went to Sparta in an unsuccessful attempt to bribe the Spartans to invade Attica and cause an Athenian withdrawal from Egypt. In 455, a large Persian navy and army under Megabazus arrived in Egypt, defeated the rebel army, relieved Memphis, and trapped the Greek fleet at

the island of Prosopitis. In summer 454, the Persians diverted the water around Prosopitis and took it by land.

The extent of the defeat has been the subject of debate. Thucydides clearly suggests that the defeat was major, with almost the entire expedition lost—including a relief force of 50 ships surprised on arrival just after Prosopitis fell. However, Diodorus states that the Athenians withdrew under truce. Modern historians have argued that the loss of 200 triremes and crew would have crippled Athens for some time, but Athens was clearly able to field large fleets in the years following the defeat. However, if half the fleet was allied and not Athenian, and the loss was not complete, this would not necessarily have been crippling. In any event, the losses were apparently serious enough to encourage Athens to look to a negotiated end to the First Peloponnesian War.

Iain Spence

See also Athens, Expedition to Cyprus; Cyprus; Egypt, Egyptians; Peloponnesian War, First

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Athens, Naval War with Sparta (376–374)

In 376, Athens and its main ally, the Boeotian state centered on Thebes, were in the third year of a war with Sparta. Spartan invasions of Boeotia by land in 378–377 had devastated some territory but had not had any decisive outcome. In 376, an invasion had even failed to force the pass over Mount Cithaeron. Frustrated by this lack of progress, a conference of Sparta's allies later in the year decided to send out a fleet. Their plan was to repeat the strategy that had won the Peloponnesian War by preventing cargo-ships bringing to Athens the imported grain it needed to feed its population.

At first a fleet of 60 triremes sent out under the Spartan navarch (naval commander), Pollis, took command of the sea to the south and east of Attica

and prevented ships from bringing grain into Piraeus. To deal with the severe food-shortage, Athens sent out under Chabrias a fleet of 60 (Xenophon) or 83 triremes (Diodorus), its first big naval mobilization since the end of the Corinthian War (387/6). It is not known what contribution the new alliance Athens had formed, the Second Athenian Confederacy, made to this fleet. The Confederacy must have contributed and the difference between the numbers of triremes given by Xenophon and Diodorus above may represent the allies' contribution.

The two fleets soon met off the island of Naxos and Chabrias was victorious. For the loss of 18 Athenian ships, he may have taken or sunk as many as 49 of the Spartan fleet. The blockade of Piraeus was over.

In the following year, Athens sent a fleet of 60 ships under Timotheus around the Peloponnese, at the request of Boeotia, to prevent Sparta transporting troops across the Corinthian Gulf into Boeotia. Timotheus was able to take the opportunity to sail to Corcyra, which now joined the Second Athenian Confederacy. Sparta sent out a fleet under the navarch Nicolochus to counter Athens' growing power in this region. Nicolochus engaged the Athenian fleet with 55 of his triremes off Alyzia in Leucas and was defeated.

Although Nicolochus set up a trophy of his own to challenge Timotheus' right to claim the victory, he could not prevent Timotheus from winning over more allies in the region. The cost of maintaining these fleets was a heavy strain on both Athens and Sparta. Together with Boeotian gains at home, this made both Athens and Sparta ready to accept a proposal for peace sent in a letter from the king of Persia, Artaxerxes II. The resulting Peace of 375/4 was a renewal of the King's Peace of 387/6 but the growth of Athenian power through the extension of the Second Athenian Confederacy put Athens on a more equal level with Sparta. This Peace was regarded as effectively recognizing Athens' naval supremacy.

Douglas Kelly

See also Artaxerxes II; Athenian Confederacy, Second; Chabrias; King's Peace; Naxos, Battle of; Timotheus; Trophy

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Athens, Oligarchic Movements

During the almost 200 years of its existence (508–322), the Classical Athenian democracy was successfully overthrown only twice.

The Four Hundred and the Five Thousand

The destruction of the Sicilian Expedition in 413 and the widespread defection of allies that followed convinced many elite Athenians that a change of government was in order. The move was prepared for in the political clubs and executed in 411, at an extraordinary meeting of the Assembly that took place while the fleet was away at Samos—along with a good number of lower class Athenians. The narrow government that resulted, championed by the likes of Peisander, consisted of 400 elite citizens; but this soon gave way to the slightly broader regime of the Five Thousand, a constitution associated with Theramenes. This, too, was short-lived, and by the following year the radical democracy had been restored.

The Thirty Tyrants

After the Athenian surrender at the end of the Second Peloponnesian War in 404, the Spartans under Lysander installed a group of upper class Athenians who would become known as the Thirty Tyrants. Eventually they were buttressed by a Spartan governor, Callibius, and a force of 700 Spartans; in spite of this, the regime would last only eight months. Democrats in exile, led by Thrasybulus, established a foothold in Phyle before moving down to the Piraeus, where they were met by an oligarchic force. This force was defeated, its leader Critias was killed, and democracy was restored once again.

James Kierstead

See also Athens; Athens, Restoration of Democracy; Delian League/Athenian Empire; Athens, Revolts of Allies (Fifth Century); Lysander; Theramenes; Thrasybulus

Further Reading

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Athens, Restoration of Democracy (403)

The Athenian democracy was overthrown with Spartan assistance at the end of the Second Peloponnesian War (431–404). The resulting narrow oligarchy, the “Thirty Tyrants,” propped up by a Spartan garrison, ruled Athens with considerable brutality for around eight months. In 403, democracy was restored after what was essentially a civil war between oligarchs and democrats.

The Thirty Tyrants drew their internal support from members of the Athenian upper classes, who considered that they had unfairly carried the Athenian war effort in the last few years of the war—both financially and physically (through hoplite and cavalry service in defense of the city itself). It seems that a significant number of the 1,000 strong Athenian *hippeis* (cavalry) were either involved in the coup or supported it. The Thirty quelled opposition through threats, arrests, and executions, including that of Theramenes (Document 13).

The military aspect of the conflict began when Thebes, which had fallen out with its ally Sparta, helped Thrasybulus and a band of 70 exiles occupy Phyle, a border fort in the mountains between Attica and Boeotia. The Spartan garrison and the Athenian cavalry attempted to drive Thrasybulus’ men out, but lost 123 men in a dawn attack on their camp. Rapidly losing their support, the Thirty had the cavalry create a refuge by expelling the inhabitants of Eleusis and killing the adult males. Late in 404, they retired there when defeated at Munychia by Thrasybulus. This battle is interesting because the Thirty’s phalanx was 50-deep while the democrats’ phalanx was only 10-deep but with slingers and javelin-equipped troops behind it. Their missiles, thrown downhill over their own troops, helped break up the enemy but Xenophon notes that before the battle started the seer with the democrats, who had told them they would win if they did not attack until one of their own was killed or wounded, leapt forward, and fulfilled his own prophecy. Two of the Thirty (Critias and Hippomachus) were killed.

The following year disagreement between King Pausanias and Lysander and a near loss of the garrison caused the Spartans to force a reconciliation between the oligarchs and democrats and withdraw. By 401, the process of restoration was complete, with the oligarchs exiled, dead, or reconciled with their fellow citizens under an amnesty. Despite this, resentment against the cavalry lingered for some years.

Iain Spence

See also Cavalry; Lysander; Pausanias, Son of Pleistoanax; Theramenes

Further Reading

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Athens, Revolts of Allies (Fifth Century)

Revolts of allies are attested for the duration of the Delian League and the subsequent Athenian Empire. The first revolt (that of Naxos in 470) took place less than a decade after the formation of the league, and the final dissolution of the empire by the Spartans in 404 was preceded by widespread defections in the wake of the Athenian defeat at Aegospotami the previous year. In the intervening period, Athens was mostly successful in suppressing revolts, although its ability to do so varied a great deal depending on the state of its navy, as well as on other factors, such as the level of support available to allies from rivals such as Sparta. The motivations behind allied revolts also varied, and are sometimes impossible to recover, but seem to have included dislike of various imperial measures, disinclination to pay tribute, and political transitions within allied states.

The chronology of the fifth-century Athenian Empire continues to be controversial, but any narrative of the allied revolts has to begin with that of Naxos, probably in 470. The allied victory over the Persians at Eurymedon the following year may have given some allies the impression

that contributions to the league were no longer necessary; if so, they were quickly disabused of this notion by the suppression of Thasos in 463/2 (two years after the initial uprising). The destruction of much of the allied fleet in Egypt in 454 may have been a factor in the revolt of Erythrae and Miletus in the same year; they were successfully returned to the alliance the following year. In 446, Pericles succeeded in the reduction of Euboea and Megara, which had revolted from Athens earlier that year. Athens' intervention on the side of Miletus in a war with Samos, and the subsequent imposition of democracy on the Samians, led to a full-scale revolt of the island (soon joined by Byzantium) in 441; despite stubborn resistance, both cities had been forced back into the Empire by 439. The origins of the Second Peloponnesian War lie partly in the revolt of Potidaea in 432 (a year in which Chalcis also revolted), though the city was eventually recovered, at huge expense, two years later. But there was little respite for Athens, which was forced to deal with an uprising in Mytilene from 428 to 427. The disastrous defeat of the Sicilian Expedition in 413 was followed by widespread revolts in Ionia and in Euboea; though financial contributions (now in the form of a 5% tax) were restored for a final time in 410, Lysander's victory at Aegospotami in 405 led in swift succession to the defection of most of Athens' remaining allies and to Athens' surrender, after which the Empire was disbanded by Sparta.

For most of the fifth century, Athens was successful in restoring rebellious allies to the Empire. The ability of these allies to resist was limited, mainly because most of them had chosen early on to make contributions to the alliance in the form of silver tribute rather than ships. Rebellions by the few allies, such as Samos, that retained their own navies, were accordingly significantly harder for Athens to repress. The state of Athens' own navy was of course a key determinant in Athens' ability to deal with rebellions; the final phase of the Second Peloponnesian War (the Decelean War, 413–404), defined by Athens' struggle to hold on to its Aegean allies, was ushered in by the catastrophic loss of ships in Sicily.

The causes of allied rebellions are not always known, but seem to have varied. Since rebellion was usually signaled by a failure to pay tribute, we can speculate that simple disinclination (or inability) to pay the amount assessed was sometimes a factor. Discontent with various measures taken by what some regarded as a "tyrant *polis*" (to use the phrase attributed to the Corinthians by Thucydides 1.122) will also have played a role in many

cases. Such measures may have included the so-called Standards Decree of around 414, which mandated the use of Athenian weights, measures, and coins by member-states of the Empire; the Decrees of Cleinias and Cleonymus, from around 426, which provide for the appointment of tribute-collectors in allied cities; and the Reassessment Decree of 425, in which Athens aggressively increased the level and scope of its financial demands on Aegean *poleis*. (Many of the decrees from this period that have survived in the form of inscriptions on stone have recently been re-dated from the middle of the century to the time of the Second Peloponnesian War.) A continuing source of grievance from mid-century was the apportionment of cleruchies, that is, pieces of land in allied states that were directly expropriated and handed over to Athenian settlers.

Some revolts occurred soon after events that may have suggested that the Delian League had either fulfilled its purpose, or had hardened into an Empire: the Thasian uprising a few years after Eurymedon may supply an example of the former case (though economic factors were also operative there), and the revolts of Erythrae and Miletus after 454 of the latter. The year 454, though, was not only the date of the removal of the League treasury to Athens, but also of the decimation of the allied fleet in Egypt; so we cannot rule out the influence of simple opportunism. Allied judgment of the ability of Athens to respond effectively to uprisings was certainly a central variable of the Decelean War. Many revolts came into being because of political struggles within allied states: Mytilene in 428 revolted as an oligarchy and surrendered after a democratic revolution. In the end, however, whatever ideological attractions democracy may have had for citizens of allied states, the Empire's survival was dependent mainly on the military balance of power between Athens and Sparta. One of the aims of Brasidas' campaigns in the north in the 420s was to detach states such as Amphipolis from the Athenian alliance; and in many cases he succeeded, at least for a time. After Lysander's victory at Aegospotami in 405, the Empire fell apart; and Athens' surrender the following year confirmed that it would not be put together again, at least not until the Second Athenian Confederacy was formed in 378/7.

James Kierstead

See also Athens; Delian League/Athenian Empire; Peloponnesian War, Second

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Athens, War with Aegina (ca. 500–458)

Causes

The Athenian war against Aegina pitted two perennial ancient naval superpowers in a conflict that spanned much of the first half of the fifth century. According to Herodotus, enmity between Athens and Aegina was long standing, and an Athenian expedition to recover a stolen statue had met with disastrous results when all but one member of the crew perished.

Course

At the end of the sixth century (ca. 500), Thebes sought Aegina's help in a war with the Athenians. Perceiving an opportunity to ally against a traditional rival, Aegina waged an undeclared war, and proceeded to raid the coast of Attica. In 491, Aegina offered earth and water to the Persians, a move met with great disdain by Athens, who appealed to Sparta for help. The two kings of Sparta, Cleomenes and Leotychidas, seized 10 of the most prominent Aeginetan citizens and sent them as hostages to Athens. After Cleomenes' downfall, the Aeginetans appealed to have their prisoners returned, but the Athenians refused. In response, the Aeginetans captured a sacred Athenian vessel carrying many leading Athenians. Around 490, all the actions of the past culminated in a failed Athenian plot to inspire revolt on Aegina, and indecisive naval battles off the coast of the island. In 480, Athens and Aegina formed a truce to unite against the Persians. Finally, Athens ended the ongoing hostilities by defeating the Aeginetans in a great sea battle (458).

Consequences

Aegina surrendered in 457 and agreed to pay tribute to the Athenians.

Robert T. Jones

See also Aegina, Aeginetans; Athens; Cleomenes I; Hellenic League (against Persians); Herodotus; Laws of War; Leotychidas

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Attalus I of Pergamum (Reigned 241–197)

Attalus was the adopted successor of Eumenes I of Pergamum. He was the first of the rulers of Pergamum to refuse to pay tribute to the Galatians and after defeating them took the title of king, establishing the Attalid dynasty. Celtic tribes of Gauls had crossed from Europe to Asia in the first quarter of the third century and settling on both sides of the Halys River (the modern Kızılırmak), they levied tribute on the whole of Asia Minor as far as the Taurus Mountains from their territory known as Galatia. Attalus' refusal to pay tribute led to the unsuccessful Galatian attack and defeat and Attalus' assumption of the title of king.

Like his predecessor, Eumenes I, Attalus exploited Seleucid dynastic struggles and fought successfully against Antiochus Hierax, securing Asia Minor up to the Taurus Mountains. Achaeus, Seleucus III Soter's general, continued the war against Attalus, reclaiming the Seleucid possessions and confining Attalus to Pergamum. However, when Achaeus declared himself king Attalus allied with Antiochus III the Great and fought a joint campaign against Achaeus (216).

In 211, Attalus allied with the Aetolian League, and indirectly, Rome, joining them in the First Macedonian War (215–205). In 209, he was elected as one of the two main generals of the Aetolian League. Sending troops to fight alongside the Aetolians, he himself used Aegina as a base for naval operations against Philip V of Macedon. While plundering Opus in Locris, Attalus was almost captured. Learning that Prusias I of Bithynia had invaded his territory he returned home, taking no further part in the war, however, his Roman allies ensured that Attalus was included in the Peace of Phoenice that ended the war in 205.

Philip V of Macedon invaded Pergamene territory in 201 and unsuccessfully laid siege to Pergamum. When Philip abandoned the siege and took to sea, Attalus, along with his Rhodian allies, followed and fought

an inclusive naval battle with him off Chios.

Attalus concluded an alliance with Athens and also asked Rome for support against Philip V of Macedon. Unsuccessful attempts at negotiations between the allies and Macedon led to the outbreak of the Second Macedonian War (200–196). While attempting to persuade the Boeotians to join the alliance against Philip V, Attalus was taken ill at Thebes and returning to Pergamum, died there aged 72 in 197. He was succeeded by his eldest son Eumenes II of Pergamum.

David Harthen

See also Achaeus; Aetolia, Aetolian League; Antiochus Hierax; Athens; Eumenes I of Pergamum; Eumenes II of Pergamum; Galatians; Macedonian War, First; Macedonian War, Second; Pergamum; Philip V; Rome, Romans; Seleucids

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Attalus II of Pergamum (Reigned 159–138)

Born in 220, the second son of King Attalus I and younger brother of King Eumenes II. Attalus undertook several embassies to Rome during his brother's reign. Attalus served alongside the Romans at the battle of Magnesia in 190 and their expedition against the Galatians (189). He succeeded his brother in 159. He received Roman support for his wars with Prusias II of Bithynia, and supported the Seleucid pretender Alexander I Balas against Demetrius II Nicator. He was succeeded by his nephew, Attalus III of Pergamum.

David Harthen

See also Alexander I Balas; Attalus I of Pergamum; Demetrius II Nicator; Eumenes II of Pergamum; Magnesia, Battle of; Prusias II; Rome, Romans;

Seleucids; Syrian-Roman War

Further Reading

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Attalus III of Pergamum (Reigned 138–133)

Son of Eumenes II, and nephew and successor to Attalus II, Attalus allegedly took little interest in statesmanship, focusing on gardening, agriculture, botany, and toxicology. He apparently wrote a treatise on agriculture, was a collector of fine art, and allegedly enjoyed modeling figures in wax and casting them in bronze. He died in 133 after ruling for just five years, bequeathing his kingdom to Rome.

David Harthen

See also Attalus II of Pergamum; Eumenes II of Pergamum; Pergamum; Rome, Romans

Further Reading

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Attendants, Military

Military attendants are known from Homeric times. In Homer, they are often called *therapontes* (retainers). They support the heroes who are the leading fighters (*promachoi*) on the battlefield, they drive chariots and carry equipment. In the late Archaic and Classical Periods, attendants appear commonly supporting the heavy infantry. They were usually personal slaves of individual hoplites. Thus, they are often referred to as *paides* (boys), a common term for a slave, reflecting an inferior and infantilized status. In addition to carrying the equipment of the hoplites, and even their arms and armor, such attendants would often set up camp, forage for food and cook meals. For example, Athenians on garrison duty at Panactum had such

paides who looked after them in the mess, doing chores like dinner preparation and on occasion they might plunder enemy property.

The most common Greek terms for such attendants included the *akolouthos*—attendant, *hyperetes*—assistant, *skeuophoros*—baggage carrier, and *hypaspistes* (pl. *hypaspistai*)—shield carrier. In Sparta, the role of attendants was played by the Helots, although some evidence suggests that the Spartans too had personal retainers or even youths separate from the Helot group. Thucydides tells us that, unusually, sometimes hoplites and cavalry carried their own food if they lacked attendants or—even more intriguingly—because they distrusted them. Attendants often appear assisting heavy infantrymen on vase paintings. They are always depicted as boys, smaller than their masters, and carrying equipment or arms, especially shields.

The role that these attendants played on the battlefield remains obscure. It is unlikely they fought invisibly side-by-side with those they served. Nevertheless, they do appear occasionally in the fighting in our sources. Thus, Xenophon's *hypaspistes* fell to his death in action on the march of the Ten Thousand. The Spartans had such shield-bearers and used Helots for this type service. In the fourth century, such attendants must have been well known to Greek society. They ultimately became a stock-figure like the boastful soldier in later Greek comedies. We have a statuette dated to the later fourth century of a theatrically masked figure carrying military and campaign equipment suggestive of a baggage-carrier (Berlin, Staatliche Museen zu Berlin, TC 7820).

The Macedonian army of Philip and Alexander had specialist units that bear all the trappings of regiments originally formed from those who supported the king carrying arms or protecting his person. Thus, the *hetairoi* (Companion) cavalry formed the king's bodyguard, and the *hypaspistai* or shield bearers made up an elite unit that led the infantry, but their title suggests an origin lying with those who carried the arms of the king like any attendants. Philip and Alexander had a reputation for traveling light if they could and for dislocating the main fighting force from the baggage train so that infantry might move more quickly and less encumbered. This had the effect of transforming the relationship between the fighting force and the baggage trains.

Such attendants continued in the service of soldiers into the Hellenistic Period. Alexander's funeral carriage was accompanied by a mass of road

makers (*odopoioi*) and mechanics (*technitai*) as well as soldiers (*stratiotai*). Many Hellenistic armies traveled with a baggage train, called the *aposkeue* (lit. “with the baggage”). These trains included many attendants and slaves, along with women and children, animals and equipment. Even garrison troops would have had attendants with them to support their lives. An important inscription that details the settlement of a dispute between Eumenes II of Pergamum and his mercenaries (Document 20) mentions alongside the fully paid, contracted and professional soldiers, unpaid men (*amisthoi*) and all those others with the soldiers. These latter may perhaps have been military attendants themselves who existed somewhere between full-time soldier and servant. Indeed, as war became more technical, specialists who could construct infrastructure, siege engines, ships, and machinery became an essential part of any Hellenistic army.

Thus, clearly, attendants played a variety of crucial roles in ancient warfare as support personnel, skilled and unskilled laborers, assistants to soldiers, and on occasion even combatants side-by-side with their masters and patrons.

Matthew Trundle

See also Camp Followers; Civilian Populations in War; Homeric Warfare; Hoplites

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B

Bactria, Bactrians

Bactria was a region in Central Asia that was independently ruled by Greek kings from ca. 250 to 130. Most of these kings are not named in ancient sources or the archaeological evidence but are known only from coins. Bactria comprised parts of modern-day Afghanistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan; it was bordered by the Hindu Kush mountains in the south and east, the Jaxartes River (Syr Darya) in the north, and modern-day Iran in the west. Bactria was first settled by Greeks when Alexander the Great invaded it in 329. Due to its terrain and isolated tribes, it was the most difficult conquest of his campaign.

Bactria became an independent kingdom around 250 when the satrap Diodotus and his son Diodotus II gradually seceded from the Seleucid Empire. Euthydemus I, the first king after Diodotus II, was a usurper who endured a siege by the Seleucid Antiochus III (the Great), battled him, and finally made a treaty with him. Around 200, Euthydemus' son Demetrius I conquered lands south of the Hindu Kush and established Greek rule in ancient India around the Indus River. For the next 50 years, Greco-Bactrian kings ruled in both Bactria and India, although the exact chronology and territory of these kings is not clear. Some held power in both regions. At one point, the two regions were divided, as Eucratides the Great, while ruling in Bactria, engaged in war with a Demetrius (probably II) who ruled in India. Eucratides and the other Greco-Bactrian kings also regularly fought with the Parthians, a dynasty that claimed a piece of Seleucid territory around the same time as the Bactrians. One of the capital cities of the Greco-Bactrians was discovered by archaeologists near the Afghan village of Ai Khanoum. It contained a palace, mint, treasury, and classically Greek

buildings such as a gymnasium and a theater. The city was abandoned around 145 and overrun by nomadic warriors. The Greeks were driven out of the rest of Bactria over the next decade. Greek-named kings continued to rule in India until ca. 20.

Frances A. M. Joseph

See also Ai Khanoum; Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon, Bactrian Campaign; Demetrius I of Bactria; Diodotus I and II of Bactria; Eucratides the Great; Euthydemus I of Bactria

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Bandits

Banditry (or “brigandage”) is evident throughout Greek history, from the Archaic to the Hellenistic Periods. Just as with piracy, banditry flourished in periods of time or in places where there was little central authority or a dominant power willing and able to suppress such attacks. The same word, *leistes* (plural *leistai*), was used for a robber on land and for one who attacks at or from the sea. Piracy is far more prevalent in the sources, unsurprising given the nature of Greek terrain, which made movement by sea far easier than by land in most areas. Nevertheless there is evidence of banditry without the aid of ships, if mostly from mythical and fictional accounts.

Much like the motivations behind piracy, those who turned to banditry were motivated by different considerations. These could range from being sent into exile for political or financial reasons, poverty leaving little choice but to engage in banditry, or in later times mercenary forces no longer in the employ of a state deciding to use their skills for private gain. Bandits would target not only money and easily portable goods, but people as well. They might target households, settlements, or travelers, in the latter case being akin to highwaymen. Diodorus mentions a story in which a leader from the city of Priene ransomed from *leistai* a group of maidens who had

been taken from some distinguished families of Messenia. Bandits who occupied territory could also extract payments for safe passage through their lands. During his campaign against Persia, Alexander encountered the Uxians, a tribe many of whom inhabited the hills and did not recognize Persian authority. They demanded from Alexander the same payments they demanded from the Persians for crossing their lands. Alexander not only defeated the Uxians, but later also defeated their neighbors the Cossaeans, who also lived a life of brigandage in the mountains.

Banditry and raiding is a common theme in mythic stories from the earliest history of Greece. In the *Iliad*, Nestor recounts a story in which as a young man he went raiding, bringing back sheep, goats, cattle, and horses. Much like similar incidents of wandering raiders (pirates) in the *Odyssey*, when conducted by heroic figures raiding appears to have been a legitimate form of warfare. However, these are stories of Greek heroes, and the reality of banditry and raiding is far less glorious. According to Plutarch in his *Life of Theseus*, it was a difficult journey to reach Athens by land because of the actions of *leistai* and “evildoers.” On the borders of Megara, Theseus killed a supposed bandit named Sciron, who was wont to rob passersby. However, Plutarch says that Megarian writers tell a different story, saying that Sciron was in fact a just man who himself fought bandits. In either case robbery clearly appears to have been thought of as a less than noble pursuit, requiring the intervention of heroes to combat it. The Corinthian general Timoleon killed many tyrants in Sicily in the mid-fourth century, one of whom, Mamercus, was killed like a *leistes*—clearly a dishonorable way to die and demonstrating that the activities of *leistai* were not considered acceptable.

Pausanias relates a story about the fabled Sphinx in which she roamed the seas with a force of ships conducting piratical raids before settling on a mountain from where she conducted plundering raids until defeated by Oedipus. Certain areas were known as hotbeds of raiding and banditry. From Thucydides’ time to the late third century, Aetolia was known as a land of bandits and brigands who embraced such a lifestyle where others had long-ago abandoned it. This also demonstrates the problem of defining what should be considered banditry and, much like piracy, the lines between banditry and legitimate warfare by a city-state are blurred.

Thucydides too discusses piracy and banditry by land as prevalent in early Greek history. He says that some regions to his day retained the old

habit of carrying arms about with them, a habit hearkening back to the days when everyone in Greece carried arms because of the vulnerability of their settlements and the unsafe nature of their communications with each other. Little is mentioned of “highwaymen” outside of fiction, but it is reasonable to assume travel along roads could be quite dangerous, especially on the margins of state control, since police forces, where they existed, were concerned with law and order within cities, not in the wilderness between the pockets of civilization represented by *poleis*. Constant warfare and the impact of this upon local populations could also drive people into banditry, or at very least weaken state control in surrounding areas and leave people vulnerable to attack. Although fictional, Lucian’s *Dialogues of the Dead* has a character who tells the story of an Athenian killed by *leistai* near Eleusis, who berated his own rashness in taking with him only two servants, implying that there was safety in numbers when travelling. This incident supposedly took place near Mount Cithaeron and, much like the story of the Sphinx and the tribes Alexander fought, shows how mountainous terrain attracted bandits, providing easily fortified bases of operation that proved difficult for armies to reach. Certainly throughout later history and into the modern era, mountains have provided safe haven for all manner of marginalized and dangerous groups.

Mercenaries who no longer served a particular master could be very dangerous, forced to extract a living from local populations. A good example of this is the famous expedition of the Ten Thousand in Persia who, after their paymaster Cyrus had been killed, were forced to march to the sea. The army’s generals were looking for plunder and were dissuaded from attacking the Tibarenians only by bad omens from their seers. Soon afterward, however, they extracted provisions from the estates of the Cotyorites, who would not provide the army with a market nor allow their sick within the city. The generals justified this plundering as necessary for the army’s survival since the Cotyorites would not open a market for them. Mercenary bands were well armed and experienced warriors, and without a steady source of pay could present a threat to those around them.

Most ancient sources are concerned with *leistai* as pirates raiding on and from the sea, helping to demonstrate the importance of the sea in Greek history. Nevertheless banditry on land was an issue throughout Greek history, being prevalent in the Bronze and Iron Ages and perhaps increasing in severity with the widespread proliferation of trained mercenary forces in

the late Classical and Hellenistic Periods.

John M. Nash

See also Acarnania, Acarnanians; Aetolia, Aetolian League; Exiles; Mercenaries; Piracy; Plunder and Booty; Social and Economic Effects of War; Ten Thousand, March of the

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Bithynia

Bithynia, located in modern Turkey, was a region in northern Asia Minor, on the southern end of the Euxine (Black Sea), to the east of Chalcedon. The area was mountainous and forested, although with fertile river valleys. It was a Thracian area but subject to early Greek influence from several colonies, the largest of which were Chalcedon and Heraclea. The local tribes often fought the colonists, but in the sixth century the area was conquered by Croesus of Lydia. When Cyrus the Great conquered Lydia in the mid-sixth century Bithynia became part of the Persian Empire, although the region gained some measure of autonomy. In 298/7 Zipoetes, a local dynast who had been ruling Bithynia since 326, proclaimed himself its first king. He maintained Bithynian independence under Alexander the Great's successors, notably Lysimachus and the Seleucids, and in 301 defeated Chalcedon and Astacus.

While the early history of Bithynia is characterized by successful resistance to invasion, the kingdom became progressively weaker over the next 200 years. By the early third century, the dynastic names such as Nicomedes I (Zipoetes' successor) demonstrate a Hellenizing influence in the court—perhaps in similar fashion to Pontus, where the court took on a distinctly Greek character. At this time Bithynia came under considerable pressure from the Celts (Galatians). Nicomedes I originally brought them to Asia Minor (278/7) to use as mercenaries against his brother Zipoetes II, to

resist Antiochus I Soter, and to expand his territory. Although successful in this, the Celts later seized the opportunity to expand their own power. Nicomedes I's heir was killed in battle against them, and they were finally defeated (228) by his grandson, Prusias I. Prusias further expanded Bithynia at the expense of neighboring Pergamum and Heraclea Pontica. Despite giving refuge for a time to Hannibal, Prusias astutely remained out of Rome's war with Antiochus III (the Great).

However, in the second century, under Prusias II, Bithynia was defeated by both Pontus and Pergamum. Prusias sent his son (Nicomedes II) to seek Roman assistance (partly to get the popular prince out of the country), but the Romans instead supported Nicomedes II's overthrow of his father. Nicomedes III succeeded his father in 127, and after some successes in Paphlagonia and Cappadocia, was forced to withdraw under Roman pressure. His successor, Nicomedes IV Philopator (reigned ca. 94–74) was forced out by his brother and Mithridates VI Eupator of Pontus but restored by Rome. However, taking advantage of Rome's distraction during the Social War (91–87), Mithridates conquered the whole of Bithynia and exiled Nicomedes IV. Although the Romans restored him again soon after (85/4), he was effectively a client king, and formally recognized Roman control by leaving his country to Rome in his will. When he died (75/4) Bithynia became a Roman province.

Iain Spence

See also Croesus of Lydia; Cyrus II; Galatians; Lysimachus; Mithridates VI Eupator; Prusias II of Bithynia

Further Reading

Herodotus 7.75; Polybius 4.48–50; Diodorus 12.82, 14.38; Strabo 12.3–4; Appian 11.2.11, 12.1–3, 9–11, 14, 16–17, *Civil Wars* 1.13; Pausanias 5.12.7; Justin 25.2.

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Biton (Third or Second Century)

Biton was the author of a short treatise entitled *Construction of Military Machines and Catapults*. It is addressed to a King Attalus, variously identified as Attalus I (241–197) or II (160/59–138) of Pergamum, but the highly technical content was clearly intended for engineers. The work comprises design specifications and diagrams for six historical devices by five named inventors: two stone-throwers, a *helepolis* (a siege tower), a *sambuca* (a pulley-operated siege ladder), and two types of *gastraphetes*. Biton's treatise is the most important source on tension-powered artillery, but it remains unclear why he chose to recommend antiquated devices that had long been superseded by torsion-powered technology. Biton mentions another, now lost, work entitled *Optics*, in which he explained a method for calculating the heights of walls.

Philip Rance

See also Catapult; Pergamum; Siege Warfare; Treatises, Military

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Black Sea, Greek Cities of

The Black Sea (known in antiquity as the Pontus Euxinus or Euxine) is a large inland sea lying between Anatolia, Europe, and the Caucasus. Its ancient name meant "the Hospitable Sea" (Strabo 7.3.6). To its north lay Maeotis Lake (the modern Sea of Azov in the Ukraine), connected by the Cimmerian Bosphorus, and to its south it emptied into the Propontis (the modern Sea of Marmara in Turkey) via the Bosphorus then via the Hellespont into the north Aegean Sea. The Black Sea is fed by a number of large and deep rivers, which are navigable into the interior and are responsible for the

extremely fertile land on the northern shores of the Black Sea. The Black Sea itself was rich in resources, such as sturgeon and herring, while the eastern shores were rich in minerals and precious metals.

Due to the region's richness, it is no surprise that the Greeks began to aggressively colonize the shores of the Black Sea, establishing numerous cities as early as the eighth century. The major proponents of these colonies were said to have been the cities of Megara and Miletus, which alone are credited with establishing up to 90 colonies in the area. By the fifth century, many of these colonies had become successful cities in their own rights, minting their own coinage, or creating local federated alliances. Panticapaeum, on the Cimmerian Bosphorus, became the capital of the burgeoning Bosphoran Kingdom in the mid-fifth century, while other cities such as Heraclea Pontica and Istria established colonies of their own and became regional centers.

Heraclea Pontica was founded in 554 by colonists from Megara, accompanied by some Thessalians and Boeotians, on the southern coast of the Black Sea. The fertile lands surrounding the city led to it becoming a major exporter of wine, mainly to the cities of the northern Black Sea coast. During the fifth century the city was friendly to Persia, apart from a brief period when it joined the Delian League in 424. Xenophon, during the famous *anabasis* of the Ten Thousand, visited the city. Tyranny, established in 364 by Clearchus, led to the flourishing of the city and the expansion of its territory inland and along the coast—with a commensurate flourishing trade in the Black Sea. During the second century it was absorbed into the kingdom of Pontus, before being integrated into the Roman province of Bithynia-Pontus in the first century.

Istria was the first and foremost Greek city on the western shores of the Black Sea, colonized by the Milesians in the middle of the seventh century. Fine agricultural land and abundant fish ensured that the city became prosperous, and pottery indicates trade contacts with Rhodes, Chios, and Athens, as well as other Black Sea cities. Due to its proximity to the Danube, the city was a conduit for transmitting Greek goods and ideas inland. It withstood attacks from tribes of the interior, before becoming part of the Roman province of Moesia in the late first century.

Russell Buzby

See also Bosphoran Kingdom; Colonies, Colonization; Pontus; Propontis,

Greek Cities of; Ten Thousand, March of the

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Boeotia, Boeotians

Boeotia's natural frontiers were well defined, enclosing rich agricultural land, situated in a pair of fertile river valleys in central Greece, the Asopus in the south and the Cephissus in the north, bounded at the north by the Chlomon massif, at the south by the Parnes massif, the Corinthian Gulf to the west, and the Euboean Channel to the east. Until it was drained in 1886, Lake Copaïs formed a semi-seasonal barrier (nearly dry in summer) and divided Boeotia into two distinct areas, the district beyond the lake to the northwest, dominated for most of its history by Orchomenus, and the large valley of the Asopus, dominated by Thebes. The valley of the Cephissus forms a natural defile through which any invaders from the northwest must pass. It is here that Chaeronea was situated, the site of several pivotal battles in antiquity. This northwestern boundary with Phocis remained remarkably stable throughout antiquity, but the southeastern frontier, the border which Boeotia shared with Athens, and the one which would seem better delineated by the Parnes massif, was nevertheless in a constant state of flux throughout the sixth and fifth centuries.

By the middle of the sixth century, the political geography of Boeotia had taken rough shape. This was undoubtedly a slow process, by which the larger city-states began through conquest or incorporation to absorb smaller communities. By 600, four principal *poleis* of Boeotia had emerged as dominant powers: Thebes in the very center of Boeotia, Orchomenus to the northwest of Lake Copaïs, Thespieae just south of the lake, and Tanagra in the eastern district. Other *poleis* scattered throughout Boeotia remained, with varying degrees of local power of their own, including Plataea, Haliartus, Hysiae, Copae, Lebedaea, Coronea, and Chaeronea. All of the cities of Boeotia, except Plataea, were ruled by narrow aristocratic oligarchies.

Most scholars accept that the Boeotians possessed a sort of federal government (commonly called the “Boeotian League”), which at the very least provided a mechanism for the common defense of Boeotia as a whole. Unquestionably, the Boeotians were culturally homogenous, speaking a common dialect of Greek and sharing distinct cultic traditions, but the Persian Wars mark a major turning point for Boeotia and the Boeotians, as indeed they did everywhere in Greece. The Boeotians were not united in common defense, and the Thebans infamously medized or surrendered to the Persians after Thermopylae fell in 480. The Thespians and Plataeans went their own way here as well, opting to keep fighting against the Persians, a choice that would engender conflict with Thebes and the rest of Boeotia in the latter half of the fifth century. For example, by the time of the outbreak of the Second Peloponnesian War (431–404), Thebes capitalized on the inevitable conflict between Athens and Sparta to make an attempt to take over Plataea, and its share of the federal government. The attempt succeeded, and by the time of the battle of Delium in 424, the power of Thebes was such that it was able to exercise hegemonic control over all the rest of Boeotia. The Thebans emerged from the Peloponnesian War far more powerful than when they began it, not only having solidified control over all Boeotia, but also having enriched themselves by plundering Attica for years. The prestige of the Boeotians was at a height. The Spartans therefore began to fear the power of the Boeotians—just as the Boeotians feared the Spartans.

From 395–371, the Boeotians were engaged in a series of conflicts off and on again and in various combinations with Sparta, Athens, and Corinth. This included a period when Thebes was controlled by a Spartan garrison (382–379). However, under the leadership of the Thebans, the Boeotians dominated nearly all of Greece between the decisive defeat of the Spartans at Leuctra in 371 and the costly battle of Mantinea in 362. Eventually, the Boeotians, like the rest of Greece, would fall under Macedonian hegemony after the battle of Chaeronea in 338, and Thebes itself, the largest city of Boeotia, would be completely destroyed by the Macedonian army of Alexander the Great in 335.

Michael Quinn

See also Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon, Destruction of Thebes; Boeotian League; Chaeronea, Battle of; Delium, Battle of; Epaminondas;

Hellenica Oxyrhynchia; Leuctra, Battle of; Mantinea, Battle of (362); Orchomenus (Boeotia); Pelopidas; Peloponnesian War, First; Peloponnesian War, Second; Persian Wars

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Boeotian League

Boeotia furnishes the earliest evidence for Greek multi-*polis* regional military and economic cooperation evolving into a federal league, and this is very important for understanding Greek federalism. Around 519 the Plataeans resisted the Thebans who were "pressing" them, apparently to become part of the League (Herodotus 6.108). Sixth-century coinage of Boeotian cities sported common obverses. Far more conclusively, Boeotarchs, chief magistrates of a Boeotian federation, are mentioned for 480–479.

From 457–446, Boeotia was controlled by Athens, but after 446, an autonomous federal Boeotia appears, composed of electoral units, perhaps 9 units before 427, and 11 after. The largest cities with their dependencies counted for over one unit; the smallest were grouped together as a single unit. Each unit had 1 Boeotarch and 60 members on a federal council of 660. Epigraphy in Boeotia's federal decrees attests to a *koinon* (confederacy) of the Boeotians.

In 386, Sparta, under the autonomy principle of the King's Peace, insisted on the League's dissolution. The Boeotian League was revived again in 378. The Boeotarchs seem all to be Theban. The decision-making body

now was an assembly—meeting in, and dominated by, Thebes. Religious and economic ties helped to maintain the loyalty of member cities. The well-organized nature of the League and its military resulted in a victory over Spartan forces at the battle of Leuctra in 371. A brief period of Theban hegemony followed where Thebes supported federalism among its allies just as Athens had supported (and exported) democracy. However, this hegemony faltered upon the deaths of its generals Pelopidas (364) and Epaminondas (362).

The city of Thebes was destroyed in 335 after revolting against Alexander the Great, but the Boeotian League continued into the Hellenistic Period, based now not on electoral units but on cities. A representative body convened regularly at Onchestus. The League now possessed seven districts, and officials called *aphedriates* represented these districts, making dedications on behalf of “all the Boeotians.” Thebes was refounded ca. 316, and it eventually (287?) became a member of the League again, though not its political hegemon. The Boeotian League’s cities joined the Aetolian League in the mid-third century and then supported Macedon before being disbanded by the Romans.

The great significance of the Boeotian League is that it points to tendencies of regional cooperation in terms of politics, economies, and religious expression evolving into, essentially, multicity states. Such multicity leagues would become increasingly important in the Hellenistic Period, when armies operated on a much larger scale than had been the case in preceding eras, and a single *polis*’ fieldable army was no match for Hellenistic dynasts’ enlarged military forces.

Timothy Doran

See also Boeotia, Boeotians; Epaminondas; King’s Peace; Leuctra, Battle of; Mantinea, Battle of (362); Pelopidas; Sacred Band; Thebes, Invasions of the Peloponnese

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Bosporan Kingdom

The Bosporan Kingdom was a small Hellenized kingdom located on the northern shores of the Black Sea (in modern Ukraine and Russia), which was founded in around 438 and lasted until 108 when it was absorbed into the empire of Pontus by Mithridates VI Eupator. The capital of the kingdom was situated at Panticapaeum at the very easternmost edge of the Crimean Peninsula, on the shores of the Cimmerian Bosporus. From this vantage point, the Bosporan Kingdom was able to control trade along these narrow straits, which separated the Maeotis Lake (the modern Sea of Azov) from the rest of the Black Sea.

While Panticapaeum was originally a colony founded by Miletus in the early sixth century, it was joined together in 480 with a number of other independent Greek colonies in the region, such as Phanagoria and Hermonassa under the rule of a line of dynasts known as the Archaeanaetidae. This family was removed from power in 438 by a Hellenized Thracian named Spartocus I who founded the ruling line of the Spartocids. The stability of their rule, and the funding of their steady military expansion and conquest over the next two centuries, is closely linked with the increasing demand for Ukrainian grain in Athenian stomachs. Demosthenes' speeches indicate the importance of this imported grain to Athenian power during the fifth and fourth centuries, and later Bosporan kings—such as Spartocus II and III as well as Pairisades I—were voted honorific titles and other honors by the Athenian assembly.

The relationship was mutual, as the Spartocids received tax exemptions while in Athens and Athenian merchants had special status in the Bosporan Kingdom. The Spartocids also tacitly supported Athenian democracy, sending dedications to Athens after its liberation in 307 and further gifts after it successfully rebelled against Demetrius I Poliorcetes in 287. During the third century the kingdom remained a part of the broader Hellenistic diplomatic scene, sending an embassy to Ptolemy II Philadelphus in 254/3, as well as making dedications at Delos. During the third and second

centuries, the Bosphoran Kingdom suffered from dynastic struggles leading to internecine strife. Under pressure from expansionist Scythian raiders (despite intermarriage with them) the last of the Spartocids, Pairisades V, readily entrusted the Bosphoran Kingdom to Mithridates VI, who absorbed it into his growing empire of Pontus in 108.

Russell Buzby

See also: Bithynia; Black Sea, Greek Cities of; Colonies, Colonization; Delos; Demetrius I Poliorcetes; Mithridates VI Eupator; Pontus; Ptolemy II Philadelphus; Scythia, Scythians

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Brasidas (d. 422)

Brasidas, son of Tellis, was an energetic and innovative Spartan commander during the Peloponnesian War of 431–404. He first appears in 431, saving Methone in Laconia in a typically audacious move. The Athenians had made a landing nearby, and while they were scattered and focused on Methone's wall, Brasidas dashed through them and into the city with a hundred hoplites. For this exploit he was the first Spartan to be officially thanked in the war.

In 429, with Brasidas as adviser, the Peloponnesian fleet deceived the opposing admiral, Phormio, into thinking they were heading for Naupactus, suddenly changed course, and caught him by surprise. However, superior Athenian experience enabled them to turn the tables during the pursuit and

recover their captured vessels. Shortly afterward Brasidas was involved in a daring raid on the Piraeus that failed, but caused considerable alarm in Athens. In 427, again a naval adviser, Brasidas suggested vigorously following up a naval victory off Corcyra with an attack on the city itself, but the commander ignored him.

In 425, Brasidas, commanding a trireme, led the attempt to expel the Athenians from Pylos. He was wounded and lost his shield, which the Athenians used in their victory trophy. The following year Brasidas, again commanding land forces, prevented the loss of Megara by his swift action when Athens seized its port, Nisaea.

Later in 424, Brasidas led 700 Helot hoplites, reinforced by Peloponnesian mercenaries, against the Athenian possessions in Thrace and the Chalcidice. The composition and relatively small size of the force suggests the Spartans may have thought it would only be of nuisance value, although sending 700 Helots so far from Sparta was designed to assist security at home. Brasidas may have proposed the expedition and certainly volunteered to lead it.

Brasidas' performance completely justified his selection as commander. He traversed a hostile Thessaly by a mixture of bluff and speed—not easy with an infantry army facing the noted Thessalian cavalry. Brasidas used oratory, threats, diplomacy, and (where needed) the use of force, to secure several Athenian allies in the north. His greatest prize, though, was the city of Amphipolis—a strategically and economically important city east of the Chalcidice and the Strymon River. Brasidas was killed at Amphipolis in 422, resisting an Athenian attempt under Cleon to recover the city. Although Cleon seems to have mishandled the tactical maneuvering outside Amphipolis, Brasidas won the battle by careful preparations and then launching his sortie at exactly the right moment to take advantage of Cleon's mistake. After Brasidas' death the Amphipolitans replaced Hagnon, the Athenian founder of the city, with Brasidas, awarding him hero status. This was a fitting honor to an energetic and audacious soldier whose successes in the north enabled Sparta to force Athens to negotiate the Peace of Nicias in 421 and bring about a temporary halt to the war.

Iain Spence

See also Amphipolis; Amphipolis, Campaign of; Cleon; Peloponnesian War, Second; Thucydides

Further Reading

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Brennus (d. 278)

Brennus was a king of the Tolistobogii, a group of the Celts whom the Greeks knew as Galatians (sometimes wrongly translated as “Gauls”). “Brennus” may well have been a title, meaning “king,” rather than his actual name. We know nothing of his early life, but Pausanias believes that it was he who urged his fellow Celts to invade Greece in 279, encouraging them with stories of the rich plunder to be had in Greek cities and sanctuaries. He was a capable military commander, who skillfully outflanked the Greek defenders at the Spercheius River and at Thermopylae. However, his winter 279/8 campaign against Delphi met with disaster amidst the mountains of central Greece, and Brennus was wounded. The retreating Celts took Brennus with them, still alive, but he committed suicide, either by stabbing himself or by drinking unmixed wine (i.e., wine with no water added: the mark of a barbarian in Greek eyes). His suicide may have been a form of ritual atonement, or done in fear of the retribution of his fellow Celts for a disastrous campaign.

Peter Londey

See also Celts, Invasion of Greece and Thrace; Delphi; Epiphanies, Military; Spercheius Valley

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Bribery and Corruption

Allegations were common that Greek political and military leaders had taken money to act against their states' interests. Prosecutors, witnesses, and juries could also easily be said to have taken money to act wrongly. This is perhaps to be expected in the intensely competitive political life of small city-states where poverty was rife and opportunities for legitimate enrichment few. The pressure on leaders, especially in democracies, to give generous benefactions to public purposes may also have contributed to this common belief in venality. Whether such allegations were factual is seldom known for certain.

The Spartan king Leotychidas II is said (Herodotus 6.72) to have been caught taking bribes during a campaign in Thessaly ca. 477 when he was found sitting in his tent on a glove stuffed with money. If true this account gives a rare instance of some material proof of bribery, as opposed to mere belief or suspicion. The Spartan king Pleistoanax broke off an invasion of Attica in 446/5 and was later exiled for having taken bribes to do so. Pericles apparently included in his audit of accounts after his term as *strategos* in this year the amount of 20 talents "for necessary expenditure" (cf. Aristophanes, *Clouds* 859). Whether Pericles engaged in some clever misrepresentation to inflame Spartan anger against what had certainly been a cautious decision by Pleistoanax or Pleistoanax thought he could get away with taking such a large sum must remain uncertain. Thucydides at least is noncommittal (2.21).

Allegations of bribery against military leaders were commonly made but are hard to prove. Such allegations could have consequences. In 413, Nicias was reluctant to withdraw from the now hopeless siege of Syracuse because he feared he would be charged on returning to Athens with having taken a bribe (Thucydides 7.48; compare Document 12). Interestingly, such suspicion could attach itself even to a man of his great wealth. Dionysius of Syracuse in 406 discredited the city's generals by alleging they had been bribed, not because he had any evidence, apart from their inefficient conduct of the war against Carthage, but because he aimed to make himself tyrant by gaining control of the city's forces (Diodorus 13.96). That generals who made poor or unacceptable decisions had been bribed was readily believed; for example, the three Athenian generals who had achieved little in Sicily were convicted of taking bribes (424: Thucydides 4.65).

Political opponents could also be denounced as corrupt. In 343 in the “False Embassy” trial, Demosthenes alleged that Aeschines’ betrayal of Athenian interests showed that he had taken bribes from Philip II of Macedon. Aeschines in reply claimed to have acted in good faith on the best available information and for good measure accused Demosthenes himself of corruption. Aeschines was acquitted by a narrow margin, which is remarkable in view of Philip II’s persistent reputation of buying supporters in Greek cities.

Corrupting a jury at Athens is alleged in the case of Anytus, who failed to arrive in time to rescue the Athenian post at Pylos from Spartan attack (409: Diodorus 13.64). If anything like the elaborate and complex system in use in the late fourth century for selecting and empanelling juries (*Ath. Pol.* 63–69) applied at Anytus’ trial, he pulled off something extraordinary. We are probably dealing with prejudice against a democratic leader who later (399) prosecuted Socrates.

It is sound method to treat all reports or allegations in ancient sources of bribery and corruption with caution. There may be good reason to accept that certain individuals were above taking bribes: for example, Pericles, Lysander, or Phocion. Hard evidence is needed to authenticate the allegations of bribery that swirl around persons such as Themistocles, Cleon, or Demades.

Douglas Kelly

See also Aristides; Cleomenes I; Philip II of Macedon

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Byzantium, Byzantines

Byzantium (later Constantinople, now Istanbul) was a Megarian colony founded in the mid-seventh century on the European side of the Bosphorus.

Tacitus (*Annals* 12.63) states that the Delphic oracle directed the colonists to found their city “opposite the land of the blind”—a reference to those who had founded Chalcedon on an inferior site on the opposite shore. The site had a fine natural harbor, good fishing grounds, and a strategic location where the Euxine (Black Sea) joins the Bosphorus, allowing access to the Aegean Sea via the Hellespont (Dardanelles). This was an important route for grain imports to Greece, and in particular to Athens, and Byzantium was ideally located to control it.

Much of Byzantium’s history is as a prize between competing powers. The Persians seized control ca. 512 and retained it (apart from a brief period during the Ionian Revolt) until after the Persian defeat in the Second Persian War (480–479). Following liberation (478) Byzantium joined the newly formed Delian League but unsuccessfully revolted (440) over Athens’ growing domination. Byzantium was reduced to subject status within the Athenian Empire—its annual tribute of 15 talents demonstrates its wealth.

In the latter stages of the Second Peloponnesian War, Byzantium changed hands several times. In 411, it revolted and accepted a Spartan garrison, was recaptured by Athens (408), and recovered by Sparta after Athens’ defeat at Aegospotami (405).

For the first half of the fourth century, Byzantium alternated between several great powers. Although often aligned with Athens and a member of the Second Athenian Confederacy (378/7), Byzantium at one point had a short-lived alliance with Thebes (364). It also fought Athens in the Social War of 357–355, securing independence. Attacked by Philip II of Macedon, Byzantium survived an epic siege (340–339)—with Athenian and Persian support—but by 335 was supporting Alexander the Great as an ally.

After Alexander’s death Byzantium maintained independence, but paid a heavy price for it from ca. 277 when attacked by the Celts. Byzantium had to pay a lot to avoid Celtic attacks on its *chora* (agricultural hinterland). Attempting to raise money for this by increasing shipping tolls in the Bosphorus alienated Rhodes, a major commercial and naval power, which forcibly ended the practice in 220/19. However, at the end of the century Byzantium aligned with both Rhodes and Attalus I Soter of Pergamum against Philip V of Macedon, whose Aegean naval ambitions threatened all three. They appealed to Rome, and Byzantium’s generally consistent support for Rome saw it emerge from the Macedonian Wars as a favored Roman ally.

See also Black Sea, Greek Cities of; Clearchus; Dercylidas; Memnon and Mentor of Rhodes; Pausanias, Son of Cleombrotus; Peloponnesian War, Second; Pharnabazus; Philip II of Macedon; Thrasybulus; Tissaphernes

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C

Callias, Peace of

The Peace of Callias was a peace treaty between Persia and the Delian League. Named after its Athenian negotiator, the peace was supposedly agreed ca. 449/8, but in the fourth century Theopompus declared it a forgery. Since then the treaty's existence has been the subject of considerable debate. While the evidence tends to support the existence of the peace, many writers over the years have remained unconvinced. Perhaps the safest view is that whether or not a formal treaty was formally concluded ca. 449/8, a *de facto* peace occurred then, and was later formalized (424/3).

There is no single detailed account of the treaty, but its terms can be reconstructed from several sources. These suggest that the Greek cities in Ionia would demolish their walls and continue to pay tribute to Persia but would otherwise be self-governing. Land and sea demilitarized zones were established, with no Persian troop movement west of the Halys River and no war ship movement into the Aegean. The precise boundaries of the sea zone are unclear but were probably Cyanaea (the mouth of the Black Sea) and (off the southern coast of Asia Minor) Phaselis and the Chelidonean Islands. The Islands are about 8 miles (13 kilometers) west of Phaselis and 25 miles (40 kilometers) further out to sea. It therefore seems likely that one was the landmark for close coastal traffic and the other for ships further out.

Iain Spence

See also Cimon; Delian League/Athenian Empire; Ships, War

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Callicrates (d. 149/8)

Callicrates of Leontium was a politician in the Achaean League, holding the position of *strategos* (general) in 180/79. In his year as *strategos*, Callicrates advocated a policy of accommodation with Rome, which set him against the faction headed by Lycortas, the father of the historian Polybius, and Polybius himself, who advocated a neutral stance vis-à-vis Rome. Although Polybius would later change his position to one of full cooperation with Rome, he remained an implacable enemy of Callicrates, accusing him (24.10) of being “the instigator of great evils for all the Greeks, and especially for the Achaeans,” after he advised the Senate to actively support and favor pro-Roman Greek politicians against their rivals. The result, as Polybius saw it, was the loss of free political debate in Greece, and the loss of some level of Greek autonomy. Polybius’ opposition to Callicrates was transformed into bitter hatred, no doubt because it was Callicrates who assisted the Romans in identifying “unreliable” Achaean politicians, including Polybius himself, and exiling them to Italy following the Third Macedonian War. Callicrates died while on a diplomatic mission to Rome in 149/8.

Paul J. Burton

See also Achaean League; Macedonian War, Third; Polybius

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Callicratidas (d. 406)

Callicratidas was a Spartiate who held the office of navarch, commanding

the Spartan-led fleet in 407/6. He took over the command from Lysander, who had enjoyed a close relationship with Cyrus, the Persian supreme commander in the west. Whether because of his own personal convictions or Cyrus' own political calculations, Callicratidas was unable to obtain from Cyrus the money necessary to maintain his fleet.

Callicratidas' first action had been to raise another 50 ships from Sparta's allies. He faced down opposition to his authority by Lysander's cronies and pressured Sparta's allies in the region, especially Chios, for money. Under his vigorous leadership he brought the Spartan-led fleet up to 170 ships and defeated the Athenian fleet, which had been run down to 70 ships, capturing 30 and driving the rest into the harbor of Mytilene, where he blockaded it. Only with the greatest difficulty did the Athenian commander Conon manage by a clever stratagem to get a trireme through to Athens with news of the blockade. By a supreme effort, the Athenians assembled every trireme they could for a relieving force of 110 triremes and made up the crews with any available manpower, including slaves and, most unusually, Athenians from the wealthy cavalry class.

Such a vigorous and unexpected counter-move was difficult for any commander to foresee. Callicratidas attempted a night-departure to take the Athenians by surprise but was frustrated by stormy weather. The resulting battle fought off the Arginusae Islands in about August 406 between the Athenian relieving fleet and the 120 ships Callicratidas took from the blockade of Mytilene was the largest in Greek history. The Athenians won, sinking over 70 ships and losing 25. For the time being Athens had regained control of the sea.

Callicratidas himself drowned when he fell overboard as his ship was ramming another. He is a puzzling figure. He declared that it was wrong to enslave Greeks in war and then did this to the Athenian garrison captured at Methymna. He declared that it was shameful for Greeks to be asking Persians for money to fight one another and that on his return to Sparta he would advocate a reconciliation with Athens. His death precluded any attempt to accomplish this ideal but such protestations, and his old-fashioned patriotism and courage, gave him a brilliant posthumous reputation.

At Arginusae his fleet, which had better rowers than the Athenians, was drawn up in a single line to carry out the maneuver known as the *diekplous* but the battle turned into a prolonged combat of single ship against ship. As

a naval commander Callicratidas lacked luck and the touch of genius needed to win a big, set-piece battle.

Douglas Kelly

See also Arginusae, Battle of; Conon; Cyrus the Younger; *Diekplous*; Lysander; Peloponnesian War, Second

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Callimachus (d. 490)

Callimachus of Aphidna was the Athenian “war-archon” or polemarch at Marathon (480). Herodotus (6.109) says he had an equal vote with the 10 *strategoi* (generals) but the *Athenaion Politeia* (22.2) states that the polemarch was still the overall commander at that date. The latter is probably correct, but at any rate Callimachus exercised the casting vote to implement Miltiades’ plan to attack the Persians. On the day of the battle, in accordance with Athenian tradition, the polemarch was in the position of honor, commanding the right wing. Callimachus was killed in the fight to prevent the Persians escaping in their transport ships. After the battle a statue of Nike (“Victory”) was erected to honor Callimachus. This “Nike of Callimachus” was damaged 10 years later in the Persian destruction of the Parthenon but fully restored in 2010 CE.

Iain Spence

See also Marathon, Battle of; Miltiades II; Persian Wars

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Callinus (Active ca. 650)

Callinus of Ephesus lived in the mid-seventh century and was celebrated for poems in the elegiac meter. He is the earliest known exponent of a literary form commonly used for moral and political exhortation (compare Tyrtaeus). His work is known only through a handful of quotations and references by later writers. One of these refers to a war between Ephesus and Magnesia and another to fighting against the Cimmerians, a group of nomads expelled from south Russia about this time that carried out extensive destructive raids in western Asia Minor before succumbing to epidemics and constant warfare.

Callinus emphasizes the warrior code of honor and courage as well as devotion to the cause of defending the state. His evidence is important for the early development of Greek warfare.

Douglas Kelly

See also Hoplites; Phalanx; Tyrtaeus

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Callisthenes of Olynthus (d. ca. 327)

The historian Callisthenes of Olynthus accompanied Alexander's invasion of the Persian Empire. He fell out with Alexander over the introduction of *proskynesis*, or prostration, a controversial form of reverence. Soon afterward he was implicated in the Page's conspiracy and was executed. His eulogizing of Alexander's achievements laid him open to the charge of flattery.

Douglas Kelly

See also Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon

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Camp Followers

In wealthy, slave-owning Greek city-states like Athens, it was normal for each hoplite to be accompanied by his personal slave, who would carry his bedding and his cooking utensils, and would cook for him. These were called *skeuophoroi* or “baggage-carriers.” Wealthy cavalrymen would take a number of servants or grooms on campaign with them. In times of battle the *skeuophoroi* would be under the control of a *hyperetes*, an equivalent of a modern logistics sergeant-major. In poorer states, such as the communities of Arcadia and Achaea, which in 401 supplied the bulk of the Greek volunteers for the *Anabasis*, hoplites would carry their own gear and cook for themselves, or take along members of their family too young to serve, but keen to see the world. Such were the young men sent out to gather brushwood to fuel the cooking fires that Xenophon mentions. Generals would try to limit the number of these noncombatants. Philip II banned wagons. All troops carried their own weapons, baggage, and grain for 30 days, and each section of 16 men was allowed one servant “who was detailed to carry the mills and ropes,” (Frontinus 4.1.6) and the cavalrymen were allowed one groom.

In the Classical Period, where campaigns were generally short, the camp followers were usually limited to these personnel, but from the fourth century standing armies were in operation for increasingly lengthy periods, and other needs would arise among the soldiers that had to be catered for. The first such army for which we have adequate evidence was the 10,000 Greek mercenaries whose march inland is described by Xenophon. The mercenary army was forced to give up everything superfluous, and the soldiers were searched, even so the soldiers would attempt to smuggle

through “a handsome boy or woman that he had set his heart on” (Xenophon, *Anabasis* 4.1.14). A Phoenician market followed Alexander’s army to cater for all its needs—just as a Lydian market had accompanied Cyrus the Younger’s army in 401. In these longer campaigns, camp followers could include traders (including slave traders who would buy prisoners of war), prostitutes, doctors—in fact anyone who could make money from an army—as well as the slaves, attendants, or even families of the soldiers. It was not always a safe occupation—camp followers of a losing army could be killed or enslaved and many of them died in Alexander’s crossing of the Gedrosian desert.

The longer an army was in the field the larger the number of camp followers would grow, and their relationship to the troops would strengthen. In 316, the Greek general Eumenes won the battle of Gabiene, but he was handed over to Antigonos I Monophthalmus by his elite infantry force, the “Silver-Shields” (Argyraspides), “since their baggage had been taken, and their children and their wives and many other relatives were in the hands of the enemy” (Diodorus 19.43.7).

Nicholas Sekunda

See also Attendants, Military; Gabiene, Battle of; Ten Thousand, March of

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Caria, Carians

Caria was a region along the southwest Anatolian coast. It was defined geographically as the region south of the Maeander River as far as the Rhodian *peraia* (area on the mainland controlled by an island state), and contextually as between Ionia and Lycia. There were Greek settlements

within Caria, particularly along the coast. The Carians were not Greeks, although they became Hellenized under the Hecatomnid dynasty in the fourth century. The Carians considered themselves indigenous.

Carians were notable mercenaries and pirates, fighting as far away as Egypt. The Greeks believed that Carians alone sacrificed to a military Zeus, and that they were the originators of crested helmets, shield handles, and shield emblems. According to Herodotus, Carians fought as mercenaries in Egypt in the seventh and sixth centuries.

By the late sixth century, the Carians were tribute-paying subjects of the Persians, but in 498 they joined the Ionian Revolt, in the course of which they were defeated in battle at the Maeander River and at Labraunda, but then ambushed and destroyed the victorious Persian army on its march into Caria. Carians probably fought at the battle of Lade, but after the Greek defeat there they were reconquered by Persia. In 480, Carians fought on the Persian side at the battles of Artemisium and Salamis, the latter under command of the Halicarnassian queen Artemisia, who according to Herodotus accidentally gained favor from Xerxes by sinking a Carian ship from Calynda.

In the fifth century, the Carians paid tribute to Athens, and some cities fought for Athens in the Second Peloponnesian War, but in 411 Athenian weakness allowed Persia once again to assert its control. In the fourth century, Caria came under the control of a Carian dynasty of Persian satraps, the Hecatomnids, the most famous of whom was Mausolus. The Hecatomnids adopted a mixture of traditional Carian and Greek culture, moving the seat of the satrapy to the coastal city of Halicarnassus and developing the Carian religious sanctuary at Labraunda with Hellenizing buildings. After the death of Alexander the Great, parts of Caria at various times came under Seleucid, Pergamene, Ptolemaic, Antigonid, and Macedonian rule. Campaigns by Rhodes in the early second century led to several Carian settlements gaining freedom. Soon afterward Caria passed under Roman control, with most settlements gaining autonomy.

Lachlan McColl

See also Caria, Greek Cities in; Delian League/Athenian Empire; Evagoras; Halicarnassus; Ionia, Ionians; Ionian Revolt; Lade, Battle of; Mausolus and the Hecatomnids; Peloponnesian War, Second; Persian (Achaemenid) Empire; Persian Wars; Salamis, Battle of (480)

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Caria, Greek Cities in

Among the various groups populating Caria were Greek *poleis* situated along the coast. They were part of the Greek world, but also interacted extensively with the Carians of the inland. Where settlements (such as Caunus) were not Greek, extensive Hellenization occurred during the Classical and Hellenistic Periods. The distinction between Greek and Carian, although clearly made by Diodorus, is therefore more uncertain for the modern researcher. Many settlements are attested as *poleis*, or are included in the tribute lists of the Delian League, while not being predominantly Greek in population or culture.

The major cities that were either clearly regarded as Greek from the Archaic or Classical Periods onward, or which had very close Hellenic connections, were Cnidus, Iasus, Heraclea, Myndus, and Mylasa. North of Caria were three Greek *poleis*—Miletus, Myus, and Priene—that were regarded geographically as within Caria, but culturally were considered to be Ionian.

Latmus, renowned for its stone, was situated near Miletus in the north of Caria, at the head of a gulf that is now an inland lake. It was refounded as Heraclea in the fourth century. There was a strong Carian element in the population, yet also prominent Greek architectural aspects.

Further south, Iasus was a heavily fortified settlement on an island just off the coast. Along with city-walls, Iasus had another wall on the mainland, apparently protecting the approaches to the island. Iasus was sacked by Sparta in 411 and sold (along with her population) to Tissaphernes who installed a garrison. Unfortunately, having returned to the Athenian side by 405, Iasus was then sacked again, by the Spartan Lysander, its 800 strong fighting-age population slaughtered, women and children enslaved, and the city razed. Nevertheless, Iasus endured to be

conquered by Alexander.

Mylasa, inland from Iasus, was the old Carian capital. It was not originally a Greek city, but under the Hellenizing Hecatomnids in the fourth century and afterward it acquired close Greek connections. The major Carian sanctuary of Labraunda, regarded by the fourth century as a sanctuary of Zeus, was in its territory.

Further south, Halicarnassus was a coastal city with a mixed Greek and Carian population. It was the birthplace of Herodotus, and in the fourth century replaced Mylasa as the capital of the satrapy.

Myndus was a fortified settlement on the tip of Halicarnassus' Peninsula. When the city would not surrender to him, Alexander the Great unsuccessfully attempted to take it by sapping.

Cnidus was an unwallled *polis*, situated on a promontory in far southern Caria. The Cnidian, who claimed originally to be Dorians from Sparta or Megara, provided the meeting place a group of Dorian cities, the *hexapolis*. In the mid-sixth century, they attempted to cut off their promontory to prevent the median Harpagus from capturing it, but allegedly they stopped on the command of the Delphic Oracle and instead surrendered. Cnidus was a member of the Delian League, but revolted in 412; despite the lack of walls, the Athenians failed in an attempt to retake it, and the city was later used as a Spartan naval base. The Athenians won an important battle at Cnidus in 394, but from 387 it reverted to Persian rule until Alexander the Great arrived in 334. In the Hellenistic Period, Cnidus was generally under Ptolemaic control; it later provided naval assistance to Rome and Rhodes against Antiochus III the Great.

Lachlan McColl

See also Caria, Carians; Cnidus, Battle of; Delian League/Athenian Empire; Halicarnassus; Herodotus; Ionia, Ionians; Ionian Revolt; Peloponnesian War, Second

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Carthage, Carthaginians

Founded around 814, Carthage enjoyed an ideal geographic position at the center of the southern Mediterranean. Wealth came from the Carthaginians' commercial enterprise and their fertile North African hinterland. By the mid-fifth century Carthage dominated not only the peoples there, called Libyans by the Greeks, but also many Phoenician sister-colonies on the coasts of North Africa, Sardinia, Corsica, and Sicily.

Carthage evolved a political system rather like those of Greece and Rome: elected magistrates (headed by two *shophetim*, "sufetes"), a senate of leading men, and a legislative and electoral citizen-assembly—although sufetes and senate together could ignore this. While loyally maintaining ties, especially religious, with its mother-city Tyre, Carthage was equally open to other influences, from Libya and Numidia nearby, Egypt, and Greece. By 340, Carthage was similar enough to a Greek city-state for Aristotle to include it in his *Politics*—unlike Rome.

Carthage's many wars are not always recorded in detail, but it is known that from the 550s on Carthage projected military and naval power well beyond North Africa, waging campaigns in Sardinia and Sicily to impose firm control over their areas of Phoenician settlement: in Sardinia chiefly the productive south and southwest, in Sicily the island's west with centers like Panormus, Motya, and Drepana. Carthage also controlled the coastlands of Lepcis Magna, Oea, and Sabratha, in today's Libya. In its own region, though, Carthage endured repeated revolts by its oppressed Libyan subjects; and in Sicily its position and ambitions frequently collided with those of powerful Greek states like Acragas and Syracuse.

Carthaginian citizens normally did not fight in land wars, though for major expeditions and emergencies they did, and senior officers at all times were Carthaginian. Citizens manned the fleets, which could be large. In the fifth and fourth centuries, the regular warship was the trireme, requiring some 170 oarsmen and a body of marines; in the early third, Carthage adopted the new and larger quinquereme, which embarked 300 oarsmen and several dozen soldiers. Transports for horses and munitions also participated

in expeditions, but sea-battles were few. Significantly, the Carthaginian navy played a subordinate role before the first war with Rome.

On land, Punic armies (“Punic” is the Roman term for “Carthaginian,” still used today) were formed mainly of Libyan conscripts and overseas professional troops, notably Spaniards, Campanians from Italy, Gauls (from southern Gaul and northern Italy), Numidians (famous especially for hardy Cossack-like horsemen), and—from the 340s to the 240s—Greeks. They fought in their own units and with their own equipment, which made their generals’ leadership tasks especially demanding.

Though lesser Greek cities sometimes preferred Carthage as hegemon, its Sicilian wars proved generally futile. In 480, Hamilcar’s great expedition was destroyed; in 409, 406–405, and again in 396, Punic armies were ravaged by plague that spread back to Carthage. Despite intermittent victories in the many wars against Syracuse from 409 to about 368, in the end Carthage remained mistress only of Sicily’s west as before. Fresh initiatives in the 340s and in 312–306 did no better. Timoleon destroyed a splendid Punic army at the River Crimisus in 341; in 310–307, Syracuse’s new ruler Agathocles countered the siege of his city by invading Libya and bringing Carthage itself close to ruin. Then in 278–276, a coalition under Pyrrhus of Epirus came close to driving the Carthaginians out of the island, only for Pyrrhus’ allies to fall out. The status quo was restored.

This lasted barely 12 years. In 264, Carthage clashed with a newcomer to Sicily, the Roman Republic—even though both began by rescuing Messina, at the straits of Sicily, from attack by Syracuse. The First Punic War proved a new kind of conflict. Huge sea-battles were fought, and usually lost by Carthage (save for two in 249, not followed up). Libya was invaded in 256–255, though the Romans under Regulus were crushingly defeated. In 241, Carthage had to accept peace with the total loss of Punic Sicily—followed in 237 by a Roman grab of Sardinia.

Under the leadership of Hamilcar Barca, Carthage opened a new military era by conquering and exploiting the riches of southern Spain (237–219), but reacted to feared Roman interference in 218 by launching the famous invasion of Italy under Hannibal, Hamilcar’s son. The Second Punic War temporarily gave Carthage mastery over almost all the western Mediterranean: Rome and Rome’s loyal Italian allies were virtually encircled, and Syracuse and Macedon became Carthage’s allies. But Hannibal’s final defeat in 202, by Scipio Africanus, ended its role as a great

power and confined the city to Libya. Carthage was intermittently harassed by the now powerful Numidian king Masinissa (203–149) who annexed one sector of Punic territory after another, and finally antagonized Rome by resisting them in 151. From 149 to 146, the Third Punic War was essentially Rome's siege of Carthage, ending when Scipio Aemilianus (Africanus' grandson) stormed, sacked, and burned the ancient city.

Dexter Hoyos

See also Carthaginian War, First; Carthaginian Wars (409–367); Carthaginian Wars (345–275); Rome, Romans; Sicily; Syracuse; Timoleon. *Roman Section:* Carthage (State); Carthage, Siege of; Carthaginians; Masinissa; Punic War, First; Punic War, Second; Punic War, Third

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Carthaginian War, First (480)

Causes

By 490, Carthage dominated most of western Sicily, not only its Phoenician-founded cities like Panormus and Motya but nearby Elymian centers like Segesta. Its own affairs were run by the Magonid family, whose military ancestor Mago had made himself its effective ruler. For obscure reasons Carthage wrangled with the leading Greek city-states Acragas, under its ruler Theron, and Syracuse, ruled by his son-in-law Gelon. They were also at odds with Anaxilas, tyrant of Rhegium and Messana at the straits of Sicily, and his son-in-law Terillus whose overthrow as tyrant of Himera in northern Sicily had been orchestrated by Theron. The trigger for the war was Terillus' appeal to Carthage's Magonid leader, his guest-friend Hamilcar, for help.

Course

After three years' preparation, in 480, Hamilcar launched a powerful

expedition to restore Terillus and subdue Sicily (this peril prompted Gelon to refuse aid to Greece against Xerxes). Hamilcar's forces are no doubt exaggerated by Herodotus and Diodorus, our main sources—300,000 soldiers (mostly mercenaries from all over the western Mediterranean), 200 warships, and 3,000 transports—but undoubtedly were large. Though damaged by a storm, the expedition put in at Panormus and then besieged Himera by land and sea. Hamilcar's curiously lethargic leadership allowed Theron and Gelon to arrive, relieve Himera, and join battle with him outside his camp. According to Diodorus, a cavalry contingent supposedly from Carthage's Greek ally Selinus, but really from Gelon's army, entered Hamilcar's camp, killed him as he made sacrifices for victory, and set his fleet on fire while the battle was going on. Herodotus' version, from Carthaginian informants, is that on seeing his army defeated Hamilcar leapt into his own sacrificial fire.

Consequences

The outcome was anticlimactic. Acragas and Syracuse did not attack Panormus or other Carthaginian possessions in Sicily. Anaxilas remained master of the straits of Messana and Carthage made no attempt to retrieve the situation or avenge Hamilcar. Peace prevailed for the next 70 years.

Dexter Hoyos

See also Acragas (Agrigentum); Gelon; Sicily; Syracuse

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Carthaginian Wars (409–367)

Causes

The reasons for the outbreak of this series of wars in 409 are obscure. As the first war-leader was Hannibal, elderly grandson of the Hamilcar defeated in 480, Diodorus' sources held that revenge was the motive, but this looks

inadequate to explain the sweeping ferocity of his campaigns—and his utter obliteration of Carthage's one-time ally Selinus. The Carthaginians, still under Magonid dominance, had made themselves masters of their Libyan hinterland during the previous generation; with Sicily's Greeks weakened by constant struggles and by the great Athenian invasion of 415–413, quite likely they now reckoned that they had the means to impose hegemony over the whole island if they acted with massive force.

Course

Aided by his kinsman Himilco, Hannibal wrought havoc in 409 and again in 406–405. Selinus and Himera were destroyed, temples and tombs desecrated. In 406, the great city of Acragas was sacked and in 405 Gela and Camarina in the southeast. Syracuse was menaced. The temple sacrileges nonetheless had consequences (so people felt)—Hannibal and many in the Punic (Carthaginian) armies perished of plague. It saved Syracuse from assault and then crossed to Libya and Carthage. Yet the new tyrant of Syracuse, Dionysius I, had to concede a peace (405) that left Carthage in control of half the island. This was the high point of its rule there.

It did not last. Dionysius rebuilt Syracuse's military strength to renew war in 398 with 83,000 troops and elaborate siege-engines and artillery. An epic siege of Motya ended in the fall and ruin of the island city; Carthage replaced it with Lilybaeum on the nearby coast. In 396, Himilco struck back with more devastation—Messana destroyed, the Syracusan fleet beaten, Syracuse itself now besieged—only for his army again to disintegrate into plague so catastrophic that he fled home with his citizen troops, abandoning the rest to death or Dionysius. The debacle was so complete that he killed himself and the Magonids fell from power.

Another bout of warfare in 393–392 under a different Mago ended in a treaty conceding central Sicily and its Sicel communities, like Enna, to Syracuse. Carthage soon judged the settlement unsatisfactory. Dionysius proceeded to fashion a Syracusan empire not only over eastern Sicily but also over much of nearby southern Italy, then started to court west-Sicilian cities under Punic control. Mago therefore was sent over in 383 to confront him. This war is recorded only sparsely: Mago lost his life in battle, but the Syracusan tyrant overconfidently rejected Carthage's overtures, opted for battle at a place called Cronium, and was routed. He now had to accept terms confirming Carthaginian control west of the Halycus (Platani) River

and requiring him to pay 1,000 talents (6 million drachmas).

The Carthaginians remained watchful. Around 378, they refounded a town, Hipponium, in south Italy that Dionysius had destroyed 10 years before, a challenge to his power in that region. All the same they themselves were weakened by Libyan rebellions, the continuing ravages of plague, and finally a great fire in their dockyards. Much encouraged, the aging Syracusan leader renewed hostilities in 368. His fleet moved against the fortress port of Drepana north of Lilybaeum, but was annihilated in one of these wars' few big sea-battles. With his death in 367 the war faded, although it seems peace was formally made only a few years later by his son and successor Dionysius II.

Consequences

The damage and suffering inflicted by 40 years of intermittent warfare fell on Carthage and Libya no less than on the unfortunate Sicilians. Heavy defeats, political upheavals, epidemics, and Libyan revolts (with Carthage besieged for a time in 396) were all direct or indirect results. The gains were limited too—at the end of the final war, Carthage's position in Sicily was virtually unchanged. Even though the Halycus line gave Carthage more of Sicily than she had had in 480 or 409, it was far from the extensive hegemony apparently aimed at in 409 and briefly won in 405.

Dexter Hoyos

See also Acragas (Agrigentum); Carthage, Carthaginians; Dionysius I of Syracuse; Dionysius II of Syracuse; Gelon; Sicily; Syracuse. *Roman Section:* Carthage (State)

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Carthaginian Wars (345–275)

Causes

Dionysius II's fall in 357 led to anarchic strife in Greek Sicily, but Carthage held aloof until 345 when a pro-Carthaginian leader at Syracuse sought help against the returning tyrant. Carthage used this appeal to launch a new attempt to extend its power in Sicily, which led to a series of wars over the following 70 years.

Course

In 345, Carthage dispatched a strong army (60,000 men, including many Greek mercenaries), which briefly occupied part of Syracuse for a year or so. Yet again the enterprise faltered, for from Syracuse's mother-city Corinth came a bold leader, Timoleon, to unite the warring Sicilian Greeks in resistance. The first Punic (Carthaginian) army withdrew (343); when a second, brilliantly equipped and headed by 10,000 Carthaginian citizen troops arrived in 341 (or perhaps 340), it fought Timoleon's smaller force at the River Crimisus (probably the Belice) near Selinus and was almost annihilated. Timoleon used the restoration of peace to revive the ravaged Greek states and repopulate them with 60,000 settlers from Greece.

As a result, by 316 the Carthaginians again faced a resurgent Syracuse. Its populist despot, Agathocles (born, incidentally, in Sicily's Punic west), regularly massacred aristocratic and other opponents at home, steadily pushed Syracusan influence over the other Greek cities, and in 312 invaded the west. This touched off a colossal struggle in which several Greek cities, Acragas among them, either allied with Carthage against Syracuse or struck out for themselves. With Syracuse under relentless siege, Agathocles turned the tables by sailing with an invasion force to Libya (his departure date is known: August 14, 310). There he wrought havoc, defeating armies sent against him, looting and ravaging inland territories, and stirring up Libyans to rebel. Carthage's fortunes looked so bleak—in Sicily, too, the siege of Syracuse was broken—that (according to Diodorus) a mass holocaust of 300 aristocratic children was performed to appease the baleful gods. Then in 308 a disgraced general, Bomilcar, attempted a failed but bloody putsch inside the city. At the same time, Agathocles was joined by a new army, brought from Cyrene by a potential rival named Ophellas whom he swiftly murdered.

Thus reinforced, Agathocles was able to capture Carthage's loyal neighbors Utica and Hippou Acra. Although he returned to Sicily early in

307 to deal with reverses inflicted on Syracuse not by Carthage but by an Agragas-led Greek coalition, his Libyan invasion rolled on and extended even into Numidia. All the same its time was nearly up. The Carthaginians reorganized their forces, defeated the scattered invasion armies, and then defeated Agathocles when he hurried back. This prompted the unsentimental tyrant (now calling himself “king”) to desert his troops—and two sons whom the troops soon killed—to hasten home alone. In 306, Carthage made a remarkable peace with him: the Halycus border was confirmed, he was paid a large subsidy, and his domination over virtually all the rest of Sicily was accepted.

Agathocles’ empire, which in time extended to southern Italy like Dionysius I’s, and even to Corcyra, collapsed after his death in 289. Once more Sicilian anarchy and inter-Greek warfare erupted, finally drawing Carthage in when Syracusan forces attacked its territory. Again besieged, Syracuse attracted the help of Pyrrhus, the ambitious king of Epirus who in 280 had crossed to Italy to aid Tarentum against Rome. Losing interest in that, he sailed to Syracuse (278), organized a fresh Greek coalition, and in two campaigns seized the entire Punic west except for the fortress-ports Lilybaeum and Drepana.

Carthage itself was threatened with a new Greek invasion, but the crisis passed. Pyrrhus’ regal high-handedness toward his Sicilian allies turned them so bitterly against them that he had to abandon his venture and return to Italy (276/5). The war ran down: Syracuse came under the rule of an intelligent general, Hieron, who preferred peace with Carthage so that he could deal with a dangerous local enemy, Messana, now occupied by Campanian ex-mercenaries of Agathocles.

Consequences

The series of wars over 70 years effectively weakened Carthage’s position in Sicily—leaving it with little except Lilybaeum and Drepana. While the war slightly increased Syracuse’s power from its start point in 345 (the peak under Agathocles was not permanent), it also created instability in Sicily, including Messana. When a new war in Sicily sparked by a mercenary occupation of Messana drew Carthage in 11 years later, her main enemy would not be a Sicilian state but the Roman Republic.

Dexter Hoyos

See also Acragas (Agrigentum); Agathocles; Cyrene; Gelon; Hieron II of Syracuse; Sicily; Syracuse; Timoleon

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Cassander (d. 297)

Son of Antipater, born no later than 354. He did not participate in Alexander's campaign, remaining in Macedonia until he was sent to Babylon in 324, to answer charges brought against Antipater. There are references in the sources to hostility between Cassander and Alexander, and after the king's death, rumors circulated that Cassander and his brothers had been involved in a conspiracy to poison the king. However, it is more likely that this hostility originated from the other Successors who later became Cassander's rivals. He married the half-sister of Alexander the Great, Thessalonice, and they had three sons, Philip IV, Antipater, and Alexander V.

Just before his death Antipater turned over the guardianship of the kings, Alexander IV and Philip III Arrhidaeus, to Polyperchon rather than to his own son. Cassander and his supporters consequently plotted to overthrow Polyperchon and renewed an alliance with Antigonus I Monophthalmus and Ptolemy I Soter. Together they were gradually able to wrest power away from Polyperchon. Many of the Greek cities remained loyal to Cassander, and he controlled Athens until Demetrius I Poliorcetes took it in 307.

Cassander also continued the bitter hostility that had existed between Olympias and his father. He formed a short-lived alliance with Eurydice, who turned over the guardianship of Philip III Arrhidaeus to him, but the royal couple were soon defeated and executed by Olympias. Olympias proved to be a formidable enemy, having 100 of Cassander's supporters executed, including his brother Nicanor, and even went as far as to desecrate the grave of their brother Iolaus. Cassander besieged Olympias at

Pydna and forced her to surrender, after which he gained control over Alexander IV and his mother Roxana. Cassander was responsible for bringing about Olympias' execution, and ambitious for the kingship, he later had Alexander IV and his mother murdered as well. Soon after, he convinced Polyperchon to murder Alexander the Great's other child, Heracles, who remained one of the last candidates with a legitimate claim to the throne. This allowed Cassander to assume the kingship of Macedonia, declaring himself king in 305. He was a member of the coalition that formed to remove Antigonus and his son from power, but was not actually present at the battle of Ipsus in 301. He ruled Macedonia until 297, when he died of an unknown illness, possibly tuberculosis.

Charlotte M. R. Dunn

See also Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon; Antigonus I Monophthalmus; Antipater; Demetrius I Poliorcetes; Eurydice; Olympias; Philip III Arrhidaeus; Polyperchon; Successors (*Diadochoi*), Wars of

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Cassandreia*. See *Potidaea/Cassandreia

Casualties

Casualty numbers for ancient warfare are notoriously difficult to determine, partly because they may have been hard to find out even at the time. Greek armies did not have the sort of rigorous, centralized record keeping that modern armies do. Nevertheless, since proper burial of the dead was considered important, armies did regularly agree to a truce after battles to allow each side to gather up and bury their dead. At this point, an accurate count could be made, though whether it included subordinate groups such as light-armed troops or Spartan Helots would be moot. Losses at sea would be extremely difficult to count. Athens did regularly erect lists of each year's war dead, but whether those included were only hoplites or whether they included all fighting men, including sailors, is not certain, and may well vary between lists. In a special case, the number of dead might be well

known: an example is the 192 Athenian dead at the battle of Marathon in 490. But this would be a rare example.

In general, historians do not trust casualty figures (or, indeed, numbers generally) in ancient sources. Xenophon even contradicts himself over the number of ships lost at the battle of Arginusae in 406; the number of sailors lost will have been unknowable. Athenian deme records might have noted citizen deaths, but the deaths of foreigners or slaves who rowed in the fleet will nowhere have been recorded. Often ancient writers may exaggerate the scale of a disaster for dramatic effect: Thucydides' description of the total destruction of Athens' Sicilian expedition in 413 may be a case in point: if Thucydides account is taken at face value, it is hard to see how Athens managed to fight on for another nine years.

Nevertheless, historians have attempted to make some judgments. Peter Krentz has reviewed casualty figures in the sources for hoplite battles between 479 and 371, arguing that the ritual gathering of the dead did provide good initial data. Krentz' conclusion, which has been widely accepted, is that between 10 and 20 percent of the losing side were killed, with an average around 14 percent. Even the victorious side lost between 3 and 10 percent killed, for an average of around 5 percent. We cannot put too much trust in these figures, but they do suggest reasons why hoplite battles were rare: the costs were just too high. These numbers represent not years of fighting, as we are accustomed to in modern warfare, but the losses of a few hours of battle. A city-state could not sustain such losses regularly. A significant disaster, such as that of the Argives at Sepeia in 494, would take a generation to make up (which is why 30-year truces were often favored).

Even in the case of hoplite battles, the recorded numbers of dead probably do not include wounded soldiers who died later, away from the battlefield, and we rarely if ever have figures for the number of wounded; prisoners are also very hard to quantify. Much Greek warfare took the form of skirmishing, by light-armed troops, cavalry, and sometimes hoplites. It is likely that casualties in these operations were much lighter than in full-scale battles, yet repeated year in and year out the effects on communities may have been considerable. But it is significant that agricultural ravaging—a form of warfare designed to humble an enemy while sustaining few casualties—was one of the most common forms of Greek warfare.

As noted above, losses at sea are even harder to quantify than on land. But Barry Strauss has argued that they may not have been as high as we

imagine. Ancient warships did not sink when disabled, but rather settled in the water and slowly broke up. This allowed plenty of time to rescue sailors clinging to pieces of wreckage in the water unless a victorious enemy prevented it or, as at Arginusae, bad weather made it impossible. Strauss argues that it was aversion to losing citizen sailors that pushed Athens toward naval tactics that emphasized clever maneuvering of ships rather than ship-board battles that left rowers highly vulnerable to enemy boarders.

In the Hellenistic Period, when kings could assemble great armies from large empires and with many mercenaries, the scale of losses was potentially greater. Soldiers in a Hellenistic phalanx were more lightly armored than their hoplite predecessors and were equipped with a long *sarissa* useless once the phalanx broke up. Hoplites, though they preferred to fight in a cohesive phalanx, could offer resistance even when thrown into disorder. When a Hellenistic phalanx fell apart, the result could be carnage, as in the 8,000 Macedonians killed fighting Flaminius' legions at Cynoscephalae in 197. They were not buried until the following year.

Peter Londey

See also Arginusae, Battle of; Cavalry; Champions, Battle of; Cynoscephalae, Battle of (197); Dead, Treatment of; Hoplites; Light Troops; Marathon, Battle of; Medicine, Military; Naval Warfare; Prisoners of War and Slavery; Ravaging; Sepeia, Battle of; Sicilian Expedition; Wounds

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Catalogus (Katalogos)

Catalogus (Greek: *katalogos*) was a technical term used at Athens in the administration of military service. It applied to an official register of men aged from 18 to 60 years, liable, because of their property holdings, for service as hoplites. There was also a separate *catalogus* for those liable to cavalry service. Those liable were entered on the *catalogus* under the year of their birth, which was recorded under the name of the Archon of that year. The requisite number of troops for a campaign was reached by calling up sufficient age groups.

Hoplites were sometimes referred to as serving *ek katalogou*, “according to the *catalogus*” (Thucydides 6.43, 7.16). This could have the implication (e.g., Aristotle, *Constitution of Athens* 26.1) that hoplites drawn from the upper classes of citizens were of better quality than other types, such as mercenaries, volunteers, or metics.

Douglas Kelly

See also Demography, Military; Hoplites; Military Service, Greek States and

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Cataphractoi

A type of heavy cavalry, with both horse and rider fully armored, probably originating in the central Asian steppes, and later extensively used in the Near East. The term *cataphractoi* or “cataphract” (lit. “completely enclosed”) does not appear until the Hellenistic Period, although armored cavalry and chariotry existed from at least the second millennium. The difference between earlier armored cavalry and the cataphract lay in the type of armor worn. Livy (35.38) describes Seleucid cataphracts as wearing breastplates, while Plutarch writes that at Carrhae (53) both horse and rider were clad in plates of armor. In the later Roman period, Ammianus Marcellinus and Julian both compare the armored cataphract to a (bronze) statue—clearly a reference to the layers of armor covering the body of horse and rider (Ammianus, *Histories* 16.10.8, Julian, *Orations* 2.57.C). The most detailed

account of the cataphract's equipment comes from Heliodorus' *Aethiopian Story* in which he describes the armored cavalry of Oroodates (9.14–15). Heliodorus also likens the cataphract to a statue, stating they “look just like a man of steel, or a hammer-worked statue come to life.”

The primary offensive weapon of the cataphract was a long, solid thrusting lance. These heavy lances were not used only against infantry—third century CE Sassanid reliefs at Firuzabad and Naqsh-e Rostam show armored horsemen engaging in what could be interpreted as an early form of jousting. The other offensive weapon of the cataphract was his armor-clad horse. The cataphract horse had to be a physically imposing animal: not tall or particularly fast, but powerful—robust and stocky like the Nesaean horse. Horse and rider worked in a controlled, methodical manner with the occasional burst of speed.

Carolyn Willekes

See also Cavalry; Seleucids. *Roman Section: Cataphractarii*

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Catapult (*Katapeltes*)

A weapon operated by a crew of several men that hurled projectiles, either arrows or stone balls, over long distances. Catapults were named after the type of projectiles, the size of the arrow, or the weight of the stone ball. There were two types of power sources: tension, generated by a normal bow, and torsion, generated by twisted bundles of ropes. Torsion power was more effective. Catapults were mostly made of wood with working parts of metal; the twisted bundles of ropes in torsion catapults were made of human or animal hair or animal sinews. Catapults can be regarded as the ancestors of modern artillery.

Catapults were initially antipersonnel weapons or were fired against targets such as siege-towers or ships. They were also used to attack the battlements or to defend city walls during sieges—but not for some time to breach city walls—in field battles, and on board ship in sea-battles. From

around the third century, catapults seem to have been powerful enough to cause some damage to walls, but presumably were still used for some time as a supplement to rams and tunneling to create a final breach. Catapults could be dismantled so as to transport them, but were unsuitable for ad hoc combat. Harsh and humid weather conditions had an adverse effect on the twisted bundles of ropes. Catapults were technically advanced and expensive military equipment.

Diodorus attributes the first development of the catapult to the reign of Dionysius I in Syracuse, Sicily, in 399. This could refer either to tension or to torsion catapults. Although modern works sometimes assume that the *gastrophetes* (a tension weapon probably similar to a large crossbow) is the most likely candidate, there is no evidence to support this. Catapults are attested for Athens in inscriptions of the first half of the fourth century and by literary sources for the Macedonians in the mid-fourth century; but the power type is not specified. Catapults were more often mentioned by literary sources for Alexander the Great's war against the Persian Empire, especially in his sieges (e.g., 332 at Tyre). In the third century, torsion catapults were common in the Mediterranean area.

The history and technical line of development for the catapult are uncertain for the Classical and Hellenistic Periods. Contemporary fourth and third century sources are rare and supply little historical or technical detail. Most information is transmitted in much later sources of questionable reliability, and therefore difficult to assess. Archaeological finds of complete catapults or parts are also rare, because their organic and metal components tend to decay. There are currently none at all from the fourth century and only one from the third century. The most helpful surviving sources are the books on building catapults and war machines by Philo of Byzantium (third/first century), Biton (third/second century), Vitruvius (first century), and Hero of Alexandria (first/third century CE)—all translated in Marsden (1971).

Hans Michael Schellenberg

See also Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon, Invasion of Persian Empire; Archimedes; Biton; Dionysius I of Syracuse; Fortifications; Hero of Alexandria; Philo of Byzantium; Siege Warfare; Tyre, Siege of

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Cavalry

Most of Greece is not well suited to cavalry. Rocky and mountainous, only the wide grazing plains of Macedonia, Thessaly, and to a lesser degree, Boeotia, encouraged large-scale *hippotrophia* (horse raising). From the Mycenaean Period to the Hellenistic Period, the functional importance of cavalry in warfare fluctuated greatly, reaching its zenith in the fourth century cavalries of Philip II of Macedon and his son, Alexander III (the Great). Cavalry in the Greek world did not come into its own until the Classical Period, and even then tended to play a tactically subordinate role to the infantry armies of hoplites fighting in close formation. Before Alexander the Great, battles were won or lost by the infantry. Philip II and Alexander the Great's victories were case studies in how to use cavalry in close coordination with infantry and auxiliary forces. For the Successors in the Hellenistic Period, however, this tactical success would rarely be repeated.

In the Mycenaean Period, we know that the great warlords of Greece used horses in a military capacity, but only with chariots. However, in the Homeric epics the chariot serves as a means of transporting the hero to and from the battlefield. Otherwise, he fought on foot.

Vase paintings of the seventh and sixth centuries depict two distinct types of horsemen: (1) infantrymen carrying hoplite shields and (2) unarmored youths engaged in cavalry action. Most scholars believe that the first represents a mounted hoplite, a heavy-armed infantryman who rides his horse to the battlefield, then dismounts to fight on foot, analogous to the function of chariots in Homeric warfare. The young men of the second type might be our earliest examples of true cavalry in the Greek world. Judging by artistic representations, the Assyrians had true cavalry, that is, men fighting on horseback, at least two centuries earlier. However, it is possible

that the Greek youths are squires for the mounted hoplites and as such only saw limited action in battle.

Aristotle (*Politics* 1289b) refers to emerging cavalry powers in the Archaic Period, notably Chalcis and Eretria on the island of Euboea; Magnesia on the Maeander in Asia Minor; and Ionia. He links the importance placed on cavalry with oligarchic states. It should be noted that in fact *hippeis*, the Greek word for horsemen, almost always refers to the elite classes. Only they could afford the enormous cost of maintaining horses. However, this does not prove that these men actually fought as true cavalry, only that they possessed great wealth and status. For example, the second highest census class in the Solonian constitution in early sixth century Athens were called *hippeis*, but there is scant evidence that this meant anything other than that they could afford to own a horse. At the battle of Marathon in 490, Athens' levy included no cavalry at all. They were all hoplites or light-armed troops. It is quite probable that if Athens had a cavalry, it was composed of mounted hoplites or that it was so small a force (under 100) that it stood little chance against the more numerous and formidable Persian cavalry. On this occasion, the Athenian *hippeis* would have served as scouts or messengers or fought with their tribal units in the hoplite ranks, as was expected of all Athenian citizens who could afford hoplite armor. The failure of the Persian cavalry to play a more active role in the battle continues to be a point of debate among military historians. Another example is Sparta whose early fifth century force of *hippeis* appears to be a royal guard of 300 hoplites, not cavalrymen (although they may have been in the seventh century). In fact, Thucydides (4.55.2) informs us that Sparta did not organize a cavalry until 424, seven years into the Peloponnesian War. Relying upon others to provide cavalry support, like their Boeotian allies, Sparta felt no compelling need to field a cavalry when their feared hoplites usually settled the issue on the battlefield. In the fifth century, cavalry did not win or lose battles; hoplite phalanxes did. However, they were not unimportant in Greek warfare. They excelled in scouting out unfamiliar terrain; skirmishing against detached forces; providing cover for their retreating comrades; or pursuing an enemy put to flight. If the opposing force had cavalry, their primary mission was to engage it in a preliminary clash and to prevent it from approaching the vulnerable right flank of their own hoplite phalanx (unprotected by the hoplite shield, always carried on the left arm). The one thing that Greek cavalry never did

was to charge the fixed hoplite ranks of a phalanx—not even Alexander the Great risked full frontal assaults. Only in the era of the cataphract was this tactic viable (see later).

The Thessalians were by consensus the finest horsemen in the Greek world, followed by the Macedonians and Boeotians. By the mid-fifth century, the southern Greeks began to reassess the importance of cavalry. In particular, Athens created a cavalry to counter their mainland rivals, the Thebans. This is the era of the Delian League, soon to be transformed into the Athenian Empire. Athens needed an imperial cavalry to fulfill its territorial ambitions in central Greece. Xenophon notes that in the fourth century it cost the state 40 talents a year to maintain them (*Cavalry Commander* 1.19). By the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War in 431, Athens could field a 1,000-man force, supplemented by 200 mounted archers (Thuc. 2.13.8). Athens took great pride in its new cavalry: its youthful *hippeis* cavalcade with prancing horses along the Panathenaic frieze of the Parthenon on the Acropolis (see illustration), a scene that caught the approving eye of Xenophon (*On Horsemanship* 11.9). The greatest comic writer of the day, Aristophanes, wrote a play about them in 424 called *Hippeis*. The Athenian cavalry would prove its worth during the long and grueling Peloponnesian War, defending Attica by harassing the invading Spartans, Boeotians, and Megarians and campaigning in the Peloponnese (a cavalry victory at Solygeia: Thucydides 4.42–44) and in the northern Aegean. Up to 300 Athenian cavalymen were regularly transported to distant battlefields, and it could be argued that the Athenians might have avoided disaster in the Sicilian Expedition (415–413) had their Sicilian allies been more forthcoming with promised money and cavalry support or if Athens had committed a larger cavalry force of their own to counter the large and effective Syracusan cavalry. However, Athens could not send cavalry reinforcements greater than 250 men in 414 because of the presence of a permanent Spartan garrison at nearby Decelea. Other western Greeks of Magna Graecia also began to develop serious cavalries at this time, notably, Taras (Tarentum) in southern Italy whose spectacular coinage from the fifth to the third century depicts the pride of place held by the young Tarantine horsemen in equestrian and martial poses.



Athenian cavalymen in the Panathenaic Procession, West Frieze, Slab 2, from the Parthenon. The Parthenon friezes were largely complete by 438 and the newly created 1,000-strong Athenian cavalry covers the entire West Frieze. The horse harness and the men's weapons were not carved but were included as bronze attachments, now lost. Located in the British Museum, London, United Kingdom. (Corbis)

The cavalries of Classical Greece were composed of young men of good families. It was a young man's game—the Panathenaic frieze and numerous cavalry reliefs confirm this reality—it was not an easy task to stay mounted without the foot support of stirrups, let alone hurl a spear from bareback. Xenophon encourages the soldiers of the Ten Thousand during the famous strategic retreat across Persian territory in 401 to take heart against the numerous Persian cavalry—as infantry, they stand on solid and stable footing against the charge, while the enemy horsemen struggle to stay mounted (*Anabasis* 3.2.18–19). Of course, this is what we would expect under the circumstances as he strives to bolster the fighting pluck of his men, but it is nonetheless a fair observation. Fighting on horseback takes equestrian skill developed by constant training and a high level of fitness. The Classical Period horseman had no stirrups, carried no shield, and wore relatively little or no body armor. A close inspection of the Panathenaic frieze shows some horsemen with body armor, others not (no doubt a case of artistic license). In a series of rapid approaches, they hurled javelins at the enemy lines, and then withdrew to let the hoplites decide the day. In the aftermath of the hoplite battle, they stood ready to pursue or to provide

cover. We are very fortunate to have valuable works on the cavalry written by Xenophon, a fourth century Athenian historian and former member of the Athenian cavalry. His technical treatises, *On Horsemanship* and *The Cavalry Commander*, detail the state of the Athenian cavalry in the fourth century, addressing topics like maintenance, training (e.g., the *anthippasia*, a mock cavalry battle of charging squadrons), equipment, and leadership.

The *Athenaion Politeia* (*Constitution of the Athenians*), attributed to Aristotle, supplements the information in Xenophon's treatises by describing the annual examination (*dokimasia*) of men and mounts by the Council of 500 (*Ath. Pol.* 49.1–2). Fortunately, our knowledge of the administration of the Athenian cavalry in the Classical and early Hellenistic Periods has been exponentially expanded by discoveries in the excavations of the Athenian Agora and the adjacent Ceramicus (ancient cemetery) over the past 50 years. In addition to inscriptions decreed by or for the Athenian cavalry, including one from 282/1 that reveals that the canonical 1,000-man Athenian cavalry had fallen to a mere 200 by this date and another that records a rare decree of the Athenian *prodromoi*, almost 700 lead cavalry tablets from the city's cavalry archives were uncovered dating to the fourth and third centuries. On each lead tablet were recorded (1) the name of the owner of the cavalry mount, (2) the horse's color and brand, and (3) its value in drachmas, 1,200 being the highest. They record the state's inspection process and the value of a cavalry mount as determined by the annual evaluation.

Philip II of Macedon, father of Alexander the Great, initiated major military reforms consonant with the consolidation of his throne and the expansion of his kingdom in the southern Balkans in the 350s and 340s. One of his signature reforms involved the infantry: he introduced a variation of the traditional hoplite phalanx by extending the length of the infantry spear, called a *sarissa*, up to 15–18 feet. On level ground, the Macedonian phalanx was almost unstoppable and a fearsome sight to behold, with its spear tips projecting beyond the front ranks in hedgehog fashion (see second illustration for Phalanx entry). This style would typify most armies of Hellenistic world.

The superiority of this new style of infantry would prove itself on the battlefield of Chaeroneia in 338. Perhaps from observing the brilliant tactics of Epaminondas and his cavalry commander, Pelopidas, while a hostage in Thebes, Philip grasped the tactical advantage of a close coordination of

infantry, cavalry, and auxiliary troops. Consequently, he reformed not only the infantry but also created a strike force of Companion cavalry with equestrian skills nearly equal to those of the Thessalians. With this new army, Philip defeated the combined forces of Thebans and Athenians in 338.

This pivotal battle in the struggle for hegemony of the Greek world marks the coming-out party of a young 18-year old Alexander. Most scholars believe that Alexander commanded his father's cavalry, as he always did later in his Persian campaigns, and that his charge was instrumental in the defeat of the elite 300 Theban fighters known as the Sacred Band (Diodorus 16.86.3, by implication). A few scholars, however, have argued that Alexander was leading an infantry force, and a reference to *sarissae* in Plutarch's life of *Pelopidas* (18.5) and *Alexander* (9) would lend some support to this interpretation. Recently, a physical anthropological examination of the bones of the fallen warriors of the Sacred Band, buried in the precinct of the Lion Monument at Chaeronea, has suggested that the fatal head wounds are consistent with the downward cut from a horseman's sword.

Another point of scholarly debate is whether the cavalry spear was also lengthened by analogy with the Macedonian infantry pike. Alexander deployed horsemen called *sarisophoroi* (*sarissa*-bearers) early in his campaigns, but it is not certain that he equipped his principal strike force, the Companion cavalry, with such lances. Experimental archaeology has led a number of scholars to test replicas of a "cavalry spear" ranging in length from 9 to 18 feet. Test simulations have shown that it is possible to wield a cavalry lance of great length in battle, and there is emerging consensus that Alexander (or his father) did introduce a cavalry *sarissa* of about 12 feet, thus longer than both the traditional javelin and the hoplite spear, but shorter than the infantry *sarissa*. The best example of a cavalry *sarissa* measuring about 12 feet can be seen on the famous Alexander Mosaic in the House of the Faun in Pompeii (see illustration in Alexander III [the Great] of Macedon, Invasion of Persian Empire entry).

Outside of the failure on the part of the Greeks to develop a stirrup, the most puzzling element of the Classical Greek cavalry is the apparent uninterest in protecting oneself with a shield. The western Greeks and Italian cavalries carried shields, but it seems not to have been adopted by cavalries in Greece until the early third century. The mounted warriors with shields on vase paintings in the Archaic Period are almost certainly

mounted hoplites, and in the fourth century Xenophon makes no recommendation to equip his troopers with shields, only protective left arm sleeves. Two theories for its introduction, both suggesting a date in the 270s, credit either Pyrrhus for borrowing the idea from his shield-carrying Tarantine cavalry allies in Italy or the Galatians who invaded the Greek world in 280/79 and whose cavalry carried round wooden shields or an oblong shield called a *thureos*. *Thureophoroi* can regularly be found in infantry and cavalry during the third and second centuries. One of the most dramatic artistic representations of the large round cavalry shield carried by Macedonians can be seen on the monument of Lucius Aemilius Paullus erected at Delphi after his victory over King Perseus of Macedon at Pydna in 168.

Alexander the Great's Persian campaigns demonstrate the decisive strike force capability of Macedonian Companion cavalry and Thessalians at every major battle. He himself commanded the Companion cavalry at the three major battles of Granicus, Issus, and Gaugamela. Unlike typical Classical armies with a ratio of 10 to 1, infantry to cavalry, Alexander deployed armies with a ratio of 6 to 1. The Successors would not sustain this high ratio of cavalry, and by the end of the third century, they fielded armies with numbers closer to the Classical levels. The prevailing emphasis was placed on infantry trained in Macedonian style and supported by large numbers of mercenary troops. The great age of cavalry warfare initiated by Alexander the Great seems to have faded away by the second and third generation of the Successors.

Cavalry, albeit assuming a secondary role, continued to play an important one in Hellenistic warfare. The Successor dynasts maintained elite cavalry units with royal-sounding names, and most Greek cities of the Hellenistic world supported citizen cavalries and militias, notably Athens. These were primarily intended for local and regional defense. The city *gymnasias* were as keenly interested in developing practical military skills as they were in cultivating the mind. The Achaean, Boeotian, and Aetolian Leagues, with collective resources at their disposal, fielded respectable, and at times, formidable cavalries in the third and second centuries. In the last decade of the third century, the cavalry commander, Philopoemen, took over an ineffective Achaean League cavalry and created a highly trained fighting force to combat the Spartan tyrant, Machanidas. Inscriptions attest the continued emphasis upon cavalry recruitment by the Boeotian League.

The Aetolian League projected their modest 500 man cavalry to regional and international theaters of war, for example, in the Social War (220–217); as mercenaries in the army of Ptolemy V at the battle of Panion (200); and as an ally of Rome, against Philip V of Macedon at Cynoscephalae in 197, even winning the praise of their enemy, Polybius, the foremost historian of the Hellenistic world and a cavalry commander of the Achaean League.

In the Hellenistic Period, two new cavalry types appear on the battlefield: the Tarantines and the *cataphractoi*, representing light and heavy cavalry, respectively. The Tarantines can be described as a light cavalry that hurled several javelins and carried a shield for protection. Military writers, like Asclepiodotus, Aelian, and Arrian, speak of two types of Tarantines: (1) the so-called true Tarantines, those who approach the enemy, hurl their javelins, and then gallop away, and (2) those who hurl their javelins as a prelude to engaging in close order combat. The presence of the shield would allow the Tarantines to dismount and fight on foot if necessary. Taras was a major cavalry power in Magna Graecia, with rich grazing lands for *hippotrophia*. Outside southern Italy, they first appear in Antigonos I Monophthalmus' armies in the late fourth century and thereafter become a regular fixture in Hellenistic armies into the second century, for example, Elis, the Achaean League, Sparta, and the Seleucid kingdom. Most scholars believe that in the wars of the first generation of Successors they may actually have come from Taras itself as mercenaries, but that by the third century the term "Tarantine" simply meant a style of fighting, not a certificate of ethnic origin. However, the ethnic connection with Taras may have abided well into the late third century, at least until the destruction of the city by Romans in 209. By the second century, however, the Tarantines and their commanders (Tarantinarchs) in Athens were Athenian citizens, and the reference applies to a particular type of light cavalry not to ethnicity. This is almost certainly true in other Greek states.

The term *cataphractoi* literally means "fully armored or covered," and this term was applied to both heavy cavalry and to ships. The cataphract represents the final stage in the development of heavy cavalry, whereby both rider and mount were encased in armor. They are mentioned prominently in the armies of Antiochus III the Great in 200 and they appear during the reign of his son, Antiochus IV Epiphanes in the 160s. Although effective as a strike force against Roman legions on the battlefield at

Magnesia in 190, the cataphracts of Antiochus III could not save the day after his other units collapsed. The limited deployment of this type of cavalry resulted from the high cost of maintenance, the lack of speed and mobility under the constraining weight, and to the stifling effects of hot climates. He was, however, the precursor to the medieval knight.

Glenn R. Bugh

See also Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon; Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon, Invasion of Persian Empire; Antigonos I Monophthalmus; Antiochus III (the Great); Boeotian League; *Cataphractoï*; Chaeronea, Battle of; Chariots; Command Structures, Army; Darius III; Epaminondas; *Hippeis*; Homeric Warfare; Hoplites; Magnesia, Battle of; Marathon, Battle of; Peloponnesian War, Second; Philip II of Macedon; Philopoemen; Polybius; *Prodromoi*; Pydna, Battle of; Pyrrhus; Seleucids; Successors (*Diadochoi*), Wars of; Training

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Celts, Invasion of Greece and Thrace (279/8)

In 279/8, a Celtic army under Brennus invaded Greece. These were Celts from somewhere to the north (possibly from around the Danube) whom the Greeks called Galatians (sometimes misleadingly translated “Gauls”). This invasion followed earlier plundering expeditions, partly encouraged by the death of Lysimachus and the resultant weakening of Thracian defenses. The first wave had overrun the army of Ptolemy Ceraunus, the man who had

ruthlessly fought and murdered his way to Lysimachus' throne and was now occupying Macedonia as well; Ceraunus himself was killed and beheaded. A Macedonian, Sosthenes, stopped this group, and they retreated.

Under a new leader, Brennus, the Celts set out to invade southern Greece. Pausanias, who gives us our main account, is keen to liken the threat to Greece to that posed by Xerxes in 480. With an army, according to Pausanias, of 152,000 infantry and 20,400 cavalry (with reserves), Brennus marched on Thermopylae, which was held by a coalition of Boeotians, Phocians, Locrians, Aetolians, Megarians, and Athenians. The defenders numbered around 24,000 infantry and 2,000 or more cavalry. The Greek cavalry and a thousand light-armed troops tried to prevent Brennus from crossing the Spercheius River, but were outflanked. Pausanias' account becomes worryingly Herodotean as he tells us that the Celts assaulted the defenders at Thermopylae in vast numbers, attacking without order like wild animals. Greek discipline and order, together with the Celts' lack of defensive armor, ensured countless losses for the barbarians, but only 40 dead for the Greeks. For their part, we are told, the Celts were so barbaric that they sought neither omens before the battle nor to recover their dead after it.

With the Celts demoralized, Brennus decided to split the Greek defenders by sending 40,000 infantry and 800 cavalry back to Thessaly to invade Aetolia from the northeast. They brutally sacked the inland city of Callion (or Callipolis), massacring the men, endlessly raping the women, pillaging sanctuaries and, according to tales the Greeks told, drinking the blood and eating the flesh of the plumper babies. The Greeks could see parallels here with the Persians in Phocis in 480, but in other ways the story differed. Like Xerxes, Brennus managed to surround the Greeks at Thermopylae; but unlike the Spartans, the Greeks in 279 prudently used an Athenian fleet to get away.

In any case, Brennus was not interested in Thermopylae. Instead he marched his army directly south through the passes leading to the rich plunder of Delphi. But as in 480, according to the story, Apollo promised to defend his property, and now indeed things began to go badly for the Celts. The Aetolians and some allies relentlessly harried the army that had displayed such brutality at Callion, so that fewer than half escaped back to Thessaly. But the army marching on Delphi suffered even worse, terrified by earthquakes, thunder and lightning, and undergoing a night of snow and

landslides. In the morning, the defenders attacked the Celts frontally, while local Phocians descended on their flank from Parnassus. There is dispute as to whether the sanctuary itself was pillaged. After fierce fighting, the Celts retreated, but the next night fell into panic and confusion (brought on, Pausanias suggests, by the god Pan), fighting each other as well as the pursuing Greeks. Continually harried, the army was destroyed on its march northward. Brennus was among the dead. The stories were no doubt exaggerated, but the terror for the Greeks was real. Afterward the Delphic Amphictyony instituted a panhellenic festival, the Soteria (“Salvation”).

Survivors from this campaign moved to Thrace, where they were defeated by the Macedonian king, Antigonos II Gonatas, at the battle of Lysimacheia in 277. Others crossed to Asia Minor, hired by Nicomedes I to take the throne of Bithynia. They settled in the area thereafter known as Galatia, but caused considerable trouble until finally defeated in 228 by Nicomedes’ grandson, Prusias I.

Peter Londey

See also Antigonos II Gonatas; Bithynia; Brennus; Delphi; Delphic Amphictyony; Epiphanies, Military; Galatians; Lysimacheia, Battle of; Ptolemy Ceraunus; Spercheius Valley; Thermopylae, Battle of

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Cersobleptes (Reigned ca. 360–342)

Cersobleptes was the son of Cotys, king of the Odrysian Thracians. On his father’s death ca. 360, Cersobleptes was obliged to partition the kingdom with two rivals, Berisades and Amadocus, and ruled only the eastern part that bordered on the Thracian Chersonese.

Threatened by Philip II of Macedon’s expansion eastward from Amphipolis, Cersobleptes, along with the other two Thracian kings, made an alliance with Athens in 357. By 353, Philip had defeated the other Thracian kings and Cersobleptes relied more heavily on Athens, conceding to it possession of the Thracian Chersonese. He was at war with Philip in 352 and again in 346. In the latter year, he sent an ambassador to Athens in

an attempt to become a party to the Peace of Philocrates between Philip, Athens, and their allies. The exclusion of his ambassador from the oath-taking later became a subject of contradictory recrimination between rival Athenian politicians, Demosthenes and Aeschines.

That dispute had little practical consequence, since it so happened that Cersobleptes had been heavily defeated by Philip's forces the day before the swearing of the oaths. He remained subject to Philip until 342, when Philip deposed him.

Douglas Kelly

See also Chersonese, Thracian; Cotys; Philip II Campaigns against Illyria and Thrace; Philocrates, Peace of; Thrace, Thracians

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Chabrias (ca. 420–357)

Chabrias, son of Ctesippus, was an Athenian *strategos* (general) active in the first half of the fourth century. Although his career spans a not very well-documented period of Greek history, there is enough evidence to demonstrate that Chabrias was an innovative land commander (especially of light troops) and also a successful admiral.

Chabrias was not from a wealthy background but married into the Athenian cavalry class—his father-in-law, Menexenus, is recorded as a phylarch (cavalry squadron commander) in 429—and amassed considerable wealth over his career. He owned a four-horse chariot team (a sign of major wealth) good enough to win its event at the Pythian Games in 374.

Chabrias first comes to attention in the ancient sources in Aegina where he successfully ambushed the Spartans and their allies using 800 peltasts. Placing his hoplites in the open to draw the enemy on, he then attacked with his hidden peltasts. Between 385 and 383, he ostensibly served as a

mercenary commander successfully helping the Egyptian rebel pharaoh, Akoris, repel sustained Persian attacks. However, his swift return to Athens when the Persians complained (379) about his activities in Egypt suggests he was there either in an official or semiofficial capacity, or at least with tacit support from Athens.

Chabrias reappears in our sources in 378 using peltasts to limit Spartan success in their invasion of Boeotia. However, his most important contribution to Athenian military success was at the naval battle of Naxos (376). Here, he decisively defeated the Spartans, restoring the vital grain imports on which Athenian survival depended. Along with Iphicrates, Chabrias helped lead a particularly successful expedition to Corcyra (373/2) but was killed at the sea battle at Chios in 357. Although Diodorus states that Chabrias was *strategos* at Chios, there is some doubt about this. He seems to have made the decision to stay with his crippled ship rather than surrender or abandon it, and died of his wounds.

Iain Spence

See also Athens, Naval War with Sparta; Iphicrates; Light Troops; Naxos, Battle of; Peltast

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Chaeronea, Battle of (338)

The battle of Chaeronea was fought in August 338 near the Boeotian town of the same name, located in the Cephissus valley northwest of Thebes. In this battle, Philip II of Macedon finally overcame Greek resistance and ended Greek hopes of independence from Macedon. Nevertheless, little

substantial information exists about the battle itself.

The context for the battle is the Fourth Sacred War, between the Amphictyonic League and Amphissa and its allies. After successful preliminary moves, including handing Amphissa over to Delphi, in 338 Philip moved against Athens. The Athenian orator Demosthenes rallied the city and allied with Thebes, blocking Philip's further advance.

The Macedonian army consisted of 30,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry, led by Philip himself, and with his son Alexander (the Great) as a subordinate commander. The Greek forces were probably about the same number (although Justin claims they were greater). The bulk of the Greek army came from Athens (commanded by Chares and Lysicles), Thebes, and Achaia. Corinth, Chalcis, Epidaurus, Megara, and Troezen also supplied troops.

The battle was fought on the plain between the Cephissus River and a line of hills. The Greeks deployed facing north, the Athenians on the left, next to the hills, the Achaeans and others in the middle and the Thebans on the right, next to the Cephissus. The Macedonians faced south, with Philip probably commanding the right wing and Alexander the left, on the Cephissus. Although many scholars have assumed that Alexander commanded the Companion cavalry, some (e.g., Gaebel) argue that only a phalanx could have overcome the Theban Sacred Band. Although open to question, the traditional view fits with Alexander's later career and it is also perhaps more likely for Philip to place his heir with the cavalry rather than the infantry. In addition, analysis of the skeletal remains of the Sacred Band indicates wounds consistent with a downward blow from a man on a horse.

The battle demonstrates the professionalism of the Macedonian troops and commanders, the superiority of the Macedonian phalanx over hoplites, and the advantages of unitary command over a coalition. Philip feigned a withdrawal to draw the Athenians forward and when the Greek line was sufficiently dislocated, reversed the withdrawal, using the higher ground he had gained to add momentum to his phalanx. The Athenians broke, exposing the left flank of the Achaeans. On the Macedonian left, Alexander routed the Thebans and surrounded and destroyed the entire Sacred Band, thus exposing the right flank of the Greek center. Attacked from both sides, the Greek center rapidly collapsed. Although Philip did not pursue far, 1,000 Athenians were killed and 2,000 captured and the Thebans and Achaeans apparently suffered even more heavily. The lion monument still on the site

is supposed to mark where the Thebans are buried.

Although Philip imposed a relatively lenient settlement on Greece, he was now undisputed hegemon. Athens lost most of her remaining naval empire and Thebes was forced to accept a Macedonian garrison.

Iain Spence

See also Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon; Cavalry; Chares; Philip II of Macedon; Sacred Band; Sacred War, Fourth; Thebes, Thebans

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Chalcidian Confederacy

The Chalcidian Confederacy (also known as the Chalcidian League) was formed before 382, most likely in 432/1 when the inhabitants of several coastal cities moved inland to Olynthus in preparation for a revolt from Athens. As Olynthus was later the federal capital, this may have created the Confederacy. However, the only certainty is that it must have been founded before 382, when Acanthus and Apollonia appealed to Sparta to prevent forced enrolment into it.

The Confederacy seems to have been a true federal system, with citizens of the member states allowed to intermarry and own property in each other’s territory. The capital was at Olynthus, but the Confederacy had federal magistrates and an army contributed by the member states. The army probably had 1,000 cavalry, a large but unknown number of peltasts, and an unknown number of hoplites (Xenophon, *Hellenica* 5.2.14 has “at least 800” but this is very low and the text is probably corrupt). The quality

of the cavalry and peltasts was high, largely contributing to the Chalcidian success at Spartolus (429), Amphipolis (422), and the death of the Spartan Teleutias (381).

If founded in 432/1, the Confederacy's early years were spent resisting Athenian attempts to reestablish domination following the revolt of Potidaea and other cities. This revolt widened with Brasidas' successful campaign in 424–422, when many more cities joined their fellows (whether informally, or formally in a confederacy). In 392, "the Chalcidians" were allied to Amyntas III of Macedon—a feature of the Confederacy's history is swinging between alliances with Athens and Macedon. However, by 382, the Confederacy dominated large parts of Macedon, including Pella.

In 382, the growing power of the Confederacy led to appeals by Acanthus, Apollonia, and Macedon to Sparta. A large Peloponnesian League force was sent north and despite setbacks (including the deaths of Teleutias in battle and Agesipolis I of illness) Olynthus was forced to surrender and the Confederacy dissolved.

How long it remained so is uncertain—"the Chalcidians" enrolled as a group in the Second Athenian Confederacy in 378/7. The friendship with Athens did not last and the Confederacy, apparently now fully reconstituted, left when Athens made attempts to recover Amphipolis. The Confederacy allied with Macedon in 357/6 and was strengthened by Philip II giving it Potidaea and Anthemus. Around this time the Confederacy consisted of 32 cities.

Apparently at the height of its power, the Confederacy quickly collapsed when attacked by Philip II (349–348). He first secured the rest of the Confederacy by force or treachery and then attacked Olynthus itself. The city fell, betrayed by two prominent citizens, Lasthenes and Euthycrates, and by its cavalry. Philip destroyed it and permanently dissolved the Confederacy.

Although the region was prosperous from agriculture and commerce, and had good quality cavalry and light troops, the Confederacy was unable to protect itself from its large neighbor, Macedon, or the intervention of Sparta, although it had more success resisting Athens' ambitions in the region.

Iain Spence

See also Amphipolis; Amphipolis, Campaign of; Chalcidice; Olynthus;

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Chalcidice

A region in northeast Greece bordering Macedon and Thrace, the Chalcidice has three peninsulas; from west to east: Pallene, Sithonia, and Acte. Macedonian pressure and Greek colonization (from the eighth century) displaced many of the original inhabitants, the Sithonians, Edonian Thracians, but others remained and over time became culturally Greek. The first colonizer was the Euboean city of Chalcis, which gave its name to the region and founded around 30 cities there. Other notable colonizing cities were Eretria and Andros; Corinth founded only one, Potidaea (ca. 700), but it was an important city. The region was fertile, had good trade access into Thrace, and good timber and mineral resources. However, it was fairly continuously under pressure from its neighbors and larger powers.

The Chalcidice became subject to Persia in the lead up to the Persian Wars but after the Persian defeat joined the Delian League. However, later relations with Athens were fragile given Athenian ambitions in the region, first shown with the revolt of nearby Thasos (ca. 465), which forfeited its mainland possessions and was reduced to the status of a subject member of the League (ca. 463/2). The foundation of Amphipolis (437/6) was a very clear indication of Athenian intent and in 432/1, exacerbated by Athenian pressure on Potidaea over its continued links with Corinth, several cities in the region revolted from the Delian League. It is likely that these formed their own federal organization, the Chalcidian Confederacy, with Olynthus as its capital (although this may not have occurred until later). Potidaea was

captured by Athens (430) but the rebels strenuously resisted Athenian attempts to restore its position there during the Second Peloponnesian War. The rebels received a boost when other cities revolted from Athens during Brasidas' campaign (424–422). The Chalcidians made good use of their cavalry and light troops to repel Athenian attacks at Spartolus (429) and Amphipolis (422).

The history of the region from 432/1 (or at least sometime prior to 382) down to 348 is essentially that of the Chalcidian Confederacy. Successful expansion west, at the expense of Macedon, was ended and the Confederacy temporarily dissolved after a war with Sparta (382–379). Refounded, the Confederacy joined the Second Athenian Confederacy, only to leave in 357/6 after the Athenians signaled renewed ambitions in the area (including founding a cleruchy at Potidaea ca. 362/1). Alliance with Philip II of Macedon (356) brought temporary gains but in 349–348 Philip subdued the region, destroyed its capital Olynthus, and dissolved the Confederacy.

From this point, the Chalcidice was essentially part of Macedon. Some of its cities, such as Acanthus and Torone, continued as reasonably important centers. Potidaea, refounded as Cassandreia (316), soon became the most important city in the region. Other cities were founded there by the Hellenistic monarchs or their families, notably Antigonea “the Sandy” (Antigonos II Gonatas) and Stratonicea (Alexarchus). In 288, Demetrius I Poliorcetes fled Macedon ahead of Lysimachus and Pyrrhus and took refuge in Cassandreia, where his wife, Phila, committed suicide.

The Chalcidice passed under Roman control in 146. Famous Chalcidians include the philosopher Aristotle (from Stageira), the historians Aristobulus and Callisthenes (from Cassandreia and Olynthus, respectively).

Iain Spence

See also Amphipolis; Amphipolis, Campaign of; Chalcidian Confederacy; Olynthus; Peloponnesian War, Second; Potidaea/Cassandreia

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Chalcis

Along with Eretria to the south, Chalcis (modern Halkida) was one of the two major towns of Euboea. It was situated at a strategically important site where the Euripus, the strait between Euboea and the mainland, is at its narrowest: even in antiquity, there was a bridge. There was Bronze Age settlement on the site, but little is known of its history in the succeeding centuries. Chalcis and Eretria were both great colonizing states, and the Chalcidice in northern Greece takes its name from Chalcis, which founded around 30 small cities there. The Greeks believed that in the eighth or seventh century, Chalcis and Eretria fought a great war over the Lelantine plain, which lay between them.

In 506, the Chalcidians supported the Spartan king Cleomenes in his campaign against Athens. After the Spartans retired, the Athenians crossed over to Chalcis, defeated it, and settled in its territory 4,000 Athenian cleruchs (settlers who retained their Athenian citizenship). Throughout the fifth century, Athenian cleruchs on Euboea were, it has been argued, crucial producers of grain for Athens. In 480, the Chalcidians manned 20 Athenian ships against the Persians. After the Persian War, Chalcis was a member of the Delian League, paying tribute of five talents. With the other Euboeans, Chalcis revolted against Athens in 446 and 411. When Athens came under the rule of the Thirty in 404, Chalcis provided a refuge for supporters of the democracy.

In the fourth century, Chalcis was a member of the Second Athenian Confederacy, before coming under Theban influence; in 348, some Chalcidians, at least, fought against Athens at the battle of Tamynae. But in 338, Chalcis was on the Athenian and Theban side against Philip II of Macedon at Chaeronea. In the Hellenistic Period, Chalcis became a

strategically important Macedonian naval base, and was one of Philip V of Macedon's three so-called Fetters of Greece. After the Second Macedonian War, Chalcis came under Roman control, but in 146 joined the Achaean League in fighting against Rome. After the Roman victory over the Achaeans, Chalcis' fortifications were demolished.

Peter Londey

See also Achaean War; Athens, External Conflicts 519–506; Athens, Revolts of Allies (Fifth Century); Chaeronea, Battle of; Chalcidice; Colonies, Colonization; Eretria; Euboea, Euboeans; Fetters of Greece; Lelantine War; Tamynae, Battle of

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Champions, Battle of (ca. 547)

The "Battle of the Champions" was a rare attempt to resolve a dispute by combat between selected groups of soldiers instead of a battle between entire armies. Its failure helps explain why it was not apparently repeated in Greek warfare. The winner of this combat between 300 Spartans and 300 Argives was to gain the long disputed border region of Thyrae (or Cynuria). When night fell two Argives survived and one Spartan, Othyrades. The Argives went home for the night; Othyrades stayed, stripping the enemy corpses. Next morning both sides claimed victory—the Argives because they had more survivors, the Spartans because their man had remained in possession of the battlefield. The rules apparently did not cover this and the two armies then fought, with the Spartans winning. Othyrades is supposed to have killed himself out of shame at being the lone

survivor.

Iain Spence

See also Argos, Argives; Sparta

Further Reading

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Chares (Active ca. 367–325)

Chares was an Athenian who held office as general (*strategos*) at least 17 times. He served in every major field of Athenian warfare from the Peloponnese ca. 367 to fighting against Philip of Macedon in 338. In the Social War (357–355), Chares shared the command in the Athenian defeat at the battle of Embata (or Embatum) in 356. He deflected prosecution by blaming his colleagues. He then hired his army out to a rebel Persian satrap, thus provoking an ultimatum from the Great King that forced Athens to end the Social War. Before this, he won a victory in Asia Minor that he allegedly claimed was equal to the battle of Marathon.

Consistently opposed to Macedonia, Chares was among the prominent Athenian leaders whose extradition Alexander the Great demanded in 335. Chares fled to Sigeum in Asia Minor and in 333–332 commanded a Persian garrison in Mytilene. However, he astutely abandoned the Persian side and is last heard of ca. 325 among the mercenaries who gathered at Cape Taenarum in Sparta rather than serve Alexander.

Chares was blamed for alienating Athens' allies by his unscrupulous methods of raising money to pay his mercenaries. His readiness to massacre opponents, as in his intervention in Corcyra ca. 361 or on his capture of Sestos in 353/2, has also blackened his reputation, perhaps unjustly in view of the conduct of Greek warfare at the time.

Douglas Kelly

See also Corcyra, Corcyraeans; Mercenaries; Sestos; Social War (357–355)

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Charidemus (d. 333)

Charidemus, born at Oreus (Euboea) of low-class parents, was a mercenary slinger and peltast before becoming a highly competent and sought-after commander. His early career exemplifies a professional soldier's life: service under Iphicrates in Thrace (360s) and then on both sides in the wars between Athens and Amphipolis and the Chalcidian Confederacy (ca. 360). In the early 350s, he attempted to carve out his own principality in northwest Asia Minor but the Persians besieged him in Ilium. Forced to negotiate with the Athenian commander Cephisodotus, he promised to gain the Thracian Chersonese for the Athenians—but then joined the Thracian kings fighting them there, marrying the sister of one of them.

Charidemus later rejoined the Athenians and secured the cession of the Thracian Chersonese to them (357). It was most probably then that he received citizenship and other honors in Athens. In the Athenian phase of his career (now highly wealthy), he served as trierarch and was elected *strategos* (general) several times. He usually commanded forces of triremes and mercenary peltasts, serving against Philip of Macedon, especially in the Athenian effort to aid Olynthus (349–348). Details of his activities from 348–338 are lacking but after the battle of Chaeronea he was elected *strategos* in the short-lived period of Athenian determination to resist Philip to the end. On Philip's death in 335, he was linked with Demosthenes in the abortive uprising against Alexander and was therefore one of the 10 or more Athenian leaders whose extradition Alexander demanded. He was the only one of this group about whom Alexander did not relent, and went into exile. He took service under King Darius, who executed him for unwelcome but not entirely groundless criticism of the Persian forces.

Charidemus had a reputation for a wild personal life but he was a highly capable commander, who could keep the loyalty of mercenary troops and the confidence of the Athenian people.

Douglas Kelly

See also Athens, Campaigns in Thrace; Chalcidian Confederacy; Chersonese, Thracian; Command Structures, Army; Mercenaries; Trierarch

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Chariots

Chariots may have been introduced in Asia Minor ca. 1900 and from there spread to Greece. Although used in warfare in Asia Minor down to the Roman conquest, the military use of chariots in mainland Greek warfare was very limited. This was for several reasons: the rugged terrain in much of Greece is unsuitable for chariots; their high cost; and their relative ineffectiveness, especially in small numbers.

Despite the limited evidence, it appears Greeks used chariots in combat prior to the Dark Age. The standard chariot was two-wheeled and drawn by two or perhaps sometimes four horses. Its crew consisted of a driver and a warrior. The warrior used either a bow or a spear from the chariot and may well have dismounted to fight, particularly in rougher terrain. Chariots, and the horses that pulled them, were very expensive, and this essentially limited them to the palace societies of the Minoan and Mycenaean worlds. With the end of these societies, chariots basically disappeared from mainland Greek armies by ca. 1100.

In the Archaic and Classical Periods, Greek chariots remained the preserve of the wealthy and were used for ostentatious local travel and in sporting events. Two- and four-horse chariot races were popular events at several Greek games and entering chariots in these races was seen as a mark of major wealth. Hellenistic monarchies in Asia Minor, where the terrain was often better for chariots and they could be used in larger numbers, often adopted chariots in accordance with local practice. However, even there they seldom, if ever, played a decisive role in battle.

However, from the Classical Period on, Greek armies did sometimes fight against peoples such as the Carthaginians, Persians, and Indians who

used chariots. These almost always proved ineffective against heavy Greek or Macedonian infantry. One of the few successes was in 395 when Pharnabazus surprised 700 of Agesilaus' men out foraging. Although they hastily formed a phalanx, Pharnabazus used two scythed chariots to disrupt the formation and then finished them off with cavalry. However, this was not a typical battlefield situation. Greeks fairly easily dealt with the Persian chariots at Cunaxa in 401, and the Carthaginian chariots at the Crimissus River (ca. 341)—although they were aided by a storm at Crimissus. Alexander the Great had little trouble with the Persian chariots at Gaugamela (331) or the Indian chariots at the Hydaspes River (326).

Iain Spence

See also Agesilaus II; Carthaginian Wars (345–275); Cavalry; Gaugamela, Battle of; Homeric Warfare; Hydaspes, Battle of; Mycenae; Persian Wars; Pharnabazus; Timoleon

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Cheirisophus (ca. 440–400)

Cheirisophus was a Spartiate officer sent to serve with the Ten Thousand. After the treacherous seizure of the mercenaries' officers, Cheirisophus was elected as the new commander. He usually commanded the vanguard while the Athenian Xenophon commanded the rear. When the army reached Trapezus on the Black Sea Cheirisophus made a vain attempt to collect ships from the Spartan governor at Byzantium. He returned to meet the army at Calpe, where he died of natural causes.

Xenophon gives the impression that Cheirisophus was chosen for the

supreme command because he was a Spartiate, and that as a commander was no match for Xenophon.

Douglas Kelly

See also Clearchus; Cyrus the Younger; Ten Thousand, March of; Xenophon

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Chersonese, Thracian

The Thracian Chersonese was the ancient name for the Gallipoli Peninsula (*chersonesos* means “peninsula” in Greek). About 50 miles (80 kilometers) long, the Chersonese runs southwest, parallel to the Asian mainland, and forms the northern shore of the Hellespont. Although the peninsula is only about 4 miles (6.5 kilometers) wide at its narrowest point near the neck, it has a total area of over 350 square miles (90,650 hectares), much of it highly fertile by Greek standards.

Because of the peninsula's status as a military zone in modern times, relatively little archaeological work has been done, but it seems probable that the inhabitants before the Greeks arrived were Thracians. Indeed, in the *Iliad* among those fighting for Troy Homer refers to Thracians living beside the Hellespont, though he also refers to Sestos, a Greek city founded by colonists from Lesbos, presumably in the seventh century. Lesbians also founded Madytos (modern Eceabat) and Alopecannesus (near Suvla Bay). Cardia, on the north coast near the neck of the peninsula, was founded by Miletus and Clazomenae. The small city of Elaious, near the tip of the peninsula (more or less at the site of the Turkish memorial to the Gallipoli campaign), boasted a sanctuary that was believed to be the Tomb of Protesilaus, the first Greek to die in the Trojan War. Thucydides believed that the Greeks had farmed the Chersonese to support themselves during the 10 years of the Trojan War.

Athenian interest in the area developed in the sixth century, probably driven both by its strategic location and by the grain-growing potential of the peninsula itself. Athenians took over the existing settlement at Elaious,

and in the late sixth century the Athenian aristocrat, Miltiades I, son of Cypselus, was invited to set up a personal fiefdom on the Chersonese in order to protect the inhabitants from marauding Thracians. In Herodotus' account, Miltiades was invited by a group of Thracians, the Dolonci, who lived inside the peninsula but were being pressured from outside by the Apsinthian Thracians. To help achieve this object, Miltiades built a wall across the narrow neck of the peninsula. The presence of the Dolonci is not surprising; Greek colonists often settled coastal areas, leaving the hinterland under indigenous control.

By the late sixth century the area was under Persian control, but the Athenians rekindled their interest in it in the fifth century. Sestos, captured by Xanthippus in 479/8, became the critical Athenian naval base in the Hellespont. In 447, Xanthippus' son Pericles fought a campaign to protect the Chersonese from renewed Thracian attack: he rebuilt Miltiades' wall and may well have settled Athenian cleruchs on land seized from Thracian inhabitants. The Greek cities of the peninsula—11 or 12, according to Xenophon, *Hellenica* 3.3.8–10—were all members of the Delian League, but after Pericles' campaign seem to have had their tribute greatly reduced, perhaps so that they could contribute directly to the defense of the Hellespont area. At the end of the century Alcibiades, in his second exile, retired to a fortress on the Chersonese; its location is unknown, but it may have been close to Aegospotami, a small town on the Hellespont coast where Lysander destroyed the Athenian fleet in the final battle of the Second Peloponnesian War (405).

In 398, a Spartan commander in the area, Dercylidas, once again built or repaired a wall across the peninsula. But for much of the fourth century the Chersonese was once again under Thracian control, as part of the expanding Odrysian kingdom, until Philip II of Macedon captured the area in 338. In 309, Lysimachus (one of the *diadochoi*, or Successors to Alexander) built his capital, Lysimacheia, at modern Bulair on the ridge on the neck of the peninsula, moving the population of nearby Cardia into his new city. In 277, Antigonos II Gonatas won a significant victory over the Gauls at Lysimacheia. During the Hellenistic Period ownership of the Chersonese swapped between Macedon, Syria, Egypt, and Pergamum. The last king of Pergamum, Attalus III, willed it to Rome as part of his possessions in 133.

At some time in antiquity Sestos' fine harbor silted up, so that by late antiquity and the Byzantine period the chief town on the peninsula was

Kallipolis (modern Gelibolu).

Peter Londey

See also Athens, Campaigns in Thrace; Colonies, Colonization; Dercylidas; Hellespont; Lysimacheia; Lysimacheia, Battle of; Lysimachus; Miltiades I; Miltiades II; Pericles; Thrace, Thracians; Troad; Xanthippus (Athens)

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“Chigi Vase”

The “Chigi vase” is a Protocorinthian *olpe*, ca. 640 (Villa Giulia Museum, no. 22679) and although not the earliest representation of a phalanx is the clearest and most detailed. It shows two phalanxes, each with two ranks of soldiers facing each other, apparently at close quarters, and therefore seen as proof that the hoplite phalanx existed by that date. However, the spears in the arming scene at the left of the main scene have throwing-loops and it has been argued that the men in the “phalanx” are equipped with a pair of throwing spears and therefore not hoplites. It is not until later in the seventh century that single (thrusting) spears become iconographically more common than paired (throwing) spears. The two sides can also be interpreted as distant from each other, and depicted face to face on the vase because of the artistic convention of avoiding an unsightly gap in the middle of the scene. Similarly, the second rank in each phalanx is almost certainly meant to be seen as some way behind the first, as they are running to catch up and still have their spears at rest.



The "Chigi Vase," mid-seventh-century Protocorinthian *olpe*. Located in the National Etruscan Museum, Villa Giulia, Rome, Italy. (DEA/G. Nimatallah/De Agostini/Getty Images)

Diana Burton

See also Art (Ancient), Greek Warfare in; Hoplites; Phalanx

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Chios, Chians

Chios was a large, 825 square kilometer (320 square mile) island in the eastern Aegean, only 8 kilometers (5 miles) offshore from the Çoşme region of Turkey. This closeness ensured that in antiquity Chios had close ties with Anatolia. The main city of the island, the urban center of the *polis* Chios, lay midway along the eastern coast of the island. Greeks believed that it had been founded by Ionian Greeks around 1,000. Chios also controlled several

surrounding islands and held a small *peraia* (mainland territory) opposite Lesbos, called Atarneus.

As well as the primary settlement and its hinterland, the rest of the island was extensively populated, particularly in the south. Chios was wealthy, with strong maritime trade and an agricultural economy notable for the mastic tree. It had a rich literary history, as the home of the poet Ion, the historian Theopompus, and was allegedly the birthplace of Homer.

With its favorable location, Chios became an early naval power and member of the Ionian League. Chios was a close ally of Miletus, cooperating against Samos, Erythrae, and Lydia. Through a combination of strength, isolation, and a policy of pragmatic capitulation, Chios remained relatively unaffected by the foreign occupations that dominated early Ionian history. This lasted until the early fifth century when Chios joined the Ionian Revolt against Persia, contributing 100 ships and 4,000 marines to the fleet at the battle of Lade. The Chians distinguished themselves, fighting to the end. The survivors abandoned their ships, fleeing on foot past Ephesus where, mistaken for nocturnal raiders, they were slaughtered. Chios was promptly captured by Histiaeus of Miletus, and by the Persians the following year. Herodotus claims that the Persians scoured the island by linking arms to make a chain from coast-to-coast; whether or not we believe the story, it implies that Chios was thoroughly subjugated.

Chios joined the Delian League after the battle of Mycale (479), retaining its navy and independence, and making contributions not of money, but ships. Chios supported Athens in the Second Peloponnesian War, including during the Sicilian Expedition, and was regarded as a prominent ally. Chios became suspect however, and in about 425 had its walls demolished by Athens. Openly revolting in 412, Chios allied with Sparta and prompted revolts throughout Ionia. Chios suffered several defeats, endured a siege, and had its countryside ravaged for the first time since the Persian Wars; yet the revolt was seriously detrimental to Athens, indicating Chios' strength at this time. Chians fought on the Spartan side at the decisive battle of Aegospotami in 405.

Chios remained allied with Sparta until 394 when it ejected its garrison and subsequently fought successively under the Athenian generals Conon and Thrasybulus. Ten years later, the Chians entered into a "perpetual alliance" with Athens that lasted until 357, when they revolted yet again. In the Hellenistic Period, Chios came under Persian and then Macedonian

control; by 191, it was allied with Rome, Pergamum, and Rhodes. A century later, in 86, Mithridates exiled the entire population as punishment for their friendliness toward Rome.

Lachlan McColl

See also Aegospotami, Battle of; Athens, Revolts of Allies (Fifth Century); Delian League/Athenian Empire; Ionia, Ionians; Ionian Revolt; Lade, Battle of; Mithridates VI Eupator; Peloponnesian War, Second; Social War (357–355)

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Chremonidean War (267/6–263/2)

The Chremonidean War was a last-ditch effort to secure Greek political freedom (*eleutheria*), unifying Sparta and Athens at the head of a coalition of other Greek cities against the imperial ambitions of the Macedonian Antigonos II Gonatas. It was named after the Athenian statesman and general, Chremonides, who secured the Athenian assembly’s support for an alliance with Areus, king of Sparta. Overall, little is known about the course and causes of the Chremonidean War, although its importance as the final attempt by Greece to assert its independence from foreign control was noted at the time.

The dates of the war are not clear, although Chremonides’ surviving decree was passed during the archonship of Peithidemus (267/6) and the war seems to have lasted three years, or possibly a little longer. Joining the

alliance were Sparta's usual Peloponnesian allies as well as forces from Crete. The decree hints at certain injustices, unkept promises and broken treaties by an unnamed antagonist. It seems as though Antigonos was to blame; after the death of Pyrrhus he had set about reasserting Macedonian dominance in the political and military landscape of Greece. His efforts within the Peloponnese were especially affronting to the Spartans, with Areus attempting to establish himself as a preeminent Hellenistic monarch. At the same time, the Macedonians had fortified the Piraeus and extended their reach throughout Euboea and Boeotia, galling to the Athenians.

Tacitly supported by Ptolemy II Philadelphus (and possibly also by Alexander II of Epirus, who had invaded Macedon at around this time), the grand alliance was nonetheless stifled from the outset of hostilities. Antigonos and the Macedonians had fortified strategic sites and ports throughout Greece, including places in Euboea, as well as the Piraeus and the Acrocorinth (see illustration in Corinth, Corinthians entry). Areus was never able to unite with the allies outside the Peloponnesus and was killed outside Corinth. Ptolemy's assistance was late and muted, and he may have lost effective control over the Aegean after the naval battle of Cos. Meanwhile Alexander's invasion amounted to little more than a distraction.

Despite Areus' death, Sparta continued to resist the Macedonians throughout much of the third century. But Athens surrendered in 263/2 and was forced to accept armed Macedonian garrisons throughout Attica and within Athens itself, with Chremonides himself fleeing to the court of Ptolemy. Athenian leaders and generals who remained in the city were executed, and defeat in this war effectively ended Athens' prominence amongst the Greek cities.

Russell Buzby

See also Antigonos II Gonatas; Chremonides; Cos, Battle of; Freedom; Ptolemy II Philadelphus

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IG II² 686–687; Plutarch, *Agis* 3; Pausanias 1.7, 13, 3.6.

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Chremonides (Active 270–240)

Chremonides was an Athenian statesman and later a general and admiral for Ptolemy II Philadelphus. He was renowned for sparking the eponymous Chremonidean War, by supporting the passage of an alliance in 267/6 between Athens and her allies, including Areus, king of Sparta, and the Macedonians under Antigonus II Gonatas. The war ended in Athenian surrender in 263/2, with Chremonides fleeing to the court of Ptolemy II, where he was an admiral of the Ptolemaic fleet. He was defeated in 253 by Agathostratus of Rhodes, but continued to hold this post during the 240s.

Russell Buzby

See also Antigonus II Gonatas; Chremonidean War; Ptolemy II Philadelphus

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Cimon (ca. 510–449)

Cimon, son of Miltiades and Hegesipyle (a Thracian princess) was a prominent conservative Athenian political and military leader in the post-Persian War period, instrumental in establishing the Delian League. Known for his Spartan demeanor, a reputed lack of intelligence, and a hard-drinking youth, his career was nevertheless long and largely successful. Although he suffered political eclipse and exile toward the end of his career, he died on campaign and after a major victory over the Persians.

After the Persian Wars, Cimon played a major role in extending Athenian power and influence in the Aegean. From 479/8 he was frequently elected *strategos* (a mark of both military competence and political power) and from 476 to 473 was continuously engaged in operations against the Persians (and pirates). Around 467/6, his destruction of Persian Aegean-based naval power in the stunning victory at the Eurymedon gave Athens

naval supremacy in the region for over 50 years. He followed this up by ending the Persian presence in the Chersonese and (465–463) besieged the rebellious city of Thasos, forcing it back into the Delian League.

However, these major military successes required long periods away from Athens, during which Ephialtes, supported by a young Pericles, moved against him. A focus of attack was Cimon's "yokefellow policy," which envisaged Sparta, the dominant land power, and Athens, the dominant sea power jointly defending Greece. Over the years this policy, and Cimon himself, became outdated in an increasingly powerful and democratic Athens. The first move, though, was not against Cimon, but the Areopagus—seen by its opponents as exercising a conservative and repressive influence. During the 460s, Ephialtes launched a series of attacks on the integrity of individual members of the Areopagus. However, Cimon's military successes and use of his personal wealth to provide largesse to his fellow citizens maintained his popularity and when he was tried on his return from Thasos he was acquitted.

In 462, he successfully argued for Athenian help for Sparta to suppress a Helot uprising after a devastating earthquake. Cimon led a force of around 4,000 hoplites to help take the rebel stronghold on Mount Ithôme. However, the absence of so many of the hoplite class, his main supporters, allowed Ephialtes and Pericles to transfer most of the powers of the Areopagus to the courts and the *Boule* (Council of 500). Cimon's political fate was sealed when the Spartans, disturbed by the democratic views of the Athenians, sent them away from the siege early, alienating many of those who would normally have supported Cimon. On his return, he failed to get the recent reforms reversed and in 461 was exiled following an ostracism.

In 457, he was denied permission to fight with his fellow citizens at Tanagra but was recalled from exile early a few years later to negotiate the Five Years' Peace with Sparta. In 450/49, he commanded a 200-strong fleet against the Persians on Cyprus, winning a major victory, but shortly afterward died while besieging Citium.

Iain Spence

See also Athens, Expedition to Cyprus; Eurymedon, Battle of; Peloponnesian War, First; Pericles

Further Reading

Thucydides 1.98–102, 112; Aristophanes, *Lysistrata* 1137–1146; *Ath. Pol.* 26–27; Diodorus 10.30–32, 11.60–62, 82, 86, 92, 12.3–4; Plutarch, *Cimon*, *Pericles* 5, 7, 9–11; Pausanias 1.25, 28, 29.

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Civilian Populations in War

In Euripides' play, *Trojan Women*, produced a few months after the Athenian destruction of Melos in 416, the god Poseidon comments that retribution will come to the man who sacks cities, sanctuaries, and the tombs of the dead (95–97, QQ 43). The play is set in the mythical past, immediately after the sack of Troy, and deals sympathetically with the plight of the Trojan widows who are about to be taken off to Greece as slaves. Many have taken this play to be critical of the Athenian treatment of the Melian population, whose adult males were executed and women and children enslaved. Yet the Greeks had no formal strictures about the treatment of civilians: insofar as there were limits on war, they mainly had to do with assaults on sanctuaries and, by extension, the gods. Civilians were a fair target.

Indeed, in the Archaic and Classical Periods, when most cities depended on citizen soldiers, the distinction between soldier and civilian was blurred. An invading army might with impunity kill farmers out in their fields or, as the Thebans had intended to do at Plataea in 431, capture those outside the city and use them as hostages. When Herodotus describes the Persians raping and killing anybody they could catch on their march through Phocis in 480, we are meant to understand this as a sign of Persian barbarity. And yet Greeks regularly did these things to each other too. When cities were sacked, rape and pillage were the norm; the conquerors had an absolute right to do as they would with prisoners. As Aristotle put it, “those vanquished in war are held to belong to the victor” (*Politics* 1255a).

Enslavement of individual civilians or of whole populations was common. This meant that all people in Greece had to live with the prospect that, if things went badly enough wrong, their lives might be utterly wrecked. Thucydides comments, when the Athenians invaded Chios after it

revolted in 412, on the highly unusual fact that its land had not been ravaged by an enemy since the Persian War, nearly 70 years before. Very few places went so long without enemies in their territory. When free families were enslaved, slave traders would have felt no compunction to keep them together: husbands and wives, children and parents would have been separated, most often permanently.

The fates that could await the inhabitants of defeated cities are well illustrated by those of three small towns in the Chalcidice, which became caught up in the struggle between the Athenians and the enterprising Spartan, Brasidas, in 424–422. Brasidas captured Torone in winter 424/3, while Scione and Mende revolted from Athens and went over to Brasidas in 423. Their revolt probably occurred after a one-year truce, committing the two sides not to extend their possessions, was agreed by Athens and Sparta but before the news of it had reached the Chalcidice. The Athenians were particularly angry with the two cities that had revolted after the truce was agreed. They besieged both, and when the gates of Mende were opened due to internal dissension in the town (a common story), the Athenians sacked it “as if it had been taken by storm”—the generals had difficulty in restraining the soldiers from massacring the population. Scione suffered a worse fate. The Peace of Nicias in 421 gave the Athenians *carte blanche* to deal with it as they wanted. Shortly afterward they succeeded in capturing the town and, in accordance with a decree moved by the now dead Cleon, they enslaved the women and children and executed the adult males—the same punishment inflicted on Melos in 416. (The term for this was *andrapodismos*, though that could also refer to the enslavement of the whole population.) Torone, which had been captured by rather than gone over to Brasidas, was treated slightly more leniently, but even here there were enormous human tragedies. Cleon captured the city in 422 and enslaved the women and children; but instead of massacring the men he sent them to Athens as prisoners. After the Peace of Nicias, they were freed through a prisoner-exchange with Olynthus, and presumably returned home. But tracking down their wives and children, who could have been sold anywhere in the Aegean, must have been next to impossible: families were permanently split apart.

Sieges were immensely trying experiences for those trapped in the city being besieged. In the Classical Period, the standard tactics to take cities were to either starve them out or to find some group inside the walls willing

to turn traitor. Starvation could be exactly that: when the Athenians besieged Sestos in 479/8, the inhabitants were reduced to boiling the leather straps from their beds and eating them. When Athens was besieged by Lysander in 405, the citizens had the additional fear that once the city fell their enemies would take the opportunity to treat the Athenians as they had treated towns like Melos and Scione. But in addition to the psychological blows of turning from being members of a state that had arrogantly disposed its power across the whole Greek world to a likelihood of future enslavement and execution, they were also starving. By the end of the siege, according to Xenophon, many were dying of starvation every day.

War, especially prolonged wars, brought other risks too. One was disease, particularly during sieges. The most famous example of this is the plague at Athens in 430–429, during the Second Peloponnesian War. First appearing in the Piraeus (Thucydides 2.48, suggests it originated in Ethiopia and spread via Egypt), it rapidly spread to the city and caused considerable casualties because of the crowded conditions caused by the war. Thucydides notes a breakdown in morality and order because of the plague—a precursor to what he sees as a general decline in behavior and social order under the prolonged stress of the war. He famously saw this general decline as occurring first in Corcyra, but then becoming widespread (Document 9).

Agricultural ravaging was an endemic part of Greek warfare: invaders would burn or slash crops, cut vines, attempt to saw limbs off olive trees, and loot anything they could that inhabitants had left behind, including the timber off houses. The degree of economic loss has proved impossible to quantify, and even in qualitative terms is much disputed. But what is certain is the heartache, anger, and frustration that hardworking farmers must have felt coming back to their vandalized farms, quite apart from their anxiety over possible future hunger. When Archidamus first invaded Attica in 431, at the start of the Second Peloponnesian War, he deliberately targeted the deme of Acharnae, because he knew that it had a large and stubborn population, and it was visible from Athens: the Acharnian farmers would be able to see the smoke rising from their farms and, he hoped, would force their fellow Athenians out to fight. Agricultural ravaging was used because it was an exceptionally good technique for inflicting suffering, both material and psychological.

Even if the enemy was not actually damaging their land, farmers must have found sieges very frustrating. They were forced to crowd into fortified

areas or depart to mountains or islands. The mixed cropping nature of Greek farming meant that there was agricultural work to be done at almost all times of the year. In larger cities, these periods of refuge meant also the loss of normal social bonds. Dicaeopolis, the hero of Aristophanes' *Acharnians*, laments the commercial ways of the city that contrast with the reciprocity and barter he is used to in his deme. The *Acharnians* also suggests the depths of poverty that repeated ravaging could inflict on a less wealthy state than Athens, with a Megarian who is desperate enough to sell his young daughters for sex in return for small amounts of food and salt.

Even an army that was passing through without specific hostile intent was a danger. Greek armies depended on foraging for or buying their food on campaign and could easily demand enough food from a small town to seriously deplete the town's reserves for the months ahead. As an alternative to simply having food reserves stolen or requisitioned, townspeople might often agree to set up a market for the visitors, so that they would at least be paid for what they gave up.

Another area that is impossible to quantify is the degree to which families suffered from the loss of labor when soldiers went off to war. In early times, campaigns were generally short and may have avoided the peak periods on the farm such as harvest. The soldiers were farmers too, in a hurry to be back to work their own farms. Later, long overseas campaigns will have taken men away from their families for months or years at a time. The problem is that we do not know enough about the rural economy to estimate how big a problem this was. Other family members, including women, will no doubt have had to contribute more labor, but the main variable we lack is how many slaves a typical farmer had. A hoplite might well take a slave to war with him as an attendant, but perhaps only if he had other slaves left to do most of the work on the farm. How well poorer farmers coped, we cannot know.

A law-court speech by Lysias gives us a rare glimpse of the social dislocations caused by war. An Athenian hoplite, Diodotus, was killed fighting with Thrasyllus at Ephesus in 409. He had left his brother, Diogeiton, as guardian of his children and wife (who happened also to be Diogeiton's daughter), and of his property, in case anything happened to him. Very often such arrangements must have worked satisfactorily, but in this case Diogeiton squandered the money, gave the wife away with a dowry less than Diodotus had left for her, and left her children with no

inheritance. The case ended up in court. A generation-long war like the Second Peloponnesian War must have generated hundreds, if not thousands of similar cases of social and economic dislocation.

On the other side, war provided opportunities. The family of Lysias, the speech-writer for the case against Diogeiton, had grown wealthy as owners of a large workshop making shields: no doubt they did quite well out of the war. For a large class of poorer men, the prospects of rowing in the fleet offered appealingly steady income through the summer months, while also allowing them to be full participants in the grand myth of the Athenian Empire. The fleet was not entirely crewed by Athenian citizens or residents. Many islanders will also have seen rowing in the fleet as useful income, as well as a way to earn back some of the tribute their states paid to Athens. Or a man could send his slave to row, as a source of income for himself, and perhaps even row alongside him.

Similar considerations apply to mercenary soldiers, who became more and more common in the fourth century and afterward. Poorer areas, such as Arcadia, were especially famous as sources of mercenaries, for whom the prospects of regular pay, adventure, and possible enrichment if they sacked a town may have seemed a reasonable alternative to a hardy life on the Arcadian plateau.

In Athens, as a radical democracy, we can clearly see how the greater part of the population felt about war. Expeditions had to be approved by the assembly, in which every citizen could vote so long as they turned up. The size of Attica will have skewed the assembly toward those who lived close to Athens and the Piraeus. That will have included a lot of landless sailors, while farmers from the more distant parts of Attica may have felt attending the assembly was too troublesome, and would take them away from their deme and farm. This may be part of the reason for the oligarchic movements of the later fifth century, as (admittedly snobbish) members of the upper classes, including Thucydides and Aristophanes but also including the oligarchic leaders of 411 and 404, considered the assembly to be overly bellicose, bringing disasters, such as the Sicilian expedition, upon the city. The flipside is that to many in the assembly, the risks of war seemed worth taking given the potential economic benefits, and the enhanced prestige of the city in which they too were shareholders. What their wives thought, we cannot know (though Aristophanes' *Lysistrata* might suggest that they did not always agree with their husbands' priorities).

See also Amphipolis, Campaign of; *Andrapodismos*; Athens, Oligarchic Movements; Camp Followers; Cleon; Corcyra, *Stasis* at; Democracy and War; Ephesus, Battle of; Families of Soldiers; Laws of War; Melos; Mercenaries; Peloponnesian War, Second; Plunder and Booty; Prisoners of War and Slavery; Ravaging; Siege Warfare; Social and Economic Effects of War; *Stasis*

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Clearchus (ca. 450–401)

Clearchus, son of Ramphias, was a Spartan officer most famous as a commander of the Ten Thousand in Cyrus the Younger’s attempt on the Persian throne. He first appears in charge of Chalcedon and Byzantium in 409 during the Second Peloponnesian War (431–404). A harsh disciplinarian, his unequal allocation of food rations in Byzantium led to its defection to Athens (408). He was exiled from Sparta in 403 when he disobeyed orders to return home. Clearchus played a major role in recruiting the Ten Thousand for service under Cyrus the Younger against his brother, Artaxerxes II. After Cyrus was killed at Cunaxa, Tissaphernes treacherously seized Clearchus at a meeting and executed him. Xenophon, who served with him, portrays Clearchus as a highly professional officer, prone to outbursts of rage. This combined with his harsh discipline made him respected but unloved by his men—and, it has been suggested, possibly a PTSD sufferer.

Iain Spence

See also Cunaxa, Battle of; Cyrus the Younger; Peloponnesian War, Second; PTSD; Ten Thousand, March of; Tissaphernes

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Cleisthenes (ca. 570–after ca. 506)

Cleisthenes was an Athenian statesman and reformer. Son of Megacles and Agariste, daughter of Cleisthenes of Sicyon, Cleisthenes was a prominent member of the aristocratic Alcmaeonid family and took a full part in the aristocratic faction fighting at the end of the sixth century.

Archon in 525/4, after some 20 years in exile, Cleisthenes was again exiled (ca. 514) but, it was claimed, bribed the Delphic Oracle to pressure the Spartans to depose the tyrant Hippias. Although this succeeded (511/10) and the Alcmaeonidae returned to Athens, Cleisthenes’ rival Isagoras gathered enough aristocratic support to be elected archon for 508/7. Outmaneuvered, Cleisthenes turned to the people, gaining enough popular support to pass major reforms and then eject Cleomenes I of Sparta when he returned to support Isagoras.

Cleisthenes is widely regarded as creating the Athenian democracy by building on Solon’s earlier reforms. He created the *Boule* (Council of 500), replaced the 4 tribes with 10 new ones, and created a highly artificial internal tribal structure of *trittyes* (thirds), with each *trittys* comprising a varying number of demes. Deme membership became the basis of citizenship. There was probably a military element to his reforms—the *trittyes* seem to have been arranged to assist mobilization of the tribal military contingents along major routes and the creation of 10 elected generals (*strategoi*) may also (but not certainly) have been part of them.

However, the main purpose seems to have been to break up aristocratic power blocs, while perhaps preserving his own. If Cleisthenes did try to preserve his own family influence, though, it was with limited success—he disappeared from history shortly after his reforms, and his family did not unduly dominate Athenian politics in the early fifth century.

Although in many respects a typical Athenian aristocratic leader of the time, Cleisthenes' appeal to the people is unusual—aristocrats were generally a little wary of this as it could weaken the whole class. His reforms helped further loosen aristocratic control and did establish a true democratic system.

Iain Spence

See also Alcmaeonidae; Cleisthenes of Sicyon; Cleomenes I; Peisistratidae; Solon; *Stasis*

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Cleisthenes of Sicyon (Ruled ca. 600–560)

Cleisthenes (not to be confused with his grandson of the same name, the famous Athenian statesman) was tyrant of Sicyon from ca. 600 to 560, coming to power in a dynastic struggle within the non-Dorian Orthagorid dynasty. Cleisthenes was seen in antiquity as a mild, fairly constitutional, tyrant responsible for Sicyon's considerable sixth century power, prosperity, and prestige. Although details are sketchy, Cleisthenes' reign involved a war (of unknown outcome) with Argos and, according to much later sources, successful support for Delphi in the First Sacred War. Internally, it seems to have been characterized by racial tension.

Cleisthenes' hatred of Argos supposedly led him to ban public poetry

recitals, because Homer honored the Argives, and to his setting up Melanippus as a rival to the traditionally honored Argive hero Adrastus. His internal reforms allegedly included renaming the four tribes at Sicyon: his own, non-Dorian tribe as Archelaioi (Rulers) and the Dorian tribes as Hyatae (Swine-men), Choireatae (Pig-men), and Oneatae (Ass-men). If true (and more recent scholarship argues otherwise), this reflects tension between the original non-Dorian locals and later Dorian conquerors—similar to that perhaps contributing to unrest prior to the Cypselid tyranny in Corinth. Cleisthenes’ reign is an example of the “good tyrant” of Greek political writing and the use of religion and ethnicity in political propaganda and action.

Iain Spence

See also Cypselus; Herodotus; Sacred War, First; Sicyon; Tyrants, Tyranny

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Cleitarchus (Fourth Century)

A historian of Alexander the Great, who wrote (probably in Alexandria) one of the earliest accounts of his campaigns in the late fourth century. His history, while not a first-hand account, was probably based on first-hand information and likely written during the reign of Ptolemy I Soter. His writing has not survived, but was widely read and greatly influenced the “Vulgate” tradition of Alexander historians, notably Diodorus and Curtius Rufus. Despite the fragmentary and shadowy nature of his work, Cleitarchus was nonetheless important to the ancient historians of Alexander, especially during the late Roman Republic and early Empire.

Russell Buzby

See also Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon; Curtius Rufus; Diodorus;

Ptolemy I Soter

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Cleitus (the Admiral) (d. 318)

Cleitus, nicknamed “the White” was a Macedonian noble, a land commander in Alexander the Great’s Indian campaign, and an admiral in the wars of his Successors (*diadochoi*). As admiral, under Antipater in the Lamian War, Cleitus defeated the Athenian fleet in a series of battles. In 318, commanding Polyperchon’s fleet against Cassander, he won a major naval victory in the Propontis but lost his entire fleet the next morning to a dawn attack on his camp by Antigonus I Monophthalmus. Cleitus got away but was captured by Lysimachus’ men in Thrace and executed.

Iain Spence

See also Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon, Indian Campaign; Cassander; Hydaspes, Battle of; Polyperchon; Successors (*Diadochoi*), Wars of

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Cleitus the Black (d. 328)

A prominent Macedonian and the commander of Alexander the Great’s Royal Squadron. Cleitus’ family had a long established connection with the royal family, as he had served under Philip II, and was the brother of Lanice, who had been Alexander’s nursemaid.

During his career, Cleitus distinguished himself by saving Alexander’s

life during the battle at the Granicus (334). Later he went on to share command of the Companions with Hephaestion, and so occupied a prominent position in the army. Cleitus appears to have felt the same anger and frustration of the more traditional Macedonian members of the army, who disapproved of Alexander's flatterers and his changing political policies. This was to be his downfall; when Cleitus drunkenly spoke some ill-chosen words to this effect at a party, Alexander ran him through with a spear.

Charlotte M. R. Dunn

See also Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon; Philip II of Macedon

Further Reading

Diodorus 12, 17; Plutarch, *Alexander*; Arrian *passim*.

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Cleombrotus I (Reigned 380–371)

Cleombrotus I, from the Agiad royal house at Sparta, succeeded his brother Agesipolis as king in 380. His military career before 371 was inauspicious. He arrived too late to relieve the Spartan garrison besieged on the Cadmea in Thebes after the uprising of 379/8. In 376, when Agesilaus was ill, he commanded an invasion of Boeotia, but failed to secure the route across Mount Cithaeron, as Agesilaus had done in the previous two years.

In the summer of 371, Cleombrotus commanded an army in Phocis and was ordered to attack Thebes, which had refused to accept the Common Peace treaty agreed to in Sparta by every other *polis*. He enterprisingly brought his army into Boeotia by an unexpected route across the mountains to Thisbe in southern Boeotia. He had thus turned the Theban defensive position at Chaeronea. He advanced to Leuctra, some 11 miles (18 kilometers) southwest of Thebes, where he was met by the Thebans. Cleombrotus drew up his phalanx in a conventional manner and did nothing to counter the Theban superiority in cavalry or the tactical innovations to be expected from the Theban generals. He was killed in what was a catastrophic defeat for Sparta. He fell in the thick of the fighting, in keeping with the traditional Spartan code of honor.

See also Agesilaus II; Agesipolis; Boeotia, Boeotians; Common Peace; Leuctra, Battle of

Further Reading

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Cleomenes I (Reigned ca. 520–ca. 490)

Cleomenes I, from the Agiad royal house, was king of Sparta ca. 520–490. Herodotus (ca. 485–425) records a number of colorful stories of his activities. Plainly he was a striking individual who left behind vivid memories. Cleomenes was the son of his father's second (bigamous) marriage. His accession to the throne drove his half-brother Dorieus into adventures abroad.

In foreign policy, Cleomenes is first heard of commanding an army in Boeotia in 519, when he urged Plataea to turn to Athens for an alliance. His motive was allegedly to stir up hostility between Athens and Boeotia (Herodotus 6.108; Thucydides 3.68). He led the force that expelled the Peisistratidae, from Athens in 511/10, and another force that tried to expel the democratic reformer Cleisthenes and his supporters in 508/7. On this occasion, he was blockaded on the Acropolis by an Athenian uprising and forced to withdraw. A year or more later, when Sparta sent an allied army to restore the oligarch Isagoras in Athens, Cleomenes was frustrated by opposition from his fellow-king Demaratus and from the Corinthians, which caused the expedition to lapse.

Demaratus frustrated Cleomenes again by refusing to cooperate when he tried to intimidate Aegina into reversing its formal submission to Persia. In retaliation, Cleomenes conspired with Leotychidas, a relative of Demaratus hostile to him, to have his fellow-king deposed on the ground that he was of illegitimate birth. He allegedly resorted to bribing the Pythian priestess at Delphi to get the necessary oracle. Leotychidas combined with Cleomenes to force Aegina to hand over hostages.

Cleomenes' actions here have been regarded as showing he had a long-sighted policy of building up Greek resistance to Persia but the case is not clear.

Cleomenes led an invasion of Argos that resulted in a great victory at the battle of Sepeia (ca. 494). He did not take the city of Argos and on returning to Sparta was put on trial on the charge of having been bribed not to take Argos. He offered the defense that his burning of a sacred grove called Argos, where Argives had taken refuge after the battle, fulfilled an oracle about taking Argos. He was acquitted but soon afterward his bribery of the Pythian Priestess became known. He fled to Arcadia and organized a conspiracy of Arcadians to establish some kind of personal supremacy for himself. In alarm, the Spartans recalled him but he died soon afterward in bizarre circumstances: confined in stocks because of assaults on people, he ended his life, so the story goes, by self-mutilation. This story is consistent with the belief that Cleomenes had always been mentally ill (Herodotus 6.75), but its truth, like much about else about Cleomenes' personality, cannot be established on present evidence.

Douglas Kelly

See also Argos, Argives; Athens, External Conflicts (519–506); Cleisthenes; Demaratus; Dorieus; Herodotus; Peisistratidae; Sepeia, Battle of

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Cleomenes III (Reigned ca. 235–222)

Cleomenes III of the Agiad royal house became king of Sparta ca. 235, succeeding his father Leonidas, who had led the opposition that crushed the radical young king Agis IV (reigned ca. 243–241). During his reign, Cleomenes carried out a social revolution at Sparta and came close to making Sparta militarily dominant in the Peloponnese.

When the Achaean League began a war of aggression against Sparta and its new young king, Cleomenes established himself as an inspiring leader of

Sparta's army. He campaigned in Arcadia, bringing Tegea, Mantinea, and Orchomenus under Spartan control, and launched lightning raids on Achaean territory, skillfully using light-armed troops and mercenaries (229). In 228, he inflicted two defeats on the League in pitched battles, one at Mount Lycaenum in Elis and the other at Megalopolis. Returning home as the man of the hour, he used his loyal troops to carry out a violent coup. The ephorate was abolished and the *gerousia* made into an annually elected body. The other king was a nonentity and Cleomenes ruled Sparta as an autocrat. He abolished debts and carried out a redistribution of the land of Sparta, creating thousands of small individual holdings, of approximately equal size. He recruited 4,000 suitable men from among the *Perioikoi* into the citizen body. He also revived the old Spartan practices, which had largely fallen into disuse, of common meals and rigorous physical and military training. A military innovator, Cleomenes abandoned the traditional hoplite equipment and trained his troops to use the two-handed *sarissa* and the shield supported by a strap round the neck.

Cleomenes had thus created not only a new social order but also a citizen army of a size, fighting spirit and level of training that no other Greek state could match. In 225, he defeated Argos and in the following year put Corinth under siege. The Achaean League seemed on the point of breaking up. To meet this crisis, the Achaean leader Aratus made common cause against Cleomenes with the old enemy of the League, the Macedonian monarchy. A combined offensive by the Achaeans and Antigonos III Doson drove Cleomenes back within his own borders and deprived him of Peloponnesian allies. Undeterred, Cleomenes sold freedom to 6,000 Helots at 500 drachmae a head and used the proceeds to create a strike force of 2,000 men armed with Macedonian equipment. Stiffening his army with this force, he made a feint toward Argos and captured Megalopolis in a surprise attack and pillaged it (223).

He then mustered every available man to face an invasion of Laconia by the combined forces of the Achaean League and Antigonos III Doson of Macedonia. In a great battle fought at Sellasia on the Spartan frontier (222), Cleomenes was defeated with catastrophic losses. He fled to Egypt, which had long subsidized his wars. He committed suicide to escape execution after attempting to stage an uprising against Ptolemy IV Philopator (220/19).

Douglas Kelly

See also Achaean League; Agis IV; Antigonus III Doson; Aratus of Sicyon; Arcadia, Arcadians; Arms and Armor; Helots; *Perioikoi*; Ptolemy IV Philopator; Sellasia, Battle of; Sparta

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Cleon (d. 422)

Cleon, son of Cleaenetus, was a controversial Athenian politician and general (*strategos*) during the Peloponnesian War of 431–404. His career provides another example of the lack of delineation between political and military life in most ancient Greek societies and the dangers of amateur commanders. The son of a wealthy father whose interests included a tannery, Cleon was a radical democratic politician.

Identifying Cleon's role in Athenian political and military conflict—and assessing his performance in these areas—is difficult because both of the extant contemporary sources are hostile to him. The historian Thucydides and the comic poet Aristophanes portray Cleon as a dishonest and cowardly radical democrat who lacked the competence to lead in war. Whatever the truth of these portraits, their similarities meant Cleon's reputation was fairly poor until more favorably inclined twentieth-century scholars saw him as a true democrat savaged by conservative writers unsympathetic to democracy.

Cleon really came to prominence after Pericles' death (429), apparently pursuing a more land-based strategy in opposition to Pericles' policy of maritime operations and avoiding major land engagements. He was a staunch proponent of the Athenian Empire and the need to keep order, if necessary by harsh measures. In 427 (Mytilene) and again in 423 (Scione), he proposed successful motions in the assembly to execute the males and sell into slavery the women and children of cities that had revolted. Mytilene was ultimately spared but Scione was not.

In 425, Cleon took charge of the operation to secure Pylos and Sphacteria. Although Thucydides and Aristophanes suggest Demosthenes did the real military planning, Cleon's judgment in arguing both for an attack and a suitable force was sound. Thucydides' criticism of Cleon for blocking the Spartan peace proposals that preceded this expedition is based on hindsight and rather unfair—it was a reasonable decision on the facts at the time. Cleon may also have been associated with the Athenian attempt to neutralize Boeotia in the 424 Delium campaign. Although unsuccessful, a victory at Delium would have freed Athens from a land war on two fronts and the Spartans may have been unable to continue the war effort.

In 422, Cleon sailed with a force of 1,200 Athenian hoplites, 300 cavalry, and 30 ships, and an unknown but large number of allies to recover the strategic center of Amphipolis and the other states in the region. Cleon recovered Galepsus and Torone and possibly another half-dozen or so places. However, the evidence for their revolt and recapture is open to debate—and most were pretty insignificant.

Cleon conducted a reconnaissance in force to Amphipolis with his entire army but apparently mishandled the withdrawal, misjudging the time available to wheel his army given its proximity to the city. The enemy commander, Brasidas, launched an attack, taking the Athenians by surprise in mid-maneuver. The part of the army already marching off simply fled and the rest ultimately collapsed under pressure from the enemy cavalry and light troops. Cleon was killed—running away according to Thucydides and fighting bravely according to Diodorus (although his account is a suspiciously stock battle description). Cleon seems to have been an influential politician, with generally very good strategic instincts. However, he seems to have lacked the basic skills to maneuver a hoplite force at the tactical level.

Iain Spence

See also Amphipolis; Amphipolis, Campaign of; Aristophanes; Brasidas; Nicias; Peloponnesian War, Second; Pericles; Thucydides

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Cleopatra VII (69–30)

Cleopatra VII was the last of the Ptolemies to rule Egypt. The historical Cleopatra is nothing like the Cleopatra of popular culture. She was of Macedonian and Greek descent and was not a black African. She was not strikingly beautiful but fairly good-looking (Plutarch, *Antony* 27). What was remarkable about her was high intelligence, political shrewdness, a forceful personality, and a charismatic ability to work on powerful men. She could be ruthless when necessary, for example, when she had her exiled half-sister Arsinoe killed in 41.

Cleopatra briefly became sole ruler in 51 on the death of her father, Ptolemy XII Auletes. She was soon forced to accept her 10-year old younger half-brother Ptolemy XIII as joint ruler and husband but soon fell out with his guardians and was expelled. It was this Ptolemy who ordered the killing of Pompey the Great when he sought refuge in Egypt (late September, 48). When Julius Caesar arrived a few days later, he did not get the cooperation he expected and so took the side of Cleopatra, then on Egypt's eastern border with an army of her own. Caesar defeated her half-brother and younger sister Arsinoe and installed Cleopatra as coruler, and therefore wife, of another younger brother Ptolemy XIV, then 11 years old.



A marble bust of Cleopatra VII. Cleopatra was the last Ptolemaic ruler of Egypt, and died in 30 when Augustus defeated Cleopatra's lover, Mark Antony, and incorporated Egypt into the Roman empire. The bust is now in the Altes Museum in Berlin, Germany. (Sandro Vannini/Corbis)

Cleopatra realized the plain fact that the Ptolemaic kingdom of Egypt had long depended on the good will of the Roman Republic and that in particular the dynasty was propped up by Roman support ever since Aulus Gabinius had restored her father to power in 55. The power struggles within the Ptolemaic dynastic made it obvious to Cleopatra that she should win and hold the support of the men of power in Rome. Her sexual relationships with Caesar (48–47) and later Marcus Antonius (first 41–40, then 37–30) were as much about politics as passion.

In summer 47, Cleopatra had a son named Ptolemy Caesarion, whose father was, as Cleopatra claimed and the world thought it knew, Julius

Caesar. Cleopatra was in Rome from 46–44. Caesar restored Cyprus (annexed by Rome in 57) to her kingdom. She returned to Egypt in about April 44, when Ptolemy XIV conveniently died. Since rule by a woman on her own was contrary to Ptolemaic convention, Cleopatra made Caesarion her coregulator as Ptolemy XV Caesar.

Later, in all her dealings with Antonius Cleopatra made sure that she received territories in return for the financial and material support she gave his army. She received the region of Chalcis in Syria in 41 and later concessions in Palestine included Jericho, valuable for its highly productive date palms.

By Antonius she had twins Alexander Helios (“The Sun”) and Cleopatra Selene (“The Moon”) born in 40 and a son Ptolemy Philadelphus in 36. In 34, with Antonius at her side she presided over a spectacular ceremony in Alexandria in which she took the title of Queen of Queens and her son Caesarion that of King of Kings.

Following Augustus’ victory over Antonius and Cleopatra at Actium, Cleopatra committed suicide on or about August 10, 30, to avoid being paraded in a Roman triumph (as had happened to her half-sister Arsinoe). Caesarion was quietly killed. Her other children by Antonius were raised by Antonius’ ex-wife Octavia. Selene later married King Juba II of Mauritania. What became of the others is unknown.

In her reign Cleopatra took the traditional Ptolemaic titles Philopator (“Father’s Beloved”) and Thea Neotera (“Younger Goddess”), as well as a new one Philopatris (“Lover of the Land”). The last reflects her active patronage of native Egyptian cults. She was the only Ptolemaic ruler to speak Egyptian and her cult image as Pharaoh, along with Caesarion, may be seen at the Temple of Hathor, Dendera.

Douglas Kelly

See also Egypt, Egyptians; Ptolemies. *Roman Section:* Actium, Battle of; Cleopatra; Mark Antony

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Cleruch, Cleruchy. See ***Colonies, Military***

Cnidus, Battle of (394)

In early August 394 (the dating comes from a solar eclipse in Xenophon, *Hellenica* 4.3.10), a naval battle was fought off Cnidus in Asia Minor between a fleet under Spartan command and a fleet raised from Phoenicia, Cyprus and other parts of the Persian Empire under the overall command of the satrap Pharnabazus, assisted by the Athenian exile Conon as his operational commander.

By 396, the fourth year of Sparta's war against Persia in Asia Minor, reports had reached Greece of a massive build-up of Persian naval power for an offensive against Greece. These reports had their basis in Pharnabazus' activity, making use of the services of Conon, in building up naval power to counter the superiority of Sparta's forces in the war on land. Persian preparations were never quick and it was only late in the summer of 395 that Sparta saw the need to assign the naval command to King Agesilaus II, then leading the land forces in Asia Minor. Sparta had maintained only minimal naval forces in the Aegean since the end of the Peloponnesian War (404), so Agesilaus ordered the construction of new triremes, a hundred and twenty of which were built.

Agesilaus appointed as navarch his brother-in-law Peisander, an ambitious man but with no experience of naval warfare. Peisander led his fleet of 85 ships eastward from Cnidus toward Physcus (modern Marmaris). In that vicinity he encountered the fleet under Pharnabazus and Conon of over 90 ships. These numbers are given by Diodorus, while Xenophon states (*Hellenica* 4.3.11) that Peisander was outnumbered by Conon's Greek squadron alone. Peisander's left wing, which was presumably on the seaward side, fled as soon as the fleets engaged and the rest of the Spartan fleet was driven ashore. Peisander himself died fighting on his ship. Fifty of his ships were captured and most of his crews fled by land to near-by Cnidus.

The battle of Cnidus broke Spartan naval control of the Aegean. Immediately after the battle Conon cruised through the islands of the Aegean to the Hellespont, expelling Spartan harmosts (governors). In the following year (393), Pharnabazus accompanied Conon on the fleet. They raided the island of Cythera to the south of Sparta, establishing a garrison there, and made a triumphal visit to a meeting of the anti-Spartan allies at Corinth.

Douglas Kelly

See also Agesilaus II; Conon; Corinthian War; Pharnabazus

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Coele-Syria. See Syria

Coenus (d. 326)

Coenus, son of Polemocrates, was a Macedonian general prominent in Alexander the Great's Asian campaigns. Like many of Alexander's commanders, Coenus started in infantry command but ended as a cavalry commander. This was a promotion, but may also have been influenced by the more mobile, cavalry-heavy style of warfare adopted in the Bactrian and Indian campaigns. Coenus first appears with Alexander in Thrace in 335 and in Asia commanded infantry contingents at the Granicus, Issus, and Gaugamela (where he was wounded). At Tyre his battalion was chosen as part of the final assault. In 328, he commanded one-third of the army in Sogdiana and played a pivotal role at the Hydaspes (326).

Coenus married Parmenion's daughter ca. 335, but in 330 was very vocal in his condemnation of Philotas, his brother-in-law, who was accused of treason. This may have been to distance himself from punishment, which in such cases often extended to relatives and associates. When Alexander's troops refused to cross the Hyphasis River and continue east, Coenus, acting

as their spokesman, successfully urged Alexander to turn back. Shortly afterward, Coenus died of illness and Alexander gave him an elaborate funeral.

Iain Spence

See also Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon; Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon, Bactrian Campaign; Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon, Indian Campaign; Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon, Invasion of Persian Empire; Issus, Battle of, Gaugamela, Battle of; Granicus, Battle of; Hydaspes, Battle of

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Coinage

Recent research on Greek coinage has confirmed its rapid spread in the Greek world from its beginnings ca. 550 to ca. 480, when there were already at least a hundred Greek cities issuing coins. It has also become clear that, from the earliest phases of coinage, Greek states issued significant amounts of small-denomination coins. This fact indicates that monetization, that is the extent to which Greeks used coinage in everyday exchanges as well as in major transactions, was more widespread and more significant than previously thought.

From the late sixth century onward, the leading Greek states had accumulated sufficient resources to carry on extended campaigns outside their own territories. Thucydides (1.1–23) drew attention to this development in his argument that the Second Peloponnesian War (431–404) was the greatest that had occurred in Greek history. Thucydides apparently had in mind material resources of all kinds, but coinage was a particularly important part of this development. Because it was easy to use and convenient to store, as well as multiplying the range of transactions possible, coinage made possible a more highly developed and sophisticated

economy.

Greek states did not have an organized system of commissariat to keep forces supplied when on extended campaign. It was semiproverbial in Athens to refer to hoplite military service as “three days’ rations” or “salt and onions,” referring to the limited amount of basic foodstuffs that troops carried on a campaign outside their borders. Troops serving for longer than this had to live off the country or to buy food and other necessities either from markets provided by friendly states or from the crowd of merchants and dealers who accompanied every army on the move. Troops, especially the crews of warships, needed to be paid wages in cash so they could support themselves. Thucydides saw that states needed large sums of money in reserve and from revenues to send out expeditions by sea on a scale to create an empire.

The increasing use of mercenaries intensified the need to have enough money to fight a war. Citizen troops could be induced, up to a point, to look after themselves for limited periods; mercenaries expected to be paid. The growing monetization of the Greek world thus made it possible for powerful Greek states to fight wars outside their territories for long periods of time. This pattern of warfare was intensified in the Hellenistic Period, when standing armies of mercenaries became common. Every Greek power fighting an extended war needed a supply of precious-metal coinage. Finding these funds was as much a part of the art of generalship as strategy or tactics.

Douglas Kelly

See also Finance and War; Logistics; Mercenaries; Pay, Military

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Colonies, Colonization

Although there is evidence for Greek colonies (or at least trading settlements) in the Mycenaean and Minoan Periods, the great waves of colonization occurred from the eighth to the sixth centuries, especially between ca. 750–550. During this period, colonies were settled in Asia Minor, the Black Sea, the Adriatic, Italy and Sicily, Sardinia and Corsica, and even France and Spain. Founding a colony had the capacity to decrease conflict in the mother city. However, it often involved conflict with the local population at the new site, or even conflict between states over suitable sites or control of a region, and later on, between different colonies or colony and mother city. Colonization was also a major contributor to the spread of Greek culture and influence around the ancient Mediterranean and Asia Minor—as well as a conduit for the influence of other peoples and cultures on mainland Greece.

Colonization was essentially enabled by sea travel. Colonies were generally founded on the coast, rather than inland (an exception was the Athenian attempt to establish a colony north of Amphipolis in Thrace that ended in disaster at Drabescus) and contact with the mother city was by sea. The existence of strong naval powers such as the Phoenicians and Etruscans could cause problems for Greek expansion. The mixed success of Greek colonies in France and Spain, predominantly founded by Phocaea and Cnidus, demonstrate this. The Phocaean colony of Massilia (Marseilles) became strong and wealthy enough to found its own colonies, including Antipolis in France and Emporium in Spain. However, conflict with the Etruscans and the Phoenicians caused several colonies to fail, including Alalia on Corsica and the westernmost, Tartessus, in Spain. However, a strong land power, or strong local resistance could also limit the spread. Egypt is a good example of this. It was too powerful to be penetrated by force—the Greeks had to be content with a strictly regulated trade settlement at Naucratis.

There were many specific reasons for founding a colony, but several broad categories can be identified. One was the need for new agricultural land, either because of overpopulation or poor conditions—Thera founded Cyrene after a drought and Chalcis founded Rhegium after a famine. As populations expanded, if the inheritance system was based on primogeniture (where the eldest son inherited), younger sons without land were prime recruits for colonists. Conversely, where all sons received an equal share of their father's estate, it was possible for the plots to reduce in

size over the generations until they could not support a family. Commerce, either with the local inhabitants or based on securing local resources for trade back to Greece, was also a motive. Naucratis, Cumae, Naxos, and Syracuse are examples where trade was either dominant or an important motive. The Euboeans seem to have founded Pithecusae (Ischia) in Italy and the Milesians Sinope and Trapezus in the Black Sea because of the mineral resources there. Amphipolis was probably founded for trade inland as well as to exploit the region's natural resources.

Piracy or control of a strategic region, for example, straits (which could allow the levying of tolls) are also possible motives at the Lipari islands and the first occupation of Zancle. *Poleis* could also establish colonies to extend their interests and influence, although there is often overlap between this motive and commerce or piracy/control of a region. Corinth is a good example of a city founding colonies in strategic locations to control routes and regions, especially on the route to Italy and Sicily. Internal political or civil conflict could also result in a group deciding (or being forced) to establish a colony. Examples include Rhegium and the Spartan colony of Taras, both in Italy. Many colonizing expeditions seem to have been led by disaffected aristocrats. External threat could also motivate colonization—Phocaea is the prime example of this. In addition, a colony could of course be founded for a combination of the reasons discussed above.

The process for founding a colony was fairly standardized, although often varied according to circumstance—especially when it resulted from the flight or expulsion of a whole population from a region because of war. A leader (the *oikistes*) was chosen, or self-appointed, colonists selected (sometimes by lot, sometimes by payment, sometimes simply by volunteering), sometimes an oracle such as that at Delphi might be consulted, and the expedition departed, carrying sacred fire and earth from the mother city. Colonists could be drawn from more than one mother city. Where the inhabitants at the destination were known to be, or considered, a threat it is likely that the first contingent comprised only men of fighting age, with the women and children to follow after. On arrival, and having secured the site (the ideal was a defensible headland or island, with suitable agricultural land and the ability to trade with the locals) the colonists would distribute the land and establish their city. Its customs and institutions generally replicated those of the mother city.

However, once established, the colony became independent of the

mother city. There were some exceptions to this in Sicily (Zancle and its colony Mylae) and the Black Sea (Sinope and its colonies Cotyora, Cerasus, and Trapezus), involving colonies and the colonies they had founded, but the main example is Corinth. It retained (or attempted to retain) more control over its colonies, for example, sending out magistrates to Potidaea and taking precedence in religious ceremonies. One of the causes of the Second Peloponnesian War (431–404) was Corinth's attempt to exert influence over its colony Corcyra by interfering between Corcyra and one of Corcyra's colonies, Epidamnus.

It was not uncommon for well-established (or precarious) colonies to found colonies of their own, in which case it was traditional for the *oikistes* to come not from the founding city but from its original mother city. The link between the second generation and original mother city was even more symbolic than for a first generation colony and its mother city, but again, the relationship between Corinth, Corcyra, and Epidamnus was an exception to this.

Iain Spence

See also Black Sea, Greek cities of; Caria, Greek Cities in; Colonies, Military; Corcyra, Conflict with Epidamnus and Corinth; Cyrene; Italy, Greek cities in; Miletus; Peloponnesian War, Second; Propontis, Greek cities of; Rhodes, Rhodians; Taras/Tarentum; Zancle/Messana

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Colonies, Military

The Greeks sent out colonies (*apoikia*) across the Mediterranean in the Archaic Period (ca. 700–480). Many of these colonies might be deemed military in nature as they consisted of men of fighting age who secured the territory for new settlement and often married the local women they found at the site, having killed the local men. Colonies drew fighting men to them in search of gain. Archilochus (F102) sings that the scum of Greece came to Thasos to fight for its gold mines. However, the deliberate establishment of specifically military colonies by Greek *poleis* was rare. The Athenians can be said to have done so in their imperial period establishing *klerouchiai* (cleruchies; military colonies) populated by *klerouchoi* (cleruchs; military colonists) across the Aegean on land seized from defeated members of the Athenian *arche* or Empire. Military garrisons became increasingly common in Greek history as the Macedonians established their power, and garrisons if settled in one place long enough become towns and villages—effectively colonies. Many of Philip and then Alexander’s foundations in their conquered territories could be deemed military colonies. Philip’s expanding Macedonian state established colonies that controlled strategic territory. His own foundation of Philippi at the site of Crenides near important mines must have had a military flavor. Alexander’s conquests left military colonies of Greeks dotted across the eastern parts of his empire especially. Many of his settlers, however, were clearly reluctant colonists. Thus, on learning of his death as many as 20,000 foot and 3,000 horse left their new foundations in the east and began the trek home only to be massacred by the Macedonians for their actions (Diodorus 18.7.1–9).

Alexander’s Successors continued the practice of founding cities for their military personnel and civilian immigrant populations. Some of these were specifically military in nature and others as part of more general city foundation. In Antigonid (321–301) and Seleucid (310–283) Asia, military colonies, styled as *katoikiai*, consisted of fighting men of military age settled with their families primarily around the northwestern parts of modern Syria and in the center of the Euphrates-Tigris valleys. Significantly, these colonies laid the foundation for future generations of military servicemen for the Seleucid monarchy. Ptolemy also had military settlers as colonists. He certainly settled men captured in Perdikkas’ invasion army of 321 on military style settlements in the delta and did the

same later when Demetrius failed at Gaza in 312. The Ptolemies also settled men of fighting age in their territories. Veterans found homes in the Arsinoite *nome* as *klerouchoi* on individual military settlements. These men remained liable for military service in return for their land grants, a liability that passed to their heirs. Traditionally, these Ptolemaic cleruchs have been seen differently from the more communal foundations of the Seleucids in their independent, one-off nature. They failed to lay the foundations for future generations of Greco-Macedonian fighting men in Egypt.

Military colonies were often indistinguishable from garrisons and effectively served the same purpose—to establish military control of an area. They could be effective in this, especially in the Archaic and Hellenistic Periods, where they also served to spread Greek language and culture (although the cultural transmission was both ways). However, in the Classical Period, when earlier used to control other areas of Greece they were generally very unpopular. The fifth-century Athenian system of cleruchies was so hated that when the Athenians set up their Second Athenian Confederacy in the fourth century the alliance agreement specifically banned the practice.

Matthew Trundle

See also Athenian Confederacy, Second; Colonies, Colonization; Delian League/Athenian Empire; Garrisons; Mercenaries

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Comics and Graphic Novels, Greek Warfare in

Comics and Graphic novels are, by their very nature, art forms of

modernity. As such, they typically focus on the present or immediate future. Comics, therefore, rarely draw thematic content from the Classical past and representations of Greek warfare within the medium are infrequent. The significance of Classical Greek literature to Western civilization, however, has meant that some aspects of Greek warfare have found representation within the comics, if only by inclusion in titles reinterpreting Homer. Most recently, comic books have tended to shadow the success of motion pictures featuring similar themes and, when these films have depicted Greek warfare, the comics have followed suit.

Greek gods have appeared frequently in comics since the earliest days of their production. William Moulton Marston's 1941 creation, Wonder Woman, was an Amazon princess and her contingent mythos exploited several aspects of Classical Greek legends, including her ongoing conflict with Ares, who was first introduced as a character in 1942. Marvel Comics similarly experimented with the Greek pantheon and introduced Hercules, initially as a villain in issue 10 of *The Avengers* (1964), but later as a hero in the first issue of *Journey Into Mystery* (1965). Hercules, Ares, and even the Amazons themselves were Classical superheroes or super-villains operating within a modern world, though, and were not meant to be representative of Classical Greece.

Among the earliest representations of Greek warfare in a comic book format are the Classics Illustrated editions of the *Iliad*, the *Odyssey*, and the *Aeneid*. A Russian immigrant to the United States, Albert Kanter, began Classic Comics in 1941 as a way of bringing literature to a wider audience. The company changed its name to Classics Illustrated in 1947 and eventually relocated its base of operations to the United Kingdom during the early 1960s. Classics Illustrated produced *Homer's Iliad* in 1950 and followed it up with an edition of *The Odyssey* the following year. *The Aeneid* was published only after the company had moved to the United Kingdom and did not appear in a U.S. edition until 2007.

In 1998, Frank Miller produced the five-issue limited series *300*, which dramatized the battle of Thermopylae (480). Miller's direct inspiration was the Rudolph Maté 1962 film *The 300 Spartans*, but *300* also featured quotations from Herodotus' *Histories*. The series was later reprinted as a graphic novel and achieved iconic status after its translation into film by Zack Snyder in 2007.

Although Eric Shanower had begun work on his own vision of Homeric

Greece in the early 1990s, it was not until 1998 that the first issue of the highly successful *Age of Bronze* found publication. Drawing together traditions as disparate as Homer's *Iliad* and Shakespeare's *Troilus and Cressida*, Shanower incorporated historical and archaeological research to create a series that he envisages running for as many as 70 issues.

Following the commercial, although not critical, success of Oliver Stone's *Alexander* in 2004, Rob Shone, Anita Ganeri and Chris Odgers produced the non-fiction graphic history *Alexander the Great: The Life of a King and Conqueror* in 2005. Wolfgang Petersen's 2004 production of *Troy* led to a similar revival of interest in the Homeric epics. From 2007, Marvel Comics produced *The Iliad* (Roy Thomas and Miguel Sepulveda) and *The Odyssey* (Roy Thomas and Greg Tocchini), each in eight issues, followed in 2009 by Thomas and Sepulveda's *The Trojan War*.

In 2013, Image Comics, the same company that produced Shanower's *Age of Bronze*, began publication of a five-issue series set in fourth-century Sparta. The miniseries, entitled *Three*, was a self-conscious exploration of Spartan militarism, but where Miller's *300* had been reverent of this tradition, *Three* was sharply critical. The creators of *Three*—Kieron Gillen, Ryan Kelly, Jordie Bellaire, and Clayton Cowles—enlisted the help of University of Nottingham professor Stephen Hodkinson in researching the comic and the end result reflects current academic trends in questioning the reality of Spartan invincibility and the legitimacy of institutions such as the *crypteia*.

Chris Bishop

See also Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon; Amazons; *Crypteia*; Gods of War; Herodotus; Homeric Warfare; Sparta; Thermopylae, Battle of

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Command Structures, Army

Building a coherent picture of Greek military command structures is difficult. Structures differed between states and regions, developed over time, and the evidence for them is patchy. It is also important to note that ancient armies lacked anything like the command structures of more modern armies or any officer training other than on the job experience. However, ancient warfare generally revolved around large set-piece engagements or sieges and there was less need for sophisticated command and control structures than today.

In the earliest depictions of Greek warfare, in Homer, command was simply exercised by king or chieftain. The accuracy of Homer's picture of the period he represents, as opposed to his own times, is debated, but the command structure depicted seems inherently likely for what were essentially local war bands. These were small and a formal subordinate hierarchy unnecessary. When larger forces were gathered, such as for the Trojan expedition, each contingent had its own commander, with an overall commander. The soldiers could be gathered in an assembly to hear the leaders speak but apparently with no opportunity for real input. Command authority was based on the leader's *arête* and position.

Hoplite warfare devolved military service lower down into a community and armies now represented a larger proportion of the population. This, and the requirement for greater discipline, increased the need for a hierarchical command system. In most cases, this led to formalizing the commander's position and creating subordinate commanders roughly equivalent to unit and subunit command in more modern armies. In democracies and mercenary armies, these positions were

often elected.

Most of our evidence for the hoplite period comes from Athens and Sparta, both atypical. Sparta, which alone had a truly professional army, had the most sophisticated command system. Unfortunately, the details are hard to recover. Thucydides provides a description of the Spartan army at Mantinea (418) and Xenophon does the same for Leuctra (371). However, their accounts are not entirely consistent, perhaps because of different knowledge (or terminology), corruption in the text, an organizational change between the two dates, or a combination of all these. The army was generally commanded by one or both of the kings, although after Agis II's poor performance in 419–418 he was accompanied by a board of advisers. For most of the Classical Period the army apparently consisted of six units of infantry, each about 600 strong. Prior to the end of the fifth century six polemarchs (*polemarchoi*; sing. *polemarchos*) may have formed a council of war with the king with no direct command function. The six hoplite units, probably (but not definitely) called *lochoi* (sing. *lochos*) were each commanded by a *lochagos* (pl. *lochagoi*).

However, by the early fourth century, these units were called *morai* (sing. *mora*), each commanded by a polemarch. At this time, each *mora* consisted of four *lochoi* commanded by a *lochagos*. A *lochos*' internal structure had two subordinate officers (*penteconteres* or *pentecosteres* [sing. *penteconter* or *pentecoster*]), each commanding two other subordinates, (*enomotarchoi* [sing. *enomotarchos*]). After Leuctra, the term *mora* disappears, although the 12 *lochoi* continue. This is perhaps because the army was downsized and restructured after the losses at Leuctra. Before Xenophon, Herodotus and Thucydides both use the term *lochos*, not *mora*, for the units in the Spartan army.

At Athens, prior to Cleisthenes' reforms (ca. 508/7) the army was commanded by a polemarch. After Cleisthenes, a board of 10 *strategoi* (generals) exercised command. They were elected, served for one year (but could be reelected without any restrictions), and commanded both by land and sea. It was relatively common for two or more *strategoi* to command an army (or fleet). Below the *strategoi*, were 10 taxiarchs (*taxiarchoi*; sing. *taxiarchos*) also elected and each of whom commanded a 1,000-strong hoplite contingent mobilized from his *phyle* (tribe). Each *taxiarchos* had 10 *lochagoi* beneath him, each commanding 100 men. Sometime between 445 and 438, the Athenians reorganized their cavalry under 2 elected hipparchs

(*hipparchoi*; sing. *hipparchos*) and 10 phylarchs (*phylarchoi*; sing. *phylarchos*)—also elected and each of whom commanded the 100-strong cavalry squadron from his tribe. A hipparch could command half the cavalry (500 men) or a smaller contingent of two or more squadrons. Xenophon's *Cavalry Commander* argued for a formal structure below this but there is no evidence that this was ever implemented. Both hipparch and taxiarch were subordinate to the *strategos* (or *stratego*) on campaign.

Athens was very big, though, and the only similar sized armies we know anything much about are those of leagues or federal states. The Boeotian League army ca. 395 was slightly bigger than the Athenian army. It was based on the League's 11 districts, and the 11,000 League hoplites and 1,100 cavalry were commanded by 11 boeotarchs. The Achaean League had one *strategos*—the commander-in-chief—and men could not hold the office two years in a row. Prior to 255, there seem to have been two *stratego*i, so the command structure clearly changed over time. In the cases of both the Boeotian and Achaean Leagues, we simply do not know whether the individual member states had a similar system, or what the league structure was below the higher echelons.

The Macedonian army under Philip II and Alexander the Great, and the armies of the *diadochoi* or Alexander's Successors, were commanded by the king, although detached forces could be commanded by trusted generals. The Macedonian army was recruited, organized, and commanded on territorial lines. The six *taxeis* (brigades; sing. *taxis*) of the *pezhetairoi* (foot companions), comprising 9,000 phalangites, formed its core; each *taxis* was commanded by a taxiarch and had sub units called *lochoi*. The 3,000 strong hypaspists were divided into six *lochoi*, each commanded by a *lochagos*. The cavalry consisted of five 200-strong squadrons (*ilai*; sing. *ile*) and the Companion cavalry squadron of 400 men, each commanded by an iliarch. After Gaugamela (331), however, Alexander reorganized the army so that each cavalry *ile* was internally divided into two *lochoi*, an additional *taxis* of *pezhetairoi* was added, and he grouped the *lochoi* into larger bodies of around 1,000 men, commanded by a chiliarch (*chiliarchos*; "leader of 1,000").

Under the *diadochoi*, the Macedonian components initially kept their existing command structures. However, influenced by local structures, and the need to increase the number of local troops as the Macedonian component declined, over time the organization changed and differences between the successor kingdoms emerged.

Although rudimentary by modern standards, from the Classical Period on, Greek armies did have a clear cut command structure with commanders at roughly equivalent levels to modern brigades, units, and subunits (noting that these differ in size between modern armies). It was unusual to find a structure below that level, with the exception of Sparta.

Iain Spence

See also Command Structures, Navy; Discipline, Military; Hoplites; Leuctra, Battle of; Mantinea, Battle of (418); Marathon, Battle of; Mercenaries; Phalanx; Ten Thousand, March of; Training

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Command Structures, Navy

Navies were commanded at three levels: by generals/admirals on campaign, by the same generals/admirals and their subordinate commanders during battle, and individually aboard each ship by the *trierarch*, or captain.

In Athens, 10 generals (*strategoî*) were elected annually to serve both on land and at sea, although by the fourth century they became more specialized in their duties. In Sparta, the two kings served as generals on land and an admiral was appointed to serve at sea in command of naval forces. This admiral could only serve in the post for one year, but when the successful commander Lysander's term finished he was appointed "vice-admiral" and in reality was still in command. These military commanders often operated far from their home bases and so they had a large degree of autonomy on campaigns. However, the fickle Athenian democracy did not tolerate what they perceived to be failure and many generals were

punished, including the historian Thucydides. Nicias' letter from Sicily (Document 12) illustrates the effect the fear of failure and punishment could have on *strategoi*.

During battle the generals/admirals and subordinate commanders would control squadrons of ships. During the battle of Salamis in 480 the Greeks were under the command of the Spartan Eurybiades, who set out the battle line, but each individual city-state controlled their forces during the battle. Ships were usually divided into squadrons that maneuvered individually during battle and pursuits, and these squadrons were not necessarily directly commanded by the elected or appointed generals.

In one incident the Athenians withdrew as one disciplined force to keep the victorious Spartans from pursuing the defeated fleet of Corcyra, a maneuver requiring tight and disciplined command and control (Thucydides 3.78). Naval battles required swift and effective maneuvering to utilize weather conditions and for favorable positioning to conduct ramming attacks, and as such they were not merely land battles fought afloat.

Each trireme had a captain, known as a trierarch, who in Athens was also responsible for the outfitting and maintenance of the ship for an entire year. Toward the end of the Second Peloponnesian War, as Athens' wealth dwindled, this duty was often split between two citizens. In the fourth century the Athenians passed a law creating a pool of potential contributors to undertake this role. The quality and experience of the trierarch had a large impact on how naval forces performed during battle.

A good illustration of the breakdown of command comes from the conflict between Corcyra and Corinth in 433. The Corinthians and the five allied contingents had their own officers, and the Corinthian admiral in overall command of the force had four subordinate commanders. The Corcyraean force opposing them was commanded by three admirals, and the Athenian contingent attached to them had three commanders, all commanding different sections of the line.

John M. Nash

See also Finance and War; Naval Tactics; Naval Warfare; Peloponnesian War, First; Peloponnesian War, Second; Salamis, Battle of (480)

Further Reading

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Commemoration

Greek commemoration of war took many forms and fulfilled a number of purposes, ranging from a triumphal desire to display one's victory to a communal sharing of loss. Obviously part of remembering and commemoration lay in story-telling, and no doubt survivors of wars were asked repeatedly to describe their experiences. The desire to fix events in memory could be a stimulus to historical narrative: Herodotus opens his history by stating that part of his purpose is to ensure that the great deeds of Greeks and barbarians are not forgotten. Greek historians wrote much about wars, but generally say little about the details of real battles: for graphic descriptions of the physical nature of Greek warfare, one goes best to the fictional battles in Homer's *Iliad*. No doubt this reflects the greater ease for a poet making things up than for a historian researching details, but it may also remind us that societies memorializing war are less interested in an accurate account of what happened than in creating and shaping an acceptable shared story that gives it a set of meanings that are deemed useful to the community. This is as true of modern war memorialization as ancient. Any commemoration of war will demand symbols, or rhetoric that produces a highly simplified story.

A basic and universal form of commemoration after a battle was the erection of a trophy by the victorious side. After a hoplite battle, only one side was left in command of the actual field of battle, and thus were the "winners," regardless of strategic consequences. The losers acknowledged defeat by asking for a truce to gather their dead, while the victors emphasized the fact of victory by erecting a trophy: this was a post or tree stump, on which were hung a set of captured armor and weapons. Presumably these were very temporary memorials of victory: they were considered inviolable, but still may not have survived long if the battle had taken place in enemy territory. Trophies were also erected after naval battles, on a prominent piece of nearby land, for example, a nearby

promontory in the case of the battle of Leucimme in 435. In 412/11, after a fairly small but successful battle with the Athenians, the Spartan admiral Astyochus took his whole fleet from Cnidus to the Athenian-held island of Syme (near where the battle had taken place) so that he could set up his trophy in enemy-held territory.

There was a view, though it seems to come from later sources, that the fragile and thus temporary nature of battlefield trophies was a virtue, because there should not be permanent memorials of victories by Greek over Greek. But some monuments were more durable. After the defeat of the Persians in 479, out of the spoils the Greeks set up a golden tripod supported by a three-headed bronze snake at Delphi, along with large bronze statues of Zeus at Olympia and Poseidon at Isthmia. (The bronze snake was later taken to Constantinople, and can be seen today in the hippodrome in Istanbul.) In the Agora at Athens, the *Stoa Poikile* (Painted Stoa) housed several paintings of battles, including Marathon and Oenoe, alongside scenes from Troy and battles with Amazons. Large scale monuments on battlefields seem rare, though examples exist. The Thebans built a round, tower-like building, in effect a substantial permanent stone trophy, at Leuctra to commemorate their victory over the Spartans in 371. But this building, now reerected (see illustration in Leuctra, Battle of), may belong to the third century, another example of historical commemoration. And at Chaeronea, a large stone lion was erected to guard a group of remains, possibly those of the Theban Sacred Band.

After a battle, many cities would bury their dead on the battlefield, though normal Athenian practice seems to have been to cremate the dead and bring their bones home. A tomb on a battlefield would also serve as a form of memorial. Even the Athenians did this at Marathon in 490 and Plataea in 479, no doubt marking there that these victories over the Persians were of particular significance. At Marathon, the 192 Athenian war dead were buried under a large mound, the *soros*, still visible today. The Plataeans who fought at Marathon similarly were buried on the field, as were other Greeks at Plataea (the Spartans in three separate tombs, for priests, Spartiates, and helots). This was such a public form of commemorative statement that Herodotus tells us that cities that had not fought at Plataea built mounds on the battlefield to pretend that they had, while the Aeginetans, who had fought, constructed a dummy mound 10 years after the event, when perhaps they thought memories might be

fading.

Stripping arms from the enemy dead was an old-standing practice, well attested in Homer (see also first illustration in Hoplites entry). It would be open to soldiers to keep and even use these themselves, but often they would be dedicated in a sanctuary, in effect as a long-term and very publicly visible form of trophy. They might remain on display for a very long time. In 340, according to Aeschines' account of the outbreak of the Fourth Sacred War, the Thebans and their supporters in Amphissa were upset because the Athenians had affixed to the new temple, before it had been consecrated, some shields with an inscription: "The Athenians, from the Medes and Thebans, when they made war on the Greeks." The religious niceties were surely less important to the Thebans than the Athenians' determination to keep reminding visitors to Delphi that in 480, 140 years before, the Thebans had medized.

Each city had its own practice regarding treatment of their own war dead. Spartan tradition held that the law-giver Lycurgus had prohibited inscriptions on gravestones, except for those who had died in war. Quite a number of Spartan grave inscriptions have been found, generally with the man's name (with no patronymic or other identifier) and the words, "in war." The gravestones themselves are simple, unimpressive, and austere, range in date from the fifth to the first centuries, indicative of a long continuity of practice, and come from all over Laconia. Their wide scatter suggests that they may have been the focus for families' commemoration of their dead (e.g., as a place to make offerings), as well as a site for mourning.

In other cases, Spartans buried their dead in mass graves—*polyandria*—out in the world beyond Laconia. Pausanias saw what purported to be the graves of both the Spartan and the Argive dead in the Battle of the Champions of about 547, nearly seven centuries before his own time. Sometimes the dead were moved to friendly territory, especially to places with links to why Sparta was fighting: examples are the burial of Lysander at Panopeus in Phocis, and of the dead from the battle of Mantinea in 418. In 427, Thucydides has the Plataeans remind the Spartans of the honors that they—the Plataeans—have paid to the graves in their territory of Spartans killed there in 479.

At Thermopylae, memorials to the battle of 480 jostled for space. Herodotus tells us that the Spartan dead were buried where they made their final stand, and there were a number of inscriptions set up over them, not

by the Spartans themselves but by the Delphic Amphictyony. But Strabo in the first century reports seeing five grave markers, two of them honoring the Opuntian (Eastern) Locrians and possibly the Thespians. Most interestingly, sometime around 440, 40 years after the battle and perhaps at a time when they wished to remind people of the prestige acquired in the Persian War, the Spartans brought back what purported to be the bones of Leonidas and buried them at Sparta. Pausanias reports that in his day this was the site of ceremonial speeches and athletic contests, and that there was also an inscribed list of all the 300. In this case, 40 years after the event, we can possibly see a military defeat being recreated as a heroic enterprise, to bring prestige on the state.

Athens is the state where the forms of military commemoration are best attested. As noted above, typical Athenian practice was to cremate bodies on the battlefield and then repatriate the bones and ashes. These were then buried in an annual public funeral, held in winter. Thucydides gives us an excellent description. For two days the bones were laid out in a tent, allowing families to bring offerings. On the day of the funeral itself, the bones were separated (how, we cannot know) according to the one of the 10 civic Athenian tribes to which each man belonged. The bones for each tribe were placed in a coffin (*larnax*) of cypress wood, and carried on wagons to the public tomb, the *demosion sema*, in the Cerameicus, the potters' quarter just outside the walls which was the main central Athenian cemetery; in addition, an empty bier represented the missing. It was a funeral for the families, with women lamenting the dead in traditional ways, but also for the state; citizens and foreigners alike could attend.

Three further rituals followed. An orator would make a speech to commemorate the dead. Very few are extant; the most famous, Pericles' Funeral Oration, is unlikely to be at all close to the original; Thucydides uses it to express his own, or Pericles', or Athenians' views of what made Athens worth fighting for. Second, there were athletic contests in honor of the dead, a ritual that goes back to Homer: as in many areas, the democracy took on the forms of aristocratic ritual. Finally, it became the practice in the fifth century to set up an inscribed list of the war dead for each year. Typically these listed men without identifiers such as father's name or name of deme, but grouped again according to the 10 civic tribes, emphasizing the men's place in the structure of the *polis*. These two facets may have been intended to signal the men's equality in death, or simply to emphasize that the most

important fact about a man who died for the city was his role as a citizen, rather than, for example, as a family member. In this it may be seen as similar to somewhat anonymizing forms of Spartan burial of the dead.

Peter Londey

See also Champions, Battle of; Dead, Treatment of; Dedications, Military; Leonidas; Leucimme, Battle of; Lysander; Mantinea, Battle of (418); Pericles; Plataea, Battle of; Plataea, Siege of; Thermopylae, Battle of; Trophy (*Tropaion*)

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Common Peace (*Koine Eirene*)

The term “Common Peace” (*koine eirene*) was used by Greek writers to refer to a peace treaty that applied generally in the Greek world, as distinct from a peace treaty between two states, or groups of states. Common Peace treaties could be described as “multilateral” and were, in theory, open to all Greek states, great and small alike, even if they had not themselves been involved in the relevant hostilities. The concept of Common Peace was an important diplomatic goal in the interrelations of Greek states in the fourth century and is found both in some contemporary sources and in later sources dealing with this period (e.g., Diodorus). Common Peace could refer to a real settlement or be no more than a slogan. Significantly, Xenophon in his *Hellenica* does not use the term although he deals with many of the relevant events. After the fourth century the term was only of minor

importance.

The idea of a peace treaty that would include a large number of states and provide security for a defined region came to the fore in 424 at a conference at Gela where the Syracusan leader Hermocrates persuaded the cities of Sicily to adopt such a plan (Thucydides 4.65). The actual term Common Peace was not used on this occasion but is first attested during the Corinthian War (395–387/6), when in 392/1 there were abortive peace negotiations. The King's Peace (387/6) that ended this war was the first Common Peace formally described as such. The term was also applied to later treaties: the peace of 375/4, the peace treaty made at Athens in 371, the peace made at Sparta in the same year, the peace of 362/1, and the "League of Corinth" (Philip II of Macedon's settlement of Greece) in 338/7, Alexander the Great's renewal of this in 336, and lastly a peace treaty established for the Greek cities by the agreement in 311 made by Antigonus I Monophthalmus, Cassander, Lysimachus, and Ptolemy I Soter.

There were other instances where Common Peace was the subject of negotiation, if not actually put into practice. In 366, Boeotia invited states to a conference at Thebes for a Common Peace treaty. Various states, including Athens, Corinth, and Arcadia objected, and it is not clear if the project came to nothing or resulted in a Common Peace that included only a limited number of states. In 346, during negotiations that led to the Peace of Philocrates, the members of the Second Athenian Confederacy other than Athens proposed that the treaty between Philip and his allies on one side and Athens and its allies on the other be in the form of a Common Peace that any state could join (Aeschines 2 [*On the False Embassy*] 57). This proposal lapsed, and there is no good reason to accept (on the basis of Diodorus 16.60) that there was a Common Peace treaty in 346.

In harsh reality, Common Peace treaties rested upon compulsion or the threat of it by the leading powers. Thus the King's Peace (387/6) was enforced by Sparta, then supreme in Greece and backed by Persia. The Peace of 375/4 depended on the agreement of Sparta and Athens. The Peace of Athens and the Peace of Sparta (371) both contained the novelty of a guarantee clause, that is, an undertaking that any states that so willed could take part in joint action against any party transgressing the treaty.

The Peace of 362/1, which followed on the stalemate resulting from the battle of Mantinea, included the obligation (not followed in practice afterward) on all parties to act against transgressions. Macedonian power

dictated the Common Peaces of 338/7, 336, and 311.

The establishment of a Common Peace was not a matter of course. Threats were needed to make Thebes and Argos-Corinth accept the King's Peace (387/6). Elis refused to take part in the peace of Athens (371). More spectacularly, Boeotia refused to take part in the Peace of Sparta (371). Many Greek states, including Athens, sat back to let Sparta enforce the treaty. The outcome was the battle of Leuctra, which changed the course of Greek history.

Common Peace treaties included provisions for the autonomy of those states participating, which in itself was a cause of dispute. For example, Elis rejected the Common Peace of Athens (371) because it recognized the autonomy of Triphylia and other territories Elis claimed (Xenophon, *Hellenica* 6.5.1). Even participation by a state could be controversial. Most notably, the admission of Messenia to the Common Peace of 362/1 meant that Sparta alone refused to join in the treaty, because Sparta could not acknowledge the existence of Messenia as a free state.

Douglas Kelly

See also Corinthian War; Diodorus Siculus; Elis; Freedom; Hermocrates of Syracuse; King's Peace; Leuctra, Battle of; Mantinea, Battle of (362); Peace; Philocrates, Peace of; Triphylia; Xenophon

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Conon (ca. 444–392)

Conon, son of Timotheus, was an Athenian *strategos* (general) active during the later stages of the Second Peloponnesian War (431–404) and important

in Athens' revival in the early fourth century. Although commanding 18 triremes at Naupactus (414/3) his first major command was as Alcibiades' replacement after Notium (406). More concerned with combat effectiveness than appearance, he reorganized the crews of 100 undermanned triremes to fully man 70. Outnumbered in ships 170:70 by the Spartan Callicratidas, Conon withdrew to Mytilene, losing 30 triremes in a battle near the entrance to its harbor. Importantly, given Athens' shortage of trained crews, all the sailors escaped. Blockaded, Conon used a stratagem to get ships away to inform Athens; the blockade ended when the relief fleet inflicted a major defeat on Callicratidas at Arginusae. Conon's final service in the war was at Aegospotami (405)—the disastrous final Athenian naval defeat. The fleet was surprised with the crews scattered searching for food, but Conon, perhaps because of better discipline and security, managed to get eight of his ships away along with the state trireme, the *Paralus*. He ensured a clean break by seizing the enemy's cruising masts (used for distance travel but removed prior to combat) from a nearby headland.

Fearing the reception for a defeated general at home following the execution of the generals after Arginusae, Conon took his ships to Cyprus. After the war, Conon served with the Persians, especially the satrap Pharnabazus. Together, they destroyed Sparta's new naval superiority in the Aegean and seriously weakened its position in Asia Minor. Their partnership resulted in the major Spartan naval defeat at Cnidus (394), followed up by sailing along the Asian coast, expelling all the Spartan harmosts (governors). They then switched their attention to Greece, where they ravaged the coast of Laconia and established a permanent base at Cythera to raid the Peloponnese. Conon then persuaded Pharnabazus that he could damage Sparta and ease pressure on Persia by rebuilding Athenian power. Pharnabazus gave him the fleet and Conon returned triumphantly to Athens, where he rebuilt the Long Walls and brought cities from Ionia and the islands into alliance with Athens. Conon was seized by the Persian satrap Tiribazus while on an embassy to Persia (apparently because of Spartan pressure and Persian fear of a resurgent Athens). Although he probably escaped, he died soon afterward (ca. 392).

Iain Spence

See also Aegospotami, Battle of; Arginusae, Battle of; Cnidus, Battle of; Hellespont Campaign; Long Walls; Peloponnesian War, Second;

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Contracts, Military

In the Archaic Period, traditional forms of *xenia* or ritualized friendship created informal bonds akin to contractual relationships during service, including distribution of booty. No written contracts, however, exist until the Hellenistic Period. The most significant extant written contract is an inscription *OGIS* 1.266 (Document 20) dating sometime between ca. 280 and 240 and set up in several sanctuaries in the vicinity of Eumenes' emerging kingdom including the one to Athena at Pergamum, Apollo at Gryneion, and the islands of Delos (Apollo) and Mytilene (Asclepius). It outlines the settlement of a dispute between Eumenes II of Pergamum and his garrisons at Philetaerea and Attalea. It is in effect a contract between the two parties. In it Eumenes agrees to pay a set amount each month, and to make a back payment, presumably from the time of the dispute; not to attempt to make the men serve for an additional intercalary month; to exempt those unfit for service; to look after orphaned children of his command; and to allow the men to leave with all their property after serving a set number of years, probably 40, with immunity from taxation. In many ways, this written document has many precedents that go back into the Greek past.

Employers and men, especially mercenaries, regularly agreed terms of service at the start of a campaign of payment amounts and booty redistribution, and to where they would be led and against whom they would fight. At a higher level, terms of employment of troops supplied by allies also appear in interstate agreements, which effectively form contracts. One example is in the alliance between Athens, Argos, Elis, and Mantinea in 420. The latter stages of the Second Peloponnesian War also provide several examples of agreements between Persia and the Peloponnesians to

pay sailors serving against Athens.

Matthew Trundle

See also Alliances; Mercenaries; Pay, Military

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Corcyra, Conflict with Epidamnus and Corinth (435–433/2)

This conflict was one of the triggers for the Second Peloponnesian War (431–404) and also sheds light on the relationship between colony and mother city. Its origins were in a civil war between oligarchs and democrats in Epidamnus, a colony of Corcyra—which in turn was a colony of Corinth. As was traditional, when Corcyra founded Epidamnus, Phalius, the *oikistes*, or leader of the expedition was drawn from the original mother city, Corinth. In this case, the colonizing expedition also included settlers from Corinth and elsewhere.

By 435, after a period of internal *stasis* or struggle, the democratic party had expelled the ruling oligarchs. These allied with the local non-Greek population (Thucydides 1.24 calls them *barbaroi*) and harassed the city. Epidamnus appealed to Corcyra to mediate with the exiles and help them against the locals. When this was refused the desperate democrats consulted the Delphic Oracle about handing themselves over to Corinth for protection. The oracle advised them to do so and the Corinthians accepted the offer. They were motivated, according to Thucydides, by both feelings of responsibility to their colony Epidamnus, and hatred for the Corcyraeans, whom they regarded as treating Corinth with gross disrespect. The Corinthians made energetic preparations, calling for new settlers for Epidamnus and raising an army.

When the settlers and soldiers arrived, Corcyra reacted very strongly, demanding the new arrivals withdraw and Epidamnus restore the exiles. This was refused and Corcyra attacked Epidamnus. Corinth raised another large expedition of soldiers and settlers, at which point Corcyra offered to

go to arbitration. As often happened in such cases, the two sides could not agree on the preconditions—the Corinthians would only agree if the Corcyraeans withdrew their besieging force and Corcyra would only agree to this if the Corinthian garrison and new settlers also left Epidamnus. The Corinthian fleet sailed and suffered a decisive defeat in a scrappy engagement at Leucimme (435); the Corcyraeans executed all the captives, except the Corinthians. The same day Epidamnus surrendered.

This victory gave Corcyra mastery of the area and they ravaged the territory of several Corinthian allies. Corinth's response was to rebuild its fleet and prepare to renew operations. During the abortive negotiations prior to Leucimme, Corcyra had threatened to seek new allies if they failed. Worried by Corinthian preparations and that they were not a member of either the Peloponnesian League (as Corinth was) or the Delian League, they asked to join the latter.

Thucydides provides versions of the Corcyraean and Corinthian speeches at Athens about this request. After initial reluctance, the Athens agreed to the alliance. They were convinced that it was legal under the terms of the peace that had ended the First Peloponnesian War and, according to Thucydides, saw war with the Peloponnesian League as inevitable and wanted the large Corcyraean fleet on their side. Athens dispatched a fleet that became involved in a naval clash between Corcyra and Corinth (433/2). This led to a breakdown in Athenian-Corinthian relations, provoking further action against each other (notably at Potidaea) and contributing to the outbreak of the Second Peloponnesian War in 431.

Iain Spence

See also Arbitration; Colonies, Colonization; Corcyra, Corcyraeans; Corinth, Corinthians; Epidamnus; Leucimme, Battle of; Peloponnesian War, Second; Sybota, Battle of

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Corcyra, Corcyraeans

Corcyra, modern Corfu, is a large and strategically located island in the Ionian Sea, between Italy and Greece. In comparison to the other islands of the Ionian Sea, it enjoyed a relatively lush climate, well suited to agriculture, as well as an advantageous position on the common trade route between Greece and Italy. In prehistoric times the island was generally culturally closer to the north (e.g., Illyria) than to the Greek mainland, and in the Neolithic and Bronze Age it was devoid of any Mycenaean influences at all. The earliest contacts with Greece are found in the first colony on the island, traditionally originating from Eretria on Euboea. According to the foundation myths, these colonists were expelled in 734/3 by settlers from Corinth who were en route to Sicily to colonize Syracuse. The earliest Greek archaeological remains on the island confirm the presence of Geometric pottery during the eighth century, although there is no clear evidence of an earlier colony, and no Euboean influence on the island.

Thucydides relates how, in around 660, the Corcyraeans fought their mother city and defeated them in a naval battle, although the Corinthians asserted their dominance over their erstwhile colony soon after. Later in the seventh century, the two cities were founding Epidamnus and other joint colonies in Illyria. After the death of Periander, the tyrant of Corinth, Corcyra permanently broke ties with its founder and entered into direct competition with Corinth for control of the trade routes in the west. According to Herodotus, Corcyra sent 60 ships to help the Greek cause at Salamis (480), but they deliberately waited off the Peloponnese, claiming to be prevented from sailing by contrary winds, until they saw what the outcome of the battle would be.

In 433, Corcyraean and Corinthian conflict over Epidamnus was one of the causes leading to the outbreak of the Second Peloponnesian War, with Athens and Corinth coming into direct conflict at the battle of Sybota. During the course of that war, Corcyra relied heavily on protection from the Athenian fleet in 427 and 425 to remain independent from Corinth. The war led to the intervention of Athenians, Spartans, and Corinthians in the local politics of the island, causing violent civil strife amongst the Corcyraeans,

which only ended in 425 with the democrats massacring their oligarchic opponents. Corcyra broke ties with Athens in 410, although it later joined the Second Athenian Confederacy in 375. This led to a short siege by the Spartans, successfully resisted by the Corcyraeans in 373. During the late fourth century, Corcyra vainly resisted Macedonian influence in the Adriatic, and was fought over by successive Hellenistic dynasts, such as Cassander, Demetrius I Poliorcetes, and Pyrrhus. In 229, it was occupied by the Illyrians who were swiftly ousted by the Romans. The island became a Roman naval base until it was attached to the province of Macedonia in 148.

Russell Buzby

See also Athenian Confederacy, Second; Colonies, Colonization; Corcyra, Conflict with Epidamnus and Corinth; Corcyra, *Stasis* at; Corinth, Corinthians; Corinth and Corcyra, Sea-Battle; Epidamnus; Peloponnesian War, Second; Periander; Pyrrhus; Salamis, Battle of (480); Sybota, Battle of

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Corcyra, *Stasis* at (427)

Corcyra (modern Corfu) is the northernmost of the western Greek islands located in the Ionian Sea just off the west coast of Epirus and the site during the Peloponnesian War in 427 of one of the most destructive and brutal instances of *stasis*, or internal strife, in Greek history of the Classical Period. While *stasis* could erupt from a variety of internal conflicts, our sources depict the *stasis* at Corcyra as a consequence of severe ideological divisions

in the citizen body between those who favored a democratic constitution (power shared amongst all adult male citizens) and continued alliance with Athens, and those who favored oligarchy (rule of an elite minority) and wanted to align the city-state with Sparta.

The violence at Corcyra began in 427 with the murder of the leader of the democratic faction in the city and 60 of his supporters by a group of oligarchs who had recently returned from exile. In the chaos that followed, these oligarchs seized power and repudiated the alliance with Athens, presumably as a prelude to an alliance with Sparta, with whom the Athenians were at war. Predictably, more violence ensued when the people (*demos*) rose up in arms. It is said that slaves and women took part in the battles that ran through the streets of the city. Shortly thereafter both Athenian and Spartan fleets arrived and each attempted to intervene, but eventually both the Athenians and Spartans retired without having appreciably influenced events. In the end, with the withdrawal of all foreign forces, the people massacred all those of the oligarchs who remained in the city, including dozens who had taken refuge at the sanctuary of the goddess Hera.

Thucydides' history of the Second Peloponnesian War (431–404) portrays the *stasis* at Corcyra as a paradigm of the Peloponnesian War as a whole, with hopes of political advantage and self-interest overthrowing all moral conventions: sacred spaces are violated, promises and oaths are broken, social obligations and family ties are ignored, unthinkable atrocities are committed.

Even though the people had risen in revolution and achieved victory to maintain the alliance between Corcyra and Athens, the treaty was repudiated in 410 anyway. Corcyra remained unaligned until at least 375, when renewed political tensions between democrats and oligarchs in the city moved them to realign with the Athenians.

Michael Quinn

See also Civilian Populations in War; Corcyra, Conflict with Epidamnus and Corinth; Corcyra, Corcyraeans; Exiles; Laws of War; Slaves in War; *Stasis*; Thucydides; Women in War

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Corinth, Corinthians

Corinth was one of the largest and wealthiest cities in Greece, though generally it was more muted in its imperialist ambitions than cities such as Athens, Sparta, and Thebes. It occupied a highly strategic position, astride the western end of the Isthmus of Corinth. With harbors at Lechaëum on the westward-facing Gulf of Corinth and Cenchreae on the Saronic Gulf (which opened out to the Aegean), Corinth was well placed to trade with the whole of the Greek world. Its own territory was about 350 square miles, abutting Megara to the east, Sicyon to the west, and separated by hills from the Argolid to the south. The city was located about one-and-a-quarter miles inland, at the foot of the imposing mountain, the Acrocorinth, which though about 1,600 feet above the city itself provided it with its acropolis (see illustration). The 7-mile circuit of the city walls enclosed an area of 1,500 acres, making Corinth the largest city in Greece. There were also Long Walls connecting the city with the harbor at Lechaëum. The population in the fifth century has been estimated at 70,000 (including slaves and non-citizens).

Corinth was a foundation of the Greek Dark Age, perhaps around 900. The city started to become prominent in the late eighth century, from which point its wide trading ties are demonstrated by the spread of Corinthian pottery, which was dominant until being overtaken by Attic styles in the late sixth century. Corinth was also a significant colonizer, with Potidaea, Corcyra, and Syracuse among its most important foundations. Apart from Potidaea in the northern Aegean, the primary sphere of Corinthian interest seems to have been in the west, both western Greece and Italy and Sicily, areas made easy to reach by the city's direct access to the Corinthian Gulf. Although Corinth had a substantial agricultural territory, its wealth may have come primarily from trade. For most of its history, Corinth was an

oligarchy, though from the seventh to sixth centuries there was a period of tyranny under Cypselus and Periander.

A view of the ruins of ancient Corinth. The slopes of the city's high citadel, the Acrocorinth, can be seen to the left. Corinth was one of the greatest cities of Greece, but was utterly destroyed by the Romans under Lucius Mummius in 146. Most of the visible ruins today are from the later Roman town on the site, but some columns of the sixth-century temple of Apollo are visible in the background. (Boris Breytman/[Dreamstime.com](#))

Thucydides paints the Corinthians as the chief proponents of war in the

lead up to the Second Peloponnesian War (431–404), in conflict with Athens at a number of key points and generally desperate to see Athens' growing power curtailed. Although the speeches that Thucydides gives the Corinthians are works of imagination, they presumably reflect his belief that it was Corinth above all, along with Aegina and Megara, which pushed Sparta into war. Immediately before the war, Corinth came off badly in conflict with its former colony Corcyra (which succeeded in obtaining Athenian help) and saw Athens trying to detach a much more friendly colony, Potidaea, from the Corinthian sphere of influence.

But the Corinthians steadily became disillusioned with Spartan leadership. Like other allies, they were unhappy with the Peace of Nicias and did not support Sparta at Mantinea in 418. After the war, they joined together with Sparta's old foe, Argos, and actually contemplated uniting the two cities. They fought against Sparta in the Corinthian War. In the 360s, Corinth sided with Thebes and withdrew from the Peloponnesian League. In 338, a congress of Greek states at Corinth set up a new Hellenic League (often known as the League of Corinth) to fight Persia under Philip II of Macedon. After the Lamian War, Corinth was occupied by the Macedonians and allied with various Successors of Alexander. In the third century, it was critical to Antigonos I Gonatas' control of the Peloponnese. Aratus of Sicyon captured the city in 243, and it joined the Achaean League. Apart from a further period of Macedonian control, when it became known as one of the "Fetters of Greece," Corinth remained in the Achaean League. But at the end of the Achaean War in 146, the Roman Lucius Mummius razed the city, executed the adult males, and sold the women and children into slavery. A century later Julius Caesar refounded the city; most of the remains visible today are from the Roman period.

Peter Londey

See also Achaean League; Achaean War; Antigonos II Gonatas; Aratus of Sicyon; Corcyra, Conflict with Epidamnus and Corinth; Corcyra, Corcyraeans; Corinth and Corcyra, Sea-Battle; Corinthian War; Cypselus; Fetters of Greece; Hellenic League (under Philip); Isthmus of Corinth; Leucimne, Battle of; Peloponnesian League; Peloponnesian War, First; Peloponnesian War, Second; Periander; Persian Wars; Potidaea/Cassandraea; Potidaea, Siege of; Sybota, Battle of; Syracuse

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Corinth and Corcyra, Sea-Battle (ca. 660)

The first recorded sea battle in Greek history was fought between Corinth and its colony, Corcyra. It is briefly mentioned in Thucydides’ account of the development of Greek naval power, in the context that Corinth built the first triremes in Greece. Thucydides provides no details of the battle (including even who won), but records later the ongoing discord between Corinth and Corcyra that contributed to the outbreak of the Second Peloponnesian War.

Iain Spence

See also Ambracia and Amphilocheia; Corcyra, Corcyraeans; Corinth, Corinthians; Peloponnesian War, Second; Ships, War

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Corinth, League of. See Hellenic League (under Philip)

Corinthian War (395–387/6)

Causes

The Corinthian War was fought between Sparta and its allies on the one side and a coalition of Athens, Boeotia, Corinth, Argos and others on the other. The war was called by this name because after 394 most of the fighting on land was around Corinth.

A mere nine years separated the outbreak of the Corinthian War from

the end of the Second Peloponnesian War in 404. That the belligerents were involved so soon after this 27-year conflict in another major war shows how ready Greek states were to resort to war to achieve political goals. The Corinthian War was not over disputed territory but political and strategic goals.

Boeotia's heavy burdens in the Peloponnesian War left it dissatisfied with its meager gains from the victory, which had reinforced the supremacy of Sparta. Within Boeotia, political leaders who opposed their state's adherence to Sparta and so aimed at changing Boeotia from an oligarchy to a democracy saw war as the only way forward. There was a similarly minded faction in Corinth. Argos was traditionally hostile to Sparta and after 404 had been left isolated and vulnerable. In Athens, there was a desire for revenge and winning back the lost empire: upper class Athenians wanted to recover property outside Attica; lower class Athenians wanted a return to the military and civilian pay that the empire had made possible.

Sparta was determined to uphold its unchallenged supremacy. It had already fought a war of retribution against Elis (400–399?), and there had been recent signs of discontent in Corinth and Boeotia. Sparta did not initiate the war. In 395, leaders in Thebes in Boeotia induced some Locrians to attack Phocis. When Phocis struck back, the Boeotians attacked Phocis, which then appealed to its ally Sparta for help. Sparta seized upon the opportunity to bring Boeotia into line.

Faced with a Spartan invasion, Boeotia persuaded the Athenians to join in by appealing to their imperial ambitions. Corinth and Argos soon joined these two. An added stimulus for these states to go to war came from a Persian agent who passed on money to leading anti-Spartan politicians, although it is unclear at precisely what point his mission took place, and estimates of its importance vary.

Course

At the outbreak of hostilities in late summer 395 Orchomenus detached itself from the Boeotian federal state. Sparta failed in an offensive against Haliartus in Boeotia that was intended to continue the breakup of Boeotia. In the following summer, the anti-Spartan coalition massed its forces at Corinth but did not move quickly enough on its planned invasion of Laconia. A Spartan army under the regent Aristodemus advanced by an inland route to Sicyon and moved eastward to inflict (ca. July, 394) a severe

but not crushing defeat on the coalition in the vicinity of Corinth in what is usually referred to as the battle of the (River) Nemea.

At the same time, the army under Agesilaus II that had been carrying on Sparta's war against the Persian Empire in Asia Minor had made its way back into Greece by the overland route from the Hellespont. This withdrawal was the intended result of the Persian money sent to Greece. Before Agesilaus entered Boeotia from the north, he received news that a fleet under Conon, financed by Persia and partially manned by Greeks, had defeated the Spartan fleet at Cnidus. His army engaged the coalition forces at Coronea but a highly risky maneuver by Agesilaus against the Boeotians turned what would have been a clear victory into an indecisive outcome (ca. August 394).

The two great pitched battles fought in 394 did not bring the war to a conclusion. Both sides now resorted to maintaining limited forces in fortified positions around Corinth. A stalemate resulted, which was not broken by occasional successes on either side, such as the Spartan capture of the Corinthian port of Lechaenum on the Corinthian Gulf or the destruction of a Spartan *mora* (regiment) by the Athenian Iphicrates' brilliant use of peltasts. About this time, Corinth and Argos joined in some close form of political union, perhaps even forming into a single unitary state. Spartan invasions of their territory ravaged the land of Corinth and Argos but did not force a conclusion. The sequence of events in this latter part of the war is not entirely clear and dating of particular events to years is uncertain.

In 392/1, there were abortive attempts at negotiating a peace but no one state was willing to make concessions. A Spartan attempt to win Persian support went nowhere and Sparta resumed its war in Asia Minor but on a much-reduced scale and without much success. Under the leadership of Thrasybulus Athens built up a navy, began to build up alliances with states in the Aegean, and secured control of the Hellespont and Bosphorus. This revival of Athenian imperialism was in the end enough to convince the Persian king to abandon his support of Athens and support Sparta instead.

Sparta had lost its command of the sea and its allies in the Aegean after the defeat at Cnidus (394) and made only limited attempts to support anti-Athenian movements, such as the oligarchs on Rhodes. Sparta was also called upon to undertake campaigns in northern Greece to retain allies—Agesilaus campaigned for two years to assist the Achaeans in a war against the Acarnanians (389–388).

The Corinthian War had come down to a wide range of small-scale actions in diverse theatres, with neither side able to force a settlement by its own efforts. Such developments as Iphicrates' campaign in the Hellespont and Aeginetan raids and privateering against Athens were destructive but not in themselves sufficient to end the war. The breakthrough came when the Spartan navarch Antalcidas assembled a fleet from Sparta's allies, including Dionysius I of Syracuse, and persuaded the Persians to support Sparta. With these resources, he was able to trap the Athenian fleet within the Hellespont, forcing Athens give up the war. The rest of the anti-Spartan coalition could not continue and had to accept the terms of the "Peace of Antalcidas," dictated by Sparta with the backing of the Persian king (387/6).

Consequences

To secure the Persian king's support, Sparta had to agree to cede to him rule over the Greek cities of Asia Minor. Now supreme in the Greek world, Sparta was able to enforce its war aims: principally, the breaking up of Boeotia into separate cities and the ending of the union between Argos and Corinth. Athens was left isolated and Sparta tightened its dominance over its allies. Xenophon commented that this victory made Sparta "more illustrious" (*Hellenica* 5.1.36) than their victory in the Peloponnesian War.

Douglas Kelly

See also Agesilaus II; Antalcidas; Common Peace; Conon; Cnidus, Battle of; Coronea, Battle of (394); Haliartus, Battle of; Iphicrates; King's Peace; Lechaeum, Battle of; Nemea, Battle of; Peltasts; Thrasybulus

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Coronea, Battle of (447)

A land battle fought in western Boeotia in late 447 (or early 446) during Athens' attempt to control the region. Following the overthrow of

Athenian-established democracies in various Boeotian cities, Athens dispatched 1,000 hoplites under Tolmides to restore the situation. Although Tolmides recaptured Chaeronea, a force of exiles from Orchomenus, assisted by others from Locris and Euboea attacked him on his way home. Tolmides and many of his men were killed and the remainder captured. To secure the release of the prisoners, the Athenians agreed to completely withdraw from Boeotia. The defeat undid Athens' success at Oenophyta (457), led to the revolt of Euboea from Athens, and cut the land routes to Locris and Phocis.

Iain Spence

See also Hoplites; Oenophyta, Battle of; Orchomenus (Boeotia); Tolmides

Further Reading

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Coronea, Battle of (394)

A rather inconclusive land battle fought mid-August 394 during the Corinthian War. The Spartan king Agesilaus II was en route back to aid Sparta after his successful Asian campaign leading troops from Sparta, Greek cities in Asia Minor, and local Greek states such as Phocis and Orchomenus (Boeotia). He had successfully traversed Thessaly when challenged by a coalition force from Argos, Athens, Boeotia, Corinth, Euboea, and Locris. The best ancient account of the battle is by Xenophon, although he is rather pro-Spartan. Xenophon fails to record the numbers involved, other than that the cavalry were about equal, but Agesilaus had a marked superiority in peltasts.

Agesilaus' Spartans on his right wing defeated the Argives and others opposite, but his allied troops on the left were defeated by the Thebans. When the Thebans moved to rejoin the rest of the coalition force Agesilaus adopted the most dangerous course. Instead of letting them past and attacking their rear or flank, he maneuvered his phalanx to meet them head on. Whether this was from over-confidence or a desire to destroy the Thebans (or a mixture of both), it did not succeed as well as Agesilaus clearly hoped. Some of the Thebans (and given Xenophon's generally pro-Spartan attitude, perhaps even many) broke through and escaped. Agesilaus was wounded and, unable to exploit his victory, withdrew south.

See also Agesilaus II; Cavalry; Corinthian War; Hoplites; Orchomenus (Boeotia); Peltasts; Phalanx; Thebes, Thebans

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Corupedium, Battle of (281)

A battle between Alexander the Great's Successors (*diadochoi*), Corupedium was fought in February 281, near Magnesia on the Sipylus, west of Sardis. It was the last battle between men who had served with Alexander—Lysimachus was over 80, and Seleucus I Nicator was 77. Lysimachus had killed his own son, the popular Agathocles, apparently at the instigation of his new wife, Agathocles' stepmother, Arsinoe. Agathocles' widow, Lysandra, fled to Seleucus' court, accompanied by another of Lysimachus' sons, Alexander (born to an Odrysian mother). They appealed to Seleucus who took advantage of the unrest and defections after Agathocles' murder and invaded.

Unfortunately, very little is known of the battle itself, other than that Lysimachus was killed and his army defeated. After the battle, Lysimachus' son Alexander had some difficulty in persuading Lysandra to return Lysimachus' body for burial. Although the battle seemed decisive at the time, Seleucus' assassination by Ptolemy Ceraunus less than a year later undid his success.

Iain Spence

See also Lysimachus; Ptolemy Ceraunus; Seleucus I Nicator; Successors (*Diadochoi*), Wars of

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Cos, Battle of (ca. 262–256)

A naval battle between Macedon and Egypt, fought near the Aegean island of Cos sometime between 262 and 256. Its precise date has been the focus of much scholarship but the battle probably occurred after Athens' surrender at the end of the Chremonidean War and before the Second Syrian-Egyptian War. The Macedonian fleet was commanded in person by Antigonus II Gonatas, the Egyptian fleet by Patroclus, admiral of Ptolemy II Philadelphus.

Antigonus sought a conclusive naval battle to confirm Macedonian primacy and to end Ptolemaic influence in the Aegean, and therefore took the opportunity to confront Patroclus and the Egyptian fleet. Evidence for the battle is fragmentary and scarce: ultimately, Antigonus was outnumbered but victorious

Russell Buzby

See also Antigonus II Gonatas; Chremonidean War; Ptolemy II Philadelphus; Syrian-Egyptian War, Second

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Cotys (d. 359)

An Odrysian king who ruled Thrace from ca. 383/2 to 359. He ruled during a period of resurgent Thracian power and extended his reach over the

Thracian Chersonese and other Aegean coastal cities before being assassinated.

Cotys gained the throne by assassinating his predecessor, then sought to strengthen ties with Athens, which already had a long relationship with the Odrysian dynasts. The Athenian general Iphicrates married Cotys' daughter and assisted in his conquest of the Thracian Chersonese, though apparently stopping short of direct actions against the Athenian settlers there.

Furthering the Thracian program of securing and influencing coastal sites in the Aegean, Cotys assisted the Triballi against Abdera. He quashed the Triballi's later revolt (375). At the same time, heterogeneous trading cities such as the Emporium of Pistiros received Cotys' guarantees and protection, demonstrating the close relations between Thracians and resident Greeks in the hinterland.

By 361, to destabilize the kingdom and regain control over the Thracian Chersonese, Athens instigated a revolt against Cotys, led by his treasurer Miltocythes. However, with Iphicrates' and Charidemus' aid Cotys bribed the Athenian commanders and successfully ended the revolt. An uneasy peace with Athens followed, during which Cotys achieved full control over the Chersonese and allied with Phillip II of Macedon. In 359, Cotys was assassinated by two brothers, Python and Heraclides, who received Athenian citizenship and honors for their deed.

Russell Buzby

See also Charidemus; Chersonese, Thracian; Iphicrates; Thrace, Thracians

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Craterus (d. 321)

Craterus was a high-ranking officer in Alexander III the Great's army. He commanded the left wing at the battles of Issus and Gaugamela and later held independent commands in the campaigns in Sogdiana and India.

In 324, he was commissioned to take back from Opis 10,000 time-expired veterans and to replace Antipater as regent of Macedonia. When Alexander died (June 323), he was still on the march in Cilicia. The Macedonian infantry at Babylon insisted that Craterus be made guardian of Philip III Arrhidaeus, their choice for the succession. Craterus took his army into Greece and with Antipater ended the Lamian War in Greece by defeating the Greeks at Crannon (322).

Craterus now cooperated with Antipater, whose daughter he married. It is not known when and how his commission to take over Macedonia was changed, but Craterus accepted whatever arrangement was made. In 321, he and Antipater led their combined armies into Asia Minor. Antipater then moved against Perdiccas and Craterus against Eumenes of Cardia. Craterus was killed in battle against Eumenes but most of his army escaped.

Craterus had been one of Alexander's most trusted and capable commanders. He was highly popular with the rank and file of the Macedonian army but never aimed at personal power. If he had lived he might have moderated the conflicts among the Successors.

Douglas Kelly

See also Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon; Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon, Indian Campaign; Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon, Invasion of Persian Empire; Antipater; Eumenes of Cardia; Gaugamela, Battle of; Issus, Battle of; Lamian War; Perdiccas; Successors (*Diadochoi*), Wars of

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Crimes, War.* See *War Crimes

Crimisus River, Battle of (341).* See *Timoleon

[Crete, Cretans](#)

Crete is the largest island in, and forms the southern bulwark to, the Aegean Sea. Its prominence and location encouraged the development and exchange of goods and ideas from Egypt, the Near East, and the Aegean world. During the Bronze Age, through until the seventh century, Crete was both powerful and significant in the development of Greek culture; however, during the Classical and Hellenistic Periods, it was seen as something of a cultural backwater. From around 2000, the island was the site of extensive settlement by an unknown people called the Minoans, who left an archaeological record replete with art, large settlements with extensive structures, a complex social system, and an early syllabic script known as Linear A. These sites, of which the famous palace at Knossos is the largest, have evidence of imported material and luxury goods (such as ivory and jewelry) from Egypt and the Near East. By the end of the Bronze Age, Crete had a distinctly Mycenaean culture and likely exerted some control over islands in the Aegean.

Decentralization and immigration occurred between 1200 and 1000; the last arrivals were Greeks speaking the Dorian dialect. Crete continued to enjoy contacts with both the Levant and mainland Greece, with traders from both regions attested from 900 to 650. During this time, Crete began to undergo orientalization, adopting the alphabet and certain artistic styles that were heavily influenced from Phoenicia. To Homer, Crete was known as the island of a hundred cities, although Crete's dominance and influence waned over the following centuries, leaving the island as something of a cultural backwater during the Classical Period.

During the Hellenistic Period, Crete was wracked by internecine strife and social conflicts, caused by the increase in landless debtors and citizens. This also led to emigration from the island, with Cretans often seeking their fortunes overseas as mercenaries; they became renowned as slingers and archers, serving in Hellenistic armies and often settling down near where they served (especially in Egypt and Asia Minor). Early in the third century, a Cretan Federation was founded by its leading cities, although Knossos and Gortyn continually squabbled over the leadership. Crete also became home to many pirates, and their raids along the coast of Asia Minor led to the outbreak of two wars with Rhodes (in 206–204 and 155–153). At the same time, the Cretan Federation began to disintegrate, as Knossos and Gortyn declared war on Lyttos—the largest Cretan city that was not a member. Civil unrest and political strife enveloped many Cretan cities during the

war, lasting from 222 to 219, with the Federation eventually disintegrating.

The cities of Crete supported Philip V in a new alliance in 217/6 to extend his control over the eastern Aegean, despite war with Rhodes. Ptolemaic Egypt also exerted a heavy influence on the island, with a garrison being installed under Ptolemy VI Philometor. Intermittent conflict continued between Knossos and Gortyn during the second century, and Crete was a renowned home of pirates and slave-traders. Vexed both by Cretan piracy and by Cretan mercenary service in the armies of Mithridates VI Eupator, the Romans decisively conquered Crete in 67.

Russell Buzby

See also Archers; Mercenaries; Mithridates VI Eupator; Philip V; Piracy; Ptolemy VI Philometor; Rhodes, Rhodians

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Crocus Field, Battle of (ca. 353/2)

The Crocion Plain (often anglicized as “Crocus Field”) was the flat plain on the western shore of the Pagasaeon Gulf (the modern Gulf of Volos; the plain is now the site of an airport). The battle of Crocus Field was probably the most important battle of the Third Sacred War. The battle was between the Phocians, commanded by Onomarchus, and the Macedonians, commanded by Philip II, competing for a dominant position in Thessaly; Philip had captured the nearby city of Pagasae shortly before the battle. Onomarchus had 20,000 infantry and 500 cavalry; his army included

Phocians, troops supplied by his Thessalian allies, the Pheraeans, and above all a large number of mercenaries. Philip commanded a Macedonian and Thessalian army of more than 20,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry. Given the flat nature of the ground, Philip's superior cavalry was decisive, and he won a crushing victory.

An Athenian fleet, commanded by Chares, was off-shore (probably arriving too late to defend Pagasae), and many of Onomarchus' soldiers, knowing that Athens was allied with Phocis, drowned or were killed trying to swim out to it. Diodorus claims that 6,000 of Onomarchus' army were killed, and a further 3,000 prisoners executed after the battle. Onomarchus himself was one of the dead, possibly being crucified by Philip. The victory left Philip undisputed master of Thessaly, and Pherae was quick to submit.

Peter Londey

See also Chares; Onomarchus; Pherae; Philip II of Macedon; Phocis, Phocians; Prisoners of War and Slavery; Sacred War, Third

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Croesus of Lydia (ca. 595–547)

Croesus was the king of Lydia, the son of Alyattes. Herodotus calls him the first to exact tribute from the Greeks of Asia Minor. Croesus was defeated by Cyrus of Persia, after Cyrus' deposition of Astyages, Croesus' brother in law and Cyrus' own grandfather.

Solon of Athens was reputed to have visited Croesus in Sardis, at the height of the Lydian Empire. His indifference to Croesus' wealth annoyed Croesus, as did his suggestion that you cannot judge a man to be happy until he is dead. However, Solon's advice was demonstrated when Croesus' eldest son, Atys, was killed in a hunting accident.

Croesus is famous for consulting the Delphic Oracle on whether to attack Persia and being told that if he fought Persia, a great empire would fall. Thinking the oracle meant the Persian Empire and not his, he made an alliance with the Egyptian king Amasis, then the Spartans, and invaded Cappadocia, part of the Persian Empire. The first battle at Pteria was

inconclusive, and Croesus withdrew to Sardis to await reinforcements. Cyrus pursued immediately and attacked before this could happen, placing his camels in front of the army to spook the Lydian cavalry. The Lydians ended up besieged in Sardis, which fell because an observant soldier noticed a scalable point on the acropolis.

Croesus was sentenced to death, but was reprieved at the last minute and became an advisor to Cyrus, and later Cambyses (according to Herodotus). It is possible that Croesus was the ruler under whom electrum was separated into gold and silver for minting.

Abigail Dawson

See also Alyattes; Cyrus II; Solon

Further Reading

QQ 20–21; Herodotus 1.26–94, 207–208, 3.14–47, 6.37–38.

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Croton

Croton was a Greek colony located in the “toe” of Italy, on a site chosen for its safe harborage. It was also famous as the place where Pythagoras worked at the end of the sixth century. Croton eventually became one of the most prosperous and prominent cities in Magna Graecia, with walls 12 miles (19.3 kilometers) in circumference. According to conflicting traditions, Croton was colonized by Achaeans in either 733 or 710, under Myscellus of Rhype. The city grew rapidly in importance and influence, sending out and establishing colonies of its own, such as Terina and Caulonia. It expanded its power within southern Italy, often at the expense of its neighbors, dominating neighboring settlements such as Lametium and Scylacium. Allied with Sybaris and Metapontum, Croton attacked and destroyed Siris (c. 540). Despite simultaneously fighting with the native Italian tribes of the hinterlands, Croton went on to betray her former ally and destroyed Sybaris in 510. It was at this point that Croton had reached the height of her power, even sending a ship to the battle of Salamis in 480.

Shortly thereafter, Croton was attacked and defeated by the combined forces of Locri and Rhegium, beginning its long, slow decline. Nonetheless, Croton was still an important city in the region, controlled an extensive territory, and in the late fifth century formed the Italiote League to unify the Greek cities of southern Italy. Depredations by the local Italian peoples—many migrating southward in response to the growing power of Rome—greatly damaged the economic and trade potential of the region. Nevertheless, the city was still well populated when attacked and subjugated by Dionysius I of Syracuse in 379/8. After this, Croton's lands were repeatedly raided by Lucanians and Bruttians, and Taras took over leadership of the Italiote League as the strongest Greek city in southern Italy in the fourth century. Croton was again captured by the Syracusans, this time under Agathocles in 296/5. Successive wars—Pyrrhic and Punic—spelled the end for Croton, with the Romans occupying the city in 277. A revolt during the Second Punic War led to Croton being abandoned, and later being resettled as a Roman colony in 194.

Russell Buzby

See also Agathocles; Colonies, Colonization; Dionysius I of Syracuse; Italy, Greek Cities in; Italy, Italians; Pyrrhus; Rome, Romans; Salamis, Battle of (480); Siris, Destruction by Croton, Metapontum, and Sybaris; Sybaris/Thurii; Syracuse, Campaigns in Italy under Dionysius I; Taras/Tarentum. *Roman Section*: Punic War, Second

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Crypteia

The *crypteia* was a Spartan secret police force whose main function appears to have been to maintain control over the subjugated Helot population. Aristotle suggested that the *crypteia* had been introduced into Sparta by

Lycurgus, the Spartan lawgiver. Although little is known about it, it appears to have been composed of young men approximately 18 or 19 years old not long out of the *agoge* and deemed to be among the smartest of the Spartiates. Upon taking annual office, the Ephors would declare war on the Helots sending members of the *crypteia* to position themselves around Sparta. Armed only with a knife, they were provided with minimal supplies and instructed to kill any Helots seen out at night, and whenever the opportunity arose, to kill any particularly strong looking Helots. It has also been suggested that the institution of the *crypteia* was designed to teach the most capable of Spartan warriors to act alone or in small groups, skills that can be associated with guerrilla warfare and which ran counter to the traditions of hoplite group warfare. This provided an elite irregular unit which, for example, Cleomenes was able to utilize as a reconnaissance and scouting force at Sellasia.

Michael (Maxx) Schmitz

See also Agoge; Cleomenes III; Helots; Sellasia, Battle of; Sparta

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Ctesias (ca. 450–ca. 380)

Ctesias of Cnidus was a physician who was taken prisoner by Persians. His skill as a doctor earned him a respected position as the royal physician for 17 years. Ctesias himself recounted that he treated the wounded King Artaxerxes II at the battle of Cunaxa in 401 (Xenophon, *Anabasis* 1.8.26; Plutarch, *Artaxerxes* 11).

On his return to Greece in the 390s Ctesias published a 27-book *Persica* (*Persian History*) that also dealt with other near eastern kingdoms preceding the Persians. The scale of the work was enormous: compare Herodotus’ nine books. Ctesias also wrote an *Indica* and a geographical work.

Ctesias claimed to have based his history on “Royal Parchments”

(Diodorus 2.32). There is no other evidence, or even any likelihood, that these existed. Nor is there any sign that Ctesias was able to read any cuneiform script or speak Aramaic or any other eastern language.

Ctesias' work survives only in excerpts and in quotations or borrowings. He recounted a suspiciously large part that he played in Greek-Persian affairs in the years 400–397. His accounts of early near eastern dynasties seem based on current legends and he treated with relish the murderous power struggles in the Persian court. He was widely regarded in antiquity as a picturesque liar.

Douglas Kelly

See also Artaxerxes II; Cunaxa, Battle of; Persian (Achaemenid) Empire; Xenophon

Further Reading

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Cumae

Cumae (modern Cuma) was the first Greek colony on the mainland of Italy, founded ca. 740 by Euboeans on the bay of Naples. It was the dominant city in the region of Campania and was the mother-city of a number of other Greek colonies in south Italy.

Etruscan expansion into Campania was checked when Cumae under its tyrant Aristodemus defeated the Etruscans under Lars Porsenna at Aricia in 505. A further Etruscan thrust in 474 was defeated in a naval battle off Cumae by a combined fleet of Cumae and its ally Hieron I, tyrant of Syracuse.

In 421, Samnite hill-tribes known as Oscans that had been moving into Campania captured Cumae. The city retained some Greek population but from now on was predominantly Oscan. Cumae had been friendly with Rome until the Oscan conquest but now was ranged with Rome's Samnite enemies. Roman expansion into Campania broke the Oscans' links with the

Samnite hill tribes and in 338 Cumae became part of Rome's federation.

Douglas Kelly

See also Colonies, Colonization; Etruria, Etruscans; Hieron I of Syracuse

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Cunaxa, Battle of (401)

The battle of Cunaxa (probably modern Tell-al-Kenisa, approximately 28 miles [60 kilometers] north of Babylon) was fought in late summer 401, between the armies of Artaxerxes, king of Persia, and his younger brother Cyrus.

Cyrus, advancing from the north, placed some 12,900 Greek mercenaries on his right, and took up the center position next to the Greeks with his personal regiment of 600 cavalry. His 100,000 Asiatic infantry, 20 scythed chariots, and the rest of his 3,000 cavalry were on his left.

On the day, Artaxerxes had 6,000 cavalry and 150 scythed chariots. Reports of the size of his infantry vary, reflecting the usual Greek difficulty with such large numbers: 900,000 (Xenophon); 400,000 in all (Ctesias, Diodorus Siculus).

Cyrus relied on his Greek infantry to break their opponents. Immediately before the armies engaged, he ordered them to move obliquely to their left, apparently to attack Artaxerxes, who was stationed in the center of an army that far outnumbered his enemy and was thus outside the Greek direct line of attack.

Cyrus' order was not carried out. The Greek charge cleared away the troops opposite them and in their advance they lost contact with Cyrus. Cyrus himself made a brave but ill-judged attempt to strike at Artaxerxes with his 600 cavalry. He wounded him before being cut down. At his death, his Asiatic army gave up. Artaxerxes' right wing attacked Cyrus' encampment in the rear of his army but were beaten off from the Greek section by the guard stationed there. The Greeks who had pursued their defeated opponents for some 3 miles (4.8 kilometers) returned to find

themselves isolated.

The battle of Cunaxa again demonstrated the superiority of Greek hoplites against Persian infantry. This, and the success of Greek mercenaries in fighting their way home (their epic journey is recorded in Xenophon's *Anabasis*) led to renewed Greek military activity against the Persians, beginning with Agesilaus II of Sparta and culminating in Alexander the Great's conquest of the Persian Empire.

Douglas Kelly

See also Agesilaus II; Artaxerxes II; Clearchus; Ctesias; Cyrus the Younger; Hoplites; Peltast; Persian (Achaemenid) Empire; Mercenaries; Xenophon

Further Reading

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Curtius Rufus (First or Second Century CE, or Later)

Curtius Rufus, author of a history, in Latin, of Alexander the Great is often identified with the self-made man who became consul in Rome in 43 CE (Tacitus, *Annals* 11.21), but there is no certainty over his identity or date. His *History of Alexander* is in 10 books. The first two are lost; Book 3 begins in 333. There are also a number of gaps in the text, including a long one in Book 10, so that the account of events from the mutiny at Opis to just before Alexander's death is missing. The personal name "Quintus" (to make him Quintus Curtius Rufus) is attested only in later manuscripts of the work.

The work is strident in tone, much given to moralizing judgments and attribution of personal motives. There are numerous speeches in the work, probably mostly composed out of the author's head.

The work is believed to derive to a large extent from the sensationalizing "Vulgate" or popular tradition about Alexander that was associated with the (near contemporary?) historian Cleitarchus. Curtius Rufus gives only the scantest indication of sources known to him (e.g., on Cleitarchus: 9.5.21, 8.15). Despite the issues, useful material can be extracted from his often surprisingly detailed account.

See also Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon; Arrian; Cleitarchus

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Cynoscephalae, Battle of (364)

Cynoscephalae, a ridge line in the territory of Scotussa in Thessaly named after its dog heads' shape, dominated the neighboring plain and Pharsalus-Larissa road. On July 13, 364 (dated by an eclipse of the sun) the Theban general Pelopidas led 7,000 men from Thebes to join perhaps 10,000 Thessalians resisting Alexander of Pherae's attempt to dominate the region. Alexander's force of Thessalians and mercenaries was perhaps as much as 20,000 strong. Alexander got to the heights at Cynoscephalae first but Pelopidas' cavalry scattered the enemy horse onto the plain. When his infantry was unable to progress uphill against the enemy's missiles, Pelopidas pushed to the front and led the men on. His presence inspired them, and Alexander's troops began to fall back. With the arrival of Pelopidas' cavalry to assist, the enemy were pushed off the crest. At this point Pelopidas, who had a personal grudge against Alexander, charged him. Although causing casualties among his guard and getting tantalizingly close to Alexander, Pelopidas was cut down. Alexander's troops were routed by a final cavalry charge, losing around 3,000 men. Another Theban victory soon afterward crushed Alexander's ambitions and forced him to give up all the territory he had gained and restrict his activities to Pherae. This second victory suggests that Cynoscephalae was not decisive. The loss of Pelopidas, a driving force in Thebes' military success, was a heavy price to pay and the first step in its subsequent decline.

Iain Spence

See also Alexander of Pherae; Pelopidas; Thessaly, Thessalians

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Cynoscephalae, Battle of (197)

The battle of Cynoscephalae in Thessaly ended the Second Macedonian War, sealed Rome's political dominance over Greece, and signaled the beginning of the end for the kingdom of Macedon. It is also significant for demonstrating the vulnerability of the ponderous *sarissa* phalanx (see second illustration in Phalanx entry) to maneuverable close-combat heavy infantry such as the Roman legion. This was proven again at Pydna (168), which completed the Roman destruction of Macedon and saw the Roman legion replace the phalanx as the preeminent infantry force.

Philip V of Macedon faced the Roman commander Titus Quinctius Flamininus. After various skirmishes the two sides headed north to find favorable ground for a decisive engagement. After a few days marching, the two armies camped on either side of a range of hills, neither knowing about the presence of the other. The next morning dense fog covered everything, significantly reducing visibility. Reconnaissance forces sent by both Philip and Flamininus to occupy the heights clashed, with the Romans initially coming off worse. As Philip's vanguard gained the upper hand, Roman reinforcements arrived and began to force the Macedonians back. This prompted Philip to send most of his cavalry and mercenaries in force to win the skirmish at the ridge. Both armies were deployed and headed to the top of the hill for a full engagement. Flamininus positioned his right wing at the foot of the hills fronted by elephants while he led the left wing up to the summit. Philip with half the phalanx and his peltasts reached the top first and, after doubling the phalanx's depth, met the Roman infantry head on and quickly routed them, the hill and the length of the *sarissae* preventing the Roman infantry from closing to be able to use their swords. At this setback Flamininus moved to command his right wing, leading it up the hill to attack Philip's left wing. These Macedonian forces had only just reached the summit and were still in disorder watching the battle to their right

rather than preparing to fight. The phalanx did not have time to form up properly and so was quickly defeated, the soldiers fleeing down the hill in panic.

At this point, both sides had won on their respective right wing but the Romans were the first to turn to face the victorious enemy. A Roman tribune, apparently acting without orders, took 20 maniples from the right and attacked the remaining half of the Macedonian phalanx in the rear. Unable to change face quickly on account of the length of their *sarissae*, the Macedonian phalangites raised or dropped their weapons to show surrender. The Romans did not understand this signal and hacked their way into the middle of the dense formation of men. Philip and the remnants of his right wing then joined the flight of the rest of the army, having suffered great losses to the phalanx.

Graham Wrightson

See also Elephants; Macedonian War, Second; Philip V; Pydna, Battle of; Rome, Romans

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Cynossema, Battle of (411). See Hellespont Campaign (411–410)

Cyprus

Cyprus is a large island situated in the eastern Mediterranean, just off the coast of Cilicia (modern Turkey), and close by the Levant. Although occupied from around 9000, it was during the Early Bronze Age that significant immigration from Asia Minor led to the widespread settlement

of the island, with numerous centers and cities developing. The Bronze Age was a time of prosperity for the island, with its rich copper mines giving the island its current name. It was also an important site for trade with the Near East, with many trade-oriented settlements developing along its southern and eastern coasts. The island also visited, traded with, and was well known to, Bronze Age Egypt. Archaeological remains indicate trade with Syria, Egypt, Phoenicia, Crete, and the Greek world.

Settled by Phoenicians in the ninth century, the island remained distinctly Greek in character, with 8 of the 10 kings of the island bearing Greek names in the seventh century when the island fell under the political influence of the Assyrians (outright conquest is not clear from the sources). By the sixth century, the influence of the Assyrians had waned, and was replaced by the Egyptians under Amasis. In ca. 525, the island was conquered by the Persians under Cambyses, and was combined with Syria and Palestine to form the fifth satrapy of the Persian (Achaemenid) Empire. Despite this, the island's monarchies seem to have survived, retaining a degree of autonomy and prosperity within the Persian satrapal system.

All of the Cyprian kingdoms—with the notable exception of Amathus—joined with the Greeks and rebelled against Persia during the Ionian Revolt. The rebellion was swiftly and decisively crushed by a vengeful Persia. However, the rebellion had a long-lasting impact on the social fabric of the island, reinforcing the Hellenism of its inhabitants and leaders. After the Persian Wars, Cyprus was briefly freed by Cimon; much of the fifth century was spent with Athens and Persia fighting for control over the island. In 411/10, Evagoras the king of Salamis swept the Persians from the island and promoted Greek culture, language, and art over Phoenician influences. This Hellenism did not survive Evagoras, who was defeated in 380 and then assassinated in 374 in a court intrigue. The struggle for independence from Persia lasted until Alexander the Great's victory at the battle of Issus in 333. The Cypriot fleet assisted Alexander in his siege of Tyre. In 295–294, the island became part of Ptolemaic Egypt under Ptolemy I Soter, before being annexed by the Romans in 58. Caesar restored Cyprus to Egypt between 46 and 44, but it passed back under Roman control when Egypt was annexed in 30.

Russell Buzby

See also Athens, Expedition to Cyprus; Cimon; Cleopatra VII; Evagoras;

Ionian Revolt; Persian (Achaemenid) Empire; Phoenicia, Phoenicians; Ptolemy I Soter; Successors (*Diadochoi*), Wars of

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Cypselus (d. ca. 625)

Cypselus, tyrant of Corinth, was father of Periander. Herodotus' account of him follows the story pattern of the endangered child who is saved, but is in the context of a speech denouncing tyranny. Cypselus' tyranny and that of his son are given as examples of the terrorizing acts committed by tyrants.

Cypselus was born to Eetion and Labda, a daughter of the Bacchiadae, the ruling class. Labda was disabled and so (unusually) was married outside the Bacchiadae. Two separate oracles suggested, first to Eetion and then to the Bacchiadae, that Cypselus would rule Corinth. The Bacchiadae sent men to kill Cypselus, but these were overcome by pity for the baby initially and failed to kill him. Labda overheard their intent as they remonstrated with each other and changed their minds, and hid Cypselus in a container (variously called a grain jar or a beehive, a *kypselē*, from which his name is taken) until the men left. This story is very similar to that of Cyrus (Herodotus), but without the positive connotations associated with Cyrus. Both Cyrus and Cypselus are put into containers, as dead infants were traditionally prepared for burial in ancient Greece.

Cypselus survived due his mother's initiative and later became the tyrant of Corinth, encouraged to do so by another oracle. He is reputed to have executed large numbers of citizens, exiled many others, and confiscated their property. He is said to have ruled for 30 years.

A variant on the tradition reported by Nicholas of Damascus, possibly drawn from the historian Ephorus, is far more positive and suggests that Cypselus became a popular leader in Corinth. He killed the last Bacchiad ruler and proceeded to exile his enemies, recalling those sent into exile by the Bacchiadae. He is said to have ruled as a benevolent king with the favor

and support of the Corinthian populace, to such a degree that he required no bodyguard.

Abigail Dawson

See also Corinth, Corinthians; Periander; Tyrants, Tyranny

Further Reading

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Cyreans. See Ten Thousand, March of the (401–400)

Cyrene

A city in North Africa (modern Libya) situated in a fertile region of the Mediterranean coast known as Cyrenaica. It was separated from Egypt to the east and Tunisia to the west by vast deserts, which focused much of Cyrene’s trade and contact north toward Crete and Greece, rather than to other parts of Africa.

Cyrene was allegedly founded in 630 by colonists from Thera (on modern Santorini), led by Battus. Though the detailed foundation myth related by Herodotus is probably legendary, a fourth century inscription shows that the Cyrenaeans continued to believe the city was settled by Therans escaping food shortages at home.

The royal dynasty, the Battiads, ruled Cyrene independently until submitting to Cambyses in 525. In 413, during the Second Peloponnesian War, Cyrene supplied two triremes and pilots to Spartan forces. Later, having submitted to Alexander the Great, Cyrene was conquered by Ptolemy I Soter’s general Ophellas, and a pro-Egyptian oligarchy installed. After minor revolts in 312–309 and 306, Ptolemy I installed his son Magas as governor, and the city remained part of the Ptolemaic kingdom until interference by the Roman Senate in 163.

See also Colonies, Colonization; Egypt, Egyptians; Ptolemies; Ptolemy I Soter; Ptolemy VI Philometor

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Cyrus II (Reigned 559–530)

Starting as king of Anshan (in Fars), Cyrus created an empire stretching from Central Asia to the Aegean in under 25 years. A four-year war (553–550) against Astyages of Media gave him western Iran. In 547, he crossed the Tigris on his way to Lydia (a traditional suggestion, denied by some collators of the crucial cuneiform text and reaffirmed by others) or perhaps Armenia. Lydia was certainly conquered by the late 540s, exposing the Aegean seaboard to Persian annexation. Then in 539, Cyrus crossed the Tigris, defeated Nabonidus' forces near Opis and entered Babylon within 15 days. While Nabonidus was unpopular with some Babylonians, their effective contribution to the outcome is unknown and many others certainly fell at Opis resisting the conqueror. Cyrus eventually died in central Asia extending a frontier whose establishment involved conflicts in eastern Iran and beyond (545–540, 538–530). The scale and rapidity of his achievement is startling.

Recent scholarship stresses an Elamite component in the birth of Persian imperialism. Cyrus' name was Elamite, Anshan had been an appanage of Elamite kings and the Elamite-language bureaucracy of Persepolis demonstrates Elam's legacy. But what empowered Cyrus surely came from Fars, not Susa; and it was in Fars that he created a royal city at Pasargadae, whose architecture and iconography were not primarily Elamite. What won power was military conquest; innovation in recruitment, tactics, and weaponry may be the key, but relevant direct evidence is lacking. Cyrus' reputation has benefited from the Hebrew Bible, though his authorization of

the reconstruction of the Temple is a fiction. It is also wrong to call his edict to Babylon (the “Cyrus Cylinder”) a Charter of Human Rights. The document was particular and not universal and was driven by political expediency and autocratic benevolence, not the application of general principles about human worth.

Christopher Tuplin

See also Croesus of Lydia; Persian (Achaemenid) Empire

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Cyrus the Younger (ca. 423–401)

One of Darius II’s four sons, and the first born after his father became king. His mother’s suggestion that (like Xerxes) he should therefore be his successor was rejected, but she did save him when Tissaphernes accused him of plotting to assassinate the new king, Artaxerxes II. His royal ambitions were undiminished by this episode and, reinstated in the Anatolian satrapies he had held since 407, he planned a military challenge. The experience and personal connections gained from funding Spartan fleets in 407–405 helped him assemble the largest Greek mercenary army yet seen in the Aegean world and, with this and Anatolia-based non-Greek forces, he marched east (401).

Belatedly warned of the danger by Tissaphernes (who had been fighting Cyrus for control of Miletus), Artaxerxes confronted him six months later at Cunaxa in northern Babylonia. Cyrus’ mercenaries easily defeated their

opponents, but the battle's outcome was settled by a cavalry encounter in which Cyrus wounded Artaxerxes but died in the ensuing *melée*.

Since Ctesias' *Persica* is known only in fragments, our fullest source for these events is Xenophon's *Anabasis*, Book 1 of which conveys a distinctive picture of Cyrus through detailed narrative and a laudatory obituary chapter. A model product of court education, Cyrus displayed physical courage, had mastered the technical skills of a Persian aristocrat (horsemanship and use of weaponry) and knew how to exercise leadership by keeping his word, punishing wrongdoing (the spectacle of mutilated criminals allegedly kept Anatolian roads safe for travelers), and, above all, taking pleasure in rewarding loyalty and success generously.

His politic empathy with subordinates even supposedly extended to suggesting that it would have been better to have been born a free Greek than a powerful Persian. In short: "all who can claim to have known him agree that no Persian since the Elder Cyrus was more like a king or more deserving of the throne" and "I have heard of nobody whom I judge to have been loved by more Greeks or barbarians" (Xenophon, *Anabasis* 1.9.1, 28).

Cyrus' fratricidal ambition, overconfidence immediately before Cunaxa (Artaxerxes' appearance caught him unawares), and fatal impetuosity during it perhaps undercut Xenophon's praise. But his successful cooperation with the equally ambitious Lysander and ability to mount a credible military challenge to Artaxerxes suggest that he had remarkable qualities. Nor should we forget that he was at most 22 years of age when he died.

Christopher Tuplin

See also Artaxerxes II; Clearchus; Ctesias; Cunaxa, Battle of; Lysander; Tissaphernes; Xenophon; Xerxes

Further Reading

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Cyzicus, Battle of (410). See Hellespont Campaign (411–410)

D

Darius I (Reigned 522–486)



A relief from the Persian capital, Persepolis, showing a Persian king receiving officials. The image is often identified as Darius I, though in fact it may not be intended to represent any particular king or it may represent Xerxes. The king's feet do not touch the ground, an important attribute according to Plutarch. (Roger Wood/Corbis)

Darius became king by assassinating a man who had usurped the throne from Cambyses. This man purported to be Cambyses' brother Bardiya, but Darius asserted (perhaps untruthfully) that he was an impostor. In any event, with Darius the kingship passed from the family of Cyrus to a new (Achaemenid) dynasty. His coup provoked resistance from supporters of the previous dynasty and empire-wide turmoil. It took 19 battles and the elimination of 9 pretenders to restore order: so Darius claimed in a victory monument at Behistun which began the assertion of a distinctive ideology in which imperial power ultimately flowed from the god Ahuramazda and was characterized by peaceful coexistence between king and subjects. There were other innovations, for example, systematization of tribute-collection (the king's way of taking a clear profit from local taxation) and the development of Persepolis and Susa as the principal heartland capitals, and there was also imperial expansion.

During 521–512, Darius defeated central Asiatic Scythians, annexed part of the Indus valley, asserted suzerainty in Macedonia and eastern Thrace, and crossed the Danube—where, however, a nomadic enemy proved recalcitrant. Over a decade later westward expansion resumed, leading (after the Ionian Revolt) to the temporary setback of Marathon. Study of Darius' world has been transformed lately by systematic work on Babylonian archives (illuminating the burden on a rich imperial province) and the Persepolis Fortification texts (illuminating the political economy, religious landscape, and complex bureaucracy of the Persian heartland).

Christopher Tuplin

See also Cyrus II; Ionian Revolt; Marathon, Battle of; Persian Wars

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Darius II (Reigned 423–404)

On Artaxerxes I's death, three brothers claimed the throne, Xerxes, Sogdianus (who murdered Xerxes in his bed), and Darius, who mounted a successful military challenge to Sogdianus. Subsequent revolts by another brother (Arsites) and satraps Tissuthnes (Lydia) and Terituchmes (uncertain location) failed, as did a later Median insurrection. Other notable events involved Egypt (native unrest; authorization of Passover celebration at Elephantine; destruction of the Jewish temple there) and the Greek frontier. Serious Persian involvement in the Second Peloponnesian War began in 412 and, with effective cooperation between Lysander and Cyrus, assured Sparta's victory.

Christopher Tuplin

See also Artaxerxes I; Cyrus the Younger; Lysander; Peloponnesian War, Second

Further Reading

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Darius III (Reigned 336/5–330)

Before becoming king, Artasatiš, the future Darius III, was satrap of

Armenia (his reward from Artaxerxes III for killing a Cadusian in single combat) and royal *astandes* (“messenger,” but perhaps in overall charge of communications). The claim that his grandfather was Artaxerxes II’s brother may be an official fiction, since such a grandfather should have been killed during Artaxerxes III’s brutal elimination of rivals at the time of his own accession. Like Artaxerxes IV (338–336), he was made king by Bagoas but, unlike him, was ruthless enough to survive the experience. Insurrections in Egypt and (perhaps) Babylonia were evidently suppressed, and, faced with Alexander’s arrival in Anatolia, Darius initially assumed he would be contained by local forces.

Their catastrophic defeat at Granicus (334) and Alexander’s willingness to march inland despite continuing Persian resistance at Halicarnassus and in the Aegean called for a change of approach. The death of Memnon, the Greek general to whom Darius (remarkably, if not unprecedentedly) entrusted Granicus’ western front after Granicus was also a factor. The strategy for Alexander’s definitive defeat now lay in the mobilization of two large royal armies, led into battle by Darius himself at Issus (southern Cilicia) in 333 and Gaugamela (northern Mesopotamia) in 331—and on both occasions roundly defeated. Each time Darius fled (see illustration in Alexander, Invasion of Persian Empire entry), which was prudent (in the interests of further resistance) but invited accusations of cowardice, not helped by claims that Darius sought to negotiate a division of the empire with Alexander before or after Issus.

After Gaugamela, Darius moved first to Media and then toward Bactria. What he expected to achieve is uncertain because he was murdered by the Bactrian satrap Bessus, who proclaimed himself king (Artaxerxes V) and then also fell victim to treachery. The difficulty Alexander experienced in pacifying Bactria-Sogdiana hardly guarantees that, had Darius retained his authority, he could have used the region to launch a successful counter attack. Nor is it certain that that loss of authority proves he was a hopeless leader from the outset. Alexander honored Darius once he was safely dead, and uplifting stories were told about Darius’ gratitude for Alexander’s proper treatment of his captured womenfolk. But these may be as suspect as the stories about abortive negotiations or reports that some Greek mercenaries were his most loyal supporters to the end or that there was a death-bed conversation with Alexander.

Gaugamela and Bessus appear fleetingly in Babylonian texts and either

Gaugamela or Issus is referenced in the Egyptian Somtutefnahkt *stele*, but knowledge of Darius is almost entirely dependent on the Greco-Roman sources that record his empire's demise. Some think this makes recovery of the historical Darius peculiarly difficult, but at least, unlike the Iranian tradition represented by Firdausi, Greeks never claimed Alexander and Darius were half-brothers.

Christopher Tuplin

See also Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon, Invasion of Persian Empire; Artaxerxes III; Gaugamela, Battle of; Granicus, Battle of; Issus, Battle of; Memnon and Mentor of Rhodes

Further Reading

Diodorus 17; Arrian 1–3; Plutarch, *Alexander* 15–21, 29–34, 37–39, 42–43; Curtius Rufus 3.1–13, 4.1,5–16, 5.1–3, 6.13; Justin 11.4–15; Kuhrt (cited below) pp. 418–465.

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Dead, Treatment of

In wars between Greeks, the general practice was to recover one's own dead and not to mistreat the corpses of the enemy. This was not always observed, however, and it was not unknown during civil conflict for corpses to be mistreated or at least not accorded the normal burial rites.

Although the niceties were perhaps not regarded as applying to *barbaroi*, or non-Greek speakers (although Pausanias at Plataea in 479 is a counter example), in warfare between Greeks the dead were supposed to be respected. One's own dead were respectfully recovered and either laid to rest at the site or, if close enough, returned home for burial. An extreme example of this (although admittedly involving royalty and therefore

unusual) was the transport of King Agesilaus' corpse home to Sparta from Asia Minor, covered in wax to preserve it. In 425, after the battle of Solygeia, Nicias sacrificed his claim to the victory by requesting a truce to reclaim two Athenian corpses which had been missed when the Athenians had removed their dead from the battlefield. If the corpses were returned home, in some cases, for example at Athens, a public ceremony could be held for their burial and they were commemorated on monuments or inscriptions.

The enemy dead, on the other hand, were regularly stripped of their arms and armor and then returned under a truce. For this reason, fierce combat could occur to prevent the enemy gaining possession of the body of a leader or other notable, or even a friend (see first illustration in Hoplites entry). As noted above, asking for a truce for the return of the dead was a formal admission of defeat, because it acknowledged that the side requesting it did not control the battlefield. It was rare for the dead not to be returned, although the aftermath of the battle of Delium (424) provides a well-known example where return of the dead was used as a bargaining tool.

The most famous literary example of mistreatment of a corpse (albeit a foreigner) is of Hector. After Achilles had stripped him of his armor (which he had previously stripped from Achilles' friend Patroclus) the Greeks who came to look at the corpse stabbed it with their spears. Achilles then cut a slit between Hector's ankles and tendons, threaded thongs through them and hitched the corpse to the back of his chariot, so that he could drag it around the city of Troy in front of the horrified gaze of Hector's relatives, wife, and fellow citizens. However, Hector was a foreigner, Achilles was known for his savagery, was distraught with grief at Patroclus' death, and it represents a very early period of Greek warfare. Another well-known literary example is from Sophocles' *Antigone*. Here, Creon of Thebes decreed that the corpse of Polyneices, a prince of Thebes who had led a foreign army against his own city to press his claim to rule, should be left out in the open to rot or be eaten by birds and animals.

Although they must have occurred, incidents such as these in the Classical Period are rare in the historical record. The corpses of Nicias and Demosthenes, who were executed as prisoners of war in Syracuse in 413, however, were supposedly left in the open to decay.

Civil conflict, which could bring out particularly high emotions, could

also result in the mistreatment of the dead. This generally involved leaving them to rot in the open, or throwing the corpses into the sea or beyond the boundaries of the state. In some cases, the bodies of the dead which had already been buried were dug up and cast beyond the borders of the state. This treatment was accorded to robbers, pirates, suicides, temple-robbers, and the like but also to traitors and those on the losing side in civil conflict.

In 317, Cassander supposedly ordered that the corpse of Olympias remain unburied; the same fate had been accorded to Phocion at Athens the year before (although the decree was circumvented). This punishment was not only a humiliation but, as the Greeks believed that the spirit from an unburied body could not rest, it was punishment beyond the grave.

Iain Spence

See also Agesilaus II; Cassander; Casualties; Commemoration; Delium, Battle of; Laws of War

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Decelea

A deme (Athenian local administrative area) northeast of Athens. Decelea had a strategic position on the eastern pass over Mount Parnes on one of the main routes between Athens and Boeotia. Its main claim to fame is in the Second Peloponnesian War (431–404), the second half of which is often called the “Decelean War.” The land route through Decelea was important for access to stock evacuated to Euboea and was a quicker final leg for grain imported via Euboea. Without this, imports had to go the longer way around Cape Sunium and were often subject to significant delay from the famous contrary winds.

In 413, on Alcibiades' advice, the Spartans occupied Decelea, blocking Athenian communications with Euboea, while allowing the occupying force to ravage Attica all year round. This prevented access to winter crops or grazing, interfered with the silver mining at Laurium, and encouraged desertion by Athenian slaves. These adverse effects were a factor in Athens' surrender in 404.

Iain Spence

See also Alcibiades; Peloponnesian War, Second

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Decelean War (414–404). See Peloponnesian War, Second

Declaration of War

There is nothing in Greek history corresponding to the elaborate ritual of Fetial Law long used by the Roman Republic to declare war. There is no example of heralds (*kerykes*) issuing a declaration of war to another state. Herald, who were sacrosanct, commonly carried messages between belligerent states or hostile armies but this role took place when war had already begun. In essence, a Greek war was underway when one side decided to attack another. The war had plainly begun when that side crossed the frontier of the other under arms.

Thucydides' account of events in 431 makes this plain. Late in 432, the Spartans and their allies had decided to go to war with Athens unless it met their demands. A series of ambassadors was sent to Athens but was met with refusals and counter-demands. "Open" war began only after a Theban force made a surprise attack by night (early 431) on Plataea, an Athenian ally. From this point on, Athens and Sparta communicated only through heralds (Thucydides 1.146, 2.1). As these states were now at war, sacrosanct heralds were needed to ensure that ambassadors could pass from one state to another. The Spartans and their allies assembled their army at the Isthmus of Corinth (431). While the army was still there, King Archidamus

II of Sparta sent an envoy (and presumably a herald, not mentioned by Thucydides) for one last try to extract concessions from Athens. The Athenians, however, had voted not to accept any herald or ambassador once the Spartan army had crossed its own frontier (Thucydides 2.12). Archidamus' crossing of the Athenian frontier carried the process of beginning war to its conclusion.

Thus, the outbreak of a Greek war was formally marked not by any verbal declaration but by a hostile act against another state. A variant on this process, involving not territory but shipping, can be seen in 340/39 when Philip II of Macedon, up to this point in a treaty of peace and alliance with Athens, attacked Athenian triremes and freighters in the Sea of Marmara. The Athenians then voted to "overturn the *stèle*" (the inscribed plinth) recording the treaty with Philip, a sign that a state of war now existed between them (Demosthenes 18 [*On the Crown*] 72).

Douglas Kelly

See also Diplomacy: Peloponnesian War, Second

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Dedications, Military

Dedications to the gods to thank them for success in a venture, or returning safely from a trip or from war could be made by both individuals and states. They were sometimes placed in a sanctuary in fulfillment of a vow to the gods made before an event, essentially in a bargain with the gods—a gift in return for success. Military dedications were therefore part of a widespread Greek practice.

Although dedications of individual spoils occurred, it became a very common, though probably not universal, practice to dedicate a tenth of war booty to the gods, at some sanctuary or other. Pausanias quotes an inscription from Olympia, describing a golden shield dedicated by Sparta after the battle of Tanagra in 457 as "the tithe (*dekate*) on account of victory in war." (Parts of this inscription have actually been found on fragments of the marble support.) The best evidence comes from the great sanctuaries,

such as Olympia and Delphi, which have been archaeologically thoroughly explored and where we have detailed written descriptions in authors such as Pausanias, but many sanctuaries in the Greek world must have benefited from this habit. The great sanctuaries became immensely rich storehouses of treasure and art. Indeed, W. K. Pritchett has commented that, "Without wars, few of the temples and other sacred buildings of Greece would have been built" (Pritchett, *Ancient Greek Military Practices*, p. 100).

Such dedications had two purposes: to thank the gods for the favor shown, in the hope of enjoying more success in the future; and as a form of public display, enlarging oneself and belittling one's enemies. Plutarch has a character in a dialog complain about all the dedications in sanctuaries with inscriptions such as, "Brasidas and the Acanthians from the Athenians," "the Athenians from the Corinthians," "the Phocians from the Thessalians," and so on (Plutarch, *Moralia* 401C-D, Loeb trans.). By Plutarch's time, these all referred to victories hundreds of years in the past: boasting in a sanctuary enjoyed considerable longevity.

At the most basic, weapons and armor taken from the enemy dead would be dedicated, but much more elaborate dedications were possible. At the sanctuary of Poseidon at Sunium, the Athenians dedicated a whole Phoenician ship captured at Salamis in 480. Often, however, dedications were paid for from the money raised by selling spoils. The golden shield referred to above is one example, as are the golden shields attached to the temple at Delphi by the Athenians. Lucius Mummius, after the Achaean War and the destruction of Corinth in 146, dedicated 20 gilded shields which Pausanias saw attached to the temple at Olympia, above the columns. Statues, especially bronzes, were also often dedicated.

Buildings in sanctuaries might be paid for out of the spoils of war. A number of treasuries at Delphi fell into this category: a treasury was a small building, built by one state, which could be used among other things to house valuable offerings. But the treasury itself was also an offering to Apollo. According to Pausanias, the Athenian treasury (which, reerected, can be seen today) was paid for out of booty taken from the Persians at Marathon, the Syracusan out of booty from the Athenians in 413, and the Theban from spoils taken from the Spartans at Leuctra in 371. The Potidaeans, Pausanias commented, had actually built their treasury out of piety. The Athenians had built a stoa from spoils taken in the Second Peloponnesian War, perhaps (Pausanias speculates) from Phormio's naval

victories in the Corinthian Gulf. In addition, the Athenians dedicated bronze shields and figure-heads from ships. At Olympia, perhaps the most favored site for military dedications, Pausanias tells us that the temple of Zeus itself, as well as the image of the god, were paid for out of the spoils taken by the Eleans from the Pisans.

Other sorts of offerings might also be made. They might simply be in the form of money—like the 100 talents of gold which Agesilaus is said to have dedicated at Delphi after successfully campaigning in Asia Minor. It is possible that people sometimes gave the sanctuary slaves captured in war, though most of the evidence for this is from stories set in the mythical past. Finally, land also could be given to a god. After capturing Mytilene in 427, the Athenian divided much of Lesbos into 3,000 allotments, which were given to Athenian citizens but rented back to the farmers of Mytilene; but 300 allotments were kept back and dedicated to the gods, whose sanctuaries would then enjoy the rent paid by the Mytileneans as a source of income.

The piety behind dedications was no doubt often genuine, but they often—perhaps usually—also represented a form of competitive display, sometimes indeed competing directly with each other. The first major statue group a visitor saw on entering the sanctuary at Delphi was in the Stoa of Lysander, built to commemorate the Spartan victory at Aegospotami in 405. This contained an impressive set of statues on two levels, including a number of gods, Lysander himself being crowned by Poseidon, and even the captain of Lysander's ship. The stoa and its statues were no doubt intended to overshadow a much more modest Athenian display right next to it, a set of statues (of Athena, Apollo, and Miltiades) paid for out the spoils of Marathon. But after defeating the Spartans at Leuctra in 371, the Boeotians built the largest treasury in the sanctuary in a position well chosen to dominate and compete with Lysander's stoa. Thus, dedications from the spoils of war became a form of competitive politics and publicity seeking.

Peter Londev

See also Achaean War; Aegospotami, Battle of; Commemoration; *Dekate*; Delphi; Olympia; Plunder and Booty; Tanagra, Battle of

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Deilia (Cowardice). See Discipline, Military

Dekate

Dekate, literally “one-tenth,” referred to the share of spoils that it was conventional to dedicate to a god, such as the tenth of the spoils dedicated to Apollo at Delphi from the spoils taken from Decelea in the last phase of the Peloponnesian War (Xenophon, *Hellenica* 3.5.5).

It was also customary to dedicate to a god one-tenth of the property of condemned traitors, since all of this was seized as part of the punishment (e.g., Xenophon, *Hellenica* 1.7.10, 20). Connected with this sense is a special application of the term *dekate* and its related verb *dekateuein* (“to exact a tenth from”) to enemies in an especially bitter conflict. In this case, the dedication of a tenth of the spoils was to be accompanied by the complete seizure of the persons of the enemy (for enslavement or massacre) and of all their land and other property.

Such a declaration amounted to a war of total extermination. In 480, the Greeks allied against the Persian invasion swore an oath that they would “exact a tenth from” any Greeks that sided with the Persians without compulsion (Herodotus 7.132). In the event, this extreme measure was not carried out: the Aleuadae of Thessaly for one bribed their way out. Thebes also escaped, but animosity lingered. In 371, when Thebes alone rejected a Common Peace, “There was now some expectation of the proverbial exacting of a tenth from Thebes” (Xenophon, *Hellenica* 6.3.20, 6.5.35). The expression had become common (cf. Polybius 9.39.5), even if such tithing never happened.

Douglas Kelly

See also Dedications, Military; Plunder and Booty

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Delian League/Athenian Empire

The naval-based alliance negotiated by Athens in 478/7 after victory in the Second Persian War that became the foundation of the Athenian Empire. It was known in antiquity as “the Athenians and their allies”; the term “Delian League” (or “Delian Confederacy”) is a modern one. Its establishment marked the start of a major shift in the balance of power in Greece away from Sparta and toward Athens.

Athens replaced Sparta in command of the campaign against Persia in the Hellespont region in 479/8. This was at the request of many of the Greek states involved who resented the arrogance of the Spartan commander, the regent, Pausanias. The Delian league was established the following year.

Member states swore an oath of loyalty and agreed to provide either warships and men or a monetary contribution. Aristides (nicknamed “the Just”) was asked to assess the member contributions. The early membership included most of the Aegean islands, cities in the Hellespont, and some in Asia Minor. Each member had an equal vote in the assembly, enabling Athens to influence the vote of the smaller states.

From early on, Athens encouraged monetary contributions and this was used to expand and fund the Athenian navy. Most allies were happy to do so, but it eventually led to the situation where the League forces were predominantly Athenian and the members lost the capacity for individual action.

Thucydides records conflicting statements of the purpose of the League. At 1.96, he states it was to ravage Persian territory to recover losses from the damage done to Greeks during the recent war. At 3.10, he records a Mytilenean statement that it was established to “free the Hellenes (Greeks) from Persia.”

The League was very successful in its early campaigns, freeing many cities from Persian control and destroying Persian naval power in the Aegean at Eurymedon River (ca. 467/6). Although the League had already

developed some less than democratic tendencies, from Eurymedon it became increasingly dominated by Athens. Actions included forcing states to join (Euboea, ca. 472) or preventing them from leaving (Naxos, 468/7; Thasos ca. 465).

Defeated revolting members were forced to contribute money instead of warships and lost foreign policy autonomy. Other methods of ensuring Athenian control were to send out a garrison, and/or political officers and to try serious offences (murder, treason) in Athens. A particularly unpopular method was to settle Athenians of military age as cleruchs (military settlers) on confiscated land.

At its peak the Delian League had about 200 members, and formed an effective counterweight to Sparta's Peloponnesian League. Membership brought considerable advantages—in the early days, freedom and continued independence from Persian rule. The League navy suppressed piracy and protected against Persian resurgence. It used a common currency and weights and measures (both Athenian). All of these encouraged stability and commerce.

However, from the 450s, the level of Athenian control meant that the League had essentially become the Athenian Empire. There was increasing resentment toward the Athenians, both from members and from other Greeks worried at Athens' rise in power and wealth. Athens' increasingly intrusive control measures were highly unpopular. By 431, only Lesbos and Chios were still contributing ships and men rather than paying tribute. The treasury was now located in Athens (moved from Delos after a serious League defeat in Egypt, in 454), and the Athenians essentially regarded it as their money. Tribute became the basis of Athenian state pay for political, jury, and military service and Pericles used it to help build the Parthenon.

Many allies took the first available opportunity to revolt during the Peloponnesian War of 431–404 (although some remained loyal throughout) and the League was dissolved when Athens lost.

Iain Spence

See also Aristides; Cimon; Colonies, Military; Delos; Euboea; Eurymedon, Battle of; Naxos, Naxians; Pausanias, Son of Cleombrotus; Persian (Achaemenid) Empire; Persian Wars; Thasos

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Delium, Battle of (424)

A major land battle fought in 424 during the Second Peloponnesian War (431–404), in the area of Tanagra (Boeotia) between the Athenians and Boeotians. The action was part of an attempt, initiated by the Athenians Demosthenes and Cleon, to neutralize Boeotia, a key Spartan ally, and the threat to Athens’ north. The engagement was part of an elaborate Athenian plan: the general Hippocrates was to fortify the temple of Apollo at Delium, while Demosthenes, with an army raised locally in Acarnania to the west, would move on Siphiae, which was to be betrayed to him, while the Orchomenians would hand over Chaeronea. The resulting unrest in Boeotia, it was planned, would ensure that the Boeotians would not interfere with Hippocrates’ operation at Delium.

The coordination failed because of a mix up in dates and the betrayal of the plot at Siphiae. As a result, Hippocrates, leading 7,000 hoplites, a large proportion of the 1,000-strong cavalry corps and some *psiloi* (light troops), ended up at Delium without the anticipated distraction. Although Hippocrates fortified Delium, one of the Theban Boeotarchs, Pagondas, leading a Boeotian force of 7,000 hoplites, 10,000 *psiloi*, 500 peltasts, and 1,000 cavalry arrived while he was still at the temple and his army a short distance from it.

Hippocrates deployed his cavalry on the wings with 300 at the temple as a guard but with orders to intervene if the opportunity arose. The Thebans deployed with their cavalry and *psiloi* on the wings and left a force to block any sortie from the temple. Of note, the Theban contingent was 25 deep, with the other Boeotian contingents in a variety of depths—the traditional disposition (which Hippocrates adopted) was eight deep. The hoplite

engagement was fairly even—while the Athenians defeated the enemy left wing, the deeper Theban phalanx on the right pushed the Athenians slowly back. The turning point was when Pagondas sent two contingents of cavalry to aid his left—when they crested the hill the Athenian right wing mistook them for the advance guard of another army and fled, leading to the collapse of the entire army. The Boeotians were unable to make full use of their cavalry and *psiloi* to inflict casualties on the fleeing enemy because nightfall interrupted. Notably, Alcibiades, serving with the Athenian horse, helped Socrates, serving as a hoplite, steadfastly withdraw from the battle. The Athenians still held the temple and the Boeotians, contrary to usual practice, refused to return the Athenian dead until the garrison withdrew, arguing that their duty to return the dead was overridden by Athenian sacrilege in occupying and fortifying the temple. The debate was ongoing when the Boeotians ended it by taking the temple (using an ingenious flame-throwing device) and returning the bodies from both the battle and the garrison.

Iain Spence

See also Alcibiades; Cavalry; Demosthenes (General); Hoplites; Laws of War; Peloponnesian War, Second

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Delos

Delos, a small Cycladic island, became an important religious and panhellenic center, particularly for the Ionian states. In myth, it was the birthplace of the twin Olympian gods, Apollo and Artemis. A sacred festival was celebrated there from the Archaic Period. Even the Persian admiral, Datis, respected the sacred nature of the island and left its treasury intact in

490. In 478, it was the symbolic core of the Ionian naval alliance.

An Ionian amphictyony existed to protect its independence, but in fact Delos had been dominated by Naxos from the seventh to early sixth centuries, Paros in the mid-sixth century, Samos briefly after the Parians—during which time, Polycrates interfered in religious matters by consecrating neighboring Rheneia—and then by Athens from the late sixth. In the sixth century, the Athenian tyrant Peisistratus, out of favor with Delphi, spectacularly “purified” Delos as a means of demonstrating Athenian intentions to set up the island as an alternative religious focus. In the fifth century, the island was the center of the Delian League, until the Athenians transferred the League treasury to Athens. During the Second Peloponnesian War, the Athenians again cleansed Delos, by emptying all the graves across the entire island, and a few years later by expelling living Delians as well.

In the Hellenistic Period, Egypt and Macedon jostled for influence in the area, but when the island supported the losing Macedonians against Rome, it was returned to Athenian control in 166. After this it flourished not just as a cult center but also as a trading port and slave market, until in 88 it was sacked by Mithridates’ general, Archelaus, and then by pirates 19 years later. Within a century, the decline was complete and the island was all but deserted.

James McDonald

See also Delian League/Athenian Empire; Delphi; Naxos, Naxians; Omens and Portents; Panhellenism; Peisistratus; Sacred Truces and Festivals

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regional alliance, the Delphic Amphictyony, tried to protect the oracle's independence. Herodotus says that in 480 the sanctuary was saved miraculously from the Persians by thunderbolts, falling rocks, and the intervention of giant spirits, Phylakes and Autoñoüs. The Gauls had more luck in 279, looting its treasures, as did Sulla and Nero. The Emperor Julian sponsored a short-lived revival before Delphi was closed and its festivals quashed by the Christian, Theodosius.

It was critical, especially for hegemonic states, to have a good relationship with Delphi. For example, Athens was out of favor with Delphi and Olympia throughout much of the Peloponnesian War of 431-404. Thucydides says that the Delphic oracle publicly expressed its support for the Peloponnesians and, on one occasion, even proffered the unsolicited assurance that Apollo himself would assist Sparta.

The importance of Delphi is shown by the fact that four "sacred wars" were fought over it (though the first, in the early sixth century, is probably legendary). The Third and Fourth Sacred Wars, in the mid-fourth century, saw Philip II of Macedon increase his influence in southern Greece. After the time of Philip and Alexander, Delphi—while remaining a rich and well-visited sanctuary—declined in political importance.

James McDonald

See also Colonies, Colonization; Delos; Delphic Amphictyony; Olympia; Omens and Portents; Panhellenism; Religious Practices before Battle; Sacred Truces and Festivals; Sacred War (First, Second, Third, Fourth); Trophy

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Delphic Amphictyony

The Delphic Amphictyony was a religious league of uncertain antiquity, which controlled the great panhellenic sanctuary of Apollo at Delphi. The Amphictyony was composed of 12-member *ethne*, or tribes (sing. *ethnos*). The original *ethne* were the Thessalians, Perrhaebians, Magnesians, Achaeans of Phthiotis, Ionians (including both Euboea and Athens), Dorians (including those from Doris in central Greece, and a number of cities in the Peloponnese, including Sparta), Boeotians, Phocians, Locrians, Malians, Aenianians, and Dolopians. Thus, although Delphi was visited from all over the Greek world, it was controlled by a limited subset of states, all from mainland Greece. The original center of the Amphictyony was probably the sanctuary of Artemis at Anthela, near Thermopylae. How it later came to control Delphi is not known.

Over time the membership could change: in 346, at the end of the Third Sacred War, Philip of Macedon was given membership in place of the defeated Phocians. However, Macedonian representatives at Delphi were not referred to as “Macedonian,” but as “from Philip,” later “from Alexander.” At some point, in 346 or earlier, the Perrhaebians and Dolopians were combined into an artificial single *ethnos*, and the Delphians became an *ethnos* in their own right.

When the Amphictyony’s workings first become visible to us in the fourth century, we find voting on the Amphictyonic Council in the hands of 24 *hieromnemes*, two from each *ethnos*. There were also subsidiary members of the Council, *pylagoroi*; their number is not known. The Amphictyony’s main role was to manage the sanctuaries under its control. We first hear of it in the sixth century, when it managed the rebuilding of the temple of Apollo after the previous one had burnt down; a similar process happened in the fourth century. A series of Sacred Wars were fought over Delphi; the First is probably a fiction, the Second very small. But in the Third Sacred War (356–346), the Amphictyony was the rallying point for states opposing the Phocian occupation of Delphi. Forces from member states played a role at the start of the Fourth Sacred War (340–338), though they soon handed the problem over to Philip II of Macedon. The Amphictyony never had armed forces of its own. Yet the prestige of Delphi meant that control of the Amphictyony could have political advantage: in the fourth century the Spartans, Jason of Pherae, the Thebans, and Philip

successively attempted to exploit this.

The Amphictyony continued to exist through the Hellenistic Period and into Roman times, and membership again changed several times. In particular, the neighboring Aetolians, never previously members, became the dominant power at Delphi in the early third century, maintaining that position until defeated by the Romans in 189.

Peter Londey

See also Delphi; Sacred War (First, Second, Third, Fourth)

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Demaratus (Reigned ca. 515–491)

A Eurypontid king of Sparta. He opposed his Agiad fellow king, Cleomenes I over the invasion of Attica (506), and again about 491 when Cleomenes tried to arrest Persian sympathizers on Aegina at Athens’ request. Demaratus fled to Persia after Cleomenes had him deposed on a false charge of illegitimacy. Accompanying Xerxes to Greece in 480, Demaratus is portrayed in Herodotus as providing high-quality advice, which Xerxes ignored. Demaratus was granted estates in Asia Minor, in Pergamum and other nearby towns, and died there.

Iain Spence

See also Aegina; Cleomenes I; Peloponnesian League; Persian Wars

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Demetrias

Demetrias was a large city in southeast Thessaly, very close to the site of the modern city of Volos. Demetrius I Poliorcetes founded the city around 290 by bringing together much of the nearby Magnesian population. Impressive fortifications and trading privileges encouraged an influx of population, and the city became a major fleet base for Macedonian rulers. Demetrias was one of Philip V of Macedon's three "fettters of Greece," central to his control of all of Greece. After defeating Philip in the Second Macedonian War, Titus Quinctius Flamininus first garrisoned but then withdrew from Demetrias. The city supported Antiochus in the Syrian-Roman War and was the point where Antiochus first landed in Greece. Returned to Macedonian control after the war, Demetrias remained an important regional center, and was head of a later Magnesian League.

Peter Londey

See also Demetrius I Poliorcetes; Fettters of Greece; Syrian-Roman War; Thessaly, Thessalians

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Demetrius I of Bactria (Reigned ca. 200–180)

Demetrius I was a Hellenistic king in Bactria and parts of northwest ancient India (modern Pakistan), ca. 200–180. He was the son and heir of Euthydemus I, and he gained a reputation for leadership and conquest while his father was still on the throne. When Euthydemus was besieged by the Seleucid king Antiochus III in about 206, Demetrius was sent to assist in the negotiations. Antiochus found the prince's bearing and speech praiseworthy, and because of this, he promised Demetrius a daughter in marriage and permitted Euthydemus to retain his independent kingship. Also while his father was still ruling, Demetrius conquered parts of India. On a stone

inscription from Kuliab, Demetrius is described as *Kallinikos* (“the glorious victor”) and son of the great king Euthydemus. Demetrius was most likely a coruler with his father when he first began minting his own coins. From the beginning, and throughout his reign, he portrayed himself on coins wearing an elephant scalp. This is symbolic of his conquest of India. It also emulates coins of Ptolemy I Soter, which depict Alexander the Great wearing an elephant scalp. The evidence of Demetrius’ coins reveals a powerful king at the head of a complex bureaucratic government. His administration ensured accuracy and standardization in his coinage. Further, patterns of his mint production show that Demetrius initiated several short-term auxiliary mints, which demonstrates that he was militarily active throughout his reign. At his peak, Demetrius controlled Bactria, the Paropamisadae, and Arachosia. The Hellenistic city at Ai Khanoum was likely one of his strongholds. Besides coins, a coin-striking die for Demetrius was reportedly found at Ai Khanoum. Demetrius’ conquests paved the way for several dozen subsequent Indo-Greek kings to rule in northwest ancient India. One later king commemorated Demetrius on a coin series and referred to him as *Anikitos*—the “Unconquered One.”

Frances A. M. Joseph

See also Ai Khanoum; Antiochus III (the Great); Bactria, Bactrians; Euthydemus I of Bactria

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Demetrius I Poliorcetes (ca. 336–283)

Known as “Poliorcetes” or “the Besieger,” Demetrius was the son of Antigonos I Monophthalmus. Of all the Successors of Alexander the Great, he most resembled him in talent, looks, and charisma. He was raised in Phrygia, and given his first independent command in 314, when he was left to defend Syria. He was defeated in the battle of Gaza in 312, but was

responsible for a number of successful campaigns against the generals of Ptolemy I Soter and Seleucus I Nicator, in 311–310. By 307, Demetrius and his father were being hailed as savior gods by the Athenians after their liberation of the city, and cults were established for them. Eventually, Demetrius was effectively deified by the Athenians (see, for example, the hymn quoted in Athenaeus 7.253D). Demetrius distinguished himself particularly by his naval victory against Ptolemy at Salamis in 306, which was later commemorated on examples of his coinage. Shortly afterward, he and his father at last crowned themselves kings, making them the first of Alexander's Successors to claim the title. It set a precedent for the other *diadochoi* to quickly follow suit. Another career highlight was Demetrius' year-long siege of Rhodes. His incredible innovations there in this form of warfare and in siege engines earned him his nickname of "Besieger"—a somewhat ironical name as the siege of Rhodes was at great cost but he was ultimately unable to take it.



Silver coin of Demetrius I Poliorcetes, minted in Macedonia ca. 289, shortly before he was deposed. Demetrius is depicted here in the traditional royal diadem, and the coin is designed to give the impression of youthful vigor and power, although he was 46 or 47 when it was minted. Located in the Yale University Art Gallery, New Haven, Connecticut. (Yale University Art Gallery)

He was also well known for debauchery and scandalous, excessive behavior, particularly in Athens where he was said to have inflicted a great number of indecencies on the Parthenon. He was polygamous, like many of the early Hellenistic kings, marrying at least five times and keeping many mistresses, including the notorious Lamia. A coalition of the other *diadochoi* defeated Demetrius at the battle of Ipsus in 301, where Antigonus lost his life and Demetrius was forced to flee. Despite this reversal of fortune, Demetrius retained his huge fleet and title and effectively ran his kingdom from the sea for a number of years as he campaigned to regain his

territories. He spent time in 299 attacking Thrace at Lysimachus' expense, and the two were to become lifelong enemies. In 296, he was able to take back Athens, and then campaigned against Sparta. The death of Cassander in Macedon and the subsequent succession crisis then allowed Demetrius the opportunity to seize the Macedonian throne.

He was, however, poorly received as king, and by 288 he was expelled by another coalition, headed by Lysimachus and Pyrrhus. Demetrius once again set about rebuilding his empire, and left for Asia with his force, but being in poor health and facing numerous desertions from his supporters, he was soon forced to surrender to Seleucus (285). He was from then on detained in honorable captivity, and appears to have refused to cooperate with his son Antigonus II Gonatas' attempts to liberate him. Demetrius died within three years of his captivity, his poor health no doubt accelerated by the excessive drinking and depression of his final years.

Charlotte M. R. Dunn

See also Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon; Antigonus I Monophthalmus; Antigonus II Gonatas; Cassander; Ipsus, Battle of; Lysimachus; Ptolemy I Soter; Pyrrhus; Seleucus I Nicator; Successors (*Diadochoi*), Wars of

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Demetrius II Nicator (ca. 160–125)

Demetrius II ruled the Seleucid Empire in two separate reigns, ca. 145–138, and 129–125. Aged about 15, he led a mercenary army to drive out the usurper Alexander I Balas. He then showed further military capacity by reasserting Seleucid control over Judaea-Palestine and defeating a usurper Diodotus, who had taken the regal name of King Tryphon.

In 139, Demetrius II launched an ambitious offensive to regain territories in Mesopotamia lost to the Parthians. He won victories but was taken prisoner, allegedly falling into a trap under a deceitful peace treaty. In his

absence the kingdom passed into the hands of his younger brother, Antiochus VII Sidetes.

When Antiochus VII attacked Parthia (129), Demetrius was released to create the diversion of a civil war in the Seleucid Empire. With the death of Antiochus VII in Parthia, Demetrius reestablished himself as king and ruled to 125, when he attacked Egypt and was killed and defeated near Tyre by Egyptian forces supporting a pretender, Alexander II Zabinas.

Demetrius II's early successes gained him the title "Nicator" ("the Conqueror"). He showed great gifts for leadership at the head of his troops in the tradition of Alexander the Great, but was too harsh to be popular and in his second rule he suffered from the discredit of his captivity in Parthia.

Douglas Kelly

See also Alexander I Balas; Alexander II Zabinas; Antiochus VII Sidetes; Seleucids; Tryphon/Diodotus

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Demetrius of Phalerum (ca. 350–280)

Demetrius of Phalerum (also Demetrius Phalereus or Demetrius of Phaleron) was an Athenian philosopher, orator, and conservative, pro-Macedonian statesman aligned with Phocion. A student of Theophrastus, he began his public career as an orator ca. 325 during the "Harpalus affair." A solid body of fragments survives from his speeches, moral philosophy, popular stories and fables, history, literary criticism, government, and letters.

When Phocion died (318) Cassander installed Demetrius as governor of Athens. Demetrius reformed Athenian political procedures and law along conservative lines, including laws to curb ostentatious spending on funerals (ironically he had a reputation for excessive personal expenditure).

However, there is no detailed evidence for the widespread legislation ascribed to him in antiquity and modern reconstructions of them may go too far.

When, Demetrius I Poliorcetes occupied Athens in 307, Demetrius fled. His unpopularity saw the destruction of 299 of his 300 statues and his other honors were revoked. In Egypt, Demetrius impressed Ptolemy I Soter, became his librarian, and is also supposed to have helped revise Egyptian law. However, when Ptolemy II Philadelphus became sole ruler (283), he exiled Demetrius, who died soon after.

Iain Spence

See also Athens; Cassander; Demetrius I Poliorcetes; Harpalus; Phocion; Ptolemy I Soter; Ptolemy II Philadelphus

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Demetrius of Pharos (Active ca. 230–215)

Demetrius of Pharos was an Illyrian general. During the First Illyrian War (229–228), Demetrius captured Corcyra before falling out with his queen, Teuta, and surrendering Corcyra and Pharos to the Romans. Demetrius advised Rome for the remainder of the war, which ended in a treaty in 228. Demetrius was made a friend of the Roman people and given Pharos. Succeeding Teuta, Demetrius reestablished relations with Macedon and at Sellasia in 222 led Illyrian forces in the Macedonian victory.

Demetrius' expansionist agenda soon brought him back into conflict with Rome. In direct contravention of the 228 treaty, Demetrius sailed past the Lissus River and engaged in piracy, triggering the Second Illyrian War in 219.

The Romans attacked Pharos, luring the Illyrian forces from their

fortress into a trap. Demetrius abandoned Pharos and fled to Macedonia, ending the war. Allied with the Macedonians, Demetrius died later fighting in their service.

Michael (Maxx) Schmitz

See also Illyria, Illyrians; Piracy; Sellasia, Battle of; Treatises, Military

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Democracy and War

For a long time, ancient historians believed that the emergence of democracy in ancient Greece was caused by a rising military participation-rate. In doing so, they accepted the testimony of Aristotle that the sudden appearance of phalanx-based battles in the mid-seventh century compelled the elites of *poleis* (city-states) to involve in their wars prosperous non-elite citizens (e.g., Aristotle *Politics* 1297b16–28). These new hoplites, he claimed, quickly demanded more popular forms of government in recognition of their contributions in battle. Also widely accepted was the proposition of Aristotle and other philosophers that the consolidation of democracy in Classical Athens was a consequence of the demands of subhoplite citizens for greater political rights (e.g., 1274a11–14; 1304a22–4). They supposedly could make such demands, because the creation of a huge Athenian fleet had made their military service possible.

In recent years, the belief that such military changes caused democratization has been seriously called into question. Aristotle wrote in the later fourth century and so his reliability as evidence for the Archaic Period is far from certain. In particular, his statements about the so-called hoplite revolution are contradictory and inaccurate. Mass fighting is clearly present in the eighth-century poems of Homer. This strongly suggests that the hoplite phalanx resulted, not from a sudden revolution, but from slow changes in tactics and weapons. In addition, Archaic Period hoplites came predominantly from the elite and waged wars infrequently. That this small-

scale warfare impacted significantly on political institutions is highly unlikely. In the same vein, the association of democracy and sea power has been shown to be a purely ideological construction. This association was invented for partisan political purposes by Pseudo-Xenophon ("Old Oligarch"), Plato and other philosophical critics of Athenian democracy. There is simply no evidence that non-elite Athenians ever believed their legal and political equality were a result of their ability to contribute militarily to the state.

In ancient Greece, sea power may not have been a direct cause of democratization. But in Classical Athens it did still impact indirectly on the consolidation of its democracy. The two decades of fighting after the Persian Wars changed significantly the economy and the society of Athens, in turn causing political changes. With imperial income the Athenians built the massive port facilities and hired the thousands of workmen that were required to maintain their warships. The needs and the salaries of these shipbuilders encouraged the development of secondary businesses. The bringing in of ever-larger amounts of cargo to service this military-led expansion quickly made the Piraeus the Mediterranean's busiest trading port. In turn, new urban jobs attracted large numbers of non-elite Athenians from the countryside. By moving to the city they found it much easier to attend the city-based meetings of Athenian democracy. The sheer number of campaigns and the complex task of running the Delian League increased significantly the volume of public business. Consequently, assembly- and council-meetings had to be held more regularly. Coming on top of the socioeconomic changes, this intensification of politics developed the institutions of Athenian democracy. It also gave the *demos* (people) the confidence and the general knowledge which they needed to take further control of the state and its magistrates.

Athenian democracy's impact on war, by contrast, was direct and two-sided. On one side its common dynamic of non-elite audiences and elite performers competing with each other led to a pronounced pro-war culture. This encouraged the *demos* to become hoplites or sailors in ever-larger numbers and to initiate wars very frequently. On the other side, Athenian democracy's public debating of war and peace normally reduced the foreign-policy risks of this cultural militarism. This debating too facilitated military innovations and helped to develop the battlefield initiative of Athenian combatants.

Non-elite Athenians understandably had a positive view of their own military service as heavily armed soldiers and sailors. Consequently, they preferred those politicians and playwrights who employed Homer's positive depiction of soldiering, which had been the preserve of the upper class before the democracy, to describe their own military service. Because non-elite Athenians continued to be ashamed of their poverty (e.g., Aristophanes, *Wealth* 218–221; Lysias 24 [*On the Refusal of a Pension to the Invalid*] 16–17), this extension of the traditional conception of *arête* down the social scale made soldiering attractive to them as a source of esteem. But this recognition of courage among non-elite soldiers proved to be a double-edged sword. While making them feel proud, it put them under social pressure to participate in, and to vote for, wars. For the Greeks, *arête* had to be regularly proven by actions, while those who saw themselves as courageous felt *aischyne* (shame) if accused of cowardice. Athenians could be so accused not only if they retreated from a battle but also if they failed to endorse a war that appeared to be necessary (e.g., Euripides, *Children of Heracles* 700–701, *Suppliant Women* 314–323). The result was that politicians exploited the fear of shame among assembly-goers to build support for their bellicose proposals, even if it risked pressuring them into wars which they could not possibly win.

Certainly the democracy's open debating of foreign policy did not affect the bellicosity of the *demos*. But it did normally reduce the risk that they would endorse poorly conceived proposals for war. Politicians were free to be contentious, and their rivalries with each other guaranteed that calls for war met with opposing arguments and alternative proposals (e.g., Thucydides 1.139; 3.36–50). The constant adjudicating of such debates by non-elite Athenians improved the quality of their decision-making on foreign affairs and made them more innovative and flexible than the combatants of oligarchies and autocracies. It allowed them to see the merits of military innovations that confounded the traditional conception of courage.

David M. Pritchard

See also Athens; Delian League/Athenian Empire

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Demography, Military

Population affects war-making, and war-making affects population. The number and types of military personnel available to a society are dictated by population size (how many men can fight), age-structure (how many are of appropriate age to serve), and incapacity. War deaths affect population by lowering it, but also by reducing the parental investment available to children. War affects population when extended campaigns separate husbands and wives, reducing reproductive encounters. Migration, another demographic phenomenon, also affects a society's ability to make war: in terms of immigration, resident aliens (metics) can serve in war; emigration of citizens reduces a society's ability to field soldiers. Finally, culture affects reproduction and demography (how many sons are desirable? Is remarriage frequent? What percent of a population is permitted to fight as a hoplite citizen-soldier or as a light-armed skirmisher?), and thus affects how many military forces can be fielded, as we see when comparing different states, such as Athens, Macedonia, Thessaly, and, most dramatically, Sparta.

Military service in Archaic and Classical Period Greek city-states was normally restricted to citizen males possessing sufficient wealth to arm themselves. Thus, a state's military power was closely related to its citizen population size, which was structured by its natural resources, territorial size and carrying capacity, economic development, and percentage of total population enfranchised. In Classical Athens, members of the lowest wealth class (the thetes) primarily served as rowers for warships since they were insufficiently wealthy to afford arms. Other Greek city-states such as Corinth, Argos, and Thebes had particularly large land armies. Typically, Archaic and Classical Greek cities are thought to have fielded approximately two-thirds of their available citizen males of military age in serious military conflicts (this assumes males 20-onward; the quantity of males over 60 was probably demographically insignificant), and troop numbers recorded in ancient literary texts have given historians ideas of

how many adult male citizens lived in particular Greek city-states. (The problem of the circularity of cross-referencing city-size by military call-up is somewhat solved by checking against territory size.)

Sparta presents a peculiar example of the relation between demography and military activity. Citizen-soldier Spartiates enjoyed privileges of income and devotion to military training, but the Spartiate population's steady decline, caused by economic and cultural factors, coupled with a deep aversion to allowing non-Spartiates into the Spartiate caste, caused Sparta's armies to contain fewer and fewer Spartiates compared to *Perioikoi*, Helots, and other marginal populations, who lacked the intensive, lifelong military training enjoyed by Spartiates. This lack surely contributed to Sparta's military losses in the fourth century, such as at Leuctra (371), Mantinea (362), and Megalopolis (331).

The fourth century witnessed the beginning of an uncoupling of a city-state's citizen population and the number of soldiers that could be fielded. The practice of hiring mercenaries and the growth of political entities larger than cities, such as federations and Hellenistic kingdoms, resulted in vastly larger armies being fielded from this point onward.

Timothy Doran

See also Athens; Leuctra, Battle of; Mantinea, Battle of (362); Megalopolis, Battle of; Megara; Sparta

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Demosthenes (General) (d. 413)

Demosthenes, son of Alcisthenes, was an Athenian general during the Peloponnesian War of 431–404. The main feature of Demosthenes' generalship is his innovation—at both the tactical and strategic levels. At the tactical level, he was responsible for every known Athenian ambush and night attack during the Peloponnesian War. This, and his use of light troops were very much outside the norm of the hoplite-dominated land warfare. At the strategic level, Demosthenes also tried to break away from the default

patterns of both hoplite warfare and Athens' largely defensive strategy.

Demosthenes' first appearance as a *strategos* (general) was in 426, when he attacked the Aetolians to protect Naupactus, a key ally on the Corinthian Gulf, and provide a launch point for future attacks against Boeotia from the west. However, Demosthenes' hoplites, unable to close with their javelin-equipped and more mobile Aetolian opponents, were eventually worn down and routed. Fearing a hostile reception at home after this defeat, Demosthenes remained in Naupactus. The relative impotence of hoplites against light-armed troops was a lesson Demosthenes never forgot and he used it to good effect in future engagements—the first being his decisive victories at Olpae in the winter of 426/5.

In 425, Demosthenes was responsible for fortifying Pylos, a headland on the east of the Peloponnese, to use as a base for raiding Spartan territory and creating unrest among the Helots. This was very effective, causing the Spartans to abandon their annual invasion of Attica to deal with the situation. Their attempt to recapture Pylos failed and a contingent of Spartan hoplites was trapped on the nearby island of Sphacteria. Working with Cleon, Demosthenes planned and executed a skilled assault on the island, using light troops and tactics in the same way used against him in Aetolia. The Spartan surrender was a major psychological blow and the Pylos garrison caused significant damage through raiding and encouraging Helots to desert.

In 424, Demosthenes failed to capture Megara, although he did take its port, Nisaea. Again partnered with Cleon, Demosthenes took a leading part in the attack on Boeotia that ended in failure at Delium (424). Whether Demosthenes or Cleon was the main influence in this attack is uncertain, but the operations against Megara and Boeotia seem to be part of a consistent policy of protecting Athens from land attacks.

In 413, Demosthenes was dispatched to Sicily. On arrival he took vigorous action to revitalize the siege of Syracuse, but suffered a major defeat in a night attack. Demosthenes advised immediate withdrawal but Nicias prevaricated. Demosthenes was captured and executed during the later retreat and destruction of the Athenian forces.

Iain Spence

See also Brasidas; Cleon; Delium, Battle of; Hoplites; Light Troops; Olpae, Battle of; Peloponnesian War, Second; Pylos (Sphacteria), Battle of; Sicilian

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Demosthenes (Orator) (ca. 384–322)

Demosthenes was an Athenian orator and statesman, who played a leading role in Athens' conflict with Philip II of Macedon. From 351, when Demosthenes delivered the first of his speeches against Philip, known collectively as the "*Philippics*," he argued that Athens should adopt more vigorous measures against Philip II of Macedon in the war that had dragged on since 357. In 348, he pressed for stronger efforts to help Olynthus against Philip. When Philip induced Athens to begin peace negotiations in 346, Demosthenes served as one of the Athenian ambassadors. He later claimed to have come to mistrust his colleagues, Philocrates and Aeschines. Demosthenes also claimed after the event that this pair had frustrated his warnings on Philip's untrustworthiness.

Demosthenes worked to undermine the peace treaty with Philip. In 343, he brought a prosecution, commonly referred to as the "False Embassy Trial," against Aeschines for high treason in the negotiations of 346. Aeschines was narrowly acquitted. In the *Third Philippic* (341) and later speeches, Demosthenes claimed that Philip was in effect at war with Athens. When Philip moved to open war in 340/39 and unexpectedly appeared with his army at Elatea in Phocis, Demosthenes made the crucial proposal for an alliance with Boeotia. After the defeat of Chaeronea (338), he no longer took a leading role in politics.

In 331, Aeschines prosecuted an associate of Demosthenes to discredit Demosthenes' anti-Macedonian policy. In this "Crown Trial," the verdict was overwhelmingly in Demosthenes' favor. In the mysterious affair over

what happened to the money Alexander's treasurer Harpalus brought to Athens (324–323), Demosthenes was condemned for embezzlement and went into exile. After Alexander the Great's death in 323, he was recalled to Athens during the Lamian War. When the war ended, Demosthenes fled and chose suicide rather than being seized by Macedonian agents.

Speeches from the “False Embassy Trial” (343) and the “Crown Trial” (331) were published by both Demosthenes and Aeschines. These opposing speeches are important historical sources. Other political speeches of Demosthenes provide important but one-sided evidence on Philip II. Demosthenes was a great orator but his policies remain controversial.

Douglas Kelly

See also Aeschines; Chaeronea, Battle of; Chalcidian Confederacy; Harpalus; Lamian War; Olynthus; Philip II of Macedon; Philocrates; Philocrates, Peace of

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Dercylidas (d. after 387)

A Spartiate who in about 398 replaced Thibron and held the command in Sparta's war against Persia in Asia Minor until superseded by Agesilaus II in 395. Nicknamed “Sisyphus” after a mythical figure of outstanding cunning, Dercylidas showed great resourcefulness in making truces with individual satraps, so he could make profitable diversions in and outside

Persian territory. Such stopgaps dealt with the immediate problem of supplying the army but were never going to end the war. His one big offensive against the combined satraps in the Maeander valley led to another inconclusive truce.

In 394, he took command at Abydos and Sestos, resolutely holding these last remaining outposts for Sparta in the region, apparently till the end of the Corinthian War. Unsurprisingly, this enterprising Spartan found life outside Sparta congenial.

Douglas Kelly

See also Agesilaus II; Corinthian War; Pharnabazus; Thibron; Tissaphernes

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Desertion. *See Discipline, Military*

Diadochoi. *See Successors (Diadochoi), Wars of*

Diekplous

The term literally means “sailing through and out” and describes a naval maneuver where ships sailed through an enemy line, turned sharply, and then rammed the enemy ships on the rear or flanks. It was a very difficult maneuver for a whole fleet to execute (although easier for one ship or part of a fleet) and required skilled crews and considerable coordination, which could only have come from training as a fleet. It was successfully used at Lade (494), Chios (201/200), and Side (190).

Iain Spence

See also Callicratidas; Lade, Battle of; Naval Tactics; Training

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Diodorus Siculus (ca. 80–30)

Diodorus Siculus wrote a "universal" history, that is, one covering all known peoples from the earliest (mythical) times down to about 60. His *Bibliotheca Historica* (*Historical Library*) consisted of 40 books, of which only 15 survive in full (1–5, 11–20).

Books 1–5 deal with the geography and mythology of different lands. Book 11 begins with the Persian War (480–479); Book 20 deals with Successors to Alexander (317–302). In the later books, events are narrated year-by-year: years are each dated by Athenian archons and Roman consuls.

Diodorus emulated earlier writers of universal history, a genre established by Ephorus and continued on a lesser scale by Polybius and Poseidonius. Diodorus fell far short of the intelligence and industry needed for even a modest level of attainment. When his account can be compared with Herodotus, Thucydides, or Polybius, slipshod work and unintelligent judgment are plain. However, parts of his account of 403–362, corresponding to Xenophon's *Hellenica*, may contain better material because of their derivation from the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia*. Books 18–20 are better than the rest, perhaps because Diodorus had a tractable source, his usual method being to follow one source at a time.

Diodorus gave considerable attention to the history of the western Greeks. He professed lofty historical principles but was inadequate in practice. Where other sources are not available, historians have to use Diodorus.

Douglas Kelly

See also Ephorus; *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia*; Polybius

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Diodotus I and Diodotus II of Bactria (ca. 300–230)

Diodotus I and his son, Diodotus II, were the first rulers of the independent Hellenistic kingdom of Bactria. Their rise to kingship is mentioned in ancient sources and is observable in their coins. Diodotus I was the satrap of the Seleucid province of Bactria during the reign of Antiochus II Theos (261–246). Around 250, Diodotus began a gradual revolt through his coinage rather than outright military action. Initially, Diodotus issued a series of satrapal coins that bore the name of Antiochus, but a portrait of Diodotus. The reverses of the coins also contained new imagery. He replaced Antiochus’ device, Apollo seated on the *omphalos*, with a new design of Zeus wielding a thunderbolt. Diodotus also made his son, Diodotus II, his coruler, a Seleucid practice that would also become common among the Greco-Bactrians. They both continued to issue coins with Diodotid imagery until regional unrest provided an opportunity to openly secede. In the same decade, Arsaces, leader of a nomadic tribe, invaded the Seleucid province of Parthia.

After Antiochus II died in 246, the new king Seleucus II Callinicus (246–225) was occupied with fighting Arsaces. Diodotus I, meanwhile, successfully used his army to defend Bactria from Arsaces. When Diodotus I died, Diodotus II made peace with Arsaces and declared himself king of Bactria. He was not hindered by the Seleucids. He issued a new series of coinage that displayed his name and title, “King Diodotus,” along with his portrait and device. Later Greco-Bactrian kings, seeking to honor their predecessors, issued several commemorative coins that reproduced the coinage of Diodotus I and II, among others. On these commemorative coins,

Diodotus I carries the epithet “Soter” (“Savior”), perhaps for protecting Bactria from Arsaces. Diodotus II was also commemorated with the epithet “Theos” (“God”). Diodotus II lost the Bactrian throne ca. 230 to a usurper, Euthydemus I.

Frances A. M. Joseph

See also Bactria, Bactrians; Euthydemus I of Bactria; Parthia, Parthians

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Dion of Syracuse (ca. 409–354)

Born around 409, Dion was a politician and supporter of his brother-in-law, the tyrant Dionysius I of Syracuse. Dion was heavily influenced by the philosopher Plato, and when the latter visited Syracuse in 388 the two men became close friends. In 366, Dion persuaded Dionysius I's successor, Dionysius II, to invite Plato to Syracuse again. Dion hoped that he and Plato could influence Dionysius II to become a Platonic “philosopher king.” Unfortunately, Dion was instead suspected of conspiracy and forced into exile.

In 357, he returned to Sicily with a small military force of 1,500 mercenaries and support from Carthage. Mobilizing popular support at Syracuse, he drove Dionysius II from power. Dion was elected *strategos autokrator* (general with supreme powers) and effectively ruled in Syracuse, until losing the support of the masses due to his opposition to democracy, his unpopular social and economic reforms, and his reliance on foreign mercenaries. He was exiled to Leontini, but in 355 was recalled and allegedly had his main political opponent murdered.

Following the suicide of his own son, as a result of a plot by his friend, the Athenian Callippus, Dion was suspected of wanting to recall his relative Apollocrates, the son of Dionysius II, and to nominate him as his successor. As a result, Dion was assassinated in 354.

See also Carthage, Carthaginians; Dionysius I of Syracuse; Dionysius II of Syracuse; Syracuse

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Dionysius of Halicarnassus. See Roman Section: *Dionysius of Halicarnassus*

Dionysius I of Syracuse (ca. 432–367)

Dionysius I, also known as Dionysius the Elder, was the son-in-law of Hermocrates of Syracuse. Dionysius rose to power during the war in Sicily between the Greeks and Carthaginians that had raged since 409. His motion in the Syracusan assembly in 406 led to the dismissal of the city's generals and the appointment of new ones, including Dionysius himself. The following year he was elected *strategos autokrator* (general with supreme powers) and surrounded himself with bodyguards. With the war against Carthage going badly and civil disturbances within Syracuse he concluded a peace treaty primarily to allow him breathing space, to gather his strength, and to make preparations to resume the war when he was better prepared. He recruited mercenaries, fortified Ortygia Island, turning it into a citadel from which he could rule Syracuse, and extended the city wall to encompass the Epipolae Plateau and the construction of the Euryalus Fortress at its western edge. At the same time, engineers working for Dionysius I invented the catapult. He also embarked on a policy of extending his control over much of the eastern coast of Sicily.

From ca. 397 to 392, Dionysius I was at war with Carthage. The first struggle, 397–396, ended in a notable victory and confined Carthage to northwest Sicily. A second conflict ended in 392 with a treaty advantageous to Dionysius.

In 391, his first attempted invasion of Italy was a disaster, in the aftermath of which, he formed an alliance with the Lucanians. With the aid

of his Lucanian allies he undertook a second invasion of Italy in 389, devastating the territories of Thurii, Croton, and Locri, and in 386, he besieged Rhegium, captured the city, and sold the population into slavery. During the siege of Rhegium, Dionysius received a near fatal wound to the groin. Dionysius' brutality toward other Greeks made him unpopular in the Greek world and his embassy to the Olympic Festival of 388 was looted and pillaged by a crowd; the actors he had employed to recite his self-composed verses were despised once the crowd realized who they represented. Despite his unpopularity with other Greeks, Dionysius' victory at Rhegium nevertheless made him the chief power in Magna Graecia. Dionysius then attempted to extend his control into the Adriatic, sending colonists to found cities, and conducting a campaign in Epirus.

Dionysius embarked on a third war with Carthage (383–379) which ended in complete disaster at the battle of Cronium in 379. Dionysius suffered a crushing defeat and his brother, Leptines, was killed during the rout. The Carthaginians refused to take prisoners, and allegedly some 14,000 of Dionysius' troops lost their lives during the battle and the ensuing rout. The resulting peace treaty settled the frontier on the River Halycus. In 368, he was again at war with Carthage, but it was to be his last; he died while besieging Lilybaeum in 367.

David Harthen

See also Carthaginian Wars (409–367); Catapult; Dionysius II of Syracuse; Fortifications; Hermocrates of Syracuse; Magna Graecia; Mercenaries; Sicily; Syracuse; Syracuse, Campaign in Epirus under Dionysius I; Syracuse, Campaigns in Italy under Dionysius I; Tyrants, Tyranny

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Dionysius II of Syracuse (Reigned 367–357 and 346–344)

Dionysius II of Syracuse, also known as Dionysius the Younger, was the son of Dionysius I of Syracuse and Doris of Locri. At the death of his father, the younger Dionysius ruled at Syracuse from 367 to 357. His first act as ruler was to end his father's war with Carthage with the diplomatic help of his uncle, Dion of Syracuse. Dionysius II lacked the military drive of his father and following the successful removal of any potential rivals adopted a life of indolence and pleasure-seeking.

Dion invited the philosopher Plato to Syracuse to help influence Dionysius to be a "Philosopher King," but Dionysius II became suspicious and banished both his uncle and Plato. While Dionysius was away from Syracuse and preoccupied in refounding cities in southern Italy, his uncle returned and usurped the rule of Syracuse. However, Dionysius retained his control of Locri in Italy and ruled there as tyrant.

Dionysius II was to return and rule Syracuse from 346 to 344, some eight years after his uncle's death. He remained unpopular both with the Syracusans and the Sicilian cities he had formerly controlled and was soon penned up in his fortress citadel, and surrendering to Timoleon in 344 he lived in exile at Corinth until his death.

David Harthen

See also Carthage, Carthaginians; Corinth, Corinthians; Dion of Syracuse; Dionysius I of Syracuse; Syracuse; Timoleon; Tyrants, Tyranny

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Diplomacy

Diplomacy is a useful term to apply to the ways in which Greek states conducted their relationships, so long as it is kept clear of any connotations of modern diplomacy with its international treaties and conventions and trained professionals residing as ambassadors in embassies that are sovereign entities on foreign soil. Greek practice was in general personal and informal.

The formal and ceremonial side of dealings between Greek states was carried on by heralds (*kerykes*), who were sacrosanct and regarded as serving the gods. Heraldry conveyed messages between states, including military matters, such as declarations of war, and religious matters, such as the announcement of the date of a religious festival. A state of hostilities between *poleis* without such a formal declaration of war was said to be a “war without heralds” (*polemos akeryktos*). An important function of heralds was to arrange truces (*spondai*), a short-term agreement for suspending hostilities that was formalized by liquid offerings to the gods. Truces allowed ambassadors to come and go for negotiations, or provided a period of immunity from harm for persons attending religious festivals from states that “accepted the truce.”

Another key role of heralds was on the battlefield where a herald was usually the bearer of a message, from the defeated side to the victorious one, requesting permission to gather up their dead for burial. This request was the formal and explicit acknowledgement of defeat: a victorious side normally had command of the field and so had no need of such a proceeding. Thucydides reports (3.97–99) some prolonged exchanges between Athenian and Boeotian heralds after the Athenian defeat at the battle of Delium (424), in a situation where there were competing claims as to what was proper conduct.

In some states, heralds like clerks and secretaries were salaried employees of the states they represented but heralds were more commonly persons of some standing, appointed for life, as were certain priests. The office of herald was often hereditary in certain families. At Sparta, a hereditary guild of heralds, the Talthybiadae, claimed descent from Talthybius, a herald in Homer’s *Iliad* (Herodotus 7.134). An Athenian decree of 367/6 (Harding 54) directs the *Boule* (Council) to appoint a herald “from all the Athenians” (i.e., a special appointment) to obtain the release of the two hereditary heralds of the Greater Mysteries from the Aetolians “who have accepted the truce.” Their seizure, states the decree, was “contrary to the common laws of the Greeks.”

In contrast to heralds, ambassadors were prominent citizens of their states, elected or appointed to carry out negotiations with a foreign state on specific occasions. No one was an ambassador as a permanent occupation, and only Athens, an advanced democracy, is known to have given pay to its ambassadors. Ambassadors went to other states in time of war under the

protection of a truce; they were not sacrosanct like heralds but by convention enjoyed a protected status. Obviously, interstate negotiations could only happen if all parties respected the go-betweens.

It was customary for ambassadors who were sent to another state to have a history of such dealings, either themselves or in previous generations of their families. Such a relationship could be expected to help ease dealings between the two states. Ambassadors to a foreign state were often chosen from prominent citizens who held the distinction of being *proxenoi* of this state. There is no obvious English equivalent of this term (in the singular: *proxenos*), which is often Anglicized as proxenus. A proxenus was a distinguished person who received from another state the honorary role of offering hospitality to ambassadors from that state. They also had important but not closely defined responsibilities or expectations of facilitating negotiations between their own state and the one for which they acted as proxenus. In 378, three Spartan ambassadors were present in Athens in peacetime when the Spartiate Sphodrias made a bungled surprise attack at night on Piraeus. The ambassadors were found, and arrested, in the home of the proxenus of Sparta (Xenophon, *Hellenica* 5.4.22).

This position of proxy (proxenia) was commonly hereditary, and could be a subject of rivalry like anything in Greek politics. Alcibiades, the brilliant young Athenian politician, was offended in 420 when the Spartans were not using him as their spokesman, even though his own grandfather had renounced the family's hereditary *proxenia* of Sparta long ago. To undermine his rival Nicias, Alcibiades wormed his way into the confidence of Spartan ambassadors at Athens in 421 and in the event deceived them by a piece of sharp practice (Thucydides 5.43–45).

Some ambassadors sent to other states acted simply as mouthpieces and presented a straightforward message that allowed of no flexibility in any discussion. An example is the last embassy that Sparta sent to Athens in late 432 on the eve of the Peloponnesian War. These three ambassadors presented a curt, non-negotiable demand: the Athenians could continue to have peace “if you will grant the Greeks their freedom” (Thucydides 2.139). Spartan ambassadors who had come to Athens shortly before this had indicated that Sparta was ready to make a deal. They demanded that Athens stop the siege of Potidaea and grant Aegina full autonomy, but made it plain that Sparta would settle for Athens rescinding the Megarian decree (Thucydides 1.139).

Ambassadors who were sent, not with clear-cut instructions, but with an open-ended responsibility to negotiate the best terms possible, or with authorization to accept whatever the other side offered, were, in Athenian terminology at least, described as *autokratores*, that is, “with full discretionary powers.” Ambassadors obliged to do their best to make a deal may be seen in the Athenian decree of 378/7 on the establishment of the Second Athenian Confederacy: ambassadors sent to Thebes are to “persuade the Thebans of whatever good they are able” (Harding 35, lines 74–75). In contrast, the 10 Athenian ambassadors sent to Sparta in 404–403 when Athens was under siege in the final stage of the Peloponnesian War were not allowed across the frontier of Sparta until they confirmed that they had been sent *autokratores*: that is, not prohibited from carrying back any demands (Xenophon, *Hellenica* 2.2.19). Previous embassies sent by Athens had been constrained by an Athenian decision not to accept any peace treaty that required demolishing their walls.

Ambassadors who had this kind of discretionary power could not themselves enter into binding agreements. They had to take the terms they had negotiated back to their authorities at home for ratification. It often happened that such ambassadors found that they could not get approval for what they proposed. In Athens, ambassadors whose efforts were rejected could face prosecution, usually in a capital trial, on charges such as treason and bribery. Four Athenians were sent to Sparta in 392/1 to negotiate a peace with Sparta in the Corinthian War. The Athenian assembly rejected the proposed terms and the ambassadors were condemned and exiled. A published speech survives by one of them (unsuccessfully) advocating the peace terms (Andocides 3, *On the Peace*).

Cases of one ambassador are known but the usual Greek practice was to use a larger group. The largest number attested is 10, such as the Athenian embassies of this number sent to Philip II of Macedon in 346. Sharing responsibilities across large groups of officials was a feature of Athenian democratic practice, but even Sparta commonly used embassies consisting of three.

“Negotiation” was used above as a term for the making of agreements between Greek states but it needs to be qualified. The common way for such agreements to be made was by speeches by ambassadors and others to the sovereign body in question. Thus at Sparta in 371, the Spartans and their allies heard speeches by three Athenian ambassadors, each presenting a

different line of argument, before they voted on a treaty (Xenophon, *Hellenica* 6.3.3–18). In 346, Philip listened to addresses by each of the 10 Athenian ambassadors sent to him and then replied to each of them in turn (Aeschines 2 [*On the Embassy*] 21–22, 25–39). In 369, Spartan and other ambassadors as well as Athenian politicians addressed the Athenian assembly when it had to decide on the practical working of a new alliance between Athens and Sparta (Xenophon, *Hellenica* 7.1.1–14). Negotiation then has to be understood in the sense of deliberative bodies making decisions after listening to speeches offering argument, exhortation, and persuasion. This is in effect, reaching an agreement through public harangues followed by a vote.

It was possible for ambassadors to negotiate (or to exchange views) with small groups of officials in private. In 415, the Melian authorities insisted on this course of action, against protests from the Athenian ambassadors, because they were worried that the citizen assembly was likely to yield to Athenian pressure (Thucydides 5.84–85). In 421, after a fruitless round of ambassadorial speeches at Sparta, two Spartan ephors put a proposal in private to ambassadors from Boeotia and Corinth. On their way home, these ambassadors met two prominent citizens of Argos for some more private dealings. However, when the Boeotian leaders put the crucial proposal to the Boeotian federal council, it was rejected because those at the top had not informed the rank-and-file members of the exchange of views and undertakings given in private (Thucydides 5.36–38). This kind of behind-the-scenes discussion went against the engrained Greek preference for speech making before, and decision by, public assemblies.

Douglas Kelly

See also Alliances; Andocides; Athenian Confederacy, Second; Declaration of War; Laws of War

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Discipline, Military

Every ancient army that fought in formations depended on some form of discipline. Greek hoplite armies of the Archaic and Classical Periods were not exempt. If we imagine discipline (*eutaxia*) in militaries measured on a scale, Greek armies of the Archaic and Classical Periods were at the more informal end of the scale. The Macedonian army of the late fourth and third centuries seems to have been more standardized in its discipline, but this too was less formal than what we might expect from the Roman military.

Although it is commonplace to think of military discipline in terms of brutal punishments and regulations, military discipline need not be defined only by formal rules or brutality (or both) or maintained by the same to be effective. It is important to recognize that military discipline, ancient and modern, is more complex than adherence to orders or punishment of infractions. It was and remains a means of control that included mental, physical, and social components that might be reinforced with positive as well as negative sanctions. As noted by Pritchett in his 1974 study, we have no source for Greek discipline equivalent to Polybius for Rome. This has resulted in having to comb our sources for scattered references to it.

Training soldiers to maintain ranks, maneuver collectively, and even remain in battle requires they learn a level of discipline. Military discipline will be acquired through various parts of service including training and learning how the unit works in battle, getting to know one's comrades in arms, and getting accustomed to the society of the army. Discipline could be enforced effectively through willing compliance and morale in combination with expectations and sanctions.

The importance of discipline is not difficult to locate. Hoplite tactics by their very nature depended for much of their success on soldiers remaining in ranks as long as practicable, regardless of whether the ranks were close- or open-order. We find references in Thucydides and Xenophon to the necessity of maintaining discipline and order in battle and on campaign. Thucydides' descriptions of the battles of Delium (424) and Mantinea (418) both make clear that the soldiers on both sides needed to maintain their ranks. Pipes may have helped at Mantinea for example, but these would

have been useless had the soldiers not been sufficiently disciplined to follow them. Xenophon makes the same point in many of his battlefield narratives, especially for Cunaxa (401), and Coronea (394) as well as during the march of the Ten Thousand. In addition to maintaining position in line, it was equally important that they remain orderly while marching and waiting for battle. At Amphipolis (422), Brasidas was able to evaluate the quality of his opposition by their inability to maintain order before battle.

As for the Macedonian army of Philip II and Alexander III, the new tactics would hardly have been effective had the army not been well disciplined. The ability at Chaeronea (338) of the Macedonian phalanx to retreat in order and then turn on their enemy on a command demonstrates how disciplined Philip's army had become. Alexander demonstrated the importance of his army's discipline at every battle, but the best example was probably when he scared off the Taulantians in 335 with a display of precision drill.

Discipline in all ancient armies would have started with the sense of community in the unit and been augmented by training. Since recruitment in most citizen-based hoplite armies was based on local community, peer pressure or social capital would have played the key role internalizing discipline. In semiprofessional (e.g., Sparta) or mercenary armies there would still have been a strong sense of military community within the unit, regardless of the soldiers' origins. This sense of community might have been augmented in these specialized units by competitive spirit or even *esprit de corps*. Familiarity with one's community and a strong sense of shame attached to cowardice and failure would have been important elements in the matrix of discipline. Training also imposed discipline by providing group actions and a layer of control as well as further demonstrating the importance of team-work.

Sanctions further reinforced discipline. Some regular ancient armies (e.g., Rome), had laws to enforce discipline, but few references to laws survive in the historical record from ancient Greece and Macedon. The laws we do learn about suggest the most common disciplinary concerns. Athens and Sparta had laws against desertion (*lipotaxia*), refusal to serve (*astrateia*), and cowardice (*deilia*). One particular form of desertion was the tossing away of one's shield (*rhipspasia*). Given how dangerous it was to those who stood and fought if their comrades fled, it is easy to understand why desertion and cowardice were serious offenses. There were also laws

against officers' abuse of power, including excessive punishment. Such laws were probably common among Greek city-states. Enforcement of these laws seems to have been inconsistent in all periods and it is not known when different cities adopted them. We find references, especially in Xenophon's works, to commanders punishing soldiers who were especially unruly or indisciplined (*ataxia*). Sparta also recognized insubordination by officers. Sparta may have had more formal disciplinary expectations built into its society, but there are few known regulations or laws standardizing military discipline. This lack of formality is not surprising, arising as a function of the citizen-soldier nature of hoplite armies and citizen rights in most city-states.

In addition to shame and the penalties imposed by laws, there was physical punishment like beating. Spartan officers carried sticks to hit those who failed to maintain discipline. Xenophon and Frontinus report examples of physical punishment among mercenary and semiprofessional armies, but as noted already these sanctions seem to have been much less common or inconsistently applied in citizen hoplite armies. There were also positive sanctions to reinforce discipline. Soldiers demonstrating great distinction (including *eutaxia*) might be singled out for special recognition, prizes, or extra booty, any of which conferred increased status within the unit, and which might last after the soldier returned home, as was the case for those who fought and survived Marathon or fought with Brasidas in the Amphipolis campaign.

The other side of the coin is indiscipline (*ataxia*) or military unrest too, of course. Mutiny was the most serious, but is merely one type of "military unrest." Other types of military unrest include military conspiracy, expression of grievances, and insubordination. The most common type of unrest in every military, insubordination, includes disobedience or failure to follow orders, defection, desertion (including cowardice), and dereliction of duty. Dereliction of duty included crimes like falling asleep on duty. The various laws previously mentioned demonstrate that Greeks recognized insubordination (in all its forms) as a problem. While beating was not unheard of, some of these laws carried penalties as severe as death and exile. According to our sources, Iphicrates, Epaminondas, and Alexander the Great each killed men they caught sleeping on sentry duty. According to Plutarch, a Spartan law punished officers who disobeyed orders at Mantinea in 362 with loss of citizenship (*atimia*) and similar penalties attached to

certain cases of cowardice. Pritchett's study includes many more examples of such penalties from many city-states, demonstrating the ubiquity of the problem in Greek armies.

The presence of military unrest does not detract from a commander's or city's reputation. Every army commander, even in hoplite armies, faced the threat of indiscipline—forces where discipline was important and enforced were susceptible to mutinies and other forms of military unrest. Even a brilliant general like Alexander the Great encountered military unrest in his army. After 323, in the Hellenistic world, military unrest would prove to be a significant problem, but in the hoplite armies of Greece there was insubordination, but no incidents that meet the criteria for mutinies.

While it may not have been as obvious to us as in the Roman military, every Greek military commander, even in hoplite armies, relied on some level of discipline for success in warfare. The level and formality of discipline varied widely across the Greek world, reaching its peak in the Macedonian militaries of the late fourth through second centuries. The nature of military discipline in hoplite armies was closely tied to citizen rights and city-state culture so that it reminds us of the importance of understanding Greek culture to appreciate its military history and vice-versa.

Lee L. Brice

See also Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon; Amphipolis, Campaign of; Brasidas; Chaeronea, Battle of; Coronea, Battle of (394); Cunaxa, Battle of; Delium, Battle of; Hoplites; Mantinea, Battle of (418); Phalanx; Philip II of Macedon; Thucydides; Xenophon

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Dorieus (ca. 540–505)

Dorieus belonged to the Agiad royal house at Sparta, son of King Anaxandridas by his first wife. Because she had been childless up till then, the ephors compelled Anaxandridas to take a second wife, who gave birth to Cleomenes before Dorieus was born. On the death of Anaxandridas, the succession passed to Cleomenes.

Dorieus resented the humiliation of living as an ordinary Spartiate while his half-brother was king and so took a number of men from Sparta to found a colony on the North African coast, in the region of modern Tripolis. Expelled from there by Libyans and Carthaginians after two years, he returned to Sparta and then organized another expedition to found a colony, named Heraclea, in the vicinity of Mount Eryx in western Sicily. Soon after arriving, Dorieus was killed, along with most of the settlers, in a combined attack by Segesta and the Phoenicians of western Sicily. Herodotus (5.44–45) weighed up the question, without giving a decision, whether Dorieus took part in the destruction of Sybaris in south Italy (in about 511/10). Herodotus was also interested in Dorieus' consulting oracles or, in the case of his first expedition, not consulting the Delphic oracle, in these failed colonizing ventures. He also treated Dorieus as a man of sterling qualities in contrast to his half-brother Cleomenes, a controversial figure.

Douglas Kelly

See also Cleomenes I; Colonies, Colonization; Delphi; Sicily; Sparta; Sybaris/Thurii

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Doris

Doris was a small region in the upper part of the Cephissus river valley in central Greece, surrounded by mountains on three sides. The Dorians of Doris were generally unfriendly with their neighbors to the east and southeast, the Phocians, but enjoyed better relations with the Locrians to the northeast. Their three main towns, all small, were Boeum, Erineus, and Cytinium. They occupied a strategic position astride the direct route between the Corinthian and Malian Gulfs. In 480, the Persian king Xerxes, having destroyed the defenders of Thermopylae, did not use that pass to enter southern Greece, but rather took his army south into Doris and thence east through Phocis. The other importance of Doris was that the Greeks believed that the ancestors of the Dorians of the Peloponnese, including the Spartans, had settled for a time in Doris during their supposed migration from the north. This sentimental attachment was enough to encourage the Spartans to defend central Greek Doris against the Phocians, while in the fourth century Doris held one of the two Dorian votes in the Delphic Amphictyony. For much of the Hellenistic Period Doris was part of the Aetolian League.

Peter Londey

See also Aetolia, Aetolian League; Delphic Amphictyony; Peloponnesian War, First; Phocis, Phocians; Thermopylae, Battle of

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E

Egypt, Egyptians

By the Greek Classical Period, Egypt was home to an already ancient civilization. The Greek historian Herodotus wrote a historical and ethnographic description of Egypt, possibly based on personal observation. Culturally the Greeks were strongly influenced by Egypt, but trade, mainly conducted at designated *entrepôts* within the Nile Delta, was also important.

The 26th dynasty of Egypt, alarmed by the expansion of the Persian Empire under Cyrus the Great, hired Greek mercenaries and expanded the fleet. Nevertheless, in 525 Cambyses II, Cyrus' son, defeated an inexperienced pharaoh and became the first Persian ruler of the 27th dynasty; Egypt was reduced to a satrapy. Egypt frequently revolted against Persian rule, first in 487 when it took two years for Xerxes to quell the revolt. On Xerxes' death in 465, the Egyptians revolted again, in 460 appealing for help from Athens. The Athenians dispatched a significant force of soldiers and 200 ships and had early successes, leaving only the citadel of Memphis in Persian hands. But by 454, the Persians had gained the upper hand and surrounded the Greek forces, who were forced to flee across the Libyan desert with few survivors.

In 404, Egypt again declared its independence, and, despite frequent dynastic struggles and internecine strife, was not reconquered until Artaxerxes III recaptured the province in 343. On his death in 338, Egypt again revolted, but Darius III regained control in 336, only to lose it to Alexander the Great in 332. Alexander left Egypt under local governors. After his death in 323 one of his generals, Ptolemy, swiftly moved to seize control of Egypt and eventually (in 304) established the Ptolemaic dynasty

as Ptolemy I Soter ("Savior").

In the third century, Ptolemaic Egypt exercised considerable power in the Aegean and the Levant, and fought a series of wars with Seleucid Syria. After the end of the Fifth Syrian-Egyptian War in 195, however, the Ptolemies were once and for all pushed back within Egypt itself, while the Sixth (and final) Syrian-Egyptian War, which ended in 168, made it clear that even in the east the dominant power was now Rome. Nevertheless, Egypt remained independent until the last Ptolemaic ruler, Cleopatra, was defeated by Rome and committed suicide in 30. Egypt then became a Roman province.

Russell Buzby

See also Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon; Alexandria, Egypt; Artaxerxes III; Athens, Intervention in Egypt; Cyrus II; Darius I; Persian (Achaemenid) Empire; Ptolemies; Ptolemy I Soter; Ptolemy II Philadelphus; Ptolemy V Epiphanes; Raphia, Battle of; Syrian-Egyptian Wars (First to Sixth); Xerxes

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Elephants

Greco-Roman authors were familiar with two species of elephant, the Asian elephant (*Elephas maximus*) and the smaller African Forest elephant (*Loxodonta cyclotis*). The larger African Bush elephant (*Loxodonta africana*) remained unknown. The limited zoological information about Asian elephants available before the 330s greatly increased as a result of Alexander's invasion of India and later Seleucid diplomatic contacts with the Mauryan Empire, which dominated the Indian subcontinent from ca. 300. African elephants attracted comparatively little scholarly interest.

Elephants first acquired military significance in early Hellenistic warfare. Shortly after his encounter with Porus' elephants on the River

Hydaspes in 326, Alexander organized an elephant-corps, but its military potential was only realized under his Successors. They initially competed to control this formation, but replenishment of adult beasts soon became a crucial consideration, especially given the difficulties and expense of captive breeding. In 305, Seleucus I ceded extensive eastern territories to the Mauryan ruler Chandragupta in return for 500 elephants, which proved decisive in subsequent engagements, notably the battle of Ipsus in 301. From then on Seleucid proximity to India permitted their domination of western access to Indian elephants, although early Antigonid and Ptolemaic armies fielded smaller numbers acquired as gifts or booty. Consequently, by the 270s, Ptolemy II commenced large-scale capture and training of African Forest elephants, despite their inferior size and strength.



A mid-second-century terracotta statuette of a war elephant trampling a Galatian warrior. Elephants entered Greek warfare after Alexander the Great's conquests; this may represent an incident in one of the Galatian wars in Asia Minor against the

Seleucids and Pergamum. The statuette, found on the Greek island of Lemnos, is now in the Louvre Museum, Paris, France. (DEA/G. Dagli Orti/Getty Images)

War-elephants first appeared in the western Mediterranean during Pyrrhus' invasion of Italy and Sicily (280–275). The Carthaginians established their own elephant-corps by 262, which served extensively in the First and Second Punic Wars. In contrast, Roman utilization of war-elephants, chiefly in the second century, was small-scale and infrequent. These beasts were mostly supplied by Numidian allies, whose forces still employed war-elephants in the 40s.

Inheriting the elephant-handling techniques of northwestern India, Alexander's Successors originally manned elephants with only a mahout and sometimes a spear- or *sarissa*-armed rider. The origin and diffusion of the howdah or turret remain obscure, but Hellenistic evidence for this apparatus begins in the 270s. It later became widely employed, either to accommodate a protective crew or as an elevated platform for missile troops, although how (and how often) it was used probably differed according to circumstance and species. On the battlefield the role of elephants, often armored and richly decorated, was primarily psychological. In addition to driving off opposing elephantry, they could disconcert or break up close-order infantry formations and panic horses unaccustomed to their appearance, noise, and smell. They were occasionally used to assault fieldworks and fortifications. Countermeasures included attacks to their eyes and trunk, hamstringing, and obstructions such as pits or spiked obstacles. Elephants were recognized as a potentially two-edged weapon, as wounded beasts might plough uncontrollably through their own ranks, but their prolonged and widespread deployment testifies to their enduring tactical value. Elephants could also assist in particular operational contexts, such as forming a breakwater when armies crossed major waterways. As symbols of military prestige, they participated in ceremonial processions, notably in Ptolemaic Egypt.

Philip Rance

See also Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon, Indian Campaign; Animals in War; Carthage, Carthaginians; Hydaspes, Battle of; Ipsus, Battle of; Porus; Ptolemies; Pyrrhus; Raphia, Battle of; Seleucus I Nicator; Successors (*Diadochoi*), Wars of. *Roman Section*: Punic War, First; Punic War, Second; Pyrrhus, War with

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Elis

The people of Elis, known as Eleians, were the custodians of the sanctuary of Zeus at Olympia. They may have been allied to the Spartans in an Archaic Period war against Argos. During the Classical and Hellenistic Periods, beginning with their contribution of triremes to the Peloponnesian fleet during the Second Peloponnesian War, they took part in various wars among the Greeks, Macedonians, and Romans.

The Eleians often struggled to maintain possession of the sanctuary of Olympia and the districts south of the Alpheius River. Strabo reports (8.33.3) that when Pheidon of Argos took control of Olympia the Eleians joined the Spartans in defeating him, and then the Spartans helped the Eleians gain possession of all the country north of the Messenian border. According to Pausanias (6.22.2–4), Elis contested control of the games with Pisa during the Archaic Period. Such reports, however, may be based upon later invention. The Eleians are listed on the serpent column from Delphi among the allies who opposed Xerxes' invasion of Greece, but are not reported to have taken part in any particular battle. They later ravaged most of the six "Minyan" *poleis* south of the Alpheius and helped defend Lepreum from certain Arcadians.

During the Second Peloponnesian War and its prelude, the Eleians provided ships for Peloponnesian fleets and expelled an Athenian force from their territory. Following a disagreement with Sparta over Lepreum, however, they joined the anti-Spartan alliance defeated at Mantinea in 418. After their victory over Athens, the Spartans repeatedly invaded Eleia in a conflict known as the Eleian War. Despite the failure of an oligarchic, pro-Spartan coup in Elis, the Spartans compelled the Eleians to make peace. The

terms deprived the Eleians of considerable territory, including what now became Triphylia, and obliged them to provide hoplites for Spartan campaigns, beginning with the Corinthian War.

In 370, the Eleians joined the Thebans, Arcadians, and Argives in invading Laconia and thus recovered some territory lost in the Eleian War. They soon fell out with their allies over Triphylia, however, going to war with the Arcadian League in 365 and helping Sparta against Thebes at the second battle of Mantinea in 362. In 343, following a decade of struggle, the Eleian oligarchs overcame the democrats and turned for support to Philip II of Macedon. After Chaeronea they sent Philip military aid and subsequently participated in the various wars of the Hellenistic Period. In 271, the brief tyranny of Aristotimus was overthrown with Aetolian help. In 245, as allies of the Aetolians and Macedonians, the Eleians recovered Triphylia, but lost it again after the invasions of Philip V in 217. During the wars that followed they at first sided with the Aetolian League but in 191 joined the Achaean League. In 146, Elis regained Triphylia, but as part of the Roman province of Macedonia.

Graeme F. Bourke

See also Corinthian War; Elis, War with Arcadia; Olympia; Peloponnesian War, Second; Triphylia

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Elis, War with Arcadia (360s)

This war was fought in the 360s, when the Arcadian League repeatedly invaded the territory of Elis, taking possession of Olympia. Although the Eleians failed to regain the sanctuary when they were defeated in a battle

near the temple of Zeus, the Arcadians agreed to return it to them under the terms of peace.

In 365, a group of Arcadian exiles set out from Elis and captured the border town of Lasion, once an Eleian possession but now belonging to the democratically-governed Arcadian League. Arcadian and Athenian forces sent to recover Lasion defeated the elite Eleian companies known as the Three Hundred and the Four Hundred, and went on to take most of the Acroreian towns. Proceeding to Olympia, they fortified the hill of Cronus, captured Marganeis, and advanced to the *agora* of Elis, but were driven back. The Eleian democrats, in league with the Arcadians, seized control of the acropolis, but were ejected by the Three Hundred and the cavalry, and 400 citizens were banished. With Arcadian help, the exiled Eleians took Pylus (inland from Elis), where more democrats from the city joined them.

The Arcadians invaded again, but the Eleians and their Achaean allies drove them from the city and they withdrew from Eleia. When the Achaeans of Pellene returned home to recapture one of their towns from the combined forces of the Arcadians and their own democrats, the Arcadians invaded Eleia for a third time and camped between the city and Cyllene. The Eleians attacked them, but were defeated and returned to Elis. The Spartans now joined the war on the Eleian side, capturing and occupying the Arcadian town of Cromnus. While the Arcadians were engaged in opposing the Spartans at Cromnus, the Eleians in the city defeated and killed the democratic exiles at Pylus and recovered Marganeis.

In 364, the Arcadians reinforced their garrison at Olympia and, in company with some of the local inhabitants, who now formed the independent state of the Pisatans (*IvO* 36; *SEG* 22.339), began to celebrate the Olympic Games. The Eleians summoned their Achaean allies and marched toward Olympia. There they made a determined assault upon the Arcadians and their Argive and Athenian allies, driving them into the heart of the sanctuary and almost reaching the altar of Zeus. Their enemies, however, pelted them from the temple rooftops, killing Stratolas, the commander of the Three Hundred and one of the leading oligarchs, so they returned to their camp. When the Arcadians and their allies built a stockade around the sanctuary, the Eleians withdrew.

The Arcadian leaders had been using funds from the treasury of the temple of Zeus to pay their federal force, the *eparittoi*, which, because the pay enabled many poorer citizens to join, had maintained a democratic

character. In 363, payment from the temple treasury was discontinued, so the poorer citizens left and were replaced by wealthier ones. The *eparittoi* became more oligarchically inclined, and the Arcadian assembly voted to conclude peace with the Eleians and return Olympia to them.

Graeme F. Bourke

See also Achaea, Achaeans; Arcadia, Arcadians; Elis; Elite Troops; Olympia; *Stasis*

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Elite Troops

Elite troops in ancient Greece fall into two broad categories. The first includes professional citizen troops, often called *epilektoi* (lit. “chosen ones”) maintained at public expense by a *polis* or league. The second encompasses units marked for special favor or holding a special position in royal armies such as those of Philip II and Alexander the Great, or their Successors.

In the case of the first category, the states were essentially trying to replicate, on a lesser scale, the effects of the Spartan system. This freed the male citizens from the need to farm or earn a living so they could devote themselves to military training. Aristotle believed that the superiority of the Spartan hoplites stemmed not from the quality of their training but the fact that they trained while others did not. The rise of *epilektoi* in Greek states, especially in the fourth century may also have been influenced by this view.

Lacking the Spartan helot system or the *agoge*, other states used state resources to maintain their *epilektoi* so they could focus on hoplite training. This allowed greater professionalism while avoiding the risks of the alternative—mercenaries.

The most famous of these elite contingents was the 300-strong Theban Sacred Band, active from 378 to its destruction in 338. However, Elis seems also to have had 300 hoplite *epilektoi* (imaginatively called “The Three

Hundred”) ca. 365 when they and the cavalry suppressed a democratic revolution there. A similar body is attested at Argos; Athens also had a group of *epilektoi* (Aeschines served in it at the battle of Tamynae), although in these cases we know little or nothing of their organization, training, and level of state support—if, indeed, they had any.

Elite troops in monarchies, such as Macedonia, were originally the royal guard. The 300 *Hippeis* attested at Sparta, for example, probably guarded the king in battle and were used for special missions, such as the nationally symbolic recovery of the bones of Orestes. The famous “Three Hundred” killed with Leonidas at Thermopylae may have been the *Hippeis*. At Macedon, the heart of the cavalry was the Companion cavalry, under Philip II eight squadrons. One of these, the Royal Squadron, was 400 strong (twice the size of the standard squadron), consisted of aristocrats and the king’s personal companions and generally fought with the king.

Over time, Philip and Alexander’s Macedonian army itself became an elite force. The core of the Macedonian infantry under Philip was six *taxeis* or brigades of phalangites, called the *Pezhetairoi* or “Foot Companions.” They did not have the same status as the Companion cavalry, but enjoyed high regard, especially in the armies of the *diadochoi* (Successors). The 3,000 hypaspists, the Argyraspides (“silver shields”), also seem to have been regarded as an elite, confirming that both social status and professionalism could bring about elite status. Even within the hypaspists, the first *lochos* (regiment) had the title “royal” and was composed of the tallest soldiers.

Like the *epilektoi* of the Greek city-states, the Macedonian army had moved from citizen-soldier to professional status. This process was significantly advanced under Philip II but by the end of Alexander’s conquests, the whole army was a highly professional force. Although there is a strong cultural, or perhaps even racist, element in prizing the Greek and Macedonian troops over the local Asian ones, the sheer quality and professionalism of these units ensured them the status of elite troops, and a vital role, in the successor armies. The Argyraspides, for example, served with distinction until they betrayed Eumenes of Cardia in return for their baggage, captured at Gabiene (316). Although their new leader, Antigonos I Monophthalmus seems to have split them up, a unit called the Argyraspides was accepted into the Seleucid army after 312. By the time of the battle of Magnesia (190), the Argyraspides were Antiochus III, the Great’s Royal bodyguard.

See also Aeschines; Chaeronea, Battle of; Elis, War with Arcadia; Leuctra, Battle of; Pelopidas; Sacred Band; Sport and War; Tamynae, Battle of; Tegyra, Battle of; Training

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Epaminondas (d. 362)

Epaminondas was one of Thebes' two most famed and effective generals during the Boeotian League's highest era of power, the Theban Hegemony (371–362), and one of the most important figures in international Greek politics of this period. Source problems plague any reconstruction of his life: Xenophon, a contemporary, de-emphasizes Epaminondas' accomplishments; Cornelius Nepos' biography of him was written some three centuries later; and Plutarch's is lost. From what can be recovered, Epaminondas was born of a prominent Theban family probably around 410 and educated by a Pythagorean philosopher. He played a role in the expulsion of the Spartan garrison in 379. In 371, he represented Thebes at the peace conference in Sparta, where he argued for Thebes representing all the Boeotians, after which the Boeotians were expelled from the negotiations. King Cleombrotus' attempt to prevent the Thebans from bringing other Boeotian

cities into the Boeotian League led to the battle of Leuctra later in 371. Epaminondas may have been instrumental in this great Theban victory over Sparta by using a combination of relatively innovative tactics such as deeper phalanx rows and the Sacred Band in front of a strong left wing, although the opposing army was quite poorly manned as well.

Epaminondas led invasions of the Peloponnese over the next two summers, utilizing Theban armies and allied armies from Arcadia, Argos, and Elis. On these expeditions he freed the Messenian Helots and probably helped to establish the cities of Ithôme/Messene in Messenia and Megalopolis in Arcadia. Between these expeditions he faced domestic opposition from rival politicians accusing him of misconduct, but was not convicted. He saw further action in 368–367 in Thebes' dealings with Thessaly and Macedon, and through his alliance Thebes recovered Pelopidas and Ismenias from Alexander of Pherae, who was holding them hostage. He assaulted Achaia in 366 and forced it into alliance with the Boeotian League, although its cities later went to Sparta, retook Oropus, and advocated the construction of a 100-ship fleet and alliances with many Aegean powers. He drove off an Athenian fleet in 364, the year Pelopidas died at Cynoscephalae. Epaminondas was certainly the mastermind behind Thebes' excellent tactics at the battle of Mantinea in 362, where he perished, supposedly stating that he did not die childless, but that the battles of Leuctra and Mantinea were his daughters. Diodorus regarded him as the best man of his generation.

The impact of Epaminondas' life and death are huge. His leadership was instrumental in vaulting the Boeotian League and Thebes into the first rank of Greek international powers. His death did not bring the death of Theban/Boeotian power, but did surely hasten it.

Timothy Doran

See also Agesilaus II; Boeotian League; Leuctra, Battle of; Mantinea, Battle of (362); Pelopidas; Sacred Band; Thebes, Invasions of the Peloponnese

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Ephebes, *Ephebeia*

Although it later became a general term for “youth,” “ephebe” (*ephebos*; pl. *epheboi*) seems to have been coined in Athens in the early fourth century to denote a participant in Athens’ youth training program, the *ephebeia*. This influential institution was widely copied, including in the Hellenistic cities of the Aegean and Asia Minor. The institution may well have existed in some form in the late fifth century (Thucydides records the “youngest” Athenians guarding walls and garrisoning border forts in the third quarter of that century), but it appears to have been formally established in its full form sometime early in the fourth century. Prior to this, ephebes, who manned the walls or frontier posts did so on an as-required basis like the rest of the army. A few years before 334 the *ephebeia* was reorganized into the form we know best.

This form, described in the *Athenian Constitution* (*Athenaion Politeia*) ascribed to Aristotle, prescribed a two-year period of military service for Athenian youths between the ages of 18–20. In their first year they lived communally, received four obols a day pay, and undertook training as hoplites but also with the bow, javelin, and catapult (cavalry training was added in the Hellenistic Period). In their second year (after a public demonstration of what they had learned), they were presented with a shield and spear at public expense and protected the borders by manning the border forts and conducting border patrols. The ephebes swore an oath (preserved in Lycurgus’ speech *Against Leocrates*, and in an inscription) not to dishonor their arms or abandon their mates, and to leave Athens greater, not smaller, than at the time of their oath. The institution guaranteed Athens had a standing border protection force and ensured a base level of training for its military age citizens. The *ephebeia* survived into the Roman period, although it took on an increasingly less military character.

Iain Spence

See also Athens; Sport and War; Training

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Ephesus, Battle of (409)

The battle of Ephesus was an Athenian defeat during the Second Peloponnesian War (431–404). The Athenian force under Thrasyllus (Diodorus mistakenly has Thrasybulus) consisted of 1,000 hoplites, 100 cavalry, and 500 sailors equipped as peltasts. The defending force, which the Persian satrap Tissaphernes had gathered from around the region, was of unknown size but included Ephesians, Persians, and ships' crewmen from Syracuse and Selinus in Sicily. Thrasyllus landed his hoplites on one side of the city and his cavalry and peltasts on the other, ordering them to advance simultaneously. However, he was defeated in detail when the entire enemy force attacked his hoplites, killing 100, and then turned against his cavalry and peltasts, killing around 300. Thrasyllus recovered the dead under a truce and sailed back to Notium where he buried them. Lysias, *Against Diogeiton*, tells the story of the effects the death of one of the Athenian hoplites had on his family.

Iain Spence

See also Civilian Populations in War; Peloponnesian War, Second; Peltast

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Ephialtes, Athenian (d. 461). See Assassination; Cimon; Pericles

Ephialtes, Malian (Active ca. 480)

Ephialtes, son of Eurydemus of Malis was the man who told Xerxes about the Anopaea path, enabling him to outflank the stubborn Greek defense at Thermopylae. According to Herodotus, Ephialtes was motivated by financial gain. The maneuver was successful and the pass forced, opening the Persian way south. After the war, Ephialtes had a price on his head but was killed for an unrelated reason. Herodotus records, but rejects, an alternative version that blamed two other men for the betrayal.

Iain Spence

See also Herodotus; Leonidas; Persian Wars; Thermopylae, Battle of; Xerxes

Further Reading

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Ephorus (ca. 400–330)

Ephorus from Cyme in Asia Minor, produced a massive history in 30 books, the first “universal” history dealing with the whole past of the Greeks and peoples known to them. It went down to ca. 340, but did not include the Third Sacred War, 355–346, which was added by his son Demophilus. Ephorus avoided mythological times and began with what was regarded as a historical event, the return of the descendants of Heracles to the Peloponnese (in approximately 1102 on standard reckoning).

His work became the standard account of Greek and “barbarian” history. It survives only in numerous quotations and references, although the *Historical Library* of Diodorus, books 11–15, which made heavy use of Ephorus, and to a lesser extent books 1–5, have been taken to give some idea of his work. However, it is not justified on present evidence to assume that Diodorus’ faults are due in whole or part to Ephorus. As with all historians whose works are lost and known from fragments, statements about Ephorus that go beyond observable fact are inferences of highly

variable plausibility.

Ephorus was censured in antiquity for a lackluster style but his erudition and laboriousness were acknowledged. What little is known of his methods in dealing with the extremely poorly documented early times does not inspire confidence. There are, however, indications that in investigating contemporary and near-contemporary events he had some sense of a historian's task, even if he was given to moralizing. He undertook some independent enquiry and at times reached his own judgments when working over his predecessors, Herodotus and Thucydides. Polybius, an acerbic critic of other historians, treated him seriously and commended his capacity for describing naval battles (12.25f: a back-handed compliment?).

Douglas Kelly

See also Diodorus Siculus; Herodotus; Polybius; Thucydides

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Epibatai

Epibatai (sing. *epibates*) denoted soldiers fighting from any platform, such as a chariot, elephant, or warship but is most commonly used for marines serving on a warship. A trireme had a complement of 14 *epibatai* (10 hoplites and 4 archers) but the later, and larger, Hellenistic ships carried more. Most marines were equipped as hoplites (see illustration in Naval Warfare entry) and were used to board enemy ships (or repel boarders) or as infantry in amphibious landings. Athenian *epibatai*, operating in Aetolia in 426, are described by Thucydides (3.98) as “by far the best men Athens lost in the war,” suggesting that they were drawn from the normal hoplite rolls. However, 700 Athenian marines deployed to Sicily in 415 were *thetes* (i.e., non-hoplites) who were probably equipped by the state. Marines could be as effective as line hoplites on land, for example, winning the battle of Mycale (479) against a much larger Persian army.

Iain Spence

See also *Catalogus*; Hoplites; Mycale, Battle of

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Epidamnus

Founded in 627, Epidamnus (modern Durrës in Albania) was a Corcyraean colony, with the *aesymnetes* (founder) and some colonists drawn from Corcyra's own mother city, Corinth. Located on the Adriatic, Epidamnus was important for trade with Illyria. Around 300, the city became known as Dyrrachion (after the headland on which the city was located), which became Dyrrhachium in the Roman period.

In the Classical Period, Epidamnus was ruled by a narrow oligarchy. However, following a period of internal *stasis* or struggle, by 435 a democratic party had expelled the oligarchs. The oligarchs regrouped and besieged the city, which appealed to Corcyra for aid. When this was refused the democrats appealed to Corinth. The poor relations between Corinth and Corcyra led to Corinth assisting the democrats and then Corcyra intervening and capturing the city. The resultant naval clash between Corcyra and Corinth drew in the Athenians and was one of the events leading to the outbreak of the Second Peloponnesian War in 431. Little more is known of Epidamnus until the Roman period and, as the modern city is built on the site of the ancient one, limited archaeological evidence has been recovered.

Iain Spence

See also Colonies, Colonization; Corcyra, Conflict with Epidamnus and Corinth; Corcyra, Corcyraeans; Corinth, Corinthians; Peloponnesian War, Second

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Epiphanies, Military

It is not just in Greek myths, such as the stories of Troy, that we hear of the gods fighting in the battles of men: accounts of historical battles also contain testimony of the direct involvement and appearance of divinities. The appearance of gods and other deities on the battlefield or in other contexts was known as an epiphany. Epiphanies were widely accepted as genuine by the ancient Greeks. Themistocles, like many of his compatriots, directly attributed the victory at Salamis to the gods and heroes (Herodotus 8.109). Sometimes these gods were prominent deities, but often these divine allies were local heroes, whose shrines were situated close by. The related term, *epiphaneia*, was also used to describe divine actions of the gods, but in which the gods did not necessarily show themselves.

It is not surprising to find a number of epiphanies reported during the Persian Wars, when the future of the Greek world itself was at stake, and the fears and anxieties of the Hellenes were at their highest. Accordingly this was the time when they most expected their gods to fight alongside them, as the case of the righteous Greek against the impious barbarian was less ambiguous than a conflict in which a Greek was fighting a brother Greek, who shared the same gods.

At the battle of Marathon in 490, it was widely believed that the goat-god, Pan, the Attic hero, Theseus, and a local chthonic hero that an oracle identified as Echetlaeus, participated directly in the battle against the Persians. Pan even struck a deal with the Athenians, via the messenger Philippides, in which he bartered his support at Marathon in return for the Athenians setting up a cult in his honor. At the battle of Salamis, 10 years after Marathon, the Athenians reported visions of armed heroes, the sons of Ajax, protecting the Greek fleet. Ajax, Telamon, and other heroes were invoked because of an earthquake in the area on the eve of the battle. Herodotus also tells us that before the battle a supernatural cloud of dust arose at nearby Eleusis from which could be heard the chant of "Iacchus" associated with the Eleusinian Mysteries. A giant serpent was also seen

swimming with the Athenian fleet, which Pausanias said was a manifestation of the local hero, Cychreus. While no battlefield apparitions were reported at the battle of Plataea in 479, Herodotus makes the point that no Persian was allowed to die upon land sacred to Demeter near the battlefield, because she had been so angered by the desecration of her sanctuary that she would not permit it.

Attacks on Delphi, the most sacred panhellenic sanctuary of Greece, would be another context in which we would expect to find a high incidence of reported battlefield epiphanies. Herodotus says that when the Persians attacked the sanctuary in 480, two giant local heroes, whom the Delphians identified as Phylacus and Autonou̓s, were seen fighting the Persians. He even goes as far as to say that this epiphany was originally reported to him by the Persian survivors themselves. Two centuries later, Apollo himself is recorded, on a *stele* set up by the victors, as having assisted Delphi against the marauding Gauls.

Battlefield epiphanies did not necessarily involve a vision of gods and/or heroes in the form of men or animals lending their support against the enemy. They could also manifest themselves as natural phenomena. For example, at Aegospotami in 405, the Dioscuri were believed to have appeared in the form of stars floating on either side of Lysander's ship. But note that these hero-twins (Castor and Pollux) were favorite battlefield deities of the Spartans. They were actually invoked when both Spartan kings marched into battle and the Spartans would have been actively looking for signs of their presence. They would have been keen to interpret anything unusual on the battlefield, such as the strange lights above the rudder, as an actual epiphany of the Dioscuri.

Sometimes it was the appearance of strangers which was later interpreted as an epiphany. For example, at Argos in 272 an unknown woman was said to have hurled the very tile that struck and killed Pyrrhus. This was later explained by the Argives as an *epiphany* of the goddess Demeter.

Just as the Greeks believed that the gods and heroes could fight alongside them, they also believed that gods and heroes could fight against them; even favoring the side of the barbarian. Herodotus reported a story that he had heard in which a giant bearded phantom was seen by a man named Epizelus, fighting against the Athenians at Marathon. This specter even killed the man next to him. As a result of this vision, Epizelus claimed

that he lost his sight.

Not all claimed epiphanies were accepted and there were even cases of fraud reported. For example, Herodotus describes a scam by Peisistratus, who dressed up a tall, handsome woman named Phya as the goddess Athena and had her drive him into the city on a chariot. Herodotus seems amazed that the Athenians were so easily duped by this cynical ruse. Although not all Greeks believed that deities could appear in the mortal world, particularly in anthropomorphic form, most Greeks seem to have been prepared to accept the notion that the gods appeared and fought on the battlefield at critical junctures. Plato's Socrates may have argued that it was foolish to believe that perfect beings would change their shapes into "corrupt" mortal forms, but his views were hardly orthodox and did not represent the common view.

James McDonald

See also Delphi; Gods of War; Marathon, Battle of; Omens and Portents; Persian Wars; Plataea; PTSD; Salamis, Battle of (480)

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Epirus, Epirotes

The northwest region of the Balkans, between Albania and Greece. Although Epirus was home to the most popular Greek oracle after Delphi, the oracle of Zeus at Dodona, fifth century sources considered the Epirotes barbarians. According to Theopompus, the population of Epirus was divided into 14 tribes, the largest of which were the Molossians (F382). In 370, the Aeacidæ emerged as Epirus' monarchs. In 359, the King Arybbas sealed a symmarchy with Philip II of Macedon through the marriage of his niece, Olympias. Arybbas was succeeded by Alexander of Epirus, whose alliances in southern Italy and Sicily formed the Epirote Confederacy. In 334, Alexander assisted Taras against the Italians. This move resulted in his death at the battle of Pandosia in 331 and the dissolution of this

confederacy. Pyrrhus was king of Epirus from 306 to 303 and from 295 to 272. He focused on developing his capital, Ambracia, and involved Epirus in the Third Samnite War (282–276). The monarchy fell in 232. The subsequent Epirote League joined several wars between Rome and Macedon. The Romans in 167 sacked Epirus. Augustus chose central Epirus as the site of Nicopolis, built in honor of his victory at Actium.

M. Falconer

See also Alexander I of Epirus; Macedonian War, First; Macedonian War, Second; Macedonian War, Third; Macedonian War, Fourth; Olympias; Pyrrhus. *Roman Section*: Samnite Wars

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Epiteichismos

Epiteichismos is a term for building near or inside an enemy frontier fortifications that often served as a forward base for operations. Two of the most famous examples occurred in the Second Peloponnesian War (431–404)—the Athenian occupation of Pylos (425) and the Spartan occupation of Decelea (413). In both cases, the fort was used as the base for continual operations against the enemy and proved particularly effective at Decelea. The tactic was little used after the developments in siege warfare in the fourth century and the Macedonian domination of Greece.

Iain Spence

See also Decelea; Demosthenes (General); Fortifications; Peloponnesian War, Second; Pylos (Sphacteria), Battle of; Siege Warfare

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Eretria

Eretria was one of the two main cities on the island of Euboea, situated on the island's west coast facing toward the northern coast of Attica across the narrow southern Euboean Gulf. Settlement on the site is visible from the ninth century onward, and Homer includes the city among those that sent ships to Troy. Together with Chalcis, Eretria settled colonies throughout the Mediterranean, including on the nearby Aegean islands of Andros, Ceos, and Tenos, and at Pithecusae in southern Italy. Extensive trade contacts existed with Syria.

Eretria was believed to have fought and lost the legendary Lelantine War against its neighbor Chalcis. In the 490s, Eretria supported the Ionian Revolt against Persian rule, and so with Athens became one of the targets of the Persian invasion of Greece during the Persian Wars. The city was sacked and burned by Datis, the admiral of Darius I, in 490, although Eretria managed to send a contingent of hoplites to the battle of Plataea in 479. Eretria was a member of the Delian League/Athenian Empire, but revolted (with other parts of Euboea) in 446 and 411. The city joined the Second Athenian Confederacy in 378/7, but again revolted in 349, before supporters of Macedon gained the city in 343. Although recaptured by Athens in 341, it was absorbed into the growing Macedonian kingdom. Sacked by the Romans in 198 during the Second Macedonian War, it was nominally free from then on.

Russell Buzby

See also Athenian Confederacy, Second; Athens, Revolts of Allies (Fifth Century); Chalcis; Delian League/Athenian Empire; Euboea, Euboeans; Ionian Revolt; Lelantine War; Macedonian War, Second

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Etruria, Etruscans

Inhabiting northwest Italy, the Etruscans were linguistically and culturally distinct from the Italic tribes to their south and west. As a seafaring power, they resisted the intrusion of Greek colonial settlement in their sphere and ca. 540 combined with Carthage to wipe out a Phocaean colony at Alalia in Corsica. In the sixth century, they expanded eastward across the Apennines into the Po valley. They had earlier moved southward into Campania, founding Capua ca. 600. There they came into conflict with Cumae, the northernmost Greek colony in Italy and were defeated in a great battle (505) by Aristodemus, tyrant of Cumae. In 474, an Etruscan naval attack on Cumae was defeated by a combined Syracusan and Cumaean fleet.

The Etruscans were heavily influenced by Greek culture in art, architecture, and religion and were a major market for imported Greek luxury goods, especially painted pottery. Spina near the mouth of the Po River was a major depot of Greek–Etruscan trade, including the export of grain. From the early fifth century onward, Celtic expansion into the Po valley limited the Etruscan sphere. To the south, Samnite expansion reduced their control of Campania and the growing power of Rome first checked Etruscan expansion and then made inroads into their territory.

Etruria itself was remote from any Greek sphere for most of its history. Etruscan piracy against Greek shipping in the Adriatic continued to be a problem down to the end of the fourth century. In 325/4, Athens established a colony in the Adriatic to provide a naval station for countering Etruscan piracy (Harding 121).

Douglas Kelly

See also Alalia, Battle of; Colonies, Colonization; Cumae. *Roman Section:* Etruria, Etruscans; Etruscan Wars

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Euboea, Euboeans

Euboea is a long island that stretches along the coast of Boeotia (modern Greece) from the Gulf of Pagasae in the north to the island of Andros in the south. It is the second largest island in the Aegean, and was also known as *Makris* or the Long Island. Its main cities during the Classical Period were Chalcis and Eretria. Between those two cities, on the headland of Xeropolis, was the town of Lefkandi which was one of the island's most important sites from the Early Bronze Age until the seventh century, with extensive trade contacts as far afield as Syria and Italy.

The island was supposed to be the site of the legendary Lelantine War, fought over the Lelantine Plain between Chalcis and Eretria. Parts of this plain were later settled by Athenian colonists in the late sixth century, before being conquered by Darius I. In the fifth century, the battle of Artemisium was fought off the north end of the island which subsequently became part of the Delian League/Athenian Empire. Euboea unsuccessfully revolted in 446 and Athens planted cleruchies on the island, which became a major source of grain and other products for Athens. Thucydides mentions the extreme shock felt by Athenians when Euboea revolted in 411. In the fourth century, the cities of the island joined the Second Athenian Confederacy in 378/7. During the third century the island became part of the Macedonian kingdom, before being declared free by the Romans in 196.

Russell Buzby

See also Artemisium, Battle of; Athenian Confederacy, Second; Athens, Revolts of Allies (Fifth Century); Chalcis; Delian League/Athenian Empire; Eretria; Lelantine War; Tamynae, Battle of

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Eucratides the Great (Reigned ca. 170–145)

Eucratides was a Hellenistic king known in ancient literature for ruling “a thousand cities.” He reigned ca. 170–145 in Bactria and ancient northwest India, as far as West Punjab. His enormous and diverse coinage shows that he commanded vast resources and territories. Many of his coins are bilingual in Greek and Prakrit. He also produced the largest known gold coin from the ancient world, a 20-stater piece. Eucratides does not have a clear royal lineage, but it is possible that his mother was royal while his father was not. Certain of his coins depicting his parents show only his mother wearing a diadem. Royal blood or not, Eucratides was most likely a usurper. He was initially based in Bactria in a capital city called Eucratidia, which may have been located at the archaeological site of Ai Khanoum, Afghanistan. He was frequently at war with neighboring kingdoms, especially the Parthians, a Seleucid-breakaway dynasty under the leadership of the nomad Arsaces. Over time, these wars weakened Eucratides and he lost a substantial amount of territory to his enemies. Eucratides’ greatest military success was his conquest in India. Demetrius II, an Indo-Greek king, ruled in northwest India and rivaled Eucratides. He attacked and besieged the Bactrian for five months, but Eucratides, while vastly outnumbered, managed to break the siege, defeat Demetrius, and take over his Indian lands. This conquest may be the reason he gave himself the title *Megas*—“the Great.” Though he ruled for a long time, Eucratides was eventually killed by his own son.

Frances A. M. Joseph

See also Ai Khanoum; Bactria, Bactrians; Parthia, Parthians

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Eumenes I of Pergamum (Reigned 263–241)

Eumenes was the nephew and adopted heir of Philetaerus of Pergamum and succeeded his uncle in 263. He took further steps to the independence of Pergamum from the Seleucid Empire than his predecessor, and he ruled for 22 years until his death in 241.

An inscription (*OGIS* 1.266, Document 20) relating to concessions Eumenes made to his mercenaries suggests that Eumenes (or possibly his predecessor) had established mercenary garrisons at Attalia in Lydia and Philetaerea-under-Ida in the Troad. War with the Seleucid Empire in 262 resulted in Eumenes defeating the Seleucid king Antiochus I in a battle at Sardis.

Celtic tribes (Galatians) had crossed from Europe to Asia in the first quarter of the third century BCE and settled on both sides of the Halys River (the modern Kızılırmak). They levied tribute on the whole of Asia Minor as far as the Taurus Mountains from their territory known as Galatia. Eumenes, too, appears to have paid them tribute.

During his rule, Eumenes appears to have concentrated on securing and consolidating his possessions in Asia Minor and never adopted the title of king. Eumenes was the patron of the philosopher Arcesilaus of Pitane in Aeolis. He allegedly died of drunkenness and was succeeded by Attalus I.

David Harthen

See also Antiochus I Soter; Asia Minor; Attalus I of Pergamum; Galatians; Lydia; Mercenaries; Pergamum; Seleucids; Troad

Further Reading

Document 20; Livy 38.16; Strabo 3.4.2; Pausanias 1.8.1; Athenaeus 11.10; Diogenes Laertius 4.6.

Eumenes II of Pergamum (Reigned 197–159)

Eumenes was the eldest son of Attalus I of Pergamum, the brother of Attalus II, and the father of Attalus III. During his reign the Pergamene

kingdom rose to the height of its power. He embarked on an extensive building program making his capital of Pergamum one of the beautiful cities of the Hellenistic world.

Eumenes inherited his father's alliance with Rome, and in refusing an alliance with the Seleucid king Antiochus III the Great, provoked the Syrian-Roman War (192–188) playing a decisive role in the battle of Magnesia in 190. With the Peace of Apamea in 188, Eumenes was given most of the Seleucid territories in Asia Minor and the Thracian Chersonese, including the city of Lysimacheia.

His Roman allies gave him diplomatic support in his war against King Prusias I of Bithynia. War between Eumenes and Pharnaces of Pontus between 182 and 179 resulted in victory for Eumenes and more territorial gains.

In 172, Eumenes denounced Perseus of Macedon to the Roman Senate, which led to the outbreak of the Third Macedonian War (171–168) against Perseus, during which Eumenes sacked Abdera. However, the political maneuverings of Eumenes during the conflict aroused the suspicion of Rome, who lost trust in him. Eumenes died in 159 and was succeeded by his brother Attalus II of Pergamum.

David Harthen

See also Abdera; Antiochus III (the Great); Asia Minor; Attalus I of Pergamum; Attalus II of Pergamum; Attalus III of Pergamum; Chersonese, Thracian; Lysimacheia; Macedonian War, Third; Pergamum; Magnesia, Battle of; Perseus of Macedon; Rome, Romans; Syrian-Roman War. *Roman Section*: Magnesia, Battle of

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Eumenes of Cardia (ca. 361–316)

Eumenes was a high-ranking Greek within the Royal Macedonian Court,

where he worked as personal scribe (*grammateus*) to Philip II of Macedon and Alexander the Great. He rose to prominence during the Wars of the Successors, after Alexander's death.

Eumenes' entry into the Macedonian Court occurred around the age of 19, either because of his father's friendship with Philip II or because of Philip's appreciation of his physical and intellectual ability (Plutarch, *Eumenes* 1.1). It was during this time that Eumenes forged close ties with the Royal Argead Family, and was elevated into the famed Companions (*hetairoi*).

Eumenes was given a minor military command during Alexander's Indian Campaign in 326. After the death of Hephaestion in 324, Eumenes was promoted to the position of a cavalry commander (*hipparch*) within the Companion Cavalry, replacing Perdiccas who was promoted to Hephaestion's former office.

After Alexander's death in 323, Eumenes was appointed as governor (satrap) of Paphlagonia and the yet unconquered Cappadocia. Calls for support in securing Cappadocia were ignored due to Eumenes' non-Macedonian heritage. Eventually, assistance came in the form of Perdiccas, who helped Eumenes secure the region.

During the Wars of the Successors, Eumenes allied with Perdiccas against a coalition that included Antipater, Antigonus, Craterus, and Ptolemy. When Perdiccas was killed in Egypt, Eumenes assumed the leadership of the faction and continued campaigning in Asia Minor. After Gabiene Eumenes was betrayed by his own men, arrested, turned over to Antigonus, and executed.

Evan M. Pitt

See also Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon; Antigonus I Monophthalmus; Antipater; Elite Troops; Gabiene, Battle of; Perdiccas; Ptolemy I Soter; Macedon, Macedonia; Philip II of Macedon; Successors (*Diadochoi*), Wars of

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Eurybiades (Active ca. 480)

Eurybiades, a Spartiate, commanded the allied Greek fleet that fought the battles of Artemisium and Salamis during the Persian invasion in 480. Sparta had little naval experience at the time and provided only 16 ships out of 378, but Sparta's allies demanded a Spartan commander. Eurybiades had to deal with fierce disputes among the commanders of individual contingents, especially Adeimantus of Corinth and Themistocles of Athens. Above all, he had to keep the Athenian fleet of 180 triremes from pulling out of the war. At a crucial point on the eve of the battle of Salamis, Eurybiades was persuaded by Themistocles that the right thing to do was to stay and fight in the channel between Salamis and Attica. Eurybiades was awarded the prize of valor, an olive wreath, for his command at Salamis.

Douglas Kelly

See also Persian Wars; Salamis, Battle of (480); Themistocles

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Eurydice (d. 317)

Eurydice, the daughter of Cynane, the daughter of Philip II and an Illyrian consort, and Amyntas IV, the son of King Perdiccas III of Macedonia was born between 338 and 335. Known first as Adeia, she took the name Eurydice after her marriage to Philip III Arrhidaeus. She appears to have been trained in military skills by her mother. At the death of Alexander the Great, Eurydice and her mother raised an army and crossed into Asia, to bring about her marriage to the new king. Perdiccas sent Alcetas to prevent this, and in the altercation that followed, Cynane was killed. Her murder did not sit well with the soldiers, who came close to mutiny and forced their commander to allow the marriage to take place.

Still in her teens, Eurydice wielded considerable political power. For a time she received support for her ambitions, causing problems for the regents and guardians of the kings. She was able to evade the control of the

regent Polyperchon, and when her position was threatened by Olympias, she formed an alliance with Cassander. Her downfall came about when she brought an armed force against Olympias. Eurydice's army defected, and she was captured with her husband and imprisoned. Philip III Arrhidaeus was soon executed, and after tending to his body, Eurydice was forced to commit suicide. According to Diodorus (19.11), Olympias sent Eurydice "gifts," making her choose between a dagger, rope, or poison. However, she chose to hang herself by her own girdle.

Charlotte M. R. Dunn

See also Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon; Cassander; Olympias; Perdiccas; Philip II of Macedon; Philip III Arrhidaeus; Polyperchon; Successors (*Diadochoi*), Wars of

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Eurymedon, Battle of (ca. 467/6)

The battle of Eurymedon was a major Greek naval victory over Persia near Phaselis in Pamphylia (southern Asia Minor) in 468/7 or 467/6. The Athenian Cimon commanded the Delian League fleet of 300 triremes (200 Athenian and 100 allied ships); the Persians probably had around 350. This was Persia's last direct attempt to challenge Athenian naval superiority in the operations following the Second Persian War.

Cimon attacked the Persian fleet while it was mustering, supported by an army, at the mouth of the Eurymedon River before the imminent arrival of 80 Phoenician warships en route from Cyprus to reinforce it. Reflecting a greater emphasis on amphibious operations than before, the Athenian ships now carried a larger contingent of hoplite marines (see illustration in Naval Warfare entry). The ships had also been modified to make it easier for the marines to move around in an engagement. The Persians were quickly driven onto the shore and sought refuge with their army. Cimon landed his marines and defeated the Persian army, then intercepted and destroyed the Phoenician reinforcements. The scale of the Persian disaster was huge—200

ships captured, in addition to an unknown number sunk, and it gave Athens naval control in the Aegean for most of the rest of the century.

In the fourth century, Eurymedon was remembered in Athenian oratory as the high point of the Athenian struggle against Persia ushering in an unprecedented period of Athenian naval domination.

Iain Spence

See also Cimon; Delian League/Athenian Empire; Naval Warfare; Ships, War

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Euthydemus I of Bactria (Reigned ca. 230–200)

Euthydemus I was a king of Hellenistic Bactria who came after Diodotus II and ruled ca. 230–200. He was not the legitimate heir, but a usurper who fought and defeated Diodotus. Little is known of Euthydemus' background except that he was Magnesians. A major event of his reign was the war that he fought (ca. 208–206) with the Seleucid king Antiochus III, who was attempting to regain eastern territories lost by his predecessors. Euthydemus' army was large and intimidating, and included at least 10,000 cavalry and an elephant corps. In the defining battle, after extensive fighting and many casualties, Euthydemus was forced to retreat to Bactra, where he was besieged by Antiochus for two years. After lengthy negotiations via the Bactrian envoy Teleas, Euthydemus persuaded Antiochus that if allied, they could fend off the greater, mutual danger of bellicose nomads. Antiochus agreed, and permitted Euthydemus to maintain independence, especially after the latter sent his son Demetrius to meet the Seleucids. Antiochus was so impressed with the young man that he promised him a daughter in marriage. Antiochus also, however, confiscated Euthydemus' elephants.



Silver tetradrachm of Euthydemus I of Bactria, minted in Bactria ca. 230–200. Euthydemus, who usurped the throne of Bactria ca. 230 and probably ruled from Ai Khanoum, is depicted here in the traditional royal diadem. Located in the Yale University Art Gallery, New Haven, Connecticut. (Yale University Art Gallery)

Euthydemus likely established Demetrius as a coruler after the prince expanded their kingdom into India. Coin evidence shows that Euthydemus ruled for a long time, as his portraiture displays distinct phases of aging in his features. He likely ruled in the Hellenistic city located at the archaeological site of Ai Khanoum, as significant numbers of his coins were excavated there. Euthydemus did not publish an epithet for himself on his coins, but a later Greco-Bactrian king issued commemorative coins calling Euthydemus *Theos*—“the God.”

Frances A. M. Joseph

See also Ai Khanoum; Antiochus III (the Great); Bactria, Bactrians;

Demetrius I of Bactria; Diodotus I and Diodotus II

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Evagoras (ca. 435–374/3)

A king of Salamis in Cyprus from ca. 411–374/3, who was instrumental in achieving Cypriot independence from Persian rule in the late fifth/early fourth century. His reign is recorded in speeches by the great Athenian orator and panegyricist, Isocrates. Despite being nominally a part of the Persian (Achaemenid) Empire throughout the fifth century after its conquest by Cyrus, the dominant cities of Cyprus retained a degree of independence with their own ruling dynasts.

During his youth, Salamis had fallen under Phoenician domination, and Evagoras was exiled to Cilicia. While there, he gathered loyal followers and in 411 returned to the island and seized the Salaminian throne. While it is true that he orchestrated a period of Hellenization on Cyprus, encouraging ties with Athens (Conon found shelter with him after Aegospotami), Isocrates' portrait of him doing so in defiance of the Great King cannot be accurate. Over the next two decades he extended his reach over almost the entire island. In 391, the remaining free cities appealed to the Persian king Artaxerxes II for assistance. The Athenians sent 10 triremes to support Evagoras, but they were captured en route by the Spartans.

Persia had no interest in a unified and Hellenized Cyprus, but Evagoras' revolt lasted for a decade, with assistance from Egypt. In this time he extended his power to parts of Cilicia and Phoenicia. Eventually in 382, the Persians sent an overwhelming force, and Evagoras came to terms. He was permitted to retain the throne of Salamis, but was forced to give up designs on the rest of Cyprus. He was assassinated in 374 in a court intrigue and was succeeded by his son Nicocles.

See also Conon; Cyprus; Persian (Achaemenid) Empire

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Exiles

Greek states commonly imposed capital penalties (death, confiscation of property) for serious political crimes. Defendants often chose to flee into exile rather than face trial. An exile returning to his native land would be executed if caught. Some states also imposed on those convicted of major crimes the formal legal penalty of expulsion for life from their territory. Such penalties could be imposed for a range of crimes, such as murder, but exiles were more likely to be political offenders. Another source of exiles was the appropriation of another state's land by an imperial power. A notorious case of this was the expulsion by Athens in 365 of the population of Samos and the settling of citizens of its own there. The Samian exiles were not restored to their homeland until Macedonia enforced this in 322. The people of Plataea were twice driven into exile: first, by the Boeotian siege and destruction of their city (429–427) and then by the Boeotians' destruction, for the second time, of their city in 373. When a city continued to exist, exiles from it were naturally opponents of the existing regime. They had every motive to bring about a change of regime and the only way open for them to do this was by force. The result was that exiles in the Greek world were a significant group and a constant source of instability.

When expelled from their city, exiles could set themselves up in a fortified position in or near the territory of their city and engage in a guerilla style war of raiding with the ultimate aim of winning control of their city. An early example is the occupation of the hill of Leipsydrium in Attica by the exiled Athenian aristocrats, the Alcmaeonidae, who were

opposed to the Peisistratid tyranny. They were soon driven out (*Ath. Pol.* 19.3). A later example is democratic exiles from the island of Chios who were driven out in 410 when Chios took the side of Sparta and became an oligarchy. The exiles occupied Atarneus, a position on the mainland opposite Chios, from where they kept up raids for at least the next 13 years (Xenophon, *Hellenica* 3.2.11).

Exiles are often found fighting alongside the enemies of their state, such as the Tegean exiles fighting in defense of Sparta in 370/69 (Xenophon, *Hellenica* 6.5.24), or a Spartiate exile with the Boeotian army at Leuctra (Diodorus 15.54.1). Bands of exiles could attempt an attack on their city on their own (like the Achaean exiles ca. 366: Xenophon, *Hellenica* 7.1.41–43) but they were more likely to collaborate with foreign invaders. In 446, Boeotians who had gone into exile under the Athenian domination of their region made an invasion in force, capturing a number of cities. An Athenian punitive expedition was defeated at Coronea (447) by a mixed force of local opponents and exiles from Boeotia and Euboea (Thucydides 1.113). In 441, oligarchs exiled from Samos when Athens set up a democracy went to the mainland, obtained mercenaries from a Persian satrap and seized control of Samos (Thucydides 1.115).

The victorious side in war often demanded the return of a state's exiles when it imposed a treaty. Athens had to receive back its exiles in 404 at the end of the Second Peloponnesian War, including hardline oligarchs who had been expelled after the failed oligarchic coup of 411. These fanatical friends of Sparta at once set about establishing the extreme oligarchy known as the "Thirty Tyrants."

The return of political exiles to the democratic state of Phlius in the Peloponnese was demanded by Sparta in about 385. Disputes at once arose over the returned exiles' claims to recover their confiscated property. Dissatisfied with their treatment in the law courts of Phlius, the returned exiles turned to their Spartan friends who demanded that Phlius set up a legal process that guaranteed them satisfaction. When Phlius imposed fines on those complaining to Sparta, they went into exile and Sparta declared war. It took some 20 months for Sparta to reduce Phlius by siege. In this time, the exiles from Phlius made up a separate and prominent part of the besieging force. At the end of the war Agesilaus forced Phlius to set up a committee of 50 returned exiles to establish a new (oligarchic) constitution and to decide which of their fellow citizens should be executed (Xenophon,

Hellenica 5.2.8–10, 3.10–21).

The problems over property and status caused by the demands of returning exiles were grave, and could be further exacerbated when the wives of exiles had remarried, or been remarried to, other husbands. The Greek world was thrown into turmoil when an order from Alexander the Great was read out at the Olympic Games in 324 ordering all states to receive back their exiles. Over 20,000 were on hand to cheer this extraordinary measure. The complications that this mass return of exiles caused can be seen in inscriptions from Tegea and Mytilene (Harding, nos. 113, 122) dealing with this crisis. Many Greek states sent embassies to Alexander protesting against this measure, which was so bitterly resented that it was a major cause of the Lamian War, when Greek states rose after Alexander's death against Macedonian domination. In this war, Athens was particularly motivated by the hope of retaining its possession of Samos.

As with many of Alexander's actions, it is not clear what his motives were in demanding the return of all exiles in 324. That he wanted glory and also wanted to have loyal supporters in all cities (Diodorus 18.8) cannot be the whole story. A highly plausible explanation is that Alexander was concerned about the instability that would be created in the Greek world by the large numbers of homeless exiles among the mercenaries he had discharged from service. Exiles had long been prominent among the floating population of the Greek world that was a prime source of mercenaries. The existence of these numerous "vagabonds" had worried the Athenian publicist and rhetorician Isocrates (436–338) and prompted him to propose a solution to this social problem: that the Greeks should conquer part of the Persian Empire and colonize it with this homeless population.

Considering that they were drawn from the educated and politically active upper-class levels of society, it is no mere coincidence that many of the leading historians in ancient Greece were exiles: Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon, Philistus, Theopompus, Timaeus, and Polybius.

Douglas Kelly

See also Agesilaus II; Alcmaeonidae; Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon; Coronea, Battle of; Lamian War; Leuctra, Battle of; Peisistratidae; Plataea; Samos; *Stasis*

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F

Families of Soldiers

The Greeks viewed the family unit as those who lived within the household (*oikos*). These included elderly parents, a wife, children, and even slaves of the male citizen. War impacted on the families of citizen and other soldiers in different ways. Greek vases often present family scenes: the departing warrior farewelling his father, his wife, and young child. Family-combatants, however, rarely found themselves exposed on Greek battlefields to the dangers of war. Greeks would regularly evacuate their children, women, and other movable property in the face of enemy invasion either inside the walls of their city or to other places of safety. Thus, the Athenians sent their wives and children to Troezen, Salamis, and Aegina in the face of Persian invasion in 480. Two generations later they brought all their families inside their city walls when the Spartans invaded Attica in 431 and sent their flocks to Euboea. The Phocaeans abandoned their city en masse and sailed to Chios when the Persians began their siege.

Sieges affected families as much as combatants. As a result of major defeats and destruction families suffered banishment, enslavement, and death in the sack of cities or destruction of the land. Tyrtaeus refers to the horrors of exile for men, wives, and children in the seventh century and Isocrates (4 [*Panegyricus*]168, 5 [*To Philip*] 120–121) laments exiled wanderers (*planômenoi*) outcast with their children and women in the fourth century. At the end of the siege of Potidaea the Athenians allowed men to leave the city with a single garment and their women with two. It is only in sieges where women appear in any combat role at all, often throwing stones or tiles from rooftops at the enemy (famously Pyrrhus of Epirus died from such a thrown tile in street fighting in Argos). As always

the stories of the fall of Troy present the paradigm of Greek ideology in defeat. The Trojan men fought the Greeks in battle. The women and old men remained within the walls of the city, often watching the battle from the battlements in what became a literary trope called a *teichoscopy*. When the city fell Greek myth records the horrors that befell the men, women, and children of Troy. The men were killed, even the aged; thus Priam died, dragged from the Altar of Zeus. Some children died in the carnage of sack, thus Hector's son Astyanax was thrown from the walls. The women and children suffered enslavement. In historical times, such destruction and appropriation (*oikeiosis*) of communities was increasingly common. The best known of these played out at the island of Melos in the Second Peloponnesian War, where the Athenians killed all the males and sold the women and children into slavery in 416/5. Similar fates befell a number of cities that resisted Athens in the later fifth century (Xenophon, *Hellenica* 2.2.3–4) in an increasingly violent and bitter struggle.

As mercenary and more professional armies emerged in the fourth century, so the families of permanent soldiers had different relationships to warfare from those of their citizen counterparts. Families often followed marching armies as part of their baggage train. Pelopidas' mercenaries left their families at Pharsalus while they campaigned in Thessaly (Plutarch, *Pelopidas* 27). Garrisons, which became increasingly permanent in the imperial systems of the Macedonians and the Successor kingdoms in Egypt and across Asia, often had the families of soldiers attached to them. This was also true in the Persian Empire. These families presented special logistical needs. When the garrison troops (*phrouroi*) of Cyrus the Younger abandoned his expedition against the Great King in its early stages, rumors circulated that Cyrus might harm their families whom he had under guard at Tralles (Xenophon, *Anabasis* 1.4.8).

Soldiers often had children both in and out of the bonds of marriage. Alexander the Great made dispensations on behalf of the children of his soldiers and made some provision for their upbringing. This had a strategic basis, as the sons of soldiers laid the foundations for future Macedonian armies. Alexander's Successors employed vast numbers of professional soldiers across their kingdoms. Many of these played the role of garrison and frontier guards. They often had families of their own. The famous inscription that outlines the relationship between Eumenes II and two of his garrisons near Pergamum (OGIS I.266) has a clause that protects the rights

of inheritance for any children orphaned (*orphanikon*) due to the deaths of their fathers in military service. In the Seleucid Kingdom of Asia, military communities of settled soldiers (*klerouchiai*) laid the foundations for several generations of military personnel, as the sons of serving soldiers themselves became soldiers to replace their fathers. Thus, the children and wives of soldiers may not have been present on Greek battlefields, but they played a significant role in the military history of Greek warfare.

Matthew Trundle

See also Art (Ancient), Greek Warfare in; Civilian Populations in War; Colonies, Military; Garrisons; Prisoners of War and Slavery

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Female Warriors. See Amazons

Fetters, Battle of the (ca. 570). See Sparta, Attack on Tegea (Fetters, Battle of)

Fetters of Greece

The so-called Fetters of Greece were three strong points controlled by Philip V of Macedon in the early second century. According to Greek envoys to Rome in 200, Philip himself had coined the term. The three cities, all of which Philip controlled with garrisons, were Corinth, Chalcis, and Demetrias. Control of Corinth, astride the isthmus connecting the Peloponnese to northern Greece, was enough to keep the Peloponnesians in check. Chalcis, which controlled the narrow Euripus strait between Euboea and the mainland, allowed him to dominate central Greece. Demetrias, a major city near modern Volos, gave him a hold over Thessaly and northern Greece.

Philip's defeat by Titus Quinctius Flamininus in the Second Macedonian War (200–196) gave the three fetters into the hands of the Romans. At the end of the war, Rome's unhappy allies, the Aetolians, accused the Romans of intending to take over Philip's position and garrison the cities themselves. Initially, Flamininus did maintain garrisons in the three cities, but at the Isthmian Games of 196, he announced that Rome would withdraw its garrisons from the whole of Greece. Greece was freed of its "fetters."

Ironically, Rome returned Demetrias to Macedonian control in 189, as a reward for Philip's support against Antiochus in the Syrian-Roman War (192–188).

Peter Londey

See also Chalcis; Corinth, Corinthians; Demetrias; Macedonian War, Second; Philip V

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Finance and War

Archaic Greeks did not rely on public finance for war. Their wars were fought infrequently and usually over contested land between *poleis* (city-states). Typically they were initiated not by the state's rudimentary political institutions but by elite individuals in a private capacity (e.g., Herodotus 6.34–37). These leaders raised volunteers by promising them a share of the booty and the land which might be won in battle. The hoplites who volunteered usually only numbered in the hundreds. They came along with their own armor, weapons and food-supplies. Like the expedition's self-appointed commander, they too came mainly from the elite. Their wars went for days or weeks and were settled by a solitary battle. Because of the winning side's lack of military capacity, they usually did not result in the subjugation, occupation, or taxation of the other side's *polis*. In the Archaic Period, war was therefore a small-scale and private activity whose participants financed it themselves. Even after the sixth century, those states not aspiring to be major or dominant military powers like Athens, Sparta,

and Thebes persisted with this small-scale style of land warfare.

War changed in two big ways in the Classical Period. Both can be seen most clearly in the *polis* of Athens. In the fifth century, this state quickly became one of Greece's dominant military powers. Athens was largely responsible for making the wars of the Greeks reliant on public finance. The first change was that war became a public activity. In Athens, this was a result of the democratic reforms which the elite leader, Cleisthenes, sponsored after 508. They gave the Athenian *demos* (people) sole responsibility for initiating wars and a new public army of hoplites for waging them. The second change was naval warfare. Persia forced the Greeks to get serious about fighting at sea. The Athenians knew that the Ionian Revolt of 499 to 493 had been lost because of Persia's superior sea power. They knew too that the triremes of the Persians had got them to Marathon in 490. Persia financed its fleet through a unique feature of its empire: it required each dependent state to pay an annual tax that was based on an assessment of what it could afford. There was no parallel for this financing of war in Archaic Period Greece. Persia's Great King, Darius I, introduced this system of *phoros* (tribute) in 518 (Herodotus 3.89–97).

To get ready for Persia's next attempt to subjugate them the Athenian *demos* decided, in 483, to expand massively their public navy. As it cost about one talent, that is, 26 kilograms of silver, to build a trireme (e.g., *Ath. Pol.* 22.7), they could only afford this expansion because of unexpectedly high recent income from their local silver-mines. The 200 triremes they had at the end of this shipbuilding was the largest *polis*-owned fleet yet seen. So that there were enough captains for this fleet the Athenian *demos* created the liturgy of the trierarchy. This public service required an elite citizen to command a trireme for a year and to pay for its running-costs over and above the *misthos* (pay) of its crew. A trierarchy cost about one talent. The payment of trireme-crews was the responsibility of the state. Their *misthos* was a logical necessity: because the trireme lacked the space for the stowing of food-supplies, its crew had to purchase food each day from local markets or private houses. In addition, there was no guarantee that sailors would remain with their ships if they were not paid. Athenian trierarchs usually hired their sailors from those volunteering their services in the Piraeus, the port of Athens, or in other ports along the way. Because volunteers faced no sanction against desertion and could find employers elsewhere, they could, and sometimes did, desert if they were not paid.

Athens therefore had to pay its sailors. But doing so proved to be hugely expensive. A sailor was normally paid one drachma per day (e.g., Thucydides 6.31). This was the same as the *misthos* of a skilled laborer or a hoplite. There were 200 sailors on a trireme and so it cost 6,000 drachmas, that is, 1 talent per month to keep it at sea. This meant that Athens had to spend hundreds of talents to send out even a fraction of its fleet for the regular sailing-season of eight months. In the Persian War of 480 to 479, the Athenians resorted to emergency measures to pay for their fleet. But to keep on using it they had to find an adequate source of public finance. This they did in 478 when Ionia's Greeks invited them to lead the ongoing war against Persia. The multilateral alliance that Athens subsequently established is known as the Delian League. So that it could finance their naval operations League-members adopted the Persian method for funding war: they each promised to pay an agreed amount of *phoros* each year. In most cases, what each *polis* paid was the same as the annual tax which it had paid Persia. These tribute-payments added up to 460 talents per annum.

For its first decades, the Delian League campaigned nonstop to expel Persians from harbors across the Aegean Sea, to destroy Persia's fleet, and to liberate Ionia's *poleis*. At the same time, Athens started to undermine the independence of League members who, by 450, were subject to laws of the Athenian *demos* and had long been forcibly prevented from ceding from what was now the Athenian Empire. Imperial income allowed Athens to employ thousands of elite and nonelite Athenians as sailors and hoplites on campaigns which lasted months or, in the case of sieges, up to a few years. With *phoros* they could wage war more frequently than ever before and pioneer new forms of warfare on land and at sea. Athens became, for example, the Greek world's leading sea power and besieger of cities. Now it was widely recognized that war relied on public finance. Athenian politicians argued that their state's *dunamis* (military power) depended on warships, fortifications, and especially money (e.g., Andocides 3 [*On the Peace*]; Aristophanes, *Lysistrata* 170–176). Pericles even argued that Athens would win the Peloponnesian War of 431 to 404, because its public finances were so much stronger than Sparta's.

In spite of this financial strength, Athens still found the Second Peloponnesian War ruinously expensive. During the first 10 years, the so-called Archidamian War, the Athenian *demos* spent on average 1,500 talents per year. This was 15 times more than what they spent on state religion and

ten times more than on running their democracy. Because it also exceeded their state's annual income of 1,000 talents (Xenophon, *Anabasis* 7.1.27), the *demos* had to find extra funds urgently. In 428, the *eisphora* which they levied raised the unprecedented sum of 200 talents (Thucydides 3.19). The *eisphora* was an intermittent tax on the elite's property to pay for a war. In 425, the Athenians trebled the *phoros* of their imperial subjects to 1,200 talents (Andocides 3 [*On the Peace*] 8–9; Aristophanes, *Wasps* 656–657). By 421, however, when Athens won the Archidamian War, it had exhausted its cash-reserves of 6,000 talents (Thucydides 2.13; *IG I³* 369).

The Peace of Nicias of 421 to 416 saw these reserves quickly restored (Thucydides 6.26). Sparta had long been Greece's dominant land power, because its hoplites, as full-time professionals, fought much better than its enemies and it could force its allies to provide further hoplites for its wars without the need to pay them. But the enormous army which Sparta could raise proved ineffective against Athens. Whenever, in the course of the Peloponnesian War, it entered Athenian territory, the Athenians simply withdrew within their fortifications, imported food-supplies by sea and waited for their enemies to leave. Now the Spartans realized that they could only defeat Athens if they became a major sea power. But to become one they too had to find a way to meet naval warfare's astronomical costs. Sparta found a way in 413, after the destruction of the enormous expeditionary force that Athens had sent to conquer Sicily. Persia saw this destruction as the best opportunity in decades to get rid of the Athenian Empire. In exchange for regaining the right to levy *phoros* on Ionia's Greeks, it thus provided Sparta with enough gold to build and to maintain a fleet. In the course of the last part of the Peloponnesian War, the Ionian War, this Spartan fleet came to surpass what was left of the Athenian fleet. In 405, Sparta easily destroyed the last of the Athenian triremes at Aegospotami in the Dardanelles and so was able to force the surrender of Athens by a land and sea blockade. With its full control of the Aegean Sea it subjugated the last of the *poleis* that supported Athens and so brought the Athenian Empire to an end.

In Greece's next 10-year-war, the financial support of Persia was again decisive. The Corinthian War, which started in 395, got its name from the battles which were fought about Corinth. This war pitted Sparta against three of its former allies, Argos, Corinth, and Thebes, who were now allied with Athens. Initially the Great King, Artaxerxes II, funded this anti-

Spartan alliance, because the Spartans had abandoned the treaty they had struck with him during the Second Peloponnesian War. Instead of letting him levy *phoros* on Ionia's *poleis*, the Spartans were now fighting him for control of them. Athens used Persia's gold to rebuild its fortifications and fleet. With these triremes it attempted to reestablish the Athenian Empire. Athens was now forcing Greek *poleis* in Ionia and the Dardanelles to be its subjects again. On them Athens reimposed the 5 percent tax on their maritime trade (e.g., *IG* II² 24), which it had first introduced in 413 (Thucydides 7.28.4). It also reimposed another public-finance measure which dated back to the Ionian War: the 10 percent tax on merchant ships through the Dardanelles (Demosthenes 20 [*Against Leptines*] 60).

These Athenian actions manifestly were at Persia's expense. By the early 380s, Athens was even backing revolts against the Persian Empire in Cyprus and Egypt. Artaxerxes II thus realized that by helping Athens to fight Sparta he was fighting fire with fire. The Athenians were now a bigger threat to his empire than the Spartans would be. Consequently, the Great King agreed to support Sparta financially as long as he got complete control of Ionia's Greeks. With Persia's financial support the Spartans assembled and quickly manned 80 warships and sailed to the Dardanelles where they stopped the grain ships sailing to Athens. This action brought the Corinthian War to a speedy end. The Athenian *demos* feared being starved into submission as they had been in 405. Thus when Persia summoned to Sardis all those who wished to hear the general peace-treaty which it wanted, the ambassadors of Sparta and the anti-Spartan alliance arrived with flattering speed.

The King's Peace of 387/6 scuttled completely the attempt of Athens to rebuild its empire. Ionia's Greek *poleis*, which had been the empire's largest group, were again, after a century, Persian subjects. The peace-treaty also stipulated that the other *poleis* must be autonomous. This meant that the Athenian *demos* could no longer force other states into dependent relations with them. Against any *poleis* that broke these terms, Artaxerxes promised that he would make war against them "both by land and sea, and with ships and money." Worse still he let Sparta use the autonomy clause as an excuse to attack other *poleis* or to ignore it altogether. In the face of this resurgent Sparta, Athens had to find new allies as a matter of urgency. It took the Athenian *demos* several years to work out just how to do this: they would invite other states, excepting Persia's subjects, to join a multilateral alliance which respected the King's Peace. This alliance is known as the Second

Athenian Confederacy (or Second Athenian League). Athens promised members that it would not interfere in their politics, nor make them pay *phoros* (IG II² 43). By 378, the Athenians judged that the Confederacy was large enough to resume full-scale war against Sparta.

In the fifth century, Athens had largely paid for its armed forces out of imperial income. But the King's Peace now ruled this option out. To fund this new war the Athenian *demos* needed to reform public finances. In 378, they changed how the tax for war on elite-property was collected. *Eisphora*-payers no longer paid individually. Instead, they were placed into groups and the wealthiest member of each paid for the whole group before collecting the tax from its other members. This reform helped to ensure that funds for an expedition were always on hand for its departure. For the same end the *demos* had, by 373, established a dedicated fund to pay for war. Any surplus of public income at the year's end was deposited into this *stratitika* or military fund (Demosthenes 1 [*First Olynthiac*] 19–20; 3 [*Third Olynthiac*] 11–13). In 373, Athens started asking Confederacy-members to make *suntaxeis* ("contributions") to their joint expeditions ([Demosthenes] 49 [*Against Timotheus*] 49). During the Athenian Empire the Athenians alone had complete control over the amount of *phoros* to be collected and how it was spent (e.g., IG I³ 71). These *suntaxeis* were quite different. The Second Athenian Confederacy had an independent council of its members. This council authorized the level of contribution which each *polis* paid and how the collected *suntaxeis* could be spent (IG II² 111). These contributions added up to around 60 talents per year (e.g., Aeschines 2 [*On the Embassy*] 71; Demosthenes 18 [*On the Crown*] 234).

In the 370s and the 360s, Athens spent on average 500 talents per year on its armed forces. In spite of its public-finance reforms this was a struggle. Athenian generals were regularly sent out with insufficient funds and so had to raise more during their campaigns. They met such shortfalls by, for example, drawing on the booty which they had captured (e.g., Diodorus 15.47.7), plundering the enemy's countryside (e.g., Isocrates 15 [*Antidosis*] 111–112), or forcing nonleague-member *poleis* and merchant ships nearby to pay protection money (e.g., Aeschines 2 [*On the Embassy*] 71–72). Importantly, however, they could not treat such funds as their own as the *imperatores* (commanders) of the Roman Republic would come to do. Instead such funds were judged to be public income. The Athenian *demos* authorized their collection and usage either before a *strategos* (general)

departed or during his expedition (e.g., Lysias 28 [*Against Ergocles*] 5–6). On his return, he submitted an account of what he had raised in the field and deposited any surplus to the state (e.g., Demosthenes 20 [*Against Leptines*] 71–80).

These different funding-sources enabled the Athenians to become a major military power. Consequently they were able to keep fighting Sparta successfully until the Thebans ended that state's hegemony of Greece at the battle of Leuctra in 371. For the next three decades Athens was able to keep its enemies well away from its territory and to launch the fleets which were required to protect its shipping-lines through the Dardanelles, which were vital for its grain-supply. It was once again recognized as Greece's leading sea power. In spite of this renewed military success, Athenian public finances were not strong enough to stop the rise of Philip II. In only 20 years Philip turned Macedonia into a major military power and then, with his victory at the battle of Chaeronea in 338, into Greece's new hegemon. Certainly this rise had a lot to do with Philip II's military innovations. He introduced an unrivalled training-program for the Macedonian army, and employed vast numbers of non-Macedonian hoplites, horsemen, and peltasts as mercenaries. By investing in siege-engines Philip II came to surpass Athens as a besieger of *poleis*. But what made this military pioneering possible was his careful building up of Macedonia's public finances. Phillip II fully exploited the mineral resources of his expanding state. When he captured, for example, Mount Pangaeum in 356, he massively expanded its gold-mines (Diodorus 16.8.6). This mining alone earned him 1,000 talents per year. As he incorporated new territories into Macedonia, he also broadened its tax-base by requiring their elites to pay *eisphorai* on their private property.

Philip's son, Alexander the Great, by contrast, grew less concerned about public finances as he conquered the Persian Empire; for plunder, he found, easily paid for his army (e.g., Diodorus 7.80.13). Initially the *diadochoi* (Successors) who, after Alexander III's death in 323, fought over his conquests, found the same. But in time they too had to manage their public finances more carefully. Thus the Ptolemies introduced a 10 percent tax on Egyptian agriculture. In Ionia and beyond, the Seleucids reintroduced the *phoros* of the Persians, while the Antigonids built on what Philip II had done in Macedonia. Such public-finance reforms enabled the Hellenistic kingdoms to raise significantly the scale of Greek warfare. At the battle of

Gaza, for example, in 217, the armies of Antiochus III and Ptolemy IV, which were mainly composed of mercenaries, totaled 140,000. This was several times more than the armies which Classical Athens and Sparta had ever been able to field against each other. War for the dominance in the ancient Greek world had now moved decisively beyond its *poleis*.

David M. Pritchard

See also Athenian Confederacy, Second; Athens; Coinage; Delian League/ Athenian Empire; Fortifications; Lycurgus; Military Service, Greek States and; Pay, Military; Peloponnesian War, Second; Persian Wars; Philip II of Macedon; Trierarch; Trireme

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Foraging. See Logistics; Ravaging

Fortifications

Fortifications—most of which can be termed city walls—constitute by far the largest single category of architecture among the ruins of the ancient Greek world. The countless remains of fortifications, dating from the early Iron Age until well into the Roman period, testify to the fact that Greek

settlements and territories had to be protected from aggressors and intruders, Greek as well as non-Greek. This is a fact and social circumstance throughout the history of ancient Greece. Warfare and its role in ancient Greek culture is well-known and much studied. Yet, while fortifications played a great role in developing our perceptions of the Mycenaean world (see illustrations in Mycenae and Tiryns entries), archaeologists and researchers after the early philhellenic travelers shifted their focus of interest in the directions of central urban topography and the architectural remains of fine religious architecture, especially temples. However, since the 1970s a number of comprehensive studies of ancient Greek fortifications have been published in English, and in the last 10 years fortification studies have taken off. This has been particularly true among scholars in central Europe, an example being the German based research network *Fokus Fortifikation* (www.fokusfortifikation.de).

As a result of this new wave of research, it has become clear that fortifications played a much greater role in a wider range of aspects of ancient Greek society than was previously imagined. They are not only a sign that the constant fear of attack was omnipresent for every individual city-state at all times: a fortification constituted normally the single most labor- and cost-intensive engineering project a city-state could undertake; its existence required a very high amount of social organization; and it had enormous repercussions for the way the city fitted into its topography. The role of fortifications was deeply embedded in the development of ancient Greek city-state culture, including on the political level, since fortifications ensured autonomy—complete or partial—for the people who erected them. Fortifications constituted a dynamic element in the ancient Greek culture, an element which matched the state of the art of warfare and responded to its changes. Fortifications are best understood when focus is kept on their function.



Part of the 6-mile-long walls of Messene, the best preserved fortifications in Greece. Messene was founded on the slopes of Mount Ithôme in 369, after the Thebans liberated Messenia (in the southwestern Peloponnese) from Spartan control. The walls were built soon afterwards, with regular ashlar masonry typical of the Classical Period. (Photo by Peter Londey)

During the many centuries before the Classical Period, fortifications were normally not constructed to withstand real sieges, exceptions being some cities with territories bordering great territorial kingdoms of the Near East. Examples are Old Smyrna, Miletus, and the other Greek cities in western Asia Minor, bordering the Lydians and later the Persians, and the Greek cities of the eastern, central and western Mediterranean, who would occasionally clash with the Phoenicians (see below). It was not until the rise of Sparta and Athens in the fifth century and Macedonia in the fourth that walls and fortification systems had to be designed to be potentially fit to withstand a siege from fellow (but hostile) Greeks. In the early Iron Age, the Archaic Period and the early part of the Classical Period, walls were built for the purpose of keeping settlements clear of unwanted animals, to guard against people like pirates and opportunistic enemies who might take advantage if the (citizen) army of the defending city lost a pitched battle in a plain near its city. No *polis*-army had the resources for sieges lasting for more than perhaps a few weeks at the most. Armies in these early times were raised by city-states and consisted of their citizens, who were bound professionally to the city they came from: they would be farmers, traders, or

craftsmen who would have business to attend to, and therefore were unlikely to be able or willing to be away from home for long periods. Conscript citizens were also unlikely to be willing to risk their lives in endeavors not directly linked to the safety or survival of their own city—expeditions against the territories of foreign city-states were simply rarely undertaken. The professional soldiers of the late Classical and Hellenistic Periods were different, and when enough of them could be bought for sufficient periods of time, fortified cities faced a much more substantial threat than ever before. Once raising such armies became standard practice for the great Hellenistic powers, from the time of the *diadochoi*, warfare changed radically, and remained that way until the Romans took over and the situation changed once again. Greek cities kept building fortifications, regardless of the fact that they might no longer be decisive in conflict, and every attempt possible was made to make things difficult for potential besiegers. Besides, the other threats and occasional inconveniences of the ancient world were still as present in the Hellenistic Period as they had been earlier: wild animals and pirates would have to be kept out of the settlement/town, and domesticated animals and people with peaceful errands would have to be controlled, which meant either kept out altogether or allowed access through controllable gates or posterns.



Fourth-century fortification walls at Eleutherae, an Athenian fortress on the border with Boeotia. The small town of Eleutherae had originally been Boeotian, but

became part of Attica in the sixth century. The fortress, one of a string of border fortifications that the Athenians built or refurbished in the fourth century, had a 2800-foot circuit wall, with a number of towers, several of which can be seen here. (Photo by Peter Londey)

Early Greek Fortifications

Sometimes Early Iron Age settlements were located within the ruined (but still functional) walls of Mycenaean fortified hill tops; in other cases, settlements located where no major structures from previous cultures existed built their own new walls. It has been the general view until recently that most settlements, not only of the Early Iron Age but also of the Archaic Period, were unfortified. This view is currently being revised, and more and more scholars now take the view that fortifications were a completely integrated element of settlement in the ancient Greek world, from the Early Iron Age down to the Roman period.

Famous examples from the early Iron Age include Old Smyrna in Ionia, Emporion in Chios, and Zagora in Andros. These sites and their fortifications are very different from each other, but seem to reflect basic types of fortification chosen by a number of settlements of the Early Iron Age Greek world. By 800, Smyrna was already a town of perhaps 5,000 inhabitants, and the core of the town was surrounded by a huge fortification, a mud brick wall on a stone socle. As early as the late ninth century, the Smyrna wall (Smyrna 1) had a monumental gate partly consisting of cut stonework of different types of stone, gray and white, and the late seventh century wall (Smyrna 3) was some 18 meters wide. Emporion, a settlement abandoned ca. 800, was a quite different case, as the hill-top fortification was devoid of houses, apart from a building which seems to have been a ruler's dwelling or a temple. The inhabitants simply lived in houses on the slopes of the hill, outside the fortification, which was then in fact a refuge. Zagora in Andros, a settlement abandoned in the early seventh century, was located on a promontory, the upper plateau of which was cut off from the main island with a wall running across the neck of the peninsula. In this case, the wall did not encompass the settlement, but protected the only easily accessible side of the settlement. On the other three sides, steep cliffs made access if not impossible, then at least very difficult.

During the seventh and sixth centuries the Greek world (the homeland—

more or less equivalent to present day Greece—as well as the colonies in Ionia and the other regions of the Asia Minor coast, Sicily and South Italy, in the Black Sea area, and the Cyrenaica in North Africa) saw hundreds of proper towns and cities developing, and evidence points in the direction of their having normally been fortified. As settlements got larger, so did fortifications, both in the areas they encompassed, and in terms of solidity and architectural and structural complexity. A wall had to have a certain height to fulfill its purpose, and it seems that in the Archaic Period walls were often some 6 meters high on the inside and 8 meters toward the outside, including the battlement. The battlement was an extra wall running around the external upper edge of the fortification to protect defenders. Walls also needed to have a certain width, both to be structurally stable and to ensure that the defending soldiers on the wall could walk on the top, with enough space to maneuver and pass each other, in armor and carrying weapons, tools or building material. A fortification wall would have a number of gates, to ensure that the people living inside the wall could exit and enter the settlement. A gate always constitutes a weak point in a fortification, a fact which would push architects to design walls with as small a number of gates as possible. With larger settlements it is clear that it would be very impractical with only one or say two openings toward the world around. More gates would allow people shorter routes to where they needed to go in peace time. Getting the balance right here, installing exactly enough but not too many gates, was crucial for functionality and security. Posterns—small openings allowing for pedestrians and animals to enter and exit a fortification—on desired spots where a gate was perhaps not necessary, or deemed too dangerous to install, would partially aid traffic flow, while constituting only minor security issues; posterns are found in walls from the Archaic Period onward. Towers are present from the time of the earliest walls, first of all at weak points, such as gates. Towers differ from bastions in being taller than the wall itself. Bastions are often simply extensions in the width of the wall at weak spots. A tower served the purpose of providing a higher firing angle than could be had from the top of the wall, enabling crossfire along the front of the wall, and providing the defenders with a number of elevated positions overlooking as much of the surrounding territory as possible. Individual towers appear with fortification walls from very early on, and systems of towers occurring at certain intervals along the whole line of a wall are known from the later

sixth century (Megara Hyblaea in Sicily), but do not seem to be a widespread phenomenon before the Classical Period. Outworks—additional structures placed in front of the wall to present enemies with further obstacles than just the wall itself, the so-called *proteichismata*—appear from very early on as well. The ditch is the most common outwork in the Archaic Period, attested in most examples from the sixth century. Fortifications were, from early on, huge undertakings for the communities that erected them, and cities therefore in the process of construction sought as many pragmatic ways to save time and money as possible. Thus it was often the case that a great part of the building material used for the wall was extracted from what was later to become the ditch in front of it, and so two fortification structures were created by one flow of work.

Classical Fortifications

By the Classical Period, fortifications had already played an important role for the architectural and topographical planning of the Greek city-states for centuries. In the fifth century, fortifications were mainly constructed as in the Archaic Period, that is, of mud brick on a socle of more or less finely dressed stone, whereas in the fourth century walls built entirely in stone became more and more frequent. A new category of fortification is siege walls, which we learn about first of all in connection with the Second Peloponnesian War. A siege wall encircled an entire besieged town, concentric to its walls, as in the case of the Spartan double wall with towers around the Boeotian *polis* of Plataea in 429–427. The purpose here was clear: the wall prevented the besieged from having any contact with the outside world and it protected the besiegers from assaults from the besieged. This siege ended successfully for the besiegers, as the Plataeans were eventually starved into giving up. Another example is the Athenian blockading wall at Syracuse in Sicily in 414, built for the purpose of cutting the city off from the rest of Sicily. This siege ended catastrophically for Athens in 413. Such siege walls constitute a truly extraordinary phenomenon, which shows the efficiency of fortification at the time but also shows the determination of some powerful states in their attempt to expand or preserve their power. This use of a defensive tool against a defensive tool would allow the aggressor to put great pressure on the besieged enemy avoiding a direct assault on the walls of the besieged city and thus minimizing the loss of lives for the besiegers. Another novelty of the fifth century was the so-called

long walls, which physically connected a fortified inland urban center with a fortified harbor, ensuring the city in question safe and fortified access to the sea in the case of a regular siege or the presence of enemy troops in its territory. The best known example is the Long Walls of Athens, but written and archaeological evidence attest to the existence of comparable walls also at Argos, Corinth, Megara, and Patrae.

Until a wall was installed in the Hellenistic Period, Sparta was the outstanding example of a *polis* that was not walled. In Archaic and Classical times, Sparta had one of the strongest armies in Greece, an army which could move anywhere quite quickly in the huge Lacedaemonian territory, and the Spartans may have seen it as a sign of weakness if they, like everybody else, had walls to fall back on if they lost a battle at a distance from their city (QQ 6, and introduction to QQ).

The fourth century saw important developments in defensive technology, as logical responses to the steady advances in the sophistication and frequency of siege warfare. The Carthaginian campaign in Sicily in the late fifth century had brought the combination of battering ram, mobile siege towers, and catapults into successful use against the Greek *poleis* of the island. The development of fortifications in the Greek world soon tried to catch up with this new threat. The race took off with great speed for real in the second half of the fourth century, when Alexander and his Successors were able to assemble resources—for the first time in the history of the Greek world—to build such machines and enable their proper handling, while also employing large numbers of mercenary troops of various sorts. Machinery, which seems to have been developed first of all by offensive military engineers, was now becoming part of the standard equipment of fortifications, at least in major cities. Artillery such as catapults were installed in towers, sometimes on more than one level, and such installations of course had repercussions on the architecture: the floor of each storey had to be strong enough to carry such machines and their munitions, and had to be designed so that the machines could shoot from the optimal height and angle, be operated properly, and so on.

Hellenistic Fortifications

City walls of the Hellenistic Period were generally higher and stronger than walls of earlier periods. They were mostly built entirely of stone apart from the center, which was normally a fill of earth and rubble. The overall agenda

for the defense of settlements of this period was to prevent siege machines from approaching anywhere near the wall. If that happened, the fight was lost. This new concern can be clearly observed in cities constructed, or refounded, in the period between Alexander the Great and the Roman conquest of Greece in 146. A key defensive tool from the earliest times, the location of a city on a high position to make attacks difficult, was becoming even more common in this golden age of siege machinery. But as cities of the period were often too large to fit on a hill top, large areas consisting of a central hill, and lesser hills as well as the plain territory in between, were often incorporated in fortifications, and the wall would run along high ridges and hilltops, so as to make approaches with machines as difficult as possible. Examples of relocations for the strategic military reasons just explained are Pleuron in Aetolia and Sicyon in Achaea. Both cities were relocated from low hills to much higher lying plateaus in the late fourth and third centuries, where new state-of-the-art fortifications were constructed in interplay with the local topography to make the cities unconquerable. In both of the cases just mentioned, the perimeter wall ran along the ridge of the plateau occupied by the relocated city, so that any attackers who wanted to bring siege engines close to the walls would have to build artificial ramps of such an immense size that it would probably never be attempted. Hellenistic cities that chose to have parts of their fortified perimeters exposed directly toward a plain would need to construct extensive outworks, a phenomenon known all the way back from the Archaic Period, as explained above. Most important here was a wide and deep ditch, or several ditches, not directly in front of the wall, but some 20 meters away from it, and one or more smaller walls and palisades. These would prevent an army, with or without siege engines, from coming anywhere near the principal wall, until after it had managed to pass the first obstacles. This alone would have been no easy task, since the defenders would ensure a constant fire of stones, arrows, and lead bullets from defense engines, archers, and hand held slings.

Rune Frederiksen

See also Aornus, Siege of; Carthaginian Wars; Catapult; Long Walls; Miletus, Siege of; Plataea, Siege of; Ravaging; Sicilian Expedition; Siege Warfare; Tyre, Siege of

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France and Spain, Greek Cities in. See Colonies, Colonization

Freedom (*Eleutheria*)

In ancient Greek society, the fundamental division was between free persons and slaves. The same language and concepts applied to individual status, *eleutheria* (freedom) and *douleia* (slavery), were also used metaphorically for interstate relations. Thus in 431, Sparta declared that it was going to war for the freedom (*eleutheria*) of the Greeks (Thucydides 2.8), meaning in practice to overthrow the Athenian Empire. Athens was often said to have enslaved Greek cities, either in general by being an imperial power or in particular cases of allies subjugated after attempting to defect (Thucydides 1.98, 124). At the end of the Second Peloponnesian War (404), there was a short-lived expectation that the end of the Athenian Empire meant the beginning of freedom for the Greeks (Xenophon, *Hellenica* 2.2.23).

Freedom of states from any external control was an aspiration difficult to attain in the real world. Leading states professed to respect the freedom of the Greeks and did not admit that their own dominance limited it. The freedom of the Greeks was a slogan taken up by Macedonian warlords in 311 (Diodorus 19.105) and by kings such as Antigonos I Monophthalmus and Demetrius II Poliorcetes in 302 (20.102), to further their own aims.

In diplomatic language, freedom (*eleutheria*), being free from external control, was often combined with autonomy (*autonomia*, the status of living under laws of one's own choosing). The practical difference between these terms was slight but both remained part of the vocabulary of Greek interstate relations and an aspiration that could always inspire hope.

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Frontinus (ca. 35–103/4 CE)

Frontinus (full name: Sextus Iulius Frontinus) was a high-ranking Roman official (consul in 72 or 73, 98, and 100 CE), who had commanded in war against the Silures (in present-day Wales). He wrote a (lost) military treatise that he claimed was the only systematic treatment of the subject. Such claims are not to be taken too literally. He followed this with the *Strategemata* in four books, intended to illustrate his doctrines by a collection of examples. The authenticity of the Book 4 has been inconclusively contested. The work is methodically organized by subject matter and shows some common sense. When other sources survive, Frontinus occasionally adds a useful detail. Faulty abbreviation on Frontinus' part is at times observable when other sources are available.

Douglas Kelly

See also Aeneas Tacticus; Polyaeus; Treatises, Military

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G

Gabiene, Battle of (316)

Fought northwest of Persepolis between Eumenes of Cardia and Antigonus I Monophthalmus, Gabiene reversed the result of Paraetacene. Antigonus placed his phalanx in the center, cavalry on the wings, and elephants and light infantry in front of the whole line. His army was around 10,000 light infantry, 22,000 heavy infantry, and 9,000 cavalry. Eumenes stationed his best cavalry on his left opposite Antigonus' better cavalry, with the elephants *en echelon* as a left flank guard. His phalanx was in the center and his weaker cavalry and remaining elephants on the right. He had about 37,000 infantry and 6,000 cavalry. The number of elephants recorded in Diodorus is the same as at Paraetacene and therefore questionable. Eumenes intended to hold back his weak right wing until the battle was decided elsewhere. Antigonus intended to overwhelm Eumenes' elite left wing.

The elephants and cavalry engaged on Eumenes' left wing. Antigonus then personally led a second wave of cavalry into the melee. Eumenes' flank guard of elephants entered one at a time, neutralizing their numerical superiority. Meanwhile Antigonus sent a detachment, hidden by dust clouds, to capture Eumenes' camp. Peucestas, one of Eumenes' commanders, fled with a third of Eumenes' cavalry. Eumenes moved his remaining cavalry to the other wing to join his reserve troops. In the center, Eumenes' phalanx routed Antigonus'. Eumenes tried to rally Peucestas' cavalry but they refused, so he withdrew.

Although the battle was arguably a draw, Eumenes' veterans of the phalanx agreed to surrender him to Antigonus in return for their captured baggage and families. Antigonus subsequently executed Eumenes, despite admiring his generalship.

See also Antigonus I Monophthalmus; Asia Minor; Elephants; Eumenes of Cardia; Paraetacene, Battle of; Peucestas; Successors (*Diadochoi*), Wars of

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Galatians

A Celtic people who also gave their name to the region they settled, between Phrygia and Cappadocia in central northern Anatolia (modern Turkey). The Galatians had crossed over into Asia Minor from Thrace as the culmination of the extensive Celtic migrations across Europe and the Balkans during the sixth to the third centuries.

After menacing Macedon and northern Greece in 281, the Galatians were defeated by Antigonus II Gonatas and then crossed the Hellespont in 278 at the invitation of Nicomedes I of Bithynia, who required their assistance with a dynastic struggle. In 275, they were defeated by Antiochus I, but continued to menace and raid neighboring Greek cities until they were checked by Attalus I of Pergamum, giving rise to the famous artistic trope of the Dying Gaul. They proved to be a ready source of unreliable mercenaries, until they were subdued by the Romans after the battle of Magnesia in 190; they remained surprisingly faithful to Rome during the Mithridatic Wars.

Russell Buzby

See also Antigonus II Gonatas; Antiochus I Soter; Attalus I of Pergamum; Bithynia; Magnesia, Battle of

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Garrisons

Most Greeks despised the professional generally and thus the professional soldier and especially standing armies in a permanent state of military preparation. Garrisons (*phrouroi*) required professional and long-standing soldiers that ran contrary to this Greek amateur ideal. In addition, garrisons were often associated with tyrannies either protecting the tyrant from the people through the use of professional outsiders—mercenaries—as much as protecting the state from outside attack. Needless to say, garrisons were also associable with foreign occupation and control.

Early Greek tyrants relied on hired troops to maintain their power within Greek states. These troops formed a permanent garrison under arms within the tyrant's community. The Persians had also used garrisons to control the cities within their empire. Thus, many of the Greek cities of the Anatolian coastline had direct experience of Persian garrison forces.

Despite Greek hostility to the idea of permanent garrisons, as the Classical Period progressed they became essential in defense of frontiers or strategic locations within *poleis*. Athens regularly sent out garrisons in the form of military settlers—styled *klerouchoi*—after the subordination of a revolt from the Delian League in the fifth century. The Spartans garrisoned Decelea in Attica in the final decade of the Second Peloponnesian War, causing the Athenians no end of problems all year round. The Spartans also dominated their briefly held Aegean Empire with the use of governors (*harmostai*) supported by garrisons on the islands of the Aegean and they garrisoned even more briefly the city of Athens itself from 404 to 403. By the fourth century garrison troops became increasingly common. The Athenians beefed up their frontier defenses and garrison troops often made up of the younger Athenian soldiers served in the frontier forts as part of what was to become the *ephebeia*, a two-year period of military training and service to the Athenian state undertaken by the wealthier Athenian hoplites.

Hand-in-glove with the more common use of garrisons went the increasing employment of mercenary soldiers in the latter fifth and fourth centuries. Thucydides refers to several garrisons of Peloponnesian troops in

the cities of Asia Minor held by Persian satraps and governors. Mercenaries like those Peloponnesians regularly formed garrison units, their professional status enabling all year round service and sedentary employment away from their homes. In the mid-fourth century Aeneas Tacticus wrote a treatise, *Poliorketika* (*Siegecraft*). In this work, he describes the use of mercenaries as part of the defensive forces of any city, effectively a professional garrison within the community. Noteworthy are his constant warnings regarding their potential disloyalty and the dangers they posed for their employers in fomenting coups or changing sides.

Garrison troops played a central role in Alexander's conquest of the East. They held down local populations, exacted tribute, and prevented native revolts. Many garrisons appeared as part of Alexander's new city foundations, especially across Bactria and northern India, thus making them appear as much like military colonies as garrisons *per se*. Garrisons were even more significant in maintaining monarchic control under Alexander's successor kings. We are blessed with good information about Hellenistic military garrisons across these new kingdoms.

Epigraphic evidence shows the relationship that garrisons had to the kings themselves as their employers. *OGIS* 1.266 illustrates that these were professional soldiers paid in coin and in kind. They served for set periods of time in settled positions often separate from the cities of the king's realm. They enjoyed rights of marriage and parenthood and their children were protected in the event of their deaths. The Seleucid monarchy which dominated western Asia in the wake of Alexander's conquests benefitted from a very successful system of military settlements—styled *katoikiai*—in which active military servicemen settled in communities that replenished themselves and thus the armies of the Seleucid monarch. In Egypt, Ptolemy more commonly settled servicemen in retirement on individual plots that made communal military replenishment less likely, though Ptolemy like all the successor monarchs employed garrisons in his frontier fortresses and at strategic locations within the country.

In Greece proper, Philip V established garrisons at Corinth, Chalcis, and Demetrias—the so-called Fetters of Greece. These were central to his control of Greece and illustrate the effectiveness of well-placed and loyal garrisons in dominating a region.

Matthew Trundle

See also Colonies, Military; Demetrias; Fetters of Greece; Mercenaries; Peisistratus

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Gaugamela, Battle of (331)

The third battle in Alexander the Great's conquest of the Persian Empire, which led to the death of Darius and the capture of Persia proper. The battle occurred in northeastern Mesopotamia (modern Iraq) on October 1, 331 and is sometimes known as Arbela, after the closest town. The extant ancient sources record unbelievable Persian numbers, with the highest being 1 million infantry and 400,000 cavalry. Whatever the numbers, it is clear that the Persians considerably outnumbered Alexander. Darius III commanded the Persian army and chose the plain of Gaugamela because it was suitable for his cavalry and chariots and, unlike Issus, had plenty of maneuver-room. When Alexander arrived, he set up a fortified camp and rested his army. The Persians, fearing a night attack, spent much of the night awake and deployed the next day tired and with low morale. Leaving his baggage behind inside the camp, Alexander conducted a careful battlefield reconnaissance before deploying his troops.

Darius was in the center, with the 2,000–4,000 Greek mercenary infantry—his best foot soldiers—and 50 scythed chariots. Another 100 scythed chariots were posted on the left wing with his best cavalry. To his right were the local Mesopotamian and Syrian troops, with another 50 scythed chariots and cavalry on the extreme right.

Alexander's main threat was having his army of 40,000 infantry and 7,000 cavalry surrounded in the open plain by the superior numbers of Persian cavalry and chariots. He posted a reserve infantry force to protect his rear and light infantry and archers on the flanks to link this with his front line. His main line was, from left to right, allied Greek cavalry, the Macedonian phalanx, the hypaspists, and, under his personal command, the

Companion cavalry. He also tasked javelin troops to target the Persian chariot drivers and horses.

In the prebattle jockeying for position, Alexander kept pushing his right wing further to the right to prevent the Persians encircling him. When this reached uneven ground on which the Persians could not use their chariots the Persians had to attack. Alexander's javelin troops destroyed most of the Persian chariots and, as ordered, the main line opened up so the few chariots that survived the javelins could pass harmlessly through. Despite exerting dangerous pressure on the Greek cavalry on Alexander's left wing, the Persians gave Alexander an opening when a gap emerged in their line. Alexander seized the fleeting opportunity, formed a wedge of his cavalry and the closest part of the phalanx and charged through the gap and straight at Darius. The Macedonians had the advantage in hand-to-hand combat with their longer infantry and cavalry spears (respectively, *sarissae* and *xysta*) and Darius fled. The Macedonian left wing was in severe difficulty—Persian and Indian cavalry had managed to break through to the baggage animals in the rear—until the reserve force carried out its orders and steadied the situation. The battle ended when Alexander called off his pursuit of Darius to aid the left wing.

Alexander's victory at Gaugamela effectively ended organized Persian resistance. Although Darius escaped, he was soon murdered by Bessus, the satrap of Bactria.

Iain Spence

See also Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon, Invasion of Persian Empire; Cavalry; Chariots; Darius III; Issus, Battle of

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Gelon (Ruled ca. 491–478)

Gelon was the son of Deinomenes, and a member of a prominent family at Gela. He served with distinction in the campaigns of the Geloan tyrant Hippocrates and was given command of the cavalry. Upon the death of Hippocrates ca. 491, Gelon seized power, nominally for Hippocrates' heirs, but as soon as he had defeated the citizen army of Gela, he claimed power for himself.

Gelon's reign from ca. 491 to 485 was peaceful; he was clever enough to realize that the Geloans, exhausted by Hippocrates' almost incessant wars, needed peace and stability. In 485, the exiled oligarchic faction from Syracuse appealed to Gelon for help. Gelon easily overthrew the new Syracusan democracy and took control of that city. Gelon immediately settled in Syracuse, where he also resettled many of the Geloans, leaving his brother Hieron to govern Gela on his behalf. Camarina, which had been captured during the tyranny of Hippocrates, was now destroyed and its population resettled in Syracuse. In 483, Gelon fought a successful war against Megara Hyblaea and destroyed the city.

By 480, Gelon is alleged to have possessed 200 warships, 20,000 hoplites, control over half of Sicily, and the firm alliance of Theron the tyrant of Acragas. Theron's expulsion of their mutual enemy Terillus of Himera brought about war with Carthage. The largest Carthaginian force yet seen in Sicily, under the command of Hamilcar, made camp near Himera. Gelon marched out to meet it and inflicted a crushing defeat on the Carthaginians and ended the war in this single engagement. When Gelon died in 478, his resounding victory over the Carthaginians and the relative peace and prosperity he brought to Syracuse were still fresh in the collective memory and his reign was seen as successful. He was succeeded by his brother Hieron.

David Harthen

See also Acragas (Agrigentum); Carthage, Carthaginians; Carthaginian War, First; Hieron I of Syracuse; Syracuse; Tyrants, Tyranny

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Gender in War

“Gender” is a key concept in feminist scholarship that aims to recover the lived experience of women in antiquity and, more ambitiously, to reconstruct the past without the male-centered assumptions, often summed up with the label “patriarchy,” embedded in the dominant culture of the past and still problematic in the culture of the present.

Ancient Greek societies rested upon the concept of the citizen as free male embodying certain qualities appropriate to masculinity, such as *arête* (roughly, “courage”). “Woman” in the abstract was seen as an incomplete and inferior form of maleness. That women bore and raised children, did housework, were subject to domestic violence and so on was not a subject of political debate, though reimaginings of the role of women could occur in Athenian comedy (Aristophanes, *Lysistrata*, *Thesmophoriae*, *Ecclesiazusae*) or philosophical speculation (Plato, *Republic* 5.452–456, *Laws* 7.813–814; 8.829–830).

That women suffered starvation in war, or death, enslavement and rape (the last two most evidently in a captured city) is self-evident, even if only sketchily attested by specific evidence. What is missing is the evidence of women’s “voices” (a virtual technical term) telling us about their experience. Very little women’s writing survives from antiquity. In a scrap of Sappho’s poetry (ca. 650–600), things of beauty second but inferior to love are an army of infantry or cavalry and warships (Fragment 16.1–2, trans. M. L. West). What to make of this?

Feminist scholarship has made only limited headway to date with the subject of war. For obvious reasons it concentrates on subjects such as domestic life or sexuality, even if the relevant texts were almost all written by men. The feminist analytical tool of “reading against the grain” may tease out hidden insights into women’s feelings in these areas, but it is still to be seen what such readings might do with Thucydides, Xenophon, or Polybius’ war histories.

In the works referred to above the philosopher Plato imagined that elite women (*Republic*) or selected citizen women (*Laws*) in the ideal states he constructed might have a role in warfare. The experiment was never actually tried anywhere. Rare examples of women as military leaders, usually from foreign, monarchic societies did not occasion any rethinking: neither Artemisia at Salamis (480), nor (a less familiar example) the

formidable Mania in the Troad (ca. 400). Etiquette required that she watch her Greek mercenaries in action from a distance in her carriage (Xenophon, *Hellenica* 3.1.13).

Women were ever present in Greek warfare, if largely unnoticed. A few incidental allusions in Xenophon's *Anabasis* (4.1.14, 3.19, 30; 5.3.1, 4.33; 6.1.12) reveal that women, including prostitutes, accompanied the "Ten Thousand" Greek mercenaries on the march into Mesopotamia and back to the Black Sea (401–399). Recovering or reconstructing the experience of these and other women in war is a work not yet in progress.

Douglas Kelly

See also Amazons; Arête; Art (Ancient), Greek Warfare in; Aristophanes; Artemisia; Camp Followers; Civilian Populations in War; Ten Thousand, March of the; Women in War; Xenophon

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Gods of War

The most well-known god of war is the Olympian, Ares, son of Zeus and Hera and the erstwhile companion of Aphrodite. Hesiod describes him in the company of *Phobos* (Fear) and *Deimos* (Terror) on the battlefield. In Aeschylus' *Seven Against Thebes*, the army swears a blood-oath on the eve of battle in which the heroes catch the blood of a sacrificed bull in a shield. With bloodied hands they jointly swear in Ares' name.

Ares was dreaded rather than loved. Zeus, in Homer's *Iliad*, says to him: "you are the most hateful to me of all the gods ... strife is always dear to you and wars and slaughter" (5.890–893). Even Ares' children were loathed, such

as the bandit, Cynos, who built a temple out of human skulls, and the hideous serpent, which fought Cadmus, the father of Thebes. Consequently, temples and monuments dedicated to Ares were uncommon in the Greek world. But despite his bad press, armies before battle usually sought Ares' favor. According to Plutarch, Spartans regularly sacrificed dogs to him under his title *Enyalios*. His role may not have been popular and other gods would have been asked to fight alongside them, but Ares' power as the main deity of the battlefield was clear. He was the preeminent Greek god of war, who could not be ignored if the army was to be successful in battle.

There were other gods, heroes and deities associated with war. In Athens, the temple of Athena *Nike* (Victory) on the Acropolis is a clear example, as are the warlike epithets of *Areios* and *Areia*, which were applied to a number of gods in other states.

Minor deities and heroes also had roles in the wars of different *poleis*. An inscribed *stele* from Selinus of the late fifth century specifically attributes victory in a battle to the benevolence of a number of gods. At the time of the battle of Marathon (490), Pausanias tells us that it was widely believed that the goat-god, Pan, Theseus, and a chthonic hero that an oracle identified as Echelaeus participated directly in the battle. Ajax, Telamon, and other heroes were invoked because of an earthquake at Salamis just before the battle (Herodotus 8.64). Herodotus' Themistocles specifically attributed victory in the Persian Wars to "the gods and heroes." Herodotus (8.65) also tells us that before Salamis a mysterious ghostly cloud of dust arose at Eleusis from which could be heard the chant of "Iacchus" associated with the Mysteries and notes (9.65) that no Persian died upon land sacred to Demeter at Plataea, because the goddess had not permitted them entry, as she was outraged by the desecration of her sanctuary.

Gods were also active in the carnage during and after the battle. Some believed that the dreaded twins, *Thanatos* (Death) and *Hypnos* (Sleep) would collect the souls of the dead. Sparta also recognized a special place in war for the Dioscuri (Castor and Pollux). Plutarch says that these twins appeared alongside Lysander at Aegospotami. They are credited with inventing the war dances of Sparta, and their duality even reflects the Spartan diarchy itself: the Dioscuri were both invoked when both Spartan kings marched into battle, but just one was invoked if only one of the kings set out.

However, not all Greeks believed in the power of these deities. Plato's

Socrates argued that it is ridiculous to believe that gods, as perfect beings, would change their shapes into “corrupt” mortal forms. But Socrates’ religious views were, in part, responsible for his execution after a trial in which he was found guilty of impiety. It is probably safer to assume that the general population revered the gods and believed that their support was required to deliver success in war.

James McDonald

See also Laws of War; Omens and Portents; Religious Practices before Battle; Surrender; War Crimes

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Granicus, Battle of (334)

The first battle in Alexander the Great’s conquest of the Persian Empire, fought in May 334 between Alexander’s Macedonian-Greek army and the Persian-Greek army of western Asia Minor. The Macedonian army was around 47,000 strong while the Persian army had 20,000 cavalry and about 20,000 Greek mercenary infantry. The Persian defeat removed the main obstacle to Alexander’s control of western Asia Minor and opened the rest of the Persian Empire to his attack.

The Persians had taken up a defensive position on the opposite riverbank, forcing Alexander to attempt an opposed river crossing. Arrian gives the best description of the battle and Diodorus’ version (that Alexander crossed unopposed) should be rejected. The Persians adopted the reverse of the normal tactics, posting their entire cavalry along the riverbank with the infantry behind them. Alexander led with his cavalry but with one brigade of infantry in close support. The main infantry force followed at an oblique angle across the river so that they would not be

forced to engage the Persians on an extended front. Alexander used his cavalry to dislodge the Persian horse from the bank and create a foothold for the infantry and Arrian (1.15.4–5) describes the start of the battle as “a cavalry struggle, though on infantry lines.” Parmenion is recorded as offering a more cautious approach than a head on attack, but from Arrian’s description Alexander’s tactics seem to have been well-calculated to avoid the risk—and the boldness of the attack may have been intended to throw the Persians off-balance.

Iain Spence

See also Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon, Invasion of Persian Empire; Parmenion

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Gylippus (d. after 403)

Gylippus was a Spartiate who in 414 was sent by Sparta to take command at Syracuse, then under siege by the Athenians. Gylippus collected reinforcements in the north of Sicily and brought them to Syracuse. The Athenian commander Nicias gravely underestimated the consequences of Gylippus’ arrival. He brought his forces into Syracuse just as it had been close to surrendering.

Gylippus reanimated the defense, aiming to cut off the Athenians’ uncompleted line of circumvallation to the north by driving out a cross-wall. He kept up morale after defeats and exploited his superiority in cavalry and light-armed troops. Gylippus also repeatedly drew in reinforcements from Sicily to counter Athenian numerical strength.

At some cost, Gylippus turned the Athenians’ north flank. Now holding the initiative, Gylippus urged the Syracusans to contest command of the

Great Harbor. After initial setbacks, their fleet neutralized Athenian sea power and blockaded the harbor entrance. In a full-scale naval battle in the harbor the Athenians were heavily defeated and made their disastrous attempt to retreat by land (413).

Gylippus also had to deal with the sensitivities of his allies, with whom tensions were inevitable. His success at Syracuse led only to a subordinate command in the last year of the Peloponnesian War, and the historian Thucydides did not markedly praise him, although he made plain the contrast between his effectiveness and Nicias' dilatoriness. The only other thing known about Gylippus is his exile for embezzling some of the money sent to Sparta by Lysander at the end of the Second Peloponnesian War. Sparta offered only limited opportunity for an ordinary citizen of such ability.

Douglas Kelly

See also Nicias; Peloponnesian War, Second; Syracuse

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H

Haliartus, Battle of (395)

Haliartus, a small Boeotian city, northwest of Thebes, was the site of the first battle in the Corinthian War (395–387/6). Sparta planned to strike after the main Peloponnesian League army under King Pausanias and troops raised by Lysander from Phocis and other friendly areas met near Haliartus. However, Lysander arrived before Pausanias and after failing to detach Haliartus from the Boeotian League, attacked the city. Surprised by Theban reinforcements, Lysander was killed and his army broken. Complete disaster was averted when the hoplites managed to re-form, counter-attacked, and killed 200 Thebans (300 according to Plutarch). Xenophon (a contemporary with good links to Sparta) suggests Lysander acted hastily because he could not bear inaction. Plutarch (a late source, but perhaps preserving local Boeotian tradition) records that the Thebans intercepted a letter from Lysander to Pausanias with the meeting date and deliberately ambushed him. The two accounts are not incompatible and it seems clear that Lysander was over-confident in attacking alone.

Pausanias arrived the next day but decided not to fight. His decision was probably influenced by doubts about his allies, Athenian reinforcement of the enemy, and the impossibility of recovering the allied dead next to the city walls without first capturing the city. He agreed to withdraw under truce in return for the bodies of Lysander and his men. This victory provided impetus to the anti-Spartan coalition. Pausanias was put on trial at Sparta but fled to Tegea.

Iain Spence

See also Corinthian War; Lysander; Pausanias, Son of Pleistoanax;

Xenophon

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Halicarnassus

Halicarnassus (modern Bodrum) was a heavily fortified *polis* of Dorian origin, but very likely with a mixed Greek and non-Greek population, located in southwestern Caria. Famous later as the location of the renowned Mausoleum, the tomb of Mausolus of Caria, and the seat of the Hecatomnid dynasty from Mausolus on, it had earlier been home both to the warrior-queen Artemisia, who aided Xerxes against Greece in 480, and to the historian Herodotus, who recorded the conflict. In the fourth century, Mausolus extended Halicarnassus by merging it with a number of local communities, and moved his capital there from its traditional location at Mylasa. Halicarnassus was supposed to have been attacked by Rhodes, and defended by its queen Artemisia. Allowing the Rhodian force inside the walls, the story went, she trapped them by towing their abandoned fleet from the harbor, before killing the stranded troops.

In 334, Alexander the Great besieged Halicarnassus. After having driven the Persian garrison behind the walls, he began to fill in the city's defensive ditches and bring up siege weapons, repelling a nocturnal attack from the defenders. After the Macedonians were victorious in a further encounter outside the gates, the Persians decided to burn Halicarnassus and retreat. Alexander captured the city, killing those found engaged in arson, while freeing the rest. He razed the town and returned it to the Hecatomnid queen Ada, along with a small garrison.

After Alexander's death, Halicarnassus came under Ptolemaic power, is noted by Livy as a free ally of Ptolemy IV Philopator in 197, and a free city under the power of Rome after the Battle of Magnesia in 190.

Lachlan McColl

See also Artemisia; Caria, Carians; Caria, Greek Cities in; Delian League/Athenian Empire; Herodotus; Mausolus and the Hecatomnids; Rhodes, Rhodians

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Hamippoi (sing. *Hamippos*)

Light infantry operating with cavalry. *Hamippoi* are attested in Sicily from ca. 480 and in a Boeotian force in 419/18. In Athens, *hamippoi* were used in the 360s and seem to have replaced the *hippotoxotai* (horse archers) as a formal adjunct to the cavalry corps around the middle of the fourth century. *Hamippoi* could be used to strengthen cavalry in defense, for example, acting as a rearguard or staging ambushes (Xenophon describes how to hide them behind cavalry). However, the most evidence is for their use to stiffen cavalry in an attack—generally on other cavalry.

Iain Spence

See also Cavalry; *Hippotoxotai*; Light Troops

Further Reading

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Harmodius*. See *Peisistratidae

Harpalus (d. 323)

Harpalus, son of Machatas, a Macedonian noble, was one of Alexander the

Great's companions. He was one of the group of Alexander's friends exiled by Philip II in 337. The exiles were recalled on Philip's death and as Harpalus was unfit to serve in the army Alexander appointed him the army treasurer. Harpalus deserted in 333, just before the battle of Issus. Alexander pardoned Harpalus and reinstated him to his post and, in 331, put him in charge of the imperial treasury at Babylon.

However, in 324, just before Alexander returned from India, Harpalus again deserted, taking with him 6,000 mercenaries, 30 triremes and 5,000 talents. Harpalus seems to have fled from fear of punishment over his lavish extravagance and maladministration. Harpalus fled to Taenarum and, leaving his troops there, went to Athens. There, in a notoriously obscure sequence of events, he offered money and troops to support a revolt against Alexander. Demosthenes initially opposed this but was brought around, reportedly because he was bribed. However, the Athenians then arrested Harpalus and convicted Demosthenes of misappropriation. Harpalus escaped and fled to Crete where members of his own entourage murdered him.

Iain Spence

See also Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon; Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon, Invasion of Persian Empire; Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon, Indian Campaign; Demosthenes (Orator); Nearchus; Taenarum

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Hegemon, Hegemonia

Hegemon is the Greek word for leader and *hegemonia* for leadership or hegemony. These terms were commonly applied to the dominant state in an alliance, since that state not only had control of directing the alliance's policy but also had command of its forces in the field. Thus Sparta held the

hegemony of the Hellenic League opposing the Persian invasion (480–479) and, on a much wider scale and over a much longer time, of the Peloponnesian League. It could also be said that in practical terms Athens held the *hegemonia* in the Second Athenian confederacy, although this actual term seems not to have been used in the treaties setting up this alliance. In two clear-cut cases, Philip II of Macedon was elected as hegemon of the Hellenic League that met in Corinth in 338/7, and the same body elected Alexander the Great to the same position in 336/5.

The authority of the hegemonial state was formally expressed by the terms of the treaty of alliance between it and its allies. However, its superior power and prestige counted for much more in practice. Modern historians have used hegemony as a conventional label for defining certain periods of Greek history when a particular state at the head of an alliance dominated the Greek cities: the Spartan hegemony (404–371), Theban (or Boeotian) hegemony (371–362 or 356). The practical differences between hegemony and empire in Greek history are not always apparent. It is only a matter of common usage that we hear of an Athenian Empire and not an Athenian hegemony. In the Hellenistic Period, a king could still be referred to as the *hegemon* of an alliance.

When an alliance was formed between states more or less equal in power, arrangements had to be negotiated for the *hegemonia* in the sense of the command of the alliance's forces in the field. For example, when Athens and Sparta formed a new alliance in 369 they had to settle this matter. The initial proposal was for Athens to hold the command at sea and Sparta on land. However, the Athenian assembly was persuaded that the *hegemonia* on land and sea should be held on land or sea by either state in turn for five days at a time (Xenophon, *Hellenica* 7.1.1–14).

Douglas Kelly

See also Athenian Confederacy, Second; Hellenic League (against Persians); Hellenic League (under Philip); Peloponnesian League

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Hellenic League (against Persians)

In 480-479, the Greeks defeated an invasion by the forces of the Persian Empire, and by doing so ensured that the states of mainland Greece did not fall under Persian control. Success was made possible because of an alliance known to modern scholars as the “Hellenic League,” bound by oaths taken in 481, in early summer of 480, and possibly again before the battle of Plataea in 479. This was a rare alliance, though only a minority of Greek states joined. The members of the Hellenic League successfully expelled the Persians, but in less than 20 years following that achievement fell into disrepair when the two most powerful members, Athens and Sparta, officially broke alliance.

Robert T. Jones

See also Artemisium, Battle of; Delian League/Athenian Empire; Hellenic League (under Philip); Mycale, Battle of; Peloponnesian League; Plataea, Battle of; Persian Wars; Salamis, Battle of (480); Thermopylae, Battle of

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Hellenic League (under Philip)

Also known as the League of Corinth. A panhellenic league established by Philip II of Macedonia after the battle of Chaeronea in 338.

Having effectively subdued Greek resistance to Macedonian expansion, Philip sought to impose his control and enforce a peace throughout Greece. To that end, he united the Greek states in a congress held at Corinth. The only state that refused to participate was Sparta. The League’s governing terms dictated that the participant states should keep a Common Peace and punish any who broke the accord. They also received votes on the League’s council and were required to provide a military levy to a joint Greek army.

Shortly after the League’s establishment, Philip revealed plans for an

invasion of Persia. He was elected as commander-in-chief (*strategos autokrator*) of the League, and before his death made preparations to lead this joint army to invade Asia.

William P. Richardson

See also Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon, Destruction of Thebes; Chaeronea, Battle of; Common Peace; *Hegemon, Hegemonia*; Hellenic League (against Persians); Panhellenism; Philip II of Macedon

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Hellenica Oxyrhynchia

Hellenica Oxyrhynchia is the Latin title (meaning “Greek Historical Work from Oxyrhynchus”) applied to over 200 papyrus fragments, some of considerable length, of a Greek historical work discovered at Oxyrhynchus in Egypt and first published in 1908. These finds have been supplemented by two accessions of much smaller but important fragments, published in 1949 and 1976.

The content of the surviving parts of the work comprises: (a) events in the last part of the Second Peloponnesian War, and (b) events in the Greek world in 396–395, principally the lead-up to Corinthian War and Agesilaus II’s campaign in Asia Minor. The scope of the work can only be guessed at. That it was a continuation of Thucydides’ *History of the Peloponnesian War* is indicated by a reference (section 2) to Thucydides by name. That the work went down to the battle of Cnidus (394) is often assumed but is guesswork.

The author’s name is not known for certain. He is competent and well-informed and was writing before the collapse of the Persian Empire, and possibly before the end of the Third Sacred War (355–346). He is therefore dated in the first half of the fourth century, and in early research was identified as either of the two major lost Greek historians at work in that period, Theopompus or Ephorus. Neither identification is convincing, and if the author is identified at all, he is sometimes thought to be the Athenian

Cratippus, about whom little is known, except that he continued Thucydides' History and lived at about the right time. More commonly, the author is left as an unknown and is conventionally designated for convenience as "P" (apparently for "Papyrus," but this has been denied).

The smaller part of the surviving text deals with Athenian attacks on Megara and Ephesus in 409 and the battle of Notium of 406. Like the much longer part dealing with 396–395, these texts have important consequences for our understanding of Greek historical writing on these events and of the events themselves. P is a conscientious, if somewhat unexciting, historian, which creates trust. Further, P's accounts are in many particulars closely related to those found in Diodorus (first century) and thus support the version of events that Diodorus gives when he differs from that found in the *Hellenica* of the contemporary Xenophon. Before the discovery of P, Xenophon's version of events was overwhelmingly preferred by modern historians to that of the slovenly and low-caliber Diodorus, even though Xenophon's habits of omission and his bias were known. With the evidence of P available, a positive reevaluation of Diodorus as an historical source has taken place, certainly for the events attested to in the surviving parts of P that overlap with Diodorus and, more controversially and uncertainly, for other parts as well.

The relationship of P to Diodorus is commonly thought to be that P was used as a source by Ephorus for the relevant parts of his *Universal History*. Ephorus himself was a main source for Diodorus in Books 5–15, so that, for all his obvious faults, Diodorus can be seen to include, in some places at least, valuable material deriving second-hand from P through Ephorus.

Douglas Kelly

See also Agesilaus II; Diodorus Siculus; Ephorus; Notium, Battle of; Thucydides; Xenophon

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Hellespont

The Hellespont (modern Dardanelles) was the narrow strait between the Thracian Chersonese (modern Gallipoli Peninsula) on the north and the Troad to the south. Since the Greeks, the Hellespont has been regarded as part of the boundary between Europe (the Chersonese) and Asia (Troad). The Hellespont led from the Aegean Sea to the Propontis (modern Sea of Marmara), thus forming part of the only maritime route between the Aegean and the Black Sea. It had considerable importance as a trade route, especially after Greek cities such as Athens came to depend on grain and other commodities from the Black Sea. The straits are only $\frac{3}{4}$ of a mile (1.2 kilometers) wide at their narrowest point. This gave rise to the legend of Hero, a girl who lived in a tower on one side, and her lover Leander, who, every night, swam the strait to be with her, until one night her lamp that guided him went out and he drowned. (Lord Byron swam the strait to emulate Leander, and now a communal swim to commemorate both Leander and Byron is held every August.)

This narrow crossing made the passage between Abydos (on the Asian side) and Sestos (in the Chersonese) the major crossing point between the continents in antiquity. In Roman times, major roads led to Sestos and Abydos so that travelers or armies could cross the straits by boat. Centuries earlier Xerxes, in about 482, did not expect his army to use boats (or to swim), but instead built two bridges of over 300 ships lashed together so that they could march across; Herodotus gives a detailed description of the method of construction. When a storm broke up the first bridges, Xerxes had the men who built them beheaded and the straits themselves lashed and branded; a second set of bridges allowed the army to cross. In 335, Alexander the Great's army crossed at the same point, though without a bridge, as Alexander invaded Asia partly, he said, as revenge for Xerxes' invasion of Greece in 480. Alexander himself sacrificed a bull to Poseidon and the Nereids at the mouth of the Hellespont, and poured a libation from a golden goblet, seeking success as he was about to set foot on Asia.

But it is the importance of the Hellespont as a passage between the

Aegean and the Black Sea that has most led to conflict in the area. As recently as 1915, control of the straits was the objective of the Gallipoli campaign. In antiquity, it was in many periods equally important, and cities such as Sestos will also have benefited by taxing cargoes. The great Bronze Age site identified as Troy was in a strategic position on the Asian side of the entrance to the strait. As early as the sixth century, Athens took an interest in the area, seizing nearby Sigeum from the Mytileneans and colonizing Elaious at the tip of the Chersonese. In the latter stages of the Second Peloponnesian War, the area saw much fighting as Sparta competed with Athens for control of this all important area. Sestos was the key Athenian naval base, and the final battle of the war occurred when Lysander, based at Lampsacus on the Asian side, surprised and destroyed the Athenian fleet on the European shore of the Hellespont at Aegospotami.

In the Hellenistic Period, the Hellespont was at various times controlled by the Seleucids, the Ptolemies, Macedonia, and Pergamum. Under the Romans, it was no longer of such vital importance until Constantinople became the seat of empire and the Hellespont once again became critical as a route for sea-borne trade and communication with the Mediterranean.

Peter Londey

See also Abydos; Aegospotami, Battle of; Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon; Chersonese, Thracian; Hellespont Campaign (411-410); Peloponnesian War, Second; Persian Wars; Propontis, Greek Cities of; Sestos; Troad; Xerxes

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Hellespont Campaign (411–410)

A campaign fought early in the Decelean War (413–404)—the resumption of full hostilities in the Second Peloponnesian War (431–404)—to control the vital sea lane through the Hellespont. Without it Athens could no longer feed itself and would have to surrender. Although it ended with Athenian victory, this campaign saw the beginnings of Persian support to Sparta, which formed an important part of the latter's ultimate victory.

The campaign was conducted against the backdrop of the huge Athenian losses in Sicily and political turmoil in Athens. In 411, influenced by an offer from Alcibiades to secure Persian help, an oligarchic coup overthrew the government. The fleet and troops at Samos remained loyal to the democracy and the Hellespont campaign was conducted by them, not the oligarchy in Athens.

In the event, Alcibiades failed to deliver and in April 411, when Sparta recognized Persian sovereignty in Asia Minor (abandoning the Greek cities there), the satrap Tissaphernes agreed to fund the Peloponnesian fleet. This laid the foundations for ultimate Spartan naval dominance in the region.

Early that summer, the Spartan Dercylidas, supported by Pharnabazus, the Persian satrap for the Hellespont, occupied Abydos. In September, Mindarus, the new Spartan admiral, tired of Tissaphernes' games with funding, transferred his fleet north to work with Pharnabazus. Mindarus reached the Hellespont undetected and disrupted the shipping route.

In response the Athenians under Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus moved north, won a close-run naval battle at Cynossema and cleared the route through the Hellespont. In April/May 410, at Cyzicus in Ionia, the Athenians under Alcibiades won another major victory. He drove ashore and captured the 60-strong Peloponnesian fleet (Mindarus was killed), defeated the Peloponnesian and Persian land forces, and recaptured Cyzicus.

This campaign removed a serious Peloponnesian threat and led to the restoration of democracy at Athens and the formal return of Alcibiades. It boosted Athenian confidence so much that they (with hindsight, foolishly) rejected peace overtures from Sparta.

Iain Spence

See also Alcibiades; Dercylidas; Hellespont; Peloponnesian War, Second;

Pharnabazus; Thrasybulus; Tissaphernes

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Helots

Helots were slaves in Sparta but of a type different from the privately owned chattel-slaves elsewhere in the Greek world. Helots were the property of the Spartan state. Although direct evidence is lacking, Helots appear to have been attached to parcels of land, so that they were owned the landholders. Helots could not be freed by individuals, only by the state.

The Helot population of Laconia was created by the Spartan conquest of this region in very early times (ca. 900–800?). The later Spartan conquest of Messenia to its west (in the First Messenian War, traditionally ca. 736–716) further increased the number of Helots, this name sometimes being loosely applied to the Messenians when it properly referred to the slaves in Laconia. Unlike the privately-owned slaves in other parts of Greece, who had no personal identity or family and communal life or social status, Helots lived in village communities and had families and cults of their own. They cultivated the lands of their masters in return for a fixed part of the annual produce, which could not be exceeded. They had a defined status but their subjection was reinforced by such obligations as that of taking part in mourning a dead Spartan king (Herodotus 6.58).

In war, Helots are first heard of in connection with the battle of Plataea (479): 35,000 Helots are said to have accompanied the 5,000 Spartiate hoplites and another 5,000 Helots the 5,000 *Perioikoi* hoplites sent by Sparta (Herodotus 9.10, 28–29). Although Herodotus (9.29) clearly states these men served as light armed troops, it is not certain whether they had been sent primarily to fulfill this role, or as laborers and porters, or simply so they could be kept close to their masters under arms and not be left to make trouble at home. Later, Helots regularly accompanied the Spartan army on

campaigns (e.g., Thucydides 5.57) but not in such great numbers. Light-armed troops are often inconspicuous in Greek sources and were often of only minor military importance. Explicit evidence of Helots being used as light-armed troops is lacking, which may reflect a lack of training and organization and their playing only a minor role on the fringes of combat.

In later times, selected volunteer Helots were used as troops, such as those who served as hoplites under Brasidas in Thrace and fought at the battle of Mantinea (418). The recruitment of Helots as hoplites, known as *Neodamodeis*, was regularized at this time. Presumably these Helots were equipped and trained as hoplites by the state only after careful selection. Normally Helots were not allowed to own weapons or, when serving on campaign, even to approach stacks of weapons (Xenophon, *Constitution of Sparta* 12.4).

Thucydides recounts (4.80) an incident, which occurred at some indeterminate time before midsummer, 424: Helots who thought that they had given good military service were invited to come forward for rewards. The 2,000 who did so were taken around the temples and then secretly liquidated. Thucydides brings in this story to support his observation that Spartan treatment of the Helots had security as its priority.

Like other similar nonchattel-slave populations in Greece living in communities, such as the Penestae in Thessaly, the Helots were capable of revolting and did so on two known occasions: the Second (ca. 650–630) and the Third Messenian War (ca. 465–456). In 370/69, Epaminondas' army permanently liberated the Helots of Messenia. Many Helots in Laconia also rebelled at this time (Xenophon, *Hellenica* 7.2.2) but it is not clear what became of them after the Boeotian army left Laconia. For most of their history, Helots remained quiescent, partly though the stringent security measures in force (such as the *crypteia*) and partly though the willingness of some Helots to serve their masters. The Athenian occupation of Pylos in Messenia (425–409/8) caused Sparta constant anxiety but led to only small-scale defections of Helots and no general uprising. In the invasions of Laconia in 370/68, 6,000 Helots volunteered to take part in what at the time looked like a last-ditch defense of Sparta (Xenophon, *Hellenica* 6.5.28–29).

There were still Helots in Laconia in the time of King Cleomenes III (reigned ca. 235–222), when 6,000 of them paid 500 drachmas a head for their freedom (Plutarch, *Cleomenes* 23). Later, Laconia was repeatedly invaded in wars with Philip V of Macedon, the Aetolians, and the Achaean

League. Spartan institutions were radically changed by the tyrannies of Machanidas (ca. 209–207) and Nabis (207–192). Nabis freed Helots for military service. After his downfall and his ex-Helot soldiers were forced into exile, Sparta was incorporated into the Achaean League (192–146). Amidst these upheavals, the Helots disappear from view. Some may have been incorporated into the citizen body of Sparta, others absorbed into the communities known in the first century as the Free Laconians.

Douglas Kelly

See also Achaean League; Aetolia, Aetolian League; Cleomenes III; *Crypteia*; Epaminondas; Hoplites; Light Troops; Messenia; Messenian War (First, Second, and Third); *Neodamodeis*; Philip V; Slaves in War; Sparta

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Hephaestion (d. 324)

Hephaestion, son of Amyntor, was Alexander the Great's closest friend, and reputed lover. He was a good general and became Alexander's second-in-command. However, his accomplishments are often overlooked because of his personal relationship with Alexander. A Macedonian noble, Hephaestion may have trained with Alexander in the school of Royal Pages. At Gaugamela, he commanded Alexander's close protection party and in 330 became co-commander of the Companion Cavalry. During the Indian campaign, Hephaestion (with Perdikkas) led a large part of the army on an independent mission and later distinguished himself at the Hydaspes. In 324, Alexander appointed Hephaestion chiliarch and married him to the

sister of one of his own wives (a daughter of Darius III). Shortly afterward Hephaestion died after a fever. Alexander was inconsolable and conducted a huge funeral; the oracle at Siwa (perhaps influenced by Alexander) declared Hephaestion a hero, or demi-god.

Iain Spence

See also Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon; Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon, Indian Campaign; Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon, Invasion of Persian Empire; Hydaspes, Battle of

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Heraclea Trachinia

Heraclea Trachinia was a colony founded by Sparta in 426, close to the site of the old Malian town of Trachis, which had asked Sparta for help against the Oetaeans to the west. The Spartans sent three oecists (leaders of a colonizing venture), together with Spartan and other Greek colonists; the population of Trachis most likely also became citizens of the new venture. Heraclea was probably established on a slightly higher and more defensible site than Trachis. Sparta, embroiled in the Second Peloponnesian War against Athens, had several good reasons for controlling this site. It was about 8 kilometers (5 miles) west of the pass at Thermopylae, and according to Thucydides the Spartans thought they could use the area as a naval base for operations against Athenian-controlled Euboea (though this does not in fact seem to have happened). Most importantly, it was close to the northern end of the primary route between the Corinthian and Malian Gulfs, through passes that skirted the western flank of Mount Parnassus. Given Athenian control of the sea, this (and not the route across the Isthmus of Corinth) gave Sparta its main access to northern Greece. It was, for example, used by Brasidas in 424. Unfortunately, the city soon came under attack from most of its neighbors, was badly served by Spartan governors, and in 419 was taken over by the Boeotians. In 399, it fell into *stasis* (violent internal conflict). In 371, Jason of Pherae captured the town and razed its walls, but

it continued to exist as it sent representatives to Delphi in the later fourth century. By then, however, Heraclea had lost its primacy in the area to Lamia.

Peter Londey

See also Brasidas; Delphic Amphictyony; Jason of Pherae; Malis, Malians; Peloponnesian War, Second; Sparta

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Hermocrates of Syracuse (d. 407)

Hermocrates was a Syracusan democrat and military commander, instrumental in the defeat of the Athenian expedition to Sicily (415–413) in the Second Peloponnesian War (431–404). In 424, he persuaded the Sicilians to unite against Athens’ interference in their affairs. In 415, he was prominent in the resistance to the Athenian attack on Syracuse and after its defeat led the Syracusan naval contingent in the Spartan operations in Asia Minor (412). However, he and his colleagues were exiled *in absentia*. He subsequently attempted to reestablish Selinus free from Carthaginian control and was killed in 407 in an unsuccessful attempt to gain control of Syracuse. His daughter married Dionysius I of Syracuse.

Iain Spence

See also Dionysius I of Syracuse; Peloponnesian War, Second; Selinus; Sicilian Expedition; Syracuse

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Hero of Alexandria (ca. 10–ca. 70 CE)

Hero of Alexandria was a Greek mathematician and engineer who lived and worked in Alexandria, Egypt. He is considered one of the greatest inventors of antiquity and his work was influenced by ancient Egyptian, Babylonian, and Greco-Roman sources.

Hero wrote numerous treatises on mechanics, metrics, mathematics, and geometry. Some of his most important works on mechanics were the *Pneumatica*, *Automatopoietica*, *Belopoeica*, and *Cheirobalistra*. The *Pneumatica* describes mechanical devices worked by air, steam, and water, such as singing birds, coin-operated machines, and the *aeolipile* (the first steam-powered engine). Hero’s other major work on mechanics, *Mechanica*, which survives only in an Arabic translation, is heavily based on Archimedes’ work. The *Belopoeica* dealt with military equipment, in particular catapults of various kinds, and provides formulae for the best weight and length of projectiles.

Most scholars agree that Hero taught at the Museum of Alexandria, as most of his writings are in the form of lecture notes and textbooks for courses in mathematics, mechanics, physics, and so forth.

Ioannis Georganas

See also Alexandria, Egypt; Archimedes; Catapult

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Herodotus (ca. 485–425)

Herodotus was an ancient Greek historian, dubbed “the father of history” (Cicero, *Laws* 1.5), whose account of the background and progression of the Ionian Revolt and Persian Wars (499–479) is the oldest surviving historiographical work of antiquity. No other works of Herodotus are known to have existed.

The Histories describes the beginnings and course of the conflicts between the Persian Empire and Greece at the beginning of the fifth century. The first four books trace the growth of the Persian Empire under the Achaemenid kings and include ethnographical accounts of the peoples they attempted to subject, including the Lydians (1.93–4), Egyptians (Book 2), Scythians (4.1–82), and Libyans (4.168–199). Flashbacks enclosed within the main narrative are key sources for the history of Archaic Greece and the phenomenon of Archaic Greek tyranny (e.g., 1.56–68 on Athens and Sparta, 3.48–53 and 5.92 on Corinth).

The main narrative of Books 5 and 6 is the account of the Ionian Revolt, which precipitated Persian expeditions against Greece. Darius’ attack at Marathon in 490 culminated in Athens’ famous victory (5.105, 6.94–120). The buildup to and course of the retaliatory campaign of Darius’ successor, Xerxes, is recounted in Books 7 to 9: the heroic Spartan defeat at Thermopylae (7.201–203), the inconclusive sea battle of Artemisium (8.1–18), the Greek victory contrived by Themistocles at Salamis (8.40–125) (all in 480), and finally the defeat at Plataea (479) of Xerxes’ general, Mardonius (9.25–89).

The key ingredients of Herodotus’ historical method are eyewitness evidence, oral tradition, and his own judgment (see e.g., 2.99). His keen awareness of the problem of sources and sophisticated approach to historical explanation are increasingly recognized. As he was a citizen of Halicarnassus, a Greek city-state in Asia Minor on the cusp of Greek and non-Greek worlds and under Persian rule in Herodotus’ childhood, a stance

of cultural relativism imbues his work (see 3.39).

Emily Baragwanath

See also Artemisium, Battle of; Darius I; Ionian Revolt; Persian (Achaemenid) Empire; Persian Wars; Plataea, Battle of; Salamis, Battle of (480); Thermopylae, Battle of

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Hieron I of Syracuse (Ruled 478–467/6)

Hieron, the second Deinomenid tyrant, reinforced Syracuse's power in Sicily and interfered in the affairs of the *poleis* of Magna Graecia. Hieron's greatest military achievement was his decisive victory over the Etruscans at the naval battle of Cumae in 474 that curtailed Etruscan influence.

Upon the death of his brother Gelon in 478, Hieron became the tyrant of Syracuse. In 476/5, Hieron destroyed Naxos, removed the inhabitants from Naxos and Catania and resettled them at Leontini. He then refounded Catania as Aetna (Diodorus 11.49.1–2). In 472, Hieron allied with Himera to defeat Thrasydaeus, and overthrew the Emmenidid tyranny at Acragas (Diodorus 11.53.4–5).

Hieron used diplomacy to prevent Anaxilas, the tyrant of Rhegium, from attacking Locri in 477, and he provided assistance to Sybaris against Croton in 476 (Diodorus 11.48.3–8). In 474, Hieron formed an alliance with Aristodemus, the tyrant of Cumae, and Syracusan and Cumaean naval forces defeated the Etruscans in the Bay of Naples, off the coast of Cumae (Diodorus 11. 51.1–2). Afterward, he established a (short lived) garrison on Pithecusae to control navigation in the bay.

Hieron died in Aetna in 467/6. He was succeeded by Thrasybulus, the last Deinomenid tyrant.

Christine S. Lane

See also Acragas (Agrigentum); Cumae; Gelon; Magna Graecia; Sybaris/Thurii; Syracuse

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Hieron II of Syracuse (ca. 306–215)

Hieron II was a Syracusan general and tyrant, born ca. 306. Hieron served under Pyrrhus of Epirus during the latter’s campaigns in Sicily and, in 275, seized power in Syracuse in a military coup and consolidated his power by marrying Philistis, the daughter of a leading citizen. He ruled the city until his death in 215, aged about 90. His rule brought stability and economic prosperity to Syracuse. At first an enemy of Rome, he became one of their most loyal allies, and played an important role in the First Punic War.

In 268, Hieron inflicted a heavy defeat on the Mamertines, Campanian former mercenaries who had seized control of Messina, on the Mylaean plain near the River Longanus. Upon his return to Syracuse he was proclaimed king. Although his conflict with the Mamertines also brought him into conflict with the Romans, he quickly resolved his differences with them, becoming their loyal ally during the First Punic War.

Later in his reign, he shared power with his son Gelon. During his long and mostly peaceful reign Hieron embarked on public building programs including strengthening the fortress at Euryalus and employing Archimedes to design war machines for the defense of Syracuse. Gelon died before his father, and Hieron was succeeded by his grandson Hieronymus.

David Harthen

See also Archimedes; Catapult; Fortifications; Mercenaries; Pyrrhus; Rome, Romans; Sicily; Syracuse; Zancle/Messana. *Roman Section: Punic War, First*

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Hieronymus of Cardia (d. ca. 250)

A contemporary and historian of the Successors of Alexander. His writings are the ultimate source of historical information for the generations following Alexander's death until the treaty between Antigonus II Gonatas and Alexander II of Epirus. According to Pausanias he hailed from the Greek city of Cardia in the Thracian Chersonese (the Gallipoli Peninsula), and was employed in the service of Alexander's secretary, Eumenes of Cardia.

He fought with Eumenes against first Perdiccas and then Antigonus, until his defeat at the battle of Gabiene in 316. Wounded, Hieronymus was captured by Antigonus and entered his service and was present at the battle of Ipsus in 301. He retained his status in the court of the Antigonids, and was appointed as the harmost of Boeotia by Demetrius I Poliorcetes in 293. His well-informed history was heavily used and widely known in the ancient world. Diodorus Siculus relied on him extensively, Arrian less so. Plutarch used Hieronymus' work for his biographies of Eumenes, Pyrrhus, and Demetrius Poliorcetes. However, since he was never quoted verbatim and only fragments of his writings have survived, his style is difficult to judge, although Dionysius of Halicarnassus found him boring.

Russell Buzby

See also Antigonus I Monophthalmus; Antigonus II Gonatas; Demetrius I Poliorcetes; Diodorus Siculus; Eumenes of Cardia; Gabiene, Battle of; Ipsus, Battle of; Successors (*Diadochoi*), Wars of

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Himera, Battle of (480). See Gelon

Himeras, Battle of (311)

A battle fought in mid-summer 311 at the River Himeras (modern Salso) on the south coast of Sicily, between the Greeks under Agathocles, tyrant of Syracuse, and the invading Carthaginians. The Carthaginian army under Hamilcar totaled 40,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry, including Greek allies and exiles. Agathocles was outnumbered: he had a mercenary army of 10,000 infantry and 3,500 cavalry, together with an unknown number of citizen troops.

At first, both armies occupied defensive positions on hills at either end of the plain divided by the river. Agathocles lured some Carthaginian foragers into an ambush by the river. When they retreated in confusion to their fortified camp, Agathocles launched an attack that almost succeeded but was beaten back when Hamilcar threw in a force of 1,000 slingers from the Balearic Islands. A second assault by the Greeks was also on the point of capturing the camp when a Carthaginian convoy unexpectedly landed fresh troops. The Greek withdrawal turned into a rout. The Carthaginian cavalry pursued the Greeks across the plain and trapped many in the riverbed.

Over 7,000 Greeks and only 500 Carthaginians were killed. Agathocles retreated to Syracuse but, instead of standing a siege as was expected, he reversed the situation by invading Africa.

Douglas Kelly

See also Agathocles; Carthaginian Wars (345–275); Slingers

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Hippeis (sing. Hippeus)

The plural, *hippeis*, means “cavalry” while the singular means “cavalryman” or a rider in general. At Athens, the term *hippeis* also denoted members of the second highest of the census classes established by Solon around 575. At Sparta, the term *hippeis* was used for the 300-strong bodyguard to the king. These originally may have been mounted, but by the Classical Period were clearly hoplites. The earliest reference to them (Herodotus 1.67) places them in the second half of the sixth century. The famous “Three hundred” killed at Thermopylae with Leonidas may have been this bodyguard.

Iain Spence

See also Cavalry; Hoplites; Solon; Sparta; Thermopylae, Battle of

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Hippias. See Peisistratidae

Hippotoxotai (sing. *Hippotoxotes*)

Hippotoxotai were horse archers. Based on artistic evidence, *hippotoxotai* of Scythian origin may have been used in Athens from the first quarter of the fifth century. In the second half of that century, they formed a 200-strong contingent attached to the Athenian cavalry corps. Their last attested usage was in 395 and by the middle of the fourth century (perhaps by ca. 365) they seem to have been replaced by *hamippoi*, or light infantry who operated with the cavalry. Their status is debated, with some historians arguing that they were state-owned Scythian slaves. However, this is far from certain—although slave foot archers were used in a police role in peacetime Athens, the Greeks generally did not make use of slaves in combat roles. In addition, citizens did serve as dismounted archers and Alcibiades the Younger served with the *hippotoxotai* after expulsion from his cavalry squadron on campaign in 395. Unfortunately, how *hippotoxotai* were used is also uncertain. Xenophon notes they led the charge of the cavalry, which suggests they rode ahead to soften up the enemy. Other likely uses include scouting and raiding, with raiding the most likely function of the 20 sent to

Melos in 416. Following Alexander's conquest of the Persian Empire horse archers became a common element of the successor armies.

Iain Spence

See also Archers; Cavalry; *Hamippoi*

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Histiaeus (d. ca. 494/3)

Histiaeus, the tyrant of Miletus, was an accomplice in the Ionian Revolt with Aristagoras. For his support of Darius in the Scythian campaign, he was rewarded with Myrcinus, in Thrace. However, Darius suspected Histiaeus' endeavors in Thrace, and invited him to stay in Susa on the pretext of needing his assistance. Histiaeus later sent a secret message to Aristagoras, by shaving a slave's head, tattooing the message on the scalp, and letting the hair regrow. This instructed Aristagoras to foment rebellion in Ionia, hoping he might be required to return home to quell it. Darius did send him back to Ionia for this reason, but in Sardis, Artaphrenes, the governor, indicated his suspicions about Histiaeus' involvement in the origins of the revolt. Histiaeus escaped, but was eventually recaptured by the Persians in Mysia, impaled on Artaphrenes' orders, and his embalmed head sent to Darius.

Abigail Dawson

See also Aristagoras; Darius I; Ionian Revolt; Miletus

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Homeric Warfare

The name of Homer is associated with two great epic poems, the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, which the Greeks counted as their most important pieces of literature. Nothing is known about the author, and there have long been arguments as to whether the same poet wrote both poems. But it is generally agreed that the poems come out of a tradition of oral poetry in which bards or rhapsodes would take up traditional stories and, in retelling them, constantly reshape them. But the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* seem to have reached their final form, most likely in the early seventh century (some place them a little earlier), after which they became canonical and changed very little. They are two of the great masterpieces of Western literature.

The two poems are works of fiction set in an imagined epic past, in which heroes were greater and stronger, and in which the gods played an active role in human affairs. This, plus the fact that actual Bronze Age sites exist at some of the key places in the story, has led many people to suppose that Homer's stories represent dim memories of society and events of the Mycenaean Period. But this view has little to commend it, and is steadily losing ground. It is implausible that an active oral tradition of story-telling (as against oral "record-keeping") would preserve original elements over a period of some 500 years, and in fact the political structures described in the poems differ markedly from the more autocratic and centrally controlled kingdoms suggested by Mycenaean archaeology and the Linear B tablets found at Mycenaean sites. The impressive visible ruins of the Bronze Age sites may well have encouraged poets to imagine a lost and glorious world: but it was a work purely of imagination, for there is no evidence of any active memory of the Bronze Age surviving.

The poems are set in the period of the Trojan War: the *Iliad* during the last of its 10 years, the *Odyssey* in the 10 years afterward as Odysseus made his long way home. They depict an imagined world of the past, but portrayed in a way to be meaningful to the poet's audience, while presumably also being flattering to the upper classes who provided hospitality to the poet and paid for his services. They may well obliquely reflect social change at the time of their composition. In *Iliad* 2, a common man, Thersites, dares to speak up against the aristocratic leaders of the expedition, and is roundly abused (and indeed beaten up) by Odysseus for doing so. It is tempting to see this as evidence that, in the period the story reached its final form, the "big men" of Greek towns were indeed being challenged by the lower social orders, such as small farmers, men

represented here by Thersites. In the *Iliad*, the poet can please his aristocratic audience by making Thersites astoundingly ugly, and by allowing Odysseus to shut him up: a pleasing fantasy for the aristocrat, but at odds with the real world where social change was afoot.

Homer's vivid descriptions of battles, spread throughout the poem, indicate clearly that there are large masses of infantry fighting, but in fact place most of their focus on the deeds of named heroes and other men of above average rank. Homeric battles thus often crystallize into a series of individual combats, or at least individual "kills" (the victim is often not aware of being targeted until too late). The actual damage that weapons cause to human bodies is described in astounding, slow-motion detail; there is nothing else to match this in Greek literature. This focus on individual combats within a general conflict spread across the battlefield is partly literary convention, a way of creating stories out of mass confusion and a way of distilling heroism and pathos from the mass. Homer often stops to tell the reader a little about the background of a man who is about to die; the heroes make implausibly long speeches in the midst of battle; and the gods are quite often prepared to intervene to save a favored mortal. These devices help make the poem work as entertainment. The focus on heroic men of the upper class will also have pleased the rhapsode's aristocratic patrons, many of whom believed that they could number Homer's heroes among their own ancestors.

The arms and armor of the heroes is varied, but not far different from the hoplite equipment that was probably in use by the time the epics reached their final form. Shields in particular seem mainly to be the round, concave hoplite shield, often with one or more bosses, and with an interior handle. Hans van Wees has argued that, even where a shield appears at first sight to be different, such as the shields of Ajax, Hector, and one or two others, which reach to their feet, this just means that they were exceptionally large but of the usual shape. Such a large round shield would be too heavy for a normal man to wield, but the heroes are consistently said to be superhumanly strong compared to any man of the poet's own day.

The warriors typically wield spears (sometimes again of exceptional size), and use them for both thrusting and throwing. The latter is more usual in combat, with spears and swords (also regularly carried) used at close range, usually to finish an enemy off. Some aristocratic warriors, such as Paris and Teucer, fight as archers, but in general Homer seems to regard the

bow, along with the sling, as a weapon more suitable for the common mass of infantry. The heroes typically wear bronze corselets and greaves and a bronze helmet with a plume (which frightens Hector's young son, Astyanax); there are occasional descriptions of leather or leather-and-felt caps. Being mythical heroes, their equipment is also often imagined as sporting plenty of gold and silver.

Around the heroes on both sides there is a large anonymous mass of soldiers, who clearly play a significant role in the battle, even if the poet often leaves them in the background. At times they are clearly described as fighting in close order, and some have seen this as evidence that Homeric warfare was really hoplite warfare, skewed to focus (for literary and social reasons) on the epic heroes. At one point, for example, the armies advance, and

When they came crowding together on one spot, close together they struck with oxhide shields and spears and the strength of bronze-plated men, but bossed shields were pressed against each other, and a great din arose. Then mixed together there were the lamentations and shouts of triumph of men destroying and being destroyed and the ground ran with blood. (Homer, *Iliad* 8.60–65; trans. Londey)

On another occasion, in the fight over a body, men mass together and the poet shows an awareness of the advantage of mutual support by shield-wielding foot-soldiers:

For Ajax went around every one of them giving many instructions: he ordered no one to retire behind the corpse, nor to fight in front, jutting out from the Achaeans [Greeks].... Nor indeed did the Danaans [Greeks] fight without shedding blood, but many fewer perished, for always in the tumult they gave heed to ward off from each other the killing that hung over them. (Homer, *Iliad* 17.356–365; trans. Londey)

But more often the fight, except in desperate situations, seems fluid, and in some way the heroes can range around the battlefield seeking out opponents of suitable rank. While this might simply be literary fiction, Hans van Wees has suggested that it is in fact similar to anthropologists' accounts of battles in New Guinea, in which men would move to the front and then back to the rear several times over the course of a day, taking rests out of

the battle before heading back to the fray; similarly, in early Zulu warfare a man would withdraw after killing an enemy. This seems similar to the Homeric battlefield, in which individuals can leave the battle for a while before returning to the front to fight as *promachoi* (lit. “fighters in front”). The advantage of van Wees’ thesis is that it allows Homer to give a moderately realistic account of an early seventh century battlefield, while also providing a good setting for poems later in the seventh century in which the Spartan Tyrtaeus exhorts his fellow citizens to stand firm at the front and not to drop back out of the fighting (see, for example, QQ 57).

Two-horse chariots are a consistent part of Homer’s battle scenes, each carrying a warrior and his charioteer. They are exclusively the preserve of heroes and other big men in the army: they are clearly a sign of social status. Heroes almost never use them as a fighting platform: rather, the chariot gives the hero mobility and prominence on the battlefield, but he dismounts to fight among the *promachoi*, while the charioteer takes the horses and chariot back out of harm’s way, but remaining close enough to come and pick up the warrior when need arises. If the warrior is killed, the charioteer never tries to recover his body, but rather turns and retires: the horses themselves are valuable and need to be preserved.

Many have felt that Homer’s depiction of chariots as “battlefield taxis” shows him wrestling with a piece of equipment from early warfare that he no longer understands. But in fact the depiction of chariots in battle is far less likely to be a surviving Bronze Age element than a borrowing from Assyrian warfare contemporary with or a little before Homer’s time. Xenophon, writing admittedly much later, describes the Assyrians of the past using chariots in battle in exactly the way Homer describes. Hans van Wees, on the other hand, has argued that not only is this a plausible way of using chariots on a battlefield where the infantry were mostly fighting in open order, but that the evidence of vase-painting suggests that chariots were in fact used in Greece, despite the general unsuitability of the terrain.

van Wees has argued that paintings on Greek vases of the first half of the seventh century (700–650) best matches the warrior equipment described in Homer. This then becomes an important piece of evidence for dating the final composition of the *Iliad*. By later in the seventh century, in the poems of Tyrtaeus, we can see development toward the ideology of close-order hoplite warfare. This may suggest that Homeric warfare is in fact, once stripped of literary embellishment, a reasonably accurate account

of warfare at a particular moment in time, when recognizably hoplite equipment had been adopted, presumably for greater self-protection within a fluid battlefield, but before the close-order phalanx and the primacy of hand-to-hand fighting had taken over (a process itself which, some would argue, was only completed a century or more later).

Peter Londey

See also Archers; Arms and Armor; Art (Ancient), Greek Warfare in; Chariots; Command Structures, Army; Hoplites; Pay, Military; Phalanx; Trojan War; Tyrtaeus

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Hoplites

Hoplites were the heavy infantrymen of ancient Greece. The name derives from the Greek word *hoplon*, which is both one of the names for the hoplite shield and also a term that means "equipped" (i.e., a hoplite is a man equipped for war). The origin of the hoplite way of fighting is a contested issue among scholars who variously date the beginnings of this organized style of combat to the eighth and seventh centuries. The hoplite rose out of the more open and heroic styles of warfare seen in the previous Mycenaean Period of Greek history. Homer, in his work the *Iliad*, does refer to massed

formations of fighting men but how closely these formations resembled the more structured formations of the Classical Period is far from certain. Herodotus (1.171) credits the use of shields with a central grip, the attachment of crests to helmets and the application of designs to shields (all elements of massed hoplite fighting) to the Carians of Asia Minor. Apollodorus (*Library of History*, 2.2.1), on the other hand, credits the invention of the hoplite shield to the Argives.

Regardless of origin, the shield and a long thrusting spear were the mandatory requirements for fighting as a hoplite. Other accouterments such as helmets, swords, body armor, and greaves were optional in many city-states of ancient Greece. The reason for this flexibility in the equipment of the hoplite was that many city-states such as Athens possessed no permanent standing army whose panoply was supplied by the state. Rather each male citizen possessing sufficient wealth was required to supply their own equipment as part of their eligibility to serve in the state's part-time militia. The cost of such equipment could be extensive. A fine suit of armor could cost 1,000 *drachmae*. Helmets could cost 100 *drachmae* (Aristophanes, *Peace*, 1221–1222, 1249–1250). Thus it was only members of the middle and lower upper classes of Athenian society who served as hoplites (the very wealthy generally served as cavalry). Such men held other vocations in Athenian society and were only mobilized when the state deemed it necessary to place a contingent of men in the field. Which men were to be called into service was determined randomly either by their age group or by the rolls of the *deme* to which they belonged. Mobilization announcements were then posted in the Agora (see illustration to Military Service, Greek States and entry) and, on a specified day, the men who had been chosen were required to assemble with their equipment and rations for the coming campaign. Troops may have then been drilled to prepare them for battle. When any fighting was over, the survivors would simply return to their regular occupations until called upon again. In the fourth century, Athens instituted the *ephebeia*—a mandatory two-year term of national service for all youths with training in garrisons on the Athenian frontier. However, prior to this time, Athens had no regular long-term soldiers.



The “Johnson Vase,” an Attic black-figure *amphora*, ca. 530–520. The hoplites are depicted with the full panoply of their time—Corinthian helmet, bell corselet, greaves, shield, and spear. The hoplite facing right is probably protecting the body of his comrade from the hoplite with the tripod on his shield, who is trying to secure it to strip it of its weapons and armor. Located in the Classics Museum, Australian National University, Canberra, Australia. (Photo by Bob Miller)



Terracotta *pinax* (plaque), with a running hoplite, late sixth century, Athens. The original name was scratched out and overwritten, but he is described as *kalos* (beautiful). He is equipped with shield, spear, and Chalcidian helmet, but not breastplate and greaves. Although the Athenian hoplites famously ran into battle at Marathon, running any distance made it difficult to maintain the phalanx formation. Located in the Acropolis Museum, Athens, Greece. (Gianni Dagli Orti/Corbis)

The practice of mobilization of a part-time militia in states like Athens is contrasted by the practices of the city-state of Sparta where all male citizens entered the state's rigorous training and education system (the *agoge*) at a very young age to train them to become soldiers and to acclimatize them to the turmoils that may be experienced on campaign. Upon leaving the *agoge* around 21 years of age, the Spartan citizen entered what was essentially the only permanent standing army in Greece during the Classical Period. Spartan hoplites wore similar items of clothing, in particular their distinctive red cloaks, and carried shields bearing a national emblem, a capital lambda (Λ), referring to Laconia, the region of Greece where Sparta was located. This was the closest thing the army of any Greek city-state had to a standardized uniform. The cloak was provided by the state as part of the *agoge* system. It is unclear, however, whether arms and armor were

provided to the Spartan hoplite at state expense as well (and if so, at what stage of their training). However, due to the nature of the Spartan state, with its egalitarian structure, the prohibition of money and luxury, and the restriction preventing any citizen from engaging in trade or commerce, it seems likely that all elements of the hoplite panoply were provided to Spartan warriors by the state—possibly upon successful completion of the *agoge*.

All hoplites, whether from Athens, Sparta or elsewhere, fought in the densely packed phalanx formation—a block of hoplites arranged into regular ranks and files (see illustration in “Chigi Vase” entry and the first illustration in the Phalanx entry). The phalanx formed the core of most armies in Classical Greece. During the early years of the Classical Period, the use of nonhoplite weapons in combat was looked down upon as “unmanly” by many states. However, by the time of the Second Peloponnesian War (431–404), troops such as slingers, archers and mercenaries, and a greater dependence on cavalry as a strike weapon, changed the nature of Greek warfare to the extent that the hoplite phalanx became part of a more combined-arms military institution. However, the hoplite still remained the essential core of most armies of ancient Greece until a new form of warfare was developed in the fourth century that outclassed the hoplite of the city-state—the *sarissa*-wielding phalangite of Macedon.

Christopher Matthew

See also Agoge; Arms and Armor; “Chigi Vase”; Homeric Warfare; Nemea, Battle of; Olpae, Battle of; Phalanx; Training

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Hydaspes, Battle of (326)

A major battle in Alexander's Indian campaign, fought at the modern-day Jhelum River. When King Porus refused to submit, Alexander, bolstered by 5,000 Indian allies, invaded. Porus' army occupied the opposite bank of the Hydaspes, presenting Alexander with another opposed water crossing. He had been successful in this at Granicus and Issus but the Hydaspes was a much greater obstacle. Alexander decided on a stealthy night crossing via a headland and island in the river about 150 *stadia* (27.5 kilometers) from his main camp. He distracted Porus with troop maneuvers and night noises over some time, conveying the impression he was going to wait until winter and the end of the flood season. Leaving behind a large force under Craterus, Alexander made his crossing under cover of a storm. He landed his force before Porus' son arrived with 2,000 cavalry and 120 chariots. The chariots proved useless in the mud and Alexander, advancing with 5,000 cavalry and 6,000 infantry, scattered the Indians with his archers and cavalry, killing Porus' son and 400 cavalymen.

Porus left part of his force to prevent Craterus from crossing and moved against Alexander with 4,000 cavalry, 300 chariots, 200 of the elephants, and 30,000 of the infantry. Alexander now faced a new problem: how to combat the elephants, which had been placed at intervals of about 100 meters across the entire frontage of the infantry. Alexander could not risk using his cavalry against the elephants as the horses were unused to them and likely to bolt. Instead, he armed several contingents with axes and sickles to use against the elephants' trunks and feet. He also kept back the infantry in the middle of his line, making his initial attack on the left wing with mounted archers, closely followed by cavalry. More cavalry was sent around the Indian left wing to attack its rear, aided by the arrival of other parts of Alexander's main force. Macedonian cavalry attacked the Indian right wing when the Indians weakened it by moving cavalry from there to help the left. Once Alexander had neutralized the enemy wings, his infantry advanced against the Indian elephants and infantry. Alexander had deployed the axe and sickle-equipped infantry and others with javelins opposite the elephants and *sarissa*-armed infantry against the Indian infantry in between the elephants. As planned, the javelins, axes, and sickles were effective against the elephants, many of which rampaged through their own men. The Indian line fell into confusion and Porus was forced to surrender when overcome

by numerous wounds.

Craterus, crossing the river elsewhere, pursued and destroyed the fleeing Indian survivors. Alexander confirmed Porus as a vassal king, reportedly so impressed by his courage and demeanor that he gave him additional territory. The battle demonstrates the sheer professionalism and skill at this time of all elements of Alexander's army, including the leadership.

Iain Spence

See also Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon, Indian Campaign; Chariots; Granicus, Battle of; Issus, Battle of; Porus

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Hypaspists (Hypaspistai). See Elite Troops

Hysiae, Battle of (669)

A battle of doubtful historicity, in which the forces of Argos defeated a Spartan army in 669. By tradition the battle, which took place near Hysiae, a small town in the hills southwest of Argos, represented the apogee of Argive power. Some have suggested that the victory was linked with the early development of hoplite tactics at Argos. In the second century CE, the travel writer Pausanias reported seeing graves reputed to be those of the fallen Argives.

Peter Londey

See also Argos, Argives; Pheidon of Argos; Sparta

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I

Illyria, Illyrians

For the Greeks, “Illyrians” was a general term for a group of in fact disparate Indo-European tribes who lived west of Macedonia and north of Epirus, on and inland from the Adriatic coast. The Greek “Illyria” referred to a more restricted area than the later Roman term “Illyricum.” Migrating south around the tenth century, Illyrians established settlements in some later Greek or Macedonian areas such as Corcyra, Leucas, and Vergina. After Greek settlers arrived, there was considerable cultural and trading contact between them and the Illyrians. There was also ongoing conflict. For example, the crisis in the 430s at Epidamnus on the Adriatic coast was caused because the city was fighting Illyrians in the hinterland, while the Illyrians were supporting a group of Epidamnian exiles. But the main Illyrian tribes, the Liburnians, Dardanians, Ardiaei, and Autariatae, were never united, and indeed spent much time fighting each other.

The Dardanians were a particular threat to Macedonia, and under their king Bardylis comprehensively defeated a Macedonian army under Perdiccas III. Perdiccas was killed, clearing the way for his brother, Philip II, to take the Macedonian throne in 359, perhaps after a brief period of regency. The following year, Philip equally comprehensively defeated Bardylis, killing the king and 7,000 of his men. Philip fought further campaigns against the Illyrians in about 351 and in 345, reducing the Dardanians to client status. He also fought campaigns against the Ardiaei (345) and Autariatae (337). Soon after coming to the throne in 336, Alexander the Great fought a further campaign in Illyria to shore up his borders. By the early third century, the Dardanians had recovered, and in 284 initiated prolonged warfare against Macedonia. In 229, they defeated

Demetrius II of Macedonia in battle. They finally came under Roman control in the first century, but remained notorious as bandits well into the Imperial period.

Peter Londey

See also Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon, Thrace and Illyria Campaigns; Corcyra, Conflict with Epidamnus and Corinth; Epidamnus; Philip II of Macedon; Philip II, Campaigns against Illyria and Thrace

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India, Indians. See Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon, Indian Campaign

Internal Security

Internal security encompasses policing, counter-espionage, and public order—essentially anything preventing an internal activity (whether from external or internal forces) hostile to a state or its government. This is during times of both war and peace, but excludes external military action (unless this has an internal component, such as a traitor opening a gate to the enemy). Internal security measures can include those as diverse as tyrants' use of a bodyguard, mercenaries, hostages, and executions, through to state police forces, spying, and even the use of garrisons.

Ancient Greece had nothing like the internal security apparatus of modern states—most cities did not even have a police force—and the level of, and emphasis on, internal security varied from state to state and over time. However, the approach to internal security and the level to which it developed in Greek states were essentially determined by three things: the perceived threat, the resources available to meet it, and the culture of the state.

Democratic Athens, for example, largely relied on its legal apparatus and the support of the majority of the population to preserve its public order and internal security. Although it had a small police force, this was presumably largely directed at criminal activity in the Agora and other

commercial or civic areas. Sparta, on the other hand, was a much more closed society and constantly concerned with the threat of a helot revolt. It expelled foreigners annually, had a secret police (the *crypteia*), and its entire *agoge* and military system could be regarded as designed to meet internal as well as external threats. However, as with many areas of Greek history, although most of our evidence comes from Athens and Sparta, neither of them were really typical *poleis* (city-states).

At the base level of public order, most *poleis* saw the threat as emanating from excessive public emotion over issues. These could arise from overly emotional women (generally seen as a threat to good [male] order in a city—see, for example, Aristophanes' *Lysistrata* and *Ecclesiazusae* [*Parliament of Women*] and Euripides' *Bacchae*) or disorder arising from economic or other issues. In one Athenian case, the tragedian Phrynichus was fined for arousing strong public emotions with his play about the Persian capture of Miletus (494).

Most cities seem to have had limited mechanisms for controlling threats to public order. Most threats were dealt with by legislation—for example, Solon's sixth century reforms at Athens were designed to defuse social stress over primarily economic issues. His measures reputedly included a law requiring all Athenians to take up arms against individuals attempting to establish a tyranny. This is an example of legislation to formalize what was the practice in most states, which generally relied on the citizen body to rally against threats to public order. However, this had clear limitations when public order was threatened by a large part of the citizenry and also contained the real risk of a response to a threat degenerating into *stasis* (civil strife) or civil war.

Few states had anything approaching a police force or standing army—although increasingly from the fourth century *poleis* had small groups of elite soldiers maintained at public expense and these could be used for internal security. In 365, for example, “The Three Hundred” at Elis, along with the cavalry, repressed a democratic revolution. In most cases, the authorities used whatever resources they had at their disposal and in the absence of formal organizations, the response was generally ad hoc.

There were some exceptions, though. Athens had a small police force of Scythian archers (instituted early in the fifth century) who assisted public officials such as “The Eleven” who could arrest people (there was a public jail), and who also carried out executions. This was primarily for criminal

offences, but could be used against threats to the established order. For example, Theramenes' arrest and execution in 404 was carried out by The Eleven on the orders of the oligarchic government (The Thirty Tyrants) to remove a potential source of opposition (Document 13). Athens also had a relatively well-developed court system, which relied on, and rewarded, citizens accusing others of illegal activities. Sparta, with a specific and continual threat from the Helot population had the *crypteia*, an organization designed to eliminate troublemakers and prevent hostile acts. In 399, the ephors used several trusted young men (perhaps from the *crypteia*), supported by cavalry, to arrest Cinadon, who was planning a revolution against the existing Spartan system.

Higher level internal security functions were directed against the threat of assassination, coups, and betrayal of the city to an external enemy. In addition to the ad hoc measures and the more formal systems in Athens and Sparta described above, tyrants and narrow oligarchies typically made use of groups of armed supporters—either citizens or mercenaries—in internal security duties. The Thirty at Athens, for example, used youths armed with daggers to intimidate state bodies such as the *Boule* (Council), or to murder and arrest opponents. One of their tactics was to involve other citizens in arrests to implicate them in their guilt and bind them to their cause. Socrates famously refused to follow the orders of the Thirty to arrest one Leon of Salamis, but the four other citizens selected with Socrates were sufficiently cowed to carry out the arrest anyway. Garrisons could also be installed in a city's citadel to ensure internal security. Some well-known examples include the Spartan/local oligarchic occupation of the Cadmea at Thebes (382–379), the Macedonian garrison on Acrocorinth in the third century, and the Seleucid use of Acra in Jerusalem in the second century.

Other than violent internal revolution or *stasis*, one of the biggest threats to a city's internal security was betrayal to an external enemy. This could occur in times of supposed peace—surprise attacks, especially by those from less settled parts of Greece such as Aetolia were not uncommon. However, they also happened in large *poleis* too. The Spartan seizure of the Theban Cadmea in 382, for example, was with the assistance and on the invitation of a party within the city (Document 28). In 243, Aratus seized Acrocorinth from Macedon by bribing members of the garrison. The threat of betrayal during sieges was particularly severe—the sole extant part of Aeneas Tacticus' military work, *On Sieges*, is largely concerned with

internal security measures.

In general, the more open a society (such as democratic Athens) the less the perceived need for internal security. In these cases, an acceptable level of peacetime internal security could be maintained by the usual means of social pressure, the rule of law, and reliance on the citizen body to deal with any major threat. However, these could be supplemented by special interrogations and trials when the occasion demanded. For example, under the stresses of the Second Peloponnesian War (431–404) the mutilation of the Hermae on the eve of the Sicilian expedition (415) was taken as a threat to the democracy and incurred vigorous reaction (or overreaction).

Less secure forms of government, such as tyranny or narrow oligarchies, faced a greater threat and had to rely on more sophisticated measures such as bodyguards, hostage-taking, central control of weapons and strongpoints, arrests, execution, and garrisons. The Spartan system of the *crypteia*, its annual expulsion of foreigners, and even its entire social and military system can be seen at the extreme end of ancient practice for a *polis* not run by a tyrant, and this resulted from the constant Helot threat to their existence.

Iain Spence

See also Aeneas Tacticus; Agathocles; Alexander of Pherae; Assassination; Cleisthenes of Sicyon; *Crypteia*; Dion of Syracuse; Dionysius I of Syracuse; Dionysius II of Syracuse; Elite Troops; Exiles; Garrisons; Hieron I of Syracuse; Hieron II of Syracuse; Jason of Pherae; Mercenaries; Peisistratidae; Peisistratus; Periander; Pheidon of Argos; Polyaeus; Polycrates of Samos; Sparta; Treatises, Military; Tyrants, Tyranny

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Ionian, Ionians

In the Mycenaean Period, the west coast of central Anatolia was variously occupied by Carians, Mycenaeans, and Lycians, among others, and was sometimes even under Hittite control. After the Mycenaean collapse, the coastline from Phocaea to Miletus would be named after a new group, the Ionians, said to have migrated from the Greek mainland.

The Greeks regarded the Ionians as those peoples occupying the lands between the Aeolians to the north, and the Carians to the south. The Ionians self-identified, partly on the basis of dialect, as distinct from their neighbors, but were generally considered part of the same larger ethnic group as Athens. Although Herodotus regards the Ionians as “weak” and the very name “Ionian” degrading (Herodotus 1.143), throughout the Second Peloponnesian War (431–404) the name was used generally to describe the Athenians and their allies.

Herodotus lists Miletus, Phocaea, Myus, Priene, Ephesus, Colophon, Lebedus, Teos, Clazomenae, Erythrae, and the islands of Samos and Chios as forming the Ionian Dodekapolis (group of 12 cities). The Panionium on Mount Mycale was their communal sanctuary and meeting place (Herodotus 1.142–148). Herodotus’ list was not definitive and ancient sources conflict on the details. Herodotus omits many settlements that were Ionian-speaking (e.g., Magnesia, Iasus, and Halicarnassus) or were geographically proximal (for example, Smyrna, which claimed association with the Ionians and sought inclusion); while including some that were seemingly located within other regions (for example, Miletus, Myus, and Priene were all located in Caria).

Ionian had a different experience of conflict from mainland Greece, where generally Greeks fought Greeks; fighting in Ionian frequently involved foreign forces on one, or even both sides. Herodotus begins his history with an account of Croesus of Lydia, who in the sixth century subjugated

mainland Ionia and extracted tribute, while at the same time securing peace with the Ionian islanders. Although Croesus' ancestors had fought Ionians (attacking Miletus and Clazomenae, and sacking Colophon and Priene), according to Herodotus he was the first foreigner to come into contact with the Greeks through alliance.

Ionia remained loyal to Croesus when propositioned by the Persian king Cyrus to revolt. With Croesus' defeat by Cyrus, the Ionians appealed for peaceful terms with Persia. Miletus received such terms, while Chios preserved its isolation by surrendering Lydian dissidents to Cyrus, but the rest of mainland Ionia was overrun and the Phocaeans driven from their home. Ionian soldiers fought alongside Cyrus in Egypt, and under Darius I they bridged the Danube and guarded it against Scythian opponents. They also prompted a Persian attack on Naxos, but when this failed, openly rebelled against their Persian masters in the Ionian Revolt of 499–493.

In the course of the revolt, the Ionians sacked Sardis with Athenian naval assistance, lost Athenian support when they were defeated at Ephesus, but went on to capture Byzantium. The revolt spread to Cyprus, Caria, and the Hellespont, but ended in defeat at the battle of Lade in 494, followed by the sack of Miletus and the reconquest of the rest of Ionia by Darius. The great Ionian temple of Apollo at Didyma was looted and destroyed (although some authors attribute this to Xerxes in 479).

The Ionians fought for Persia during much of Xerxes' invasion of Greece in 480, including at the battles of Artemisium, Salamis (at which they remained mostly loyal despite Themistocles' plea), and Mycale, at which they were not trusted and turned against Persia. After Xerxes' defeat, Ionian troops helped Athens besiege the remaining Persians at Sestos.

The Ionian *poleis* were all members of the Delian League, and fought loyally for Athens through much of the Second Peloponnesian War. Thucydides says that the cities of Ionia were unfortified and therefore feared Spartan incursions, but many (such as Miletus and Colophon) did have defenses, Phocaea famously so. Ionians fought with Athens throughout the Mediterranean, including the failed attack on Potidaea and in the Sicilian expedition. But in 412, Chios and Erythrae revolted from Athens, coinciding with Persia's intervention in the war and sparking a widespread Ionian Revolt that lasted until the end of the war. With Athens' defeat in 404, Ionia quickly fell back under Persian control.

In 395, Sparta campaigned successfully in Ionia during the Corinthian

War, but eventually ceded control again to Persia. Ionia remained in Persian hands until Alexander the Great crushed Miletus as the only Ionian *polis* to resist. After Alexander's death, Ionia as a region became less cohesive, although many individual *poleis* still thrived. They witnessed the wars of the *diadochoi* (Successors), falling first under the power of Lysimachus, then variously into the domain of different kingdoms, primarily the Seleucids, followed by Pergamum. Ionia was then incorporated into the Roman province of Asia.

Lachlan McColl

See also Athens, Revolts of Allies (Fifth Century); Chios, Chians; Corinthian War; Croesus of Lydia; Cyrus II; Darius I; Delian League/Athenian Empire; Ionian Revolt; Lade, Battle of; Mycale, Battle of; Peloponnesian War, Second; Persian Wars; Successors (*Diadochoi*), Wars of; Xerxes

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Ionian Revolt (499–493)

A widespread revolt against Persian rule by the Ionian Greeks, Cyprus, Caria, and island and Hellespontine cities. The revolt originated in Miletus, lasted from 499 to 493, and was a major cause of the Persian invasion of Greece in 490. Herodotus Book 5 provides a detailed account of the revolt, stating that the main instigator was Aristagoras, tyrant of Miletus, influenced by his father-in-law and predecessor as tyrant, Histiaeus. Although the tyrants of the Greek cities in Asia Minor owed their positions to the Persians, many joined the revolt. In addition to seeking local support, Aristagoras traveled to mainland Greece to canvas aid.

Aristagoras' visit to Greece had mixed success—although Athens contributed 20 ships and Eretria 5, Cleomenes I of Sparta refused help. Herodotus records that Aristagoras had almost persuaded Cleomenes to send troops until he revealed that the Persian capital, Susa, was three month's march from the sea. Spartan reluctance to campaign far from home ended his chance of support.

With the mainland Greek assistance, in 498 the rebels marched to Sardis and burnt it. Although the garrison held out on the citadel, this was a significant symbolic victory. Herodotus claims that Darius never forgave the Greeks, and especially Athens and Eretria for this outrage, even though they played no further part in the revolt. This success caused Cyprus, Caria, and the Hellespont to revolt, seriously escalating the threat to Persia. In response, Darius sent out three large armies, some supported by fleets. Although the campaigns were waged simultaneously, the Cypriots were neutralized first. Not all Cypriot cities had revolted, but the rebels defeated the enemy fleet sent against them. Unfortunately, at the same time as the naval action, part of their force deserted when they faced the Persians on land and the remainder was defeated. It took the Persians some time to capture the fortified cities and Soli, the last to surrender, held out until 496. Caria held out until 494. The Carians lost the first two major land battles but retrieved the situation with a successful night ambush in which an entire Persian army was destroyed. A feature of the Carian campaign was the support the Carians received from their Ionian Greek neighbors.

The collapse of Cypriot and Carian resistance left the Ionian Greeks isolated and they decided to make use of their main strength, naval warfare, and stake everything on a naval battle. This was fought at Lade, near Miletus, in summer 494. Although parts of the Greek fleet fought very creditably, as in Cyprus, desertions and disunity led to their defeat. The Persians mopped up, taking each city in turn and using executions and massacres to cow the remaining rebels; city walls were demolished to discourage future revolts. Mardonius was sent to settle the area in 492 and established democracies in many cities. The revolt was hard fought but characterized by disunity among the rebels. The involvement of Athens and Eretria focused Darius' attention on mainland Greece and its potential to cause instability in the Greek territory in his possession. This played a major part in his decision to invade Greece in 490.

Iain Spence

See also Aristagoras; Cleomenes I; Darius I; Eretria; Histiaeus; Lade, Battle of; Mardonius; Miletus

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Iphicrates (ca. 415–ca 353)

An Athenian general and commander of mercenaries, Iphicrates is credited with revolutionary infantry tactics, especially in his use of light-armed soldiers known as peltasts. In 390, his mercenary peltasts defeated 600 Spartan hoplites at Lechaeum, near Corinth, a feat hitherto thought impossible. This exploit raised the profile of light-armed troops and helped to pave the way for the combined-arms militaries of Philip of Macedon and Alexander the Great. Despite his successes, Iphicrates was a controversial figure at Athens. Though he often acted in an official capacity as an Athenian general, he demonstrated a marked tendency to pursue his own goals despite, and sometimes in direct opposition to, the parameters of his missions and the stated aims of Athens. Iphicrates was closely tied to Thrace, from where the peltast originated. For many years, he served the Thracian kings Seuthes and Cotys, even marrying the latter's daughter and fighting a naval action on his behalf against the forces of Athens itself. He is thus often listed among the so-called *condottieri* of the fourth century, a group of commanders explicitly compared to the mercenary leaders of late Medieval and Renaissance Italy.

Iphicrates first rose to prominence as a protégé of Conon during the Corinthian War (395–387/6), when he is said to have boarded an enemy ship and carried off its commander, armor and all. Aside from his command over peltasts at Corinth, for much of the early fourth century he acted as an Athenian general in many places around the Aegean, including the

Hellespont, Thrace, and Macedonia, where he attempted unsuccessfully to recover the important former colony of Amphipolis. He also served as a mercenary in Egypt. His last major command came during the Social War (357–355), after which he was prosecuted by a rival general. He was acquitted but seems to have died soon after the trial. Many of his campaigns were famous in antiquity, and he was praised as an excellent commander by Xenophon. But he has earned a place in military history textbooks because of Diodorus' account of his infantry reforms. Iphicrates supposedly increased the length of the spear by half, and doubled the length of the sword. He also made the shield lighter and smaller, to a form called the *pelte*, from which his infantry were called "peltasts." However, Diodorus' account is problematic. There were peltasts long before Iphicrates' supposed reforms took place, and we hear nowhere else of these new infantry soldiers. Some scholars, however, believe that Iphicrates' infantryman was an inspiration for the *sarissa*-wielding pikeman of the Macedonian phalanx.

Matthew A. Sears

See also Amphipolis; Athens, Campaigns in Thrace; Conon; Corinthian War; Cotys; Lechaeum, Battle of; Peltast; Seuthes; Social War (357-355); Thrace, Thracians

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Ipsus, Battle of (301)

Antigonus I Monophthalmus and his son Demetrius I Poliorcetes pressed for dominance over the other Successor kingdoms throughout the last decade of

the fourth century. In terms of the number of combatants on each side, the battle of Ipsus was the largest battle ever fought in the Greek world until the arrival of Rome, with the largest number of elephants ever deployed in battle outside India. It involved the combined forces of four of the last six remaining successors of Alexander and brought about the end of the large Antigonid kingdom in Asia Minor. Other than the death of Antigonus and the subsequent division of his kingdom, there were very few lasting consequences of the battle. Rather it is the scale of the conflict that is of most interest to students of Greek history.

After failed attempts to take Rhodes and Egypt Antigonus tried to take Greece from Cassander of Macedon. Cassander, after failed peace negotiations, asked for assistance from the remaining Successor kings: Lysimachus of Thrace, Ptolemy I of Egypt, and Seleucus I of Babylon. Lysimachus, reinforced by forces sent by Cassander, crossed the Hellespont and invaded Asia Minor, the stronghold of Antigonus' power. Antigonus was in Syria preparing for a festival but Demetrius sent troops to oppose Lysimachus while he remained in Greece fighting Cassander. After initial campaigning Lysimachus decided to wait for Seleucus' arrival and was forced into desperate marches to escape being trapped by Antigonus before winter set in. Demetrius sailed to reinforce Antigonus before Seleucus' arrival; Ptolemy started to invade Syria, but retreated after receiving false news of an Antigonid victory.

At Ipsus, Lysimachus and Seleucus directly opposed Demetrius and Antigonus. It is estimated that Antigonus commanded roughly 70,000 infantry, 10,000 cavalry, and 75 elephants, and that the allies fielded 64,000 infantry, 10,500 cavalry, 120 chariots, and at least 400 elephants. Both sides deployed elephants and light infantry along the front of the whole line. The phalanx was in the center and cavalry on the wings. This was the standard deployment for Hellenistic armies of the Macedonian style. Seleucus remained behind the allied line with a large reserve force of elephants.

The battle began with a skirmish of elephants and light troops while the cavalry of both sides fought on each wing. Demetrius easily routed the cavalry on the allied left, commanded by Seleucus' son Antiochus I, and pursued them. Seleucus then deployed his elephant reserve to block Demetrius' cavalry and prevent him returning to the battle. While Demetrius' force was thus engaged, Seleucus and his cavalry threatened to charge the Antigonid phalanx, which was now unprotected by cavalry, to

encourage the infantry to change sides. Lysimachus, while continuing the cavalry melee on the right, sent to the center missile troops who were so numerous that their volleys forced the Antigonid phalanx to retreat in disorder. Antigonus died in the phalanx, pierced by many missiles, to the end believing Demetrius would ride in and save him. As Ptolemy had failed to appear, Seleucus and Lysimachus excluded him from the resulting division of Antigonus' territory, laying the foundation for future disputes between Seleucus and Ptolemy.

Graham Wrightson

See also Antigonus I Monophthalmus; Antiochus I Soter; Asia Minor; Cassander; Demetrius I Poliorcetes; Egypt, Egyptians; Elephants; Lysimachus; Ptolemy I Soter; Rhodes, Rhodians; Seleucus I Nicator; Successors (*Diadochoi*), Wars of

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Issus, Battle of (333)

The second battle in Alexander the Great's conquest of the Persian Empire. Issus cemented the result of Granicus and caused Persian resistance in the west to crumble. The associated disintegration of the Persian fleet caused the loss of Ionia and the Asia Minor coast. The battle was fought at the Pinarus River (either the modern-day Deli Tschai or the Pajas) in eastern Cilicia in November 333. It is difficult to estimate the numbers involved as the ancient sources hugely exaggerate the size of the Persian force, but it is clear that Alexander was significantly outnumbered—and that his opponents seem to have included 30,000 Greek mercenary infantry.

Again, Arrian seems to provide the best account of the battle. Although Darius III, personally leading the Persians, surprised Alexander by appearing in his rear, he negated this by choosing a restricted area to give battle. This meant he could not take full advantage of his superior numbers

and also led to considerable overcrowding and confusion among the Persians as the battle progressed—increasing their casualties.

The Persians deployed their cavalry on the right wing (next to the sea), their mercenary infantry in the center, and their native infantry on the left wing (in the foothills). The left wing was placed to outflank Alexander's right wing. In response, Alexander put his allied Greek cavalry on the left (next to the sea), his phalanx in the center, and his Macedonian cavalry on the right. Anticipating the Persian move to outflank his right wing, Alexander countered by reinforcing the cavalry there and moving his *prodromoi* and light troops against the Persians. He provided added protection with a line of archers and light infantry at an acute angle to his main line. These maneuvers neutralized the threat from the foothills and he then moved the archers and some of the Agrianes to the front of his right wing to outflank the Persians.

In the main battle Alexander's basic tactic was to dislocate the enemy by the speed of his attack. Once in Persian missile-range, Alexander had his right wing charge across the river, driving the Persians back. However, this opened a dangerous gap in the Macedonian phalanx in the center and on the left wing the outnumbered Greek cavalry were steadily forced back by their Persian opponents.

The gap in the phalanx was penetrated by the Greek mercenary infantry and could have resulted in the defeat of the Macedonians. However, Alexander held his nerve and continued to press with the right wing toward Darius (see illustration in Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon, Invasion of Persian Empire entry). When he fled, Persian resistance began to collapse and the victorious right wing moved back against the Greek mercenaries and relieved the pressure on the phalanx. The Persian cavalry on the left only withdrew when they saw Darius and the Greek mercenaries beaten. The Persians suffered many casualties; Alexander lost 500 men.

Iain Spence

See also Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon, Invasion of Persian Empire; Darius III; Granicus, Battle of; Mercenaries; *Prodromoi*

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Isthmus of Corinth

The Isthmus of Corinth, or "neck" of Corinth, refers to the narrow land bridge that separates the Peloponnese from the rest of mainland Greece. The narrow stretch of land divides the Gulf of Corinth, to the northwest of the Isthmus, from the Saronic Gulf to the southeast, and is roughly four miles wide at its narrowest point. The area was of great importance, both militarily and commercially. Corinth had a harbor on each of the gulfs, and as early as the sixth century (perhaps under Periander) had built the *diolkos*, a slipway for dragging ships from one sea to the other, avoiding the dangerous journey around the Peloponnese. The *diolkos* remained in use until Roman times. Herodotus and Thucydides make many mentions of the Isthmus as a key choke point and as a gathering point for Sparta's allies, for example, before invasions of Attica during the Second Peloponnesian War (431–404). During the Persian War of 480–479 the Peloponnesians fortified the isthmus to prevent the Persians from entering the Peloponnese. In the first century CE, the Roman emperor Nero tried, unsuccessfully, to dig a canal through the isthmus. A canal was finally built in the late nineteenth century.

Robert T. Jones

See also Corinth, Corinthians; Peloponnesian War, Second; Periander; Persian Wars

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Italy, Greek Cities in

The Greek colonization of southern Italy (in the region known as Magna Graecia) and Sicily began in earnest during the eighth century, coinciding with a time when many of the native inhabitants of the Italian Peninsula became self-identifying polities, trade was flourishing within Italy and across both the Tyrrhenian and Ionian Seas, and with the growth of urbanization. As elsewhere, Greek colonies provided an environment for the development of a direct relationship between Greek culture and the myriad of local cultures they encountered.

The first Greek settlements in Italy were founded by colonists from Euboea, specifically from the cities of Chalcis and Eretria, who established a colony at Pithecusae on the island of Ischia, and then shortly after another at Cumae on the mainland in Campania. Colonies were set up at key strategic locations, such as at Zancle (commanding the Straits of Messina) or at Lipari on the Aeolian Islands (the so-called bulwark of Sicily). The eastern shores of Sicily seem to have been colonized next, according to both historical and archaeological evidence, with important cities settled at Catania (possibly by colonists from Rhodes), Megara Hyblaea (from Megara), and Syracuse (from Corinth) during the middle of the eighth century. Within the “heel” of Italy colonies were swiftly founded in the last decades of the eighth century, including Rhegium, Sybaris, Croton, Metapontum, and the Spartan colony of Taras (Tarentum).

During the late seventh and early sixth centuries secondary colonies were established by some of the prominent cities from the first wave. Zancle founded Himera in northern Sicily, Megara Hyblaea settled Selinus in southern Sicily in 650; Gela colonized the important site of Agragas (Agrigento) in 580, and Poseidonia (Paestum) was founded by settlers from Sybaris. Fresh colonists, fleeing from Persian domination of the Ionian cities after the failure of the Ionian Revolt, populated these Italian cities during the sixth century settling sites such as Velia, the Dicearchia, and Neapolis.

Sites were initially settled with an emphasis on trade and commerce, such as at Pithecusae, located remotely but near important sources of materials or on strategic maritime trade routes. These colonies generally had peaceful relations with the local Italian peoples, and the archaeological evidence from these sites indicates a degree of synthesis between local and foreign cultures. Nonetheless, some colonies were founded as a result of demographic pressures in the colonizing city and were situated to exploit

land and territory at the expense of the Italians. Large-scale land-use planning is evident around ancient Metapontum, with carefully arranged orthogonal roads and plots. It seems no coincidence that Metapontum's coinage features ears of corn. The Greeks seemed to have been checked only by the increasingly organized and migratory Italian peoples (such as the nascent Samnite Leagues) of the inland, the established Etruscan sites to the north, and the Phoenician colonies of the western islands (the tip of Sicily and the islands of Sardinia and Corsica). Internal dissension between the Greek cities in Italy was not uncommon, as shown by the utter destruction of Sybaris by its rival Croton in 510, whose forces diverted a river to cover the site completely.

Cumae, as one of the oldest Greek cities in Italy, held a preeminent position among its peers, asserting dominance over the nearby cities of Dicearchia and Neapolis, and beyond Campania to Zancle. Cumaean forces, with aid from Syracuse, successfully kept Etruscan influence from Campania: in 474, Cumae and Syracuse combined to defeat the Etruscans in a naval battle off Cumae. However, by around 421 Cumae had been conquered by Oscans. A similar story repeated throughout the Greek cities in Italy during the end of the fifth century and fourth century, as many of these sites were conquered by the local Italians, abandoned due to disease, or fell to Syracusan expansionism under its tyrants. Poseidonia flourished, before being besieged and captured by the Lucanians in around 390. Rhegium was destroyed and razed by Syracuse in 387. Taras was one of the last remaining independent Greek cities of Italy, and rose to prominence during the fourth century, yet was still unable to resist the Italians without external assistance. The Spartans under King Archidamus II assisted in 338, followed by Alexander I of Epirus in 334. In 282, the Tarentines enlisted Pyrrhus of Epirus to resist Roman interests, but after sustaining considerable losses he quit Italy in 275 and left Taras to have its walls demolished and its population enslaved by the Romans in 272. The Pyrrhic and Punic Wars continued what the Italians had started, and the Romans completed their dominance over both mainland Italy and Sicily in the third century.

Russell Buzby

See also Acragas (Agrigentum); Colonies, Colonization; Croton; Cumae; Etruria, Etruscans; Ionian Revolt; Italy, Italians; Magna Graecia; Rome, Romans; Sicily; Siris, Destruction by Croton, Metapontum, and Sybaris;

Sybaris/Thurii; Syracuse; Taras/Tarentum; Zancle/Messana. *Roman Section*: Etruria, Etruscans; Rome (City); Rome (History);

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Italy, Italians

The peninsula of Italy was well known to the Greeks, who had begun to settle along its southern coastlines during the ninth and eighth centuries. These colonies varied considerably in both size and intent: some were for the resettlement of populations, such as Paestum, Cumae, or Brundisium, while others, such as Pithecusae in southern Italy, were predominantly for trade with the Italians.

From this time, until the fifth century, Italy was a patchwork of various Iron Age cultures, languages, and peoples, who were variously influenced by the introduction of language and material culture by the colonizing Greeks. The Celts dominated the northern river plains, while further south were the Etruscans and the Oscan-Umbrians, the Latins in the Tiber valley, the Samnites in the Apennines and the Mesapians along the east coast. Some, such as the Faliscans, had legendary foundation myths that emphasized their Greek origins.

The Greek colony of Cumae, established in the mid-eighth century, began a flourishing trade with the Etruscans who entered the plain of Campania during the same period. Mixed populations are indicated by the survival of a small Greek sanctuary with offerings to Apollo, Hera, and Demeter at Etruscan sites. Trade was predominantly in the outputs of the rich mines of the Apennines; however, interest in this began to decline during the sixth century, as mines in Attica (at Laurium) and Spain began to compete.

Political upheavals in the cities of Magna Graecia were coupled with weakened Etruscan power during the fifth century, and migrations of the inland peoples of Italy. Dominant amongst these were the Samnites, a term used by Greek and Roman authors to cover a number of autonomous groups occupying the eastern slopes of the Apennines down to the Adriatic coast. These peoples spread throughout central and southern Italy at this time, placing pressure on the Greek cities of the coast, and in turn becoming more Hellenized. Greek influence is apparent in their religious beliefs in the afterlife: “warrior” burials (with arms and armor won from conflicts with the Greek cities) and the placing of coins in the mouth of the deceased both become more popular.

In 473, Tarentum—preeminent amongst the cities of Magna Graecia—allied with Rhegium to combat the growing menace of the inland Italic peoples, but they were decisively defeated at the battle of Kailia (modern Ceglie). Again in 466, Tarentum was defeated, causing internal unrest within the rulers of the city. After ongoing interference by the kings of Epirus, by 330, the Greek cities were willing to ally themselves with the Italians against the nascent power of Rome.

Russell Buzby

See also Colonies, Colonization; Etruria, Etruscans; Italy, Greek Cities in; Magna Graecia; Rome, Romans; Sicily; Taras/Tarentum. *Roman Section:* Etruria, Etruscans; Rome (City); Rome (History)

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J

Jason of Pherae (d. 370)

Jason, tyrant of Pherae, a city in southeastern Thessaly, was able to extend his power over the whole of Thessaly and for a short time was the most powerful man in northern Greece. Nothing is known about Jason's early career, but in the early 370s he was intervening in the affairs of Euboea. By 375, he had extended his power over most of Thessaly, while also controlling much of central and western Greece. His power was built on 6,000 mercenary soldiers. The final stronghold of local opposition was the Thessalian city of Pharsalus, whose leader Polydamas in 375 sought help from Sparta. But the Spartans, already stretched by war with other Peloponnesians and with Athens, could not assist, and Pharsalus went over to Jason. Jason took on the title of *tagos* (commander-in-chief), evidently marketing this as a traditional title for the leader of Thessaly, and now had at his command 8,000 cavalry, 20,000 hoplites, and a large number of light-armed troops.

In 371, Jason made a forced march south into Boeotia after the battle of Leuctra, but dissuaded his Theban allies from risking a second battle with the defeated Spartan army. Instead he brokered an agreement allowing the Spartans to withdraw, then on his way home ravaged parts of Phocis and dismantled the walls of Heraclea in Trachis. This was the high point of his power. The following year he planned to preside over the Pythian Games at Delphi, and ordered his allies to supply a vast number of sacrificial animals for the festival. His intentions remain unclear, and before his plans came to fruition he was assassinated. After a brief period of turmoil, he was succeeded by Alexander of Pherae, who cemented his position by marrying Jason's daughter.

See also Alexander of Pherae; Pherae; Thessaly, Thessalians

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Josephus. See Roman Section: *Josephus*

Judaea, Jews

The main source for the early history of the Jews up to the Greek period is the Hebrew Bible. Scholars have debated fiercely the extent to which it can be used for historical purposes, but most historians would agree that it provides useful contextual information, which can be supplemented by secular texts and a well-sifted archaeological record.

The kingdom of Israel first appears in the Egyptian records in a late-thirteenth-century victory inscription of Merneptah. Arguably, the most successful period in the history of the Jews was the reigns of David and Solomon (after about 1010). David's famous adversary, Goliath, was the champion of the Philistines, who as many would argue were of Aegean origin (1 *Samuel*, 17). From this time, the Jewish kings were regularly involved in warfare. Israelite and Judahite forces relied heavily on their slingers. The Syrians and Moabites inflicted major damage on Israel (the northern kingdom) in the ninth century. In the early eighth century, under Jeroboam II, Israel had rejuvenated and became strong briefly, before the Assyrians destroyed it in 721. Under Hezekiah, the army of Judah (the Jewish kingdom in the south) expanded, but foolishly provoked mighty Assyria. *Kings*, *Chronicles*, and *Isaiah* as well as Assyrian sources document the consequent nemesis: the victory of Sennacherib and the destruction of most of Judah around 700.

In effect, the Jews were largely peripheral to the Greek world until the Hellenistic Period, but this is not to say that there was no interaction. There was certainly trade and it is widely accepted that Greeks (perhaps known in some early Jewish texts as “Kittim”) were employed as mercenaries. They

garrisoned the fort of Mesad Hashavyahu during Josiah's reign (late 600s). The Classical Greeks knew Israel and Judah as territories under Assyrian control and then as part of Persia, before Alexander conquered the Levant and Egypt.

The first major Jewish diaspora had been triggered as early as 587–586, when the Babylonian, Nebuchadnezzar, sacked Jerusalem and removed its elite to Mesopotamia. Even when they were allowed to return in 538 by the Persian king, Cyrus, some Jews chose to remain. Other displaced or enterprising Jews over the ages established large enclaves in cities in Cyrenaica, Lydia, Egypt, and, eventually, in lands across the Mediterranean. After the “Babylonian Exile,” the many Jews who did choose to return to Jerusalem built the Second Temple, ca. 520–515. By 445, Nehemiah had restored the walls of the city.

After Alexander, Judah and Israel were ruled by the Ptolemies and then, by 200, fell under Seleucid control. During the reign of Antiochus IV, there were ill-conceived efforts to Hellenize Jerusalem. Judaism was suppressed and the Temple was even reconsecrated to Zeus in 167. This sparked the Maccabean Revolt, which, eventually, saw Judaea granted independence by Demetrius II Nicator in 140. The Jews were able to retain their independence for about 80 years until Pompey captured Jerusalem for Rome in 63. The Romano-Jewish historian Flavius Josephus is the main source for the Hellenistic and early Roman periods.

James McDonald

See also Antiochus IV; Demetrius II; Maccabean Revolt; Persian (Achaemenid) Empire; Phoenicia, Phoenicians; Syrian-Egyptian Wars.
Roman Section: Josephus; Pompey

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Justin/Pompeius Trogus

Justin (in full, Marcus Justinianus Justinus) produced a surviving epitome

(condensed version) in 44 books of the lost *Philippic History* of Pompeius Trogus, who lived ca. 30 BCE–20 CE. Both works are in Latin. Justin's date is uncertain: it has been placed at various points in 100–400 CE.

The *Philippic History* covers the world known to classical antiquity from the earliest times down to the first century BCE, with the peculiar feature of ignoring Roman history, apart from the regal period, except in so far as it impinged on the Greek world. The title derives from that of the fourth century Greek Theopompus' historical work centered on the reign of Philip II of Macedon (359–338). The ignoring of Rome appears to be due to Hellenizing cultural affectation.

The narrative in Justin is often so condensed as to be difficult to follow and errors abound. Justin also had a liking for sensational or melodramatic episodes. However, his work is, for all its faults, at times the only connected narrative available, especially for parts of the Hellenistic Period.

Douglas Kelly

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K

King's Peace (387/6)

Also known as the Peace of Antalcidas after the Spartiate admiral (*nauarchos*) who had worked on negotiating it since 392, this “Common Peace” of 387/6 between the Greeks and the Persian king Artaxerxes II ended the Corinthian War. The treaty stipulated that the Greek *poleis* of Anatolia, Clazomenae, and Cyprus would pay taxes and obey commands rendered by the king or his agents, ending the autonomy won for them a century earlier in the Persian Wars. In exchange, it promised autonomy for the Greeks; this, when selectively applied by Sparta, meant the dissolution of the Boeotian League, the innovative Argos-Corinth union (with Corinth rejoining the Peloponnesian League), Arcadian Mantinea, and the Chalcidian Confederacy. As a concession, the Athenians were allowed to keep their cleruchies (military colonies) at Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros. Sparta was to police the arrangement, and all signatories were bound to assist the king against anyone breaking the stipulations. The treaty was inscribed and set up on pillars and temples in Greek cities. The treaty was extraordinarily controversial and caused the Spartan state to be regarded as traitors to the Greeks. Some sources suggest Spartan regret over this and a desire to liberate the Greeks of Anatolia again. The idea of a Common Peace lasted longer than the actual peace of this treaty.

Timothy Doran

See also Agesilaus II; Antalcidas; Artaxerxes II; Boeotian League; Chalcidian Confederacy; Common Peace; Corinthian War; Finance and War; Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros; Sparta, Campaign against Olynthus

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15.9, 15.19, 28.2.
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L

Lade, Battle of (494)

Lade, a small island off the coast of Miletus, was the site of the final major battle in the Ionian Revolt (499–493). When the Persians attempted to recover Miletus with a land and sea attack the Ionians decided to send a fleet to help, but let Miletus defend itself on land. The Ionian fleet was 353 triremes, with most coming from Chios (100 ships), Miletus (80 ships), Lesbos (70 ships), and Samos (60 ships). The Persian fleet, raised from Phoenicia, Cyprus, Cilicia, and Egypt, was 600 strong. Although his city had supplied only three ships, Dionysius of Phocaea persuaded the Ionians to adopt a strenuous training program to prepare for battle. The fleet kept it up for a week before it was abandoned as too onerous. This provided the impetus for the large Samian contingent to agree to a Persian offer to defect.

Herodotus records that all but 11 of the Samian ships deserted at the start of the battle, starting a chain reaction of flight in other contingents. The Chians apparently performed well, using the *diekplous* maneuver against the enemy and causing significant losses. Despite this, the Persian numerical superiority and the flow of desertions delivered a Persian victory. Without naval support, Miletus was soon taken and the Ionian Revolt effectively ended.

Iain Spence

See also *Diekplous*; Ionian Revolt; Miletus; Naval Tactics; Trireme

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Lamachus (d. 414)

Lamachus was an Athenian general (*strategos*) during the Peloponnesian War of 431–404. A signatory of the Peace of Nicias in 421, in 415 Lamachus was chosen alongside Nicias and Alcibiades to command the ill-fated Sicilian expedition—however, his relative poverty and lack of status gave him less influence than his colleagues.

According to Thucydides, Lamachus' advice was to sail straight to Syracuse and fight there, taking advantage of the panic the large Athenian force would inevitably create. Nicias' plan was to focus on Selinus and then sail home after a show of force, while Alcibiades advocated making local alliances, establishing a base at Messana, and then building up to attack Selinus and Syracuse. Unable to convince the others to adopt his plan, Lamachus supported Alcibiades. If Thucydides' account is accurate—and he is not just using Lamachus to convey a better alternative option—it is evidence of Lamachus' military ability. His plan probably offered the best chance of success, and certainly recognized that Syracuse was the center of gravity for the expedition.

Unfortunately for Athens, after Alcibiades' departure, Lamachus was killed in a skirmish, leaving the over-cautious (and ill) Nicias to lead the expedition to defeat. Lamachus appears in Aristophanes' *Acharnians* as an inveterate warrior, devoted to warfare, although after his death Aristophanes' *Frogs* pays tribute to him.

Iain Spence

See also Alcibiades; Nicias; Peloponnesian War, Second; Sicilian Expedition; Syracuse; Syracuse, Siege of; Thucydides

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Lamian War (323–322)

Causes

The Lamian War, a conflict that saw an Athenian-led coalition under Leosthenes defeated by Antipater and the Macedonians, permanently curtailed the power and autonomy of Athens, and marked the final end of the *polis* as the dominant political institution in the Greek world.

After Alexander the Great's death in June 323, an Athenian "nationalist" faction—that included, at various times, the orators Demosthenes, Lycurgus, Charidemus, Hyperides, Ctesiphon, Ephialtes, and Polyeuctus—saw an opportunity to restore Athenian political prestige and independence constrained since the battle of Chaeronea in 338. The name of the war itself is problematic. Epigraphic evidence suggests the Lamian War was known alternatively as the "Hellenic War" in antiquity, and this was the favored term of reference for the Athenians, for obvious propagandistic reasons. Hieronymus of Cardia was the first to use the expression "Lamian War" and this was followed by Diodorus who provides the most complete surviving source for the war.

Course

The Athenians began to mobilize immediately upon hearing the first reports of Alexander's death, and, despite the concerns raised by Phocion, Athens appointed Leosthenes *strategos* and authorized him to raise a mercenary army of 30,000 men at Taenarum, financed with a portion of Harpalus' looted treasure. In 324, Harpalus had fled Asia ahead of Alexander's return from India and made off with the sizable sum of 5,000 talents of silver, 30 ships, and 6,000 mercenaries. The Athenians appear to have achieved some limited early military success against Antipater's force of only 13,000 infantry and 600 horsemen. However, despite a victory in Boeotia and the occupation of Thermopylae, the Athenians were unable to force a decisive battle with Antipater, who withdrew to a heavily fortified position at Lamia, in Malis in central Greece. Diodorus' account suggests that Antipater may well have planned to occupy Lamia even before the conflict began. The

initial successes earned the Athenians some support among the Peloponnesian states. There was the possibility of a genuinely Hellenic revolt, perhaps much broader than the one that had been led by Agis III in 331 (but which Athenian abstention had undermined).

The Athenian siege of Antipater's Macedonian forces in Lamia formed the central action of the war on land during the winter of 323/2. However, a combination of two significant defeats at sea and the increasing futility of the Lamian siege strained the Greek coalition and prevented any further Greek rebellions in favor of the allies. The siege itself lasted nearly four months, from November 323 to February 322. Confronted with this prolonged siege and mounting casualties, Leosthenes was unable to preserve the unity of the Greek cause. Even worse for the allies, he was killed in a skirmish below Lamia, but was eulogized by Hyperides in a fashion befitting the greatest of Greek heroes. Although remembered as a heroic, albeit tragic figure, his reputation may ultimately owe more to the quality of his funeral oration than to his own achievements. He was unable to conclude the siege and draw Antipater into the critical battle that would have allowed the Greeks to exploit the military advantage they held in 323. This failure left Athens isolated and vulnerable in the spring of the following year. In May/June 322 the Greek fleet suffered a major loss to Cleitus at Amorgos—Athens alone lost 170 ships—and a later defeat in the Malian gulf effectively ended the naval war and Athens' place as a major sea power.

While the Greek army and alliance were continually weakened by the siege, Antipater awaited reinforcement. At the outset of hostilities he had summoned assistance from the Macedonian generals Leonnatus and Craterus. The arrival of Leonnatus and his army in spring proved decisive. Although Leonnatus was killed in an ensuing battle, the siege of Lamia was ended and Antipater united the two Macedonian armies. Craterus, arriving later, conceded the command of his 10,000 Macedonian veterans to Antipater. With this combined force, Antipater readily defeated the Greeks in battle at Crannon, on September 5, 322.

Consequences

The individual Greek states that had revolted were forced to come to terms individually with Antipater. Athens, isolated and faced with the prospect of a Macedonian siege, accepted Antipater's terms for peace along with the

imposition of significant constitutional change. Antipater ended Athenian democracy by reducing the franchise and depriving all citizens whose property was valued at less than 2,000 drachmae of their civic rights. He installed a garrison at Munychia and demanded the surrender of the orators Demosthenes and Hyperides. Hyperides, who had been instrumental in stirring up support for the war, met a particularly grisly end. Plutarch records that Demosthenes, having taken refuge in the temple of Poseidon on the island of Calauria, swallowed poison that he had concealed in a pen rather than fall into Antipater's hands.

John Walsh

See also Agis III, Revolt against Macedon; Antipater; Athens; Demosthenes (Orator); Harpalus; Leosthenes; Lycurgus; Macedon, Macedonia; Malis, Malians; Phocion

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Laws of War

The question of whether the ancient Greeks had "Laws of War" to regulate the way they waged war is closely linked to how the Greek states interacted with each other and whether they had any form of international law. However, it should be stated at the start that there was nothing in ancient Greece like the modern Geneva Convention, nor any sort of international court or international body to enforce (or attempt to enforce) its rulings. This is not surprising, as inter-state relations were generally not conducted on a formal level as they are today with diplomatic corps, embassies and ambassadors, and systems of treaties.

However, there was a system of interstate relations, built around

proxenoi (closest perhaps to the modern honorary consul). These were citizens who had a hereditary family link to another state and provided a low level of representation for them, including hosting visiting envoys. This was part of the general belief that Greeks were bound together by a common language and culture. Despite warfare and issues between Greek states, the common bond was seen as marking Greeks out from *barbaroi* (non-Greek speaking foreigners). Part of this belief of “Greekness” was a view that certain behaviors were contrary to nature or custom (sometimes referred to as the “laws of the Hellenes”) and therefore unacceptable even in war. As noted, there was no means of enforcing this—other than individual states, or sometimes formal groups (such as the Delphic Amphictyony or the Hellenic League) imposing punishments on the transgressor. These punishments, were, of course, only as good as the ability of the state or group imposing them to enforce them. In essence, the gods were relied on to punish transgressions of the “laws of the Hellenes.”

The situation was further complicated as wars against *barbaroi* were seen as outside this system. In addition, the Greeks could wage war against each other in the form of *polemos akeryktos* (lit. “war without herald”) or *polemos aspondos* (lit. “war without truce”). This basically meant that the rules did not apply—rather like the medieval French practice of raising the *Oriflamme* standard to indicate that contrary to normal usage no prisoners would be taken. The origin of this was presumably that if a state attacked without a formal declaration of war (delivered by a *keryx* or herald) their enraged opponents believed they could retaliate any way they wished. The American outrage at the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 without a declaration of war shows the high level of emotions caused by a surprise or “sneak” attack.

An example of *polemos akeryktos* is the long-running conflict between Athens and Aegina that began in the late 490s with an Aeginetan attack without a declaration of war. If there is any basis to Herodotus’ story that the Delphic Oracle instructed Athens to respond by building a sanctuary, wait 30 years, and then declare war (i.e., a formally declared conflict), it may have been Delphi’s attempt to place the conflict on a more legitimate level. In the event, the Athenians built the sanctuary but did not wait for 30 years and the war that followed was basically one of surprise attacks, raids, and a few atrocities by both sides.

The mere existence of *polemos akeryktos* demonstrates that the opposite

existed—a war fought (or at least started) by some sort of rules. However, there is no codified version of the “laws of the Hellenes.” The elements have to be recreated from scattered references, often complaints that someone has breached them. A further complication is that there was a tendency in the fourth century and later to look back at earlier periods of Greek warfare as almost a golden age of gentlemanly behavior. An example of this is Demosthenes’ criticism that “Philip [II of Macedon] marches wherever he wants, not with a hoplite phalanx but with *psiloi* (light infantry), cavalry, archers, and mercenaries” (Document 19). The best it is therefore possible to achieve is to identify a list of what was generally seen as unacceptable, noting that different parts were no doubt emphasized more at different times and in different parts of Greece.

With the exception of the almost certainly fictional agreement to ban missile weapons in the Lelantine War (ca. 700), most of the “Laws of War” referred to (or implied) in our sources unsurprisingly overlap with general ideas of civilized behavior. These include the inviolability of heralds (who conveyed requests and demands between the combatants) and sanctuaries, the duty of the victors to return the enemy bodies for burial, not to mistreat the corpses, and to treat prisoners humanely. All combatants were supposed to abide by agreements and oaths.

As noted, much of our evidence for these comes from complaints that a particular usage had been breached. For example, after the battle of Delium (424) the victorious Boeotians refused to follow the normal procedure and return the Athenian dead on the grounds that the Athenians had, contrary to custom, occupied a Boeotian temple—and were still in possession of it. The Athenians countered that they had done nothing the gods would not excuse. The basis of the story of *Antigone* is the refusal to bury the body of a prince of Thebes (Antigone’s brother) who had attacked his own city—and Antigone’s strong belief that it was her duty to provide the proper funeral even at the risk of her own death.

After the Persian defeat at Plataea (479), Lampon of Aegina suggested Pausanias should mutilate the corpse of Mardonius, the Persian commander, in revenge for Persian mistreatment of Leonidas’ corpse after Thermopylae (480). Pausanias rejected this, stating “...you cast me down to the depths by suggesting I abuse a corpse and telling me if I do I shall improve my renown. But to do these things is better for *barbaroi* (foreigners) than Greeks—and is hateful even for them.” (Herodotus 9.79.1). In 427, the

Athenian Paches illustrated the importance of keeping one's word in war—and demonstrating that a clever general could find a way around it. At Colophon he lured the enemy commander out to talk, promising not to harm him and if they failed to agree, to return him safe inside. He then seized him, carefully not putting him in restraints, captured the fort with a surprise attack, brought him safely inside, and then killed him.

There are numerous examples of the mistreatment of prisoners, especially in the Second Peloponnesian War (431–404), ranging from the harsh conditions endured by Athenians captured at Syracuse to the latter stages of the naval war when Athenians sometimes cut off the right hands of captured ships' crews, or threw them overboard, and the tit-for-tat Peloponnesian reaction to this. Interestingly, and perhaps somewhat ironically, after the victory at Aegospotami (405) Lysander asked his prisoner Philocles, the Athenian responsible for throwing the crews of two triremes into the sea, "what he ought to suffer for having been the first to treat his fellow Greeks contrary to the law"—and then had him killed (Xenophon, *Hellenica* 2.1.32).

There is another element to the question of "Laws of War"—the extent to which hoplite warfare itself was fought as a contest (*agōn*) with a set of procedural rules. Those who support the view of hoplite warfare as having an agonal nature generally see this as a means of restricting casualties among citizen soldiers who were predominantly farmers when not involved in a campaign. In this view, the hoplite phalanxes drew up, completed the prebattle sacrifices and rituals, and fought it out man to man. After the battle the victor set up a trophy and returned the enemy dead under truce. It was short, contained, and many campaigns were effectively resolved in one pitched battle.

Perhaps the clearest representation of this is Herodotus' story (Document 4) of Mardonius' critique of hoplite warfare as being a contest fought on level ground with no skill or maneuver and heavy casualties. Although this perhaps has a strong element of truth for early hoplite warfare, it certainly did not apply to the way the Greeks used the terrain at Thermopylae and Plataea and is certainly greatly oversimplified from the Second Peloponnesian War on. This does not mean that hoplite warfare did not originally have the effect of containing the results of conflict or have an agonal flavor. However, under the pressure of major and complex wars, Greek warfare certainly became more complex and more sophisticated. The

hoplite clash remained for many years the centerpiece of combat, but increasing use of light troops, archers, and cavalry inevitably eroded the older style agonal conflict. Greeks always fought to win, but over time, warfare became more complex and those involved saw, perhaps erroneously, the relative simplicity of earlier combat as a more honorable form.

The belief in the “laws of the Hellenes” that also applied to warfare was relatively widespread in ancient Greece. However, as in much of modern combat, the rules were not always (and in some cases not often) followed. Although they provided a basic framework for the conduct of war, there was no international court or body to enforce them, other than the court of public opinion, and they were often breached, or broken down under the stresses of combat. There could be a fine line between keeping one’s word and stratagems to deceive the enemy, and as Philocles discovered, one atrocity easily leads to another.

Iain Spence

See also Civilian Populations in War; Crocus Field, Battle of; Declaration of War; Delium, Battle of; Diplomacy; Lelantine War; Panhellenism; Pergamum; Prisoners of War and Slavery; Pyrrhus; Religious Practices before Battle; Sacred Truces and Festivals; Sacred War, Third; Sepeia, Battle of; Stratagems; Surrender; Truces; War Crimes; Women in War

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Lechaeum, Battle of (390)

A Spartan defeat near Corinth during the Corinthian War. It is significant

for the use of peltasts and its psychological and propaganda results. Xenophon provides a detailed account of the action.

The battle was essentially a large ambush—sprung by the Athenian Iphicrates on a force of 600 Spartan hoplites. The Spartan *mora* (regiment) with a cavalry contingent was escorting Spartan troops from Amyclae returning home to celebrate a religious festival. Just short of Sicyon the infantry contingent turned back leaving the cavalry to complete the escort task and then catch up. The Athenians ambushed them with a mixed force of peltasts and hoplites. Iphicrates' peltasts harried the Spartans with javelins while the hoplite phalanx kept back, but apparently close enough to prevent the Spartans adopting an open formation. The Spartans sent out groups (*ekdromoi*) to drive the peltasts back but they were unable to catch them and lost men to javelins when returning. When their cavalry support arrived it was misused and proved ineffective. The Spartans finally retired to a hill where the *mora* broke; about 250 were killed. The psychological boost to the allies led to considerable local successes.

Lechaeum is a good illustration of the weakness of unsupported hoplites against a combination of well-handled light troops.

Iain Spence

See also Corinthian War; Hoplites; Iphicrates; Light Troops; Peltast

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Lelantine War

The Lelantine War was a shadowy, and probably largely mythical conflict between the two major cities of Euboea, Chalcis and Eretria. It takes its name from the Lelantine Plain, a fertile agricultural plain between the two cities (though closer to Chalcis), over control of which the war was supposedly fought. Thucydides, writing in the fifth century, comments (1.15) that it was in the “war which took place at some point in earlier times

between the Chalcidians and the Eretrians that the rest of the Greek world was in alliance with one side or the other.” Modern historians have gathered fragmentary pieces of evidence, drawn from sources written between the seventh century BCE and the second century CE, of friendships, alliances, and enmities, to try to assemble a list of the allies on each side. According to these theories, Chalcis’ allies included Samos, Corinth, and its colonies, Thessaly, Athens, Sparta, Erythrae, and some of Chalcis’ own colonies, while Eretria was supported by Miletus, Megara, Boeotia, Aegina, Argos, Chios, and Mytilene (forming a series of pairs of neighbors who were often in conflict nearer to home).

These theories are inherently implausible. The war is generally dated to the late eighth or early seventh century, when such large-scale alliances are quite unlikely. Aristocrats in one city might well support their aristocratic guest-friends (*xenoi*) in another (in the sixth century Peisistratus used such connections to gain and maintain power in Athens), and perhaps such support in a local conflict is at the heart of the story. Some historians have connected the abandonment of Lefkandi (on a site midway between the two cities) as a consequence of the war, but there is no direct evidence. A fragment of the seventh century poet Archilochus comments that the lords (*despotai*) of Euboea fight on the plain, not with bow or sling but with swords and spears. Some have linked this with the development of hoplite warfare. Writing late in the first century Strabo claims to have seen an inscription in Euboea banning the use of ranged weapons such as slings, arrows, and javelins. If such an inscription did exist, it was set up long after the supposed date of the war, but may reflect local traditions about the style of war favored in Euboea.

Peter Londey

See also Chalcis; Eretria; Euboea, Euboeans; Hoplites; Laws of War; Peisistratus

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Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros

Three islands in the Aegean, of particular importance to Athens. Lemnos had been noted in the *Iliad* as a rich source of wine. Along with Imbros, in the sixth century it was absorbed into the Persian (Achaemenid) Empire by Otanes, the general of Darius I, before being taken by the Athenian Miltiades II. After the Persian War, the islands became part of the Athenian Empire. Scyros was seized from the resident Dolopians by the Athenian general Cimon around 475, and all three islands became closely held Athenian possessions. On all three Athens set up cleruchies, settlements in which the colonists maintained their Athenian citizenship, probably because they were vital ports for securing the Athenian grain supply from the Black Sea, as well as producing grain themselves.

This status ceased with Athens' defeat at the end of the Peloponnesian War in 404, although the three islands were reformed as cleruchies in the fourth century (ca. 393). Later in the fourth century they passed into Macedonian hands under Phillip II, still later were controlled by various Hellenistic rulers, and eventually came under Roman rule in the mid-second century.

Russell Buzby

See also Athens; Cimon; Colonies, Military; Delian League/Athenian Empire; Miltiades II; Peloponnesian War, Second

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Leonidas (d. 480)

Leonidas I, son of Anaxandridas II, was a member of the Agiad royal family at Sparta. He led the Greeks to a glorious defeat at the battle of Thermopylae (480), while opposing the Persian advance in the Second Persian War (480–479).

According to Herodotus, Anaxandridas was under pressure to divorce his childless wife and take another to ensure he had an heir. He refused and was allowed to take a second wife without divorcing his first. Shortly after his new wife had a son (Cleomenes I), Anaxandridas' first wife also had a son, Dorieus, and then another, Leonidas. As Cleomenes was the heir, Dorieus and Leonidas underwent the *agoge* (the Spartan state training system), from which royal heirs were exempt. Dorieus was killed in Sicily but Leonidas remained in Sparta and married Cleomenes' daughter Gorgo. Leonidas became the Agiad king in 490 on the disgrace and death of Cleomenes.



Marble bust, fifth century, from the Temple of Athena of the Bronze House, Sparta. Although often identified as King Leonidas who led the Spartans at Thermopylae, the only support for this seems to be the elaborately decorated cheek pieces possibly indicating a royal owner. Located in the Archaeological Museum, Sparta, Greece. (De Agostini Picture Library/Getty Images)

To counter Xerxes' invasion of Greece, the Greeks established the Thermopylae/Artemisium defensive line in Malis. Leonidas commanded the small land force (7,000 soldiers from the Peloponnese, Boeotia, Phocis, and Locris) sent to Thermopylae, operating in conjunction with the fleet at Artemisium. The Spartan contribution was only 300 men—possibly the *hippeis*, or king's bodyguard. Despite this, it is highly unlikely that the Spartans saw Leonidas' task as a suicide mission. The Spartans were conscious of their military prowess, the Athenians (not noted for land warfare) had decisively beaten the Persians at Marathon 10 years earlier, and the pass at Thermopylae was, in antiquity, very narrow—which would negate Persian numerical superiority. The size of the Spartan force may have been influenced more by overconfidence than caution.

Leonidas occupied the pass at Thermopylae, further strengthening it with a low wall. His left flank was secured by mountains, the right by the sea. When Leonidas learned of a mountain trail (the Anopaeon track) that could be used to outflank his main position, he placed the Phocians to secure it. In short, he did everything a competent commander could be expected to do to prepare. When Xerxes demanded that the Greeks surrender their arms to him, Leonidas is reputed to have said "*labe molon*" ("come and get them," Plutarch, *Moralia* 225) and the Greeks inflicted serious casualties on the Persians during several days of fruitless frontal attacks.

Leonidas' plan foundered when Ephialtes guided the Persians along the Anopaeon track and the Phocians failed to hold it. When Leonidas learned of the Persian threat to his rear he dismissed most of his army and fought to the bitter end with his 300 Spartans, 700 Thespians, and 400 Thebans. Given the huge disparity in numbers, the result was inevitable, but the final heroic resistance became the stuff of legend. However, in practical terms this legend helped stiffen Greek resistance, and the casualties Leonidas inflicted were heavy enough to damage Persian morale.

Iain Spence

See also Artemisium; Ephialtes, Malian; *Hippeis*; Persian Wars; Thermopylae, Battle of

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Leonnatus (ca. 356–322)

Leonnatus was a prominent member of Alexander the Great's army, and was among those who served as a *somatophylakes* (bodyguard) of Philip II. He was said to have been distantly related to the royal house, and a great emulator of Alexander.

He played an important role in Alexander's campaign against the Mallians, acting quickly to protect the king when Alexander was injured after leaping down from the walls while besieging the city. Leonnatus was among those who saved his life. He undertook a number of military campaigns, including a great victory over the Oreitae, and was later honored at the Susa weddings in 324—he was awarded a golden crown and a Persian bride.

After Alexander's death, Leonnatus briefly played a role in the succession, and it was proposed that he be awarded joint guardianship of Alexander's child, along with Perdiccas. However, the assembly of foot soldiers overturned this decision, voting instead for a joint rule between Alexander IV and Philip III Arrhidaeus, under the guidance of Perdiccas and a number of others. Leonnatus remained supportive of Perdiccas, was awarded the satrapy of Hellespontine Phrygia, but quickly began to work to gain a better position for himself. He designed to marry Alexander the Great's sister Cleopatra, which may have provided him with a strong claim to the Macedonian throne, but he died from wounds received while attempting to assist Antipater with an Athenian rebellion in Lamia.

Charlotte M. R. Dunn

See also Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon; Lamian War; Perdiccas;

Philip II of Macedon; Successors (*Diadochoi*), Wars of

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Leosthenes (d. 323/2)

Leosthenes led the Athenian uprising against Macedon known as the Lamian War (323–322). His father Leosthenes had suffered exile from Athens in 362/1, and had fled to the court of Philip II to avoid prosecution for treason. It is possible that the younger Leosthenes may also have spent time at the Macedonian court, but the details of his career before 324 remain largely unknown.

Leosthenes may have been a mercenary commander under Alexander in Asia, but his intense hostility to Alexander seems to militate against this view. An alternative view is that he was actually a mercenary commander in the service of Darius. Whatever the truth, it would appear that Leosthenes was in Athens and serving as trierarch in 325/4 shortly before Alexander's death. There is some epigraphic evidence that Leosthenes was *strategos* in 324/3 when, following Alexander's death, he recruited a mercenary army at Taenarum and led the revolt against Antipater. He enjoyed some early success at the head of an Athenian-led coalition of Greek states, and besieged Antipater at Lamia. The siege was ultimately a failure, and Justin and Diodorus record that Leosthenes was killed by a missile hurled from the walls of the city during a foray launched by Antipater. After his death, the coalition disintegrated under the leadership of Antipater, and the Athenians were forced to sue for peace. Leosthenes was eulogized by Hyperides.

John Walsh

See also Antipater; Lamian War; Mercenaries; Taenarum

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Leotychidas II (ca. 545–469)

Leotychidas (also Leotychides), son of Menares, joined Cleomenes I's plot against Demaratus, succeeding him as king of Sparta in 491. Prior to the Persian Wars he secured a truce between Athens and Aegina, taking hostages from the latter. However, his main claim to fame is winning the stunning victory at Mycale (479), attaining naval superiority in the Aegean and Hellespont and ending the Second Persian War.

After the Persian Wars, Leotychidas led a Hellenic League army against those in Thessaly (especially the Aleuadae) who led it to defect to Persia. He had mixed success (failing at Larissa, but perhaps succeeding at Pherae and Pagae). When he returned home, he was accused of accepting bribes from the Thessalians, went into exile in Tegea, and died there ca. 469.

Iain Spence

See also Bribery and Corruption; Cleomenes I; Demaratus; Hellenic League (against Persians); Mycale, Battle of; Persian Wars

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Lesbos

Lesbos is the largest of the Greek islands off the coast of Anatolia, occupying an excellent strategic position for maritime routes in the northern Aegean. Its fertile soil also supported agriculture, particularly olive oil production.

Lesbos was occupied from about 3300. Bronze Age remains show a strong mercantile relationship with Troy. Homer has both Achilles and

Odysseus attack the island. In the tenth century, Aeolian Greeks planted themselves on Lesbos. Five cities were established on the island: Mytilene (the strongest), Methymna (Mytilene's main rival), Eresus, Pyrrha, and Antissa. By the Archaic Period, Lesbian cities started colonizing the Troad. Colonial interests brought Mytilene into conflict with Athens, for example over control of Sigeum.

Lesbos emerged as a significant cultural and political power in the Greek world during the late seventh and early sixth centuries. After earlier oligarchies, from the early sixth century there was a period of tyranny. Civil strife saw the islanders turn to Pittacus, one of the "seven sages," as an *aisymnetes* (intermediary with governing power) in Mytilene to restore order. In this period important buildings were constructed and the island's arts and sciences flourished, with education encouraged and a relative degree of freedom achieved by women. Famous residents on Lesbos were the musician, Terpander; the poets, Arion, Alcaeus, and Sappho; and the philosophers, Theophrastus, Epicurus, Aristotle, and Cratippus.

By 527, Lesbos had come under Persian control. It participated in both Cambyses' campaign against Egypt and Darius' against the Scythians. In 499, Mytilene rebelled against Persia and took part in the failed Ionian Revolt, but was retaken by the Persian fleet in 493. It did not free itself until it allied with Athens in 479. While most of Athens' allies, over time, gave up their own fleets and contributed levies rather than ships to the Delian League, Lesbos, and Chios were the two islands to retain strong independent navies.

The persistent rivalry between Mytilene and Methymna gave outside powers the opportunity to use local politics to get a foothold on the island. This was most apparent during the Second Peloponnesian War: when Mytilene went over to Sparta in 428, it was betrayed by Methymna. After the surrender of its *demos* to the Athenians, Mytilene suffered punitive measures such as the loss of its fleet and destruction of its fortifications and settlement of its land by Athenian cleruchs. An order to massacre its men and enslave its women and children was only avoided by a late change of mind and the dispatch of a second Athenian ship to reverse it. It is not surprising, therefore, to see Mytilene trying again to leave the Delian League in 412–411. In 405, Lesbos fell to Sparta.

During the fourth century, Mytilene actually became a strong and consistent supporter of Athens and member of the Second Athenian

Confederacy. In 333, Lesbos and other islands were taken by Memnon, a brilliant Rhodian general, who assisted the Persians against Philip, but it was soon retaken by the Macedonians. The island changed hands among Persia, Macedon, and the Ptolemies, until Mithridates took it around 88.

James McDonald

See also Delian League/Athenian Empire; Ionian Revolt; Memnon and Mentor of Rhodes; Mithridates VI Eupator; Mytilene, Siege of; Peloponnesian War, Second; Persian (Achaemenid) Empire; Persian Wars; Troad; Tyrants, Tyranny

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Leucimne, Battle of (435)

The initial naval battle of the dispute between Corinth and Corcyra over Epidamnus. The battle was fought when Corinth sent a fleet to support Epidamnus against oligarchic exiles. The Corcyraeans regarded this as interference in their sphere of influence (Epidamnus was their colony) and lent their support to the exiles. The Corcyraeans won, sinking 15 Corinthian ships, and erected a trophy at Cape Leucimne. Epidamnus surrendered the same day and the Corcyraeans killed all their prisoners except for the Corinthians.

The Corcyraeans aggressively followed up their victory, dominating the western Greek coast. However, major Corinthian preparations for a counter attack prompted the Corcyraeans to make an alliance with a reluctant Athens. This led to Athenian involvement in the battle of Sybota between Corcyra and Corinth, contributing to the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War.

See also Corcyra, Conflict with Epidamnus and Corinth; Corcyra, Corcyraeans; Corinth, Corinthians; Naval Warfare; Sybota, Battle of; Trophy (Tropaion)

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Leuctra, Battle of (371)

A battle fought in Boeotia between Thebes and the Peloponnesian League near the small town of Leuctra, southwest of Thebes, near Thespieae. The battle was a decisive Theban victory and permanently ended Sparta's military power in Greece. Sparta precipitated the battle by insisting that Thebes could not sign the restatement of the King's Peace on behalf of the Boeotian League.

When Thebes refused, King Cleombrotus I led a Peloponnesian League army of 10,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry into Boeotia. The course of the battle, unfortunately, has to be reconstructed from several sources, which do not always agree. Xenophon's contemporary account glosses over the details, Diodorus Siculus' much later description has several obvious mistakes and elements of stock battle descriptions, and Plutarch focuses on the Theban Pelopidas, who was not overall Theban commander.



The unusual Theban memorial to their victory at Leuctra consisted of a round tower surmounted by a ring of nine hoplite shields in relief. The monument has been reconstructed in modern times on the basis of the masonry pieces found around the site. Permanent trophies became more common from the late fifth century and probably indicated, as in the case of Leuctra, that the winners saw their victory as particularly significant. (Photo by Peter Londey)

However, it seems likely that the events unfolded along the following lines. Although outnumbered (only 6,000 strong according to Diodorus Siculus), Theban morale was good. Both sides were apparently determined to fight: the Thebans to defend their homes and preserve the Boeotian League, Cleombrotus to counter rumors he was pro-Theban. Further spurred on by alcohol, Cleombrotus initiated hostilities. He placed his cavalry in front of his infantry—perhaps to screen an outflanking maneuver on his right wing, like the successful one at Nemea—but the better quality Theban horse routed them, driving them back on their own infantry, causing some

confusion in the ranks. This helped Epaminondas who had advanced obliquely, leading with his Thebans deployed 50 deep on the left flank and his allies on the right trailing. This was unusual as traditionally the best troops were on the right. Epaminondas had also deployed the elite Sacred Band either slightly behind or to the left of his left flank.

Disordered by their own cavalry, the Spartan right flank, personally commanded by Cleombrotus, was halted during their own outflanking attempt and then driven back by the massed Thebans. The Sacred Band then took the Spartans in their unshielded right flank, causing a collapse. Cleombrotus was killed (along with many of his companions), possibly earlier in the battle. The Spartans' Peloponnesian allies on Cleombrotus' left wing and the Theban allies facing them apparently never fully engaged. Peloponnesian League and Boeotian League casualties were light, but around 1,000 Lacedaemonians and 400 Spartiates died, a huge cost to Sparta. Epaminondas made a point of releasing the bodies of Sparta's fallen allies first, emphasizing that most of the dead were Spartans.

Leuctra was terminal for Spartan military power—in the years following a series of campaigns ended Sparta's domination of the Peloponnesian League and, even more serious, over Messenia, and led to a period of Theban hegemony.

Iain Spence

See also Alcohol; Cleombrotus I; Epaminondas; Hoplites; Jason of Pherae; King's Peace; Nemea, Battle of; Pelopidas; Peloponnesian League; Phalanx; Sacred Band

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Libya

The area of North Africa that lay to the west of Egypt. In early times, for

example, in Homer, the name referred to a distinct and narrow area of land, although later it became synonymous with the entire continent of Africa. Herodotus tells us that there was disagreement as to where the division between the continents of Asia and Libya lay, due in part to the division of the Nile as it entered the Delta region.

The Greeks were aware of the desolate and uninhabited regions of inland Libya (the modern Sahara Desert), although there were many areas of its northern Mediterranean coast that were fertile and populated by Libyans, Carthaginians (or Phoenicians), and Greeks alike. Exploration into the heart of Libya revealed the Niger River, and later exploration under the Ptolemies was made along the Blue Nile.

It was believed that Libya's southern coastline did not extend beyond the equator, although early reports of circumnavigation by Phoenician sailors are difficult to believe. Greek colonization of the Mediterranean coast of Libya was concentrated around Cyrene and the surrounding region known as the Cyrenaica. Egypt remained to the east, and Phoenician and Carthaginian colonies extended to the west, along the coast. Overall, little is known or recorded about the local inhabitants of Libya until Roman times.

Russell Buzby

See also Carthage, Carthaginians; Colonies, Colonization; Cyrene; Egypt, Egyptians; Phoenicia, Phoenicians. *Roman Section: Africa*

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Light Troops (*Psiloi*, *Gymnoi*)

The broad term light troops (*psiloi*, sing. *psilos*; *gymnoi*, sing. *gymnos*) essentially denotes any infantry other than the hoplite or Macedonian phalangite. It therefore covers everything from men with nothing more than rocks and daggers (*petroboloi*, lit. “stone throwers”) through peltasts to specialists with the javelin, bow, or sling. Whatever their weapon, light

troops are characterized by a lack of protective armor (compared to the hoplite) and by fighting in no, or a loose, formation. Generally drawn from the poorer sections of society, their protection might consist of a helmet—probably generally a felt or leather *pilos* (see third illustration in the Arms and Armor entry), perhaps a wicker shield (especially for peltasts), and light leather or cloth body protection. The relative lack of protection meant they were more vulnerable than a hoplite, but more maneuverable and faster. The heavier protection and close formation of the hoplite conferred protection but limited maneuverability. Because of this, the hoplite and his phalanx could be vulnerable to light troops (and even more so to light troops operating with cavalry).

Their social class and ability to run from and return to an engagement meant that in most of mainland Greece light troops were looked down upon by the hoplite class. This class saw light troops, particularly those with missiles, as less manly than the hoplite who stood face to face with his enemy in close combat. Athens, for example, had no formally constituted light troops until 424, and this attitude means that light troops are often much less visible in the contemporary record, which was largely written by the hoplite class. As was the case with cavalry, the hoplite dominance of warfare and society inhibited the development and use of light troops in most of Greece south of Thessaly. However, in the northern and more tribal areas such as Aetolia, light troops were the standard troop type and these were often hired as mercenaries to supplement the phalanx. Some areas were known for their specialist troop types—for example, Cretan archers and Rhodian slingers.

As with many other aspects of Greek warfare, the Second Peloponnesian War (431–404) led to an increased use of light troops. During the course of this war it became apparent that hoplites were vulnerable to light troops (particularly those with missile weapons) and it became increasingly standard practice to complement the phalanx with light troops. These were generally deployed on the flanks of the phalanx, to protect it or to threaten the enemy flanks, or in front of it as a skirmish line. In these cases, they often operated with the cavalry.

When used offensively, the light troops would come within missile range, discharge their javelin, spear, sling—or even throw rocks—and then retire to safety when the slower and more cumbersome phalanx tried to catch them. When the phalanx slowed or stopped, the process would begin

again. Some relief could be gained by selecting groups of younger troops (*ekdromoi*) to charge out to keep the enemy light troops away, but this could not be done if the enemy had hoplites nearby who could attack if the integrity of the phalanx was disrupted when the *ekdromoi* left it. The *ekdromoi* who charged out were also vulnerable to attack as they were returning back to their lines.

Spartolus, Pylos, and Lechaeum provide late fifth/early fourth century examples of hoplite phalanxes eventually collapsing under the pressure of continual harassment by light troops. The Athenians seem to have been quicker to grasp the potential of light troops (although Sparta seems to have used Helots as light troops during the Persian Wars), and Demosthenes was particularly adept at their use. Some of the light troops at Pylos (425) were Athenian oarsmen doubling as light infantry and there are other examples of sailors being used this way. In the fourth century, Iphicrates introduced the peltast (originally from Thrace) into Athens and developed peltast equipment to make the arm more effective. From this point on, the use of light troops continued to increase. This was especially so in the kingdoms of the *diadochoi* (Successors to Alexander) who had to recruit from the local non-Greek population, but often excluded them from the phalanx. Most regions in Asia Minor produced light troops or cavalry, not heavy infantry, so these were the troop types available to the Successor armies.

Light troops were cheaper and more mobile than hoplites, able to operate in more rugged terrain and particularly effective in ravaging. However, they did have their limitations. They could not match the hoplite in close combat and were themselves vulnerable to the superior mobility of the cavalry.

Iain Spence

See also Archers; Arms and Armor; Demosthenes (General); Helots; Lechaeum, Battle of; Olpae, Battle of; Peltast; Pylos (Sphacteria), Battle of; Slingers; Social Values and War; Spartolus, Battle of

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Locris, Eastern

The eastern Locrians occupied the coastal strip on the southern side of the Malian and Euboean Gulfs. On the west, they bordered Malians and central Greek Dorians, on the east the Boeotians, and to the south they were separated from their traditional foes, the Phocians, by the range of Mount Cnemis, over which there were several crossing points. They shared ethnic identity and membership of the Delphic Amphictyony with the western Locrians, despite their territory not being contiguous. When ancient authors speak of Locrians, it is not always clear which group they mean. In general, though, the eastern Locrians were less isolated than their western cousins, and thus, for example, may have played a much more prominent part in the Third Sacred War. The eastern Locrians had a more developed federal structure than their western counterparts; the political center was the largest city, Opous.

During the Persian invasion of Greece in 480 the Locrians found themselves on the front line once the Persians reached Thermopylae. The pass at Thermopylae ran from Malis in the west to eastern Locris, though in the event the Persian Army did not use this route but instead marched south and then east through Doris and Phocis. The Locrians contributed to the Greek defense of the pass, but subsequently escaped the Persian depredations suffered by the Phocians. The eastern Locrians were usually allied with the Boeotians, like the Boeotians fought on Sparta's side in the Second Peloponnesian War, and sent a late-arriving contingent to the battle of Delium (424). In the Third Sacred War, they bore the brunt of Phocian aggression, as the Phocians sought to secure routes to northern Greece.

For much of the period from 292 to 167, the eastern Locrians were part of the Aetolian League, but unlike in western Locris this was punctuated by periods under Macedonian or Boeotian control. From 167, they too regained

their independence until falling under Roman rule in 146.

Peter Londey

See also Aetolia, Aetolian League; Delium, Battle of; Delphic Amphictyony; Locris, Western; Peloponnesian War, Second; Sacred War, Third; Thermopylae, Battle of

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Locris, Western

The western Locrians occupied a mountainous region on the north coast of the Gulf of Corinth, west of Delphi. Their territory bordered Phocis on the east, and Aetolia and Doris on the north. They regarded themselves as ethnically connected with the eastern Locrians, who lived on the other side of Phocis, and together the two groups were considered as one of the *ethne* (tribes) that were members of the Delphic Amphictyony. When ancient authors speak of Locrians, it is sometimes not clear whether they mean one or both groups.

The two major cities of western Locris were Naupactus, on the north coast of the Gulf, close to its narrowest point, and Amphissa, at the north end of the coastal plain below Delphi (behind the modern town of Itea). The hinterland behind the coastal strip along the Gulf is mountainous, and did not boast large cities in antiquity. The exact boundary with Aetolia is not known, and may have changed over time. Politically, the two parts of Locris remained separate; in the Classical Period, western Locris (excluding Amphissa, which was independent) formed a loose tribal state, with its center at the mountain town of Physceis.

Naupactus occupied a strategically important position dominating passage through the Corinthian Gulf, and Athens, which had captured it in

the 460s, used it as a naval base in the Peloponnesian War of 431 to 404 to impede Peloponnesian operations. In the fourth century, the western Locrians were allies of Sparta, but later participated in the Third Sacred War against their traditional enemies, the Phocians. Amphissan encroachment on the sacred land at Delphi was the spark that set off the Fourth Sacred War. From 292 to 167 the area was part of the Aetolian League, but then regained its autonomy until the advent of Roman rule in 146.

Peter Londey

See also Aetolia, Aetolian League; Delphic Amphictyony; Locris, Eastern; Peloponnesian War, Second; Sacred War, Third; Sacred War, Fourth

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Logistics

Logistics is organizing the movement, maintenance, and accommodation of military forces. In the ancient Greek context, this almost entirely involved the supply and transport of food and drink (campaign supplies such as tentage, clothing, and cooking utensils were almost always the responsibility of the individual soldier). Understanding logistics is crucially important for an understanding of Greek warfare—men need adequate food and drink to be able to fight. The acquisition of food, its transport, and its distribution to sailors and soldiers were always therefore central questions facing ancient Greek commanders, and determined the timing and conduct of warfare.

Despite their decisive importance for the success of military campaigns, however, logistics are rarely mentioned in our first surviving descriptions of wars fought by Greeks—Homer's *Iliad* and *Odyssey*. Although these are epic poems, scholars have shown that they, like other epic poems, present a coherent account of the conditions of life in the society in which they were

composed—in the case of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, the Greek world of the late eighth and early seventh centuries. In these poems, Homer describes a world of heroes whose actions were to serve both as a model for rulers of his time and as an entertainment for his audience. There was therefore not much room for everyday and unheroic subjects such as logistics. Nevertheless, enough incidental mentions of ordinary military realities allow us to construct a broad outline of the food supply of armed forces in the Greek world around the turn of the eighth century.

Prior to leaving for an overseas military operation, men might be treated to a feast by the leader of the operation (always their king or another man of high rank) and provided with animals to sacrifice and to consume. This was to build support and morale for the upcoming expedition. Homer mentions the gathering of supplies from the storerooms of kings for men leaving on foreign expeditions of public importance such as Telemachus' voyage to Pylos seeking news of his father, Odysseus, and men leaving on overseas military expeditions were probably supplied in the same way. Men setting out for land wars against neighboring communities, on the other hand, probably just supplied themselves with food from their own resources.

Once Homeric military forces were traveling to or from their overseas military targets, the methods they used to secure their food supply (after their initial provisions ran out) differed depending on whether they were in hostile or friendly territory. If sailing through hostile territory, Homeric warriors simply stole any food they needed (on their way home from Troy Odysseus and his men plundered wine from cities they had sacked and stole sheep from the island of the Cyclopes). In friendly territory, though, military leaders could expect to be received and feasted by the rulers of the communities they stopped at, while the men would receive food such as barley, wine, and cattle from the public stores of the friendly community before they set out again.

When they reached the campaign area, there were two ways in which Homeric military forces acquired supplies: plundering/foraging and trade. While the Greeks were besieging Troy, they sometimes bartered with men from nearby islands who traveled to their camp for this purpose. The Greeks obtained wine in exchange for items they had plundered (such as metals, cattle, and slaves). However, the majority of the Greeks' food came from foraging and (especially) plundering operations. Homer mentions many

raids on nearby areas in which the Greeks plundered cattle and other animals. Although Homer does not mention it in his siege narrative (because it was not dramatic or honorable), we should imagine that the Greeks at Troy also left their camp regularly to collect grain and other foods from surrounding areas. For land wars against neighboring communities men presumably supplied themselves with food taken from the land they were invading.

Greek armies in the late eighth and early seventh centuries therefore did not have a regular commissariat—that is, there was no logistical system organized by Greek communities at this time to support armies or navies operating for any period of time away from their home community. For the rest of the Archaic Period (ending ca. 480), too, Greek armies on campaign lived an essentially hand to mouth existence. The few references we have from this period to the food supply of land armies show them depending on foraging for their food supplies and struggling to stay in the field for long.

We know (relatively speaking) a lot more about the logistics of Greek military forces in the Classical Period. In the late fifth and early fourth centuries, Thucydides and Xenophon give us our first historical narratives of contemporary wars. However, they seldom mention details of logistics in their accounts of military operations since these were familiar to their audiences and because other questions such as grand strategy and diplomacy were more exciting to consider and discuss. We therefore have few exact numbers for logistical matters (we do not know, for example, how many donkeys or private traders ever accompanied any Classical Greek land campaign). Still, with those details of military food supply in Thucydides and Xenophon, and in other literary sources (such as comedies and legal speeches from Athens), we can confidently create a general picture of how Classical Greek armies and navies fed themselves.

Each individual soldier was responsible for providing and preparing his own food (and for other campaign supplies). Soldiers setting out on land campaigns were typically ordered to bring along three days' supplies, which they would gather from their own domestic stores or buy in the market. Three to four pints of barley-meal per day provided the base of soldiers' diets. This barley-meal would be eaten either in the form of *maza*—a kneaded and uncooked barley-cake—or gruel. To add flavor and variety to this basic barley-meal staple, soldiers would also bring along on campaign cheese, onions, olives (but not olive oil usually), garlic, salted fish, and herbs

(such as thyme). All of this would be washed down with water and wine (which the Greeks diluted with water). This diet would have provided somewhere between 3,000 and 3,500 calories per day, more than enough for the average Greek soldier, who would have been 5'7" (160 centimeters) tall and weighed about 150 to 155 pounds (around 168-170 kilograms).

Hoplites or cavalrymen did not carry their own provisions. Their food was usually carried by slave attendants (owned by the soldier, not by the state). These slaves would also have carried hoplites' and cavalrymen's cooking utensils and drinking cups, as well as their bedding, weapons, and armor—although some of these items (together with other collective items such as road-making tools, siege machinery, and tents) would also have been carried on the wagons and (more often) pack-animals (usually donkeys) which also accompanied Classical Greek land armies on their marches. Light-armed soldiers, who came from the less well-off sections of Greek city-states, probably mostly carried their own supplies.

By the time the three days' provisions the soldiers had brought with them from their home cities ran out, they would have found themselves in the territory of another city. If this city was a friendly or neutral one (whose territory the army was traveling through on its way to the war zone), the army's commander would normally send ahead to ask the city to provide a market for the army. The soldiers would then be able (using the pay provided to them by their home city) to buy the supplies they needed for their onward march. The friendly city arranged the organization and operation of the market, which was normally outside the city walls because of the fear of allowing large numbers of armed men inside the gates of the city.

If, however, the army had marched into hostile territory, or if it had already invaded the territory of its enemy, the soldiers supplied themselves mainly through foraging (the collection of food supplies from the area around an army's march route or camp). It was for this reason that Classical Greek land armies usually campaigned in the early summer—this was the time of year when their enemies' grain was ripe but not yet harvested and was therefore available for foraging. For this reason Classical Greek land campaigns were usually relatively brief affairs, lasting only as long as grain and other foods were available to forage. Once this source of supply gave out, armies simply went home (the Peloponnesian army had to return home quickly from Attica in 425 as they had invaded when the grain there was

still green and therefore inedible).

Private traders always accompanied Classical Greek armies on their overland marches, and sometimes in large numbers. These traders, however, never made more than a minor contribution to the supply of land armies. They followed armies mainly for the opportunity of purchasing the army's plunder at low prices, with the goal of making profits from the resale of this plunder in nearby cities. They did sell food, but only high-value, low bulk foods such as cheese and honey to add variety to the soldiers' grain-based diets. The food sold by private traders was therefore always supplementary to the food men acquired from markets provided by cities in friendly territory and from foraging in enemy territory.

Nor did supply trains (a specific section of a military force on campaign dedicated to carrying supplies for that force) usually play any role in the food supply of land campaigns in the Greek world at this time. Even the better organized Spartan armies, which were accompanied by craftsmen and an organized baggage-train with all the tools that an army might need, had no supply train. It was only in special circumstances—when armies unexpectedly had to remain immobile in the field in the presence of nearby enemy forces—that Classical Greek states sent out supply trains to their armies. In 479, for example, supply trains were sent from the Peloponnese to the Greek forces encamped at Plataea. Supply lines (a continuous line of supplies between a military force and its home city or base of operations) were never used to feed Greek soldiers on overland campaigns.

Finally, the donkeys and oxen (pulling the wagons), which provided transport for armies, as well as the horses taking part in military operations, all needed to be fed, too. Here, also, the responsibility lay not with the state but with the animals' owners (although Athens [at least] did provide a daily monetary allowance to cavalymen to pay for most of the costs of the grain their horses ate). Donkeys and mules needed 4 to 6 pounds (1.8 to 2.7 kilograms) of grain (usually barley) a day, horses 5 to 10 pounds (2.26 to 4.5 kilograms), while oxen needed up to 15 pounds (6.8 kilograms) a day. This grain would have been sourced through the same methods men used to feed themselves. All of these animals needed anywhere from 10 to 20 pounds (4.5 to 9 kilograms) of fodder per day, too, though this could be substituted by pasturage on campaign.

Sailors, like soldiers, were also responsible for providing and preparing their own food. For their provisions for the first few days of their

expeditions, they collected from their own stores or bought in markets the same types of food eaten by soldiers: barley-meal, onions, olives, garlic, and salted fish. Sailors also washed down this food with wine (diluted with water) and water. Rowers, however, unlike soldiers, who could generally count on finding water in the countryside they passed through, were not able to source fresh water on board triremes without landing. Rowers setting out on naval expeditions therefore also had to fill water-skins to bring with them on board their triremes before they sailed out on campaign.

Because of the lack of space on board Classical Greek triremes—200 men crammed into a ship 35 meters (nearly 115 feet) long, 6 meters (nearly 20 feet) wide, and 3 meters (nearly 10 feet) high did not leave much room for storage—sailors departing from their home cities could not take with them more than a few days' supplies in addition to their water-skins. Because of this, merchant ships sailed alongside naval expeditions as a sort of supply train, so that the rowers would have food in case bad weather forced them to stop in hostile or uninhabited territory. For the same reason, merchant ships serving as supply trains also accompanied naval expeditions specifically sent out to ravage enemy territory (such as the Athenian raids on the Peloponnese in the first years of the Peloponnesian War of 431–404). Triremes were equipped with utensils such as cooking pots and grills for the men to prepare their food, and water-buckets and containers for mixing wine and water for their drink.

Just as in the case of armies, navies were able to resupply themselves on their way to and from theaters of operations in markets provided by friendly or neutral cities (again using the pay provided them to do so). Once they had reached their theater of operations, navies acquired their food supplies from private traders. Navies in this era often remained stationary for long periods once they had reached their war zone. This was for two main reasons. Firstly, navies were sometimes sent out (especially by Athens in the fifth century) to besiege cities into submission. Secondly, navies that were not besieging cities were not constantly at sea but would remain at their operational bases in between bouts of fighting, especially in winter when poor weather conditions discouraged navies from setting sail. Traders sailed to the camps and operational bases of these navies to sell food to the rowers. Just as on land, there was no centralized state system to prepare and supply food to rowers.

In the middle of the fourth century, Philip II of Macedonia developed an

army more organized and efficient than any previously seen in the Greek world, which enabled him to take control of mainland Greece. Philip did not allow his soldiers to use wheeled transport and limited the number of attendants that infantrymen and cavalrymen could use. He also ordered his men to carry 30 days' supplies on their backs when they marched out at the start of the summer for the campaigning season. But there were limits to Philip's logistical reorganization. Once the supplies his men had brought with them on campaign ran out, Philip's army relied on exactly the same means of supply that the armies of Classical Greek city-states used to feed their armies.

Philip's son, Alexander the Great, as he marched from the Mediterranean to India and then back to Babylonia, supplied his army by markets provided by friendly communities and through foraging in hostile territory or plundering food stores in enemy settlements. But his expedition into Asia also brought him into many areas (such as mountainous and desert regions) where these methods of supply were unavailable. In these cases, as the tens of thousands of animals needed for supply trains would have slowed his march to a crawl, Alexander pre-prepared supply depots along the route of his march instead. These supply depots (sometimes called magazines) were stocked by gifts from communities that were friendly or had surrendered to Alexander or from requisitions (forced appropriations of resources). Sometimes, Alexander had to prepare thousands of water-skins to allow his army to cross particularly dry and barren areas. In addition to these preparations, Alexander sometimes also divided his army into separate contingents to reduce the pressure on the resources of the regions they marched through.

In the Hellenistic Period (from ca. 323 to 30), Greek cities used the same methods to supply their military forces on campaign as those used in the Classical Period. Commanders setting out on campaigns ordered their men to come prepared with provisions. Before marching through friendly territory, commanders would send word ahead to cities to prepare markets for their armies. In hostile territory, soldiers continued to depend on foraging for their supplies. One major change in the Hellenistic Period was that wheat replaced barley-meal as the grain base of all military forces' diets. The 1½ to 2 pints (around 0.7 to 1 liter) of wheat soldiers and sailors consumed every day (usually in the form of bread) contained the same amount of calories as the 3 to 4 pints (1.4 to 1.8 liters) of barley-meal eaten

daily by men in the Classical Period.

Other major changes in military food supply also occurred in the Hellenistic Period. The armies of the men who fought for control over Alexander's vast conquests in the decades after his death still foraged for food in enemy territory. Private traders, too, still supplied food to naval forces when they were engaged in lengthy sieges (as when Demetrius I Poliorcetes besieged Rhodes in 305/4). However, the Successors were also able to exert much greater command over the resources than any Greek city had been able to. They could therefore on occasion requisition from the people they ruled enormous amounts of food to support their armies and navies in the field.

With the formation of permanent kingdoms in the territories conquered by Alexander, Hellenistic royal dynasties (such as the Ptolemies and the Seleucids) were able to build up massive reserves of foods such as wheat, olive oil, and wine through taxation-in-kind and to mobilize these reserves to support their armies and navies. For the first time in Greek history, permanent standing armies could be formed and commissariats set up to feed and maintain them. The men in the garrisons of these armies received two payments: one for pay proper, and another for food. This food payment was often converted into coin to be used to cover basic food expenses. In this case, Hellenistic soldiers could be offered markets by their employers where basic foods were sold to them at fixed prices (that were lower than the market prices for these foods).

It was only, however, with the onset of Roman military campaigning in the eastern Mediterranean that armies and navies of tens of thousands of men were supported in the field by a fully developed logistical apparatus. This logistical superiority—that enabled the Romans to supply more men and for longer than any Greek power—was one of the crucial factors underlying the Roman conquest of the Greek world in the late third and early second centuries.

Stephen O'Connor

See also Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon; Alliances; Animals in War; Camp Followers; Civilian Populations in War; Coinage; Demetrius I Poliorcetes; Finance and War; Homeric Warfare; Pay, Military; Philip II of Macedon; Plunder and Booty; Siege Warfare; Slaves in War

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Long Walls

"Long Walls" were walls connecting a city to its harbor and designed to prevent the city being starved out by a land-based siege. The most famous were the 6-kilometer (4 $\frac{3}{4}$ -mile) long walls connecting Athens with its port, the Piraeus. Built between ca. 462 and 446/5 they first enclosed a large area, with walls to the north of Piraeus and south of Athens' other harbor, Phalerum. A third wall, built south of the Piraeus, later created a narrower corridor less vulnerable to an amphibious landing between Phalerum and Piraeus. The Long Walls prevented a Spartan siege of Athens until the destruction of Athenian naval power toward the end of the Peloponnesian War of 431–404.

Athens' Long Walls were demolished by the victorious Spartans in 404/3 but rebuilt between 395 and 391. The Macedonian garrison in the Piraeus from 322 rendered them obsolescent, though the Long Walls are mentioned in an inscription of 307/6 dealing with wall maintenance. Other examples of "Long Walls" are Megara (built with Athenian help in 459 and demolished by Athens in 424), Corinth (to its northern port Lechaëum on the Corinthian Gulf), Argos, Amphipolis, and Patrae.

Iain Spence

See also Fortifications; Peloponnesian War, Second; Pericles; Siege Warfare

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Lycurgus (ca. 390–324)

Lycurgus, a fourth-century Athenian statesman and orator, was born into the aristocratic family of the Eteoboutadae; his grandfather, also named Lycurgus, was killed by the Thirty Tyrants. After studying at the schools of both Plato and Isocrates, Lycurgus emerged as a significant public figure rather late in life. From 338 to 326 he played a predominant role in managing his city’s finances, probably as Treasurer of the Military Fund. He probably died in 324.

Lycurgus is said to have raised the annual revenue of the Athenian state from some 600 to some 1,200 talents. This enabled him to fund an impressive number of public works, which included a portico at Delphi, the refurbishment (the stone seating of which survives today) of the Theatre of Dionysus, and the publication of an official copy of the works of the three great tragedians.

Lycurgus was instrumental in strengthening Athens’ defenses in the wake of its disastrous defeat at Chaeronea (338). His military significance lies mainly in his ambitious rebuilding of the naval ship sheds in the Piraeus, the completion of a large arsenal nearby, and various improvements to the city’s walls. But his efforts were not merely architectural. He also vigorously prosecuted citizens who, in his perception, had either failed the Athenian cause at Chaeronea or abandoned it afterward. These included Lysicles, a general at the battle, and Leocrates, whose suspicious absence from the city from 338 to 332 is the subject of Lycurgus’ only surviving legal speech.

James Kierstead

See also Athens; Chaeronea, Battle of; Finance and War

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Lycurgus (Spartan) (Unknown Date)

Lycurgus is the traditional founder of the Spartan system of government. The details of this mythical, or semimythical, figure are quite obscure. Plutarch, for example, opens his *Life of Lycurgus* with the following admission:

Nothing can be stated about Lycurgus the *nomothetes* (lawgiver) which is not disputed. Different accounts exist of his birth, travels, and death, and especially of his laws and constitutional reforms. There is least agreement among historians about when he lived. (Plutarch, *Lycurgus* 1)

Despite this, Plutarch manages to write a 23-chapter account of Lycurgus, but it must be largely fictitious. Like his later, and historical, Athenian counterparts, Solon and Cleisthenes, Lycurgus is supposed to have implemented his reforms in part to end internal strife. Also like Solon, there is a tendency with Lycurgus to ascribe any good feature of the system to one of his "reforms." The hallmark of his reform was *eunomia* or "good order" and this was regarded as the main feature of Spartan government and society for much of antiquity. The constitution was widely regarded as a good, or even the best, model of a "balanced" constitution, in which no element was unduly predominant. The Lycurgan system was underpinned by the principle that Spartiates were *homoioi* or "equals." Each Spartiate underwent the state training system or *agoge* and as an adult had a plot of land, worked for him by Helots, to generate his contribution to the *syssition*, the common mess, and feed his family.

All adult Spartiates over 30 were members of the *apella* or assembly. This met once a month, summoned by the ephors, and was regarded as the democratic element of the constitution. The *apella* voted on major issues, especially war, peace, and disputed royal successions, and elected the ephors, members of the *gerousia* (the council of elders), and other magistrates. However, there seems to have been no provision for debate and voting was by the primitive system of acclamation (whichever side made the loudest noise was adjudged the winner) or division (where the “yes” voters moved to one side and the “no” voters to the other). In addition, the decisions of the *apella* seem to have been subject to veto by the *gerousia*.

The *gerousia*, or council of elders, was regarded in antiquity as the aristocratic element. It comprised the 2 kings and 28 nobles over the age of 60. The latter were elected by the *apella*, but held office for life. The *gerousia* prepared the agenda for the *apella*, was the supreme criminal court (except for the *Perioikoi*), and was the advisory council to the kings. The *gerousia* was seen as a check on the kings and on the *apella*—as noted, the *gerousia* could veto the *apella*’s decision by dismissing it.

The two Spartan kings were hereditary monarchs from the Agiad and Eurypontid families. They had religious, judicial and military functions, which represent in some respects vestiges of earlier royal power. Under the Lycurgan system, the kings held some priesthoods and conducted sacrifices to Apollo, and the prebattle sacrifices. They judged issues concerning adoptions, heiresses, and public roads. However, their main role was military—they were the supreme commanders (although by 500 this was curtailed by their being accompanied on campaign by two ephors as advisers) with the right of execution in the field. Originally they could declare war, but this function was later transferred to the *apella*.

The final element of the Lycurgan system was the ephorate, which seems to have been later than the other elements. Each year the *apella* elected five ephors. On taking office they swore to maintain the kings’ powers undiminished (if the kings kept their oaths to preserve the constitution). The ephors constituted the supreme civil court and the supreme criminal court for the *Perioikoi*. They ordered the levying of the army and two of them also accompanied the king as advisers. They also chaired the *apella* and attended meetings of the *gerousia*. In antiquity, the ephors were sometimes seen as an oligarchic element, although as they were elected and only held office for one year they should be regarded more as a

democratic element.

Clearly there are strong survivals from Archaic Greek society in the Lycurgan system—the monarchy and *gerousia*, but also the *apella*, which was essentially the army acting as an assembly to vote on key matters involving it. However, elements were added over the years. Unfortunately the available evidence is not good enough to decide when each element was introduced or whether it was gradual, the work of Lycurgus, or another single reformer, or a mix of the two.

The earliest mention of Lycurgus is in Herodotus, who dates him to around 900, which is surely too early. Other ancient writers tend to place him ca. 775, although there are also other suggestions. Whether Lycurgus actually existed—and it is quite possible that the core of the system attributed to him was developed by one man—is now impossible to recover. Nevertheless, and noting that it was supposedly based on the Cretan system, the Lycurgan constitution of Sparta provides perhaps the best example of a balanced or mixed constitution prized by the Greeks as the best means of avoiding *stasis* or internal conflict. In the Lycurgan system, each part wielded important powers, but each also had a check on it from some other part of the system. Although the strength of personality of the individuals (especially the kings and ephors) could mean that one element gained a temporary ascendancy that was not intended, in general the system worked.

Herodotus (1.66) notes that Lycurgus' reforms were so successful in achieving stability that in combination with the fertility of Laconia the population increased to the point that they decided to expand into Arcadia and surrounding areas. Although the date is traditionally ca. 570 (much later than Lycurgus' possible dates), according to Herodotus (1.66) the Spartans' first effort in this endeavor ended in disaster at the "Battle of the Fetters" in Tegea. Nonetheless, Lycurgus' model "good order" somewhat ironically contributed to conflict in the Peloponnese, and led to several hundred years of Spartan military domination of the region. The system did begin to break down after Sparta's defeat at Leuctra (371) and the loss of Messenia shortly afterward, but real *stasis* is not seen in the city until the third and second centuries.

Iain Spence

See also: Agoge; Cleisthenes; Religious Practices before Battle; Sparta, Attack on Tegea (Fetters, Battle of); Sparta

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Lydia

A kingdom in western Anatolia (modern Turkey) that grew to prominence during the seventh and sixth centuries, frequently clashing with the Greek city-states of Ionia. The most famous of the historically-attested kings of Lydia was Croesus (ca. 595–547), who was the last king of the Lydians, as the kingdom was defeated and absorbed into the Persian (Achaemenid) Empire.

There is little archaeological or historical evidence for the Lydians prior to the eighth century. Herodotus (1.7) has preserved a spurious list of kings and dynasties from early Lydian history, but it is not until the reign of Gyges (ca. 680–644) that the name of a Lydian king is corroborated in other historical material. Beset by invasion, Gyges’ petition for assistance from Assurbanipal, the king of Assyria, is preserved in the archives of Assyria and dated to ca. 664. Later, around 660, Gyges is said to have sent mercenaries to Egypt to assist the Pharaoh Psammetichus I. Lydia clearly had well-developed cultural ties and trade relationships with the other great kingdoms of the Near East. Indeed, trade routes between the Greek cities of the west and the powers of the Near East, fostered by cultural bonds, were as integral to the famed wealth of the Lydian kings as were the electrum refineries and coin mints of the capital city Sardis.

Under Gyges, Lydia began encroaching on the Ionian Greek cities of the Aegean coast, attacking both Smyrna and Miletus. Gyges’ successor Ardys

(ca. 644–late seventh century) even captured Priene, although the Lydians never managed to establish a permanent foothold on the Aegean coast. Despite frequent conflict the Lydian royal family maintained close ties with the Greek world, including intermarriage with prominent Greek families, such as that of Melas, the tyrant of Ephesus. The Lydians also gave offerings to and worshipped at Greek temples and sanctuaries, such as at Delphi, Assesus (a sanctuary in the territory of Miletus), and the great temple to Artemis at Ephesus. But ultimately Croesus, according to Herodotus fatally misunderstanding a message from the oracle at Delphi, invaded the territory of the Persian (Achaemenid) Empire. When he was defeated by Cyrus, both the Lydian kingdom and the Lydian capital of Sardis swiftly fell to the Persians in c. 547.

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See also Croesus of Lydia; Ionia, Ionians; Persian (Achaemenid) Empire

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Lysander (d. 395)

Lysander, a Spartan admiral, played a major role in Athens' final defeat in the Second Peloponnesian War. He did this by reinventing Spartan foreign policy late in the war: making friends with the Persian prince Cyrus, which reversed earlier Spartan reluctance to deal with Persians, and accepting Persian subsidies against Athens, a novel practice in Sparta. Through these means and his own planning, Lysander administered a more energetic, efficient, "modern" overseas Spartan imperialism in the form of a brief Spartan empire from 407 onward. Each of this empire's constituent cities was governed by Spartan governors and by decarchies, oligarchic boards of 10 men personally loyal to Lysander (with 30 men in huge Athens). Later

sources state that Lysander had been brought up in poverty and was not a Spartiate full citizen but a *mothax*, which seems to indicate an individual who had a Helot mother and Spartiate father. Given the Spartiate population decline in the Classical Period, and the usage of Helots, *Perioikoi*, and *Nothoi* in the Spartan forces, it is unsurprising that non-Spartiates could attain power in the Spartan state. Allegations that Lysander sought to remake the Spartan kingship into a meritocracy also fit into this picture.

Such novelties were not welcome in Sparta, creating friction with individuals like Callicratidas, admiral after Lysander in 406, who despised Spartan-Persian friendship. In 405, Lysander defeated the Athenian fleet at the battle of Aegospotami, destroying Athens' grain supply, and then sailed to Athens in 404, where he besieged it into surrendering and becoming a subordinate ally to Sparta. Lysander thus ended the Peloponnesian War, and his efficacy in concluding this bloody generation-long conflict occasioned unprecedented divine honors in Greece, including altars, sacrifices, a religious festival to Hera on Samos renamed the "Lysandreia," and a statue-group at Delphi showing Poseidon crowning Lysander, with the Dioscuri, Zeus, Apollo, and Artemis alongside. After the War, Lysander acted as kingmaker, obtaining a kingship for his *eromenos* Agesilaus II even though the latter's handicapped status would normally have obstructed kingship in eugenics-loving Sparta. Lysander, hoping to restore or maintain his decarchies in Asia Minor, next served for a period in Asia in a Spartan expedition against the Persian Empire in 396, his many petitioners provoking jealous resentment from Agesilaus, and died during the Corinthian War, at the battle of Haliartus in Boeotia in 395.

Lysander's interest as a historical figure extends beyond his ending the Peloponnesian War. He attempted to be a "modernizer" to aristocratic Sparta, utilizing marginal classes in Spartan society to alter Sparta's role in a changing Aegean, seeing Persian and Spartan corule of the Aegean as a possibility, creating a coinage fitting both within the Persian and many Greek standards in Asia Minor and the islands, appointing military governors regardless of birth or wealth, and attempting to widen the Spartan kingship.

Timothy Doran

See also Aegospotami, Battle of; Agesilaus II; Callicratidas; Haliartus, Battle

of; Peloponnesian War, Second; Sparta

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Lysimacheia

Lysimacheia was founded in 309 on the narrowest part of the Thracian Chersonese as the royal capital by Lysimachus, one of the Successors (*diadochoi*) of Alexander, who ruled Thrace, and much else, from ca. 322–281. Its exact location is uncertain. If it was on the Hellespont side of the Isthmus, the city was intended to command the sea-route through the straits. However, there is no sign that this was the case, and it is more likely that Lysimacheia was on the other of the isthmus, very close to or on the site of Cardia, or, even more likely, in the center of the peninsula near the modern village of Bolayir.

Lysimacheia was important as a bulwark against Thracian and later Gallic raids. After Lysimachus' death in 281, it was briefly occupied by Ptolemy Ceraunus before passing to the Ptolemies. In 277, it was the scene of a notable victory by Antigonus II Gonatas over a Gallic horde. At one point Lysimacheia was an external member of the Aetolian League. It was taken by Philip V in 202 during his campaign in this region, and soon afterward devastated by Gauls (ca. 199).

Antiochus III reestablished the city in 196 when he first brought his army across the Hellespont. After his defeat at Thermopylae (191), he rebuilt its walls and made it his main supply base. However, he let it fall intact to the Romans when he abandoned the defense of the Chersonese (190). Lysimacheia decayed into insignificance after this time.

Douglas Kelly

See also Antigonus II Gonatas; Antiochus III (the Great); Celts, Invasion of Greece and Thrace; Chersonese, Thracian; Galatians; Lysimacheia, Battle of;

Lysimachus; Philip V; Ptolemy Ceraunus; Successors (*Diadochoi*), Wars of

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Lysimacheia, Battle of (277)

In 277, Antigonus II Gonatas sailed with his forces to the Thracian Chersonese, where Macedonian power had collapsed. Anticipating an attack by an invading Celtic tribe with 5,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry, Gonatas abandoned his camp near Lysimacheia, moved a few troops and the non-combatants to his naval encampment and concealed his main force in a forest. The Celts made a night attack on the camp and, encouraged by finding it deserted, made straight for the fleet, expecting easy plunder. They were there taken in the rear by Gonatas' concealed troops and wiped out.

Douglas Kelly

See also Antigonus II Gonatas; Celts, Invasion of Greece and Thrace

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Lysimachus (ca. 355–281)

Lysimachus was an able officer in Alexander the Great's army who rose to the prestigious rank of *somatophylax* (bodyguard). In the carve-up of the empire after Alexander's death he received the underdeveloped region of Thrace. Hard fighting against the Thracian tribes was necessary to assert his control over the hinterland, on which Lysimachus set out to impose the same tight control as over the Greek cities on the coast.

Lysimachus prudently stayed out of the wars among Alexander's Successors but did follow others in taking the title of king in 306/5, thus formally opposing any attempt at restoring Alexander's empire. The main

threat of this kind came from Antigonus I Monophthalmus in the western part of Alexander's Asiatic empire. In 302, in collaboration with Seleucus I in Babylon and the other kings, Lysimachus invaded Asia Minor and in a brilliant defensive campaign pinned down Antigonus until he and Seleucus were able to defeat and kill Antigonus at Ipsus (301). As his reward, Lysimachus took over the rich territory of Asia Minor. Now with wider ambitions, he extended his kingdom northward across the Danube until a defeat by the Getae forced him to make the Danube his frontier (297). He joined with Pyrrhus of Epirus in stopping the attempt by Antigonus' son Demetrius I Poliorcetes to take the kingdom of Macedonia. The two divided the kingdom but two years later Lysimachus took over the whole (287–285).

By this point Lysimachus was at the height of his power, ruling a territory extending from the Adriatic to the Black Sea. His personal life had so far been sedate but infatuation with a new wife Arsinoë (daughter of Ptolemy I) led him to believe her allegations that his son and heir, the highly popular Agathocles, was plotting against him. His murder of Agathocles alienated the nobility who called in Seleucus. In the battle of Corupedium in Asia Minor, Seleucus defeated and killed Lysimachus (281).

Tough in combat and a highly capable administrator, Lysimachus was dour and uncharismatic. He did not help his reputation by his rigor in collecting taxes and by his tight-fistedness in spending his money, at a time when kings were expected to be liberal. His city foundations included his capital Lysimacheia in the Thracian Chersonese, Alexandria Troas on the Asiatic coast south of the Hellespont, and Arsinoeia, a refoundation of Ephesus. These were utilitarian rather than showy. Lysimachus' abundant coinage, which was of a high standard of purity and artistic production, perpetuated the same types as Alexander the Great had used. Alone of the Successors, Lysimachus did not put his own portrait on his coins.

Douglas Kelly

See also Antigonus I Monophthalmus; Corupedium, Battle of; Demetrius I Poliorcetes; Lysimacheia; Pyrrhus; Seleucus I Nicator; Successors (*Diadochoi*), Wars of

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M

Maccabean Revolt (167–160)

The Maccabean Revolt was a guerrilla war conducted by traditional Jews against the Seleucids and hellenizing Jews to restore Jewish religious autonomy. The revolt proper lasted from 167 to 160, but fighting to gain further autonomy continued down to 140, when Judaea achieved independence.

There are two theories of the nature of the revolt. One is that it began as a civil war between traditionalist and hellenizing Jews (those willing to worship Greek gods), which led to wider conflict when Antiochus IV, the Seleucid monarch, intervened on the side of the hellenizers. The more traditional view is that the revolt resulted from Antiochus IV forcing the Jews to worship Greek gods. Antiochus IV's policy was a reversal of Antiochus III's policy of Jewish religious autonomy. Enraged by a Jewish revolt in 168, Antiochus IV brutally sacked Jerusalem in 167 and attempted to suppress the Jewish religion.

In accordance with Antiochus' policies, an official, Apelles, directed Mattathias the Hasmonean, a prominent citizen of Modin, to sacrifice to the Greek gods. He refused and, with his sons, killed another Jew who stepped forward to sacrifice—and then Apelles. Fleeing into the desert with their supporters they began a guerrilla war against the Seleucids and the hellenizing Jews. Noting that previous rebels had been butchered when they refused to bear arms on the Sabbath, in a major departure from Jewish tradition, Mattathias and his sons decided to fight every day.

Mattathias died a year later, but was succeeded by his son, Judas Maccabaeus. Under Judas' command, the Maccabees won several important victories. The Seleucid general Apollonius was defeated and killed, then a

large Seleucid force defeated at Beth-Horon and its commander Seron killed.

Distracted by a major campaign in Persia, apparently over nonpayment of taxes, Antiochus delegated the Jewish campaign to a trusted commander, Lysias. However, the Jewish forces defeated a large Seleucid force at Emmaus before taking Jerusalem, and in December 164 purified the temple. This purification is the origin of the Chanukah celebration, still conducted today.

After Antiochus IV's death in 164/3, Lysias, now regent for Antiochus V Eupator, led a large army to recapture Jerusalem. Although meeting with some success, Lysias was forced to make terms with the Jews to protect Antiochus Eupator's shaky reign. He did so in 162 by restoring Jewish religious autonomy. Although the fighting continued for some years, its nature had changed—it was now about Jewish political autonomy not religious autonomy.

In 161, Judas Maccabaeus won a major victory against the hellenizers and the troops of Demetrius I Soter (who had deposed Antiochus V) and sought an alliance with Rome. However, he was killed the following year. Judas' brother Jonathan continued to fight until 152, when extracting concessions during the war between Demetrius I and Alexander I Balas he was made high priest and given military command in Judaea. Jonathan continued to capitalize on the ongoing dynastic conflict after Demetrius I's defeat and death, dealing with all sides—Alexander I Balas, Demetrius II Nicator, Diodotus Tryphon, and Antiochus VI Epiphanes. When Jonathan was killed by Diodotus Tryphon, his brother Simon, the last of Mattathias' sons, became leader. Faced by multiple threats from several opponents, in 140 Demetrius II gave Judaea independence.

Michael (Maxx) Schmitz

See also Alexander I Balas; Antiochus III (the Great); Antiochus IV Epiphanes; Demetrius II Nicator; Judaea, Jews; Seleucids; Tryphon/Diodotus

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Macedon, Macedonia

Macedon, or Macedonia, was loosely defined geographically, primarily because it consisted of a number of tribes and baronies, each asserting varying degrees of sovereignty. The monarchy was therefore never absolute; the king, despite the efforts of Philip II and his son Alexander III, was always *primus inter pares* (first amongst equals).

The Argead royal family, according to myth, descended from Heracles through Perdiccas, the son of Temenus, king of Argos. Perdiccas left Argos and founded a kingdom in the area of Vergina, ancient Aegae, just south of the Haliacmon River and north of Mount Olympus. Perdiccas' son and successor, Argaeus, gave his name to the Argead family. This story, however, only ever appears in the context of Alexander I (ca. 495–452), who used it to legitimate his participation in the Olympic Games.

The early history of Macedon is therefore unverifiable, but we can accept that it originated near Vergina, and that through the sixth century it expanded to encompass the lowland marshes between the Axios and Haliacmon rivers, from the shores of the Thermaic Gulf north to the mountains bordering on the territories of the Paeonians and Illyrians. This geographical diversity produced cereal crops and small animal husbandry, but the most valuable resources were minerals and timber. The spears and ships used in vast quantities by the warring Greek city-states were mostly provided through Macedonian timber.

The sixth king, Amyntas I (513–497), may have expanded Macedon east of the Axios River and into the Chersonese. However, under him Macedon also became tributary to the Persian Empire and the expanded territory may well have been a gift from Darius I.

Alexander I (ca. 495–452), the son of Amyntas, despite being subject to the Persian king, assisted the Greeks during the Persian Wars. After the Persian withdrawal from Europe he expanded Macedonian territory as far east as Mount Dysoron.

Through the fifth century Macedon remained on the periphery of the Greek world. During the Second Peloponnesian War, the role of Perdiccas II (454–413) mostly involved rival claimants to the throne and a Thracian invasion. However, his reign provides the best picture of the Macedonian monarchy. An Athenian treaty with Macedon in the 440s records Perdiccas as head of state, but also several other Argeads, each of whom is called

“king.” In addition, Thucydides (2.99) says that “there are in Macedonia the Lyncestian and the Elimeioatae and other highland nations who each have their own sovereignty despite being subject to Perdiccas.”

Archelaus (413–399) improved Macedon’s defenses and administration, including relocating the capital to Pella, but his murder instituted several years of short reigns and turbulent successions. The reign of Amyntas III (393–370) was little more than a struggle for survival with internal disputes complicated by an Illyrian invasion and the loss of much territory—even the capital for a short time. Amyntas’ three sons succeeded in order: Alexander II (370–369/8), Perdiccas III (365–359), and Philip II (359–336).

Philip II, against all odds, steered Macedon from virtual annihilation to become the leading power in the Greek world. He is most celebrated for his military reforms, creating a standing professional army with revolutionary new weapons and training. Philip also added a newly equipped cavalry that could be used as a front-line assault weapon, and continued to employ hoplite infantry, slingers, javelins, and archers. Arguably he was the first commander to employ what are now called “combined arms tactics.” Most importantly, Philip reconstituted the relationship between the baronage and the monarchy, creating the “Companion Class” that fostered loyalty to the crown never before seen in Macedon.

As a result, by 357 Philip was quickly able to conquer the Illyrians, Paeonians, and Thracians. The same year Philip became involved in Thessaly and, in 355, with the Social War; in 346 he ended the Third Sacred War and became influential at Delphi. Fear of Philip’s growth aroused the city-states and in 338 he met and defeated a combined Greek army at Chaeronea. The battle established Philip as hegemon, or master, of the Greek world and he established the League of Corinth, announcing his plans for the invasion of Persia. However, Philip was assassinated in 336 and his 20 year old son, Alexander, succeeded as king.

Alexander III (the Great) moved quickly, suppressing rebellions to the north and then that of Thebes, which was destroyed in 335. In 334, he invaded Asia and by 330 had conquered the Persian Empire. The war to capture the Upper Satrapies—modern Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan—took another five very difficult years and considerable Macedonian manpower.

When Alexander died of illness in 323, his generals contended for the empire. Antipater was regent in Macedon and immediately faced an Athenian-led coalition of Greek states. Antipater was defeated at

Thermopylae and withdrew to Lamia in Thessaly. Only the arrival of Macedonian forces from Asia enabled him to defeat the Greek coalition, but his victory in the Lamian War (323–322) helped secure his position. Antipater died in 319, and Polyperchon became regent, initiating a long and bitter contest for control. Cassander, the son of Antipater, was able to rally the Greek states against Polyperchon and by 315 ruled Macedon.

Despite attempts by Antigonus I Monophthalmus to take control of Greece and Macedon, Cassander managed to eliminate Alexander's bloodline and take the royal title in 305. The direct threat from Antigonus ended with his death at Ipsus (301) and the postbattle settlement confirmed Cassander as ruler of Macedon and Greece. Cassander was succeeded by three of his sons, none of whom ruled long or well, and Demetrius I Poliorcetes, the son of Antigonus, gained the throne in 294. But in 288, Demetrius faced a multipronged attack that ended with Pyrrhus of Epirus on the throne. Pyrrhus' tenure was brief. In 287, he was ousted by his former ally, Lysimachus, who ruled Macedon until 281.

After a period of rapid successions and even anarchy, Antigonus II Gonatas, the son of Demetrius I Poliorcetes, became king in 277/6. His reign was long, ending with his death in 240/39, but plagued by constant threats from Epirus. He was succeeded by his son, Demetrius II (239–229) and he by Antigonus III Doson (229–222).

The history of Macedonia entered its final phase with the accession of Philip V (222–179), the son of Demetrius II. Philip took the side of Hannibal in the Second Punic War, which brought the enmity of Rome. The First (215–205) and Second (200–196) Macedonian Wars reduced the power of Macedon considerably and attempts to restore it resulted in the defeat of Perseus, the son of Philip, by the Romans at the battle of Pydna (168). With that, Macedon ceased to exist as an independent nation.

E. Edward Garvin

See also Alexander I of Macedon, Alexander II of Macedon, Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon; Archelaus; Command Structures, Army; Hellenic League (under Philip); Lamian War; Macedonian War, First; Macedonian War, Second; Macedonian War, Third; Macedonian War, Fourth; Peloponnesian War, Second; Philip II of Macedon; Sacred War, Third; Social War (357–355); Thessaly, Thessalians; Thrace, Greek Cities in; Thrace, Thracians. *Roman Section:* Macedonian War, First; Macedonian War,

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Macedonian War, First (215–205)

Causes

The First Macedonian War was fought between King Philip V of Macedon and Rome after Philip signed a treaty of mutual cooperation against Rome with Hannibal, who had recently defeated Rome in the battle of Cannae in 216.

Course

The Roman strategy was mostly defensive. They struck a treaty of alliance with Macedon's inveterate enemy the Aetolian League in 211, intending that the latter would fight as Rome's proxy in Greece. Philip's strategy was to push westward against the Illyrian peoples, especially those linked to Rome through informal ties of friendship, with a view to perhaps invading Italy itself to link up with Hannibal. The king's plans were frustrated because he was unable to match Roman naval power. The Romans controlled the seas with a new Roman ally (from 210), Attalus I of Pergamum. The war ground to a stalemate. Philip (and his allies, the Achaean League) became bogged down in land operations against the Aetolians and their allies, thus recreating the conditions of the earlier Social War (220–217).

Consequences

In the absence of significant Roman infantry deployments in Greece, the Aetolian League made peace with Philip in 206, compelling the Romans to make an unsatisfactory peace (the Peace of Phoenice) with the king in 205.

Paul J. Burton

See also Achaean League; Aetolia, Aetolian League; Attalus I of Pergamum; Macedon, Macedonia; Philip V. *Roman Section: Macedonian War, First*

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Macedonian War, Second (200–196)

Causes

The Second Macedonian War was fought between Rome and King Philip V of Macedon. Various causes for the war have been cited: Rome's desire for revenge, greed for plunder, fear of Philip's imperial ambitions, and the need to demonstrate Roman *fides*, "good faith," to their allies, and friends in the East (Attalus of Pergamum, Rhodes, Athens, and the Aetolian League), who sought Roman protection against Philip's attacks.

In 200, only a year after the Roman victory over Carthage in the Second Punic War, the Senate asked the assembly to authorize a war on Philip, but the people, exhausted by the recent war with Carthage, refused. They reconsidered after a timely speech by the consul Publius Sulpicius Galba. Envoys were dispatched to the east armed with a conditional declaration of war on Philip. One delegation appeared in Athens, currently under attack by Philip's general Nicanor. Another embassy, headed by Marcus Aemilius Lepidus, met with Philip while he was besieging Abydus on the Hellespont. Aemilius demanded that Philip not wage war on any Greek state and submit his differences with Rhodes and Attalus to arbitration. Philip refused these conditions and a state of war came into being.

Course

The Senate dispatched its fleet to Greece under Galba's command in September 200. Philip was now at Demetrias, from where he marched to Athens and laid waste Athenian territory, while a detachment of Roman ships was dispatched to protect the Attic coastline. During the following

winter, Galba tried to bring the Aetolian League on side in time for his spring offensive. His strategy was to invade Macedon from the west while the Dardanians and Illyrians did so from the northwest; the Aetolians were needed to invade from the south via Thessaly, while the Roman fleet would patrol the eastern coastline of Greece. In early spring, 199, Galba entered Macedon and defeated Philip's cavalry in a few skirmishes. He then defeated Philip's phalanx and seized the modern Kirli-Derbend pass in northern Greece, before returning to the Illyrian coast to winter at Apollonia. In this same year, Philip scored some successes in Thessaly against the Aetolians and their ally, Amynder of Athamania, while his general Athenagoras defeated the Dardanians on Macedon's northern flank.

In early spring, 198, Philip seized one end of the Aous pass in Epirus, which he reckoned, correctly, the Romans would use to reenter central Greece from the Illyrian coast. The Romans entered the Aous valley by early May, and set up camp opposite Philip. While the Roman commander, Galba's replacement Publius Villius Tappulus (consul 199), was debating whether to try to force the pass, his replacement, Titus Quinctius Flamininus (consul 198) arrived. After a 40-day lull and a failed mediation attempt by Epirus, some skirmishing broke out between the two camps. A local shepherd showed Flamininus a route around Mount Meropus, which stood between the two armies. Flamininus sent a detachment of 4,000 men behind Meropus and surprised Philip by suddenly appearing in his rear. The detachment sent up smoke signals, indicating Flamininus should begin his attack. Philip, caught between two Roman armies and unable to deploy his phalanx in the narrow pass, fled south into Thessaly, where he laid waste the territory of his own subjects (probably in an attempt to deprive the Romans of supplies). Flamininus marched through the Aous gorge into Thessaly, and Philip withdrew into the Vale of Tempe, refusing to give battle. The king's plight was made worse by the news that the Achaean League had defected to the Roman side, and that Flamininus had taken Elatea, effectively shutting the king out of Phocis and eastern Locris.

While Flamininus was trying to force his way into Opus (November 198), the king requested peace talks. The Romans demanded that the king evacuate Greece, return all the gains he had made in Illyria during the First Macedonian War, and return to Ptolemy all the Asia Minor towns he had conquered between 204 and 200. Philip asked leave to send an embassy to Rome. Flamininus, playing for time while awaiting word about whether his

command would be extended for another year, readily agreed. In Rome, Flamininus' agents secured the extension of his command and scuttled talks with Philip's envoys. They departed Rome having accomplished nothing.

The campaign of 197 culminated in the battle of Cynoscephalae. A detachment of Macedonians, dispatched to seize the heights of Cynoscephalae, blundered in a thick mist into a Roman detachment on a reconnaissance mission. The early skirmishing soon evolved into a battle. The two sides were evenly matched until an unnamed Roman military tribune halted the pursuit of Philip's defeated left wing, wheeled about, and attacked Philip's victorious right wing in the rear. The Macedonians threw down their shields and retreated, while Philip withdrew toward Tempe. The king now sued for peace.

Consequences

The terms of peace were as follows: Philip was to surrender his fleet, set all his Greek possessions free, and pay an indemnity of 1,000 talents. He was allowed to retain his kingdom but had to surrender control of Thessaly. At the Isthmian Games in July 196, Flamininus declared "the Freedom of the Greeks." All Greeks would be free, independent, and subject to their own laws henceforward. The Romans would leave no garrisons behind nor demand any tribute.

Paul J. Burton

See also Cynoscephalae, Battle of (197); Macedonian War, First; Philip V. *Roman Section*: Cynoscephalae, Battle of; Flamininus; Macedonian War, Second

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Macedonian War, Third (171–168)

Causes

The Third Macedonian War was fought between Rome and King Perseus of Macedon. The causes of the war are obscure. Polybius' ancient analysis is far from satisfactory: he points to Perseus' inheritance of his father Philip V's anger and resentment toward Rome for various diplomatic humiliations at Rome's hands in the 190s and 180s. Philip, however, collaborated with Rome, always complied with Roman instructions and demands, and there are no overt signs of hostility toward Rome on his or Perseus' parts. Indeed, the first act of Perseus' reign in 179 was to renew Macedon's friendship with Rome, which the Roman Senate readily granted, in addition to acknowledging Perseus' legitimacy as Macedon's new king. Roman greed for glory and plunder, Roman fear of Perseus' growing power and influence in Greece, and Roman disdain for Perseus' pretensions to equality with Rome have been cited as motives for Rome's declaration of war. The desire to demonstrate their *fides* (good faith) toward King Eumenes II of Pergamum, Macedon's traditional rival, may also have influenced Rome's decision to go to war. In a closed-door meeting early in 172, Eumenes detailed for the senators a long list of Perseus' crimes and misdemeanors. Whether any of the allegations were true cannot be known, but what Eumenes said certainly stirred the senate to action.

Course

Roman envoys were sent around Greece in 172 to drum up Greek support. War was declared in spring 171, and Roman armies crossed the Adriatic several months later. An initial encounter in Thessaly resulted in a shock loss for Rome. Perseus tried several times to negotiate, but the Romans unacceptably insisted on the king's absolute surrender. The war continued in desultory fashion for several years as Roman troop morale sank, troop recruitment failed, and Rome's reputation among the Greeks plummeted. Meanwhile, Perseus attracted more allies, including the Illyrian king

Genthius and most of Epirus. The tide turned in Rome's favor in 169, when the consul Quintus Marcius Philippus restored Rome's reputation and invaded Macedon itself. In June 168, Philippus' replacement, Lucius Aemilius Paullus, won a decisive victory at the battle of Pydna. Perseus was captured and sent to Rome to grace Paullus' triumph, and later died in captivity. Genthius of Illyria was defeated later that same year.

Consequences

The Macedonian monarchy was abolished and replaced by four self-governing republics. The mines were closed and the republics were forbidden to have any dealings with each other. The Epirotes were punished by having 70 of their towns turned over to the Roman soldiers to plunder at will, and 150,000 people were sold into slavery.

Paul J. Burton

See also Eumenes II of Pergamum; Pergamum; Perseus of Macedon; Philip V; Pydna, Battle of. *Roman Section:* Aemilius Paullus, Lucius; Macedonian War, Third; Pydna, Battle of

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Macedonian War, Fourth (150–148)

Causes

The Fourth Macedonian War was fought between Rome and Andriscus of Adramyttium, who claimed to be Philip, the son of Perseus, the last king of Macedon. Philip had in fact died in captivity at Alba Fucens in Italy in the late 160s.

In 153, Andriscus, posing as Philip, tried but failed to stir up a nativist

revolt in Macedon. In 151, he sought help from the Seleucid king Demetrius I Soter. The latter sent Andriscus under guard to Rome, but the Senate released him. Andriscus then went to Miletus, where he was imprisoned, but then released. He next went to Pergamum, and made contact with Callippa, a former concubine of Perseus, who fitted him out in royal attire and a diadem, and gave him money and slaves. He journeyed to Thrace, where various Thracian chiefs, including Teres, who was married to a granddaughter of Perseus, gave Andriscus troops.

Course

With the troops from Teres, Andriscus entered Macedon in 150 and won two battles against the Macedonians. He arrived at Pella and proclaimed himself King Philip VI. He then conquered most of Thessaly. The Senate sent Publius Scipio Nasica to try to negotiate a peaceful solution, but talks failed, and Nasica used Achaean troops to defend Thessaly. A Roman army led by the praetor Publius Iuventius Thalna was sent against Andriscus in 149, but was soundly defeated, and Thalna was killed. Another Roman army, under the command of the praetor Quintus Caecilius Metellus, arrived in 148. At some point, Andriscus' general Telestes defected with the Macedonian cavalry. Another troop of Macedonian cavalry won an initial skirmish against the Romans. Andriscus then divided his army in two and sent one half to ravage Thessaly while he remained with the other half near Pydna to confront Metellus. Metellus defeated Andriscus and won over the rest of his army. Andriscus fled to Thrace, but was handed over to Metellus by Byzes, a Thracian prince.

Consequences

Metellus celebrated a triumph, in which Andriscus was displayed, and adopted the honorific title Macedonicus.

Paul J. Burton

See also Macedon, Macedonia; Perseus of Macedon. *Roman Section:* Caecilius Metellus Macedonicus, Quintus

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Magna Graecia

A term (lit. “Great Greece”) properly applied to the area of Greek settlement in southern Italy, but also sometimes used to denote the Greek settlements in Italy and Sicily. Magna Graecia, which became wealthy from the fertility of its lands and its prime position for trade, had an important influence on the local Italian peoples. However, it gradually fell under Roman control from around 350 to 200. Its cities included: Caulonia, Croton, Cumae, Elia, Epizephyrian Locri, Metapontum, Neapolis, Paestum, Rhegium, Sybaris, Tarentum, and Thurii.

Iain Spence

See also Colonies, Colonization; Croton; Cumae; Italy, Greek Cities in; Pyrrhus; Rome, Romans; Sicily; Sybaris/Thurii; Taras/Tarentum

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Magnesia

Magnesia was a region along the coast east of Thessaly, occupying the coastal lowlands on either side of the long ridge of Mount Pelion and Mount Ossa to the north. Like the Achaeans of Phthiotis and the Perrhaebians, the Magnesians were in the Classical Period dependents (*perioikoi*) of the Thessalians; writing two centuries later, Aristotle says that the Thessalians achieved this domination over their *perioikoi* through war. The Magnesians were a member *ethnos* (tribe) of the Delphic Amphictyony, and were colonizers, giving their name to Magnesia on the Maeander in Asia Minor.

With the Thessalians, the Magnesians medized in 480, and the Persian fleet that fought at Artemisium, after suffering off the dangerous and harborless east coast of Pelion, was based at Aphetæ, at the southern tip of

the Pelion promontory. In the fourth century, the Magnesians fell successively under the sway of the tyrants of nearby Pherae in Thessaly, the Boeotians, and Philip II of Macedon. When Demetrius I Poliorcetes founded Demetrias around 290, he brought much of the population of Magnesia into the new foundation, and the area remained under Macedonian sway until 196, when the Romans declared Magnesia independent. Demetrias later headed an independent Magnesian League, though there were further periods of Aetolian and Macedonian control.

Peter Londey

See also Delphic Amphictyony; Demetrias; Demetrius I Poliorcetes; Magnesia on the Maeander; Pherae; Thessaly, Thessalians

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Magnesia, Battle of (190)

After the defeat of Macedon at the battle of Cynoscephalae (197) the only Hellenistic power strong enough to threaten Roman control of Greece was the Seleucid Empire. Its king, Antiochus III the Great, invaded Greece on assurances that the Greeks would join him to throw off the Roman shackles. However, the support did not eventuate and after defeat at Thermopylae (191) Antiochus fled to Asia Minor. After the Seleucid navy was beaten at the battles of Side and Myonessus (190), a large Roman army, with forces from Rhodes and Pergamum, crossed the Hellespont. It was led by the Consul Lucius Cornelius Scipio, accompanied by his elder brother Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus, the conqueror of Hannibal at Zama. This led to a decisive battle in 190 at Magnesia ad Sipylum (Magnesia near Mount Sipylus), in Asia Minor. Antiochus might have won the battle except for Eumenes II of Pergamum's cavalry support to the Romans.

The Romans had 25,000 infantry, 3,000 cavalry, and 16 elephants. Antiochus had 60,000 infantry, over 12,000 cavalry, and 16 elephants. More specifically he had 16,000 *sarissa* phalangites in the center; toward the right wing were 1,500 Galatian heavy infantry, 4,000 heavy cavalry, 1,200 horse archers, 10,000 light infantry, and 54 elephants. Toward the left wing were 3,500 Galatian and Cappadocian heavy infantry, 2,700 auxiliaries, 4,000 heavy cavalry, scythed chariots and camels, 2,500 light cavalry, and 24,000 assorted light infantry.

Antiochus had fortified a position across a river and after a few days of inaction, the Romans moved nearer, securing their left flank with the river (they lacked enough cavalry to protect both flanks). The battle saw victories on the right wing of each army. Despite being outnumbered almost three to one Eumenes crushed Antiochus' left wing through his aggression, first using light troops to nullify the chariots and camels and then in the disorder charging with his 3,000 heavy cavalry to rout the rest down to the phalanx. In the center, the Seleucid phalanx was able to hold off the Roman infantry until forced by Eumenes' cavalry to edge behind their fortifications. On the other flank Antiochus personally led a decisive heavy cavalry charge to rout the Roman infantry on the left wing, resting on the river. Unfortunately, rather than turn and attack the exposed Roman flank and relieve his phalanx in the center Antiochus pursued too far. The Roman camp guard of 2,000 infantry rallied the retreating men and, aided by 200 cavalry brought by Eumenes' brother from the other wing, counterattacked Antiochus. The enthusiasm of this small force and the defeat of most of his left wing prompted Antiochus to flee and the rout spread to the rest of the army including the victorious phalanx in the center. Antiochus reportedly lost 50,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry while the Romans only lost 350 men. Antiochus' defeat at Magnesia did not win any real territory for Rome but it paved the way for later eastward expansion and made Antiochus submit to the power of Rome.

Graham Wrightson

See also Antiochus III (the Great); Eumenes II of Pergamum; Pergamum; Rhodes, Rhodians; Rome, Romans; Syrian-Roman War. *Roman Section:* Magnesia, Battle of

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Magnesia on the Maeander

Magnesia on the Maeander was one of two cities called Magnesia in Asia Minor; the other, identified as "Magnesia ad Sipylum," was the location of a major battle in 190. The site of Magnesia on the Maeander visible today is situated at the base of Mount Thorax, near the Lethaeus River, a tributary of the Maeander. The unknown site of the original city was probably closer to the Maeander, but was moved either for defensive reasons or to escape the silting of the river in the early fourth century. Rich in fertile alluvial land, the original city had been gifted to the exiled Themistocles in the fifth century by the Persian king, Artaxerxes I, to supply him with grain: it yielded 50 talents per year until his death. Magnesia apparently had a military focused on cavalry.

Magnesia's experience of conflict according to most sources was poor. The earliest reference to conflict is contained in a fragment of the seventh century poet Callinus, suggesting that Magnesia was engaging in successful conflict against Ephesus, though there are also references to an Ephesian victory over Magnesia.

Magnesia was later ravaged by the Persian commander Mazares in the sixth century. It remained under Persian control in the fifth century, and was sometimes used as a base by Tissaphernes during the Second Peloponnesian War. Captured from the Persians in 391 by the Spartan Thibron, the unwallled city was then moved to its new site near Mount Thorax. Magnesia surrendered to Alexander in 334 and to Rome in 190. With even the new site eventually buried under alluvial mud, much of Magnesia was well preserved into modern times.

Lachlan McColl

See also Artaxerxes I; Ionia, Ionians; Persian (Achaemenid) Empire; Themistocles; Thibron; Tissaphernes

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Malis, Malians

Malis was a small region in central Greece, consisting of the flat agricultural plain of the lower Spercheios River, around the end of the Malian Gulf, and the hills on either side. The chief cities were Lamia, on the north side of the plain, and Trachis on the south side. On the east, south of the gulf, was the major sanctuary of Demeter at Anthela, close to where the pass of Thermopylae led into eastern Locris. Anthela was one of the two sanctuaries controlled by the Delphic Amphictyony, and the Malians were a member *ethnos* (tribe) of the Amphictyony. There may have been at least a loose political federation of Malian cities, as they often seem to have acted in concert.

In 480, the Malians medized, though with Xerxes’ army camped in their territory they scarcely had any choice. According to one story, the man who showed the Persians a route around the position at Thermopylae, leading to the Greek defeat, was a Malian, Ephialtes. In 426, the people of Trachis, at war with their neighbors on the west, the Oetaeans, sought help from Sparta. The Spartans responded by founding a new city, Heraclea Trachinia, nearby, to help the Trachinians and to be a secure point on the main route by land to the north. Indeed, Brasidas passed this way in 424. The other Malians, however, opposed the foundation and made constant war against it. The city fell into *stasis* in 399, and survived having its walls pulled down by Jason of Pherae in 371.

With the decline of Heraclea, Lamia became the main city of Malis. In 323, the Macedonian regent, Antipater, used Lamia’s fortifications as a safe

refuge while his army was besieged by the Athenians and their anti-Macedonian allies. The failure of the four-month siege, which ran into early 322, was the decisive turning point of the war. Between 280 and 188, Malis was part of the Aetolian League. Lamia was besieged by Philip V of Macedon in 208, again in 190, when it served as Antiochus III's headquarters in his war with Rome, and was plundered by the Roman Manius Acilius Glabrio.

Peter Londey

See also Delphic Amphictyony; Heraclea Trachinia; Lamian War; Philip V; Syrian-Roman War; Thermopylae, Battle of

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Mantineia, Battle of (418)

A land battle fought near Mantineia in Arcadia in late summer 418, between the Peloponnesian League and a coalition of Argos, Athens, Mantineia, and Arcadians. The action occurred during the period of supposed peace in the Second Peloponnesian War (431–404) following the Peace of Nicias. The Spartan king Agis II, accompanied by 10 "advisors" to supervise him after his poor performance in Argos earlier that year, was attempting to reassert Spartan authority in the Peloponnese against Argive moves (supported by Athens) to create an effective anti-Spartan coalition there. Agis' immediate aim was to relieve the other main Arcadian city, Tegea, which was on the verge of defecting from Sparta under pressure from the coalition army.

Agis drew the coalition forces away from Tegea by invading Mantineia. He narrowly avoided a looming disaster when stung into reconsidering his attempt to make a difficult attack against the coalition force's very strong position on a hilltop. In an interesting example of Spartan questioning of authority, a veteran soldier (referring to Agis' recent much criticized

withdrawal from Argos without fighting) called out to him that he “was trying to remedy one evil with another” (Thucydides 5.65). Agis halted just short of the enemy and withdrew, to the bewilderment of the enemy generals who failed to exploit the opportunity.

The following day, under pressure from their troops, the coalition generals moved down to the plain. Thucydides gives a detailed description of the deployment but not the numbers involved (although noting that the Spartan force looked bigger). From his account, it is clear that the outflanking movement that won the battle for the Spartans, and which was attempted again at Nemea and Leuctra, was more by accident than design.

Agis opened up a potentially fatal gap in his front when trying to correct the natural rightward drift of hoplite armies by extending his left wing to the left and moving two contingents of Spartiates from the right to fill the gap. The two Spartan officers, judging they were too close to the enemy, refused to move. The Mantineans and Argives broke the now isolated Spartan left wing, causing considerable casualties and pushing the enemy back to their camp. However, on the Spartan right, the accidental outflanking of the enemy allowed the Spartans to turn in and catch them on their flank. The coalition right and center collapsed, with the Athenians escaping major casualties only because of the protection of their cavalry and Agis’ decision to return to aid his defeated left wing. The victorious coalition right wing suffered major losses from the intact Spartans as they tried to return to the fray.

Coalition dead were around 1,000, while the Spartans lost 300. Despite the element of luck, the Spartan victory effectively reduced the anti-Spartan movement in the Peloponnese, and Argos subsequently made peace.

Iain Spence

See also Agis II; Alcibiades; Leuctra, Battle of; Nemea, Battle of; Peloponnesian War, Second

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Mantineia, Battle of (362)

This immense land battle of 362, involving some 50,000–60,000 Greek combatants, had deep repercussions for the Greek balance of power. The lead-up to the conflict began with differences among members of the Arcadian League (specifically Mantineia and Tegea), tension between the Arcadian League and Elis in the 360s, and the alliances of the various parties. Elis battled the Arcadians in 365 and 364 over borderlands. Arcadia supported one faction of Eleans desiring a new political system, then seized the panhellenic shrine of Olympia from Elis and occupied it.

Next, in 363/2, the Arcadians used sacred treasures at Olympia to finance a federal military, ignoring their pro-Spartan member state Mantineia's disapproval and going along with the approval of Tegea, another member-state whose loyalties lay with Thebes. The Arcadian assembly voted to not use these funds, which removed from the Arcadian federal army all persons who needed wages, leaving only better-off individuals. Tensions increased when Tegeans, aided by a Theban army, arrested Mantineans making peace overtures to Elis. The Mantineans protested this, and so the Arcadian League became divided. Tegea and Megalopolis remained allied with the Boeotian League and the Mantineans asked for help from Athens and Sparta.

In 362, Epaminondas brought a Boeotian League army to Nemea and then Tegea along with Thessalian and Euboean contingents, and soon divisions from Messenia, Argos, Euboeans, Thessalians, and Locrians alongside, of course, Tegea and Megalopolis. The Mantineans had help from Sparta, the Eleans, the Achaeans, and the Athenians. As a show of defiance against Sparta Epaminondas first attacked south, which most populations in his coalition resented; despite almost catching Sparta undefended, Epaminondas' troops were repelled by Agesilaus II. Epaminondas next went back up to Tegea. Hoping to win a decisive victory before leaving the Peloponnese, Epaminondas led the Boeotian–Tegean force against Agesilaus' coalition army at Mantineia.

Epaminondas died in the battle, although using innovative and clever tactics including, in addition to heavy hoplite phalanx in a "beak-like" formation, the innovative integration of light infantry and cavalry supporting each other. Sparta's military was weakened by the Spartiate demographic decline and by the losses suffered at the battle of Leuctra in

371, but was not defeated, partially because the Theban side did not press their advantage after Epaminondas' death. Both sides claimed victory. A Common Peace treaty resulted, the first called by this term and the first since 387/6 not involving foreign powers such as Persia; an inscription even refuses help to rebels from the Persian Empire. Sparta's refusal to be involved in the treaty was closely linked to Messenia gaining recognition as a legitimate political entity autonomous from the Spartan state.

Xenophon ends his *Hellenica* with this battle, throwing his hands up and complaining (justly) that everything became even more complicated after it. He correctly notes that neither side gained territory. He thus avoids the most significant (in terms of Aegean geopolitics) result of this battle: with Epaminondas' death, and the end of Theban hegemony, would come the successes of Philip of Macedon against an exhausted Greece.

Timothy Doran

See also Agesilaus II; Arcadian League; Boeotian League; Epaminondas; Leuctra, Battle of

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Mantineia, Mantineans

Mantineia was a major Arcadian city, located in the northern part of the Arcadian plateau, about 2,000 feet above sea level. The city was, very unusually in Greece, located in the center of flat and marshy valley, astride a river. The urban center seems likely to have been a late foundation, with population brought in from a number of villages probably located on or against the surrounding hills. Whether Mantineia was politically unified before this *synoecism* is not certain. Siting the city in the valley was perhaps a matter of convenience, rather than military prudence. The city walls, nearly 2.5 miles (4 kilometers) long, had 10 gates, allowing easy access to the surrounding farmland. Defensively, there were 105 towers, and the location on the river, Hans van Wees has suggested, allowed animals to be brought in in time of attack.

Mantineia sent 500 hoplites to fight with the Spartans at Thermopylae in 480, but the Mantineans arrived late for the battle of Plataea the following year. There were other occasions when Mantineia supported Sparta, including at the battle of Olpae in 426/5. But in the 420s they extended their control over much of northern Arcadia, and in 421 broke away from Sparta and allied with Argos. After the Spartan victory at the battle of Mantineia in 418, the city was forced to give up its Arcadian ambitions. Relations with Sparta remained tense, and in 385 the Spartan king Agesipolis I attacked the city. He blockaded the city with a trench but, learning that the inhabitants had a large quantity of grain stored up, resorted to the tactic of damming up the river to flood the town and undermine the mud-brick walls. Fearing the consequences if the Spartans captured the town, the Mantineans agreed to terms: the walls were demolished, and the city broken up; the population moved back to their original villages. The city was refounded in 371/70, after the Spartan defeat at Leuctra. Lycomedes of Mantineia instigated the formation of a reborn Arcadian League, centered at the new foundation of Megalopolis. But conflict, especially with Tegea, led to war between the members, and the battle of Mantineia in 362, where Mantineia was supported by Athens and Sparta.

Mantineia's Hellenistic history is not well documented; at various times it was a member of both the Achaean and Aetolian Leagues. But in 223, Antigonos III Doson enslaved the population in retribution for its having massacred an Achaean garrison. The city was later refounded, and Mantineans fought for Octavian at the battle of Actium in 31.

Peter Londey

See also Agesipolis I; Arcadia, Arcadians; Arcadian League; Mantineia, Battle of (418); Mantineia, Battle of (362); Megalopolis; Olpae, Battle of; Thermopylae, Battle of

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Marathon, Battle of (490)

A defensive battle fought on the plain of Marathon in northeast Attica between an Athenian/Plataean army and the Persians. It ended the first Persian invasion of Greece, which had been mounted to punish the Athenians and Eretrians for aiding the Ionians during the Ionian Revolt. Herodotus states (6.94) that Darius' instructions to the commanders of the force, Datis and Artaphrenes, were to "enslave Athens and Eretria and bring the captives before him."

The size of the Persian land force is unknown, but perhaps a reasonable estimate is 25,000–30,000 (ancient writers give the usual exaggerated Persian numbers, ranging between 200,000 and 600,000). Eretria fell through treachery and the Persians crossed to the mainland to attack Athens. They landed at Marathon on the advice of Hippias, one of the Peisistratidae, who fled to Persia after his tyranny at Athens was overthrown. Marathon was an easy crossing from Euboea and offered suitable terrain for the large Persian army and its cavalry. The Athenians requested assistance from Sparta and marched northeast with around 10,000–11,000 hoplites (1,000 from Plataea).

The "war-archon" or polemarch, Callimachus held overall command, but the 10 *strategoi* (generals) were effectively in control, holding command in rotation for one day. The Athenian/Plataean force was in the foothills, to negate the Persian numbers, and the *strategoi* were divided over whether to defend or attack. Miltiades is reputed to have been the architect of the Athenian tactics and with Callimachus' support persuaded the Athenians to attack. The Athenians charged the Persians at the run, probably when they began to move south in the direction of Athens. The Persians were amazed at the attack by an outnumbered force unsupported by archers or cavalry. However, their own cavalry played no part in the battle—this was a mystery even in antiquity, but it may have been off scouting or already embarked on the ships (or, less likely, still on Euboea). The Greeks had weakened their center to extend their phalanx to cover the entire Persian frontage and the

Persian infantry broke though there. However, although outnumbered, the Greek hoplites proved superior to the Persian foot and the Greek wings pushed their opponents back and re-formed a solid line. A large part of the Persian force was surrounded and some 6,400 Persians died. The rest escaped on their transports, although seven ships were captured. The Athenian celebrations were cut short when a shield signal was seen on the hills above and the Persian fleet sailed south toward Athens. A forced march of 22–26 miles (35–42 kilometers) ensured they reached the city before the Persians, who then left for home. The 192 Athenians killed were, contrary to convention, buried on the battlefield. Their burial mound (*soros*) on the plain locates the epicenter of the battle. The Spartans arrived too late to take part. The battle became a key element of Athens' self-image and the veterans, the *Marathonomachoi*, held a special place in later Athenian tradition.

Iain Spence

See also Alcmaeonidae; Darius I; Ionian Revolt; Miltiades II, Son of Cimon; Omens and Portents; Peisistratidae; Persian Wars; Pheidippides

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Mardonius (d. 479)

Mardonius was an Achaemenid Persian noble and general, who played a prominent role in the Second Persian War (480–479). Mardonius was the nephew and son-in-law of Darius I. Herodotus, our main source, provides a picture more literary than historical. Mardonius is shown as a driving force behind the decision to invade and, during the 480–479 campaign is portrayed as consistently spurring his cousin Xerxes on against the Greeks.

In 492, Darius sent Mardonius to organize the recently resubjugated areas of Asia Minor after the Ionian Revolt. Following this, he extended

Persian control across the Thracian coastline and the Chalcidice—an essential precursor to a land invasion of Greece. During the invasion of 480–479 he was one of Xerxes’ senior officers and was left in charge when Xerxes returned to Persia after Salamis. Mardonius commanded the Persians at the battle of Plataea and handled the preliminary maneuvers and skirmishing well. He quickly seized the opportunity to attack the Greeks when they were in a position of considerable disarray, but the attack was poorly coordinated. Mardonius was killed and his army defeated. He seems to have been a generally effective administrator and commander in the east, but he and his troops were outclassed at Plataea.

Iain Spence

See also Ionian Revolt; Persian Wars; Plataea, Battle of; Thermopylae, Battle of

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Marines. *See* ***Epibatai***

Mausolus and the Hecatomnids

The Hecatomnid dynasty ruled Caria, in southwestern Asia Minor, as Persian satraps for two generations from 392 to 334. The dynasty’s founder, Hecatomnus, was ordered by the Persian king to attack Evagoras of Cyprus in 391, but secretly aided him. His son, Mausolus, is the best-known member of the family. Mausolus reigned from 377/6 to 353/2 and is most remembered for his tomb in Halicarnassus, the Mausoleum, constructed posthumously by his sister and wife Artemisia, who reigned until 351/50. Mausolus moved the Carian capital from inland Mylasa to Halicarnassus

(modern Bodrum), a largely Greek city on the coast, enlarging the city by merging several discrete communities. He was open to Greek influences, while also preserving Carian religion and culture.

The dynasty was constantly involved in conflict. Mausolus conducted campaigns in Anatolia, attempting to take Miletus by subterfuge and succeeding in capturing Heraclea under Latmus. He also besieged both Assos and Sestos with a fleet of 100 triremes. From 362, he was involved in the later stages of the satraps' revolt, but returned to the Persian king's favor and remained satrap afterward. Demosthenes accused Mausolus of having instigated the Social War against Athens in 357, but in reality the extent of his involvement (including tangible military assistance) is uncertain.

After Mausolus' death, the satrapy passed to his wife Artemisia, who was said to have fought a war against Rhodes, then to his sister Ada via his brother Idrieus. Ada was expelled by her brother Pixodaros, who was succeeded by his brother-in-law Oronomates. Ada, however, cooperated with Alexander and, adopting him as her son, orchestrated her own forceful return to power.

Lachlan McColl

See also Caria, Carians; Caria, Greek Cities in; Halicarnassus; Persian (Achaemenid) Empire; Social War (357–355)

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Medicine, Military

A significant question in Greek military history is whether medical care was institutionalized in Greek military structures. In some periods, doctors were hired to accompany military campaigns, especially for the sake of leaders and wealthy members of campaigns. However, at the most basic level, soldiers would have no doubt attempted to ease their injuries and the injuries of their comrades, applying whatever medical knowledge (or lack thereof) that they had. In general, your personal wealth and rank in the

army probably affected your ability to access medicine in ancient Greek armies.

The ancient Greeks generally did not have doctors who were hired by the military. The lack of a standing army in most city-states meant that doctors were probably only hired occasionally to accompany military campaigns. According to Xenophon, the Spartans had doctors as part of the king's retinue. Xenophon also states that doctors were hired by generals to keep their men in good health. The same passage (*Cyropaedia* 1.6.14–15) also discusses the importance of avoiding unhealthy camp sites (alluding to circumstances such as marshy land, which could cause a variety of diseases). Similar themes are discussed in the Hippocratic corpus, a Greek collection of reference texts for doctors. The Greeks were aware of some environmental causes of disease and appear to have made attempts to avoid them.

Additionally, according to Xenophon, ordinary soldiers were selected to act as doctors. This does not seem to have involved much training; rather the soldier was appointed as a carer for wounded comrades while the army was on the move. We see Patroclus in Homer's *Iliad* removing an arrow and cleaning the wound for a fellow soldier, a skill that he has reportedly learned from Achilles (see illustration). This type of tale may reflect a reality on the battlefield, where soldiers passed on knowledge to their comrades and gained some level of competence in treating their own wounds and the wounds of others. However, in the case of infectious disease, this practice may have actually caused the spread of illness. Thucydides notes the unique misery associated with choosing to either abandon your comrade to a lonely death or risk contracting an illness yourself—a situation that eventually migrated off the battlefield and into mainstream Athenian society during the plague in Athens in 430, during the second year of the Peloponnesian War.



Achilles binds the wounded arm of his companion, Patroclus, in a scene from the interior of an Attic drinking cup, ca. 500. Although the scene is mythological, it would have been one familiar to men who no doubt tended each other's wounds on the battlefield. The cup, found in an Etruscan tomb in Italy, is now in the Altes Museum, Berlin, Germany. (VPC Travel Photo/Alamy Stock Photo)

However, being abandoned on the field while sick, injured or dying does not seem to be a phenomenon limited to soldiers who had infectious diseases. Often, the circumstances of war meant that there simply was no time for medical assistance. An example of this is the Athenian retreat from Syracuse in 413, where Thucydides, perhaps rhetorically, describes injured soldiers as more miserable than those who were already dead. As the retreat took place, injured soldiers begged their comrades for assistance and followed as far as they could, as uninjured or relatively uninjured soldiers simply had to abandon the wounded to save their own lives.

Much of the burden for getting the critically injured off the battlefield appeared to fall on friends and comrades. Certainly, some (particularly those with arm wounds) would have been capable of continuing to keep up with their uninjured comrades. Potentially, given the speed required and the resources available, some of the wounded might have been carried on litters, provided there was someone willing (or required, in the case of slaves) to carry them. Depending on the logistics of the campaign, there may have also been supply wagons available for carrying the wounded. The

wealthy will have had a distinct advantage here, as an injured cavalry member with an unwounded horse would also have a significant advantage over an infantryman.

Those soldiers who were abandoned on the battlefield generally will have succumbed to their wounds, been killed by enemy soldiers, or been captured. Wounded soldiers, once captured by enemy forces, will most likely have been sold into slavery or simply killed. Diodorus provides an account of prisoners of war being provided as sacrifices to the gods by the Carthaginians. However, by the Hellenistic Period prisoners of war could be ransomed, whether by the military or by their relatives and friends back home. It appears that the wounded who were captured in battle would have had some chance of getting back home, which was usually dependent on being ransomed or the establishment of a treaty. For those left injured but alive in a hostile area, chances of survival seem exceedingly low.

Even when circumstances provided an opportunity for medical treatment to take place, this did not always mean an increased chance of survival. The small number of doctors must have also constantly faced the decision whether or not to treat a particular patient. Some wounds were simply too dire for even a trained doctor to be able to make a difference, to the extent that medical texts actually instruct doctors to refuse to treat patients in such circumstances (in the civilian setting, this was to protect the doctor's reputation).

However, this does not mean that no palliative care existed on the battlefield. Other soldiers, especially those acting in a quasimedical role, would have made efforts to increase the comfort of the dying. Also, given that these men were somewhat less likely to be hindered by concerns about their professional reputation, they were probably more likely to attempt medical assistance in a case where it appeared that all hope was lost (such as a deep stomach wound, which would have almost certainly been fatal in a matter of days).

Even in cases where nonfatal wounds had time to be treated, if there were not enough doctors on a campaign, then many soldiers must have been left untreated or exposed to substandard care. This will have created the situation where some injuries could fester or worsen, leading to fatal or incapacitating consequences, especially when the medical assistance of other soldiers lacked expertise and resources.

Some individuals may have continued to participate in military duty

while wounded, as different areas of service make different demands. A commander might be missing an eye (like Philip II of Macedon), but his speech and mind were his most vital tools. A rower might have limited sight or have a clubfoot, but he could probably continue to row with those conditions. A cavalry soldier need not be able to walk long distances, but must be able to ride a horse. Hoplites and light armed troops probably had the highest level of physical fitness required to serve effectively, but we even hear of exceptions in this area. However, severe wounds (such as limb loss and blindness) would presumably have excluded individuals from military service entirely.

Adrienne White

See also Animals in War; Peloponnesian War, Second; Prisoners of War and Slavery; Social and Economic Effects of War; War Crimes; Wounds

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Megalopolis

Megalopolis (strictly *Megale Polis*, “Great City”) was a major new urban foundation in southern Arcadia created in the years 370–367. A large number (39 in one account) of small Arcadian cities were prompted by the actual or recent presence of a Boeotian army under Epaminondas to combine into an urban center capable of resisting Spartan aggression. Synoecism (*Synoikismos*) is the Greek term for such a physical relocation of cities to a new center. True to its name, Megalopolis covered some 350 hectares (1.3 square miles) and the circuit-walls extended for about 9 kilometers (5.5 miles). Its population, considerable at first, declined in the third century and unoccupied space within its walls gave rise to witticisms about the “Great Wilderness.” Modern estimates of its total territory range from 400 to 1,500 square kilometers (around 155 to 580 square miles).

Megalopolis became the capital, or at least the leading city, of the Arcadian League, which comprised all Arcadians hostile to Sparta. Notable

structures included the Thersilium, a roofed assembly-building of unusual design for meetings of the supreme governing body of the League, the “Ten Thousand” (not to be taken literally) and a theatre capable of seating 20,000 persons.

Megalopolis depended at first on its alliance with Boeotia. In 361, the year after the battle of Mantinea, Boeotia had to intervene to stop the secession of some malcontents. When Boeotian military power in the Peloponnese faded during the 350s because of the Third Sacred War, Spartan pressure made Megalopolis appeal to Athens in 352/1. Megalopolis later made an alliance with Athens in 342/1 when Athens was trying to build up resistance to the growing threat from Philip II of Macedon. At this point Athens had decided an alliance with the Arcadians was preferable to its previous alliance with their enemy Sparta. However, Megalopolis also made an alliance with Philip at about the same time and did not take part in Athens’ war against him (340–338).

Megalopolis resisted the revolt led by King Agis III of Sparta in 331 and did not take part in the Lamian War (323–322). In later times, it took the side of Cassander, passed in turn under the control of Demetrius I Poliorcetes and Antigonos II Gonatas, but liberated itself by 280. It remained consistently hostile to Sparta. The growing power of the Achaean League challenged Megalopolis’ dominance in Arcadia but in 235 its tyrant Lydiadas resigned his power and brought the city into the League. Megalopolis was sacked by King Cleomenes III of Sparta in 223 but revived to play an important part in the League. It produced three notable figures in League affairs, Lycortas and his son Polybius, the historian, and the military leader Philopoemen.

Douglas Kelly

See also Arcadia, Arcadians; Arcadian League; Epaminondas; Megalopolis, Battle of

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Megalopolis, Battle of (331)

Agis III of Sparta meticulously planned a revolt against Macedonian overlordship and asked for Persian assistance (333). He also issued an appeal to all Greeks to assert their freedom and gathered 30,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry. Agis defeated the local Macedonian governor and garrison at Corinth. Antipater, the regent of Macedon, quickly resolved a brief insurrection in Thrace (one perhaps coordinated by Agis) and marched south with 40,000 men. The two sides met outside the Arcadian city of Megalopolis, which Agis was besieging. The battle occurred either after receiving news in Greece of Alexander III's victory at Gaugamela or just before. The battle was the last attempt by Sparta to establish a hegemony and the last attempt at any Greek resistance to Alexander's Macedonian rule.

The Spartans formed up on a hill and met the Macedonians who were cramped for room. The Spartan army fought for a long time and very fiercely but began to fall back. Agis' royal squadron charged and the Spartans forced the Macedonians back down the hill, but on the plain the weight of the Macedonian numbers told. Agis succumbed to multiple frontal wounds and his bodyguard carried him back to camp. The rest of the Spartans, regaining the advantage of the hill, resisted fiercely. Eventually Macedonian numbers told and the Spartans retreated in disorder. On being carried away and surrounded by the enemy Agis told his men to save themselves and he, fighting from his knees, challenged his assailants to combat, but they attacked him from a distance. He killed some of the enemy before finally being felled by a javelin. Over 5,300 Greeks were killed and 3,500 Macedonians (1,000 according to Curtius Rufus).

Graham Wrightson

See also Agis III; Agis III, Revolt against Macedon; Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon; Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon, Invasion of Persian Empire; Antipater; Megalopolis; Sparta

Further Reading

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A *polis* on the Isthmus of Corinth, Megara had ports on both the Saronic Gulf (Nisaea) and the Corinthian Gulf (Pagae and Aegosthena); that fact, and its position on the isthmus, gave it some commercial and considerable strategic importance. Megara was an active and independent presence in the Archaic Period, but found itself eclipsed in the Classical Period by its larger neighbors (Athens, Corinth, and Boeotia). By the fourth century, Megara seems to have been committed to a program of peaceful neutrality.

Megara's territory was approximately 470 square kilometers (about 180 square miles), of which scholars estimate 20 percent was arable. Its population likely reached 40,000 at its peak, of which around 25,000 would have been citizens. During the invasion of Xerxes Megara could muster a hoplite force of 3,000 and a naval contribution of 20 triremes.

Megara coalesced as an independent *polis* during the eighth century, before which its five constituent villages were dominated by Corinth. During the eighth and seventh centuries Megara was heavily involved in the colonizing movement, founding colonies in Sicily as well as the Black Sea region. Megara experienced repeated border conflicts with both Athens and Corinth during the sixth century, as well as brief naval conflicts with Samos and Miletus. The Spartans passed through the Megarid repeatedly in the course of their late sixth century conflict with Athens, suggesting that they were allied with Megara at the time.

Although it stood aloof from early clashes with Persia, Megara was a member of the Hellenic League and a staunch supporter of the Greek cause against Xerxes. After the Persian War Megara remained a member of the Peloponnesian League with the exception of a brief period from about 460 to 446 during which it was allied to Athens. In the late 430s, the Athenians passed the "Megarian Decree," barring Megarians from all harbors in the Athenian Empire and from the Athenian Agora. This decree became one of the proximate causes of the Second Peloponnesian War. During that war Athens also repeatedly ravaged Megarian territory, causing significant economic damage.

Megara appears to have leaned toward a pro-Theban alignment in the fourth century conflicts between Thebes and Sparta. The sack of the city by the troops of Demetrius I Poliorcetes in 307 was a major blow. Megara joined the Achaean League in the 240s, the conditions of which included the concession of sovereignty over the ports of Pagae and Aegosthena and constitutional changes.

See also Byzantium, Byzantines; Hellenic League (against Persians); Isthmus of Corinth; Megara, Battle of; Myronides; Peloponnesian League; Peloponnesian War, First; Peloponnesian War, Second

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Megara, Battle of (458)

The battle of Megara was an Athenian victory over the Peloponnesian League early in the First Peloponnesian War (460/59–445). In dispute with Corinth, Megara left the League ca. 460/59 and allied with Athens. This was important to Athens, allowing it to protect its western border from invasion from the Peloponnesians. Consequently, when the Peloponnesians attacked Megara, the Athenians reacted quickly, even though they were already campaigning in Aegina and Egypt. The *strategos* (general) Myronides hastily levied an army from those normally too young or old to serve and marched west.

Details of the fighting are obscure—Diodorus Siculus records a fairly stock hard fought battle resulting in Athenian victory, while Thucydides (who is to be preferred here) records rather an inconclusive first engagement followed by a major victory 12 days later against a predominantly Corinthian force trying to set up a trophy on the original battlefield.

Whatever happened, the victory was a setback for the Peloponnesian League. It was also Myronides' first known success, contributing to his later ranking by writers such as Diodorus Siculus and Plutarch as a leader alongside Solon, Miltiades, Themistocles, Aristides, Cimon, and Pericles. The battle was celebrated by later generations as the famous battle where “the oldest and youngest” triumphed over the Peloponnesians.

See also Megara; Myronides; Peloponnesian League; Peloponnesian War, First; Trophy

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Meleager (d. 323)

Meleager, son of Neoptolemus, was one of Alexander the Great's commanders. He took part in the campaign against the Getae (335), commanded infantry at Granicus and Issus, and cavalry at Gaugamela, and served in all subsequent campaigns. Following Alexander's death, Meleager proposed that the succession should go to either Philip III Arrhidaeus or Hercules, son of Barsine, and led the infantry in support of the opposition to Perdiccas. Appointed co-regent with Perdiccas, Meleager was outsmarted and killed by his rival.

Iain Spence

See also Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon; Perdiccas; Philip III Arrhidaeus

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Melos

Melos is a small volcanic Greek island, situated on the western edge of the Cyclades in the Aegean Sea. From early prehistoric times, the island was involved in the trade of obsidian. Melos was settled ca. 700 and considered to be a colony of Sparta. It was for this reason that after the Persian Wars

Melos did not become a member of the Delian League. Melos remained a loyal ally of the Spartans, although in the first part of the Second Peloponnesian War it remained neutral. However, the Melians actively sided with Sparta after Nicias led an Athenian force of 60 ships and 2,000 hoplites in an unsuccessful attack on the island in 426.

In 416–415, during the second phase of the Second Peloponnesian War, the Athenians attempted to force the Melians to join the Delian League. This was probably as much about the challenge that the mere existence of an independent Melos posed to Athenian status as it was about any intrinsic strategic value Melos possessed. The Athenians landed a force of just under 3,000 hoplites, 300 archers, and 20 mounted archers (*hippotoxotai*) on the island; they then sent ambassadors to the Melians to negotiate their terms. The Athenians announced that they would spare the island on the condition that Melos would submit to the Athenian demands and pay them tribute. Otherwise, the Melians would have to face the complete destruction of their city-state. When the Melians refused their request, the Athenians organized a siege of the city. The Melians fiercely defended their city for many months but with the help of reinforcements and traitors inside the city the Athenians forced an unconditional surrender. The Athenians massacred every adult male and all the women and children were sold into slavery.

Thucydides presents in great detail the Athenian sacrilegious behavior in a dramatic literary piece, the so-called Melian Dialogue—one of the more famous passages in his history. The form of the dialogue—a point-by-point debate rather than a pair of speeches—is unique in Thucydides and has sometimes been seen as evidence of “notes” made by Thucydides that he later intended to turn into matching speeches. Thucydides uses the Melian Dialogue to reveal Athenian imperialism at its most naked, with its main message that “the strong exert their power and the weak submit.” Thucydides’ positioning of the Melian Dialogue immediately before the disastrous Sicilian expedition and the emphasis he gives to it have been interpreted as him deliberately presenting Athenian hubris and its resulting punishment. The Athenians afterward established 500 cleruchs, or military settlers on the island. After the defeat of Athens in 404, the Melian survivors were restored to the island by the Spartan general, Lysander.

Aikaterini-Iliana Rassia

See also Andrapodismos; Hippotoxotai; Nicias; Peloponnesian War, Second;

Thucydides

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Memnon and Mentor of Rhodes (ca. 380–333, ca. 385–340)

Often inaccurately described as simply a mercenary, Memnon of Rhodes was arguably the most dangerous opponent Alexander the Great faced during his conquest of the Persian Empire. An experienced military commander who had married into the Persian aristocracy, Memnon served the Persian Empire for most of his adult life.

Little is known of Memnon’s early life. He was born in Rhodes in or around 380 and is first mentioned in 358 as serving alongside his older brother Mentor under the Phrygian satrap Artabazus (the son of Pharnabazus). Mentor married Artabazus’ daughter, Barsine. In about 353, Artabazus rebelled against the Persian king, Artaxerxes, with Mentor and Memnon as two of his commanders. When the revolt failed, Mentor fled to Egypt, while Memnon and Artabazus went into exile at Pella, the capital of Macedonia. Mentor switched sides, betraying Sidon and Egypt to Artaxerxes, and was recalled to Persian service in 343, but died soon afterward.

Meanwhile, Memnon remained in Macedonia for three to four years, where he came into contact with the Macedonian royal family, including Philip II and the future Alexander the Great, who was seven years old at the time. Plutarch claims that Memnon and Alexander spoke at great length, with the young crown prince asking serious questions about Persian military strength, tactics, and dispositions. The details of Memnon’s conversations with Alexander cannot be confirmed, but whatever

impressions if any the young prince made on the Rhodian, Memnon's time in Pella enabled him to observe Philip as ruler, diplomat, and military commander. More importantly, it convinced him of Philip's intention to invade Persia. Also, unlike his Persian counterparts, Memnon came away from Pella with a clear understanding of Macedonia's military capabilities.

Through Mentor's influence, Memnon was recalled to Persian service, and when Mentor died Memnon in turn married Barsine. In 339, Memnon helped repel an assault by Alexander's father, Philip II of Macedon, on Byzantium. In Macedonia, Memnon had gained a sense of the political intrigue that plagued Macedonia's newly established hegemony over Greece, and the depth of Greek antipathy to Macedonian rule. Thus when Alexander invaded Persia, Memnon urged Darius to take the initiative by using Persian gold to foment rebellion in Greece. Darius initially rejected that advice, but after the Persian defeat at Granicus awarded Memnon command of the western satrapies. Memnon organized the defense of Halicarnassus when Alexander besieged the city, and was nearly successful. More importantly, he employed Persia's naval superiority to initiate an island hopping campaign and negotiations with Sparta to take the war to Greece by sea. Unfortunately for Persia, Memnon died besieging Mytilene in 333, but his amphibious campaign and the Spartan-led insurrection he incited posed the greatest threat to Alexander's rule since he became king. Had Memnon lived, Alexander might have been forced to abandon Asia Minor and return home to defend his throne. As it was, Memnon's near success drove Alexander to eliminate the threat by conquering Phoenicia before driving into the Persian interior.

Memnon's widow, Barsine, later became Alexander's mistress and gave birth to a son, Heracles, who briefly contested for Alexander's throne. Alexander's admiral Nearchus married Barsine's daughter by Mentor, and initially supported Heracles' bid for the throne, but met with no support. Barsine and Heracles were murdered by Polyperchon in 309.

Carl Otis Schuster

See also Agis III; Agis III, Revolt against Macedon; Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon; Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon, Invasion of Persian Empire; Artaxerxes III; Byzantium, Byzantines; Darius III; Halicarnassus; Nearchus; Polyperchon

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Memorials. See *Commemoration*

Mentor. See *Memnon and Mentor of Rhodes*

Mercenaries

Mercenaries played an integral role in the warfare of the ancient Greeks from earliest times to the Hellenistic monarchies. However, although men who served purely for profit rather than for honor or fidelity must have existed since the earliest times, the ancient Greeks never had a term that explicitly identified a mercenary.

The first mercenaries of Archaic Greece probably emerged in the Homeric culture of reciprocal relationships and aristocratic friendships known under terms relating to *xenia* (guest-friendship). *Xenoi*, technically foreigners, ranged from friends and allies to mercenaries. Homer also calls some of the allies of Priam at Troy *epikouroi*. The *epikouros* resembles closely the mercenary or ally, a foreigner literally fighting alongside those directly involved in a war. The poet Archilochus identifies himself as such an *epikouros* and *epikouroi* appear quite commonly in Herodotus in the service of others. Importantly, Herodotus (2.152, 163.1–3) styled the 30,000 Carians and Ionians who found service with Psammetichus in 664 as “*epikouroi*.” Such *epikouroi* served in foreign armies as late as the late fifth and early fourth centuries. Arcadia was one of the main sources of Greek mercenaries in classical antiquity—according to Xenophon’s *Hellenica*, Lycomedes the Arcadian asserted that whenever anyone wanted *epikouroi* they came to Arcadia. *Epikouria* and *xenia*-relationships brought allies together in service, even though such terms hid the mercenary nature of the relationship. Inevitably, booty and profits accrued at the conclusion of

hostilities were shared among the successful combatants.

In the late sixth century, the spread of coinage as a form of money in the Greek world transformed military relationships. Coins emerged simultaneously and symbiotically with more blatant mercenary relationships. A new term also emerged for a man who took pay for service: the *misthophoros* (“wage taker” or “wage carrier”). In time, *misthophoros* displaced terms like *epikouros* and *xenos* in referring to mercenaries. Coins transformed all manner of military relationships. The coin taken as a wage (*misthos*) mitigated the need for a state or a general to divide up the booty at the end of a campaign, as had been the case with allies and guest-friends. Coinage, therefore, ushered in a new era of military service. The first large-scale wage earners appeared in naval contexts because of the requirements of Greek navies for thousands of oarsmen drawn from poorer status groups who needed payment to induce them into service. As the fifth century progressed, wage earners appeared more regularly in land armies, both as citizen-soldiers and as mercenaries. *Misthophoros* carried some stigma, especially for those in the service of others for payment, but it was not until the fourth century and later that sources talk in terms of foreign wage earners specifically as in the *xenoi-misthophoroi* found in later sources like Arrian.

The Greek *polis*-navies led the way in providing pay and opportunities for service to large numbers of increasingly professional oarsmen and specialist crews. The Athenian navy is a good example of this development. This navy had been hugely expanded after the chance discovery of a rich seam of silver (the basis of Greek coinages) and its crews received pay from as early as the Persian War period. As the fifth century progressed and Athens’ empire drew resources from the Aegean into the state, the navy became more and more coin-oriented and increasingly more professional oarsmen, both citizens and foreigners (*xenoi*), rowed for the Athenians.

Mercenaries provided useful support for the regimes of sixth century tyrants in Greek cities. Tyrants used coins to draw men from beyond the immediate aristocratic circle to their cause. Often these men came from beyond the *polis*. This was certainly the case for Peisistratus and we are told explicitly by Herodotus and the *Athenaion Politeia* that when he finally established his tyranny he did so with both silver from the mines of the northern Aegean and mercenaries provided by fellow tyrants at Argos and Naxos.

The fifth century saw increased monetization in the Aegean. The Athenian use of coined money as the medium of exchange within its empire for its system of tribute and its means of paying and maintaining its navy significantly increased professional and mercenary conditions. The Peloponnesian War of 431-404 added impetus to the increasingly professional and financial nature of warfare. Several speeches in Thucydides—even at the start of war—allude to the power of money as a means of attracting oarsmen in particular from the Athenian cause. Eventually, the naval crews of Persian-funded Sparta received coins in great quantities. Persian funds provided pay at a higher rate than those of Athens, luring mercenary oarsmen away from Athenian fleets.

The Peloponnesian War had seen a steady increase in mercenary infantry units and guards with tyrants, Persian satraps and some states on the periphery of the Greek world. The most important turning point in the history of Greek mercenary service, however, took place at the end of the fifth century. In 404, the Great King of Persia died, leaving his empire to Artaxerxes II. A younger brother, Cyrus, who had been instrumental in providing Sparta with the resources to defeat Athens, rose in revolt and had many of his Greek guest-friends (*xenoi*) and the Spartans as his allies bring men to him to overthrow the Great King. Xenophon, who served on this expedition recorded the story of how the Greeks followed Cyrus to the heart of the Persian Empire and defeated the Great King at Cunaxa only to see Cyrus himself killed, forcing them to return to the Greek world north via the Tigris and over the Caucasus Mountains to the Black Sea. This work, called the *Anabasis*, provides a very detailed account of a mercenary army in Asia, with information as to how the army was gathered, paid and organized.

Xenophon was a guest-friend of a Theban named Proxenus who was in turn a guest-friend of Cyrus. This set of relationships illustrates neatly the way that mercenary service worked in the Classical Period. Aristocratic friends of powerful people brought into service others with whom they were already connected. Local elites might bring large groups with them in a chain reaction not dissimilar, perhaps, to Homeric heroes bringing with them bands of men from home to serve in the armies of more powerful rulers who were their own guest-friends. The military structure of this army reflected that of the regular *polis*. Generals (*strategoi*) provided an inner council and link to the paymaster. File-leaders, usually translated as

captains (*lochagoi*), commanded the smaller contingents of varying sizes and the regular soldiers made up a large assembly that received information and heard debates and orders conducted by their high command in much the same way as the Athenian democratic assembly on the Pnyx.

Cyrus offered the men good pay for service, initially a Daric a month or about a drachma a day and bonuses on completion of the job. This would appear to represent a very good daily wage. Although pay rates varied, oarsmen and hoplites in Athens might expect between a drachma or (more commonly) half that; three obols. The men also received assistance with supplies—a market travelled with the army to assist them with food provisioning. The *Anabasis* represents a significant and transformative moment in mercenary service because of the numbers of men involved and the ambition of the enterprise more than the mercenary service itself. Over 10,000 Greek hoplites followed Cyrus deep into the Persian Empire to overthrow the Persian king. The importance of the hoplite was a driving force of mercenary service. The Persian elites served as cavalry and infantry generally armed with bows, short spears and small wicker shields (see illustration in Persian (Achaemenid) Empire entry). They could draw on ample levies of light-armed troops from their imperial domains. The Greeks offered them the hoplite or heavy infantryman, adding significantly to Persian military power.

The fourth century represents the great age of Greek mercenary service in the Mediterranean. Greek hoplites found themselves serving the governors of the western Persian Empire and the Great King in an increasingly less stable environment. Several wars fought for control of Egypt in the 380s, 360s, and 340s and an enormous satrapal revolt from 366–360 kept thousands of Greeks employed in mercenary service. Similarly, in the west, the great tyrant of Syracuse in Sicily Dionysius I employed mainland Greeks in his wars against his neighbors and more significantly against the Carthaginians. By 340 Carthage too had begun to employ mercenaries from mainland Greece. Finally, Alexander's conquest of the Persian Empire saw as many as 50,000 Greeks fight for the Persians, and a good number served Alexander as well. On the other hand, Greek cities began employing light-armed infantry from the northern Aegean, most notably the peltasts of Thrace, to augment their heavily armed hoplite forces. This movement of heavy infantry out of Greece and specialist light infantry into the mainland illustrates nicely that mercenary service was

demand driven as states sought to increase their power in arms in which they were weak. Even the wars of the Greek mainland saw increasing mercenary activity. The Third Sacred War over Delphi (356–346) saw the Phocians melt down the sacred treasures of the sanctuary into coins to employ thousands of mercenaries in their defense. The fourth century experienced much mercenary activity. Treatises appeared on how to employ mercenaries; philosophers and orators discussed them and their usefulness and at the same time lamented the loss of the past as a golden age of citizen-amateurs. That said, the citizen-hoplites still fought and died in defense of their states and all the major pitched battles of the century from Coronea to Chaeronea were fought primarily by Greek citizen soldiers.

Alexander's death and the wars of the Successors mark another turning point in the history of mercenary service. In the new circumstances of the Hellenistic Period and the new kingdoms created in the wake of Alexander's conquests, and the money that these had released into circulation from the vaults of Persia's treasuries, the generals sought to employ Macedonians and Greeks in as large numbers as possible. Rewards for service peaked again as competition for good soldiers increased exponentially. The absence of old national identities in this age saw professionalism more firmly rooted in military relationships. To this age belong the first contracts between paymasters, the emerging Hellenistic kings, and their men in the form of inscriptions. Such contracts were something new and soldiers were now professionals, tied to their kings and to their units. In this age, tellingly, the generic Greek word for a soldier—*stratiotes*—represents a professional and the citizen amateur requires definition.

As the Hellenistic monarchies became more established, the kings attracted soldiers to them with offers of pay and bonuses. In Egypt, the Ptolemies settled veterans on land. Initially this successfully bound men to the king, but the decline in Macedonian and Greek military strength in Egypt was stark in the third century, culminating in the need to enroll native Egyptians into the army that won at Raphia in 217. In Asia, the Seleucids enjoyed longer and more settled military stability through the use of military colonies of active servicemen. These colonies laid the foundations for a military class that replenished itself with each new generation. The core of the royal armies became established, embedded, and professional. However, mercenaries from outside the kings' domains continued to play important roles in the armies of the Hellenistic monarchs.

Peoples on the periphery of major powers provided specialists for the royal armies. Cretan archers, Balearic slingers, Thracian peltasts, and Galatian light infantry all saw service as the Hellenistic Period drew on.

Matthew Trundle

See also Archilochus; Coinage; Command Structures, Army; Contracts, Military; Cunaxa, Battle of; Cyrus the Younger; Dionysius I of Syracuse; Diplomacy; Egypt, Egyptians; Finance and War; Harpalus; Homeric Warfare; Military Service, Greek States and; Pay, Military; Plunder and Booty; Taenarum; Ten Thousand, March of the; Tyrants, Tyranny

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Mesopotamia

Often considered the cradle of civilization, Mesopotamia is the area encompassing the Tigris and Euphrates river valleys; most of it is in present day Iraq. Mesopotamia was part of the so-called Fertile Crescent, a region of good agricultural land in an otherwise arid landscape. From the third to first millennia the area was home to groups such as the Sumerians, Akkadians, Assyrians, and Babylonians who, directly and indirectly, had a great cultural influence on the Greeks. From the sixth century the area was under the control of the Persian Empire, until Alexander the Great conquered it in 331. Babylon on the Euphrates was the great city of the empire, and also the place where Alexander died in 323. In the Hellenistic Period, Mesopotamia formed part of the Seleucid Empire, before it was lost to the Parthians in the second century.

See also Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon, Invasion of Persian Empire; Parthia, Parthians; Persian (Achaemenid) Empire; Seleucids

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Messana. See *Zancle/Messana*

Messenia

Messenia is the large region in the southwest Peloponnese bounded by Triphylia and southern Arcadia to the north and separated from Laconia to the east by the Taygetus range. The region is hilly and has heavy rainfall. It has abundant pasturage and arable land, including one of the most fertile areas in Greece, the Macaria plain on the lower River Pamisus. The Spartan poet Tyrtaeus described Messenia as “good to sow and good to plough.”

In the eighth century, Messenia was conquered by Sparta in the First Messenian War (traditionally ca. 736–716) and its population mostly reduced to the status of Helots. A great revolt in the seventh century, the Second Messenian War (ca. 650–630), ended in failure and resulted in tighter Spartan control. A revolt ca. 465–456, the Third Messenian War, also failed. Messenian refugees were settled at Naupactus in Western Locris ca. 456 by Tolmides and served Athens in the Second Peloponnesian War. When the war ended they were expelled from Naupactus. Some are found serving as mercenaries with Conon ca. 396 (*Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* 20.3).

In winter 370/69 a Boeotian-led army liberated Messenia after invading and ravaging Laconia. A new Messenian state, one of the great achievements of Epaminondas’ leadership, was formed, with a newly built city on Mount Ithôme. This site had been the stronghold of Messenian resistance in the Third Messenian War. The new city, known as Messene, was protected by a 6-mile (9.5-kilometer) circuit of fortification walls, constructed to the highest contemporary standards of town-fortification. The walls are the best surviving example of fourth-century fortification (see

first illustration in Fortifications entry). Messenia also included a number of towns that had been *Perioikoi* under Spartan domination. The relationship to the Messenian state in Hellenistic times of such places as Asine, Corone, and Mothone is not certain.

The bitter hostility of Sparta to the new Messenian state forced it to rely upon the protection of its ally Boeotia. When the Third Sacred War (356–346) limited Boeotia's capacity to assist, Messenia turned elsewhere for friends. It made an alliance with Athens in about 355 but, despite a later alliance with Athens and thanks to Philip of Macedon's careful cultivation of it from about 348 on, opted for prudent neutrality when Athens and its old friend Boeotia went to war with Philip (340–338). After the battle of Chaeronea (338), Messenia was a favored ally of Philip's. Messenia joined the anti-Macedonian side in the Lamian War (323–322).

Messenia was caught up in the power struggles of the generations after Alexander the Great's death. Cassander attacked it in 316 and Demetrius Poliorcetes in 295. Faced with continuing hostility from Sparta, Messenia was also often on bad terms with its Arcadian neighbors, mainly because of disputes over territory that was absorbed into the new foundation of Megalopolis. The failure of Messene and Megalopolis to form a common front against their enemy Sparta illustrates how common bad relations between neighboring Greek states were.

Messenia was also opposed to the growing power of the Achaean League in the Peloponnese in the late third and early second centuries. The reasons for this are not clear. Messenia was often allied with the Achaean League's enemies, Elis and Aetolia. Messenia was never a decisive force in Peloponnesian affairs and was often a source of instability because of its feuds. It was finally incorporated by force into the Achaean League in 182 (Polybius 23.17).

Douglas Kelly

See also Achaean League; Aetolia, Aetolian League; Epaminondas; Helots; Messenian War, First, Second, and Third; *Perioikoi*; Tolmides; Tyrtaeus

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Messenian War, First (ca. 736–716)

The First Messenian War refers to the Spartan conquest of Messenia in the eighth century. It lasted for 20 years and was fought by “our fathers’ fathers” according to the Spartan poet Tyrtaeus (ca. 680–620), quoted by Pausanias (4.6.5) and traditionally dated 736–716. The Spartan subjugation of Messenia about this time is historical fact. The detailed narrative given by Pausanias is part of a patriotic Messenian history fabricated well after the liberation of Messenia in 370/69.

Douglas Kelly

See also Messenia; Messenian War, Second; Sparta; Tyrtaeus

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Messenian War, Second (ca. 650–630)

The Second Messenian War refers to a great rebellion by the Messenian Helots against their Spartan overlords in the seventh century and is traditionally dated ca. 650–630. That it reportedly lasted 20 years, the same as the First Messenian War, should worry historians. Even more so should the fact the main source is the elaborate and detailed narrative given by Pausanias, author of a learned travel-guide, *Description of Greece* (lived ca. 150 CE).

Pausanias says (4.15) that he had to choose for his accounts of the Messenian Wars between two sources: Myron of Priene (a third-century historian) and Rhianus of Bene in Crete (a third-century epic poet, author of various lost epics on early history). Why Pausanias chose these two, and

not, say, the standard historical work of Ephorus is to do with the way writers of his day cultivated out-of-the-way erudition. A more pressing historical problem is raised by Pausanias himself: Myron assigned the legendary Messenian hero Aristomenes to the First War while Rhianus assigned him to the Second. The wars are too far apart in time for one man to be in both, and Pausanias preferred Rhianus. However, stories could easily cluster around a legendary Robin-Hood-like figure such as Aristomenes, without any historical basis.

That Messenian folk-memory preserved stories of the great rebellion is likely. That these stories preserved detailed, accurate accounts of alliance-making (and breaking), battles and the feats of individuals is extremely unlikely. It goes against all that is known of orally transmitted traditions in the absence of written historical records.

Possibly some authentic memories are preserved in the mass of tradition that Pausanias records. Exploits of Aristomenes, the gallant leader to the end of the failed resistance, would be lovingly remembered, but freely embroidered and expanded. Memories of the place-names of great battles, such as the battle of the Great Trench (Pausanias 4.17.2) might survive but little else that is authentic. To use the accounts of the First and Second Messenian Wars for the history of hoplite warfare or anything else is naïve.

Douglas Kelly

See also Ephorus; Hoplites; Messenia; Messenian War, First; Phalanx; Sparta

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Messenian War, Third (ca. 465–456)

The Third Messenian War marked a critical stage in Greek diplomatic history. What began as a Helot revolt grew into the dissolution of the

Hellenic League, the alliance that fought the Persians, and the inception of the open hostilities that ravaged Greece throughout the rest of the fifth century.

At some point between 469 and 464, a destructive earthquake hit Sparta, devastating the city and leaving its citizens vulnerable. Many Helots used the opportunity to revolt, citing the continued Spartan mistreatment of their people. Along with the *Perioikoi* of Aethaea and Thuria, the Helots moved west and gathered in their traditional homeland of Messenia. The Spartans attempted to end the rebellion by sending Arimnestus, the man who supposedly killed Mardonius at the battle of Plataea, with 300 picked men to Messenia. At the short battle of Stenyclerus, Arimnestus and all 300 Spartans fell to a well-organized, and much larger, Messenian army. The Messenians were well trained in the Spartan way of war, as many likely fought at Plataea alongside Arimnestus.

Sometime after the battle, the Messenians moved to a well-fortified position on Mount Ithôme. With their city in ruin and the rebellion growing stronger, the Spartans appealed for help from allies, most notably the Athenians, who were more skilled in siege warfare. The Athenians responded by sending a large force of 1,000 under Cimon, but their involvement could not sway the war.

The Spartans then became paranoid, thinking that the new political policies of the Athenians might eventually have them side with the rebels. Unceremoniously, the Spartans dismissed the Athenians while keeping the rest of the allies in place. The Spartans contended that they simply no longer needed the assistance of the Athenians, but the Athenians caught wind of what they thought were unwarranted Spartan suspicions. Upon returning to Athens, the Athenians immediately broke the alliance with Sparta that had been formed against the Persians (ca. 481) and allied themselves with Sparta's traditional Peloponnesian enemy, Argos. They also allied with the Thessalians and the Megarians, and began construction of defensive works in preparation for war with Sparta.

Meanwhile, the Spartans continued their siege of the Messenians. After a prolonged affair, the two sides came to terms. The Spartans allowed the Messenians to safely leave Mount Ithôme on condition that they were not to return to the Peloponnese. Seeing another opportunity to work against the Spartans, the Athenians settled the Messenians in the strategic position of Naupactus, a city taken from the Western Locrians and located on the north

coast of the Gulf of Corinth. In that location, the Messenians would prove to be a valuable asset for the Athenians throughout the Peloponnesian Wars.

Robert T. Jones

See also Cimon; Hellenic League (against Persians); Helots; Messenia; Messenian Wars, First and Second; Naupactus; Peloponnesian War, First; Peloponnesian War, Second; Plataea, Battle of; Sparta

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Metic

A metic (Greek *metoikos*, plural, *metoikoi*) was a formally recognized resident alien or foreigner. Although they existed in other states (Sparta is an exception), the best evidence is for Athens. There, metics paid a special tax that entitled them to live in Athens, with civic obligations but limited rights. A metic was registered in the deme where he lived and had to have a *prostates* or sponsor who was a citizen.

Metics were eligible for military service and some liturgies (compulsory public functions involving service and/or expense)—but not being a trierarch. They contributed to the *eisphora* (war tax) when it was levied. A metic could not legally marry a citizen or (unless they had a special exemption) own land or a house. What they gained was permanent residency, protection in the courts (there were fines for unsuccessful prosecutions of metics), and financial equality with citizens. Many were involved in commerce or manufacturing.

Metics could be vulnerable in times of crisis. For example, under the Thirty Tyrants wealthy metics seem to have been particularly targeted for arrest and execution. Although largely a means of raising money, it seems likely that the fact they were non-Athenians (or even non-Greek) was a factor.

Iain Spence

See also Athens, Restoration of Democracy

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Miletus

Miletus was one of the most prominent *poleis* in Archaic Ionia. The settlement lay on the coast, on the southern side of the Gulf of Latmus, near the mouth of the Maeander River. Today the site, in modern Aydın province in Turkey, is several kilometers inland, as silting by the river has turned the gulf into a broad plain nourishing cotton crops. The site of Miletus was situated on generally flat ground with a small hill, Kalabaktepe, to the south. The earliest Bronze Age settlement had been on an offshore island, giving protection from threats from the mainland. By the Late Bronze Age, the settlement had moved to the mainland, where a small peninsula flanked by two good harbors was fortified. In the Archaic Period, in the seventh century, walls were erected on Kalabaktepe.

Miletus was famous for its wealth, and was one of the major Ionian contributors to the Delian League in the fifth century. Its military power was great, and it contributed 80 ships to the battle of Lade in 494. Even in the Late Bronze Age, the Hittites knew Miletus as a formidable neighbor. In its prime, Miletus controlled an extensive territory of between 150 and 2,000 square kilometers (around 60 to 770 square miles), and established a reputed 90 colonies in the Aegean, the Black Sea and elsewhere. By the late Archaic Period, especially in the sixth and early fifth centuries, Miletus had become the most important intellectual center in the Greek world, and was home to several prominent pre-Socratic philosophers.

In the late sixth century, Miletus suffered, according to Herodotus, a series of annual Lydian invasions, but withstood these due to its fortifications and its control of the sea. In 499, Aristagoras, the tyrant of Miletus, instigated the Ionian Revolt against the Persians. The revolt effectively ended with defeat at the battle of Lade in 494, at which Milesian naval supremacy was broken. After the battle the Persians besieged and sacked the city. Fifteen years later, Miletus fought on the Persian side at the

battle of Mycale in 479, but it was an uneasy alliance that culminated with Miletus betraying and attacking the Persians. After Mycale, Miletus joined the Delian League, and in 440 gained the League's protection against an aggressive Samos. On the other hand, Miletus revolted against Athens on two occasions, in 454 and 412.

Passing back under Persian control after the Second Peloponnesian War, Miletus never regained its former strength. Its most enduring conflict then was not with foreign powers, but with the water that sustained it, as the progradation of the Meander River into the Gulf of Latmus slowly transformed the ocean into land, prompting territorial conflict with neighbors such as Myous. Miletus resisted Alexander the Great in 334, but was captured by force. Passing back and forward among large powers through the Hellenistic Period, it eventually ended up under Roman rule, where it endured as an important site until the Maeander eventually reduced the harbor of Miletus to a muddy swamp.

Lachlan McColl

See also Athens, Revolts of Allies; Delian League/Athenian Empire; Ionia, Ionians; Ionian Revolt; Lade, Battle of; Mycale, Battle of

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Miletus, Battle of (411)

The battle of Miletus was an Athenian victory during the Peloponnesian War (431–404). An Athenian force under Phrynichus, Onomacles, and Scironides, consisting of 3,500 hoplites (including 1,000 allies and 1,500 Argives—500 of whom were light troops provided with Athenian armor)

was attempting to secure the strategic coastal city of Miletus. The Milesian force consisted of 800 hoplites, supported by an unknown number of Peloponnesian hoplites, mercenaries, and Persian cavalry under Tissaphernes. Alcibiades fought alongside the Milesians. The Argives, advancing overconfidently, were routed by the Milesians, losing around 300 men, but the Milesians withdrew when the Athenians drove back the Peloponnesians and Persians. The Athenians set up a trophy and began to besiege the city but withdrew when they learned of an inbound Peloponnesian relief fleet. Thucydides comments favorably on Phrynichus' prudence in avoiding battle—in contrast to his colleagues who wished to stay and fight.

Iain Spence

See also Alcibiades; Hellespont Campaign; Peloponnesian War, Second

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Miletus, Siege of (494)

Toward the end of the Ionian Revolt (499–493), the Persians attacked Miletus, the epicenter of the rebellion. As supplies could be brought in by sea the presence of the Ionian fleet at nearby Lade precluded an effective siege. However, when this fleet was defeated, the city was subject to a full investment by land and sea. The details are scant, but the Persians used a variety of tactics, including undermining the walls, to take the city. Most of the male inhabitants were killed and the women and children enslaved; some survivors were relocated to the mouth of the Tigris River on the Persian Gulf. The Persians retained the city and surrounding plain but gave the hilly parts of the Milesian *chora* to local Carians.

The Athenian tragedian Phrynichus wrote a play about the capture of Miletus—one of the few known about a contemporary event. Although the play does not survive, it was apparently so moving that the Athenians fined Phrynichus for the distress he had caused and banned further performances. After the loss at Lade and the siege of Miletus, the Ionian Revolt was

effectively over apart from mopping up.

Iain Spence

See also Ionian Revolt; Lade, Battle of; Miletus

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Military Service, Greek States and

All Greek states in the Classical Period, including Athens, fielded contingents of hoplite infantry drawn exclusively from the citizen body, who were armed for hand-to-hand combat with a spear, usually protected by bronze or composite body armor, and always carried a large round shield (see illustrations in Hoplite entry). These soldiers and their equipment were especially well adapted to fight in what was known as the phalanx formation—a tightly organized battle formation usually composed of eight parallel ranks and as many files as there were men to fill them (see first illustration in Phalanx entry). Universally in the Greek *poleis* of the fifth century, citizens who could afford the cost of the hoplite’s equipment were required to serve the state throughout all of their adult lives. In Athens, for example, men whose families met a certain property qualification were enrolled in the ranks of the hoplite force (*catalogus*) at the age of 18 and could be called on to serve until they reached the age of 60. In return, Athenian hoplites were entitled, expected, and in some cases required to participate directly in the political life of the state.

Most believe that hoplites represented a kind of “middle class” in most Greek city-states during the Archaic and Classical Periods (700–323), consisting largely of independent farmers and landowners. As a propertied class in the state, these citizens would have been able to afford the cost of the weapons and armor and were capable of absorbing the economic strain of prolonged absence from home during the campaigning season. The loss of

the hoplite's labor on the family farm, it is thought, could have been offset by the labor of slaves who would have been owned by moderately prosperous households. Furthermore, many believe that as the hoplite phalanx became the dominant force on the battlefields of Archaic Greece, those who fought also came to dominate the political field, developing a sense of class ideology and solidarity that ultimately forced the local aristocracies to cede power.

In democratic Athens, where political distinctions between property classes gradually diminished, military class distinctions always remained important, at least as long as individuals were responsible for supplying their own equipment. Even at Sparta, where all adult male citizens were provided with weapons, armor, and extensive training, citizens were nonetheless required to contribute a significant amount of food and drink to the public messes.

Other oligarchic states also tended to align political rights with the obligation of military service. Military service was compulsory for the politically enfranchised, who could actually be fined for not owning the proper military equipment. In some states, those who did not meet a property qualification may even have been prohibited from possessing hoplite arms and armor, though they may have still performed voluntary military service as light troops (*psiloi*, *gymnoi*).

Prior to the fourth century, there is no evidence that Greek soldiers, other than the Spartans, received any formal military training. In his explanation of their military system, Xenophon implies that Spartan hoplites were capable of maneuvers, such as a unique counter-march technique, that no other Greek army could achieve. In the fourth century, there is some evidence that training had become a more common part of military service, such as the Athenian *epheboi*, though such training regimens may have been necessary due to the increasing use of more specialized and sometimes more professional soldiers, such as peltasts and mercenaries.

Some states also experimented as early as the sixth century with the use of specially selected and trained units of 300 men, kept under arms at state expense. At Sparta, they were known as the *Hippeis* ("Horsemen"), and at Thebes they were initially called the "Charioteers" and later reconstituted as the "Sacred Band." Athens too possessed a specially trained unit of 300 men, who Herodotus says scored a significant victory at the battle of Plataea (379)

against some Persian cavalry.

Although the evidence is sparse, sometimes hoplites attempted to evade military service. The frequency of evasion is not certain, nor is it clear how often individuals were prosecuted for it, but service evasion is routinely mentioned in Athenian forensic oratory, comedy, and drama, indicating it posed problems for the efficient mobilization of hoplites.



The remains of the Monument of the Eponymous Heroes, mid-fourth century, Agora, Athens. Bronze statues of the patron heroes of the ten Athenian tribes formed the centerpiece of this monument, where the Athenians posted public notices. These included white boards (see Document 6) listing the names of men called for service, or those tribes whose troops were to report for a campaign or expedition. (Photo by Iain Spence)

Michael Quinn

See also Agoge; Arms and Armor; Catalogus (Katalogos); Demography, Military; Elite Troops; Finance and War; Herodotus; Hoplites; Light Troops; Mercenaries; Peltast; Phalanx; Sacred Band; Sparta; Training

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Document 6; Thucydides 2.13.6–7; Xenophon, *Hellenica* 1.1.34, 1.4.21; *Ath. Pol.* 7.3–4, 42.4, 49.2, 53.4; Aristotle, *Politics* 1273b36–9, 1274a16–22, 1297b1–2; Diodorus 11.81.4, 11.84.4–5; Plutarch, *Pericles* 18, *Phocion* 10,

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Miltiades I, Son of Cypselus (Sixth Century)

Miltiades was a member of the great Athenian family, the Philaids, and was a great-uncle of the fifth-century general, Cimon. Miltiades' father was an Athenian Cypselus, probably so named due to family connections with the family of Cypselus of Corinth. Miltiades was an Olympic victor in the four-horse chariot race. In the mid-sixth century, Miltiades left Athens at the invitation of the Dolonci, Thracians living in the Thracian Chersonese, to help defend them from marauding Thracians from outside the peninsula. He set up a personal fiefdom on the peninsula, with his base at Agora near the neck. To defend it, he built a wall across the narrowest part of the peninsula, from Cardia to Pactye. Herodotus suggests he did this because he did not want to live in Athens under Peisistratus, though Peisistratid policy was also interested in the Hellespont area. Making war on Lampsacus, on the other side of the Propontis, he was captured but released, according to Herodotus, through the intervention of Croesus of Lydia (this part is probably apocryphal). He died childless, and rule of the Chersonese passed to his nephew, Stesagoras, and thence to Miltiades II. After his death, the people of the Chersonese set up a hero cult for Miltiades.

Peter Londev

See also Chersonese, Thracian; Cypselus; Miltiades II, Son of Cimon; Peisistratus; Thrace, Thracians

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Miltiades II, Son of Cimon (d. 489)

Miltiades, son of Cimon, was a member of the Athenian aristocratic house of the Philaids, and is most famous as the victorious general at the battle of Marathon in 490. He was the nephew of Miltiades I, son of Cypselus, the local ruler of the Thracian Chersonese. Miltiades I's successor, Miltiades II's brother, Stesagoras, was soon after murdered with an ax while fighting a war with Lampsacus. Miltiades' father, Cimon, had been murdered by the Peisistratids (sons of the tyrant Peisistratus), yet the Peisistratids now sent Miltiades out to maintain Athens' interest in the Chersonese. Miltiades' rule was less amicable than his uncle's: he used a ruse to seize the most powerful men from the cities of the Chersonese, and ruled with the aid of 500 Thracian mercenaries. He also married a Thracian princess, Hegesipyle, daughter of Olorus. (The historian Thucydides' father was also called Olorus, and was no doubt related to Miltiades' family).

When Darius I invaded Scythia in 513, Miltiades supported a Scythian suggestion that the Ionians break down the bridges over the Ister (Danube) River, leaving Darius trapped; but he was overruled by the Ionian tyrants, who owed their rule to Darius. Nevertheless the Scythians, stirred up by Darius' invasion, attacked the Chersonese, and Miltiades vacated his holdings for three years. Returning, in about 496 he took advantage of favorable winds to sail from Elaious to the island of Lemnos in one day, expelled the inhabitants, and acquired the island for Athens. After the failure of the Ionian Revolt, Miltiades again fled the Chersonese. A son by his first marriage, Metiochus, was captured and sent to Darius I, who treated him well and gave him land and a Persian wife; his children were regarded as Persians.

Miltiades returned to Athens, but there found himself brought to trial by his enemies on the charge of being a tyrant on the Chersonese. Acquitted, he was elected one of the 10 generals for 490/89, and thus was one of the commanders at Marathon. According to Herodotus, Miltiades' was the decisive voice in favor of fighting the Persians at Marathon, and was the commander on the day of the battle. With his new won prestige, the following year (489) Miltiades was given a force of 70 ships and laid siege to the island city of Paros, allegedly due to a personal grudge against a particular Parian. The 26-day siege was unsuccessful and Miltiades returned to Athens, having achieved nothing, and nursing an infected thigh wound

(incurred, according to a no doubt hostile story, while trying to burgle a sanctuary). Once again he was put on trial, this time by Xanthippus, the father of Pericles. Too ill to speak, he was defended by friends and relatives, who reminded the jurors of his services at Lemnos and Marathon. He was fined the enormous sum of 50 talents, but died soon afterward from his wound, leaving his son Cimon, the famous fifth-century general, to pay the debt.

Peter Londey

See also Chersonese, Thracian; Cimon; Darius I; Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros; Marathon, Battle of; Miltiades I, Son of Cypselus; Peisistratus; Scythia, Scythians; Thucydides; Xanthippus (Athenian)

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Mithridates VI Eupator (Reigned ca. 113–65)

Mithridates VI Eupator was as an ambitious king of the mountainous and partially Hellenized Anatolian state of Pontus. His Iranian dynasty, having two centuries of ties with the Seleucids, had assumed some Greek cultural characteristics by the second century including the use of the Greek language for official matters. His father had assisted Rome against Carthage in the Third Punic War (149–146) and against Aristonicus' revolt (132–129) and was given Phrygia as a reward. He married a Seleucid princess and was assassinated in 120, at which point Mithridates inherited the Pontic kingship around the age of 11. He endured a number of murderous intrigues resulting in him killing his own mother and a brother. He obtained most terrain surrounding the Black Sea, gaining resources and soldiers. He took over Bithynia and Cappadocia while the Romans fought the Social War (91–87). Alarmed, Rome sent special legates to force Mithridates to recognize Bithynia and Cappadocia's respective kings and to remove his armies from these places, then urged Bithynia's king to invade Pontus and seize booty to compensate the Romans for their assistance. However, in 90 Mithridates defeated this king, attacked Pergamum and gruesomely killed a Roman

envoy. The period of 89–88 saw many cities in Asia Minor welcome Mithridates as *Soter* or Savior. He then built a fleet to attack Rhodes and ordered his satraps and the magistrates of the cities in Anatolia to order a simultaneous mass murder of all Romans and Italians of both sexes and all ages, and to share these victims' valuables with Mithridates. Slaves betraying or killing their masters were offered freedom; debtors killing their (presumably Italian) creditors were offered 50 percent debt-remission. Atrocities are reported for Ephesus, Pergamum, Adramyttium, Caunus, and Tralles among other cities. Later called the "Asiatic Vespers," the massacre involved between 80,000 to 150,000 casualties and sparked a swift Roman military response.

Support for Mithridates evidences a common anti-Roman attitude. Anti-Roman sentiment in the Greek East was surely aroused by usurious and extortive Roman tax collectors and a proliferation of underground anti-Roman literature supports this. We can conjecture that Mithridates helped mold this frustration into a resistance movement. However, Appian reports that the mass murders were sparked not only by hatred of Rome, but also by fear of Mithridates. Lucius Cornelius Sulla punished several Greek cities for supporting Mithridates, for example, looting Athens in 86, and defeated Mithridates thoroughly in 85. Shortly after this, Mithridates was made *amicus* of Rome, paid indemnities, and surrendered his Asia Minor acquisitions and warships. The Roman province of Asia was forced to pay ruinous indemnities. Mithridates rose again in the 70s, assisted by his son-in-law Tigranes. The Roman general Lucullus patiently warred for seven years against Mithridates, ejecting him from Pontus. Finally Pompey pursued him until in southern Russia in 63 he committed suicide, the last hope of the Greeks against the Romans.

Timothy Doran

See also Pontus. *Roman Section*: Mithridates VI of Pontus; Mithridatic Revolt; Mithridatic Wars; Pompey; Sulla, Lucius Cornelius

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Munychia, Battle of (404). See *Athens, Restoration of Democracy*

Music

Sparta, as the most militaristic of the Greek city-states, is where we might expect to find evidence of the formal use of military music, and we are not disappointed. Ancient commentators noted the Spartans' use of panpipes and flutes in the ranks to keep the army "in step," as if this were an unusual practice in need of some explanation (e.g., Plutarch, *Lycurgus* 21; *Moralia* 238b-c). Plutarch even goes as far as to say that Lycurgus had made it a legal requirement.

A passage in Thucydides describes the use of music to keep order before the battle of Mantinea in 418 (see also the illustration in the "Chigi Vase" entry). After the sacrifices and the opposing generals had made speeches and the Spartan soldiers had sung their war songs, Thucydides (5.70) records the advance of the two armies into battle as follows:

... the Argives and their allies advanced with great fury, but the Spartans advanced slowly in step with their many flute-players. This custom was not a religious matter, but it was designed to help them keep in unison and to move forward steadily without breaking ranks, as great armies can do when they are confronting an enemy.

Many other cities also used music in battle. Most armies also sang war songs to settle nerves and build camaraderie. Before or during battle, the trumpet or conch could be used by leaders to sound an alarm or predetermined signal.

Music in ancient Greece was also found in the context of military celebration and rites following a victory. Xenophon records a famous moment when the Spartans celebrated the destruction of the Long Walls of

Athens in 404 with girls playing flutes. War dances were celebrated in honor of Zeus and other gods. *Korybantes* were male performers, who celebrated the Phrygian goddess, Cybele, by drumming, stamping, and dancing in armor. In Crete, there were *Kouretes*, who honored Zeus through a similar form of martial dance as part of a rite of passage for young men. The origin of the *Kouretes*, some said, is found in the myth of the birth of Zeus on Crete. To “shield” the cries of the baby from his father, Cronus, who wanted to eat his newborn son, the *Kouretes* clashed their shields and spears, sang and danced.

James McDonald

See also “Chigi Vase”; Mantinea, Battle of (418); Religious Practices before Battle; Sparta

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Mutiny

Mutiny is defined as collective, violent (actual or threatened) opposition to established, regular military authority. Given that definition, most hoplite armies, even Sparta’s, were insufficiently formal in terms of their discipline and punishments to have had the kind of regular authority one can mutiny against. The Macedonian army, however, did have formal discipline and penalties for misbehavior so there we find mutinies, expressions of grievances, and a couple of military conspiracies in addition to insubordination.

There may have been earlier incidents for which no record remains, but historians have traditionally called two incidents during Alexander’s campaign mutiny. One incident, the so-called mutiny at the Hyphasis, was not actually a mutiny because there was no threat of violence and no orders for the soldiers to oppose. This incident is actually another, less serious type of military unrest called an expression of grievances. These less notorious incidents were often insubordinate, but nonviolent, vocal confrontations or

communications in which soldiers typically sought to protest various grievances, real and illusory, and protect their interests. In this case the soldiers communicated their discontent by their silence and then through their officers. The soldiers were successful and during the march down the Indus Alexander restored order.

The Opis mutiny, the only actual mutiny, occurred in 324 when soldiers in Alexander's army mutinied over their discharge and replacement with Persians trained in the Macedonian manner of fighting. The infantry soldiers clamored loudly and even those who were not being discharged refused openly to serve further. In response, Alexander charged the ringleaders and had his bodyguards round them up and execute them. He then harangued the rest of the army and went forward with his plans. In response, the Macedonians begged forgiveness and accepted the reforms so that Alexander took them back and restored order.

The fact that Alexander encountered military unrest in his army does not detract from his reputation as a brilliant leader. Every army commander, even in hoplite armies, faced the threat of indiscipline; forces where discipline was important and enforced were susceptible to mutinies and other serious forms of military unrest. The resolution of such incidents and restoration of order was what distinguished good commanders. After 323, in the Hellenistic world, military unrest would prove to be a significant problem, but in the hoplite armies of Greece there was insubordination, but no incidents that meet the criteria for mutinies.

Lee L. Brice

See also Discipline, Military; Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon; Ten Thousand, March of the

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Mycale, Battle of (479)

The battle of Mycale was the final major engagement of the Second Persian War (480–479). Greek tradition dated the battle to September 479, the same day as the battle of Plataea, but this seems too coincidental to be true.

The Greek fleet under the Spartan king Leotychidas II at Delos was invited to Samos by locals, who guaranteed an easy victory. Herodotus records 110 ships there in 480, but they may have been reinforced (Diodorus has 250 in 479, but this seems too high). The Persians withdrew, beached their ships at Mycale (a promontory on the mainland, on the north of the Bay of Miletus), built a stockade around them, and linked with a 60,000 strong army under Tigranes. Diodorus Siculus records 100,000 men but this is probably a major exaggeration. Unless supplemented by rowers equipped as hoplites or men from troop transports not mentioned in the accounts, the ships’ marines (see illustration in Naval Warfare entry) comprised the sole Greek hoplite force. If so, at a maximum of 30 per ship (the usual complement was 14: 10 hoplites and 4 archers) the Greek hoplites can only at best have numbered between 3,300 and 7,500 and could not have faced a Persian army of this size. The Greeks landed and, encouraged by a rumor that the Persians had been defeated at Plataea that morning, routed the Persians. The Persians’ Ionian Greek allies defected during the battle, joining in the slaughter of the Persian fugitives. Herodotus emphasizes the Athenian role in the battle, while Diodorus has the Persians attack the Greek landing force. Herodotus’ account is probably to be preferred, but the most important aspect of the battle is its result.

Mycale confirmed Greek naval superiority in the Aegean and Hellespont and many of the Aegean islands defected to the Hellenic League. This enabled the Greeks to conduct offensive naval and amphibious operations against the Persians and laid the foundations for the Delian League and Athens’ subsequent maritime empire.

Iain Spence

See also Artemisium, Battle of; Delian League/Athenian Empire; *Epibatai*; Leotychidas II; Persian Wars; Plataea, Battle of; Thermopylae, Battle of

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Mycenae

Mycenae, in the northeast of the Argolid, was such an important Bronze Age palace city that the four centuries of Greek history in which it flourished, are called the Mycenaean Period (ca. 1600 to 1100).

According to legend, Perseus founded Mycenae. In the *Iliad*, it is the seat of Agamemnon, commander of the Greek forces at Troy. Its impressive archaeological remains and preeminence in epic poetry may suggest that it was indeed the major Greek city of the Bronze Age. Homer describes the city as “well-built” and “golden” (*Iliad* 2.569, 7.180, 11.46). Its remains are consistent with this image. In the surviving written records of the Mycenaean palace communities, the Linear B clay tablets, Mycenae also appears as a leading city.

The famous Lion Gate (see illustration) marks the main entrance to the citadel through its cyclopean walls. There are also spectacular corbelled “beehive” tombs, known as *tholoi*. Heinrich Schliemann, who was also the first major excavator of Tiryns and Troy, excavated Mycenae in 1876. He revealed grave circles and rich funerary dedications, including the gold so-called mask of Agamemnon.

Destruction layers are apparent for the late 1200s and the demise of the citadel soon followed. Small contingents of Mycenaean troops fought in the major battles of the Persian War of 480–479, but, as with its Bronze Age neighbor, Tiryns, it was destroyed by the Argives, around 468. Argos seemed intent on appropriating Mycenae’s past glories for itself, as the new power in the region. By 150 CE, Mycenae was largely deserted.

James McDonald



The Lion Gate, the main entrance to the Bronze Age citadel of Mycenae. Built around 1250, the gate is named for the two lionesses depicted on the relieving triangle, which serves to reduce the weight on the 14-foot-long lintel. The structure, with its 9-foot-high doorway, remained visible throughout antiquity, and is mentioned by the second-century-CE traveler Pausanias. (Photo by Peter Londey)

See also Argolid; Argos, Argives; Tiryns; Trojan War

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Myronides (ca. 510–450)

Myronides was an Athenian general celebrated for two brilliant successes on land in the 450s. He commanded the force of “the oldest and youngest” Athenians that in 458 defeated Corinth and its allies in the territory of Megara. In 457, he defeated the Boeotians at the battle of Oenophyta, bringing all Boeotia except Thebes under Athenian domination. Memories of his brilliant generalship lived on in Athens in later generations.

Douglas Kelly

See also Megara, Battle of; Oenophyta, Battle of; Peloponnesian War, First

Further Reading

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Mytilene. See Lesbos

Mytilene, Siege of (428–427)

The siege of Mytilene, the main city in Lesbos, early in the Second Peloponnesian War (431–404), is mainly famous for the debate at Athens over the fate of the captive Mytileneans. Thucydides provides a detailed contemporary account of the operation, which was precipitated by the revolt of Lesbos (except Methymna) from Athens. Mytilene rebelled in 428, but their preparations were not yet complete when the Athenians got wind of the revolt and sent out a fleet. This blockaded Mytilene from sea while the Mytileneans sent to Sparta for aid. In early 427, a Spartan officer, Salaethus, arrived to lead the resistance and tell Mytilene that help was at hand. However, Mytilene surrendered before the relief fleet arrived. The city was out of food and when Salaethus issued hoplite equipment to the ordinary citizens with the intent of marching out to fight they refused to obey orders and demanded a redistribution of food. The Mytilenean leaders came to terms, allowing the Athenian army into the city. The Athenian commander, Paches, agreed not to kill or imprison anyone until a Mytilenean delegation made its case at Athens.

Thucydides records the debate at Athens in some detail, using it to set out two opposing views of empire and how to deal with revolts. Cleon, who

proposed that all adult male Mytileneans be killed and the women and children sold as slaves as a deterrent to others initially won the debate and a ship was dispatched with the orders. However, the next day the Athenians reconsidered and Diodotus' argument, that killing people who had surrendered would ensure that future revolts would be fought to the bitter end, prevailed. Interestingly, neither speaker addresses the issue of the morality of the punishment—the entire debate is framed in terms of realpolitik and what was best for Athenian interests. The second ship rowed day and night and arrived in Mytilene as Paches was reading the first decree but had not yet begun the executions. The population was spared, though over 1,000 ringleaders of the revolt were executed anyway. Athens demolished Mytilene's fortifications and took over its fleet. No tribute was imposed, but the land (except for Methymna) was allocated as plots to Athenians. The Lesbians continued to cultivate the land but paid a high rent to their Athenian landlords.

Iain Spence

See also Alcidas; *Andrapodismos*; Civilian Populations in War; Cleon; Lesbos; Peloponnesian War, Second; Thucydides

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N

Naupactus

Naupactus was the most significant town of western Locris, situated on the north coast of the Corinthian Gulf, near its western end. Little is known about the city's early history; it seems to have increased in size around 500 with the arrival of new settlers from other parts of Locris. Naupactus had fertile land and access to good timber, but it was most valuable because of its strategic location close to the narrowest point of the Gulf, and its possession of a good harbor. The name itself means a place for building ships. In 456/5, after the fall of Ithôme, the Athenians removed the city from Locrian control, and settled Messenian exiles from the Peloponnese there. The existing inhabitants and the Messenians coexisted, forming a *sympoliteia* (a community formed by joining two groups). The Messenians at Naupactus were a useful source of hoplites for Athens, but Naupactus was most important as a naval base to disrupt enemy shipping, especially Corinthian, traveling along the Gulf. During the Second Peloponnesian War, it also made a useful base for raids on the Peloponnese. The Athenian general Phormio fought several engagements in the area in 430–429.

After the war, the Messenians were expelled and Naupactus given back to the Locrians. For parts of the fourth century it was an Achaean dependency, before Philip II of Macedon gave it to the Aetolians in 338. Thereafter, it became the main Aetolian naval base, until the second century when it came under Roman rule. The city long remained a significant port, called by the Venetians Lepanto, and was the Ottoman base at the battle of Lepanto in 1571.

Peter Londey

See also Aetolia, Aetolian League; Locris, Western; Messenian War, Third; Peloponnesian War, Second; Phormio

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Naval Tactics

Greek naval tactics included several different maneuvers that required skilled and disciplined crews to turn their ships into weapons. The main warship for two centuries, the trireme, was designed to be a weapon by utilizing the large metal ram fitted to the bow (see illustration in Naval Warfare entry). Larger ships of the Hellenistic Period, "fours," "fives," and others, carried more troops and mounted artillery pieces for greater lethality in close quarters. The largest ships described in the Hellenistic Period, "sevens" all the way up to one attested "forty" were almost certainly prestige pieces, and when they are described as being present in battle would have acted as command and control platforms more than offensive vessels. No matter the tactics used, all required clear and effective command and control to be effective. As Athens demonstrated time and time again, superior training and seamanship was able to overcome unfavorable odds.

The most basic of naval tactics was that of boarding, using hoplites and other infantry to board an enemy vessel to gain control of it. An Athenian trireme usually carried a complement of 10 hoplites and 4 archers, though this number varied over time and at the behest of different commanders. The greater size of Hellenistic vessels allowed them to carry more archers and artillery which could "soften up" an enemy ship before boarding. The Athenians relied on ramming tactics more than boarding, and consequently carried fewer marines than the ships of other city-states (who might carry two or three times as many). Boarding was the most basic of tactics: that does not mean that it was easy to effect or that naval battles devolved into mere land battles afloat. When the battle of Sybota in 433 became a contest between ships boarding one another, the historian Thucydides makes

specific note of this by remarking that it was not a battle employing the normal “science” of naval battle but was one of brute force. As a naval commander during the war, Thucydides was well placed to comment on naval tactics.

The first difficulty which the marines and missile troops who fought from the deck of a warship had to contend with was the inherent difficulty of doing anything on a moving and unstable platform. The deck was in constant motion and, depending on weather conditions and maneuvering, probably wet and slippery. This helps explain why all excess gear was removed before battle and left ashore, to clear up deck space as well as to lighten the vessel for speed. Also, unlike a conventional hoplite battle on land, the marines did not fight in a large formation like the phalanx and could not count on the collective protection provided by such a formation.

Secondly, the ship had to approach an enemy vessel without being rammed before they were in position. The great danger was that in approaching an enemy vessel the ship intending to board would be out-maneuvered by the enemy and rammed before the marines could engage. The ship was also at risk of being rammed by an enemy vessel even after successfully coming alongside and boarding, or being left vulnerable to boarding itself with all of the ship’s marines engaged elsewhere. In the Hellenistic Period, shipborne artillery such as *ballistae* made close-quarter maneuvering even more dangerous.

Triremes were not of a uniform design or construction, and they were usually better suited to different tactics depending on their construction. Athenians seem to have preferred light and fast vessels which they could use to out-maneuver opponents, to utilize the ram rather than boarding tactics. This did, however, make them less suitable for operations in confined waters, such as in the Great Harbor at Syracuse in Sicily in 413. The confines of the harbor made it virtually impossible for the Athenians to use their great mobility to attack the flanks of the enemy warships. In addition, the Syracusans modified their own ships by strengthening the bows and reinforcing the upper-works of the prow which gave them the advantage in the harbor where usually only head-on attacks were possible. In this instance, the Syracusans were better able to adapt their vessels and their tactics to overcome the Athenians, who were not as experienced in such confined waters.

As a side-note to the naval battles of the Sicilian campaign, the

Syracusans also employed an unorthodox tactic in the form of a fireship. The ship was packed with dry wood, set on fire, and allowed to drift down with the wind into the anchored lines of the Athenians with the aim of setting them alight. This unusual tactic was one often used much later during the age of sail and the great naval encounters of the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries.

Ramming was the primary means of attack for warships into the Hellenistic Period, and several different tactics were employed. Boarding of an enemy vessel did cause far less damage to the captured ship than ramming, but wooden ships do not sink easily and even one which had been the victim of ramming would often still be captured by the victors. During the battle of Salamis off Cyprus in 306, Diodorus mentions that many ships were disabled when their oars were sheared off by the maneuvers of enemy ships and could take no further part in the fighting.

One of the usual ramming tactics used by warships was the “breakthrough” maneuver, the *diekplous*. This involved the attacking ships forming into a line-ahead formation and breaking through the defending ships in line-abreast formation. This gave the attacking side the chance to attack the exposed flanks and sides of the defending ships. It was a tactic that came with great risk, for the attacking ships were left with their own flanks exposed when passing through the line of the defenders. The Greeks of Chios successfully used this tactic in the battle of Lade against the Persians in 494, though their ships also carried a large complement of marines in case the Persians were able to board.

The other common ramming tactic used by warships was “sailing around” or “encirclement,” the *periplous*. This was generally favored when one side had a measure of numerical superiority which allowed the wings of the attacking side to overlap those of the defenders. It also required fast ships, fast enough to get around the wings of the defending ships to attack from the rear, presumably while the defenders were being kept occupied by the other attacking ships to the front. The numerically inferior Greek forces at the battle of Salamis in 480 negated the risk of being outflanked in a *periplous* maneuver by fighting in the narrow channel between the island of Salamis and the mainland. This was effective, and the faster and numerically superior Persians were not in any position to encircle the Greeks. This allowed the Greeks to launch what was effectively a *diekplous*, which their slower ships were able to pull off because their crews were

much better rested than the Persian ones who had been at their oars for many hours beforehand.

Finally, warships could form up in a defensive circle formation known as a *kyklos*. At Artemisium in 480, the numerically inferior Greeks formed this defensive circle, holding the Persians at bay until just before nightfall. At a signal the Greeks all attacked outward at the Persians, who by that point were sailing around the Greek formation and had left their flanks exposed to the Greeks (see Document 5). This particular tactic, however, failed a numerically *superior* Peloponnesian fleet in 429. A group of 47 Peloponnesian ships were sailing from Corinth with their vessels loaded more as troop carriers than fighting ships. They were intercepted by the 20 Athenian vessels guarding the narrow straits leading out of the Corinthian Gulf. The Peloponnesians were surprised by the audacity of a fleet less than half their size, but they nevertheless formed a defensive circle, bows out. The Athenian commander Phormio then had his ships sail around the Peloponnesians, feigning an attack every now and again. This resulted in the Peloponnesian ships closing ranks even further, and as Phormio had known would happen, the wind came up and caused the Peloponnesian ships to fall foul of one another. The Athenians attacked in force and won a decisive victory. This example illustrates very well the need for good seamanship and good command and control, as well as the importance of understanding weather conditions.

All of these tactics, especially the *diekplous* and *periplous*, required a high standard of seamanship and discipline. At the beginning of the Second Peloponnesian War, the Athenian statesman Pericles told the Athenian population that the Spartans would not find it easy to challenge Athens at sea. In this famous passage, Pericles says that the unseamanlike Spartans will find familiarity with the sea difficult, that the Athenians themselves who had been practicing since the Persian Wars had not yet perfected the art of seamanship. Further, seamanship was a skill that required constant practice and was not a leisurely pursuit; so exacting a skill to maintain that it left no time for leisure (Thucydides 1.142). This was an accurate assessment, for the Athenians proved many times the superior training which allowed them to employ the above tactics to great success over many decades and become the most powerful navy in the Aegean.

John M. Nash

See also Aegospotami, Battle of; Arginusae, Battle of; Artemisium, Battle of; Athens, Naval War with Sparta; Command Structures, Navy; Naval Warfare; Peloponnesian War, Second; Salamis, Battle of (480); Sybota, Battle of; Thucydides; Training; Trireme (*Trieres*)

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Naval Warfare

Naval warfare played a pivotal role in conflicts during the Classical and Hellenistic Periods, both between Greek city-states and between Greeks and foreigners. The Greeks had a long and rich maritime history, from when the Minoan king Minos supposedly established a thalassocracy based on the island of Crete. Greeks colonized the entire Mediterranean basin, fought wars with Persians and others, and interminably fought each other. The rough nature of terrain throughout the region and the primitive nature of roads meant that naval forces had much greater strategic and operational mobility than land forces.

Apart from the literary record, Greek naval warfare has left behind little evidence. Yet many naval battles of the era had decisive impacts on conflicts and wars of the time, turning the tide or winning them outright. The great naval battle of Salamis in 480 helped halt the Persian advance into Greece, and in 405, it was the naval battle at Aegospotami in the Hellespont (Dardanelles) that ensured Spartan victory over Athens in the Second Peloponnesian War.

Examination of Greek naval warfare relies heavily on written sources, as few archaeological remains of ships or equipment survive and artistic depictions are more stylistic than representative. Various historians and even playwrights served on naval campaigns and described them. The historian Thucydides was a naval commander during the Second Peloponnesian War, which he later wrote about. His failure to save the strategically important city of Amphipolis in 424/3 while in command of a

naval force led to his exile. The great playwright Aeschylus almost certainly fought at the battles of Artemisium and Salamis, the latter battle being the focus of his play *The Persians*.

The main warship of the Classical Period was the trireme, which had evolved from smaller vessels known as penteconters. The trireme was a swift vessel either sailed or rowed, though always rowed during battle. The ship itself was a weapon, fitted with a large ram and primarily designed for ramming attacks against other vessels using speed and maneuverability. It also carried marines (*epibatai*) armed for close combat or with bows and missile weapons which could be used to target the crews of other vessels. Occasionally, when seamanship training was poor, a commander might prefer to employ boarding tactics using the *epibatai* rather than the more complicated and disciplined tactic of ramming.



Funerary *stele* of Democleides, son of Demetrius, Athens, ca. 400–380. Democleides probably died in one of the naval battles in the Corinthian War (395–387/6). His monument depicts the two offensive weapons of classical naval warfare—the trireme’s ram and the *epibatai* (marines) carried on board. Democleides, a marine, is shown sitting in sad contemplation on the prow of his trireme, helmet and shield beside him. Located in the National Archaeological Museum, Athens, Greece. (DeAgostini/Getty Images)

Naval battles could involve hundreds of ships and tens of thousands of men and, although generally naval battles were fought within sight of land, this could still be quite some distance and marines were weighed down by armor. Bad weather conditions, such as those after the battle of Arginusae, could prevent the rescue of sailors in the water, and storms could be deadly. For example, a key event in the Persian War of 480 was the destruction by bad weather of a Persian fleet sailing around the weather side of the island of Euboea (see Document 5). This helps highlight the dangers of sailing the Mediterranean, especially during particular times of the year. Usually the four months of winter put a halt to major operations at sea, although there is the case of a small contingent of Athenian warships sailing from mainland Greece to Sicily in the middle of winter 414/3 to reinforce the desperate Athenian forces there. Winter was an impediment to sailing, but pressing military imperatives could override the Greek aversion to sailing at dangerous times of the year.

Because of the restricted carrying capacity of warships, fleets often put into a port or landed ashore at night to eat and rest. Fleets could and would sail across the open ocean if needed, or they might sail along the coast depending on the circumstances. Likewise, ships and fleets would sail overnight if required. In fact, there are numerous examples of generals and admirals waiting until nightfall to commence an attack or a landing of troops with their ships. A clever ploy in 415 allowed the Athenians to sail their ships full of troops down the coast of Sicily by night and land on the shores of the Great Harbor at Syracuse, surprising the defenders there (Thucydides 6.64–65).

The operations which Greek naval forces undertook ranged across a wide spectrum, including both combat and noncombat operations. Naval operations are now commonly divided into three different major roles containing subordinate tasks: Military, Diplomatic, and Constabulary. These are modern terms used to categorize modern naval operations; nevertheless, Greek naval forces can clearly be seen undertaking all three roles in the Classical and Hellenistic Periods.

As is true of all navies throughout history, the core job of Greek naval forces was to fight and to win at sea. Battle between fleets was a key feature of the Greek wars with Persia from 480 to 449, as well as during the Second Peloponnesian War and the wars of the fourth century. As already noted, several of these battles had a critically defining impact on the war in which

they were fought. These battles could involve anywhere from 40 through to over 400 ships, rivaling battles fought on land in numbers of combatants involved. The battle of Sybota in 433 involved 270 ships in total, which means there would have been between 40,000 and 55,000 combatants present, depending on the sizes of the respective crews. Such a large number of rowers and combat troops required a significant investment in training, as well as in money. Rowers were not slaves and were paid, and the larger the fleet and the longer it spent away, the more financially costly was the campaign.

Because ships were very capital- and human resource-intensive, battle was often seen as a way in which to bring about the outright defeat of an enemy. The Persian forces which invaded Greece in 480 aimed at destroying the Greek naval forces so they might have control of the sea. This would have allowed the Persians to land troops in the Peloponnese, thus bypassing the Greek attempt to defend the narrow Corinthian isthmus. After the small Spartan army was annihilated at Thermopylae, the Greek naval forces which had been successful at Artemisium were forced to fall back. Gathering at the island of Salamis off the coast of Attica, the Greeks finally resolved to hold their position and fight the Persians. When the Persian forces were defeated, they retreated back to Asia and the army left behind was defeated the year after by the combined Greek forces at the battle of Plataea. Without victory at Salamis, the Peloponnese would have been left wide open to attack from the sea by Persian naval forces. The battle of Plataea may have expelled the Persians from Greece, but without victory at sea off the coast of Salamis there would have been no Plataea.

Fifty years after the battle of Salamis the Corinthians tried to convince the Spartan assembly that one large-scale victory at sea over the Athenians would break their power. Though it took longer than envisaged, the Athenians were eventually defeated when their navy was completely destroyed by the Peloponnesians under Lysander in 405 at Aegospotami. The destruction of the Athenian fleet left their city exposed to blockade by sea as well as land and the Spartans were able to starve them into submission. Athens feared the same thing in 387 when a combined fleet of 80 ships from the Peloponnese and Syracuse set up near Abydos, blocking grain ships sailing from the Black Sea to Athens. Salamis (in Cyprus) was the scene of a naval battle in 306 when the fleets of Ptolemy I Soter and Antigonus I Monophthalmus, two of Alexander's Successors, met in battle.

Antigonus' force, led by his son Demetrius I Poliorcetes, was victorious and destroyed Ptolemy's naval force, opening the way for an invasion of Egypt.

Outside of battle between fleets, Greek naval forces were involved in other forms of combat operations. The interception and protection of trade was a very important task assigned to navies. This was especially true for the protection of Athenian trade. Athens was a maritime power and relied heavily on the import of food and other goods, as well as the export of high value crops such as olive oil and wine. After the loss of their fleet in Sicily in 413, the Athenians fortified and set up a fleet base at Cape Sunium at the southern tip of Attica to protect the grain ships rounding the cape. Spartan ships were sent out specifically to raid Athenian trade near Cnidus in the eastern Aegean, a threat which the Athenians took very seriously and successfully countered with their own naval force. During the Third Macedonian War, Perseus dispatched warships to the Aegean to protect grain ships bound for Macedonia.

As noted above, the Spartan victory at Aegospotami allowed Sparta to cut off the supply of grain to Athens. Prior to this, the Spartan king Agis had remarked that so long as grain ships continued to sail into the harbor of Athens, his siege of the city by land was a fruitless undertaking. Because ships could not stay at sea for extended periods of time they did not execute a blockade by staying off-shore, but by having a nearby base from which they could intercept vessels attempting to break through the blockade. Nevertheless, navies could effectively cut off land forces as the Athenians did to the Spartans trapped on the island of Sphacteria in 425, who were besieged by the blockading Athenians for 72 days. In his *Constitution of the Athenians* 2.11–12, the “Old Oligarch” (or Pseudo-Xenophon) remarked that the Athenians were able to control unruly allies by using their navy to cut off the recalcitrant city-state from seaborne trade.

Navies granted the different city-states of Greece great mobility, a capacity to bypass rough terrain, inhospitable political territory and enemy forces. The Greek force holding the pass of Thermopylae in 480 was protected from an outflanking maneuver by the attending fleet at Artemisium. In 424 the Spartan general Brasidas was forced to take a longer and rougher journey overland to northern Greece to attack the Athenian allies there, since he dared not go by a sea which the Athenians controlled. It also required skillful maneuvering to avoid marching the army through the territory of neutrals and inflaming political sensitivities, less of a

consideration when going by sea. Alexander the Great used a force of 20 Athenian triremes to swiftly carry siege equipment to help take the city Halicarnassus in 334.

Not only did a navy allow for mobility, it also allowed for the landing of troops in enemy territory to raid or cause serious damage. Persia's first invasion of Greece, by Darius in 490, resulted in an amphibious landing at Marathon, followed by a seaborne retreat. It was this invasion that convinced the Athenian statesman Themistocles to build the fleet which would protect Athens and indeed all of Greece during the following invasion in 480. Marathon was a hoplite victory and yet it still resulted in the construction of a strong navy, the Athenians realizing an army of hoplites could do little in the face of a superior naval force able to move much more quickly than a land force.

The Second Peloponnesian War fought between the Athenians and Spartans provides numerous examples of amphibious campaigns. The starkest illustration of the predominance of naval forces is the fact that the war involved only a few pitched hoplite battles, of which one (the battle of Mantinea in 418) was technically during the Peace of Nicias between the two main powers. Further, most of the war was conducted far removed from the actual cities of the main protagonists, from Sicily in the west all the way to Rhodes and the Black Sea in the east.

During the first 10 years of the war Athenian strategy centered on its sea power, used to take control of the islands outlying the Peloponnese and giving them bases from which they could launch attacks on the Spartans and their allies. These attacks ranged from small raids on territory to large attacks on cities all the way up to attempts at establishing a fortified position in the Peloponnese where the unruly Helot population of Sparta might be enticed to desert. The ultimate success of this strategy was when in 425 the Athenian navy trapped some 420 Spartan hoplites on the island of Sphacteria (see illustration in Pylos [Sphacteria], Battle of entry). So dire did the Spartans find this situation that they immediately asked for a truce. When the truce failed and the 292 survivors (including 120 Spartiates) were captured by the Athenians, a shocked Sparta asked for a full-blown peace treaty to get them back, and when this failed they refrained from their annual invasions of Attica lest the Athenians execute the prisoners.

Perhaps the greatest example of an amphibious operation in Classical Greece and indeed in all of ancient history is the Athenian expedition

against Sicily in 415–413. Thucydides says of it that it was the largest military undertaking up to that time and he goes on to detail a force of 136 warships, some utilized as transports, as well as a large supporting force of 30 supply ships and over 100 other boats. These forces operated in southern Italy and then down the entire eastern coast of Sicily, culminating in a long and bloody siege of Syracuse. Over the course of two years of operations, a constant stream of reinforcements was sent by both sides from Greece to Sicily. This entailed naval operations back in Greece. In one case, the Athenians desperately tried to prevent Peloponnesian reinforcements sailing from the Corinthian Gulf while Corinthian warships did their best to engage the Athenian warships and allow the transports full of soldiers to slip past. In this they were successful and some 700 hoplites were able to reinforce Syracuse against the Athenians. Alexander the Great did not utilize naval forces on a large scale, and his long overland march west from India helps demonstrate the folly of even an ostensibly strong land power ignoring the power and utility gained from possession of a strong navy. In the Hellenistic Period, wars often ranged across the Aegean, with troops carried across the sea from Egypt, Greece, and Cyprus.

The use of navies for constabulary tasks, especially the policing of piracy, is perhaps the oldest and the most enduring of all naval operations. Thucydides (1.4–5) says that King Minos of Crete, who he thinks was the first to establish a navy, did his best to put down the piracy which had become rife throughout the Aegean. Early in the Second Peloponnesian War the Spartans tried to recruit pirates to attack Athenian shipping since their own navy was so inferior. Down into the fourth century the historian Diodorus (16.5.3) states that pirate ships had made the entire Adriatic Coast unsafe for merchant ships, necessitating naval intervention. Warships were critical, not only in directly combating pirate vessels but also in neutralizing pirate bases of operations. At the end of the day, the causes of piracy had their roots on land, and the stability and security provided by a strong navy, as in the case of Athens and Rhodes in the Aegean, was of critical importance to the maintenance good order at sea.

Naval forces were often utilized for diplomatic purposes, especially by the Athenians to control their allies. Land forces were unavoidably intrusive, but naval forces could reach far and wide and make a statement of strength or support without any actual encroachment into territory or acts of outright aggression. The Athenian statesman Pericles sailed a force of 100

ships around the Aegean and into the Black Sea as a show of strength. He displayed to potential adversaries Athens' ability to strike anywhere along the coast while simultaneously showing the allies that Athens' navy was in control of the sea—both a threat and a sign of support to those allies. During the Second Peloponnesian War, both the Athenians and Peloponnesians often sent out warships to collect money or tribute from allies and neutral powers, with the clear message that noncooperation would lead to the intervention of warships packed with troops.

Warships could be used in more subtle ways for diplomatic purposes. Before the outbreak of the Second Peloponnesian War, Athens decided to conclude a defensive alliance with the island of Corcyra, a bitter enemy of Athens' rival Corinth. Corcyra possessed one of the most powerful navies in Greece, and that fact in itself helped persuade the Athenians it would be better to have those warships on their side than that of potential enemies. When Corinth threatened Corcyra with attack, the Athenians sent 10 ships to reinforce the island. This small contingent of warships had the dual role of providing comfort to the Corcyraeans that Athens would indeed aid them, as well as signaling to the Corinthians that Athens was resolved to uphold its defensive alliance with Corcyra despite Corinthian threats.

Athens' war with its allies (the Social War) in 357–355 had its origins in the reemergence of Athenian naval power. Justifying the need for their navy by referring to the threat of piracy, Athens became more forceful with allies and neutrals alike. Seeing this rise in Athenian power as a threat, several of its most powerful allies revolted and conducted their own maritime operations against Athens and its remaining allies. The direct military use of Athenian naval power had dire diplomatic consequences, convincing others of the threat Athens posed and leading to war.

In the third century, the Ptolemies of Hellenistic Egypt became the dominant maritime power in the Aegean. Ptolemy I built up a powerful navy in the last two decades of the fourth century, strong enough to campaign simultaneously around the Aegean. He established a strong presence in Cyprus, both allowing for a solid defense of Egypt from the north as well as allowing his forces to strike at the Phoenician coast and up into the Aegean.

Ptolemy II Philadelphus inherited both the strong navy and a strong strategic position, which allowed him to dominate affairs in the Aegean. Ptolemaic naval bases were established throughout the southern Aegean,

including on Cos, Samos, Thera, and Crete. These provided bases from which ships could strike out at enemies, protect trade and maintain a diplomatic presence.

Ptolemy II made contact with Rome as early as 273, demonstrating more than just a token interest in the western Mediterranean. The image of a Ptolemaic warship with the name *Isis* was found in the Black Sea and can be dated to the mid-third century. The Ptolemies were also very active in the Red Sea, trading from the port of Berenice and other places with ports along the coast of Africa, Arabia, and even into India. The size of the Ptolemaic navy in the Red Sea is unknown, but likely to have been large enough to protect their trade interests and military expeditions, especially from piracy, though they faced no great naval threat in the area.

Ptolemy III Euergetes was able to capitalize on a strong position in the Aegean to extend Ptolemaic influence over the coast of Syria and Cilicia at the expense of the Seleucid Empire. It was only with the rise of Rhodes as a strong naval power in the late third century that Ptolemaic Egypt lost its position as supreme sea power in the eastern Mediterranean. Even then, by the time of Octavian and Mark Antony's civil war, Ptolemaic Egypt still possessed a powerful navy which was finally defeated at the battle of Actium in 31.

Naval warfare played a crucial role in the major conflicts of the Greeks, from the Persian Wars to the wars between Alexander's Successors. Athens, Rhodes, and Ptolemaic Egypt were amongst the greatest maritime powers in the ancient world, their strength at sea allowing them to establish and maintain great cosmopolitan cities where goods and ideas were exchanged around the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean.

John M. Nash

See also Aegospotami, Battle of; Arginusae, Battle of; Artemisium, Battle of; Athens, Naval War with Sparta; Command Structures, Navy; Finance and War; Macedonian War, Third; Naval Tactics; Peloponnesian War, Second; Piracy; Salamis, Battle of (480); Ships, War; Social War (357–355); Successors (*Diadochoi*), Wars of; Sybota, Battle of; Thalassocracy; Thucydides; Trireme (*Trieres*). *Roman Section*: Actium, Battle of; Mark Antony

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Naxos, Battle of (376)

The Athenians' first unaided naval victory since the end of the Peloponnesian War (431–404), the battle of Naxos, fought during Athens' war with Sparta 376–374, reestablished Athens as a major maritime power. The Spartan fleet consisted of 60 to 65 triremes, under the command of Pollis; Athens sent a fleet of possibly 83 triremes, under the command of Chabrias, to lay siege to Naxos, a Spartan ally. Pollis responded by bringing the entire Spartan fleet into the bay of Naxos and, commanding the right wing himself, successfully engaged the Athenian left where he killed Cedon, an Athenian commander, sank some ships and forced the rest into flight. Seeing the distress on his left wing, Chabrias sent reinforcements to the left and was himself able to break the Spartans and rout the majority of their ships, capturing 8 and destroying 24. Athenian losses totaled 18 ships. Mindful of the precedent of Arginusae, Chabrias refrained from pursuing and destroying the Spartan fleet, concentrating instead on recovering Athenian survivors and dead from the water.

Robert T. Jones

See also Arginusae, Battle of; Athenian Confederacy, Second; Athens, Naval War with Sparta; Chabrias; King's Peace; Naval Warfare; Naxos, Naxians

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Naxos, Naxians

Naxos is the largest island of the Aegean Sea, and belongs to the group of the Cycladic islands. During the sixth century, Peisistratus, the Athenian tyrant, attacked Naxos and installed the tyrant Lygdamis on the island. By 528, the Spartans had overthrown the tyranny at Naxos and many exiled oligarchs returned back to the island. In 500/499, the island was attacked by Aristagoras, the Milesian tyrant who in the name of the Persian Empire tried to conquer the island. Herodotus mentions that the island was attacked because exiled Naxian aristocrats appealed to Aristagoras for help in order to return to the island. He also suggests that the failure of the attack led in part to the Ionian Revolt of 499–493. During the last years of the Persian Wars, the Naxians tried to expel the Persians from the island. However, the island did not manage to restore its former military power.

The island joined the Delian League in 477. Around 468/7, the Naxians tried unsuccessfully to revolt from the League. As a result, the Athenians enslaved the Naxians—Naxos was the first member of the League to be subjugated in this way. After the enslavement, Naxos lost its autonomy and this could in practice involve the following: the demolition of its fortifications, the establishment of an Athenian military garrison on the island, the confiscation of its fleet, and the payment of a monetary tribute to Athens. By the 450s, Athenian cleruchs were established on the island of Naxos. The behavior of the Athenians toward the Naxians revealed their oppressive nature and imperialistic intentions.

Naxos gained its freedom with the Athenian defeat in the Second Peloponnesian War (431–404) and in 376 an Athenian attack on it drew off the Peloponnesian fleet blockading the Piraeus. The 83-strong Athenian fleet under Chabrias defeated the 65-strong Spartan fleet under Pollis—largely because of the initiative of Phocion. This was the first truly Athenian naval success since the end of the Peloponnesian War and led to a surge of states joining the Second Athenian Confederacy. Naxos, too, joined the Confederacy but subsequently attempted to revolt—again unsuccessfully.

Aikaterini-Iliana Rassia

See also Aristagoras; Athenian Confederacy, Second; Athens, Naval War with Sparta; Chabrias; Colonies, Military; Delian League/Athenian Empire; Peisistratus; Persian (Achaemenid) Empire; Persian Wars; Phocion; *Stasis*; Tyrants, Tyranny

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Nearchus (d. ca. 312)

Nearchus, son of Androtimus, was born on Crete but his family later settled in Amphipolis. Although probably older than Alexander the Great, at some point Nearchus became one of his companions. In 337, during the family discord over Philip's impending marriage, Philip II exiled Nearchus, Harpalus, Ptolemy, Erigylius, and Laomedon. The exiles were recalled on Philip's death and Nearchus was rewarded with the satrapy of Lycia early in Alexander's conquest of Persia (334/3).

Nearchus reappeared in the historical accounts in 328, arriving in Bactria with reinforcements for Alexander's invasion of India. His main claim to fame is as the admiral in charge of the fleet Alexander dispatched to establish the route from the Indus River to Persia. Nearchus' description of this was used by Arrian. Based on Arrian's record of detailed distances for each stage of the voyage, it seems Nearchus took careful notes. Later geographers, such as Strabo also used Nearchus' work. When Alexander died (323), Nearchus supported the unpopular claim of Alexander's son by Barsine. He later served Antigonos I (Monophthalmus) and Demetrius I (Poliorcetes) and was probably killed at Gaza in 312.

Iain Spence

See also Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon; Alexander III (the Great) of

Macedon, Indian Campaign; Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon, Invasion of Persian Empire; Amphipolis

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Nemea, Battle of (394)

A decisive Spartan land victory over the allied states of Argos, Athens, Corinth, and Boeotia (Thebes) during the Corinthian War of 395–387/6. The Spartans marched along the coast of the Gulf of Corinth under the command of the boy-king Agesipolis’ guardian, Aristodemus. The Spartan army was composed of 6,000 Spartan hoplites; 7,500 hoplites from Elis, Triphylia, Acroreia, Lasion, Sicyon, Epidaurus, Troezen, Hermione, and Halieis; 600 Spartan horse; 300 Cretan archers; and 400 Marganeis slingers. There were also an undisclosed number of hoplites from Tegea and Mantinea, probably bringing the total to more than 15,000 soldiers. Of the 24,000 hoplites on the allied side, there were 6,000 Athenians, 7,000 Argives, 5,000 Boeotians, 3,000 Corinthians, and 3,000 Euboeans. There were also substantial cavalry regiments brought by the Boeotians (800), Athenians (600), Chalcidians of Euboea (100), and Opuntian Locrians (50).

The two armies met on opposite sides of the Nemea River, a dried up river bed to the southwest of Corinth. The battle commenced with each side heavily favoring their right flank, the Boeotian-led allies winning a victory over the Spartan allies, and the Spartans winning a victory over the Athenians stationed on the left of their line. With the battle hanging in the balance, the Spartans seized an opportunity to turn the allied wing. Finding that the allies were in too deep a formation to allow this, the Spartans collided with the Argives, Corinthians, and Boeotians as they attempted to return from their pursuit. The Spartans routed their enemy, collecting 2,800 casualties from the Boeotian led alliance, while only suffering 1,100

casualties of their own, most coming from their own allies.

Robert T. Jones

See also Archers (*Toxotai*); Corinthian War; Coronea, Battle of (394); Hoplites; Slingers (*Sphendonistai*)

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Neodamodeis

Neodamodeis are first attested as part of the Spartan army in 421 (Thucydides 5.34). They were ex-Helots who had been freed to serve as hoplites. In contrast to the Helots who had served with Brasidas, and who were freed only on their return to Sparta, *Neodamodeis* were freed before they served. Their precise social status is uncertain. Their title apparently referred to their new (*neo-*) standing and to their connection with the citizen body (*damos*), but they were not equal to Spartiates in power and privileges.

Neodamodeis were used on prolonged campaigns outside the Peloponnese, such as those in Sicily in 413 (Thucydides 7.19) and in Asia Minor in 399–94 (Xenophon, *Hellenica* 3.1.4, 4.2). They are last attested in 370/69 as a garrison at a key point on the Spartan frontier before the Boeotian invasion (Xenophon, *Hellenica* 6.5.24). After this Sparta hardly needed troops for prolonged campaigns outside the Peloponnese and in any case *Neodamodeis* disappear from historical sources after 370/69.

Douglas Kelly

See also Brasidas; Helots; Slaves in War

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Nicias (ca. 470–413)

Nicias, son of Niceratus, was a moderate Athenian politician and general (*strategos*) during the Peloponnesian War (431–404). He was reelected *strategos* each year between Pericles' death (429) and his own (415). Thucydides, who probably knew Nicias personally, provides a generally favorable portrait of a man of some ability brought down by bad luck and an overly cautious nature. He comments on Nicias' capture and execution at the end of the Athenian expedition to Sicily that he "... of all the Greeks in my time, least deserved such a miserable death as his entire life was devoted to studying and practicing *arête* (virtue)" (Thucydides 7.86.5.)

Nicias was a very wealthy man, famously owning 1,000 slaves he leased out as miners. Following Pericles' death, Nicias was the voice of caution against the advocates of a more aggressive strategy. His main opponents were Cleon (first opposing him over Pylos/Sphacteria) and then Alcibiades. Nicias enjoyed a few years of political dominance between the signing of the Peace of Nicias (421) following Cleon's death and Alcibiades' first venture—support for the anti-Spartan movement in the Peloponnese which culminated in the battle of Mantinea (418).

Alcibiades' attempt to undermine Sparta in the Peloponnese was really formal recognition that the Peace of Nicias between Athens and Sparta had effectively failed. Thucydides (5.16) notes that Nicias had a personal as well as a policy motive for peace—he wanted a trouble free life and to avoid risking his good war record and reputation in further operations. If true, it suggests that Nicias was no longer really interested in shouldering the burden of command, or perhaps believed he was no longer really up to it.

This is certainly consistent with Nicias' remaining career and especially his opposition to the Athenian expedition to Sicily in 415. When it became clear the expedition would occur, Nicias tried to dissuade the Athenians by insisting on a huge force. When the assembly voted the forces he had recommended he had little choice but to accept command, along with Alcibiades and Lamachus.

On arrival, Nicias made a final attempt to avoid combat, arguing that they should sail home after a show of force. This was rejected by his fellow

generals. With Alcibiades' recall and Lamachus' death, Nicias became the senior commander in Sicily and had the misfortune of presiding over the military disaster he had feared and had worked so hard to avoid. His caution, which if heeded in 415 would have prevented the expedition in the first place, now worked against him. When decisive action was required to withdraw, Nicias delayed, according to Thucydides through a mixture of illness, excessive religious observance, and a fear of what would happen if he returned home unsuccessful. The result was the complete destruction of the expeditionary force and Nicias' capture and death (413).

Nicias' career was characterized by moderation. He was a solid commander but ultimately unable to cope with the complexities and strains of managing a major war in the context of the volatile Athenian democracy.

Iain Spence

See also Alcibiades; Lamachus; Mantinea, Battle of (418); Peace; Peloponnesian War, Second; Pericles; Pylos (Sphacteria), Battle of; Sicilian Expedition; Strategy; Syracuse, Siege of; Thucydides

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Notium, Battle of (406)

Notium, the harbor of Colophon, situated west of Ephesus was the site of a Peloponnesian naval victory over the Athenians during the Second Peloponnesian War (431–404). Militarily unimportant, it ended Alcibiades' checkered career as a general.

The two main accounts, Xenophon and Diodorus Siculus and his apparent source, the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia*, differ in detail—perhaps

because the latter's information derives from Athens and Xenophon's from Sparta. Alcibiades had originally sailed with 100 ships but as Xenophon later records that Alcibiades' fleet significantly outnumbered Lysander, who had 90 ships, he must have received local reinforcements prior to the battle (Xenophon, *Hellenica* 1.4.20, 5, 15). While visiting Thrasybulus, the Athenian commander in the Hellespont (Dardanelles), Alcibiades left his helmsman, Antiochus, in command with strict instructions not to engage the Peloponnesian fleet under Lysander at nearby Ephesus. Antiochus, however, chose to take 10 (or perhaps two) triremes and sail past Lysander's fleet, laughing at them. Lysander sent ships in pursuit, sank Antiochus' ship, and then launched a general attack in good order. The main Athenian fleet, clearly unprepared, entered the engagement piecemeal and lost either 15 or 22 ships. Although most of these crews escaped, the result was embarrassing and Alcibiades' enemies ensured he was blamed on the valid grounds Antiochus was unsuitable to lead. Alcibiades, stripped of his command and replaced by Conon, went into exile (for the final time).

Iain Spence

See also Alcibiades; Conon; *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia*; Lysander; Peloponnesian War, Second; Thrasybulus; Xenophon

Further Reading

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O

Oenophyta, Battle of (457)

The battle of Oenophyta is an obscure but major Athenian victory over a Boeotian League force led by Thebes in autumn 475. Diodorus Siculus' details of Athenian preparations before a victory by Myronides in Boeotia may well refer to Oenophyta. Although he treats this as a separate engagement, Diodorus seems to have created two battles from one. Other than that, no details of the preparation or fighting are preserved in the extant sources.

However, it is clear that Oenophyta reversed the result of Tanagra, significantly extended Athenian power to its north, and made Myronides' reputation as a general. Shortly after the major Athenian defeat at Tanagra, Myronides led the Athenians back into Boeotia. At Oenophyta in southeast Boeotia, although apparently outnumbered, he decisively defeated the Boeotian League army. Athens reasserted control over all of Boeotia except for Thebes. Myronides followed up by subduing Locris and forcing Phocis to ally with Athens, but returned home after failing to overawe the Thessalians.

Iain Spence

See also Boeotian League; Megara, Battle of; Myronides; Tanagra, Battle of

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Olpae, Battle of (426)

Olpae was a stronghold near Amphilocheian Argos. In 426, it was the site of a battle fought between Athens and their Acarnanian allies and the Peloponnesians and their Ambraciot allies during the Second Peloponnesian War (431–404). The Athenian *strategos* (general) Demosthenes defeated the Ambraciots and Peloponnesians under Eurylochus, rehabilitating his reputation after his earlier defeat in Aetolia. Demosthenes commanded an Acarnanian and Athenian army that had combined to retake Olpae. Outnumbered, Demosthenes placed a contingent of hoplites and light troops in ambush on his left wing. Their attack on the rear of the enemy right wing caused a rout.

Demosthenes negotiated a secret agreement allowing the Peloponnesian survivors to withdraw if they abandoned their Ambraciot allies. At dawn the next day, Demosthenes attacked and destroyed a second Ambraciot army coming to help those at Olpae. The reported Ambraciot casualties were so huge that Thucydides refused to record them because he found them incredible. Despite this, and the success of Demosthenes' deal with the Peloponnesians in discrediting them as allies in the region, the subsequent peace between the Ambraciots and Acarnanians did little to extend Athenian influence in the area.

Iain Spence

See also Aetolia, Aetolians; Demosthenes (General); Hoplites; Light Troops

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Olympia

Olympia, in Elis in the western Peloponnese, was an important panhellenic center and the most important sanctuary of Zeus. Just as Delos was a particularly significant sanctuary for Ionian Greeks, so Olympia was

important to Dorians. Its temples and shrines drew a steady flow of religious pilgrims. Its quadrennial athletics festival, the Olympia, was the first of the four *agōnes* (contests, sing. *agōn*) officially recognized as part of the *periodos* (schedule of festivals), the others being the games at Delphi, Nemea, and the Isthmus.

The Olympia with its associated games were traditionally founded in 776; lists of victors were maintained until 217 CE. Participation in the Olympic Games was open to all free Greek men. Victors included generals, shepherds, nobles, and philosophers. Unmarried women could watch, but women could not compete. A separate *agōn* for women, the Heraea, was held before the men's games.

Victors in the *agōnes* were not just considered to be skilled athletes, but men of *arête* (virtue). The only material prize, for which athletes competed, was an olive wreath. Welcoming the athletes before they entered the stadium was a line of statues dedicated to famous victors, but funded through the fines of those who had cheated. As suggested in Pindar's *epinikia*—poems written to celebrate the victors—winning delivered great fame in the mortal world and demonstrated divine favor.

As at Delphi and Delos, Olympia housed sacred treasures dedicated by many of the leading *poleis*. Excavations have unearthed many dedications of *tropaia* (trophies of arms taken in battle), including examples from the Persian Wars, notably a fine bronze helmet inscribed with the name of Miltiades, victor of Marathon.

In 432, the Corinthians tried to borrow Olympian and Delphian sacred funds to fight Athens, although the proposal was not carried through. In the fourth century, Elis and Arcadia fought over control of the sanctuary. Olympia remained a wealthy and important sanctuary in Hellenistic and Roman times, though as the Greek world declined, so did the fortunes of the sanctuary.

James McDonald

See also Delos; Delphi; Elis; Elis, War with Arcadia; Miltiades II, Son of Cimon; Olympic Truce (*Ekecheiria*); Panhellenism; Pindar; Sacred Truces and Festivals; Trophy

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Olympias (ca. 373–316)

Olympias was the daughter of a Molossian king, whose family claimed to be descended from the legendary Achilles. She married Philip II in 357, with whom she had two children; the famous Alexander the Great, and a daughter, Cleopatra.

Olympias was a devoted worshipper of Dionysus, and the subject of great negativity in the ancient sources, where she appears as a vengeful, spiteful woman. Although anecdotes of her poisoning and roasting her rivals alive are likely to have been greatly exaggerated and the consequence of hostile sources, Olympias certainly showed she was highly capable and ruthless when she entered the political struggles of Alexander's Successors. She fought to secure the Macedonian throne for her grandson Alexander IV, and was responsible for numerous deaths including those of the royal couple Philip III Arrhidaeus and his wife Adea Eurydice. Olympias was forced to surrender to her political enemy Cassander following a disastrous siege at Pydna in 316. An assembly voted for her execution, and she met her death bravely at the hands of her victims' families.

Charlotte M. R. Dunn

See also Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon; Cassander; Eurydice; Philip II of Macedon; Philip III Arrhidaeus; Successors (*Diadochoi*), Wars of

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Olympic Truce (*Ekecheiria*)

The Olympic *ekecheiria* was a truce associated with the Olympic Games, held every four years at the sanctuary of Zeus Olympios in Eleia.

The traditional view is that the announcement of the *ekecheiria* by envoys from Elis led to several months of peace throughout Greece. Lämmer argues, however, that since *ekecheiriai* were also declared for the other three major panhellenic festivals, all held in summer (when most Greek warfare took place), the truce must merely have guaranteed safe passage for festival-goers. In 420, nevertheless, although no visitors to the games seem involved, the Eleians fined the Spartans for attacking their own territory after the *ekecheiria* had been announced there.

Aristotle, citing an inscribed disc at Olympia, reported that the Eleian king Iphitus and the Spartan reformer Lycurgus had established the *ekecheiria*, and Pausanias says the truce was inscribed on the disc. The earliest mention of the *ekecheiria*, however, is found in Thucydides, and the disc may be a Classical creation.

Graeme F. Bourke

See also Elis; Olympia; Triphylia

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Olynthus

Olynthus, an important city in the Chalcidice and capital of the Chalcidian Confederacy is located about 2.5 kilometers (1.5 miles) inland, at the head of the Gulf of Torone, between the peninsulas of Pallene and Sithonia. The site has been extensively excavated and provides a large part of our knowledge of Greek housing.

Originally a Neolithic settlement, Olynthus was resettled by Greeks in the seventh century. However, when the Persian Artabazus captured it in

winter 480/79 Olynthus was inhabited by the Bottiaeans—he handed over the settlement to local Greeks. The city was fairly insignificant until 432, when parts of the Chalcidice revolted from Athens and the Macedonian king, Perdiccas II, persuaded the inhabitants of several nearby coastal towns to move to the safer site of Olynthus. The city expanded considerably and sometime prior to 382 became the capital of the Chalcidian Confederacy.

In that year, Amyntas II of Macedon and two Chalcidian towns—Acanthus and Apollonia—complained to Sparta that Olynthus was expanding into Macedon and forcing cities into the Chalcidian Confederacy. The Spartans dispatched an expeditionary force from the Peloponnesian League. In 381, when the Spartan commander Teleutias was killed, Sparta sent out reinforcements under King Agesipolis I. Although he died of illness, the Olynthians were forced to make peace and the Confederacy disbanded.

However, this may have been very temporary as “the Chalcidians” appear as a group in the new Second Athenian Confederacy, founded in 378/7. Twenty years later, Olynthus had regained its full power and position at the head of the Chalcidian Confederacy. For the next 10 years or so, it preserved its independence by alternately allying with Athens and Macedon. The final alliance, with Athens, failed to save the city. Having forcibly detached the rest of the Confederacy from Olynthus, in 348 Philip II seized it after a short siege, through the treachery of two prominent citizens, Lasthenes and Euthyrates. He destroyed the town (ironically preserving it for the extensive archaeological digs in the twentieth century) and sold the inhabitants as slaves. Although a small part of the city’s northern area seems to have been reoccupied, it was a mere shadow of its former self. The last inhabitants were moved to the site of Cassandreia in 316.

Iain Spence

See also Chalcidian Confederacy; Chalcidice; Peloponnesian War, Second; Philip II of Macedon; Potidaea/Cassandreia

Further Reading

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Omens and Portents

The interpretation of omens and portents was not a simple science. Even the religiously conservative Herodotus questioned whether it was the Magi's sacrifices to Thetis which stopped a damaging storm at Sepias, prior to Artemesium, or whether the storm had "naturally abated" (Herodotus 7.191). But more often than not, Herodotus and other commentators were willing to accept that signs from the physical world were indications of divine will. For example, Thucydides reports that it was retrospectively explained and widely accepted that the devastating earthquake at Delos had been a portent of the miseries to beset Athens in the Peloponnesian War (431-404). Even spiders spinning black webs were interpreted by Pausanias as an omen of the destruction of Thebes by Alexander the Great.

The closed society of the Spartans may have made them more conservative in religious matters than most other Greeks. While their tardiness at Marathon has been criticized as being more political than a genuine religious qualm over the progress of the full moon, it is not an isolated example. The Spartans made few exceptions in religious practices. The Argive democrats, who knew the Laconian mind better than most, banked on its piety by timing a coup to coincide with the festival of the *Gymnopaediae* in the hope of discouraging Spartan interference.

Before most battles, the seers who generally accompanied the armies would closely examine the sacrifice for signs of what would come. Whether the animal was blemished, or balked at the altar, how the flames behaved, and the way that the fat and entrails burned were all studied carefully. The seers would then say whether these omens were favorable or not, and only then would an army willingly march against its foe.

When the gods did not visibly support one side over the other or offer a clear sign, it was still possible for a commander to claim that the gods were on side. All that needed to be done was to espouse the righteousness of the

cause. Natural phenomena could also be used to lend weight to *either* side of the argument. For example, Thrasybulus interpreted a sudden snowstorm at Munychia as direct evidence of divine approval, while a solar eclipse deterred Cleombrotus from attacking the Persians after Salamis. Examples in which omens were ignored, but a victory was achieved nevertheless, are hard to find. Pelopidas deliberately ignored an eclipse and the advice of his seers against entering into battle, yet his army won. But Pelopidas, who lost his life in this battle, may have been the lonely exception to prove this rule.

There was a corpus of *chresmoi* (prophetic verses) and *logia* (oracular fragments), which were also used for advice in times of war or disruption. Thucydides notes how these proliferated before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War. These verses tended to be more a resource for the general population in times of anxiety rather than part of any authorized divinatory process. Not all citizens relied on these prophecies. The verses of Bacis and the gullibility of those interpreting them are parodied in Aristophanes' *Knights* (121–124).

The most reputable sources of advice from the gods, of course, were the major cults and sanctuaries. There were clear political advantages to be gained from the control or influence of these sites. Themistocles' successful restoration of the sanctuary of the Lycomidae at Phlya and his attempt to create a cult of Artemis Aristoboule in public celebration of his role in the victory of Salamis, may serve as two examples.

But even the most renowned religious center of the Greek world, Delphi, could err. It famously predicted that Xerxes' army would defeat the Greeks. In supplementary advice it changed its position to say that a "wooden wall" would save Athens from the Persians. Of course, oracles can be interpreted in many ways. In this case, the general view was that the Pythia (the priestess who delivered the oracle) meant a wooden barricade on the Acropolis, but Themistocles "correctly" argued that the wooden walls were ships of the Athenians (Herodotus 7.140–143, 8.51–2). Irrespective of the interpretation, omens and portents were taken very seriously by the ancient Greeks and could affect the morale of the troops and the strategy of the generals.

James McDonald

See also Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon; Athens, Restoration of Democracy; Epiphanies, Military; Gods of War; Religious Practices before

Battle; Sepeia, Battle of; Teisamenus; Themistocles; War Crimes

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Onesander (Active Mid-First Century CE)

Onesander was a Platonic philosopher who wrote a commentary (now lost) on Plato’s *Republic* and a military treatise called *Strategikos* (*On Generalship* or *The General*) which is still extant. The latter named work was dedicated to Quintus Veranius Nepos, who was the Roman governor of Britain in 57 CE and who died while in office, thereby dating Onesander’s treatise to the mid-first century CE. It is an important and comprehensive work on the duties of a general.

David Harthen

See also Aelian; Aeneas Tacticus; Asclepiodotus; Polyaeus; Treatises, Military

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Onomarchus (d. 352)

Onomarchus was a Phocian aristocrat and general, who was the supreme Phocian commander for a period from 354 to 352 during the Third Sacred War (356–346). He was one of the Phocians fined by the Delphic

Amphictyony for tilling sacred land, charges which had been the trigger for the war, and commanded forces alongside Philomelus, the initial Phocian commander. After Philomelus' death at the battle of Neon in 354, Onomarchus gathered together the defeated Phocian forces, and became the leading proponent for continuing the war, and indeed doing so more ruthlessly than ever. He either began or accelerated the looting of Delphic treasures to pay for mercenaries, and Phocis reached the height of its power, with forces of over 20,000 men, under his leadership. He also killed and confiscated the property of many of his enemies within Phocis.

With his enlarged forces, he prosecuted the war energetically, attacking the neighboring eastern and western Locrians and making several incursions into Boeotia. By allying himself with Lycophron and Peitholaus, the tyrants of Pherae, he opened up a new front in Thessaly. A probably apocryphal story claims that, when he was defending the Phocian town of Elatea against a Boeotian attack, he lined up the women, children, and elderly outside the walls but behind his army, to demonstrate to the enemy the desperation with which they would fight. Probably in 353, Onomarchus invaded Thessaly to help his Pheraean allies against their enemies in Thessaly, and also against Philip II of Macedon. Onomarchus defeated Philip twice, on one occasion inviting the Macedonian forces to pursue his retreating men into a crescent-shaped valley, only to attack them from the ridges on the flanks. Philip withdrew, "like a ram," he said, "to attack all the more violently" (Polyaenus, *Stratagems* 2.38). The two generals met again the next year (353/2) at the battle of Crocus Field, near the Gulf of Pagasae. This time Philip won a comprehensive victory and Onomarchus was killed. He was succeeded in command by his brother, Phayllus.

Peter Londey

See also Crocus Field, Battle of; Philip II of Macedon; Philomelus; Phocis, Phocians; Sacred War, Third

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Orchomenus (Boeotia)

Orchomenus was a city in Boeotia in central Greece. The site was one of the many excavated by Heinrich Schliemann. Its foundational myth involved an eponymous King Minyas who gave his name to the region and the people (the Minyans), already attested to in Homer's Catalogue of Ships. During the Middle and Late Helladic Periods, the city was prosperous and produced a unique style of pottery known as Grey Minyan Ware, and it was a significant city during the Mycenaean Period, giving rise to a number of epic and mythical traditions.

Orchomenus was one of the first Boeotian cities to begin minting its own coinage in the mid-sixth century. It was a prominent rival to Thebes, and stubbornly refused to join the Boeotian League. It gradually but steadily declined throughout the fifth century, which seems to have stemmed from the flooding of the fertile Copai's plain to form Lake Copai's. Orchomenus sided with the Spartans against Thebes in both the battle of Haliartus in 395 and the battle of Coronea in 394. Eventually Orchomenus was destroyed by the Thebans in 364, and then again in 346. It was rebuilt by Philip II of Macedon in 338 and continued to prosper during the third and second centuries before being completely destroyed by Sulla in 86 during his war against Mithridates VI Eupator.

Russell Buzby

See also Boeotia, Boeotians; Boeotian League; Chaeronea, Battle of; Coinage; Coronea, Battle of (394); Haliartus, Battle of; Mithridates VI Eupator; Thebes, Thebans. *Roman Section:* Mithridatic Wars; Sulla, Lucius Cornelius

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Ostracism (Ostrakismos)

Ostracism represents an interesting formal or institutional attempt to

prevent civil conflict. The practice (or something very similar) is attested at Argos, Megara, Miletus, and Syracuse; however, our best evidence is for fifth-century Athens. The premise behind it was to defuse internal conflict and prevent it from escalating into full-blown *stasis* or civil strife involving violence by temporarily removing a key participant in the conflict. It may also have been in part designed to avoid the sort of situation later described by Aristides where he lamented that he and Themistocles were so bitterly opposed that they even opposed each other's good measures.

At Athens, this was done by a two-stage vote of all the citizens. Every year a vote was taken in the Athenian *ecclesia* (assembly) to decide whether the political climate was sufficiently strained to warrant an ostracism. If a majority voted for an ostracism, this was done by a second vote taken soon afterwards. The voting took place in the Agora, under the supervision of the archons, by voters nominating the individual they most wanted removed from Athens. The votes were scratched on a very common resource in ancient Greece—old bits of broken pottery, called *ostraka* (sing. *ostrakon*). Hundreds of *ostraka* have been found with an individual's name and his father's name and/or deme—sufficient to identify him precisely, and occasionally a comment like “let him leave!”


The quorum for the vote was 6,000 and it is generally accepted that if this number of votes had been cast, then the individual named on most *ostraka* was exiled. However, there is a minority view that an individual had to have 6,000 votes cast against them to be ostracized. This is based on a fragment of Philochorus (F30) who wrote in the late fourth/early third century, some time after ostracism had fallen into disuse.

The man who received the most votes had to leave Athens within 10 days and was exiled for 10 years. He was not fined, did not lose his citizenship or property, and when the 10 years was up simply returned to his normal place in society. The idea was that 10 years would ensure the individual lost his influence and contacts, and the conflict which had caused the decision to hold an ostracism would have passed. Occasionally, a state emergency resulted in an individual being recalled early. Aristides was ostracized in 482 but recalled to help repel the Persian invasion of 480. Cimon was ostracized in 461 but recalled sometime after the disaster in Egypt (454) to negotiate the Five Years' Peace with Sparta.

The date ostracism was established in Athens is also the subject of debate. It was traditionally assigned to Cleisthenes' reforms (508/7) but the

first known ostracism (a Peisistratid called Hipparchus) was not until 487—part of a sequence which also saw Megacles, an Alcmaeonid and apparently other Alcmaeonids exiled from 487–485, probably because of fears they were pro-Persian. The gap between the alleged institution in 508/7 and first ostracism in 487 suggests that ostracism was instituted a few years after Cleisthenes, and later incorrectly linked with his major reforms. Attaching reforms to known and famous reformers is not uncommon in ancient Greece—apart from Cleisthenes this also seems to have occurred with Solon and Lycurgus. However, it is equally possible Cleisthenes introduced ostracism to target his opponent, Isagoras, whose failed attempt to seize power with Spartan help led to his exile without the need to hold an ostracism.

Although ostracism remained part of the Athenian legal system in the fourth century, it fell into disuse in the late fifth century. It had deficiencies, including issues with literacy levels. Aristides is famously supposed to been asked by an illiterate fellow-citizen to write “Aristides” on his *ostrakon*. When Aristides asked him why, the man replied that he was just sick of hearing everybody refer to Aristides as “the Just” (Plutarch, *Aristides* 7). In addition, any practice designed to curb individuals can be subverted and in the case of ostracism, there is early evidence of attempts to influence or manipulate the process. For example, a batch of 190 *ostraka* with Themistocles’ name on it was found that had clearly been produced by a small number of people with the clear intention of handing them out to others. The final straw came in 417, with the ostracism of Hyperbolus—a relatively minor player in Athenian politics at the time. He was ostracized because the two main politicians, Nicias and Alcibiades, organized their supporters to vote for Hyperbolus, to ensure neither of them was exiled.



A fifth-century Athenian *ostrakon*, naming the prominent politician Themistocles. Themistocles survived several ostracisms until ca. 471, when he was voted into exile. Located in the Agora Museum, Athens, Greece. (Gianni Dagli Orti/Corbis)

Iain Spence

See also Aristides; Athens; Athens, Intervention in Egypt; Cimon; Cleisthenes; Lycurgus (Spartan); Peisistratidae; Pericles; Solon; *Stasis*; Themistocles; Xanthippus (Athenian)

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Othismos

From the Greek word “to push,” the *othismos* is a phase of hoplite combat where one side pushes against the other. The true nature of the *othismos* has been long debated. The “literal model” proposes that all hoplite warfare involved both sides clashing “shield against shield” and physically pushing each other—in something akin to a rugby scrum—as in the battles of Delium in 424 (Thucydides 4.96) and in the last phase of the battle of Coronea in 394 (Xenophon, *Hellenica* 4.3.19). The “figurative model” proposes that the “push” was more metaphorical—a description of one side forcing the other back—such as occurred at the “Tearless Battle” between Sparta and Argos in 368 (Xenophon, *Hellenica* 7.1.31) or at the opening of Coronea (394) where much of the fighting was conducted “at spear length” (Xenophon, *Hellenica* 4.3.17). It seems that whether a hoplite battle developed into a literal or figurative pushing match was dependent upon the circumstances of the individual engagement.

Christopher Matthew

See also Hoplites; Phalanx

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P

Pangaeum, Mount

Mount Pangaeum is an isolated mountain chain, over 6,000 feet (1,828 meters) high, 15 miles (24 kilometers) long, and 10 (16 kilometers) wide, lying north of the Aegean in eastern Macedonia, just east of the Strymon valley. It was important in antiquity as a rich source of gold and silver. The area was mined by local Thracians as early as the seventh century, but by the sixth century outsiders, possibly Thasians and certainly Athenians, were also exploiting the area. One of the chief sources of wealth for the Athenian tyrant Peisistratus was mining interests at Pangaeum, and there are archaeological remains of sixth-century Athenian settlements on the nearby coast. In the fifth century, Athenians such as Cimon and the historian Thucydides had private interests in Thracian mines, probably around Pangaeum.

There were also larger, public attempts to exploit the area's resources. In around 512, Histiaeus, tyrant of Miletus, was allowed by the Persians to found a colony at Myrcinus in the Strymon valley, most likely in order to exploit the mines and timber in the area. In 465 the Athenians attempted to colonize Ennea Hodoi ("Nine Ways") on the lower Strymon with 10,000 settlers, but met with disaster when they tried to push further inland. The Athenians returned more successfully in 437/6, and founded Amphipolis nearby. They only held the city until Brasidas captured it in 424, but spent much of the following 70 years trying to recover it, no doubt driven by the wealth of the area. In about 370, the Thasians colonized Crenides, east of Pangaeum, and this became the main mining center. But in 357 Philip II of Macedon took control of the whole area, renamed Crenides "Philippi," and exploited the mines vigorously. According to Diodorus, they gave him an

annual revenue of more than 1,000 talents. The mines continued in use in Hellenistic and Roman times. Since 2012 there has been some limited archaeological exploration of the ancient mines.

Peter Londey

See also Amphipolis; Cimon; Macedon, Macedonia; Peisistratus; Thucydides

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Panhellenism

To understand the concept of panhellenism, we must first understand the fierce independence of the Greek city-states. The concept of a single Hellenic identity may have been strong, with a common language, pantheon and culture, but there was no sense of a common "nation." Greeks certainly considered outsiders as barbarians. The word itself (in Greek, *barbaroi*) mimics the "bar-bar" thought to be spoken by foreigners. There were also persistent internal ethnic divisions, primarily between the Ionians (mainly, Athens and its allies) and the Dorians (mainly, Sparta and its allies). This is not to say that the Greeks did not consider themselves "Greek," just that there was no compelling urge to form a single panhellenic polity.

Religion could serve as a common focus for Greeks. The four great Panhellenic Games, all part of religious festivals, at Olympia, Delphi, Nemea, and the Isthmus, formed a *periodos* (circuit) in which citizens of many states competed. Other sanctuaries which attracted visitors from all over the Greek world included the Argive Heraion, Didyma, the Artemision at Ephesus, the Heraion at Samos, and the Kabeirion on Samothrace. Athens promoted its own Panathenaea, the mysteries at Eleusis, and the importance of Delos as a pan-Ionian site.

In the face of a common enemy, some (but not all) Greek states might combine successfully, often under Spartan leadership. The Persians were their “natural” foe. Of the leading *poleis*, only Thebes went over to the Persians in 480 and suffered the stain of having “medized” for years afterward. The generals at Plataea seem to have sworn a common oath to enforce a joint resolve against the Persians. Explaining their refusal of terms offered by the Persian general Mardonius, the Athenians cited the need to avenge the desecration of panhellenic temples, and their duty to defend a common Hellenic identity bound by blood, language, religion, and culture. But the mainland and island Greek states were ambivalent about aiding the Greeks of Asia Minor, though in the fourth century the need to defend panhellenic identity against barbarians in the east or west was the subject of popular speeches.

States might come together in a *sympoliteia*, with a merged citizenship, as occurred with the Achaean, Boeotian, and Aetolian Leagues, the Chalcidian Confederacy, or the alliance of Corinth and Argos in the Corinthian War. But the Peace of Antalcidas (otherwise known as “the King’s Peace”), which ended the latter conflict, did much more to unite the Greeks, albeit through force. Spartan hegemony was propped up through Persian gold purchased, in turn, by the abandonment of Ionia and Cyprus to Artaxerxes II. There were further Common Peace agreements, but the rise of Philip II of Macedon and his son Alexander, saw the first really effective panhellenic federalism in the 330s. It is ironic that it took the sheer force of the men of Macedon, the former fringe-dwellers of the Classical world and those considered by the traditional powers to be “the least Greek,” to unite the old *poleis*.

James McDonald

See also Achaean League; Aetolia, Aetolian League; Alliances/Allies; Boeotian League; Chalcidian Confederacy; Common Peace (*Koine Eirene*); Delos; Delphi; Ionia, Ionians; Laws of War; Olympia; Olympic Truce; Persian Wars; Philip II of Macedon; Sacred Truces and Festivals; War Crimes

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Paraetacene, Battle of (316)

Antigonus I Monophthalmus and Eumenes of Cardia are regarded as the two best generals of the Successors and fought a series of battles against each other in Asia Minor. Paraetacene and Gabiene were the last of these engagements. Both should be noted as the first pitched battles in the Hellenistic Period that saw a large number of elephants fight on both sides.

From the left, Eumenes drew up light cavalry fronted by elephants and light infantry, the veteran *sarissa* phalanx fronted by elephants in the center, and heavy cavalry on the right, with an advance and rear guard of slaves or pages. Eumenes commanded around 35,000 infantry, 6,000 cavalry, and 120 elephants. Antigonus' deployment was identical but with the 30 best elephants in an echelon line on his left. He had a similar number of infantry, 10,600 cavalry, and 65 elephants.

Antigonus' left wing commander insubordinately attacked first, charging Eumenes' right wing. He was winning until Eumenes counterattacked with light cavalry and infantry. Eumenes' veterans defeated the enemy phalanx in the center. Antigonus personally led a heavy cavalry charge between Eumenes' phalanx and left wing, bypassing the elephant screen, and easily routed the surprised cavalry salvaging a draw by winning on the left, with Eumenes victorious everywhere else. Eumenes' veterans in the phalanx refused to leave their baggage undefended and so abandoned the battlefield. Antigonus forced his men to encamp on the field and thus claimed a victory. Antigonus may have lost up to 8,000 men and Eumenes up to 5,000.

Graham Wrightson

See also Antigonus I Monophthalmus; Asia Minor; Elephants; Eumenes of Cardia; Gabiene, Battle of; Peithon; Successors (*Diadochoi*), Wars of

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Parmenion (ca. 400–330)

Parmenion (Parmenio), son of Philotas, was a distinguished Macedonian nobleman and general who served under both Philip II and then Alexander the Great, who executed him in 330. According to Plutarch (*Moralia* 177c), Philip II contrasted himself with the Athenians, who were able to find 10 generals to elect every year, stating “over many years he himself had found only one general—Parmenion.” Despite the high regard in which he held Parmenion, few details survive of his service under Philip. He first appears with a major victory over the Illyrians in 356, campaigning independently of Philip. In 346 he captured the city of Halus in Thessaly and was one of the Macedonian ambassadors who negotiated peace with Athens. In 342/1 Parmenion campaigned on Euboea while Philip was in Thrace. Parmenion also fought in Thrace, probably in 340. In 336 Philip sent him to Asia as commander of the advance guard for his invasion of Asia.

Parmenion’s service under Philip indicates a senior general who could be trusted with major independent commands and diplomatic negotiations. Under Alexander, Parmenion was effectively second-in-command of the campaign, and commanded the left wing at Granicus, Issus, and Gaugamela. However, it is difficult to get a proper idea of his contribution from the extant sources. These tend to portray Parmenion as a cautious foil to the headstrong Alexander. For example, he advocated delay at Granicus and a night attack at Gaugamela. He is also supposed to have advised Alexander to accept Darius III’s peace offer (332), saying that if he were Alexander he would take it (QQ 8).

Parmenion was left in Media in 330 and executed there shortly after his son Philotas, who was with Alexander, was executed for treason. It is highly unlikely that Parmenion was actually implicated in the plot, but Alexander could not afford to let him live—he was too senior and influential and could

provide a focal point for unrest among Macedonians who saw Alexander's policies and practices as increasingly too Persian and un-Macedonian.

Iain Spence

See also Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon; Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon, Invasion of Persian Empire

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Parthia, Parthians

The name Parthian probably derives from the satrapy of Parthava, located in the northeastern part of the Achaemenid Empire, bordered by the satrapy of Hyrcania, the Dasht-e-Karir desert and the Oxus River. The Parthavians provided cavalry for the Achaemenids and later Alexander the Great. In the third century, Parthava experienced a series of incursions by a north Iranian Saka group called the Aparni/Parni—a nomadic peoples from the shores of the Caspian Sea (Strabo, *Geography* 11.7.1). Following these incursions the satrapy came to be called Parthia and its inhabitants the Parthians.

During the third century the city of Asaak north of the Kopet Dag mountains was the Parthian capital. Here, Arsaces was crowned the first Parthian king, establishing the Arsacid dynasty (Isidore of Charax, *Parthian Stations* 11). At the time of Arsaces' coronation, Parthia was a Seleucid satrapy. Arsaces failed in his early attempts to secure Parthian freedom. However, following a revolt by the Parthian satrap Andragoras against Seleucid rule, and Andragoras' subsequent defeat by Arsaces, the kingdom of Parthia was established, comprising the former Seleucid satrapies of Parthia and Hyrcania. The Seleucids were unable to counter this as they were tied up in an ongoing Ptolemaic War.

Arsaces' successors were quick to take advantage of Seleucid misfortune after the Romans defeated Antiochus III the Great at Thermopylae in 191 and Magnesia in 190. Mithridates I (171–139/8) added Bactria, Media, and Mesopotamia to Parthian territory and was crowned king in Babylon. He

also established the city of Nisa/Mithradakert in the former satrapy of Parthia, thereby recognizing the region as the Parthian “homeland.”

The Parthian Empire continued to grow under Mithridates II (124/3–88/7). He secured northern Mesopotamia and brought the city of Dura Europos under Parthian control. Mithridates also entered into formal trade relations with China. The resulting trade routes between Parthia and China became the basis for the silk road.

In 97, Mithridates II subjugated the region of Armenia, which became a major point of contention between Parthia and Rome. The Roman Senate sent Sulla to negotiate with Mithridates, setting the Euphrates as the border between Roman and Parthian territory. After Sulla, both Lucullus and Pompey attempted to meddle in Parthian affairs, but it was Crassus who brought things to a head when he crossed the eastern bank of the Euphrates with his army in 53, breaking the treaty between Mithridates II and Sulla. The resulting battle of Carrhae was an unmitigated disaster for the Romans. Caesar was on the brink of leaving for Parthia to retrieve the lost standards and avenge the loss at Carrhae when he was assassinated. Antony attempted to attack the Parthians in 38, but his campaign was a disaster plagued by tactical errors, betrayal, and desertion. In the end, Augustus negotiated the return of the standards and any surviving prisoners of war. The Euphrates was once again recognized as the border between the two empires although relations remained uneasy, especially with regards to Armenia. Several emperors, including Trajan, Verus, Septimius Severus, and Caracalla attempted to conquer Parthia with little consistent success. Roman invasions of Parthian territory ceased after the emperor Macrinus was forced to pay an extraordinary sum to the Parthian ruler Artabanus to end Parthian hostilities. From this point on Parthia began a slow decline and was eventually conquered by the Sassanids.

Carolyn Willekes

See also Mesopotamia; Seleucids. *Roman Section*: Carrhae, Battle of; Crassus (Marcus Licinius Crassus); Persia, Arsacid; Persian Wars, Arsacid; Sulla, Lucius Cornelius

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Pausanias, Son of Cleombrotus (d. 470)

Pausanias, son of the Agiad Spartan Cleombrotus, succeeded his father as regent for his cousin Pleistarchus, son of Leonidas, was given high command of the Greek forces in 479 and displayed admirable behavior at first. He defeated Mardonius' army at Plataea, refused a Greek suggestion to mistreat Persian corpses, and contrasted the austerity of Spartan food with opulent Persian food, astonished that Persians would invade so poor a country as Greece (QQ 31), supporting Herodotus' strong theme of environment's relation to culture. Over the next two years he led the Hellenic coalition against Persia, subduing Cyprus and Byzantium.

However, Pausanias' hubristic behavior began to repel the coalition, who complained. He was officially recalled to Sparta. Accusations surfaced that he had received a letter from Xerxes proposing a marriage alliance, wore Persian outfits, had Median and Egyptian bodyguards, indulged in Persian-style banqueting, and had developed a despotic, violent temper. This change in behavior was either the prime reason, or a pretext, for the Greek coalition's leadership being transferred to Athens. He was convicted for private acts of oppression but acquitted for medism (collaboration with the Persians). Pausanias then went to Byzantium without state backing, and was recalled to Sparta again in the second half of the 470s. Before his arrival he is reported to have made some sort of promise of freedom to the Helots. Convicted of this and of medism, he fled to the temple of Athena of the Bronze House. Rather than sacrilegiously slaying a suppliant, agents of the Spartan state enclosed the temple and let him die of hunger. This, however, was not enough to avoid later charges of sacrilege being leveled against Sparta.

Timothy Doran

See also Laws of War; Mycale, Battle of; Persian Wars; Plataea, Battle of; Sparta

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QQ 31; Herodotus 8.3.2; Thucydides 1.94, 1.96, 1.130; Diodorus 11.50.

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Pausanias, Son of Pleistoanax (ca. 450–ca. 380)

Pausanias of the Agiad royal house at Sparta reigned 446/5 to 426, for a long period at first as a minor, when his father Pleistoanax was in exile. He became king again when his father died in 409/8.

Pausanias played no part in the Peloponnesian War until 405, when he brought up an army from the Peloponnese to join in the siege of Athens. In 403, out of jealousy at Lysander's power in dealing with the democratic uprising in Attica, Pausanias persuaded the Ephors to give him the command. In spite of some losses in clashes with the democrats, he encouraged them to make settlement with their opponents. The reconciliation between the two sides reestablished democracy in Athens. The small separate state created at Eleusis for the extreme oligarchs was subjugated by Athens in 401.

At this point, if not earlier, Pausanias was put on trial and narrowly acquitted. His policy of trusting that a democratic Athens would be a loyal Spartan ally was obviously controversial. When the Corinthian War broke out in 395 Pausanias led a force into Boeotia but he did not link up in time with Lysander, who was defeated and killed at Haliartus. Faced with prosecution for this failure, and with his Athenian policy in tatters, Pausanias fled into exile at Tegea, where he died.

Douglas Kelly

See also Athens, Oligarchic Movements; Athens, Restoration of Democracy; Haliartus, Battle of; Lysander; Peloponnesian War, Second

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Pay, Military

Military pay is a fixed regular payment (agreed in advance) paid by an employer (such as a city-state or king) to a sailor or soldier in return for military service. Military pay can be paid in money or in kind (i.e., in goods and/or services).

There is no military pay as such in our first surviving descriptions of Greek warfare: Homer's *Iliad* and *Odyssey*. In the Homeric world—which reflects, underneath a supernatural sheen, the Greek world of the late eighth and early seventh centuries—men participating in military operations did not receive fixed regular payments in return for their service. Instead, they were rewarded in other ways. They could be treated to a feast before setting out on a campaign, for example, or receive gifts of food and drink for overseas military expeditions. More importantly, Homeric fighters expected to receive a share of any booty won in a war or taken in a raid. A successful leader of a war or raid (always a king or another high-ranking man) distributed booty on the basis of his soldiers' status and their efforts in the fighting. Failure in war or raiding therefore meant that fighters received no tangible profit from their service.

For most of the rest of the Archaic Period (ending ca. 480), too, there was no military pay for men taking part in wars or raids. The brief campaigns during this period were mostly undertaken against neighboring cities, so fighters could depend on food they brought from home and on foraging in enemy territory. For slightly longer operations, the supplies soldiers acquired themselves may have been supplemented by gifts of food and drink from their aristocratic military leaders. In addition, throughout the Archaic Period each man could still expect a share of the booty from successful campaigns (the size of the share depending as before on his status and performance in the fighting).

The earliest explicit reference to military pay in the Greek world, concerning the payment of sailors sailing on foreign expeditions, is in a law of the city of Eretria (on the island of Euboea) from the last quarter of the sixth century. Three major factors led to the introduction of pay in the late sixth century for men on naval service. First, the adoption of coinage by cities in the Greek world over the course of the sixth century provided a more convenient means for cities to pay fixed wages to their military forces. Second, central authorities within Greek cities grew in power over the

course of the sixth century. These more powerful central authorities meant that cities could more efficiently mobilize their citizens for military service and use increased public revenues (raised in coin from sources such as indirect taxes and fines) to pay for that military service.

Third, and linked to these first two factors, the growing use by Greek states of the trireme to fight their wars on sea from the third quarter of the sixth century onward forced cities to introduce pay (in coin) for naval service. Triremes required crews of 200 men (in contrast to previous Greek warships which contained 30 to 50 men), so fleets of triremes required much more food than previous fleets. But because of the lack of space on board Greek triremes—200 men crammed into a ship 35 meters (115 feet) long, 6 meters (20 feet) wide, and 3 meters (10 feet) high did not leave much room for storage—sailors departing from their home cities for overseas expeditions could not take with them more than a few days' supplies. So that their trireme fleets could resupply themselves away from home, cities therefore had to provide pay to their crews to use in friendly territory to buy food in markets provided by friendly and allied cities. In hostile territory—where the increased numbers of men aboard triremes now meant that foraging was no longer a supply method that could readily be used to feed fleets—naval crews could use their pay to buy food in markets provided by private traders who sailed alongside their ships as a sort of supply train.

With the introduction of pay, the capacity of Greek states to find sources of money for their rowers now became a central and determining factor in the outcome of their naval and overseas wars. The more money a community could raise, the more sailors it could pay—and it could pay them for longer periods of time. Finding a reliable source of pay for their trireme crews was therefore an important consideration in the discussions of the Ionian Greeks before their revolt against the Persians in 499. The discovery of rich lodes of silver at Laurium in the 480s enabled the Athenians to not only construct the largest trireme fleet in the Greek world but also to pay the men sailing these triremes during the Persian invasion of 480–79.

In the decades after the Persian Wars, the Athenians were able, thanks to their silver mines and (even more importantly) to the tribute coming in from the subjects of their empire, to amass unprecedented amounts of silver. This enabled them to send out navies—accompanied by land forces—to engage in overseas operations much longer than any mounted previously by a Greek state. Using the pay they received from the state to buy their food

from traders, the tens of thousands of sailors and soldiers on Athenian overseas expeditions in the mid and later fifth century often besieged rebelling cities for months, and even years, at a time.

It is unclear when exactly pay for military service on land campaigns was introduced in the Greek world but, at least by the time of the early years of the Peloponnesian War (431–404), it was taken for granted that all states would provide pay for their soldiers serving both on sea and on land. The first evidence for how much Greek sailors and soldiers were paid in return for their military service also comes from this period. One drachma a day (paid monthly) was the usual rate of pay for sailors and soldiers in Athenian forces in the first two decades of the war, while three Aeginetan obols per day (again paid monthly) was the standard rate of pay for Peloponnesian infantrymen. (Three Aeginetan obols equaled 4.325 Attic obols; there were 6 obols in a drachma.) Rates of pay did not differ by rank or by type of service in state military forces, with the exception of cavalry—horsemen usually received double the pay given to infantrymen to enable them to feed their mount.

Since one or two obols could purchase enough food to live on for a day, pay rates at this time (which were roughly equivalent to what other public workers received at Athens in the late fifth century) gave men on military campaigns the potential to make a tidy profit. The opportunity for monetary gain from service was even greater at Athens for men with special skills—such as *thranitai* (the rowers on a trireme's uppermost bench) and helmsmen—who, in addition to the standard rates paid by the state, could be paid bonuses by trierarchs competing to recruit the best quality crews possible. Individuals serving in Greek military forces in the Classical Period (from ca. 480 to 323) could no longer expect, however, to receive a share of any booty won on campaign: plunder (and the profits from its sale) was now under the control of the state.

The monetary resources available to or possessed by Athens and other military employers determined how much they paid their military forces. While they ruled their empire, the Athenians were exceptional in the concentrated wealth they were able to accumulate and could pay their men well for extended periods of time. When the Athenians lost the power to extract tribute from their subjects in the last years of the Peloponnesian War, however, they had to halve their sailors' pay. Even then, Athenian generals still had to resort to desperate measures such as sales of plunder

and exactions of money from cities to fund their fleets. Since the Spartans and their allies lacked any reliable income stream large enough to support lengthy foreign campaigns, their naval forces fighting the Athenians at this time were only able to do so because of Persian financial support. But the Persian king proved to be a notoriously unreliable payer, and so sailors on Peloponnesian triremes were sometimes, too, forced to scrape for funds (even spending part of one summer as farm workers to earn enough money to live on).

No fourth-century Greek city-state was ever able to develop sources of revenue consistent or large enough to ensure that their forces would be regularly and reliably paid for any extended period of time. The Arcadians did seize control of the great sanctuary of Olympia in 364 and the Phocians Delphi in 356 to use the great wealth built up in the treasuries of these religious centers to finance large armies, but these treasuries were not sustainable sources of long-term military funding (or sources acceptable to other Greeks). For all other armies and navies, since the public finances of cities never quite matched their military ambitions, funding—and so the pay of the men who made up these forces—always remained uncertain. Even with the lower rates of pay in this period, overseas forces, in particular, often had to rely on plunder or exactions from cities to raise money to survive. Probably because of long experience of the inability of their states to deliver pay regularly or in full, it was common practice during this period for sailors and soldiers to bring their own money to spend while on campaign.

In response to the pressures military pay put on public treasuries, a new system of military payments emerged at Athens and other cities in the Greek world by the middle of the fourth century. Military pay, instead of (as before) being considered (and disbursed as) one payment, was now understood as consisting of two payments, one for subsistence and one for pay proper. The Athenians (and other city-states) were often in a position to provide only enough money to cover the first subsistence payment and left the cash for the second payment to be raised from the personal resources of trierarchs or sales of booty.

In the middle of the fourth century Philip II of Macedonia seized control of the silver and gold mines along the coast of Thrace. He used the enormous income he received from these mines both to pay large numbers of mercenaries, and to raise and train a large army of Macedonians into a

force more organized and efficient than any army previously seen in the Greek world. The exceptional revenues Philip possessed also enabled him to use this army on prolonged campaigns and so to take control of mainland Greece. These revenues and this army formed the basis, too, for his son Alexander's initial operations in his invasion of Asia. Alexander experienced problems paying his men on their march through the interior of Asia, but was able to use the vast wealth amassed in the capitals of the Persian Empire to pay his men monetary rewards previously undreamt of by Greek armies.

In the Hellenistic Period, the distinction between pay and subsistence rations, which had emerged in the middle of the fourth century, became established practice. With the formation of permanent kingdoms in the territories conquered by Alexander, Hellenistic royal dynasties could build up massive reserves of foods such as wheat, olive oil, and wine through taxation-in-kind and to mobilize these reserves to support their armies and navies. Hellenistic rulers used these resources and their vast monetary revenues to give their soldiers two payments in return for their service: pay (proper) in coin and (for the first time in Greek history) a payment of rations in kind—although the value of part or all of this second payment was often converted into and paid in coin. In the latter case, Hellenistic soldiers could be offered markets by their employers in which basic foods were sold to them at fixed prices (which were lower than the market prices for these foods).

Hellenistic rulers enjoyed resources much greater than any city-state ever had and therefore could raise much larger forces and pay their soldiers all year round—so creating the first permanent standing armies in the Greek world. Sometimes even Hellenistic kings, however, ran out of money to pay their men and had to resort to extraordinary (and dangerous) measures such as the plundering of temples to finance their campaigns. It would only be when Roman armies conquered the Greek world in the late third and second centuries that the funding of military force in this region would be fully secure.

Stephen O'Connor

See also Coinage; Contracts, Military; Finance and War; Homeric Warfare; Mercenaries; Plunder and Booty

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Peace (*Eirene*)

In Aristophanes' comedy *Peace*, produced in Athens in spring 421, just before the concluding of the Peace of Nicias, the deity Peace (*Eirene*) has to be hauled out of a cave by Greek peasants, led by the Athenian Trygaeus. Earlier in the play War (*Polemos*) and his attendant Confusion (*Kudoimos*) have both speaking roles and take part in the action. In contrast peace is a silent figure, apparently represented on stage by a dummy. In the comedy, there is much about the blessings of peace, especially simple country life and the enjoyment of good food, and much dislike expressed of the hardships of military service and the arrogance of military men. Peace is addressed as "Divine Lady, mistress of dancing and weddings" (lines 974–5).

Aristophanes' *Peace* encapsulates the common Greek understanding of peace: it is difficult to attain, more often a matter of wishful thinking than reality, and fondly associated with the simple pleasures of life. Greek thinking about peace does not go beyond these obvious commonplaces.

Imagining peace as a goddess came readily to Aristophanes and his audience. Personifying abstract ideas such as Victory (*Nike*) or Good Order (*Eunomia*) was a common feature of Greek religious imagination. In actual practice, the first and only cult of Peace as a deity in Greece was established in Athens in 375/4, to celebrate the conclusion in that year of a Common

Peace treaty that gave some advantages to Athens, especially in comparison with the King's Peace of 387/6. A famous statue of Peace was made by the sculptor Cephisodotus, perhaps the cult-statue in her shrine. A late copy may be seen in the Glyptothek in Munich (no. 219). Peace is depicted as a beautiful woman, nursing the child *Plutus* (Wealth): she is the nurturer of life and bringer of prosperity, as all Greeks knew. However, this Athenian cult of Peace is as much a celebration of victory as the golden statuettes of Nike, the goddess Victory, which began to be dedicated on the Athenian Acropolis from this year on.

The modern student who turns to introductory or other works on ancient Greek history and society will usually find in the index plenty of entries on "War" or "Warfare," but none on "Peace" as a general concept. The word "Peace" (*eirene*) was also used in Greek in the concrete sense of a peace treaty, and index entries on "Peace" in this sense will be found (e.g., King's Peace, Peace of Philocrates), but that is all.

No Greek politician was ever idealistic enough to envisage a permanent end to war. It was hard enough to bring about a settlement ending a war. Down to the end of the fifth century peace treaties, like alliances, were usually made for a specific number of years. It might be expected that such treaties could be renewed and, from the fourth century onward, such treaties were usually made "For Ever" or for the indefinite future, no time limit being specified. No one expected these treaties to be perpetual.

The tenuous nature of peace in a world in which war was the commonest, if not the most effective, way of ending disputes between states may be seen from a pair of published speeches. Isocrates 8, *On the Peace* (ca. 355) shows the insecure basis of the peace treaty ending the Social War (357–355). Demosthenes 5, *On the Peace* (late summer 346) is a clever effort to insinuate that, while Athens has no choice but to acquiesce for the time being in the Peace of Philocrates, peace with Philip will not last.

King Pyrrhus of Epirus is reported (Plutarch, *Pyrrhus* 14) to have been asked by his chief diplomatic agent Cineas of Thessaly what he intended to gain by his forthcoming campaign in Italy (280–275). Pyrrhus answered the conquest of Italy. In reply to a series of more questions Pyrrhus gave conquest after conquest as his goal: Sicily, Carthage, Macedonia, and Greece. With all that accomplished, he said, he could relax and enjoy good wine and good company. Cineas told him that he could enjoy these good things now but Pyrrhus did not take the point. Cineas, it should be noted,

was arguing not against war in general but against a particular, ill-advised war.

It follows that there were no pacifists and no pacifism, in the sense of a principled rejection of war, in ancient Greece. It was quite different to work toward or to wish for the ending or the avoiding of a given war, but describing either Nicias or Phocion as a pacifist is an abuse of the term.

Douglas Kelly

See also Aristophanes; Common Peace; Demosthenes (Orator); King's Peace; Nicias; Philocrates, Peace of; Phocion; Pyrrhus

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Peisistratidae

An aristocratic family prominent in sixth-century Athenian political conflict. The most famous member of the family was Peisistratus, tyrant of Athens, but the term "Peisistratidae" is generally used to refer to his sons, Hippias and Hipparchus, or to the family in general.

Hippias became tyrant when Peisistratus died in 528/7 and initially continued his father's successful policy of maintaining rule through personal popularity, good government, and observing existing laws. He maintained reasonable terms with other powerful aristocratic families, allowing Cleisthenes (525/4) and Miltiades (524/3) to be archons. Hippias also continued his father's policy of public works, including building or renovating several major religious buildings in Athens.

Thucydides, among others, comments favorably on the early years of the Peisistratidae. However, Hippias' younger brother, Hipparchus, was

regarded as a playboy and according to Thucydides his failed attempt in 514 to seduce Harmodius, the lover of an older man, Aristogeiton, led to the end of the Peisistratid reign. Rejected by Harmodius, Hipparchus deliberately insulted his sister. Harmodius and Aristogeiton had already begun plotting to overthrow the tyranny and this insult spurred them to action. They succeeded in assassinating Hipparchus at the Greater Panathenaic Festival but missed Hippias. Harmodius was killed on the spot and Aristogeiton captured and tortured to death. There were a number of other conspirators, suggesting political as well as personal motives for the attack.

After this, Hippias implemented a much harsher rule. The Alcmaeonidae went into exile again and Herodotus claims that after one failed military attempt to return they bribed the Delphic oracle to encourage Spartan intervention. Despite their previously good relations with the Peisistratidae, the Spartans decided to end the tyranny. Anchimolius led the first attempt, landing at Phalerum, where his force was defeated and he was killed by Hippias' army, aided by 1,000 Thessalian cavalry. However, another Spartan attack in 511/10 forced Hippias and his relatives into exile.

Hippias fled, ending up in Asia Minor. The Spartans, who had soon decided it was a mistake to expel Hippias, failed to convince their allies to attack Athens and restore Peisistratid rule. Persian insistence that Athens should restore Hippias was similarly ineffective and probably influenced Athenian participation in the Ionian Revolt. Hippias' last known attempt to regain the tyranny was in 490 when he accompanied the unsuccessful Persian landing at Marathon.

Iain Spence

See also Alcmaeonidae; Cleisthenes; Marathon, Battle of; Miltiades I; Peisistratus; *Stasis*; Tyrants, Tyranny

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Peisistratus (ca. 600–528/7)

Peisistratus was a leading and very successful contender in sixth-century Athenian political conflict post-Solon. This conflict was family- and clan-based and involved the full spectrum from factional maneuvering, through assassination, to the use of large-scale armed force. Peisistratus was tyrant of Athens three times.

Born ca. 603–598, Peisistratus came to prominence in the mid-560s by capturing Nisaea from Megara. In 561/60 he faked an attack on himself, persuaded the assembly to vote him an armed bodyguard and then seized power with it. He was expelled after about five years when the other two faction leaders, Lycurgus and Megacles, temporarily united against him.

Shortly afterward, Peisistratus allied with Megacles, married his daughter, and returned to Athens as tyrant. However, Peisistratus' second tyranny was probably even more short-lived than the first. As the Alcmaeonids were reputedly cursed and he already had children, Peisistratus did not want more by Megacles' daughter. Megacles was incensed and realigned with Lycurgus; Peisistratus went into exile.

Peisistratus spent around 10 years preparing for his return. He raised money from mining interests in the north and allied with Eretria, Thessaly, Thebes, and Lygdamis, a prominent citizen (and later tyrant) of Naxos. With men and money from these places and mercenaries from Argos, Peisistratus landed at Marathon and defeated the Athenian army at the battle of Pallene.

Peisistratus' third tyranny was his most successful, lasting from around 545 until his death in 528/7. He maintained his power by mixing traditional security measures with personal popularity derived from good government. Internal security measures included perhaps disarming the people (according to the *Athenaion Politeia* 15.4, but apparently contradicted by Thucydides 6.56.2, 58.1), taking hostages, and maintaining a force of mercenaries—all reinforced by external military alliances. However, Peisistratus kept this in the background, maintaining his position more by his popularity.

Peisistratus retained the existing laws and customs and ensured peaceful local government and fair administration of justice. The Areopagus was retained and Peisistratus also permitted aristocrats from other factions to hold the archonship at various times during his tyranny. He boosted the economy, partly through a program of public buildings, including ensuring

the city's water supply, and made personal loans to the poor. Peisistratus also took steps to unify Attica. He appointed circuit judges to administer uniform justice in the countryside and regularly toured Attica. As part of this policy, Peisistratus also purified Delos (the Ionian religious center) and enhanced the Panathenaic festival. He (or Hippias) may also have minted coins depicting Athena.

Peisistratus' three tyrannies illustrate the very personal and competitive nature of aristocratic politics in Greece. His alliance with Megacles collapsed over his treatment of Megacles' daughter and Peisistratus' return to power was based in part on aristocratic contacts elsewhere.

Later assessments of Peisistratus' tyranny by Herodotus, Plutarch, and in the *Athenaion Politeia* are all favorable. These stress the moderation of his rule and the prosperity and stability it brought to Athens. Peisistratus retained the existing forms of government and in some ways continued the process started by Solon, who had made wealth rather than noble birth the basis for holding political office in Athens. In general, Peisistratus' rule diminished the power of the aristocratic clans, increased the unity of Attica, and built up a sense of Athenian identity. All of these played an important role in paving the way for Cleisthenes' democratic reforms.

Iain Spence

See also Alcmaeonidae; Cleisthenes; Delos; Internal Security; Naxos, Naxians; Peisistratidae; Peltast; Solon; *Stasis*; Tyrants, Tyranny

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Peithon (ca. 350–316)

A *somatophylax* (bodyguard) of Alexander the Great. He does not seem to have played a prominent role during campaigning, but was a trierarch of the Hydaspes fleet in 326, and was distinguished with a gold crown and a

Persian bride during the Susa weddings in 324. Peithon spoke against the nomination of Philip III Arrhidaeus for the kingship, and instead proposed that Perdiccas and Leonnatus should have joint guardianship over Roxane's child. For his support he received the satrapy of Media and was sent to suppress the Greek rebellion in the upper satrapies.

Peithon seems to have harbored ambition for greater power, but was unable to make anything of it. He was for a brief time a guardian of the kings, but lost this to Antipater. He later joined Perdiccas and was with him for the disastrous expedition in Egypt (321/20), where he became a member of the mutinous party that murdered Perdiccas. He made several attempts to better his position, and allied first to Seleucus, then Antigonus I Monophthalmus. Antigonus found him a useful ally but soon suspected Peithon of plotting rebellion. Antigonus tricked Peithon by pretending he was going to hand over the army and upper satrapies to him, and instead had him executed.

Charlotte M. R. Dunn

See also Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon; Antigonus I Monophthalmus; Hydaspes, Battle of; Leonnatus; Perdiccas; Philip III Arrhidaeus; Seleucus I Nicator; Successors, (*Diadochoi*) Wars of

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Pelopidas (ca. 410–364)

Pelopidas was a distinguished military and political leader in the Boeotian state after the liberation of Thebes in 379/78. Exiled by the pro-Spartan oligarchy imposed in ca. 382, Pelopidas was a leader of the small group that carried out the coup that overthrew the oligarchy. He was then elected one of the Boeotarchs, the board who were the chief executives of the new Boeotian state, and went on to hold this annual office 13 times.

In 375, Pelopidas showed his tactical brilliance by defeating a small Spartan force at Tegyra. At the battle of Leuctra (371), he played a key role

while commanding the elite infantry regiment, the Sacred Band. Pelopidas shared the command with his friend Epaminondas on the first Boeotian invasion of the Peloponnese in winter 370/369. Along with Epaminondas, he was put on trial for exceeding his legitimate term of office but was acquitted. Up to this point Pelopidas had been closely associated with Epaminondas' policies of securing Theban dominance in Boeotia and breaking Sparta's power in the Peloponnese. In 369-8 Pelopidas took the lead in a new initiative to establish Boeotian supremacy over Thessaly and Macedonia, the regions to its north. He freed Larissa in Thessaly from Macedonian rule and supported the Thessalian cities opposed to Alexander, tyrant of Pherae. He made Macedonia into a Boeotian ally and among the hostages brought to Thebes was a young prince, Philip, later to rule Macedonia as Philip II. While on a combined military and diplomatic mission in Thessaly in the next year, Pelopidas was captured through trickery by Alexander of Pherae. An expedition led by Epaminondas secured his release.

In ca. 367, Pelopidas led a diplomatic mission to the king of Persia and persuaded him to transfer his support away from Sparta to Boeotia. However, in the event the Persian king had neither the will nor the means to compel Greek states to accept the terms he laid down.

In 364, Pelopidas led into Thessaly a Boeotian army that combined with the free Thessalian cities to defeat Alexander of Pherae at the battle of Cynoscephalae. Although victorious, Pelopidas, still angry at his imprisonment, was killed while rashly pressing forward through the enemy to personally kill Alexander.

Douglas Kelly

See also Alexander of Pherae; Boeotian League; Cynoscephalae, Battle of (364); Epaminondas; Leuctra, Battle of; Omens and Portents; Sacred Band; Tegyra, Battle of

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Peloponnesian League

Modern scholars call Sparta's alliance system in the Archaic and Classical Periods the Peloponnesian League, although it was not a federal state like the Boeotian League. Ancient writers described this alliance more accurately as "The Lacedaemonians and their allies." Its early structure consisted minimally of influence exercised by encouraging pro-Spartan politicians and oligarchies in each friendly state, and discouraging or sometimes expelling tyrannies and democracies, and maximally of separate, ostensibly eternal, bilateral alliances between Sparta and each allied member state. League armies were called up at need from the members on an *ad hoc* basis, with Spartans assigning a required levy from each member.

Uncertainty necessitates much guesswork. Some cities joined because they felt threatened by Argos, the other sixth-century Peloponnesian hegemon; some whose tyrants the Spartans expelled felt pro-Spartan loyalty. Tegea's incorporation into the League (ca. 550) probably set a precedent for many member states to cede some control over their foreign policy to Sparta. Each member seemingly possessed one vote; only Sparta could convene representatives of the League. But not all members were deferential. Two levels of allies may have existed, one more independent than the other. Larger *poleis* like Corinth enjoyed considerable latitude. Corinth's involvement in the First Peloponnesian War (460/59–445) and with Corcyra and Epidamnus (late 430s) include no Spartan approval. At League meetings, Corinthian delegates boldly criticized Sparta. A myth of common Dorian descent, and religious institutions such as the Olympia festival, provided some unity. Corinth, Elis, Tegea, Orneae, Phlius, and eventually most towns in the Peloponnese became members, as did Thebes.

During the Persian Wars, the League expanded into a larger Hellenic anti-Persian alliance including most Greek *poleis*, with Sparta as leader. Afterward, Sparta withdrew from this larger alliance (partly because of Greek hatred against Pausanias) and retired back to its Peloponnesian allies while Athens headed the Delian League. The Peloponnesian League's most unified performances begin in the battle of Tanagra in 457, and continued in its defeat of Athens during the Peloponnesian War (431–404)—assisted by considerable funds from the Persian Empire. Sparta's subsequent imperial phase featured strong enforcement of the League's obligations. Sparta's weakening after Leuctra (371) freed some allied states to seek other forms of

protection such as the Arcadians, who formed their own federal state. An attenuated Peloponnesian League remained until Philip II of Macedon dissolved it in 338 to create the League of Corinth.

Timothy Doran

See also Epaminondas; Hellenic League (against Persians); Hellenic League (under Philip); Leuctra, Battle of; Pausanias, Son of Cleombrotus; Pelopidas; Peloponnesian War, First; Peloponnesian War, Second; Sparta

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Peloponnesian War, First (460/59–445), Causes

This complex, poorly understood war clashed Athenians against several Peloponnesian *poleis*, stemming from Athenian attempts to create both a land and sea empire and from Corinthian westward ambitions. The war's roots may partially lead back to Spartan displeasure over Athens taking over its leadership of the anti-Persian panhellenic sea alliance. Although Athenian assistance to Sparta during a Helot revolt after the earthquake of the 460s suggests friendliness, Sparta dismissed the Athenian force early, suspicious of Athens' democratic sympathies. In response, the Athenians ostracized their Sparta-friendly politician Cimon. Without Cimon's influence in the Athenian Assembly, policies that did not include appeasement of Sparta became possible. Athens concluded an alliance with Sparta's enemy Argos, allied with Thessaly, and settled Sparta's rebellious Helots in Naupactus, whose gulf location threatened the Peloponnesians, particularly the Corinthians. Around 460, the Megarians, involved in a border dispute with Corinth, revolted from the Spartan alliance. They allied

with the Athenians, who secured Megara and its port Pegae with garrisons and long walls to Megara's harbor Nisaea. Corinth perceived this as a threat, but Spartan interference seemed unlikely considering their lengthy Helot uprising.

Timothy Doran

See also Cimon; Corinth, Corinthians; Delian League/Athenian Empire; Helots; Megara; Peloponnesian League

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Peloponnesian War, First (460/59–445), Course

Athens unsuccessfully fought Corinthians and Epidaurians in 459/8 at Halieis, and in a naval battle at Cecryphalea defeated “the Peloponnesians,” either a purely geographic term or indicating the Peloponnesian League. Athens then besieged Aegina, which eventually submitted and joined Athens’ Delian League. Athens’ combination of control over Megara, Naupactus, and Aegina, as well as its alliance with Corinth’s rival Argos, understandably intimidated the Corinthians, who next (458) invaded Geraneia but suffered a debacle in the Megarid, incorrectly assuming that Athens would be too busy with numerous wars to help its new allies.

Spartan entrance into the war occurred when unrelatedly, in spring 457, the Phocians campaigned against the original *metropolis* of the Dorian Peloponnesians, Doris, which also represented Sparta’s wishes on the Amphietyonic League. The Spartans forced the Phocians to make terms and started home; however, at Tanagra, 14,000 Athenians and allies attacked them, suspecting a plot against the Athenian democracy. The Spartans won

and went home. Next the Athenians defeated the Thebans at Oenophyta, and took Tanagra, holding all Boeotia except Thebes for a decade. This marks Athens' attempt at creating a land empire in addition to its sea empire. Athens meanwhile completed her own Long Walls. Theoretically, walling Megara also and connecting it to Nisaea would have given Athens a walled fief north of the Peloponnese.

Athens' aggressive subsequent actions included successfully besieging Aegina, which was enrolled in the Delian League, and, in 456–454, raiding the Peloponnese and Acarnania. Thucydides states (1.112.1) that next the Peloponnesians and Athenians made a truce for five years, presumably in 451. War in Cyprus and Egypt occupied the Athenians next for several years, until a flurry of revolts broke out against Athens. Additionally, Athens meddled in Delphi against Spartan wishes around this time, giving Delphi back to the Phocians after the Spartans had returned it to the Delphians. In 448 Athens quelled a Megarian revolt, but (probably in 447/6) some Boeotian exiles regained several *poleis* in Boeotia and, at the battle of Coronea, the Boeotians defeated the Athenians, later represented as a war of liberation against Athens. The Athenians evacuated all Boeotia, after having occupied it for a decade, now agreeing to allow cities there (except Plataea, which remained Athens' ally) to choose their own form of government. This defeat noticeably weakened Athens, and in 446, several events seem to have added up to a carefully-calibrated, multifront effort to hit Athens simultaneously. First, Euboea, resenting Athens' cleruchies (military settlements), revolted against Athens. When Pericles entered Euboea with an army, he learned that Megara with Corinthian, Sicyonian, and Epidaurian help had revolted and killed its Athenian garrison, and the Peloponnesians were on the point of invading Attica. Pericles rushed his army back from Euboea to discover that a Peloponnesian army had ravaged Attica up to Eleusis and Thria, and then gone home. Desperately, the Athenians then crossed over again to Euboea, subdued the whole island, expelled the Histiaeans, and occupied Histiaea. Finally, in 446 the overstretched and exhausted Athenians made a peace treaty with the Spartans and their allies that was intended to last 30 years.

Timothy Doran

See also Athens, Expedition to Cyprus; Athens, Intervention in Egypt; Cimon; Corinth, Corinthians; Coronea, Battle of (447); Isthmus of Corinth;

Long Walls; Megara, Battle of; Myronides; Oenophyta, Battle of; Tanagra, Battle of; Tolmides

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Peloponnesian War, First (460/59–445), Consequences

Thucydides and Diodorus agree at least on the contours of the peace made in 446, detailed more in Diodorus 12.26.2. Athens had overextended itself as a power. Peace terms included Athens giving up its posts in the Peloponnese, Nisaea, Pegae, Troezen, and Achaëa; freedom for each alliance leader to use violence to resolve conflicts among its allies; that a hegemon could not interfere with allies listed in the opposite hegemon's alliance; and autonomy for neutral *poleis*, but not listed allies, to make alliance with either hegemon.

This war's most significant consequence was Athens' loss of its central Greek land empire and other subordinate partners on the Peloponnese: 16 years of war for territorial extension ended with Athens having won nothing more than she had held in 461. Its actions had additionally made Athens' territorial acquisitiveness obvious and unpopular. However, it left Athens with many other opportunities east, west, and to the Black Sea, and Athens' sea empire and Sparta's Peloponnesian League both remained intact. With the example of Euboea, which Sparta allowed Athens to harshly discipline, it left Athens' allies the knowledge that Sparta would not necessarily protect them against Athens.

Timothy Doran

See also Athens; Delian League/Athenian Empire; Peloponnesian League;

Sparta

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Peloponnesian War, Second (431–404), Causes

Scholars continue to debate the precise trigger of the Peloponnesian War, which lasted from 434 to 404, but the chief contemporary source, an Athenian named Thucydides, believed that the Athenian Empire had incurred the anger of other Greek city-states threatened by its power. He wrote that some states had lost their independence to Athens, and others, especially Sparta (one of the more powerful rivals of Athens), feared that they might as well. The most likely causes of the war are to be found in the events of the fifth century that followed the creation of the Delian League in 478/7.

During the 50-year period after 480 (sometimes called the *pentacontaetia*), Athens had become increasingly powerful, mainly by drawing on the Delian League, an alliance network that had evolved into an empire. At the same time, Sparta had some internal difficulties but remained leader of the loose alliance called the Peloponnesian League. The First Peloponnesian War, a conflict between members of the Delian and Peloponnesian Leagues that began in 461 over Athenian expansion on the mainland ended without serious result in 446 with the Thirty Year Peace. In the years that followed, free to strengthen its control over its allies, Athens grew even stronger and wealthier under Pericles' leadership. All of this concerned other Greek city-states, including several allies of Sparta. This growing fear of Athens was the general cause of the war, but it still required a series of incidents to actually trigger the conflict.

The first incident started in a small Greek city on the Adriatic coast,

Epidamnus. A civil war between pro-oligarchy and pro-democracy supporters in Epidamnus, a colony of ancient Corcyra, broke out in 435. The pro-democracy side sought support and ended up turning to Corinth, the city that had originally founded Corcyra. Corinth was an oligarchy, but it was also a long-term enemy of Corcyra, so it came to their support. The Corcyraeans resented what they perceived as meddling and armed conflict broke out between the two cities. Corcyra fared poorly and eventually made an alliance with Athens, despite the risk of breaking the Thirty Year Peace should Athens engage in battle against Corinth. In 433, Corcyra, with Athenian assistance, defeated Corinth at sea. Corinth, already afraid of Athenian influence, saw Athenian intervention for the threat that it was (in helping Corcyra, Athens gained an even larger navy) and complained to Sparta. The Spartans, however, did not declare war.

The second flashpoint occurred in the northern Aegean at Potidaea. This city, located on the Chalcidice Peninsula, was a former colony of Corinth, but also a member of the Delian League. Despite its alliance with Athens, Potidaea and Corinth maintained close political and economic ties. During 433–432, the Athenians demanded in decrees that Potidaea dismiss its Corinthian magistrates and submit to Athenian authority. When their demand was rebuffed, the Athenians laid siege to its ally. With active support from Corinth and Perdiccas, the king of Macedonia, the Potidaeans held out for two years. In support of its former colony, Corinth again appealed to Sparta repeatedly for the Peloponnesian League to declare war, but to no avail.

The final trigger occurred in Megara when Athens moved against its neighbor and former ally. A city-state just west of Athenian territory and east of Corinth, Megara had been an early member of the Peloponnesian League but in 460 joined the Delian League until 446. In 432, probably under Pericles' direction, Athens issued the Megarian Decrees that included several restrictions, most important of these banning Megarian merchants from Delian League ports. The advantage of such a measure on Pericles' part was that it allowed Athens to cause harm to a member of the Peloponnesian League without violating the peace treaty. Megara was reliant upon maritime trade for its success, and all the important ports were in the Delian League, so this decree was particularly damaging. Despite repeated requests, Athens would not rescind the decrees. As a result, Megara joined Corinth's previous appeals to Sparta for Peloponnesian

League action. Although the decree appears extraordinarily provocative, Thucydides saw it as a mere pretext for the later war.

The combination of Megarian and Corinthian appeals finally stirred Sparta to decide that the combination of provocations had violated the peace treaty. Negotiations toward a resolution with Athens dragged on over the winter of 432–431. Then, in 431, the city of Thebes, a member of the Peloponnesian League, attacked the city of Plataea, an old Athenian ally, and the war was underway. As with so many wars, neither side probably expected the war to last as long as it did or to have such far-reaching consequences.

It often appears to modern readers, as it did to later ancient authors, that Athens held the bulk of advantages and should have won, and so may have provoked a war in time of strength. It is important to remember, however, that for contemporaries the outcome was not a foregone conclusion. Also, much of the knowledge of these events comes from Thucydides' account, in which, despite his Athenian bias, he constructs a superb literary work that builds the drama inherent in the conclusion of the war.

Lee L. Brice

See also Athens; Colonies, Colonization; Corcyra, Conflict with Epidamnus and Corinth; Corcyra, *Stasis* at; Corinth, Corinthians; Delian League/Athenian Empire; Megara; Peloponnesian War, First; Pericles; Potidaea/Cassandraia; Potidaea, Siege of; Sparta; Sybota, Battle of; Thucydides

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Peloponnesian War, Second (431–404), Course

Between 431 and 404, the Peloponnesian War raged throughout Greece and the Aegean Sea, and even as far west as Sicily, as Sparta and its allies in the Peloponnesian League fought against what had become the Athenian Empire. It was to be an odd war in which the best Greek army faced the best navy, but Athens had the additional advantages of offensive mobility by sea and plenty of funds. Many Greek cities and even Persia became involved in the war so that it had an impact on nearly every part of the Greek world. The war ended in defeat for Athens and dissolution of its empire.

Throughout the period after 478, Athens had become increasingly powerful, mainly by drawing on the Delian League, an alliance network that had evolved into an empire. After a series of what appeared to Spartan allies as provocations, Sparta, led by King Archidamus II, declared Athens in violation of the existing peace treaty and the war began in 431.

According to the primary source for this period, Thucydides, both sides had a strategy for victory. Archidamus planned to draw the Athenians out to battle and win a swift victory on land that would result in the collapse of the Delian League. Pericles, the leader of Athens, advised his fellow citizens to remain behind their walls, secure with their large wealth reserves to maintain the fleet and import food but also raid the coastline of the Peloponnesian League members.

The first phase of the war, sometimes called the Archidamian War, lasted 10 years and began with a Spartan invasion of Athenian territory. Pericles pursued his semidefensive strategy with great effect. The invasion raided Attica but left Athens itself untouched, and after some desultory destruction the Spartans withdrew. The next year, while the Athenians remained behind their walls, a plague struck Athens and reduced its population. This not only affected the numbers of men it could field, but also cost the city-state one of its most capable leaders, Pericles, in 429.

During the early years of the war, there were victories on both sides, but the Athenian occupation of Pylos and capture of some Spartan citizens scared the nearby Spartans into suing for peace in 425. The Athenians, seeing their advantage, refused. Sparta responded by campaigning in the northern Aegean and eventually capturing Amphipolis in 422. This success led directly to the Peace of Nicias (421), which was intended to restore the

status quo, with both sides returning captured territory.

The treaty may not have been fully implemented, but it initiated a period of uneasy peace during which Athens sought to expand its empire by alliance with Argos, the conquest of Melos, and then a great expedition to Sicily in 415. That campaign in the west proved costly to Athens, as its huge force was defeated at Syracuse in 413. That expedition led to the end of the peace and the beginning of the second phase of the war, called the Decelean War.

During the Siege of Syracuse, Sparta was not idle, invading Attica again and occupying a fort at Decelea. Sparta also focused on building up its fleet to take advantage of the battered state of the Athenian navy. A significant portion of the Athenian fleet was destroyed in the attack on Sicily and with it, the men to man the new ships Athens was desperately trying to build. Also in the aftermath of Syracuse, several members of the Delian League revolted and this further occupied Athenian attention. Between 411 and 408, Athens experienced a *coup d'état* in favor of oligarchy and then a restoration of democracy, the continued rebellion of several allies, and food shortages caused by Spartan naval successes. However, a major Athenian naval victory at the battle of Cyzicus in 410 decimated the Spartan fleet and revived Athens' hopes of winning the war.

Despite the fact that Athens had secured its supply lines and even reclaimed a few of its subject states, political squabbling among the Athenians hampered their military, and the Spartans, with wealth provided by the Persians, continued to apply pressure. Athens achieved its last significant victory in the war at the battle of Arginusae in 406, but even that triumph was marred by the execution of several Athenian generals for reportedly failing to recover and bury their dead. The following year, the Spartan commander Lysander crushed the Athenian fleet at the battle of Aegospotami. Sparta then cut off Athens' food imports and besieged the city by land, forcing it to surrender in 404.

Sparta spared Athens from utter destruction, though Corinth and other Spartan allies desired it. Under the conditions of surrender, Athens lost its overseas possessions, its Long Walls, and most of its fleet. The Delian League also dissolved. The Golden Age of Athens and its empire was over. Despite this conclusion, Sparta had difficulty exploiting its victory in the decades that followed. In this way, the Peloponnesian War only led to a longer period of wearing conflict among the Greek city-states.

See also Aegospotami, Battle of; Agis II; Alcibiades; Amphipolis; Amphipolis, Campaign of; Archidamus II; Arginusae, Battle of; Aristophanes; Athens; Brasidas; Cleon; Delium, Battle of; Demosthenes (General); Ephesus, Battle of; Hellespont Campaign; Hermocrates of Syracuse; Lamachus; Mantinea, Battle of (418); Miletus, Battle of; Mytilene, Siege of; Notium, Battle of; Pausanias, Son of Pleistoanax; Peloponnesian War, First; Pericles; Pharnabazus; Plataea, Siege of; Potidaea, Siege of; Pylos (Sphacteria), Battle of; Sicilian Expedition; Sparta; Spartolus, Battle of; Strategy; Syracuse, Siege of; Theramenes; Thucydides; Tissaphernes; Xenophon

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Peloponnesian War, Second (431–404), Consequences

The Peloponnesian War ended in 404 when Athens accepted Spartan terms. Most of the immediate consequences of the treaty were predictable for both sides. Spartan success in the war initiated a 60-year period in which exploiting military success became a problem for every city-state that tried to dominate Greece, ultimately resulting in the end of politically independent Greek city-states.

Although some of Sparta's allies had sought the total destruction of Athens, the treaty was much more lenient, either because Sparta held the unlikely belief that Athens was a worthy city or because it actually feared the city that might benefit in the power vacuum caused by Athens' destruction (most likely Thebes or even Argos). The terms required

destruction of the walls around the city and the Piraeus harbor, the surrender of all but a dozen ships, and the recall of all exiles (most of whom were opponents of democracy). Not surprisingly, although it was not a term of the treaty, the Delian League dissolved, as it had been all but destroyed already by Lysander. As bad as these measures were, they applied only to Athens.

The other immediate impacts of the war were much more widespread, albeit more difficult to quantify. In addition to the battle deaths on both sides, an unknown number of men, women, and children died violently off the battlefield during the war. A number of city-states, including Melos and Delium, had been entirely destroyed or depopulated. The plague in Athens did not single out Athenians, but killed many non-Athenians as well. Agricultural production had suffered throughout much of the Greek mainland, causing additional economic, social, and medical problems. All of this meant an overall decline in the population in Greece that, although spread unevenly, affected all economic levels, free and slave. The nonagricultural economy also suffered in every aspect (except military-related), as the number of expensive ships and mercenaries employed by both sides increased over time. The loss was great, but within 10 years many city-states had rebounded noticeably and were ready for renewed fighting.

In the aftermath of the peace treaty with Athens, Lysander, still in control of the Spartan navy, tried to exploit the advantage and create a Spartan empire. He forced captured cities that had been part of the Athenian Empire to receive garrisons and a board of pro-Spartan political overseers (*decarchies*). In Athens, Lysander installed a garrison and a board of 30 pro-Spartan overseers that came to be called the Thirty Tyrants because of their excesses.

But Lysander and his supporters overreached, and the behavior of the Spartans fomented opposition among other city-states, including some allied members of the Peloponnesian League. The Spartans also irritated their former source of wealth, Persia, as they went back on the terms of their agreement with that kingdom. In return for the wealth Sparta received during the war, it had promised to give the Persian king control of the Greek city-states in western Asia Minor. Lysander initially rejected the agreement because he sought to maintain his own control over these cities.

The Athenians restored democracy in 403 and removed the garrison. Then, in 395, frustration with the Spartans led to the Corinthian War as

Corinth, Thebes, and Athens joined forces, with Persian funding and naval support, against Sparta. The war at sea went well, with Conon winning a major victory at Cnidus in 394. Conon then returned to Athens, where he led the restored democracy in rebuilding its walls and fleet and began to organize a new naval alliance called the Second Athenian Confederacy. The war only ended in 387/6 when the Persian king threw his money behind Sparta and imposed a peace treaty on Greece, often called the King's Peace.

Despite the peace treaty, conflict broke out repeatedly between Thebes and Sparta and led to the utter defeat of Sparta at the battle of Leuctra in 371. The outcome led to the end of the Peloponnesian League, as Thebes invaded Spartan territory several times and freed the Helots and Messenia. As Thebes grew powerful and started to create its own "empire," conflict arose between Athens and Thebes, culminating in 362 at the battle of Mantinea, where the Theban general Epaminondas was mortally wounded and Theban dominance began to wane. In the years that followed, Athens tried to dominate but had no better luck, facing opposition from Thebes and Persia that culminated in the collapse of the Second Athenian League.

By the mid-fourth century, the Greek city-states were financially and militarily exhausted. The political and military vacuum that had eventually resulted from the Peloponnesian War coincided with the emergence of Philip II as king of a resurgent Macedon in the north. In 338, the city-states of Greece succumbed to him, thus bringing the Classical Period of Greek history to an end and initiating an era of expansion under monarchs.

Lee L. Brice

See also Agesilaus II; Agesipolis I; Agis II; Amphipolis; Athenian Confederacy, Second; Athens, Restoration of Democracy; Civilian Populations in War; Cnidus, Battle of; Conon; Corinthian War; Epaminondas; King's Peace; Leuctra, Battle of; Lysander; Mercenaries; Pausanias, Son of Pleistoanax; Pharnabazus; Social and Economic Effects of War; Sparta; Sparta, Campaign against Olynthus; Tissaphernes; Xenophon

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Peltast (*Peltastes*)

The peltast was a type of medium- or light-armed infantry soldier named for his wickerwork or wooden crescent-shaped shield, the *pelte*. In addition to this shield, which could be conveniently slung across the back via a strap, peltasts were typically equipped with javelins as their primary offensive weapons, though some might have had thrusting spears. Unarmored and equipped with a light shield, peltasts were relatively quick and were notoriously difficult for hoplites to grapple with on open ground. Though eventually peltasts could be found throughout the Greek world, they probably originated in and were closely linked to Thrace, and were often employed as foreign mercenaries in Greek armies to supplement heavy-armed hoplites. By the end of the fourth century, peltasts were a standard feature in many armies, especially those of the Macedonians.

Peltasts would have been familiar to those Greeks living close to Thrace from the Archaic Period, and were introduced to Athens in the mid-sixth century, probably by Peisistratus who relied upon mercenaries raised in Thrace as he fought to regain his position as tyrant of Athens. From this time, peltasts appear on Attic pottery, usually clothed with traditional Thracian garb, including distinctive boots and a patterned cloak. From the artistic evidence, there appear to have been two kinds of peltast, one armed with javelins and another with a thrusting spear. Despite this early introduction in Athens, peltasts only saw extensive service as mercenaries in Greek armies starting with the Second Peloponnesian War. In 425, the Athenians Cleon and Demosthenes used peltasts and other light troops recruited from cities in and near Thrace to defeat a force of Spartan hoplites trapped on the island of Sphacteria, lying near Pylos. The Spartan hoplites, the most fearsome fighters in the world, were unable to close with the mobile light troops arrayed against them. Consequently, the Spartans surrendered, and nearly 300 of them were taken to Athens as prisoners. This

battle demonstrated that light-armed troops, including peltasts, could be effective even against hoplites. Later in the war, a group of Thracian peltasts in the service of Athens massacred the entire population of the Boeotian town of Mycalessus. This horrifying event helped to solidify the negative image of peltasts held by most Greeks, especially those of the hoplite class. During the massacre, cavalry from Thebes arrived to drive the peltasts away, and the peltasts demonstrated their famed tactics by swarming against the horsemen in small detachments to hurl their javelins before falling back again. Peltasts could thus be effective against cavalry too.

After the Peloponnesian War, peltasts were part of the expedition of the Ten Thousand Greeks in the service of the Persian Cyrus the Younger, and fought at the battle of Cunaxa in 401. During this campaign, the Athenian Xenophon realized that peltasts could be well used if placed on high ground to rain down javelins on the enemy. In 390, at Lechaeum, mercenary peltasts under the command of the Athenian Iphicrates utterly defeated a division of 600 Spartan hoplites, perhaps the most renowned feat of any peltast force. Iphicrates was made so famous by this battle that some ancient sources wrongly credit him with inventing the peltast in the first place. Iphicrates, however, might have conceived of a new type of infantry soldier based in part on the peltast. In response to the challenge posed by peltasts, some Spartans, including Agesilaus II, devised novel tactics for hoplites, including ordering the youngest age groups of hoplites to charge out from the phalanx in an attempt to catch and kill the fast-moving peltasts. This tactic had some measure of success, since one-on-one a peltast was little match for a Spartan hoplite. More often than not, though, the peltasts used their speed and loose formations to avoid facing hoplites in hand-to-hand combat.

Despite some spectacular battlefield victories, and despite the extensive use of even Greek peltasts by those Greek cities lying closest to Thrace, peltasts failed to change the nature of Greek battle during the Classical Period. Hoplite phalanxes continued to be the most prominent element of Greek armies, and even great innovators such as Epaminondas of Thebes are known mainly for their new phalanx formations rather than their use of light troops. Philip of Macedon and his son, Alexander the Great, during the latter half of the fourth century, finally made peltast contingents an integral part of their battlefield formations and tactics. Some scholars think that the soldiers of the Macedonian phalanx were based on the variation of the peltast armed with the thrusting spear. The Macedonian heavy infantry was

equipped with a smaller and lighter shield than the traditional hoplite shield, and the sources often call the Macedonian shield a *pelte*. The Macedonian shield was also slung over the neck and shoulder with a strap, very much like the peltast's shield. However, the most obvious use of peltasts by the Macedonians was as a light infantry force usually placed on the wings, outside of the heavy cavalry, to protect the army's flanks. The mobility and speed of peltasts made them uniquely suited to exploiting high ground and rough terrain, which was often found at the edge of the battlefield, including, for example, at Issus in 333.

Matthew A. Sears

See also Iphicrates; Lechaeum, Battle of; Light Troops; Mercenaries; Pylos (Sphacteria), Battle of; Spartolus, Battle of; Thrace, Thracians

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Perdiccas (d. ca. 320)

Born ca. 360, Perdiccas was the son of Orontes and possibly of royal descent. He occupied a prominent position in Alexander the Great's court, including serving as a *somatophylax* (bodyguard). He was a member of the Royal Hypaspists at the time of Philip II's assassination in 336, and was among those who pursued and killed his murderer. In the sources, Perdiccas is often linked to events that highlight the lack of discipline of his soldiers, but much of this negativity likely stemmed from Ptolemy I Soter's history; he and Perdiccas became serious rivals after Alexander's death.

After Hephaestion's death in 324, Perdiccas effectively became Alexander's second-in-command. He was one of the most influential

marshals when Alexander died, and he was said to have been given the king's signet ring just before his death. Perdiccas supported the right of Alexander's unborn child for the kingship, and was poised to seize sole regency before Philip III Arrhidaeus was put forward as another candidate. A compromise followed that limited Perdiccas' power, although he remained Chiliarch. Perdiccas set about eliminating rivals almost immediately, executing Meleager and having 300 of his supporters crushed to death by elephants. Perdiccas also had Alexander's wife Stateira and her sister murdered (so that they could not be used as political pawns), and annulled Alexander's last plans, to cancel Craterus' instructions to assume the regency of Macedonia. Seeking a strong alliance, he married Antipater's daughter Nicaea, but soon aimed higher and secretly courted Alexander's sister Cleopatra as well. Perdiccas was successful in campaigns to conquer Cappadocia with Eumenes of Cardia, which made the army well-disposed toward him for a time.

In 321/20 Perdiccas was facing confrontation with Antipater, Craterus, and Antigonus I Monophthalmus, who feared his growing power, but he turned his attentions instead to Egypt. Perdiccas had arranged Alexander's body to be transported to Macedonia in a magnificent funeral procession, through which Perdiccas hoped to be seen as Alexander's legitimate heir. Ptolemy intervened, however, and had the funeral procession and body stolen and brought to Egypt. This prompted Perdiccas to attempt to eliminate Ptolemy once and for all, however, the campaign was a disaster. In attempting to reach an island opposite Memphis, Perdiccas lost at least 2,000 men to the Nile (and to the crocodiles). Unwilling to suffer any longer under Perdiccas' leadership, his prominent generals, including Seleucus I Nicator and Peithon, stole into his tent and murdered him in the night.

Charlotte M. R. Dunn

See also Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon; Antigonus I Monophthalmus; Antipater; Eumenes of Cardia; Hephaestion; Meleager; Peithon; Philip II of Macedon; Philip III Arrhidaeus; Ptolemy I Soter; Seleucus I Nicator; Successors (*Diadochoi*), Wars of

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Pergamum

Pergamum was a city situated on a towering hill on the north side of the broad Caicus valley in Mysia, northwestern Anatolia. It is first mentioned in historical sources by Xenophon, who says the town surrendered voluntarily to Thibron the Spartan in 399, but the city only rose to prominence in the Hellenistic Period, when it became the capital of the Attalid kingdom of Pergamum. After the death of Attalus III of Pergamum in 133, the city and kingdom of Pergamum briefly became the capital of the Roman province of Asia.

Lysimachus chose Pergamum as a secure treasury and appointed Philetaerus as the garrison commander. However, Philetaerus switched his allegiance to Seleucus I in 282, just before the downfall of his former master. At first, Pergamum was nominally under Seleucid rule but following his victories over the Galatians in the 230s, Attalus I of Pergamum declared himself king, thereafter pursuing a vigorous policy of resistance to Seleucid rule in Asia Minor. Pergamum was to become the heart of the Attalid kingdom which controlled much of Asia Minor. Attalus I of Pergamum allied himself with Rome against Philip V of Macedon during both the First and Second Macedonian Wars.

In 201, Philip V of Macedon besieged Pergamum and perhaps out of frustration at his inability to take such a well-fortified and well-defended city, resorted to impiously laying waste to the religious sanctuaries of the lower city. Pergamum was again besieged unsuccessfully in 192–191 by Seleucus, the son of Antiochus III the Great. Under Eumenes II of Pergamum, the city and kingdom of Pergamum once again allied with Rome—against Perseus during the Third Macedonian War. Between 156–154, Prusias II of Bithynia invaded Pergamene territory, and like Philip V of Macedon before him, resorted to despoiling the sacred places including the Nicephorium, without making any real attempt to take the city itself.

Pergamum was an excellent example of well thought out town planning, evolving and expanding over time. The palace and citadel occupied the top of the hill while other buildings were built in terraces on the slopes of the hill including a large and splendid theater. The citadel at Pergamum

contained arsenals and barracks; the city also boasted a magnificent library, regarded as being second only to the Great Library of Alexandria, and a museum. The city also housed the Great Altar of Zeus, the temple to Athena Nicephorus, and was also famous for its Sanctuary of Asclepius. At the height of its power Pergamum was one of the most beautiful, important, wealthy, and powerful of the cities of the Hellenistic World.

David Harthen

See also Antiochus Hierax; Attalus I of Pergamum; Attalus II of Pergamum; Attalus III of Pergamum; Eumenes I of Pergamum; Eumenes II of Pergamum; Galatians; Laws of War; Lysimachus; Macedonian War, First; Macedonian War, Second; Macedonian War, Third; Prusias II; Rome, Romans; Seleucus I Nicator; Siege Warfare; Thibron; Xenophon. *Roman Section: Amicitia*, Asia Minor; Macedonian War, First; Macedonian War, Second

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Periander (ca. 625–587)

Periander, tyrant of Corinth, son of Cypselus. Married Melissa, daughter of the tyrant of Epidaurus; they had two sons. Herodotus' portrayal of him varies: he is clever and manipulative, but also subject to the dysfunction of his family and an autocrat.

In Book 1 he is a friend of Thrasybulus, the tyrant of Miletus, and passes vital information to him to aid him against Alyattes of Lydia. He also is the dealer of justice to lying sailors in the story of Arion the singer, who threw himself overboard rather than be killed. Periander searched out the truth and punished the sailors.

In Book 3 he is said to have killed his wife, Melissa, causing a rift between himself and both his father-in-law and his youngest son, Lycophron, which resulted in him exiling his son to Corcyra (Corfu). When

he later offered to swap places so that Lycophron might rule Corinth, the Corcyraeans murdered Lycophron to avoid having Periander as tyrant. As punishment, Periander sent 300 eminent Corcyraean boys to be castrated by Alyattes in Sardis.

In Book 5, he heeded the advice of Thrasybulus and executed eminent Corinthian citizens to retain control of Corinth, and severely humiliated the women of Corinth by having their clothes stripped from them as they attended what they thought was a festival, as a sacrifice to his dead wife. This story is told in the context of examples of the villainy of tyrants.

Abigail Dawson

See also Alyattes; Corinth, Corinthians; Cypselus; Thrasybulus; Tyrants, Tyranny

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Pericles (ca. 495–429)


Pericles, son of Xanthippus, was a prominent mid-fifth-century Athenian political and military leader who dominated Athenian politics from c. 443 until his death in 429. From a wealthy and prominent family (his father commanded the Athenians at Mycale and his mother, Agariste, was the niece of the great reformer Cleisthenes), Pericles chose the popular side of politics. He first appears in the 460s as (probably) a junior partner to Ephialtes in the successful attacks on the Areopagus and the prominent conservative Cimon. Most of the powers of the Areopagus were transferred to the courts and the *Boule* (Council of 500) and Cimon was exiled under the conflict-breaking mechanism of ostracism (461).

Following Ephialtes’ assassination, Pericles became the leading popular politician. He introduced one of the key planks of the Athenian democracy, state pay for service. The initial coverage, 6,000 jurors in the reconstructed court system (454), was over time expanded to around 20,000 citizens. In 451

Pericles sponsored a law restricting citizenship to those with two Athenian parents. This restricted the pool of those eligible for the increasing number of financial benefits to citizens but was also in part an antiaristocratic law—aristocrats not uncommonly married women from aristocratic families in other *poleis*. Both these measures resulted in enhanced influence for Pericles.

Pericles complemented this political activity with a successful campaign in the Corinthian Gulf (455), during the First Peloponnesian War (460/59–445). He followed this up in the 440s with campaigns to strengthen the Athenian Empire. He returned Delphi to Phocis and suppressed the revolts of Euboea and then Samos (440–439). A feature of his campaigns (although he did not originate the practice) was establishing cleruchies (military colonies) to extend Athenian control. He also established colonies in the west (at Thurii) and at Amphipolis in the Chalcidice.

This combination of popular control of political institutions, military success, and the tangible benefits of an expanded empire secured massive support. In 443, Pericles' main opponent, Thucydides son of Melesias (not the historian), was ostracized. From this point onward Pericles was reelected *strategos* every year and faced no serious internal political opposition until the end of his life. Thucydides (2.65.9) famously commented that “in what was in name a democracy, the rule was in fact in the hands of the first man.”



Marble bust of Pericles found at Tivoli, Italy, perhaps a copy of a fifth-century original by Cresilas. Pericles is wearing a Corinthian helmet as if prepared for battle (the helmet would be lowered just before action). However, because of his disproportionately long head, contemporary comedies call Pericles "squid head," and Plutarch suggests the helmet was to hide this. Located in the British Museum, London, United Kingdom. (Library of Congress)

Pericles' continued external focus from 443 to 431 was strengthening and expanding Athens' empire, and weakening Athens' main rival, Sparta. However, the pressure on Sparta was a major factor in the outbreak of the Second Peloponnesian War (431–404). By refusing the arbitration required under the Thirty Years Peace of 445, Sparta was legally responsible for the war. However, the pressure on Sparta's allies, and therefore Sparta's power and position, was immense and Pericles must have known that Sparta had little choice but to go to war. For example, in the years immediately

preceding the war, Athens had strengthened its position in the west and the Chalcidice, simultaneously weakening Corinth, by allying with Corcyra and besieging Potidaea. In 432, the Megarian decrees struck at another strategically located Spartan ally, Megara. If Sparta did not demonstrate that it could and would protect the members of the Peloponnesian League it is entirely possible that several would leave.

Pericles was apparently willing to run the risk of war because of Athens' very strong financial and naval position and his measures to strengthen Athens' general defense. These included improving the Long Walls, which effectively prevented Athens from total blockade except by a stronger naval power—which did not exist—and establishing an effective 1,000-strong cavalry. Pericles also had a strategy to resist the Spartans, almost certainly devised prior to the outbreak of war.

This so-called “island policy” called for Athens to avoid major land clashes with Sparta, protect the empire at all costs, and feed the city with imported food. As long as Athens had naval supremacy and the empire, the Long Walls to the Piraeus meant Sparta could not starve the city out. Complementing this was a limited, cavalry-based, protection of Athens' *chora* (agricultural land), and amphibious raids on the Peloponnese. The latter were designed to appease public disquiet at the Peloponnesian ravaging of Attica and to maintain pressure on Sparta's allies.

This plan cleverly exploited Athenian strengths and Spartan weaknesses. The criticism that this was essentially a defensive policy that could avoid losing the war but could not win it overlooks the real victory requirements for Athens. Athens needed only to realize the aims of the prewar pressure to detach Spartan allies from the Peloponnesian League, neutralizing it (and Sparta) as the dominant military alliance in Greece. To achieve this, Athens needed to demonstrate that Sparta could not protect its allies and that the allies were better off either neutral or aligned with Athens. This did not require an Athenian military victory. If Sparta was unable to achieve a decisive victory and made peace essentially on the basis of the prewar status quo, Athens would emerge stronger relative to Sparta than it was in 431.

However, when the Athenians saw their *chora* being ravaged without a full military response and were struck (430) by plague, the level of discontent considerably reduced Pericles' popularity and he was tried and fined. Nevertheless, he was reelected *strategos* for 429/8 but died from the effects of the plague (which had earlier killed his son) that same year.

Pericles' strategy to win the Peloponnesian War could arguably have done so had he lived to maintain control. A great statesman and leader, Pericles brought Athens to the height of its power and glory, while helping unleash the war that led to its decline. He is supposed to have stated on his death bed (with some inaccuracy) that his proudest legacy was that "no living Athenian ever put on a black *himation* (mourning dress) on my account" (Plutarch, *Pericles*, 38.4).

Iain Spence

See also Cimon; Colonies, Military; Finance and War; Mycale, Battle of; Peloponnesian War, First; Peloponnesian War, Second; Strategy; Thucydides

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Perioikoi

Perioikoi (meaning "those dwelling round about") was the term used in ancient Greece for dependent communities that were part of a larger state. Although they existed elsewhere (for example, Achaea Phthiotis seems to have been in this relationship with Thessaly) the term *Perioikoi* was particularly applied to the *poleis* subordinate to Sparta, the central *polis* of the Spartiates. Together with the Spartiates, they made up the state known to the Greeks as the *Lakedaimonioi*, that is, the people of the region Lacedaemon (which modern historians usually call Sparta).

There were *poleis* of the *Perioikoi* in both Laconia and Messenia. They each included free citizens and historically they had escaped the subjugation by conquest that had happened in early times to the Helot population. *Perioikoi* seem to have administered their internal affairs but had no part in the governing of the Spartan state. They provided hoplites and cavalry in time of war. At the time of the battle of Plataea (479), they may have fought in separate units from the Spartiates (Herodotus 9.28). Later, they fought alongside them in the same ranks (Thucydides 5.67). In any case, hoplites from the *Perioikoi* were plainly fit and proficient enough to make up a composite army with the Spartiates. Ancient sources do not distinguish Spartiates and *Perioikoi* in describing Spartan forces. An exception is the Sciritae, a regiment which was recruited from *Perioikoi* on the north border of Laconia and which had the distinction of being stationed on the left wing of a Spartan army (Thucydides 5.67).

Little is known about the social structure of the *Perioikoi* but it is highly likely from some indications, such as Herodotus 7.234 and Xenophon, *Hellenica* 5.3.9, that *Perioikoi* had Helots of their own, so that their *poleis* were in some sense miniature Spartas. In the Messenian uprising of ca. 465–456 (Third Messenian War), some *Perioikoi* in Messenia joined the rebel Helots (Thucydides 1.101). In the Boeotian invasion of Laconia and Messenia in 370/69, many *Perioikoi* joined the invaders. Some rebel *Perioikoi* in northern Laconia were then incorporated into the new foundation of Megalopolis but the rest of those in Laconia did not maintain their independence after the invaders left. *Perioikoi* were still part of Sparta in the reign of King Cleomenes III (235–222), who recruited 4,000 suitable individuals from them into the expanded body of Spartiate citizens (Plutarch, *Cleomenes* 11). After the incorporation of Sparta into the Achaean League in 195, the *Perioikoi* became free states separated from Sparta.

Douglas Kelly

See also Achaean League; Achaea Phthiotis; Cleomenes III; Helots; Megalopolis; Messenian War, First; Messenian War, Third; Sparta

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Perseus of Macedon (d. ca. 165)

Perseus was the last king of Macedon, reigning from 179 to 168. He was the eldest son of King Philip V of Macedon and Polycratia of Argos, although rumor had it that he was an illegitimate son of Philip and a seamstress named Gnathaenion.

During the Second Macedonian War, Philip sent the 12- or 13-year-old Perseus with some of his retainers to occupy the passes of Pelagonia. In his late teens, Perseus fought on the Roman side in the war against Antiochus III. He and his younger brother Demetrius, who had been a hostage in Rome between 196 and 190, became estranged in the mid-180s. This was allegedly because Demetrius was treated with extraordinary favor by the Romans, while Perseus inherited his father’s hatred of Rome. In 182, Perseus accused Demetrius of trying to assassinate him. In 181, Perseus used Didas, Philip’s governor of Paeonia, to extract incriminating information from Demetrius regarding his future plans and relations with Rome. The plan worked, and Perseus convinced Philip to have Demetrius executed in 180.

Perseus succeeded his father in 179, renewed his friendship with Rome, defended Macedon against the Bastarnae and the Thracians, and granted amnesty to Macedonian debtors and exiles. He launched a charm offensive toward the Greek states, including the Achaean and Aetolian Leagues and Boeotia, increased his influence with the Amphictyonic council (which managed the sacred site of Delphi), married Laodice II, daughter of Seleucus IV of Syria, and gave his sister Apame in marriage to Prusias II of Bithynia. Eumenes II of Pergamum put the worst possible construction on these activities before the Romans, in addition to accusing Perseus of stockpiling weapons and money in preparation for a war against Rome. Rome declared war in 171 and after some initial success, Perseus was defeated at the battle of Pydna in 168. He was captured and displayed in the triumph of his

conqueror Lucius Aemilius Paullus, after which he was interned at Alba Fucens and died around 165 (or possibly 162). It is reported that he either starved himself to death, or was killed by his jailers who deprived him of sleep.

Paul J. Burton

See also Macedonian War, Second; Macedonian War, Third; Philip V; Pydna, Battle of. *Roman Section*: Aemilius Paullus, Lucius; Macedonian War, Third

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Persian (Achaemenid) Empire

In 550, Cyrus defeated the Median king Astyages and inaugurated the formation of the Achaemenid Empire. At its peak (around 500, see map) the king's sway stretched from northern Greece to the Indus valley, Sudan to Central Asia, and the Indian Ocean to the Caucasus. Even at the start of Darius III's reign (just before its demise) the only certain difference is that the northwest frontier was the Anatolian coast. The lack of appropriate source-material makes identification of the other frontiers difficult—an abiding problem of Achaemenid historiography is that evidence is skewed to the empire's center and west. Royal inscriptions described the empire in lists of up to 31 *dahyava* (lands/peoples) of whom the king said "I reigned over them, they brought me tribute, what I said to them, they did, my law held them." Herodotus listed some 65 nations arranged in 20 tribute-districts—not an authentic document, but capturing a truth in its focus on tribute: resource-extraction as a symbol of power and means of enriching king, court, and imperial elite was a central characteristic.

Formed in just over a generation, the empire met its end in a limited sense (replacement of its Persian ruler by a Macedonian) in just four years (334–330) and in a more substantial sense after Alexander the Great's death with its division into separate kingdoms. The era of formation and

expansion ended with Xerxes' failure in Greece (480–479), but the following 150 years saw some recovery of consequent losses (the Persian claim to Anatolia was reaffirmed by the King's Peace of 387/6), and the empire remained the defining geopolitical fact for the east Mediterranean and western Asia—a situation that showed little sign of ending. Alexander's achievement was a shockingly improbable realization of the aspirations of Greek panhellenists.

The era of postexpansion stability was not devoid of conflict. Both before and after conquest of new territory ceased there were wars of succession (522–521, 424–423, 401), native insurrections of varying duration (Lydia: immediately postconquest; Babylonia, Elam, Media: 522–521; Greek Anatolia: 499–493, 479–386; Cyprus: 499–496, early 340s; Egypt 486–485, 460–454, 404–343; Babylonia: 484, Media: 409; Paphlagonia: early fourth century; Phoenicia: early 340s) and trouble caused by disaffected satraps: Oroetes (ca. 522–520), Aryandes (late sixth century), Masistes (479/8), Megabyzus and his son Artyphius (mid-fifth century), Pissuthnes and his son Amorges (late 420s–412), Terituchmes (reign of Darius II), and Ariobarzanes, Mausolus, Autophradates, Orontes, Datames and Artabazus—six participants in the so-called satraps' revolt of the 370s–350s. There were also structural sources of recurrent disorder—notably the Mysians and Pisidians of western Anatolia, the Carduchians of southeastern Anatolia and the Cadusians of the west Caspian region, people who were never more than semi-attached to the empire, even though located within or immediately adjacent to it. Exercise of central control was discontinuous and divergent in type. The empire was not neatly divided into uniform provinces governed by satraps: even areas such as Caria, Lycia, or Cilicia could be for long periods rather marginal to such a system.

What kept it together? Royal inscriptions and iconography stressed peace and harmony: this was not an ideologically militarist empire even initially (despite a Greek perception to the contrary). It also did not generally practice cultural imperialism. The Persians had no desire to “persify” the world, merely to extract its resources for their own benefit. Much of the time collusion from local elites (who could also benefit) helped maintain stability, and exploitation of existing bureaucratic processes fostered continuity. Where control was lost for long periods this was generally influenced by geographical factors. For example, the comparative difficulty of invading the Nile valley across Sinai or through the Delta

helped the Egyptians in 404–343. A mismatch between the physical boundary of Asia Minor and the ethnocultural boundary between non-Greek and Greek combined with the emergence of imperial powers in Aegean Greece created a special situation in Greek Anatolia in 479–386 (only finally resolved by playing those powers off against one another).



Painting of a scene from the "Alexander Sarcophagus," late fourth century, Sidon. The scene depicts combat between Persians and Macedonians during Alexander the Great's conquest of the Achaemenid Empire. The depiction of the Persians as lightly equipped, with bows or the light *pelte* shield and (now missing) spears or javelins, is consistent with literary descriptions of late Achaemenid troops. The sarcophagus is located in the Archaeological Museum, Istanbul, Turkey. (Bridgeman Images)

In the end imperial control entailed that subjects either experienced or feared superior military force. Even the King's Peace finesse, for example, depended on the threat of military intervention. In tactical/weaponry terms this force came from a mixture of Iranian (Persian and non-Persian) and non-Iranian troops. The historian's problem is deciding the proportions and precise identities of these categories in any given context. Herodotus' description of Xerxes' army is a product of ethnographical information-gathering and cannot be taken seriously; few other major armies are systematically described, and smaller forces are rarely categorically itemized at all. Large-scale expeditionary armies were probably in practice

dominated by Iranians and an elite Persian core. But it is harder to figure out what was locally available in provincial regions, especially in the empire's western half. Satraps maintained forces of Iranian cavalry, but the incidence of Iranian infantry is rather less clear. Soldiers are hard to identify in documentary sources (admittedly the archives we possess are rarely well-suited to the task), and Xenophon's generic statements about the garrisoned landscape are hard to validate: in fact, it is hard to know how occupied the landscape seemed away from major centers and roads. Mercenaries appear quite often (not only in the heyday of Greek mercenary employment from the later fifth century), and one suspects that non-Iranians/Persians—whether paid as mercenaries or levied as subjects—were a majority among troops available for immediate response. That is why serious provincial disorder was apt to require intervention from outside. The frequency with which local forces successfully controlled low-level disorder that might otherwise have turned into something serious is something we cannot assess.

Christopher Tuplin

See also Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon; Artaxerxes I; Artaxerxes II; Artaxerxes III; Cunaxa, Battle of; Cyrus II; Cyrus the Younger; Darius I; Darius II; Darius III; Finance and War; King's Peace; Mercenaries; Persian Wars; Ten Thousand, March of; Xerxes

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Persian Wars (490–479), Causes

The basic cause of the Persian Wars was the desire of the Persian Great King to ensure control of the western extremity of his empire, and then to expand

it further west. Although the expansion into Thrace did bring natural resources such as timber and gold into the empire, Greece proper was hardly known for its riches. Possessing Greece would have brought slaves, tribute, and taxes, but the Greeks themselves did not believe that the Persians were motivated by wealth (QQ 31).

The issue of control was real. Persian acquisition of Croesus' Lydian Empire brought numerous Greek settlements in coastal Asia Minor into the empire. The Persians tried a variety of control measures, including setting up pro-Persian tyrants in many cities. However, the Ionian Revolt of 499–493 highlighted the cross-border “Greek problem.” The revolt was relatively widespread and in some areas difficult to suppress—the Greek naval campaign was troublesome and Persian victory at the battle of Lade in 494 was not a foregone conclusion. The rebel appeal to Sparta, although unsuccessful, and the military assistance provided by two Greek cities, Athens and Eretria, illustrated the nature of the problem. As long as Greece proper remained independent, their support for the Greek cities under Persian domination was a constant threat. This, rather than a desire to punish Athens and Eretria, was probably the motive behind the first expeditions against Greece. Although the aims of the Persian campaign which culminated at Marathon in 490 are uncertain, there was probably more to it than a punitive expedition. Athens and Eretria were the main targets, but it seems likely that the Persians were testing the waters, and that if they had won at Marathon they may have established a permanent presence, or at least accepted the submission of other Greek states.

This motive was probably even more prominent in the invasion of 480–479. The original motives remained, but Xerxes was clearly keen to restore the prestige lost by Darius with the defeat at Marathon. Although in the context of the empire Marathon was a minor setback in a frontier area, it had reinforced Greek independence and the possibility of support to their compatriots in Asia Minor.

Iain Spence

See also Darius I; Ionian Revolt; Lade, Battle of; Lydia; Persian (Achaemenid) Empire; Xerxes

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Persian Wars (490–479), Course

Although it is possible to argue that the Persian Wars did not really end until around 449/8 whether by a formal peace (the Peace of Callias) or a de facto cessation of hostilities, the Persian Wars are traditionally regarded as comprising the Marathon campaign of 490 (the First Persian War) and the campaign of 480–479 (the Second Persian War). This view dates back as least as early as Thucydides, who describes (1.23.1) the war as “coming to a speedy end through two sea and two land battles.” However, which battles he meant is not entirely clear as the 480–79 campaign had five battles. If, as seems likely, he regarded Mycale as part of the follow-up action rather than of the war to defend mainland Greece, these battles were Artemisium, Salamis, Thermopylae, and Plataea.

Both campaigns were preceded by preliminary operations to secure the Persian route to Greece. Darius I had secured large areas of Thrace ca. 512 but control had to be reestablished after the Ionian Revolt (499–493). From 492 to 491, Mardonius secured territory from the Thracian Chersonese to Macedon, including Thasos and the Chalcidice. However, the Persians could not control the weather and their first attempt against Greece, an amphibious operation in 492, failed when most of the fleet was lost in a storm off Mount Athos in the Chalcidice.

In 491, the Persians sent envoys to demand earth and water as a sign of submission from the Greeks. Athens and Sparta refused (killing the envoys) but other states complied. These were mainly Aegean island states (which were more vulnerable to Persian attack) but included some mainland ones. A notable submission was the island of Aegina, strategically located off the Athenian coast. However, an Athenian appeal to Sparta neutralized this threat—Cleomenes I, despite the opposition of his fellow king Demaratus, took hostages and forced Aegina to remain quiet.

In 490, probably because of the disaster at Athos in 492, the Persians launched their next attack across the Aegean. Under Datis and Artaphernes a Persian fleet with perhaps around 25,000 troops, securing the islands of the Cyclades (including Naxos) en route, arrived on Euboea. It took Carystus and then besieged Eretria. After six days Eretria was betrayed, its temples burnt in revenge for the destruction of Sardis in the Ionian Revolt, and the population enslaved and deported. The Persians, advised by Hippias, the exiled Athenian tyrant, then landed unopposed at Marathon. This was easier than an opposed landing at Phalerum, avoided the potential for delays and/or shipwreck traveling around Sunium, and was good terrain for their cavalry. Hippias had recommended Marathon, perhaps because he also hoped for local support there. Reinforced only by the Plataeans, the Athenians deployed northeast to prevent the Persian army advancing on Athens. In the ensuing battle, the Greeks, around 10,000 strong, defeated the much larger Persian force. The surviving Persians, after a failed attempt to get to Athens by sea before the Athenian army returned, sailed home.

The Marathon campaign demonstrated the clear superiority of the Greek hoplite over Persian infantry, and the difficulties faced by Persia in conducting a campaign in Greece. These difficulties included the terrain, which was not suited to the Persian cavalry, and the extended supply lines. Worryingly for the Greeks, though, the campaign also demonstrated that many Greek states were not prepared to resist a Persian attack.

Although the Persians clearly regarded Marathon as a temporary setback, they did not return for 10 years. The main reason for the delay was a revolt in Egypt and Babylon and the death of Darius in 486. It took some time for his successor, Xerxes, to firmly establish his rule and to suppress the revolts. In addition, when he was ready to renew hostilities, the scale of the preparations, at least as recorded by Herodotus, were so vast that it took considerable time to organize. In 483, for example, the Persians began digging a canal across the neck of the Athos Peninsula to avoid a repeat of the storm losses in 492.

In the meantime, the Greeks were not idle. At Athens a series of ostracisms removed politicians suspected of Persian sympathies and, more importantly, a new fleet of 200 triremes was constructed. As the Persian preparations became more advanced, and better known to the Greeks, the Hellenic League was formed to resist the Persians. Their preliminary agreement was confirmed at the Isthmus of Corinth in 481. Thirty-one states

swore to resist and to punish medizers (Greek states who joined the enemy), agreed to end all wars and feuds between them, to seek support from Crete, Corcyra, and Sicily, send spies to Persia, and that Sparta would command the coalition land and naval forces. This was an important agreement, although the number of states involved was a clear minority of Greek states. Both Argos and Syracuse refused to join unless they were given shared command with Sparta, which was refused. Corcyra ultimately sent assistance, but so slowly it took no part in the war, and Crete remained neutral. In several cases, these states were encouraged not to fight because of oracles delivered (or claimed to have been delivered) by Delphi.

Athens, which provided as many ships as all the other Greeks put together, made a considerable sacrifice in giving naval command to Sparta, and also ended its war with Aegina. Sparta, on the other hand, also made sacrifices by supporting the new Hellenic League instead of insisting that the war be fought under its existing Peloponnesian League.

According to Herodotus, whose figures are regularly and clearly exaggerated, the Persian forces had around 500,000 fighting men and 1,207 warships. In 480 these advanced in parallel, the army so large Herodotus claimed it drank rivers dry and stripped the countryside of food. Whatever the size of the force, the preparations were unprecedented in Greek experience—the Persians even constructed a temporary bridge across the Dardanelles for the army to cross. The fleet was an important supporting element, both in terms of food supply and to neutralize the Greek fleet, but the emphasis was clearly on a land victory and permanent conquest.

As the Persians moved south, overawed Greek states in their path generally simply surrendered and joined them. The first Greek counter move inevitably mirrored the Persian advance—a joint land and naval response. A force of 10,000 men was deployed by sea to block the pass at Tempe (north of Thessaly). However, the fleet found no suitable anchorages and the army discovered there were three passes—too many to guard. The only sensible decision was to withdraw, but this resulted in the now unprotected states south of Tempe, including Thessaly, joining the Persians. This deprived the Greeks of their main source of cavalry.

The next line of defense saw 7,000 troops deployed to Thermopylae and 271 triremes at neighboring Artemisium. This confirmed the Greek strategy—a combined land and sea defense, located at narrow points which would negate the Persian numerical superiority. The defense initially went well,

with 200 Persian ships lost in a storm and the army inflicting serious casualties on the Persians in the narrow pass at Thermopylae. When the pass was turned part of the army escaped, the Spartans and Thespians fought to the death, while (according to Herodotus) the Thebans surrendered. The fleet had no choice but to withdraw. The next natural line of defense was the Isthmus of Corinth, which meant every Greek state north of it was exposed. Boeotia (except for Plataea) and many other states defected to Persia; the Athenians evacuated their city, preparing to fight at sea.

Although some were buoyed by the heroic defense at Thermopylae and encouraged by the performance of the fleet at Artemisium, many had given up—this was the crisis point for Greece. The Peloponnesians busied themselves fortifying the Isthmus and were reluctant to operate north of it. The Persians sacked Athens and the Greeks debated withdrawing their fleet from Salamis. Fortunately for them, they decided to stay and fight a naval battle (although Herodotus records that the Athenian Themistocles maneuvered his reluctant allies into it). The resounding Greek victory was a major blow for Xerxes who withdrew, leaving Mardonius and a still sizeable army to finish the task. Mardonius withdrew to Thebes for the winter, leaving a devastated Attica behind and the Peloponnesians still reluctant to move north.

While the fleet followed up the Persians to ensure their navy posed no threat, the Peloponnesians remained idle. Finally, under considerable pressure from Athens and Corinth, the Spartans led the Peloponnesian League forces north. At Plataea, still outnumbered, the Greek hoplite again proved superior to the Persians. Mardonius was defeated and killed, his army destroyed and the land threat to Greece was ended. The survivors suffered considerably on the retreat and most of them did not return home. About the same time as Plataea (traditionally on the same day, but this is unlikely) the Greek fleet won a major victory over the Persian fleet and accompanying army at Mycale, on the coast of Asia Minor. This effectively ended the Persian threat to mainland Greece and from this point onward the Greeks undertook operations against Persian possessions in Thrace, the Hellespont, the Aegean islands, and even Asia Minor.

Iain Spence

See also Aegina, Aeginetans; Aristides; Artemisium, Battle of; Cleomenes I;

Darius I; Demaratus; Ephialtes, Malian; Eurymedon, Battle of; Hellenic League (against Persians); Herodotus; Leonidas; Marathon, Battle of; Mardonius; Mycale, Battle of; Pausanias, Son of Cleombrotus; Persian (Achaemenid) Empire; Plataea, Battle of; Thermopylae, Battle of; Xerxes

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Persian Wars (490–479), Consequences

The main effect of the Persian Wars was to permanently change the balance of power in both Greece and the Aegean. In Greece proper, although Sparta was confirmed as the preeminent land power, Athens became much more important. Athens' reputation was significantly enhanced by Marathon, and by its performance and sacrifice in the 480–479 campaign. In addition, Athenian vigor in pressing the postwar fight home against Persia in Thrace, the Hellespont, the Aegean islands, and even Asia Minor, contrasted with Sparta's reluctance. This, and the poor behavior of Pausanias, led to Athens' assuming leadership of those Greeks who wanted to take the fight to Persia, or who wanted freedom from Persia. Athens was now the preeminent Greek naval power. The foundation of the Delian League formalized Athens' position and the League's transition into an empire ultimately led to Athens seriously challenging Sparta's position in Greece.

The war also affected other Greek states to varying degrees. Punitive expeditions were sent against Boeotia and (less successfully) Thessaly. While the reputations of Sparta and particularly Athens were enhanced, Thebes was never allowed to forget it medized—it was a constant reproach thrown in its face by its enemies.

In general, the wars also caused the Greeks to redefine themselves. It heightened the idea of the difference between Hellenes and *barbaroi*

(“barbarians”—those who did not speak Greek) and increased Greek confidence and identity. Military superiority had been established, and the Greeks saw the result in terms of the victory of spear over bow, of freemen over slaves.

For the Persians, the wars meant abandoning any attempt to expand the empire westward. Persia continued to influence Greek affairs, but it was now through bribery and the threat of military force. At the same time, the Persians compensated for their deficiency in heavy infantry by hiring Greek hoplites as mercenaries. Territorially, the Persians were expelled from Europe, losing their considerable possessions in Macedonia and Thrace and also suffered losses in Anatolia in Asia Minor. The independence of Greek cities in Asia Minor became a real possibility, although not fully realized until Alexander the Great. Although Xerxes survived for a while, his failure in Greece appears to have weakened him. When the last Persian attempt to exert direct military influence failed at Eurymedon ca. 468, Xerxes was assassinated.

Iain Spence

See also Aristides; Callias, Peace of; Cimon; Darius I; Delian League/Athenian Empire; Eurymedon, Battle of; Hellenic League (against Persians); Pausanias, son of Cleombrotus; Persian (Achaemenid) Empire; Themistocles; Xerxes

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Peucestas (Active ca. 325–316)

Born ca. 350, Peucestas was an officer in Alexander the Great’s army. He

distinguished himself by saving Alexander's life during the Mallian campaign. For this he was made an eighth *somatophylax* (bodyguard), even though traditionally there were only seven in this position. He was awarded the satrapy of Persis in 324, and was notably one of the few Macedonians who adopted Persian dress. He even learnt the Persian language, and is said to have been the only prominent member of Alexander's court who did so. In the poisoning rumors that followed Alexander's death, Peucestas was implicated in the conspiracy, and appears to have been present at the drinking party where Alexander became ill.

His time as satrap in Persis made him very popular in the east, and he led an army against Peithon in 317 to prevent him from gaining the upper satrapies. Eumenes of Cardia attempted to bring Peucestas and his army under his own control, which led to hostility and the eventual compromise of a joint command. When Antigonus I Monophthalmus attempted to intimidate Peucestas into compliance by threatening to remove his satrapy, Peucestas accepted an alliance with Eumenes in earnest. This again devolved into a power-struggle over their forces, each attempting to undermine the other. After their defeat at Gabiene (316), Peucestas defected to Antigonus. He lost his satrapy but retained his life, unlike many of the other officers. It is unknown what happened to Peucestas, but he may have remained in Antigonus' entourage and later at the court of Demetrius I Poliorcetes.

Charlotte M. R. Dunn

See also Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon; Antigonus I Monophthalmus; Demetrius I Poliorcetes; Eumenes of Cardia; Gabiene, Battle of; Peithon; Successors (*Diadochoi*), Wars of

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Phalaecus (Active 350)

Phalaecus, son of Onomarchus, was the last Phocian general in the Third

Sacred War. While still young, he succeeded his uncle Phayllus in command in 351, at first with a veteran general, Mnaseas, as co-commander; but Mnaseas was soon killed in battle. Phalaecus was defeated in a cavalry battle near Chaeronea, and the Boeotians ravaged much of Phocis. Deposed from office for his role in looting the treasures at Delphi, he regained command in 346. Later that year, as Philip II of Macedon prepared to end the war, Phalaecus abandoned the Phocians to their fate and took his mercenaries to the Peloponnese. After an abortive attempt to campaign in Italy, he took a job fighting for Knossos in Crete. He died besieging Cydonia, possibly trying to save a siege tower which had been struck by lightning—a punishment, some said, for his earlier impiety.

Peter Londey

See also Onomarchus; Phayllus; Sacred War, Third

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Phalanx

The phalanx was an ordered formation of heavily armed infantry drawn up in ranks and files. It played an important, and often central, role in Greek land warfare from the seventh century (and perhaps earlier) down to the second century.

Archaic Period (ca. 700–480)

The ancient Greeks used massed infantry formations from the beginning of the Archaic Period, if not earlier. In the *Iliad* (4.297–300), Homer describes a Greek formation with the strongest men in the front and rear ranks. This is echoed in Xenophon's description (*Cyropaedia* 6.3.25) of hoplite formations of the later Classical Period with officers positioned in their front and rear ranks. Homer's *Odyssey* (9.54) may refer to ordered battle lines—further indicating that such formations were known to him. These also seem to have existed in the Second Messenian War. In Fragment 11, Tyrtaeus, a contemporary writer, details how contingents of light troops were

positioned beside formations of heavy infantry. This is supported by the detail in Pausanias' much later account (second century CE). It therefore seems that by the seventh century at least, some sort of massed formation was known to the Greeks.

During the Archaic Period, hoplites carried two shafted weapons—a javelin and a thrusting spear. The seventh-century poet Callinus (fr. 1.5) extols a warrior, as he dies, “to hurl his javelin one last time.” The use of javelins within a massed formation required the men to be separated by an interval large enough for them to effectively use such a weapon. This would suggest that the men were in the so-called intermediate-order spacing of at least 90 cm (3 feet) per man (see below). The use of thrown spears/javelins as a method of battle is a common theme throughout Homer's *Iliad*. However, in the poetry of Tyrtaeus none of the troops throw javelins at an enemy. This may indicate a change in methods of fighting between the time of Homer and that of Tyrtaeus and/or reflect regional differences in fighting style.

Tyrtaeus and Homer also describe Archaic Period shield-walls. In the *Iliad* (13.131), Homer describes a Greek formation awaiting the Trojan advance with “shield pressed against shield, helmet by helmet, man by man.” The Spartan poet Tyrtaeus (11—QQ 57) also describes a formation of men ready to engage, “setting foot beside foot, resting shield against shield, crest beside crest, helmet beside helmet.” Such terminology clearly describes the close-order formation common to the Classical Period where each man occupied a space of 45–50 cm (around 1 foot 6 inches) while his shield overlapped with the man on his left, creating a shield wall (see first illustration).



Detail of the North Frieze of the Siphnian Treasury, Delphi, ca. 525, depicting the battle between the gods and the giants. Although a mythical scene, the giants are depicted as hoplites and those on the right are in phalanx formation. The fleeing hoplite in the middle has lost or broken his spear and holds his sword; the *porpax* or central armband of his shield is clearly depicted. Located in the Archaeological Museum, Delphi, Greece. (De Agostini Picture Library/G. Nimatallah/Bridgeman Images)

It is not known if variants of these basic depths and structures were used in the Archaic Period, if different city-states adopted different formations, or even if different shaped formations were employed. Tyrtaeus attests to Archaic Period battle lines arranged with light troops positioned on the wings and Pausanias supplies the additional detail that they could be behind the phalanx or sometimes in the center of the line with contingents of hoplites on either side. However, although our tactical knowledge of the employment of such formations is very limited, what these descriptions do show is that the Archaic phalanx was vulnerable on its flanks. Pausanias, a very late source, records that at the battle of Ithôme, Messenian light troops moved onto the wings and attacked the Laconian hoplite formations in the flank, eventually causing them to rout. The Laconians had positioned their light troops in the center and their hoplites on the wings and this left the side of their infantry formation dangerously exposed.

These accounts indicate that in terms of tactical thinking warfare in the Archaic Period was not rudimentary. As with the deployment of massed formations in later periods, the disposition of troops and formations in the Archaic Period followed a process of tactical decision-making by those in

command who determined how troops were to be arranged for battle. Warfare in Archaic Greece was not merely a process of facing an opponent and relying on skill, resolve and luck. By the Archaic Period, the fundamentals of tactical thought were in place—undoubtedly aided by the organization of the phalanx into units and sub-units. This allowed for better command and control of troops on the battlefield and for the formulation of more complex ideas for the conduct of war. Possibly because of these tactical applications, and despite its inherent vulnerabilities, nearly every Greek state adopted the hoplite phalanx during the Archaic Period. The phalanx remained relatively unchanged from its beginnings in the Archaic Period until the mid-fourth century when the fighting style of the Greek hoplite was superseded by the rise of the Macedonian phalangite.

Classical Period (ca. 480–323)

During the Classical Period the phalanx developed further. The vulnerable flanks were better, and more regularly, protected by light troops or cavalry, and formations of various shapes were employed to meet tactical requirements. It is uncertain when the Classical hoplite phalanx as it is currently understood came into being. It has been suggested that it was created by Pheidon of Argos for the battle of Hysiae ca. 669. However, Pausanias, the only reference to this engagement, makes no mention of the creation of the phalanx, and the literary evidence suggests that the Greeks had been using massed infantry formations much earlier. The Classical phalanx seems to be a refinement of an element of ancient Greek military organization that had been used for more than a century before the battle of Hysiae.

Although the organization of the Spartan army is notoriously uncertain, Thucydides (5.66–68) describes the Spartan command chain, but not the army's structure, at the battle of Mantinea in 418. However, when combined with other sources, this suggests the following composite structure. The army was divided into seven divisions (*morai*), each under the command of a *polemarchos*. Each *mora* was subdivided into four companies known as a *lochos*, each commanded by a *lochagos*. Each company was further divided into a number of platoon-sized units called an *enomotia* led by an *enomotarchos*. A row of officers, each known as an *ouragos*, was positioned as the rear rank of the unit. At Mantinea, most Spartan *enomotiae* were deployed in four files of eight—although Thucydides notes that each

enomotarchos could decide on the depth of his *enomotia*. Xenophon (*Lacedaemonian Politeia* 11.4) additionally states that the *enomotia* could also be deployed two (? the text is corrupt at this point), three, or six men abreast. When four *enomotiae* were combined, they formed a tactical and administrative unit known as a *pentykostys* commanded by a *penteconteros*.


Other city-states followed their own ideas about the arrangement and deployment of their armies. *Athenaion Politeia* 21.1–22.2 states that the Athenian hoplite force consisted of 10 contingents, each drawn from one of the 10 Athenian tribes, and each commanded by a taxiarch. In Boeotia, 11 boeotarchs were elected from across a confederacy of Boeotian city-states to command various divisions of the army each containing 1,000 hoplites and 100 cavalry supplied by the various states on a *pro rata* basis. How the armies of many of the other city-states of ancient Greece were organized is far from certain.

The “block” phalanx was probably the most commonly used hoplite battle formation as it made it easier for an army marching in column to redeploy into a battle-line. Xenophon (*Lacedaemonian Politeia* 11.8) describes a marching *lochos* as arranged with each *enomotia* following one behind the other. When moving into line, the column would halt and the second *enomotia* would move forward and take up a position to the left of the unit before it. The third and fourth *enomotiae* would follow behind and then they too would redeploy to the left of the unit ahead of it until the entire formation was deployed. The structure of the phalanx into sub-units suggests that the Classical Greek phalanx did not fight as one continuous solid line of men. Rather it is more likely that the phalanx was made up of smaller discrete “combat groups” acting in concert with each other.

The common depth of the file in the Classical Greek phalanx was eight men—although there are references to formations as shallow as a single rank (the Spartans at Dipaea ca. 471), 25 deep (the Thebans at Delium in 424) and 50 deep (the Thebans at Leuctra in 371). Both Thucydides (4.93) and Xenophon (*Lacedaemonian Politeia* 11.6) state that the depth of the line could be adjusted to either deep or shallow depending upon the orders given and the way the line was formed when the army was deployed. Thus it seems that the depth of deployment was a decision made by the contingent commanders depending upon the terrain of the battlefield and the tactical requirements of the situation.

As well as different depths, the phalanx could be deployed with varying

orders of interval between each man. Asclepiodotus states that infantry formations could be deployed in one of three orders: a close-order, with interlocked shields, separated by about 45 cm (1 foot 6 inches) on each side; an intermediate-order with each man separated by about 90 cm (3 feet) on all sides; and an open-order with each man separated by about 180 cm (6 feet) by width and depth. These intervals, although outlined for the armies of the Hellenistic Age, may hold as true for the hoplite phalanx of the Classical Period as they do for the later formations of phalangites.



A modern reconstruction of a section of a Macedonian phalanx. It depicts the first five ranks lowering their *sarissae* (long spears), ready to engage while the remainder keep their weapons upright for ease of maneuver and to protect against missiles. In action, the phalanx would have had units on either side protecting its flanks. (Look and Learn/Bridgeman Images)

The close-order shield wall was used both offensively and defensively—although any advance made in close-order could only be done slowly, and perhaps (certainly for Sparta) with the aid of a sung cadence and/or music to maintain the integrity of the line (see illustration in “Chigi Vase” entry). The intermediate-order interval, on the other hand, facilitated the movement of the formation and charges or sallies would have been made by hoplites arranged in this intermediate order. Arranged in an intermediate-order, the rims of each adjacent shield just touched—providing the hoplite

with an easy way of determining whether he was maintaining his position. However, the intermediate-order phalanx, while more maneuverable than the close-order formation, lacked the defensive advantage of the interlocking shield-wall. The more spacious open-order interval was generally only used when an army was on the march rather than as a battlefield deployment.

Deploying with different intervals also created other tactical advantages for the phalanx. Because of the length and point of balance of the hoplite spear, the weapons held by both the first two ranks of a close-order formation projected well forward of the line, and could reach an enemy. Furthermore, the smaller interval of the close-order formation meant the weapons projecting ahead of the phalanx were laterally separated by only 45–50 cm (around 1 foot 6 inches). Troops arrayed in intermediate-order, conversely, only presented the weapons carried by the front rank to an enemy and these weapons were separated by around 90 cm (3 feet). This difference in offensive and defensive capabilities made the close-order shield-wall a formidable formation. In every account of a battle involving one side in close-order fighting against one in intermediate-order (or even cavalry), the side deployed in close-order is victorious.

Yet the phalanx did have its drawbacks. Once on the move, the phalanx was difficult to maneuver except by well-drilled troops or by having the formation break up and then re-form. For the most part, phalanx warfare in Classical Greece involved a forward advance or charge against an enemy and face-to-face combat. Due to this inflexibility, the flanks of the formation were quite vulnerable and were regularly protected by contingents of more mobile troops like cavalry and light-armed skirmishers (*psiloi*).

The phalanx could also be arranged into different shapes depending upon the situation. Xenophon (*Hellenica* 7.5.22–23) describes how the Thebans at Mantinea (362) deployed in a wedge-shaped formation (*embolon*). Both Diodorus Siculus and Plutarch's *Pelopidas* describe the Theban deployment at Leuctra (371) as an oblique line. Xenophon's mercenaries formed a defensive circle (*kyklos*) while making a river crossing, and the defensive square (*plasion*) was also a common deployment for hoplite armies when hard pressed from all sides on the march (for example, see Thucydides 4.125, Xenophon, *Hellenica* 4.3.4, and *Anabasis* 3.2.36). This shows that the Classical phalanx was very adaptable to the varied nature of the battlefield (despite being relatively inflexible once

fighting had actually commenced).

Hellenistic Period (ca. 323–30)

The Macedonian phalanx of the Hellenistic Period (see second illustration) replaced hoplite spearmen with phalangites equipped with a much longer, two-handed, spear (*sarissa*). The sight of a Macedonian phalanx struck terror into all who witnessed it. Polyaeus (*Excerpts* 18.4) calls the formation an “invincible beast.” The Roman historian Livy (44.41) states that “the phalanx is irresistible when it is closely packed and bristling with extended pikes.” At the battle of Gaugamela in 331, the phalanx of Alexander the Great is said to have “rolled forward like a flood” (Plutarch, *Alexander* 33). Plutarch (*Aemilius Paulus* 19) says that Aemilius Paulus, the Roman commander facing a Macedonian phalanx at the battle of Pydna in 168, “had never seen a more fearful sight.” Diodorus (17.4.4) simply states that the sight of the Macedonian phalanx “causes concern.”

Name of Unit	
Stoicheion dekad	16
Dimoirites	32
Tetradichiae	64
Taxite tetchochiaie	128
Syntagma tarch	256
Pentacosia archia	512
Chilarchia osiarchiaie	1,024
Merarchia chiae	2,048
Phalangarchia ie	4,096
Diaphalangarchia meros	8,192
Basilephalangarchia phala (general)	16,384

Macedonian Phalanx According to Asclepiodotus

The smallest unit within the Hellenistic phalanx was a file (*stoichein* or *dekad* or *enomotia*) of 16 men. Each file had an officer (called a *dekadarchos*) in position one, a “half-file closer” (*dekastateros*) in position eight, a half-file leader (*dimoirites*) in position nine, and a file-closing officer (*ouragos*) in position 16. Between these officers (positions 2–7 and 10–15) were positioned regular soldiers. This arrangement allowed for the depth of the phalanx to be reduced through the process of “doubling” whereby the

rear half-file moved forward into the intervals between the files—reducing the depth of the formation to eight, doubling the number of men across the front, and leaving a row of officers across its front and rear ranks.

Asclepiodotus, Aelian, and Arrian state that a “perfect phalanx” of 16,384 men was formed by continually merging smaller units together in the sequence given in the table titled “Macedonian Phalanx According to Asclepiodotus.”

The *syntagma*, a square formation of 16 files of 16 men, was the basic tactical formation of a Macedonian army. Attached to each *syntagma* were five supernumeraries: a standard bearer (*semeiphoros*), a rear commander (*ouragos*), a trumpeter (*salpingktes*), an aide-de-camp (*hyperetes*), and a herald (*stratokeryx*). The basic operational formation was the *chiliarchia* containing 4 *syntagmae*. The larger *di-phalangarchia*/meros was considered one wing of the entire phalanx and was essentially an army in itself.

Many scholars attribute the creation of the Macedonian phalanx to Philip II of Macedon—the father of Alexander the Great. However, there is no conclusive evidence to support this. The forerunner of the Hellenistic phalangite, the Iphicratean peltast, was perhaps created in 374 by the Athenian Iphicrates—5 years before Philip became king of Macedon—and Iphicrates had close ties to the Macedonian royal house (see: Anaximenes, *FrGrHist.* 72 F4; Aeschines, 2 [*On the Legation*] 26–29).

The Hellenistic phalanx employed all three intervals used in the Classical Period. Aelian (*Tactics* 31) states that the close-order interval was only used when moving units around the battlefield prior to the commencement of hostilities during which time the phalangites held their long pikes vertically. Thus, unlike the close-order Classical formations, the close-order Hellenistic phalanx was not a combat formation. When deployed for combat in intermediate-order, the pikes held by the first five ranks of the Hellenistic phalanx projected between the files and beyond the front of the line. The phalangites in ranks 6–16 held their pikes angled forward over the heads of the men in front to provide a protective screen against volleys of incoming missiles (Polybius 18.30).

Despite its formidable appearance, the Macedonian pike-phalanx was an inflexible formation. Once moving forward, the lengthy pikes projecting ahead of the formation made it almost impossible to wheel about or to turn suddenly to face an unexpected attack from the side. This made the flanks of the phalanx vulnerable unless they were protected by cavalry, hoplites, and

light infantry (*psiloi*). If large gaps formed in the line, or if a more mobile enemy managed to get inside the presented pikes, the phalanx was similarly imperiled. The sheer size of the *syntagma*, and the encumbrance of the phalangite's equipment, meant that to maintain the integrity of the formation the phalanx could only move slowly. Tactics employing the use of the Macedonian phalanx relied on it acting as a solid mass of pikes in the center of an army group, forcing the enemy to face it head-on while more mobile troops swept around the enemy's wings to attack them from the side (the hammer), forcing them onto the phalanx (the anvil). In all of his major battles (Granicus, Issus, Gaugamela, Hydaspes), Alexander the Great employed this same tactic—he clearly knew the strengths and weaknesses of the phalanx and how to use it to its full advantage. Even the length of the *sarissa* itself aided this tactic.

The Macedonian phalanx was one of the most dominant military formations for nearly 200 years. Employed with great effect by Alexander, armies of *sarissa*-wielding phalangites allowed the Macedonians to conquer Greece and the surrounding regions, destroy the Persian Empire, and extend their reach as far as India. Yet the weaknesses of the Macedonian phalanx allowed it to be finally overcome by an organized army that utilized formations that could exploit gaps and opportunities that a rigid phalanx-style system could not—the mobile maniples of the Roman Republic.

Christopher Matthew

See also Aelian; Arms and Armor; Arrian; Art (Ancient), Greek Warfare in; Asclepiodotus; “Chigi Vase”; Command Structures, Army; Delium, Battle of; Gaugamela, Battle of; Granicus, Battle of; Homeric Warfare; Hydaspes, Battle of; Issus, Battle of; Leuctra, Battle of; Messenian War, Second; Music; Pheidon of Argos

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Pharnabazus (d. ca. 370)

Pharnabazus was a Persian noble who governed the satrapy of Dascylium (Phrygia) ca. 413–370. This coincided with the latter stages of the Second Peloponnesian War (431–404), Sparta's postwar operations in Asia Minor, and the Corinthian War (395–387/6). Pharnabazus therefore had considerable contact with the Greeks, both as an ally and opponent. Xenophon was sufficiently impressed by Pharnabazus to provide a reasonably detailed portrait of him, essentially as a Greek gentleman, albeit with the full trappings of Persian aristocracy.

Pharnabazus adopted a pro-Spartan line during the Greek operations in his region during the Peloponnesian War, presumably because he saw the Athenians as a greater threat. He provided financial and other support to the Peloponnesian fleet and directly fought against Athens at Abydos, Cyzicus, and Chalcedon. However, he later encouraged the Athenians to negotiate support from the king himself, Darius II, probably to ensure the Peloponnesians did not become too powerful.

Pharnabazus had an interesting relationship with his fellow-satrap Tissaphernes. Ironically, although the Peloponnesians regarded Pharnabazus as the more honest of the two to deal with during their war with Athens, his territory was later the main target of Spartan operations—largely because of Tissaphernes' intrigues.

Although hampered by the superior quality of the opposing Greek hoplites and navy, Pharnabazus seems to have been a solid military commander. His use of cavalry against foragers from the Ten Thousand (401/400) and Agesilaus II (395) was highly effective. For a Persian aristocrat, he showed an unusual interest in naval operations, including commanding the fleet at Cnidus (394) with Conon.

Pharnabazus was also apparently good at administration and court politics. Not only did he serve as satrap for around 40 years but he was also given the Great King's daughter as a wife and entrusted with two (albeit unsuccessful) commands to recover Egypt (in 385 and 374).

Iain Spence

See also Abydus; Agesilaus II; Alcibiades; Cnidus, Battle of; Darius II; Hellespont Campaign; Persian (Achaemenid) Empire; Ten Thousand, March of; Tissaphernes

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Phayllus (d. 351)

Phayllus was a Phocian commander during the Third Sacred War. In 353 he led an expedition into Thessaly, but was defeated by Philip II of Macedon. He succeeded his brother Onomarchus in command on the latter's death in 352. With the help of Spartans, Athenians, and Achaeans, he succeeded in keeping Philip from entering southern Greece at Thermopylae. An invasion of Boeotia led to a series of defeats, but he was more successful in a campaign against the eastern Locrians, only to fall sick and die of a wasting disease after capturing and razing the city of Naryx. He was succeeded as commander by Onomarchus' son, Phalaecus.

Peter Londey

See also Onomarchus; Phalaecus; Phocis, Phocians; Sacred War, Third

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Pheidippides (d. ca. 490)

Pheidippides (also Philippides) was an Athenian herald and courier. In 490,

when the Persians landed at Marathon, he was sent to Sparta to request help. He is reputed to have covered the 150-mile (240-kilometer) trip in two days. Herodotus records only Pheidippides' run to Sparta (during which he had a vision of Pan), but later authors added a return trip the next day, and then a 26 mile (42 kilometer) run from Marathon to Athens to announce the Athenian victory. Pheidippides is supposed to have collapsed and died after making the announcement. This last run was the inspiration for the modern day marathon running event.

Iain Spence

See also Marathon

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Pheidon of Argos (ca. 720–ca. 660)

Pheidon, a hereditary king of Argos who turned his rule into the unlimited personal power of a tyrant, was an important but poorly documented figure in the early history of the Peloponnese. He made Argos the leading power in the Peloponnese in place of Sparta and took over from Elis the celebration of an Olympic festival (possibly that of 668). As a strong centralizing ruler, he introduced a new uniform system of weights and measures that was widely used. He was also credited (wrongly) with the first issue of coinage in mainland Greece at Aegina. Modern hypotheses have connected Pheidon with the Argive defeat of Sparta at Hysiae in 669/8 and, more broadly, with the development of hoplite phalanx warfare, of which he may have been a pioneer. Later sources place his reign at different times from 895 to just before 657. Herodotus (6.127) may indicate an early sixth-century date.

Douglas Kelly

See also Argos, Argives; Hoplites; Hysiae, Battle of; Phalanx; Tyrants,

Tyranny

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Pherae

Pherae was a major city in southeastern Thessaly, a little inland from the site of the modern city of Volos. Pherae had agricultural wealth, dominating the southern part of the plain west of Lake Boebe. In Homer's *Iliad*, the Pheraean Admetus (who also appears in Euripides' play, *Alcestis*) sends his son with 11 ships to the Trojan War. Pheraean prosperity may have increased with the development of a harbor town at Pagasae, on the Gulf of Volos.

During the Peloponnesian War (431–404), Pherae supported Athens, and was among a number of Thessalian cities that sent cavalry to help defend Attica against enemy incursions. Afterward, the city became the dominant power in Thessaly under a series of tyrants, who made extensive use of mercenaries: Lycophron, Jason, and Alexander.

This period of Pheraean greatness lasted for half a century. In 404, Lycophron, aiming according to Xenophon at ruling the whole of Thessaly, defeated the Larissans and other Thessalians in battle. Sometime after Lycophron's death in 390, Jason (who may have been his son) came to power and by the late 370s had established himself as the dominant power in northern Greece. But Pheraean power declined after Jason's assassination in 370 and Alexander of Pherae's defeat by the Boeotians at Cynoscephalae in 364. After Alexander's death in the early 350s, Pherae came under the control of Philip of Macedon, who installed a garrison in 344.

Pherae remained under Macedonian control until 197, when Titus Quinctius Flamininus defeated Philip V of Macedon in the Second Macedonian War. By this time the leading city in southeast Thessaly was Demetrias, founded near Pagasae by Demetrius I around 290. Nevertheless,

Pherae regained its position as a leading member of a renewed Thessalian League, but apart from being plundered by the Macedonians in the Third Macedonian War, largely drops out of history. Inscriptions show that it continued to thrive into Roman times.

Peter Londey

See also Alexander of Pherae; Cynoscephalae, Battle of (364); Jason of Pherae; Macedonian War, Second; Macedonian War, Third; Thessaly, Thessalians

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Phila (ca. 350–288)

Phila, the eldest daughter of Antipater, Alexander's regent in Macedonia, was born ca. 350. She was married first to Balacrus, a prominent Macedonian officer, to whom she bore one son, Antipater. After being widowed, she married Craterus in 322, with whom she also had one son, Craterus. Finally she was married to Demetrius I Poliorcetes in 320, despite being considerably older than him (he was about 16 at this time). This highly unusual disparity in ages was the price of dynastic marriage. They had two children, Antigonus II Gonatas and Stratonice.

She was the first woman of the Successors' dynasties to receive a royal title, and was referred to as *Basilissa* in inscriptions dated to ca. 306. She was also the first Hellenistic royal woman to receive cult worship. She was known for being wise and resourceful, and appears to have occasionally played a role in politics. Her popularity among the Macedonians was a major factor in Demetrius' ability to claim the throne. She bore Demetrius' numerous infidelities patiently. When he married an Epirote princess she withdrew but returned to him after his defeat at the battle of Ipsus in 301. When Demetrius was driven out of Macedonia by Pyrrhus and Lysimachus in 288, Phila could not bear the shame and so committed suicide by poison.

See also Antigonus II Gonatas; Antipater; Craterus; Demetrius I Poliorcetes; Successors (*Diadochoi*), Wars of

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Philip II of Macedon (ca. 383–336)

Philip II was the father of Alexander the Great and king of Macedonia from 359 until his death. As king, he oversaw a dramatic increase in the power of Macedonia over Greece, primarily through military force. At the time of his death, Macedonia was the dominant power in Greece, having defeated a coalition of states on the battlefield and then enforcing a peace through the Hellenic League (League of Corinth). His restructuring of Greece and strengthening of the Macedonian military provided a basis for Alexander's later campaigns against the Persian Empire.

During his youth, Philip was sent as a hostage by the Macedonian royal family to Thebes. During those years, he developed close ties with Epaminondas, the influential Theban general and statesman. After Philip's return to Macedonia, his brother, the king, Perdiccas III, fell in battle with the Illyrians (359). Philip may have acted as regent for his infant nephew, Amyntas, before becoming king himself.

Following the defeat of Perdiccas, Macedonia was under extreme pressure from outside forces. The battle which claimed Perdiccas' life had also claimed several thousand fighting men; Illyrian and Paeonian forces were encroaching on Macedonian territory from the north; and rival claimants to the throne were supported by Thrace and Athens. As a result, the first years of Philip's reign were focused on securing Macedonia from outside forces.

To that end, Philip addressed the issues individually. He withdrew Macedonia's claim to the city of Amphipolis, thus appeasing Athens, and bribed the Thracian king who was supporting one of his rivals. He then set out to greatly increase Macedonian military power. The improvements that

he made to the military had far-reaching consequences, well beyond his own reign. Most well known are his development of the *sarissa*, the elongated spear which gave the Macedonian phalanx superiority over other infantry, and the establishment of a corps of siege engineers in his army. The results of his military improvements led to decisive victories against Paeonia and Illyria in 358, before he broke his pact with Athens and in 357 took control of Amphipolis by force.



Silver tetradrachm of Philip II of Macedon minted in Macedonia, fourth century. The image here is of Zeus, with a laurel wreath; the reverse depicts a young horseman carrying a palm of victory. The coin is designed to convey divinely granted royal power handed down through the dynasty—an important message for stability and continuity. Located in the Yale University Art Gallery, New Haven, Connecticut. (Yale University Art Gallery)

In 353, Philip was called into Thessaly, during a civil war between the

two major cities of Larissa and Pherae. This struggle had its roots in the Third Sacred War, with Pherae supporting the Phocians, who had seized Delphi, in their war against other members of the Delphic Amphictyony. Siding with Larissa, after some initial defeats Philip bested the Phocian general Onomarchus at the battle of the Crocus Field in 352, and was installed as Tagos of Thessaly, giving him access to the highest quality stocks of cavalry horses that were native to the region.

After this, Philip dedicated several years to expansion in the north, particularly in taking the Chalcidice Peninsula. In 346, fearful of Philip's growing power, the leaders of Greece assembled at a peace conference in Macedonia. Philip controlled the negotiations, which arrived at a settlement known as the Peace of Philocrates.

Crucially, however, Phocis was excluded from the terms of the treaty, allowing Philip to end the Sacred War. Once the treaty was concluded, he marched on Thermopylae, which he took without a battle. With nothing standing between them and Philip's army, the Phocians surrendered, were stripped of their position on the Amphictyonic Council, disarmed, and had their cities broken up into villages. Philip was rewarded with the Phocian votes on the Council and the honor of hosting the upcoming Pythian Games.

Over the following years, Philip focused his attention eastward. He expanded his influence throughout Thrace and even into Scythia, before turning his attention to the region surrounding the Hellespont. When he laid siege to Perinthus, on the north shore of the Sea of Marmara, the Perinthians received aid not only from nearby Byzantium, but also from the Persian Empire, which was fearful of the growth of Macedonian power near their borders. After a hard siege in which Philip made only small advances, he took half his army to simultaneously besiege Byzantium. This action alarmed Athens, which sent a force to aid the city. Philip lifted both sieges and withdrew, before declaring outright war upon Athens shortly after.

This dispute came to a head in 338 at the battle of Chaeronea. Entering central Greece on a pretext provided by the Fourth Sacred War, Philip with his allies confronted a hastily-arranged alliance of Athens, Thebes, and others. The Macedonians won a decisive victory through the well-trained maneuvers of their infantry coupled with the superiority of their cavalry on the left wing, led by Alexander. The Greek dead numbered in the thousands, including the Theban elite fighting corps, known as the Sacred Band. With

his superior infantry and cavalry, Philip had defeated the final major opposition to him in Greece.

In the aftermath of Chaeronea, Philip established the Hellenic League, or League of Corinth, as a panhellenic council to represent his new unified Greece. All participant states were bound to a Common Peace under this body, with Sparta being the only major state missing. Philip did not attack Sparta but, detaching its surrounding territories, left it isolated. Philip was elected as the leader of the united Greek forces on the promise of a joint invasion of Persia. Preparations for this campaign were made and Philip sent a preliminary force under several of his generals into Asia Minor.

These plans were interrupted by Philip's assassination during his daughter's wedding at Aegae in 336. Pausanias, one of Philip's royal bodyguards, was named as the assassin. However, Pausanias' precise motives and whether or not there was a larger conspiracy involved is unclear. Alexander was swiftly installed as the new Macedonian king.

William P. Richardson

See also Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon; Amphipolis; Chaeronea, Battle of; Common Peace; Crocus Field, Battle of; Delphic Amphictyony; Epaminondas; Hellenic League (under Philip); Macedon, Macedonia; Panhellenism; Philip II, Campaigns against Illyria and Thrace; Philocrates, Peace of; Sacred War, Third; Sacred War, Fourth; Thessaly, Thessalians; Vergina

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Philip II of Macedon, Campaigns against Illyria and Thrace (359–340)

Philip II fought several campaigns against Illyria and Thrace. The first was

to ensure survival after Bardylis' Illyrians defeated and killed Philip's brother, Perdiccas III (359). This exposed Macedon to considerable danger—the Paeonians threatened from the north, the Illyrians from the northwest, and the Thracians from the northeast. Philip bought off the Thracians (and Athenians), dealt with several pretenders, and built up his army.

In 358 Philip decisively defeated the Paeonians and then demonstrated the quality of his generalship and his remodeled army by destroying Bardylis' army. The Illyrian casualties (7,000) were particularly high because of Philip's use of cavalry in an extended pursuit.

This early engagement was part of Philip's immediate attempts to secure Macedonian survival. The victory over Bardylis also regained control over Macedonian territory lost in 359. However, once he had secured his reign and country, the later campaigns were designed to provide long-term security to Macedon, expand its territory and influence, and gain booty.

In 356, Philip was faced by a Paeonian, Illyrian, and Thracian coalition—supported by Athens and the Chalcidian confederacy. Philip's general Parmenion pushed the Illyrians back from Macedon while Philip advanced east—temporarily leaving his siege of Potidaea—to help Crenides against Cersobleptes of Thrace. Cersobleptes withdrew without a fight; Philip garrisoned Crenides and returned to take Potidaea. The minor Thracian king Cetriporis was probably reduced to vassal status at this time.

Philip advanced into Thrace in 353 but withdrew to capitalize on events in Thessaly. In autumn 352 he marched north again. Cersobleptes, warring against fellow Thracians and perhaps also against Byzantium, was the main target. Philip struck deep, reaching the sea north of the Thracian Chersonese, and Cersobleptes surrendered. He renounced his territorial claims, ended his Athenian alliance, and became Philip's vassal. Illness seems to have cut Philip's campaign short.

With Thrace (temporarily) under control, in 351 (or 350) Philip campaigned in Illyria, Epirus, and possibly Paeonia. Nothing is known of this Illyrian campaign and Philip was not again active there until 345, extending control west to the Adriatic. The Dardanians (Bardylis' people) were reduced to client status but the Ardiaei under Pleuratus, beaten in battle were not conquered—Philip was wounded and apparently made peace. The final Illyrian campaign (337) against a Pleurias (possibly leader of the Autariatae) seems designed to keep the frontier quiet before Philip's attack on Persia.

In 346, between his Illyrian campaigns, Philip conducted a short, decisive Thracian campaign, confirming Cersobleptes as a vassal. However, his final, and biggest, Thracian campaign was 342–340. The reason (or excuse) was probably Cersobleptes' attacks on Greek cities in the Hellespont area. The attack was a sustained one—Philip did not return home for winter, and he and Alexander (who had his first independent command there in 340) founded new cities with non-Thracian settlers to help pacify the region. Cersobleptes and Teres, another Odrysian leader, were driven out and the region largely fell under Macedonian control.

Philip's early Illyrian and Thracian campaigns were for survival. The later ones were to stabilize and protect (or regain) Macedonian territory, while the last few were to extend his possessions and to provide security against hostile tribal neighbors.

Iain Spence

See also Chalcidian Confederacy; Illyria, Illyrians; Philip II of Macedon; Thrace, Thracians

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Philip III Arrhidaeus (ca. 358–317)

Arrhidaeus, as he was originally named, was the illegitimate son of Philip II of Macedon and a Thessalian concubine Philinna. As he was intellectually handicapped or psychiatrically ill, he survived the accession to the throne of his half-brother Alexander III the Great. He apparently accompanied Alexander throughout the invasion of the Persian Empire but held no position of authority. After Alexander's death (June 323) the Macedonian army insisted on his becoming king. He took the royal name of Philip and shared the royal power with Alexander's posthumous son Alexander IV.

Merely a nominal king, Philip was a pawn in the hands of a series of Macedonian warlords and also of his wife, Eurydice, a granddaughter of

Philip II. In 318 she used him to seize power in Macedonia with the aid of Cassander. When challenged by an Epirote army headed by Alexander the Great's mother Olympias, Philip and Eurydice were deserted by their troops (317). Olympias had him executed.

Douglas Kelly

See also Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon; Cassander; Eurydice; Olympias; Perdiccas; Philip II of Macedon; Polyperchon; Successors (*Diadochoi*) Wars of

Further Reading

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Philip V (238/7–179)

Philip V, king of Macedon from 222 to 179, despite his many qualities and talents, is remembered only as the king who chose the wrong side and in so doing brought an end to Macedonian power and independence. Philip was the son of Demetrius II (239–229), who died when Philip was only eight years old. The regency was taken up by the late king's brother, Antigonus III Doson (229–222) and on his death the royal mantle fell to Philip, who was only 15.

In 220, Philip was faced with the Social War, a contest between the Aetolian League and the Achaean League, but he also had to consider the threat from the Illyrians. It was not until the winter of 219/18 that Philip finally arrived at Corinth and from there pushed the Aetolians out of Elis in a rapid campaign. In the following summer, Philip attacked and sacked the Aetolian capital, Thermus, before turning on Laconia. The Social War was concluded in 217, partly because of events in Italy.

News of Cannae, and encouragement from Demetrius of Pharos, inspired Philip to ally with Hannibal, which forced the Romans to station a fleet at Brundisium. Philip's hesitant activities between 214 and 213 did nothing to advance his position. His failure to connect with Hannibal at Tarentum in 212 is inexplicable. In 211 the Romans formed an anti-Macedonian alliance which included the Aetolians, Illyrians, and Attalus of

Pergamum, but little was accomplished on either side and a peace was negotiated in 205.

Philip used the peace to extend his possessions in the Aegean and from 205 to 200 he captured many of the islands and Ionian cities of the coast. In 200, however, the Romans reopened hostilities and despite an invasion of Macedon by the Dardanians in 199, Philip was able to hold his own until Titus Quinctius Flamininus arrived in the theater in 198. Flamininus defeated Philip in the battle of Cynoscephalae in 197. A peace was negotiated in which Philip retained his throne but lost all of his holdings outside Macedon including his fleet.

The invasion of Greece by Antiochus III the Great in 192 forced the Romans and Philip into alliance but Philip continued to work as covertly as possible to restore his power. The latter years of Philip's life were, however, more consumed by family strife. Jealousy between Demetrius, his eldest son, and Perseus, the younger, resulted in the execution of Demetrius. Philip died in 197, apparently consumed with guilt and remorse.

E. Edward Garvin

See also Achaean League; Aetolia, Aetolian League; Antigonus III Doson; Cynoscephalae, Battle of (197); Demetrius of Pharos; Macedonian War, First; Macedonian War, Second; Pergamum; Perseus of Macedon; Philopoemen; Social War (220–217). *Roman Section:* Flamininus; Macedonian War, First; Macedonian War, Second

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Philo of Byzantium (Active ca. 200)

Philo of Byzantium, or Philo Mechanicus, was a writer on mechanics, and civil and military engineering ca. 200. Little is known of his life and career. Philo alludes to lengthy stays at Alexandria and Rhodes, though his location at the time of writing is never specified. He implies that he was somewhat younger than the renowned Alexandrian inventor Ctesibius (ca. 270–230), whose advances in ballistics and pneumatics he refined, but their personal acquaintance is uncertain. Philo wrote a large technological compendium

entitled *Mechanike syntaxis*, the first of its kind, which is mostly lost. Surviving books are addressed to Ariston, an otherwise unknown correspondent or possibly patron, to whom each volume was sent independently in accordance with a previously outlined program. Its content and arrangement are conventionally reconstructed as: 1 *Eisagoge* (introduction); 2 *Mochlika* (levers); 3 *Limenopoiika* (harbor construction); 4 *Belopoiika* (artillery construction); 5 *Pneumatika* (pneumatic principles and devices); 6 *Automatopoiika* (mechanical amusements); 7 *Paraskeuastika* (defensive preparations); 8 *Poliorketika* (siegecraft). Philo also indicates his intention to write about methods of sending secret messages, as employed in warfare and espionage, in either a ninth book or a separate treatise. The extant Greek text of Philo's writings comprises only Book 4, together with extensive excerpts of 7 and 8 (which older scholarship considered a single Book, formerly misnumbered 5). The survival of these three strictly military books probably reflects the selective interests of Byzantine editors. The *Pneumatika* is preserved in Arabic translation, heavily interpolated by medieval scholars, and in a partial Latin translation of another, now-lost Arabic version.

The *Belopoiika* (translated in Marsden 1971) contains technical specifications for the construction of artillery, principally torsion-powered catapults. Philo assimilates empirical techniques he learned from artificers in workshops at Rhodes and Alexandria, some of whom had worked with Ctesibius. He critiques recent developments and proposes enhancements to both standard components and famous devices constructed by his predecessors. Philo's debt to lost writings by Ctesibius cannot be demonstrated or quantified.

Philo's *Paraskeuastika* and *Poliorketika* (translated in Diels and Schramm 1920, Garlan 1974, and [parts only] Lawrence 1979) constitute a comprehensive guide to defending and attacking a Hellenistic city. The *Paraskeuastika*, the only treatise on fortification to have survived from antiquity, contains detailed recommendations for the design, layout, and construction of walls, towers, battlements, and outworks, as well as the organization of manpower and provisions before and during a siege. The *Poliorketika* prescribes engineering techniques, equipment, and tactics to be used by besieger and besieged. The extent of Philo's firsthand experience or dependence on written sources is unclear, but both the *Paraskeuastika* and *Poliorketika* contain material drawn, directly or indirectly, from the

poliorcetic treatise of Aeneas Tacticus (completed in the 350s). Some modern attempts to place Philo's writings on fortifications and siegecraft in a specific historical, military, and/or geographical setting possibly exaggerate his military objectives and expertise in isolation from his wider technological interests. The *Paraskeuastika* and *Poliorketika* became influential models for Byzantine military literature.

Philip Rance

See also Aeneas Tacticus; Catapult; Fortifications; Siege Warfare; Treatises, Military

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Philocrates (ca. 390–ca. 330)

Philocrates was an Athenian politician who took the leading role in making the peace treaty with Philip II of Macedon known as the “Peace of Philocrates.” He proposed both the initial assembly decree in 348 authorizing negotiations with Philip and all the subsequent decrees on the treaty. He served on the first embassy to Philip that brought back to Athens Philip's proposals (about February, 346) and then on the second embassy (May–early July, 346) that took some three months to secure Philip's oaths to the treaty.

Philocrates had the cooperation of Demosthenes at first but the latter

fell out with him on the second embassy, alleging that Philip had bribed Philocrates and others to betray Athenian interests. In the crucial meetings of the Athenian assembly in mid-July 346 that ratified the treaty, Philocrates easily dismissed Demosthenes' objections.

Demosthenes and others continued to undermine the peace treaty by exploiting Athenian disappointment over Philip's actions. In 343 Philocrates was formally indicted for high treason but fled into exile before the trial, so that he was condemned in absentia. This did not invalidate the treaty but had serious repercussions on Athenian relations with Philip.

Douglas Kelly

See also Demosthenes (Orator); Philip II of Macedon; Philocrates, Peace of

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Philocrates, Peace of (346)

The Peace of Philocrates was the treaty ratified in about July 346 between Athens and Philip II of Macedon, putting an end to the war that had lasted since Philip's capture of Amphipolis in 358. The treaty is commonly referred to by this name since the Athenian politician Philocrates was mainly responsible for bringing Athens into negotiations with Philip and he moved the relevant decrees in the Athenian assembly.

The events leading to the making of the treaty and the terms of the treaty itself are documented in great detail by speeches published by both the Athenian orator and politician Demosthenes and by his opponent Aeschines. These come from Demosthenes' prosecution of Aeschines for treason in 343 (the "False Embassy") and Aeschines' prosecution of an associate of Demosthenes in 331 (The "Crown" trial). This evidence, which consists largely of contradictory claims by rival politicians after the event, requires careful interpretation.

The treaty itself was first formulated as a peace agreement. It guaranteed either side's possession of territory then under its control and so excluded any later claims to disputed territory such as Amphipolis. The peace treaty was widened to include a defensive alliance between Philip and Athens and was extended to Philip's descendants.

The treaty was between Athens and Philip and their respective allies, but was so formulated as to exclude Athens' ally the Thracian king Cersobleptes and, more importantly, Phocis, which Athens was supporting in the Third Sacred War (356–346).

Douglas Kelly

See also Amphipolis; Cersobleptes; Demosthenes (Orator); Philip II of Macedon; Philocrates; Phocis, Phocians; Sacred War, Third

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Philomelus (d. 354)

Philomelus was a Phocian aristocrat from the city of Ledon, who in 356 led his countrymen into the ultimately disastrous Third Sacred War. Philomelus was, according to Diodorus, a man of unusual boldness and lawlessness. In 356, the Delphic Amphictyony voted to fine some of the Phocians for farming sacred land. In response, Philomelus convinced the Phocians to claim their supposedly ancient rights as masters of the Delphic sanctuary. Elected supreme general by the Phocians and according to Diodorus, with the tacit agreement of Sparta, he used mercenaries and Phocian soldiers to seize Delphi and began plundering the treasures. Further increasing his forces, and bolstered by alliances with Athens and Sparta, he fought several successful battles with the neighboring Locrians, who then sought help from other members of the Amphictyony. Philomelus now found himself faced by much larger forces, including Boeotians and Thessalians. After further successes, in 354 he encountered a large Boeotian force on the slopes of Mount Parnassus. Cut off from his forces and fearing capture, Philomelus threw himself off a cliff, possibly that above the modern town of Ano

Tithorea. The Phocian command passed to Onomarchus.

Peter Londey

See also Delphi; Delphic Amphictyony; Phocis, Phocians; Sacred War, Third

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Philopoemen (ca. 253–183/2)

Philopoemen was the son of Craugis, a native of Megalopolis and an Achaean general and statesman. He distinguished himself in the attempted defense of Megalopolis against Cleomenes III of Sparta in 223 and again at the battle of Sellasia in 222.

Philopoemen was 30 years of age when Cleomenes III attacked Megalopolis and although his force was insufficient to defend the city he nevertheless bought valuable time to enable the citizen population to evacuate it. Philopoemen suffered a wound and lost his horse during the fighting. At Sellasia the following year Philopoemen’s actions as a cavalry commander were the key to the victory over Cleomenes.

Philopoemen spent 10 years as a mercenary leader in Crete. When he returned to the Greek mainland he was elected as the cavalry commander for the whole of the Achaean League in 210–209 and his reorganized cavalry defeated an Aetolian force on the Elean frontier. As a general of the Achaean League in 208–207 he trained and equipped his troops to fight in the Macedonian manner and defeated a Spartan army at Mantinea in 207; Philopoemen himself killed the Spartan commander. Philopoemen was elected general again the following year and again in 201–200 when he defeated the Spartan forces under Nabis at Messene and at Tegea.

During the Second Macedonian War (200–196) Philopoemen urged the Achaean League to remain neutral. He himself went to the aid of the Gortynians in Crete and conducted a guerilla war for six years.

Upon his return Philopoemen was elected general for a fourth time in 193–192. Despite losing a naval battle to Nabis, Philopoemen managed to almost completely destroy his army but was prevented from taking Sparta by the Roman general Titus Quinctius Flamininus. He nevertheless managed to annex Sparta into the Achaean League, to the displeasure of Flamininus, and also added Messene and Elis to the Achaean League. When Messene rebelled in 183/2, Philopoemen was captured during a skirmish and forced to take poison.

David Harthen

See also Achaea, Achaeans; Achaean League; Antigonus III Doson; Cleomenes III; Crete, Cretans; Megalopolis; Mercenaries; Plutarch; Polybius; Rome, Romans; Sellasia, Battle of

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Phocion (ca. 402/1–318)

Phocion was an upper-class Athenian who served as *strategos* (general) for 45 annual terms, the highest number known. He was widely respected for his integrity (getting the nickname of “The Good”) and for his competence. Leading Athenian generals had to play a role in politics: Phocion’s role was to urge caution at every turn. He was thus opposed to any forward or offensive strategy in Athens’ war against Philip II of Macedon or to such risky ventures as the Lamian War. Once war had been declared by the state, Phocion loyally and efficiently carried out the missions assigned to him, such as in Euboea in 348 and in the relief of Byzantium from Philip II’s siege in 340. He seems never to have been confronted with the challenging task of commanding mercenaries and the even more challenging task of finding pay for them, unlike Chares or Charidemus. It is not known what he did as general in 338/7, the year of the battle of Chaeronea.

Phocion’s conservatism and distance from Athenian democratic leaders made him the obvious person to negotiate with Antipater when Athens was

defeated in the Lamian War. He was able to accept, if he did not positively welcome, Antipater's overturning of Athens' democratic constitution. In 318 when Polyperchon's intervention brought about a brief restoration of the democracy, Phocion was condemned, in a travesty of a trial, for his loyalty to Antipater's settlement. His execution sealed his reputation as (yet another) loyal servant of the democracy who was treated ungratefully and harshly.

Douglas Kelly

See also Antipater; Byzantium, Byzantines; Chares; Charidemus; Euboea, Euboeans; Lamian War; Philip II of Macedon; Polyperchon

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Phocis, Phocians

Phocis was a region in central Greece, occupying the 8,000-foot (2,400-meter) Mount Parnassus and areas to its north, east, and south. The mountain was used as a place of refuge in war and as a place to graze animals in summer; for the Phocians, it was a unifying rather than dividing feature. On the west, a narrow valley separated Parnassus from the territory of western Locris. North of the mountain, the heartland of Phocis was the wide valley of the Cephissus River, running east toward Boeotia. There was no physical barrier between Phocis and Boeotia, and the relationship between the two groups was often uneasy. South of Parnassus there was a more broken region, with cities in a number of valleys and on the Corinthian Gulf bays of Anticyra (Andikira) and Cirrha (Itea). There was easy communication with the Peloponnese across the Gulf. East of Parnassus there were routes linking the northern and southern parts of Phocis, while west of Phocis there was a good route between Parnassus and the mountains to the west from the Corinthian Gulf to the Malian Gulf (near Heraclea Trachinia). The Spartans in particular, for example, Brasidas

in 424, used this route to move troops to northern Greece, avoiding the Isthmus of Corinth.

In early times, archaeology suggests that the two areas of Phocis were not unified, but by the end of the sixth century the Phocians north and south of the mountain had formed a fairly tight-knit ethnic *koinon* (league), and at least in their own minds were ethnically one people. By the Classical Period they claimed (perhaps wrongly) that the important sanctuary of Apollo at Delphi was traditionally a Phocian sanctuary. To a remarkable degree, the Phocians were hostile to and disliked by their neighbors, such as the western and eastern Locrians (their territory split by that of Phocis) and the Boeotians. There was also persistent hostility between Phocis and Thessaly, and in the late sixth century the Phocians defeated a Thessalian attack. The Phocians and eastern Locrians were the only groups in central or northern Greece to fight against the Persian invasion of 480; Herodotus claims that the Phocians did so because of their hostility toward the medizing Thessalians. The result was that after Thermopylae the Persians sacked and burnt all the Phocian towns in the Cephissus valley, together with the temple of Apollo at Abae.

In the Second Sacred War (ca. 448) Athens supported Phocis' claim to control of Delphi, but by the start of the Second Peloponnesian War Phocis was an ally of Sparta. In 395 a border conflict between Phocis and Locris was instrumental in starting the Corinthian War. The great moment of Phocian power came in the Third Sacred War (356–346), when they seized the sanctuary at Delphi, looted the treasures, and hired large numbers of mercenaries. But in the aftermath of Philip II of Macedon's settlement of the war, the Phocian cities were broken into villages, and the Phocians for years had to pay a large war indemnity. The Phocians had recovered enough to contribute some forces to Alexander's campaigns, but they were never strong again. For most of the Hellenistic Period they came under the domination of the Aetolian League.

Peter Londey

See also Aetolia, Aetolian League; Corinthian War; Crocus Field, Battle of; Delphi; Persian Wars; Sacred War, First; Sacred War, Second; Sacred War, Third

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Phoenicia, Phoenicians

Like Greece, Phoenicia was not a nation, but a group of city-states linked by a common language, culture, ethnic origin, and religious practices. In the Bible, the Phoenicians are referred to as the Canaanites, a west Semitic people. But the more common name used to describe them appears to come from the Greek, *Phoinikes*, meaning “red men.” Scholars have debated the etymology, but it is generally agreed that it is derived from the reddish-purple dye they produced from sea snails and traded abroad. The Phoenicians themselves identified themselves as natives of their particular city (Sidonians, Tyrians, and so on).

It is ironic that the people who with the Phoenician script gave us the basis of the modern Western alphabet left behind very little written material. It is in the writings of other peoples and the archaeological record that we learn most about them. The Phoenicians first really appear in the historical record in the mid-fourteenth-century Armana correspondence, letters exchanged between the Phoenicians and Egyptians. These letters show how they had established themselves in well-defended, walled cities of the Levant. Their main centers were Tyre, Sidon, Byblos, Berytus (Beirut), Sarepta, and Arwad, but they also established colonies westward across the Mediterranean, the most famous being the great city of Carthage.

Phoenician cities are recorded as fielding light infantry units supplemented by chariots and archers, but it was their navies that provided their most powerful defensive force. The Phoenicians built and operated the greatest navies of the Mediterranean throughout most of the Classical and Hellenistic Periods. Herodotus claims that Phoenician sailors circumnavigated Africa around 600, and it is generally believed that their ships traded as far west as Cornwall for tin. Their merchant fleets certainly regularly serviced cities as far away as Spain, Africa, Sicily, and Cyprus. In the Levant, the Phoenicians had access to extensive cedar forests and other timber, useful for shipbuilding as well as to trade with their dominant

neighbors: Egypt, and later the Assyrians and Babylonians. From the 530s Phoenicia came under Persian control, but generally was able to enjoy a level of autonomy.

The Greeks believed that Cadmus, the legendary founder of Greek Thebes, was Phoenician, but the relationship with the Greeks was often more hostile, given overlapping colonial and maritime interests. To some extent Greek colonizers were more interested in agricultural land than the trade-oriented Phoenicians, but there was significant scope for conflict in areas such as Sicily.

Persia relied heavily on Phoenician fleets in its wars with the Greeks and Egypt. Phoenician service to Persia over the years earned them a degree of independence and important mercantile privileges. Herodotus tells us that the fleet from Tyre was pivotal in Cambyses' successful Egyptian campaign of 525. He also describes (6.6) the Phoenicians as the "most committed" of Persia's allies at the battle of Lade in 494. The Athenian Cimon was unsuccessful in ending Phoenician control of Cyprus in 450-449 and the resulting Peace of Callias (449/8) saw the Athenian fleets barred from Cyprus. Consequently, the Phoenician Cypriot city of Citium, flourished.

Persian rule of Phoenicia ended with the conquests of Alexander the Great, who captured Tyre after a protracted siege in 332. After changing hands several times in the decades following Alexander's death in 323, for most of the third century Phoenicia was controlled from Egypt by the Ptolemies. But the Seleucids regularly contested Ptolemaic control, and themselves ruled Phoenicia for the greater part of the second century. After a period of Armenian rule, Phoenicia became part of the Roman Empire in 65.

James McDonald

See also Callias, Peace of; Carthage, Carthaginians; Cyprus; Lade, Battle of; Persian Wars; Sicily; Syrian-Egyptian Wars; Thebes, Thebans; Tyre, Siege of

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Phormio (d. 428)

Phormio (Phormion), son of Asopius, served Athens as *strategos* (general) ca. 440–428. He helped Pericles end Samos' revolt (440–439) and participated in the siege of Potidaea (432–429). On the outbreak of the Second Peloponnesian War (431–404) he was still in the Chalcidice, working with Perdiccas II of Macedon. Most of Phormio's service during the war was around the mouth of the Corinthian Gulf. His military record was good, with successes at Amphilocian Argos (430), a major victory over a Corinthian fleet near Naupactus (429), and in Acarnania (429). Shortly after his victory near Naupactus he was maneuvered into fighting a Peloponnesian fleet almost four times the size of his own but after an initial reverse managed to salvage the situation. Although an able general, he was assisted by the superiority of the Athenian navy over their opponents. He disappears from the record in 428 and may have died then (his son, Asopius, was elected *strategos* in 428/7).

Iain Spence

See also *Epibatai*; Naval Tactics; Peloponnesian War, Second; Potidaea, Siege of; Samos, Siege of

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Pindar (518–ca. 438)

A lyric poet from Boeotia, Pindar wrote mostly *epinikia* (victory odes), commissioned by wealthy winners in the *agōnes* (“athletic contests”) of Olympia, Delphi, Nemea, and the Isthmus. There is evidence to suggest that, as a Boeotian, Pindar accepted Theban neutrality in the Persian Wars, but that he also admired those who resisted. The stigma of being from “medizing” Boeotia does not seem to have affected him, with works

commissioned by a range of patrons. In early *epinikia*, he seems to admire Athens as champion of Hellenic freedom, but his later poems are critical of Athens' growing dominance.

James McDonald

See also Delphi; Olympia; Sacred Truces and Festivals; Thebes, Thebans; Trophy

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Piracy

Piracy is a phenomenon found in the earliest Greek stories, and occurred throughout the Archaic, Classical, and Hellenistic Periods. The Greeks used two words to describe a pirate, *leistes* (plural *leistai*), and *peirates* (plural *peiratai*), although *peirates* is only found in writings dated after 300 while *leistes* is also used to describe a robber on land. The main issue when examining piracy is what activities should be considered piracy. Modern international law strictly defines piracy, but often in the past it was a label attached to anyone whose activities were deemed unsavory or illegal to a particular state. The generally accepted definition of piracy is robbery on the high seas by a nonstate actor; attacks on shipping by the armed forces of a state or hired by a state should be considered as falling under warfare or, in the latter case, as “privateering.” More important than what they were called is what they actually did.

Like piracy in the modern era, the roots of the problem extend from the land. Land scarcity, poor fishing, poverty, and other political/social issues could drive people to survive from piracy. In some cases, piracy may have been conducted on a purely opportunistic basis. The regular presence of a navy often helped suppress piracy, a concept now termed “good order at sea,” creating an environment conducive to maritime trade. Thucydides says that King Minos was the first Greek to construct a fleet and that he used it to suppress piracy. The strong navies of Athens, Ptolemaic Egypt, and

Rhodes all seemed to have contributed to maintaining stability and good order at sea in the Aegean while these states were the dominant sea power.

The types of vessels used by pirates are not well-known. Vase paintings show bireme type vessels being used, and in the Hellenistic Period the *hemiolia* (a fast light warship, probably with a crew of 50) became synonymous with piracy. This type of vessel was not used exclusively by pirates and could be found in navies throughout the Aegean, but its strong association with piracy suggests that it was the most common type of vessel used by pirates in the late Classical and Hellenistic Periods. Pirates preying on an area's local traffic may have used quite small vessels, equipped only to make short trips from land. Attacks on open-sea trade would have required larger vessels, but there is nothing to indicate that pirates used anything approaching the size or sophistication of a trireme, although those engaged in privateering may have had the resources to afford larger and more powerful vessels.

Pirates preyed on both merchant vessels and coastal towns and cities, taking not only goods but people as well. They might take everything from high-value items down to livestock and food supplies. Grain was a valuable commodity in the ancient world. Often pirates are described as taking ships and other vessels during raids, ships being high value targets in themselves. People were often taken, both for sale into slavery or in many cases to be held for ransom. It is perhaps the taking of people as slaves or hostages that most caused pirates to be hated, and the enslavement of people by pirates became a theme in literature.

The organization of pirate groups is virtually unknown. Later sources sometimes refer to an individual as an *archipeirates*—"arch-pirate." Clearly there would have been some sort of hierarchy among groups of pirates, based on either ability to fund pirate activities or in possessing above average skill in seamanship and navigation. Pirates in later times would not follow an unsuccessful captain and those trying their hand at such a dangerous activity would need to be sure they could make a living out of it.

The earliest mention of piracy in Greek literature comes from Homer. In two different episodes of the *Odyssey*, men are met with a very formulaic greeting, asking whether they were sailing the seas on business or raiding as pirates. These passages seem to indicate that piracy was a common enough occurrence, but there is a distinct note of disapproval regarding the activities of pirates.

Herodotus only mentions piracy once. He tells of an Ionian Greek, Dionysius of Phocaea, who decided that the Ionian Revolt of the 490s was doomed and, seizing three ships, sailed to Phoenicia where he amassed great wealth by attacking merchant vessels. He then sailed to Sicily and established himself as a pirate there, but only ever attacked non-Greek ships.

Thucydides mentions pirates at the beginning of his work, saying that it had been such a problem in the past that cities were usually built inland to protect them from pirate attacks. However, when he comes to the Peloponnesian War there is no mention of piracy outside of what might be termed privateering. Privateering is a concept just as hard as piracy to describe, but in its essence is the employment by a state power of private naval forces to wage war on their enemies. In 427 the Athenians attacked the island of Minoa off the coast of Megara to stop Spartan *leistai* from sailing out from the island. The attack comes four years into the war and suggests that the *leistai* on the island were a recent problem and that they were working for Sparta. Sparta was again employing pirates at the end of the war, when the Spartan admiral Lysander had in his employ a Milesian *leistes* named Theopompus. During Demetrius' siege of Rhodes from 305 to 303, he had as allies a group of *peiratai*, and Rhodians encountered three of these pirate ships out raiding merchant traffic at Demetrius' behest. These examples help demonstrate that pirates could hire out their services to a state power, especially one with a weak navy like Sparta, and thus be thought of as privateers. It also highlights the blurred line between piracy and normal warfare in the Greek world of the time.

City states across the Mediterranean region took steps to combat piracy and protect trade. Dionysius II, tyrant of Syracuse, founded two cities in the Apulian region in 359/8 to protect merchant vessels from pirates who had made the Adriatic shores unsafe for traders. The Athenians also established a colony in the Adriatic region in 325/4 to help combat piracy in the region. Rhodes above all is singled out by the ancient sources as a power which suppressed piracy to make the seas safe for merchant vessels. Diodorus says that on behalf of all the Greeks the Rhodians waged war on the pirates and purged the seas of these evil-doers in the late fourth century. They had a strong imperative to keep the seas free of pirates, since they seemed to have relied not just on maritime trade for prosperity, but in particular on grain from Egypt. Byzantium also made strong efforts to fight piracy in the Black

Sea in the late third century, protecting not only trade, but fishing vessels as well. The interconnected nature of trade saw cities taking bold steps to fight piracy, especially in the fourth and third centuries.

Just as some places had a reputation for fighting piracy, certain places gained a reputation for engaging in piracy. Taphian pirates feature in Homer, and in the fifth and fourth centuries many cities fought against Tyrrhenian pirates, a term sometimes used to describe pirates from Etruria but often as a general name for pirates generally operating out of Italy. In the late third century, Crete was known as a hotbed of piracy, provoking Rhodes into the first Cretan War ca. 206–203.

Piracy and privateering were common throughout all of Greek history, though the frequency and severity of pirate attacks waxed and waned as various maritime powers did their best to combat them. That piracy was such an issue helps demonstrate the proliferation and importance of the maritime economy to the Greek world, and it was an issue that would later plague the Roman world too.

John M. Nash

See also Crete, Cretans; Naval Tactics; Naval Warfare; Plunder and Booty; Ptolemies; Rhodes, Rhodians; Ships, Transport; Ships, War; Thalassocracy; Thucydides

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Plataea

Plataea was a small city in southern Boeotia on the border with Attica. It had a long tradition of friendship with Athens and a desire not to be part of a larger Boeotia. Plataea became an ally of Athens in 519 to preserve its independence. It fought alongside the Athenians at the battle of Marathon

(490) and remained loyal to the Greek cause in the Persian invasion: it was razed by the Persians in 480, but 600 Plataeans fought in the great battle on their territory in 479.

After (if not before) Athens gave up Boeotia in 446, Plataea became part of the Boeotian League. Fearing its defection, Thebes made a surprise attack on Plataea in early 431. The attack failed, but was the hostile act that precipitated the Second Peloponnesian War (431–404). Most of the population of Plataea was evacuated to Athens and the city was garrisoned by about 400 Plataeans and 80 Athenian volunteers, plus 110 women to do the cooking. Plataea was besieged from 429 to 427. Over half the garrison broke out in winter 428/7. The rest surrendered in 427: the men were executed and the women enslaved.

The city was destroyed and given over to private occupiers. It was restored after the King's Peace (387/6) and remained an independent state, allied to Sparta, until, in 373, it was taken by a surprise Boeotian attack and again razed to the ground.

Plataea was restored by Philip as part of the settlement he established in the Greek world after his victory at Chaeronea (338). The Plataeans took part readily in the assault on and destruction of Thebes by Alexander the Great in 335.

In Hellenistic and Roman times, Plataea was the scene every year of two popular panhellenic festivals, one in honor of Zeus of Freedom, the other celebrating the Concord (Homonoia) of the Greeks. The first of these went back to religious ceremonies on the battlefield of Plataea in 479; the second began in the third century.

Douglas Kelly

See also Boeotian League; Marathon, Battle of; Peloponnesian War, Second; Plataea, Battle of; Plataea, Siege of; Siege Warfare; Thebes, Thebans

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Plataea, Battle of (479)

Fought in September 479, Plataea was the final, and decisive, land battle of the Second Persian War. After the battle of Salamis (480), it took some time for the Spartans to lead an army north and when they did the Persian forces withdrew to Boeotia—the Greeks followed. Herodotus (9.32) gives the Persian numbers as 300,000 (including 50,000 Greeks) but this is probably exaggerated. Facing them across the Asopus River, the Greek army had 110,000 men but only 38,700 hoplites—the remainder were light-armed troops (*psiloi*). The Persians were commanded by Xerxes’ son-in-law, Mardonius; the Greeks by Pausanias, regent for his nephew Pleistoanax.

The course of the battle is difficult to reconstruct. Ancient locations are difficult to relate to modern ones and Herodotus’ description, the only near-contemporary account, is confused. This is partly because events *were* confused, but also because Herodotus was reliant on oral traditions about an important victory in which every Greek state wanted to share (cf. 9.85)—and on eye-witness accounts from old men, who would have seen only their small section of the action.

Twelve days of skirmishing, during which the Greeks suffered from constant cavalry attacks, preceded the battle. Both sides remained on the defensive either side of the Asopus. This was ostensibly because prebattle sacrifices were unfavorable to an attack, but it was also sound military practice not to attempt an opposed river crossing. On the eighth day, Persian cavalry interdicted the Greek supply lines and on the twelfth fouled the Gargaphia spring, an important part of the Greek water supply.

Short of supplies, and warned by Alexander I of Macedon of an impending Persian attack, the Greeks decided to move to a better position that night. A night move is always difficult, and most of the Greek center overshot the agreed position and halted at Plataea itself. The Spartans and

Tegeans on the right wing and the Athenians on the left moved late. After fruitless negotiations with Amompharetus, a Spartan commander who refused to withdraw, Pausanias eventually left him behind, moving parallel (but on the other side of a ridge line) to the Athenians. At sunrise, most Greeks were at Plataea (out of position), with the Athenians, Tegeans, and Spartans still marching, and Amompharetus trying to catch up. Seeing this, Mardonius launched a general attack on the Spartans and Tegeans. An attack by Persia's Greek allies prevented the Athenians from helping them. The Persian assault was uncoordinated, with contingents arriving piecemeal and Greek hoplites again proved superior to their more lightly armed and armored opponents. The Persians suffered heavy casualties, especially as Artabazus failed to immediately commit his sizeable force. When Mardonius was killed Artabazus withdrew and the rest of the Persians fled in disorder to their fortified camp. Most Greek casualties occurred in a cavalry attack on the main body of the Greek army, which had lost formation in a hasty pursuit of the fleeing Persians.



The area around Plataea, where the Greek destruction of the Persian army in 479 ended the Persian invasion of mainland Greece in the Second Persian War (480–479). The photo is looking northeast toward the Persian positions and shows the undulating nature of the terrain that contributed to the confused conduct of the battle. (Photo by Iain Spence)

The battle concluded with the Greeks storming the Persian palisades and annihilating the survivors. Although 40,000 escaped with Artabazus, Herodotus (9.70) records that only about another 3,000 Persians survived, with 159 Greeks killed in the main fighting and another 600 killed by the

Theban and Persian cavalry (9.69). Although the Persian casualties are undoubtedly exaggerated, the battle ended the Persian land threat to mainland Greece.

Iain Spence

See also Amompharetus; Hoplites; Mycale; Pausanias, Son of Cleombrotus; Persian Wars; Plataea; Religious Practices before Battle

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Plataea, Siege of (429–427)

In 431, the unsuccessful Theban attack on Plataea, an Athenian ally in Boeotia, precipitated the Second Peloponnesian War (431–404). In 429, the Peloponnesian League attacked Plataea instead of conducting the annual invasion of Attica, currently ravaged by plague. Thucydides provides a detailed contemporary account of the dramatic siege that followed.

Led by Archidamus II, the Spartans began a series of determined attempts to take the city. Most of the women and children and older men had been evacuated, leaving only 480 men (including 80 Athenians) as defenders, along with 110 female cooks. After building a wooden palisade around the city, the Peloponnesians constructed a mound against the city wall. The Plataeans delayed this by building their wall at the mound higher, then removing the lower part of the wall and digging away the base of the mound—until the Peloponnesians realized and filled in the gap. They then dug a mine under the wall and removed the mound from below as fast as the enemy could build it. Ultimately, the Plataeans built a new curved section of wall opposite the mound so any troops getting over would be

faced by a new wall in front and to their sides.

The Spartans also tried battering rams. However, the Plataeans successfully countered these by either dropping large chain-suspended beams to snap off the ram or by lassoing and breaking them. The next Spartan tactic was to set fire to the city. Numerous large bundles of wood were thrown inside the walls from their mound and set on fire, aided by sulfur and pitch, forcing the Plataeans to abandon large sections of the city. Unfortunately for the Peloponnesians, the wind failed to rise and (although Thucydides hints it was a later embellishment) a thunderstorm and heavy rain ended the attempt.

At this point the Spartans decided to starve the city out and replaced the palisade with a brick wall. During the winter, 212 defenders staged a daring night break-out across the enemy wall, aided by a diversionary attack by those left behind. The remaining defenders ran out of food in summer 427 and surrendered on the basis that they would receive a fair trial. However, the “trial” ended up as a simple question posed to each defender: “in the present war, have you done anything good for the Lacedaemonians and their allies?” (Thuc. 3.52.4). Only able to answer “no,” the defenders—around 200 Plataeans and 25 Athenians—were executed and the 110 women sold as slaves. After a year the city was razed by the Peloponnesians and the land handed over to Thebes. Thucydides notes that this harsh treatment was designed to keep Thebes a staunch ally. Ironically, Plataea was later restored by Sparta in 386 as a counterweight to rising Theban power.

Iain Spence

See also Archidamus II; Fortifications; Peloponnesian War, Second; Plataea; Siege Warfare

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Plunder and Booty

For Greeks, the capture of booty was one of the regular benefits of fighting wars, and could be one of the prime purposes. When the tyrant of Miletus, Aristagoras, tried to convince the Spartans to support the Ionian Revolt in the 490s, one of his key arguments according to Herodotus was the enormous quantity of booty to be obtained attacking the Persian Empire. When the Delian League was set up after the Persian invasion, the ostensible purpose was to make up Greek losses by ravaging Persian territory. In 415 Nicias accused Alcibiades of wanting to attack Sicily to get wealth to prop up his extravagant lifestyle. Thucydides tells us that many Thracians joined Sitalces' expedition in 429/8 out of hope of plunder. In the Hellenistic Period booty was a standard way of financing mercenary armies.

Classical Greek authors do not speak much about plunder, especially about Greeks plundering Greeks (most of the examples above involve non-Greeks as perpetrators or victims). But plunder, on the part both of individuals and of the state, was clearly a normal part of Greek warfare. One of the most regular parts of warfare was ravaging the enemy's countryside. When people knew that a hostile army was approaching, they naturally evacuated families, slaves, livestock, and other valuables, so far as was possible. Whatever of value was left would be stolen, unless that was not practical. Crops would generally simply be interfered with as much as time allowed, but sometimes armies harvested grain for their own use. During the Spartan occupation of Decelea in the Peloponnesian War many Boeotians, according to the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia*, got rich from buying up captured slaves and other property at low prices, while some would carry back to Boeotia the timber and roof tiles from Attic houses. Attica, which apart from brief Spartan invasions earlier in the war had not been plundered for a long time, offered rich pickings, just as Chios did when the Athenians ravaged it in 412. When Demetrius I Poliorcetes besieged Rhodes in 305 and campaigned in Thessaly in 302, he allowed large numbers of private pirates or plunderers to take what they could.

The sack of cities naturally led to large amounts of private and public plunder; in the absence of any laws of war, it was entirely up to the victorious commanders to determine how much and for how long their soldiers might pillage the defeated city. Military camps, if captured, might hold surprising quantities of redeemable items, including soldiers' families, pay, and previous booty. Sanctuaries were supposed to be inviolable, but were sometimes plundered. Prisoners of war were often ransomed or

enslaved, sources of profit generally for the state, not for individuals. Surprisingly often defeated armies were massacred, despite the foregoing of economic gain. Captured slaves would rarely be freed (though sometimes slaves escaped during war and might be successful in setting themselves up as free men); those captured would simply become the victors' property. Captured livestock, especially cattle, was well worth driving away, while all other forms of portable property, including money, gold and silver, works of art, and so on, would be commandeered.

Peter Londey

See also Civilian Populations in War; *Dekate*; Delian League/Athenian Empire; Demetrius I Poliorcetes; Finance and War; Ionian Revolt; Laws of War; Peloponnesian War, Second; Piracy; Prisoners of War and Slavery; Ravaging

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Plutarch (ca. 45–ca. 120 CE)

Plutarch came from an upper-class family in Chaeronea in Greece. His upper-class origins enabled him to spend a good part of his early life in study and travel. Later he returned to Chaeronea, keeping around him a circle of young admirers who looked up to him as a teacher. He served for some 30 years as a priest at Delphi and had numerous friends among the Roman aristocracy. Because of his social position and some services to imperial government, Plutarch received various honors, including Roman citizenship. However, in his outlook and in his chosen way of life, Plutarch was a citizen of a small but deeply loved Greek city.

Plutarch was steeped in the culture of the Greek past. His intellectual

interests centered on ethical philosophy, especially Platonism, but also embraced all the areas of knowledge cultivated by the educated class in his time. He was not a professional scholar but a learned gentleman of wide interests. In the later part of his life Plutarch produced a volume of written work that makes him one of the most prolific of Greek writers.

His best-known work is his *Parallel Lives*. These comprise 23 pairs of matching biographies, one Greek and one Roman. Plutarch wrote these for the ethical purpose of providing himself and his friends with examples of conduct to imitate or, in some cases, to avoid. He concentrates on character and carefully distances himself from the well-established genre of formal history. Plutarch also wrote separate Lives: *Aratus*, *Artaxerxes II*, and, from a series on Roman emperors, *Galba* and *Otho*.

Plutarch ranks as one of the most learned men in ancient times. He quotes in his writings some 439 different authors by name, from every branch of literature. His deep reading and wide interests differ, however, from modern concepts of research. His *Lives* provide abundant material for historical investigation but call for careful analysis and interpretation. For example, Plutarch is aware (*Themistocles* 27) that the historians closest to the time said that when Themistocles fled to Persia he met with Artaxerxes I (reigned 465–425). However, Plutarch also knew from later writers a story which he rather prefers, that Themistocles met with Xerxes, the Persian king he had outwitted at the battle of Salamis (480).

In addition to the *Lives*, Plutarch wrote a much larger body of treatises usually referred to collectively by the Latin title *Moralia*, meaning “Ethical Works.” Although moralizing is often explicit or close to surface, the term does not cover the enormous range of subjects that Plutarch dealt with, which range from philosophy to advice to a newly married couple. Among those of particular historical interest are *On the Malice of Herodotus* and *On the Fortune of Alexander the Great*, and a dialogue dealing with two of Plutarch’s special interests, Platonism and Boeotian history, set in Thebes in 379/78, *On the Daemonium of Socrates*.

Douglas Kelly

See also Themistocles

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Polyaenus (Active ca. 162–166 CE)

Polyaenus was a professional rhetorician from Macedonia who compiled a work in eight books entitled *Strategemata*, a collection of military tricks, devices, and procedures from the past that had been successful in war, usually against the odds. Polyaenus dedicated the work to the jointly ruling Roman emperors Marcus Aurelius and Lucius Verus, for the ostensible purpose of providing guidance in the Parthian War (162–166 CE).

The practical value of the work is slight: it makes no reference to conditions in Parthia. It belongs to a well-established literary genre, derived from more practical handbooks, of collecting interesting and instructive incidents from history. An earlier example is the *Strategemata* of the Roman Frontinus (lived ca. 35–103/4 CE). The author of the earliest known military treatise, Aeneas Tacticus (ca. 350) illustrated his advice with accounts of incidents drawn either from his own experience or from historical works. In the hands of a man of letters like Polyaenus, the encyclopedic collection of instances has become an end in itself.

Polyaenus collected material from both Greek and Roman history as well as from mythology, and included a section on stratagems by women (8.26–71). He drew from a wide range of authors, not necessarily at first hand. When other sources survive, Polyaenus occasionally adds a useful detail. When he is the only source, lack of context and his brevity limit his usefulness.

Douglas Kelly

See also Aeneas Tacticus; Frontinus; Treatises, Military

Further Reading

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Polybius (ca. 200–118)

Polybius of Megalopolis was, like his father Lycortas, a leading figure in the politics of the Achaean League. In 167 Polybius was among the 1,000 leading citizens of the League deported as hostages to Rome after the defeat of King Perseus of Macedon. The surviving hostages were not released until 150. In his time in Italy, Polybius became a friend and advisor of Publius Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus, one of the most important men in Rome. Polybius accompanied Scipio in his command in the Third Carthaginian War and witnessed the destruction of Carthage.

As well as his *History*, Polybius wrote other works that have not survived: a eulogy of Philopoemen, a work on tactics, one on geography, and an account of Scipio's Numantine War. His great work, the *History*, was made up of 40 books. The first two books, beginning where Timaeus ended, gave a preliminary account of the years from the First Punic War (264–241) down to 220. In the rest Polybius took up what he rightly saw as the momentous 53 years (220–167) in which Rome became the dominant power in the Mediterranean world.

Polybius prided himself on writing “pragmatic” history, literally, “history dealing with affairs of state,” but meaning the serious and analytical kind of history that rose above sensationalism and romanticizing and offered elite readers insight into judging and making policy. Of all ancient historians, Polybius was closest, despite his own characteristics, to Thucydides in method and outlook. He had a deep interest in causation (3.6–7) and believed that the historian needed personal experience of political and military affairs. He saw the importance of travel to localities important in history. He made a crossing of the Alps to ascertain Hannibal's route and insisted that the historian needed to study the terrain of battlefields on the ground. His frequent references to “chance” (*tyche*) in history do not add anything beyond commonplace observation.

Of the 49 books of the *History*, only 1–5 survive intact. There are

substantial excerpts from books 1–18 and smaller and fewer excerpts from most of books 19–40. Polybius cast his work on the widest scale: it dealt with both Roman and Greek history, including coverage of the eastern Seleucid Empire and the Greek kingdoms of Bactria.

Polybius also devoted books to special thematic subjects: Book 6 on Roman political and social structures; Book 12 on historical writing; and Book 34 on geography. He strove to be impartial but could not conceal his dislike of Aetolians, anti-Roman Achaean League politicians, and historians who relied upon rhetorical fine writing. Polybius was a man of considerable intellectual capacity, wide interests and great industry. What he lacked was an ability to write concise and vivid prose.

Douglas Kelly

See also Achaean League; Perseus; Philopoemen; Thucydides; Timaeus.
Roman Section: Punic War, Third; Scipio Aemilianus

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Polycrates of Samos (Reigned Third Quarter of the Sixth Century)

Tradition claims Polycrates ascended to the throne around 533/2, but the archaeological evidence of several of his great works suggests the 540s are more likely. According to Pausanias, the Heraion (a monumental temple to Hera) was burnt by the Persians between 550 and 546, necessitating its

reconstruction (7.5.4). Aristotle attributes the great buildings of Samos' tyrants to Polycrates (*Politics* 1313b), whereas Herodotus simply credits the Samians for the Tunnel of Eupalinus, the fortification surrounding Pythagoreion's harbor, and the Heraion (3.64). An economic boost can also be deduced from new breeds of animals, the luxury foodstuffs, and a change in currency ca. 525. Polycrates is also credited with establishing a thalassocracy by naval supremacy and piracy, subjugating ships and islands. Trade was established with the Etruscans, the Athenians, and the Laconians as well as Egypt and Cyprus. Polycrates allied Samos with Naxos and Persia. Amasis of Egypt broke off their alliance in 526, allegedly out of envy for Samos' good fortune according to Herodotus (3.43). A more likely reason was the courting of Persian favor while the Persian king, Cambyses, invaded Egypt. Under Polycrates' leadership, Samos was attacked by Corinth and Sparta ca. 525 for the theft of 300 enslaved Corcyraean boys ca. 585. The Peloponnesian League's actions may also have been motivated by the threat of Samos becoming a Persian ally. The resultant 40-day siege marked the end of naval impunity for Samos in the Aegean Sea. Polycrates was assassinated by the Persian governor of Lydia, Oroetus, in 522.

M. Falconer

See also Lelantine War; Naval Warfare; Piracy; Samos; Thalassocracy

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Polyperchon (ca. 380–ca. 295)

An officer in Alexander the Great's army, Polyperchon was elected Craterus' second-in-command when he was sent with 10,000 discharged veterans to Macedonia. On his deathbed, Antipater named Polyperchon the guardian of the two kings, Alexander IV and Philip III Arrhidaeus. He initially had strong support, but faced opposition from Cassander. He sought to keep his position by extending support to Eumenes, and promised to oppose Antigonus I Monophthalmus in return for aid, but was unsuccessful.

He made a final bid for power when he allied with Heracles, the son of

Alexander and Barsine, and attempted to promote his claim to the kingship. Heracles had previously been overlooked as a candidate for the throne, partially because he may have been illegitimate. However, with the murder of Alexander IV in 310, he suddenly had a much stronger claim. Cassander was able to persuade Polyperchon to murder Heracles in exchange for a share in power, but in fact was given only a command in the Peloponnese. The murder, however, cost him this support in the long term. He continued to operate in the Peloponnese between the battle of Salamis (306) and the battle of Ipsus (301), and was still antagonizing Demetrius I Poliorcetes later in 295, when he would have been nearly 90. It is unknown what became of him.

Charlotte M. R. Dunn

See also Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon; Antipater; Cassander; Craterus; Demetrius I Poliorcetes; Philip III Arrhidaeus; Successors (*Diadochoi*), Wars of

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Pontus

Pontus, in north Asia Minor, extended from the coast of the Black Sea south to Cappadocia and Armenia and from the Halys River to Colchis. It was a fertile region, with good deposits of iron, copper, and silver. It had a largely tribal nature, with a powerful nobility and priestly caste. The Greek colonies along its coast seem to have been originally founded for trade (especially in the local metals).

The kingdom of Pontus was founded under Mithridates I Ctistes (302–266). His successors developed significant alliances with the Seleucids, increased the power of the monarchy and reduced the power of the nobility and priests. Mithridates V Euergetes who reigned from ca. 152/1 until his assassination in 120 in particular extended Pontic territory, changed the

character of his court to make it more Greek, and developed strong ties with Rome. He supported Rome in the Third Punic War (149–146) and the slave revolt in Pergamum (133–129).

Pontus reached its greatest extent and power under Mithridates VI Eupator (reigned in his own right 113–63). However, his attempts to annex Cappadocia led to three wars against Rome, each of which Mithridates lost, culminating in the dissolution of Pontus as an independent entity (63/2).

Iain Spence

See also Black Sea, Greek Cities of; Mithridates VI Eupator. *Roman Section:* Mithridates VI of Pontus

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Porus (Active 320s)

Porus was the ruler of the region between the Jhelum and Chenab Rivers in the Punjab and an opponent of Alexander the Great. It is probably impossible to recover his Indian name (“Porus” is the latinized version of his Greek name), but it may have been Paravatesha or Parvataka. Porus was apparently hostile to Taxiles, Alexander’s local Indian ally, and chose to resist Alexander’s advance, occupying a defensive position on the Hydaspes (Jhelum) River (326). Alexander outmaneuvered him by making a night crossing further up the river bank and then decisively defeated Porus’ main army. Impressed by Porus’ personal bravery, Alexander confirmed him as ruler of his own territory and allocated him additional territory, up to the Hyphasis (Beas) River.

Iain Spence

See also Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon, Indian Campaign; Elephants; Hydaspes, Battle of

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Potidaea, Siege of (432–429)

The siege of Potidaea began six months before (and was one of the triggers for) the outbreak of the Second Peloponnesian War (431–404) and was one of the major operations of its opening stages. The serious deterioration of Athenian-Corinthian relations following the battle of Sybota (433) placed Potidaea in an awkward position. It was a colony of Corinth, which maintained strong links with Potidaea (including sending magistrates to serve there every year), but was also a tribute-paying member of Athens' Delian League. Corinth was certainly hostile to Athens and Athens was aware that Perdiccas II of Macedonia, recently alienated from Athens, was encouraging Potidaea (and other cities in the area) to revolt. Athens, therefore (432), demanded that Potidaea demolish its walls facing the sea, provide hostages, and cease the practice of accepting Corinthian magistrates. Whether Potidaea was already considering a revolt or not, these measures precipitated one.

Corinth sent out a force of 1,600 hoplites and 400 *psiloi* (light troops) to help. When an Athenian force of 3,000 hoplites, an unspecified number of allies, and 600 Macedonian cavalry from the enemies of Perdiccas II arrived, the Potidaeans and their Corinthian reinforcements marched out against them. Their plan of attacking the Athenians in the rear from Olynthus failed when the Athenians placed their Macedonian cavalry as a blocking force. The Potidaeans were quickly beaten, losing 300 men to the Athenians' 150. The Athenians began the siege by building a wall cutting Potidaea off from the north and using their fleet to block access from the sea. They were not strong enough to cut Potidaea off from the promontory of Pallene to the

south until an additional 1,600 troops under Phormio arrived. Another wall was constructed to the south and Potidaea was now effectively blockaded.

In 430, the Athenians sent out another army and attempted to take the city by storm, using siege engines. However, they were unable to achieve anything because they brought the plague with them from Athens and lost just over a quarter of the 4,000 hoplites in 40 days (Phormio and his 1,600 men were away and avoided this). The siege then settled back into one of starving Potidaea out. This tactic eventually succeeded—the city was so short of food that cases of cannibalism occurred—and in winter 430/29 it surrendered. The Athenian commanders, also suffering privations and concerned at the high cost of the siege (unusually for ancient warfare we know how much it cost—2,000 talents) allowed the inhabitants to leave with one garment each (two for women) and a fixed sum for travelling expenses. They were heavily criticized at Athens for not insisting on an unconditional settlement. The Athenians then sent out cleruchs (military settlers) to occupy the city and its territory.

Iain Spence

See also Corinth, Corinthians; Peloponnesian War, Second; Phormio; Potidaea/Cassandreia; Siege Warfare; Sybota, Battle of

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Potidaea/Cassandreia

Founded by Corinth ca. 600, Potidaea was strategically located on the Pallene Peninsula of the Chalcidice, well suited to influence the shipping lanes of the north Aegean. Isocrates went so far as to say that Potidaea had the best strategic location in all of Thrace. It is certainly because of this

advantage that Potidaea was so often drawn into broader regional conflicts.

The Persians conquered Thrace in 513/2, and Potidaea came under their control. After the defeat of the Persians at Salamis in 480, Potidaea was one of the first cities to throw off Persian rule. As a member of the Delian League Potidaea retained its status as a colony of Corinth, but in 433/2 this dual and contradictory allegiance caused Potidaea to be drawn into the rapidly escalating conflict between Athens and Corinth. Potidaea seceded from Athens, resulting in a protracted siege, which was one of the factors leading to the outbreak of the Second Peloponnesian War. The Potidaeans capitulated in the winter of 430/29 and the city was depopulated and resettled by Athenians. Potidaea won its freedom in 404 when Athens surrendered to Sparta.

Olynthus took control of Potidaea by 382, but Sparta launched an attack that began with the capture of Potidaea. In 365/4, as an element of the competition between Athens and Thebes for control of the Aegean, Timotheus, the Athenian general, captured Potidaea, and caused the Thebans to withdraw from the theatre.

With the rise of Philip II of Macedon Potidaea once again became a central pawn in the geopolitical gamesmanship. Philip captured the city in 356, enslaved the people, and handed the city over to Olynthus in exchange for Pydna, but in 348 Philip captured Olynthus and Potidaea again fell under Macedonian rule.

Cassander changed the name of the city to Cassandreia in 315 and the city prospered under Macedonian rule. During the Macedonian anarchy (279–277), Apollodorus ruled as tyrant but Antigonus II Gonatas regained control and Cassandreia became the principal naval base for the last of the Macedonian kings until the fall of Perseus to the Romans in 168. In the reign of Augustus, Cassandreia was made a colony of Rome and the citizens granted Roman citizenship.

E. Edward Garvin

See also Agesilaus II; Antigonus II Gonatas; Cassander; Delian League/Athenian Empire; Peloponnesian War, Second; Pericles; Persian Wars; Perseus of Macedon; Philip II of Macedon; Philip V; Potidaea, Siege of; Timotheus

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Prisoners of War and Slavery

Captives were a ubiquitous part of Greek warfare, especially at the conclusion of sieges. Depending on the specific circumstances of their capture and the needs or interests of their captors, prisoners of war might suffer any fate, ranging from execution to instant release. Most commonly, captives would be ransomed or were sold into slavery.

Ransoms usually seem to have been paid privately, meaning that a prisoner had to rely on his family or friends to raise the funds demanded and then actually deliver them to his captors. According to our sources, the state played no appreciable role in these matters, and so the captive and his family were entirely at the mercy of the captors in keeping their side of the bargain. Ransoms were usually quite exorbitant, between 100–200 drachmas, so only the wealthy could hope to be released in this way. A poorer person could of course obtain help from a rich patron, but at Athens, by law, that poorer person “belonged” to the ransomer until he paid back the money (Demosthenes 53 [*Against Nicostratus*] 11). On rare occasions, ransomed or released prisoners could be disfigured, such as occurred at the end of the Peloponnesian War when the Athenians threatened to cut the right hand off of any prisoners they took (Xenophon, *Hellenica* 2.1.31–2).

Prisoners who were not released or ransomed were usually enslaved. Slave labor was a fundamental part of the ancient Greek economy, although we know remarkably little about ancient Greek slavery. No extant ancient Greek writer discusses it at length. Slavery was essentially a legal status, imposed on the captive by right of conquest. That is, when a captive became a slave through the process of a sale, he or she lived without civil rights and was owned as a possession, usually by another individual, but sometimes by the state itself. The owner usually possessed the power of life and death over the slave, but at Athens, the law forbade the killing of a slave without the permission of the state. To his or her master, the slave owed all labor and service—including, if required, sexual favors. In exchange, the master

sheltered, clothed, and fed his slaves, just as he would be expected to care for his livestock. The origins of slavery as an institution are lost, but certainly slavery was not confined to the Greeks. In Homer's *Iliad* (written down around 750), slaves are shown to be war captives.

War was certainly one of the principal sources of slaves. A defeated people, Greek or non-Greek, could face slavery at the victors' discretion. For example, after subduing the Greek *polis* of Melos in 416, during the Second Peloponnesian War (431–404), the Athenians put to death the entire adult male population and sold the women and children into slavery (Thucydides 3.84).

Such captives would probably have been sold on the spot to slave traders, who followed Greek armies on campaign. Slave traders had access to cash and transport, with which they could bring their newly purchased slaves to a market for resale. The Greek states of Chios and Ephesus were important slave markets in the 400s; other commercial centers, such as Athens and Corinth, played their roles. On occasion, the supply of slaves could far outpace demand, and in such circumstances slave traders simply abandoned the oldest or youngest captives (Xenophon, *Agesilaus* 1.21–2).

The sale of prisoners as slaves divided families. The demand for adult male slaves was usually far less than the demand for women, teenagers, and children (purchased for domestic duties). Children were especially prized as long-term investments, but many mothers surely were left behind on the auction block.

In 425, the Athenians used Spartan captives as a bargaining chip—threatening to kill them if the Spartans invaded Attica. During the Hellenistic Period, captured Greek or Macedonian soldiers were sometimes used to create military settlements, as Ptolemy I Soter did in the Nile Delta in 321 and 312.

Aside from release, ransom, or enslavement, war captives were routinely executed. Although the methods employed for the execution of captives are not always known, an array of methods was available. The extant sources mention a number of common methods: shooting with javelins, piercing with arrows, slashing throats, stoning, strangulation, crucifixion, or flogging. Sometimes, various methods were used in combination, though not always by design. For example, in 424, the Athenians managed to kill 60 Corcyraean oligarchs by beating or stabbing as they ran the gauntlet between two lines of hoplites, but when word

finally reached those who remained to be killed, they rioted. Some opted to commit suicide and managed to strangle themselves with strips torn from clothing, or slashed their own throats with arrow-heads or roof tiles. Those that remained were eventually shot down by the Athenians with arrows and stones (Thucydides 4.47–8). The execution of prisoners was therefore logistically complicated, labor intensive, and even on occasion risky to the executioners. In general, the execution of war captives was justified *ex post facto*, as if the deaths occurred as a part of battle, and thus were entirely consistent with the conventions that normally governed Greek warfare. For the soldiers who actually performed such executions, the distinction between the justifiable killing of the enemy and cold-blooded murder would be critical to the preservation of their sense of honor.

Michael Quinn

See also Aegospotami, Battle of; Civilian Populations in War; Colonies, Military; Crocus Field, Battle of; Families of Soldiers; Laws of War; Medicine, Military; Plunder and Booty; PTSD; Slaves in War; Social and Economic Effects of War

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Prodromoi

Both Athens and Macedon had *prodromoi* (lit. “fore-runners”). In a military context, the word usually refers to a mounted advance guard or mounted skirmishers operating in advance of an army, or as couriers. Xenophon advised potential Athenian cavalry commanders that they should demand

their *prodromoi* constantly practice, and become proficient in, the use of the javelin. In contrast, the Macedonian *prodromoi* of Alexander the Great appear to have been armed with a long lance, as they are occasionally referred to as *sarisophoroi* (sarissa bearers).

In the accounts of Alexander's campaigns the *prodromoi* are invariably mentioned as serving alongside the Paeonian cavalry. At the battle of Granicus (334), the Macedonian *prodromoi* fought on the right wing of Alexander's army, as they also did at the battle of Issus (333). The *prodromoi* carried out scouting duties prior to the battle of Gaugamela (331) and fought on the right wing alongside the Paeonians during the battle. In the aftermath of Gaugamela the *prodromoi* are occasionally mentioned being used by Alexander in forced marches or pursuit.

David Harthen

See also Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon; Cavalry; Gaugamela, Battle of; Granicus, Battle of; Issus, Battle of

Further Reading

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Propontis, Greek Cities of

The Propontis (in Greek literally “before the Pontus”) is the small body of water that connects the Aegean with the Black Sea (currently known as the Sea of Marmara in modern Turkey). Its northern outlet is via the Thracian Bosphorus; its southern is the Dardanelles (or Hellespont). Both straits, as well as the Propontis itself, were popular locations for Greek colonies and settlements from the seventh century onward, as they commanded the vital and often lucrative trade routes between the Black Sea and the Aegean. Because of the importance of these routes in feeding the Athenian population, many of the cities in the Propontis became members of the

Delian League/Athenian Empire (either voluntarily or otherwise).

Greek settlement focused on the Asia Minor coast of the Propontis, as well as the narrow straits emptying the body of water; the Thracian coast was less well-watered by rivers, and had fewer harborages. One of the earliest colonies was Cios, settled by colonists from Miletus in 626/5. It fell under Persian control with their conquest of Asia Minor, but later joined the Delian League and eventually was a member of the Aetolian League. It was conquered and destroyed in 202 by Philip V who gifted the site to the Bithynian king Prusias I, who refounded it as Prusias on the Sea. The Bithynians also founded their own cities around the Propontis, such as Nicomedia in 265, which became the capital of the kingdom (and later capital of the Roman province of the same name).

Two of the most important Greek cities of the Propontis were strategically located on, and dominated, both shores of the Thracian Bosphorus. Chalcedon, on the Asian coast at the southern entrance to the Thracian Bosphorus, was traditionally colonized in 685 by Megara; the colonists were said to have been blind for missing the superior location of Byzantium, founded 17 years later by Megarians slightly further north and on the European side of the strait. With the expulsion of Pausanias, son of Cleombrotus, from Byzantium in 476, the Athenian domination of the cities of Propontis began. Both cities were commercially and financially important, with Byzantium consistently contributing 15 talents to the Delian League (Chalcedon only contributed between 3 and 9 talents). The cities of the Propontis were fought over during the Peloponnesian Wars, with Chalcedon eventually falling to Sparta, before being conquered by Byzantium in 357.

During the Hellenistic Period, the cities of the Propontis frequently clashed with, or were conquered by, Macedon and later Bithynia. In 218 Mithridates I allied with Chalcedon, Heraclea Pontica, and Byzantium against Seleucus I Nicator. Philip V swept through the area, conquering cities in 202; some cities in the region such as Chalcedon allied with Rome during the Macedonian Wars.

Russell Buzby

See also Asia Minor; Bithynia; Black Sea, Greek Cities of; Byzantium, Byzantines; Colonies, Colonization; Delian League/Athenian Empire; Megara; Miletus; Pausanias, Son of Cleombrotus; Persian (Achaemenid)

Empire; Philip V

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Prusias II of Bithynia (ca. 220–149)

Prusias II of Bithynia (ca. 220–149), known as “the Hunter,” ruled the Bithynian kingdom from ca. 182 to 149. He was the son of Prusias I of Bithynia and Apama III. In 181, Prusias joined an alliance with King Eumenes II of Pergamum, against King Pharnaces I of Pontus. Later on, he attacked his old ally, Pergamum (156–154), but he was defeated. As a result, Pergamum asked for heavy reparations. Prusias sent his son Nicomedes II to Rome to ask the Senate’s help in reducing these reparations. Nicomedes, however, with the aid of King Attalus II of Pergamon, revolted, murdered Prusias in 149, and became king of the Bithynian kingdom. Ancient sources portray Prusias II as a man whose physical deformity was combined with a vicious, uneducated, and degraded character.

Ioannis Georganas

See also Bithynia; Eumenes II of Pergamum; Pergamum; Pontus

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Ptolemies

The Ptolemies ruled an empire centered on Egypt for most of the Hellenistic Period. The dynasty was named after its founder, Ptolemy I Soter who ruled Egypt from 323 to 283/2 (as king 305/4–283/2). Ptolemy I served under

Alexander the Great and all his male successors were also called Ptolemy. A feature of the dynasty was corule; fathers frequently associated a son with them as king, but it was not unknown for siblings to rule together. It was also not uncommon for brothers and sisters to marry—as a foreign (Macedonian) dynasty ruling over a largely Egyptian population, this was one method of ensuring dynastic purity. In addition to internal security issues because the dynasty was non-Egyptian, much of the history of Ptolemaic Egypt onward revolved around conflict with the Seleucid Empire, based in Syria.

The Ptolemies preserved their rule by maintaining firm control of the military and adapting Egyptian culture and practices. Nevertheless, there were occasional revolts and the Ptolemies (as in many Successor kingdoms) tended to keep the core of the army Macedonian or Greek. The training of Egyptians as Macedonian-style phalangites prior to the battle of Raphia in 217 seems to have been an exception to this.

Ptolemy I Soter substantially expanded his territory to include Palestine, Phoenicia, and parts of Asia Minor. Ptolemaic naval power began with his acquisition of Cyprus and Aegean islands. He also controlled most of Syria south of Lebanon and Damascus, as well as other places in Asia Minor and the Aegean islands. Much of this was achieved at the expense of the Antigonids, however, the region of Coele-Syria (essentially the coast and inland of Lebanon) became a particularly contested region between the Seleucids and Ptolemies.

The Ptolemies had mixed success against the Seleucids. They achieved their greatest power under Ptolemy III Euergetes in the Third Syrian-Egyptian War (246–241), but the loss of the Fifth War (202–195) eliminated Ptolemaic power in Asia Minor and Coele-Syria. Only Roman intervention saved Egypt from conquest in the Sixth War (170–168). Clever diplomacy ensured Ptolemaic independence until 30 when the last Ptolemaic ruler, Cleopatra VII, committed suicide after the defeat at Actium, ending the dynasty. Egypt was made a Roman province.

Iain Spence

See also Antigonus I Monophthalmus; Antiochus III (the Great); Cleopatra VII; Demetrius I Poliorcetes; Ptolemy I Soter; Ptolemy II Philadelphus; Ptolemy IV Philopator; Ptolemy V Epiphanes; Ptolemy VI Philometor; Successors (*Diadochoi*), Wars of; Syria; Syrian-Egyptian War, First–Sixth.

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Ptolemy I Soter (367–282)

Ptolemy I Soter was a general and biographer of Alexander the Great. After Alexander's death, Ptolemy became ruler of Egypt (323–282) and founder of the Ptolemaic dynasty.

Ptolemy was born in 367 to the Macedonian nobleman Lagus and Arsinoe (though ancient authors mention rumors that he was an illegitimate son of Philip II). He was one of Alexander's closest childhood friends, and participated in Alexander's eastern campaign from the beginning. Ptolemy took part in the battle of Issus (333) and accompanied Alexander to the oracle of Ammon at Siwah in the Libyan desert in 331. In December 330, Ptolemy was appointed as *somatophylax*, one of Alexander's seven bodyguards and trusted deputies. Ptolemy's first independent command was against Bessus, the last Achaemenid king, whom he captured and handed over to Alexander for execution. During the campaign in the Indian subcontinent, Ptolemy was in command of the advance guard at the siege of Aornus and fought at the battle of the Hydaspes in 326.



Silver tetradrachm of Ptolemy I Soter, minted in Paphos, Cyprus, ca. 305–284. Ptolemy is depicted wearing a diadem, with an *aegis* around his neck. The reverse depicts an eagle with a thunderbolt. The coin symbolizes royal power and divine protection and links back to Alexander the Great, whose coins also showed him with the *aegis* (the symbol of protection by Zeus and Athena). Located in the J. Paul Getty Museum, Malibu, California. (The J. Paul Getty Trust)

After Alexander's death in 323, the main officers of the Macedonian army gathered for a meeting to discuss the future of his empire. It was Ptolemy's arguments that convinced the other generals that they should divide the conquered territories among themselves, and Ptolemy was given the satrapy of Egypt. Ptolemy, to strengthen his position over the imperial regent Perdiccas, managed to bring Alexander's body for burial in Egypt. In 322 he allied himself with Antipater against Perdiccas, while in 316 he joined forces with Cassander, Seleucus, and Lysimachus to resist Antigonus' ambition to reconstitute the whole of the Macedonian Empire under his

rule.

At the same time, Ptolemy tried to turn his capital city, Alexandria, into the most important city in the eastern Mediterranean. He founded the Museum and the Library, and initiated the construction of the Pharos, the lighthouse that would come to be considered one of the seven wonders of the ancient world. Ptolemy was a very effective administrator and managed to win the support of the local Egyptian population by marrying an Egyptian, restoring ancient Egyptian temples and offering sacrifices to Egyptian gods, and establishing the cult of Serapis, which fused Egyptian and Greek religious elements.

Like all Alexander's Successors, Ptolemy (in 305) assumed the title of "king" (and in his case also "pharaoh"). His success in defending Rhodes against Demetrius I Poliorcetes' assault in 304 also earned him the name *Soter* ("Savior"). Ptolemy's memoirs offered a detailed description of Alexander's campaigns and it was the main source of the account written by the later historian, Arrian. Ptolemy I died in 282 and he was succeeded by his second son, Ptolemy II Philadelphus, who was already coregent since 285. The dynasty of the Ptolemies lasted for some 300 years.

Ioannis Georganas

See also Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon; Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon, Indian Campaign; Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon, Invasion of Persian Empire; Alexandria, Egypt; Arrian; Demetrius I Poliorcetes; Egypt, Egyptians; Hydaspes, Battle of; Ptolemies; Ptolemy II Philadelphus; Successors (*Diadochoi*), Wars of

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Ptolemy II Philadelphus (308–246)

Son of Ptolemy I Soter, and joint ruler from 285. Ptolemy Philadelphus ("Sister-loving") married his sister Arsinoë who displaced his existing wife (also an Arsinoë). She reputedly exercised considerable influence over him

until her death (270). In 279 Magas, Ptolemy's half-brother, the governor of Cyrenaica, rebelled. In 274 Magas and his father-in-law, Antiochus II launched a coordinated attack on Ptolemy. This, the First Syrian-Egyptian War (274–271), ended in stalemate. The Second Syrian-Egyptian War (260/59–ca. 253) was sparked by Ptolemy. This also ended with no appreciable gains for either side, although it caused Ptolemy considerable financial difficulties and temporarily damaged Ptolemaic naval power in the Aegean. Ptolemy died in 246 and was succeeded by his son Ptolemy III Euergetes.

Iain Spence

See also Cos, Battle of; Ptolemies; Syria; Syrian-Egyptian War, First; Syrian-Egyptian War, Second

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Ptolemy III Euergetes (Reigned 246–221)

Son of Ptolemy II Philadelphus, Ptolemy Euergetes (“Benefactor”) came to the throne shortly after the death of Antiochus II of Syria. Antiochus’ death sparked a succession dispute pitting his first wife (Laodice) and her son Seleucus II Callinicus against Ptolemy’s sister, Berenice, (Antiochus’ second wife) and her son. Ptolemy began the Third Syrian-Egyptian War (246–241) by marching north to support his sister, and continued it after his sister and nephew were murdered. Despite some reverses, the war ended with Ptolemaic territory at its greatest ever extent. Although many of the gains seem either ephemeral or perhaps exaggerated, Ptolemy did gain the valuable prize of Seleucia-in-Pieria (Antioch’s port). He poured considerable money into Greece to counter Macedonian power, initially supporting Aratus of Sicyon, but then Sparta and the Aetolian League. Despite this, Ptolemy lost naval control in the Aegean to Antigonus II Gonatas. He did, however, retain sufficient seapower in the east to allow him to operate with relative impunity against the Seleucid navy. Ptolemy had a reputation for

good government and sound financial management.

Iain Spence

See also: Cleomenes III; Ptolemies; Syria; Syrian-Egyptian War, Third

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Ptolemy IV Philopator (ca. 244–205)

Son of Ptolemy III Euergetes, Ptolemy Philopator (“Father-loving”) was king of Egypt from 221 to 205. He had a troubled reign, although after a run of defeats and territorial losses Egypt unexpectedly snatched victory in the Fourth Syrian-Egyptian War (221–217). However, the resistance seems to have been directed by Sosibius, Ptolemy’s minister, who took the unusual step of training Egyptians in the Macedonian phalanx. This was crucial to the victory at Raphia (217) but may to have led to postwar internal issues. Egyptian priests seem to have taken a more independent line, and the Thebaid revolted around 205 and could not be recovered for some time. The same year Ptolemy was assassinated by two of his ministers, Sosibius and Agathocles.

Iain Spence

See also Ptolemies; Raphia, Battle of; Syria; Syrian-Egyptian War, Fourth

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Ptolemy V Epiphanes (Reigned 210–180)

Son of Ptolemy IV Philopator and joint king with him (as a minor) from 210. Ptolemy Epiphanes (“Made Manifest”) became king in his own right, still as a minor, in 204. However, Antiochus III the Great and Philip V of Macedon took advantage of his minority rule to seize Egypt’s overseas territory. Egypt lost the Fifth Syrian-Egyptian War (202–195) and with it Coele-Syria

and Palestine; however, Rome prevented Antiochus from invading Egypt proper. Ptolemy was more successful internally—the Thebaid was regained (187/6) and a local revolt suppressed (184/3).

Iain Spence

See also Antiochus III (the Great); Philip V; Ptolemies; Syria; Syrian-Egyptian War, Fifth

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Ptolemy VI Philometor (ca. 186–145)

Son of Ptolemy V Epiphanes, Ptolemy Philometor (“Mother-loving”) ruled jointly with his mother, Cleopatra I from 180 to 176. He ruled alone from 176 to 170 and again from 163 to 145, but from 169 to 164 jointly with his brother Ptolemy VIII (Euergetes II) and with his sister/wife Cleopatra II. His reign was marked by internal dissension—he was exiled in 164/3. Ptolemy lost the Sixth Syrian War to Antiochus IV Epiphanes, only retaining Egypt because of Roman intervention. He died of wounds fighting Alexander I Balas.

Iain Spence

See also Alexander I Balas; Antiochus IV Epiphanes; Ptolemies; Syria; Syrian-Egyptian War, Sixth

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Ptolemy Ceraunus (ca. 320–279)

This Ptolemy, who was nicknamed Ceraunus, “Thunderbolt,” was the eldest son of King Ptolemy I of Egypt by his first wife, Eurydice daughter of Antipater. When he was pushed aside from the succession to make way for Ptolemy II Philadelphus, Ceraunus tried to get himself reinstated by first

Lysimachus and then Seleucus. Ceraunus was with Seleucus when he defeated Lysimachus at Corupedium (281) but shortly afterward personally assassinated him just after he had landed in the Thracian Chersonese.

Ceraunus put himself at the head of Seleucus' army and took over Lysimachus' kingdom. He also obtained the Macedonian throne by making an agreement with Pyrrhus, then preoccupied with his Italian expedition, and defeating Antigonus II Gonatas in a sea-battle. After one year of his rule, Macedonia was invaded by the first wave of Celts (279). Ceraunus' hastily levied army was heavily defeated and he was captured and beheaded.

Ceraunus had a high sense of entitlement due to his birth but was ruthless and incapable.

Douglas Kelly

See also Antigonus II Gonatas; Celts, Invasion of Greece and Thrace; Corupedium, Battle of; Lysimachus; Ptolemy I Soter; Ptolemy II Philadelphus; Pyrrhus; Seleucus I Nicator

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PTSD (Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder)

Although the condition had been identified and named by late seventeenth-century Swiss and German doctors and was known variously as “shell shock” (World War I) or “battle fatigue” (World War II and Korea), it was officially recognized under the name PTSD (Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder) by the American Psychological Association in 1980. It refers to the psychological issues deriving from severe trauma such as combat, accidents, physical attacks, rape, or any other traumatic experience. Symptoms include depression, flashbacks, nightmares, panic attacks, exaggerated response to loud noise, heart palpitations, and shaking.

Although the ancient Greeks had no formal term for PTSD, it is inconceivable that it did not affect them. However, it could be argued that the incidence and perhaps severity of PTSD in ancient soldiers may have

been less than today, because of both differences in warfare and also cultural differences. For citizen soldiers at least in the Classical Period, hoplite warfare generally involved a short campaign, resolved in one battle. Ancient soldiers were not subject to high explosive or automatic weapons and anything other than edged or missile weapons such as arrows and javelins were rare (one exception is the “flamethrower” at Delium, described by Thucydides, 4.100). Soldiers would have served in close formations (itself a comfort) alongside friends and members of their local community, performing what was seen as a civic duty—all fit adult males with the means to buy equipment were expected to serve. There was no separation of civil and military and any community division over a war did not result in criticism or targeting of those who served—as was the case with the Vietnam War. As in modern times, ancient states and societies had measures to make service and death more palatable, including maintenance of war-orphans, and monuments, public funerals, speeches, and art honoring those who died on active service.

However, these factors should not be used to underestimate the effects of ancient warfare on participants. The fear of death would have been just as real, and facing one’s enemy eye-to-eye and dispatching them with a sword or spear is more immediate and arguably more traumatic than firing a long-range shot. The execution of prisoners of war was not uncommon and this was also likely to have had an effect on those carrying it out. In addition, ancient soldiers had none of the modern support mechanisms available to today’s veterans. Presumably one of the coping mechanisms, as today, would have been self-medication with alcohol. In the late fifth century and the Hellenistic Period, as warfare became more professional, and more extended, men increasingly served for longer periods. The armies of Philip II and Alexander the Great of Macedon regularly campaigned all year round and, in Alexander’s case, for years at a time. On balance then, while ancient soldiers were generally not subjected to the same level of sustained service and the violence inherent in gunpowder- and high explosive-era warfare, PTSD is likely to have occurred in some form or another, although not necessarily with the same range of symptoms.

Although there is no extant medical treatise or any discussion of a condition like PTSD in the ancient literature, there are apparent examples of it. In his seminal 1994 study Jonathan Shay compared Homer’s portrayal of Achilles with American Vietnam War veterans he was treating. He

identified in both common symptoms arising from a common set of experiences (including a feeling of betrayal by one's own commanders). The story of Epizelus at Marathon is also often seen as an example of PTSD. In this case Epizelus was struck blind in the middle of the battle without any physical injury. He remained blind for life and ascribed his condition to seeing a phantom of a huge hoplite whose beard covered his whole shield, who bypassed Epizelus and killed the man next to him (Herodotus 6.117, Document 3). The Spartan general Clearchus, with his excessive love of war and his heavy punishments inflicted during erratic rages and then regretted (Document 14) could also be seen as perhaps suffering from PTSD.

Although this article focuses on soldiers, PTSD would also have occurred in civilian populations affected by warfare. For example, several Greek tragedies are centered on this, including Sophocles' *Antigone* and Euripides' *Trojan Women* and *Hecuba*.

Iain Spence

See also Civilian Populations in War; Clearchus; Epiphanies, Military; Marathon, Battle of; Prisoners of War and Slavery

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Public Order. See Internal Security

Punishments, Military. See Discipline, Military

[Pydna, Battle of \(168\)](#)

Philip V of Macedon's successor, Perseus, led Macedon into the Third

Macedonian War against Rome after a few years of building up his military forces. The final battle of the war, Pydna, lasted less than an hour and demonstrated the vulnerability of the *sarissa* phalanx when fighting on uneven terrain without cavalry support against a maneuverable enemy. The battle is best known as the final defeat of the Macedonian *sarissa* phalanx and resulted in the end of the Kingdom of Macedon.

After a few initial losses in the war, Perseus began to gain the upper hand with small victories against Roman armies and took up a strong position over the River Elpeus. The new Roman Consul, Lucius Aemilius Paullus, was determined to end the war quickly. He ordered his subordinate, Publius Cornelius Scipio Nasica Corculum, to head to the coast as if ready to launch a river-borne assault on Perseus' position. Instead Nasica moved south, then west, and finally northeast over the mountains to outflank the Macedonian army. Roman deserters informed Perseus of the plan but the force he sent to block Nasica, 12,000 men under Milo, was quickly defeated and fled back to Perseus' camp. Perseus moved his army northward to the village of Pydna, selecting a field of battle that was wide, flat and open providing the Macedonian *sarissa* phalanx with perfect conditions for battle. Paullus joined Nasica and headed north but finding Perseus' army already drawn up in battle formation pitched camp on the foothills to recover from the march. That night there was a lunar eclipse that was perceived by the Macedonians to signal the defeat of their king.

Paullus delayed attacking until the afternoon of the following day. Perseus did not attack presumably because the Romans were in the foothills. The battle began either when Paullus purposefully sent an unbridled horse forward to engage the enemy and instigate a skirmish, or when some Romans foraging for food came too close to Perseus' army. Either way the skirmish developed into a full-scale battle.

The Macedonian phalanx was initially successful in opposing the Roman legions, the length of the *sarissae* preventing the Romans from closing to use their swords. The sight and prowess of the phalanx supposedly terrified Paullus and began to affect Roman morale, showing how formidable the phalanx was in a frontal assault. Once the phalanx pressed forward too far and got onto broken ground, gaps began to appear in the formation as some advanced faster than others. The Roman infantry, perhaps following the instructions of Paullus, attacked the gaps independently creating many small conflicts but avoiding facing the *sarissas* head on. The phalanx quickly

broke apart and a wholesale slaughter began. Perseus retreated with his cavalry apparently having never joined the attack.

Of the Macedonian soldiers, 25,000 died but only 80 to 100 Romans. Eventually Perseus and his family were forced to surrender to the Romans after all his soldiers, friends, and courtiers abandoned him during a brief flight to Samothrace.

Graham Wrightson

See also Cynoscephalae, Battle of (197); Macedonian War, Third; Perseus; Rome, Romans. *Roman Section*: Aemilius Paullus, Lucius; Macedonian War, Third; Pydna, Battle of

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Pylos (Sphacteria), Battle of (425)

An Athenian victory against Sparta on an island (Sphacteria) next to Pylos, a headland in Messenia on the west coast of the Peloponnese (modern Navarino Bay). Thucydides provides a detailed contemporary record of the action. Earlier that year (425) the Athenian general Demosthenes had seized and fortified the undefended Pylos as a base for raiding Spartan territory and creating unrest among the Helots. The Spartans tried but failed to recapture Pylos and during this attempt a contingent of Spartans on the nearby island of Sphacteria was trapped by the Athenian fleet. The battle of Pylos (Sphacteria) was the final part of the action at Pylos and involved an Athenian assault on Sphacteria and the capture of most of the Spartans there.

The battle is interesting for several reasons: the debate in the Athenian assembly which authorized the assault, and the success of light troops (supported by hoplites) against even the redoubtable Spartan hoplites. Although clearly influenced by Thucydides’ dislike of Cleon, the account of the debate between Cleon and Nicias in the assembly is quite plausible. Outmaneuvered by Nicias, Cleon ended up in command, having vowed to

take the island without taking further Athenian troops. He took with him peltasts and archers, Lemnians and Imbrians and, according to Thucydides, on arrival left the detailed planning to Demosthenes.

A fire on the island had revealed the Spartan numbers (440 hoplites) and the best landing sites. Demosthenes and Cleon assaulted with a force that included 800 hoplites, 800 archers, 800 peltasts, and crew members from around 70 ships. The Athenians surprised the first guard post and overran it. Dividing into 200-strong groups of light troops backed up by a hoplite phalanx, they then harassed the main body of the Spartans. Unable to come to grips with the enemy hoplites, under a continual barrage of arrows, javelins and stones, without water and in burnt out terrain, the remaining 292 Spartans surrendered. The prisoners were taken back to Athens and were to be executed if the Peloponnesian League invaded Attica again. The news of the surrender was greeted with disbelief in Greece—since Thermopylae nobody had thought that Spartans would give up like this.



Part of the island of Sphacteria, off Pylos in the southwestern Peloponnese. The rugged terrain of the island made it more suitable for Demosthenes' and Cleon's light-armed troops than for the Spartan hoplites who were trapped there. (Photo by Peter Londey)

Because the enemy were Spartans, Pylos was a more spectacular demonstration of the utility of light troops in the right circumstances than the battle of Spartolus in 429. It reinforced Demosthenes' experience in the

Naupactus campaign (426) and at Olpae (426), and may have influenced later Athenian tactics, for example, at Lechaeum (390). The Athenian victory was a major psychological blow to Sparta. It allowed ongoing and significant damage through raiding and encouraging Helots to desert and meant that Attica was now safe from annual ravaging. Ironically, the inability to invade Attica led the Spartans to focus on the Chalcidice, the loss of which was serious enough to bring Athens to make peace with the Peloponnesian League in 421.

Iain Spence

See also Cleon; Demosthenes (General); Hoplites; Lechaeum, Battle of; Light Troops; Peloponnesian War, Second; Spartolus, Battle of

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Pyrrhus (319–272)

From a dynasty claiming descent from the great hero Achilles, Pyrrhus was king of Epirus for several years in the early third century, beginning as a child. He had a good claim to be king, but so did others. He was expelled several times and in those periods sought other adventures and possibilities for power. He travelled to Asia, Egypt, Italy, and Sicily. An adventure in the city of Argos in 272 resulted in his unglamorous death. He was involved in street fighting and the mother of his temporary opponent was watching from a roof. She grabbed a nearby roof tile and hurled it downward, striking Pyrrhus in the head.

As a very young man, Pyrrhus was involved in the great battle of Ipsus in 301, where he acquitted himself well in a losing cause. He spent some time at the court of Ptolemy in Alexandria. Pyrrhus and Lysimachus jointly invaded Macedonia in 297, but three years later Demetrius I Poliorcetes

invaded and made himself king until 285. Pyrrhus was king for several more brief intervals until he decided to respond to a request for help from the south Italian city of Tarentum. This began an adventure in south Italy and Sicily, which would keep him there for the next four or so years (roughly 280–276). He fought with or against Tarentines, Syracusans, and Carthaginians, and occasionally Romans. His battles with Romans have given rise to the phrase “Pyrrhic victory”: after winning the battle of Asculum in 279, but with more heavy casualties (troops he could not easily replace), he is alleged to have said, “One more such victory and I am undone” (Plutarch, *Pyrrhus* 21). He did in fact leave Italy shortly thereafter and went to Sicily. Sicily proved no more successful for him than Italy, and after his return to Italy and final defeat there, at Beneventum in 275, he returned to Epirus.

He found much chaos in Greece in which to meddle. Antigonus II Gonatas had recently become king of Macedonia, and would remain in that position even if Pyrrhus had some hope of returning. There were local factions in Sparta, and in Argos, which sought help of the now famous Pyrrhus. He was not only famous as a general, but also as a fighter. In Argos, Gonatas supported one faction, and Pyrrhus the other. He was decapitated after being stunned by the tile in the ensuing street fighting, and his head recovered by an illegitimate son of Antigonus Gonatas, who proudly presented it to his father. Gonatas was not pleased; he scolded his son for “barbaric” action and arranged for the proper burial of Pyrrhus.

The short life of Pyrrhus, 46 years, was filled with warfare. It was what he liked to do and knew how to do. Contemporaries compared him with Alexander the Great. His several opportunities for actually ruling were not very successful.



A Roman bust of King Pyrrhus of Epirus, perhaps a copy of a third-century Greek original, from the Villa of the Papyri, Herculaneum. Pyrrhus fought several campaigns in Italy and Sicily in the early third century. He defeated the Romans in several battles but at such a cost to his limited military manpower that they led to the phrase "Pyrrhic victory"—a victory causing more damage to the winner than the loser. Located in the National Archaeological Museum, Naples, Italy. (Araldo de Luca/Corbis)

Janice J. Gabbert

See also Antigonus II Gonatas; Argos, Argives; Epirus, Epirotes; Ipsus, Battle of; Laws of War; Lysimachus; Macedon, Macedonia; Peace (*Eirene*); Ptolemy II Philadelphus; Rome, Romans; Sicily; Sparta; Women in War. *Roman Section: Pyrrhus, War with*

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Raphia, Battle of (217)

The battle was fought in 217 between the armies of the Seleucid king, Antiochus III the Great, and King Ptolemy IV Philopator of Egypt, during the Fourth Syrian-Egyptian War. Nearly half of Ptolemy's phalanx at Raphia was composed of Egyptians armed and trained to fight as a Macedonian phalanx. This reliance by Ptolemy on Egyptian (rather than Greek and Macedonian) troops led to increased Egyptian influence within the Ptolemaic administration.

Antiochus had an army consisting of 62,000 infantry, 6,000 cavalry, and 102 Indian elephants. Ptolemy's forces numbered 70,000 infantry, 5,000 cavalry, and 73 African elephants. Antiochus opened the battle, unleashing an elephant attack against the elephants on Ptolemy's left wing. Ptolemy's outnumbered elephants fled, causing havoc amongst the Ptolemaic Agema (Royal Guard) and cavalry who were stationed on the same wing. Antiochus followed up his success by launching the remainder of his troops on his right wing against Ptolemy's shaken left wing, driving them back, but at this crucial moment Antiochus left the battlefield in pursuit of Ptolemy's defeated left wing. Ptolemy's cavalry on his right wing outflanked Antiochus' left wing, and with the support of elephants, Greek mercenaries, Gauls, and Thracians drove off Antiochus' left wing. Finally, Ptolemy's phalanx, consisting of some 25,000 Macedonians and 20,000 Egyptians, secured the victory in the center.

Ptolemy did not aggressively follow up this victory. However, Antiochus' losses and the risk of Ptolemy advancing into Syria proper caused Antiochus to withdraw from Coele-Syria and make peace (which lasted until 202).

See also Achaeus; Antiochus III (the Great); Egypt, Egyptians; Elephants; Ptolemies; Ptolemy IV Philopator; Seleucids; Syria; Syrian-Egyptian War, Fourth

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Ravaging

Agricultural ravaging was one of the most common tactics in Greek warfare, a normal part of any invasion of an opponent's territory. It served several interlinked purposes: as a form of psychological warfare; as a means of damaging an enemy's agricultural economy; as a way of forcing an enemy to give battle; as a form of foraging; and as a source of plunder.

Greek historians constantly refer to armies ravaging enemy agriculture, but rarely describe it in detail. The work might be carried out by hoplites, light-armed troops, or other attendants (such as slaves or Helots). Greek farms were generally small, mixed farms, separated by stone walls or hedges. The main crops were grain, vines, and olives. If an invasion took place in the month before harvest, then grain could be burnt, with devastating results. Before that (up to about mid-May) it was too green and would not burn, and the ravagers would have to trample or cut it, a much more time-consuming process. Plutarch tells us that ravagers usually used sickles or knives to cut grain, but that in the third century Cleomenes III devised pieces of timber specially shaped to shatter the grain more efficiently. If grain was ready to be harvested, the invaders might choose to harvest some of it for their own use, after scaring the defenders away. Later in the year, the ravagers might be able to capture and cart away stored grain from farmhouses and villages.

Greek vines grew close to the ground, making them difficult to break by trampling, especially in spring or summer when they were still fairly pliant. Vines are also difficult to burn or to pull out of the ground. The most common method of destruction was cutting the stems, something complained about by the chorus in Aristophanes' *Acharnians*. Olives,

especially for the production of olive oil, were an important and valuable crop in Greece, but olive trees are difficult to destroy. It is an enormous job to dig an olive tree out by the roots, and there are only a few references to attackers burning trees, possibly because it needs a lot of fuel to make an olive tree burn, but also because olives will regenerate after being burnt. Instead, the ravagers would either chop entire trees down—a large undertaking with a mature tree—or, more commonly, chop or saw branches off.

Ravagers would also do as much damage as possible to farmhouses, other farm buildings, and equipment. Houses would be looted of any valuables that owners had been unable to take away, and then burnt down. Most commonly they had stone foundations and mud-brick walls, but the walls and the tiled roof depended on a timber frame and beams, which would burn as long as some brush was brought in as fuel. Other equipment, such as olive presses, would also be attacked, while any farm animals left behind could be driven off or, very likely, killed and eaten by the invaders.

When an invasion was impending, farmers would naturally evacuate themselves, their families and livestock, and as much of their valuable property as possible. They would harvest whatever they could and remove stored produce, as well as rescuing portable farm tools and household furnishings. In 431, before the first Spartan invasion of the Peloponnesian War, the Athenians even removed the woodwork from their houses. The most obvious place to evacuate to was the fortified *polis* center; this was the prime purpose of city walls, to provide a safe haven (especially in the fifth and early fourth centuries when fortified cities were very rarely taken except by starvation or treachery). It has been argued that even the Athenian forts on the border with Boeotia were less important as defensive sites to prevent enemies from invading Attica than as safe havens for the outlying Attic population who would not have time to get to Athens itself. But people might also evacuate to safe areas nearby, probably preferable to crowding the town with livestock. When the Persians arrived in 480, some Phocians took their belongings up to a spur of Mount Parnassus, while others found refuge in Amphissa in western Locris, while the people of Delphi sent their women and children across the Corinthian Gulf to Achaëa and their property either to the sacred Corycian Cave on Parnassus or, again, to Amphissa. Faced with the same danger, the Athenians sent their families and possessions to Troezen, Aegina, and Salamis, while in 431 they

sent their animals to Euboea and other islands.

But the defense against ravagers was also often more active. In particular, cavalry would be sent out to disrupt the ravagers' work as much as possible. The invaders were vulnerable because the very act of ravaging forced them to scatter, out of formation and in small, dispersed groups, to be effective over as wide an area as possible. While some troops would be deployed to protect those actually wreaking havoc on farmers' land, cavalry (and perhaps light troops) could come on them quickly and inflict casualties. This was a major function of the Athenian cavalry during the Second Peloponnesian War. But the attackers could also escalate the conflict by setting up a permanent base in the defenders' territory, as the Athenians did in the Peloponnesian War with a base at Pylos, and the Spartans later by fortifying Decelea.

Ravaging could certainly cause an enemy temporary food shortages, but there is argument over how much permanent cost ravaging inflicted on farmers. It used to be assumed that the losses were devastating, especially damage to olive trees, which take decades to grow. But more recently Victor Davis Hanson has argued that the damage, while annoying, was not economically crippling. As noted above, doing serious damage to most crops was a labor-intensive activity. The more efficiently it was done, by dispersing the ravagers over a wide area, the more vulnerable they were to counter-attack. Farms were small and often in difficult terrain. Grain crops would only burn close to harvest time, a period when citizen soldiers preferred to be at home working on their own farms. Hanson estimates that it would take, at the most optimistic, 33 hours of labor to cut the vines in a one-acre vineyard, and even cut vines would soon sprout again. The loss to the farmer would only be one year's crop. Damaging olive trees again involved a great deal of work, and with grafting the farmer would be back in production in a few years. That was serious, but most farms were mixed, so farmers did not depend on any one crop.

One of the best documented examples of ravaging is the five Spartan invasions of Attica between 431 and 425, in the first half of the Peloponnesian War. These were brief invasions, each of a few weeks, carried out at a time of year to maximize damage to grain, thus allowing autumn crops such as vines and olives to be harvested. Each invasion only targeted parts of Attica. Hanson calculates that, even with large armies of over 20,000 men, over a total of roughly 150 days for the 5 invasions, the

Peloponnesians may have had 3.5 million man days with which to ravage Attic agriculture. We do not know exactly how much of Attica was under cultivation, but Hanson estimates that this allowed 15 man days per acre of cultivated land, over the whole 10 years of the Archidamian War. But since a large invasion could not happen by surprise, farmers could return to their land to repair things while the Peloponnesians were away. The conclusion would be that the economic damage done to defenders was serious (especially at an individual level) but not crippling. That balance might alter: for a period during the Peloponnesian War Athens invaded neighboring Megara twice a year. This probably did have a devastating effect on Megarian agriculture, and the resulting Megarian poverty made a pleasing joke for Athenians in Aristophanes' *Acharnians*, produced in 425.

But the real point of ravaging was not economic damage, though the Spartan occupation of Decelea probably did reduce the Athenians' ability to fight. Rather, it was annoyance. Small farmers who toiled on their farms year after year would be hugely confronted by having willful and unnecessary damage done to their crops and equipment. Sometimes ravagers were seeking a specific result, to force defenders out from behind their walls. In 431 the Spartan king Archidamus chose to ravage the large deme of Acharnae, only seven miles from Athens and within view of its walls, because he thought the numerous Acharnians would incite their fellow citizens to come out from behind the Long Walls and do battle with the Spartans. According to Thucydides, there was indeed dissent against Pericles' policy of refusing battle to the superior Spartans, but Pericles was able to convince the citizens to stick to his policy.

But the Spartans kept coming back, and Greek armies kept ravaging other states' territory, because ravaging represented a victory in itself, bringing honor to oneself and shame on the enemy who allowed such wanton damage to be done to their farms. And, like violent supporters of football teams, the Greeks fought wars as much for status as for any material gain.

Peter Londey

See also Archidamus II; Cavalry; Cleomenes III; *Epiteichismos*; Fortifications; Long Walls; Peloponnesian War, Second; Pericles; Persian Wars; Plunder and Booty

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Recruitment. See *Military Service, Greek States and; Mercenaries*

Religion. See *Commemoration; Dedications, Military; Epiphanies, Military; Gods of War; Religious Practices before Battle*

Religious Practices before Battle

The significance of religious practices before battle should not be underestimated. At Plataea, the Greeks refused to move, despite enduring damaging arrow-fire from the Persian host. Their seer had not yet received favorable omens. Only once the rites had been successfully concluded, would they commit to battle.

Ceremonies and Procedures

The most common rituals conducted before battles were blood sacrifices (*sphagia*). Livestock would accompany the army, not just for provisions, but also for sacrifice. A beast might be selected and ritually cleansed with a splash of water. The priest would recite a few prayers and lead the animal to an altar, where a few hairs might be cut from its forehead and a sprinkle of barley grains added as “first fruits” to be burnt in the fire for the gods. The animal would then be butchered, with its blood collected separately in a bowl. The Spartans would usually slaughter a goat for Artemis Agrotera. The ancient sources tell us that the entrails would be examined—in particular, the liver—for signs of what was to come. The bones, wrapped in

fat, would be given up to the gods through the fire. Libations of wine might also be involved at some point in these ceremonies. Homer, Pausanias, and other commentators note the expectations of the gods in receiving these sacrifices and how they could be easily angered if ceremonial requirements were not dutifully observed.

All armies sacrificed before engagement, but significant differences existed from *polis* to *polis*. Local heroes and deities had to be appeased or entreated for assistance. Similarly, the different circumstances of each conflict could lead to different approaches. The divinity, choice of beast, manner of its slaughter, role of the priest, and the precise nature of the rites and prayers could vary considerably.

Although being a seer was not a profession as such, the role required specific skills and could hold great status. Occasionally, a military leader could perform the sacrifice, but this was unusual. The best seers held a special place in the army and broader society. The Spartans and Athenians recognized the value of winning favorable omens and took great trouble to recruit those who had the best credentials. Great honors were bestowed by the Spartans upon the memory of the seer, Teisamenus, whose religious duties were considered to have helped deliver the major victories of the Persian Wars. The Spartan festival of the *Carneia* was said to have been established by the ancient Dorians to appease Apollo for the murder of the Arcadian seer, Carnus, a favorite of the god.

In the myths, we hear of human sacrifice before or after battle. This may have occurred in Mycenaean times. The poets say that Agamemnon's daughter, Iphigenia, was sacrificed at Aulis to win the favor of the gods before the Greek fleet sailed against Troy, and Achilles slaughtered 12 Trojan youths in retribution for the death of his beloved Patroclus. But beyond the literature, there is almost no evidence of human sacrifice in Greek religion after the Bronze Age. Phantias of Lesbos, a late commentator, may have asserted that Persian captives had been sacrificed at Salamis, but his account is unconvincing.

In fact, even amid the gore of the battlefield, religious sensibilities were usually piously observed, including mercy for suppliants and respect for the bodies of the slain. It was important not just to win the favor of the gods before battle, but also to keep them on side during the course of the conflict itself. Even after battle, it was important to observe religious practices and keep the state free of *miasma* (religious pollution). Following the battle of

Plataea, Athens ensured the ritual cleansing of the state by fetching a new fire from Delphi for all the hearths of the state. Thucydides describes elaborate arrangements to honor the unburied slain of Athens and uses it to contrast the disrespect shown the dead during the worst days of the plague of 430.

Seeking Support from the Gods

Well before a battle was fought, many states would go to great trouble to win the approval of the gods for the coming campaign. For example, in the sixth century, the Spartans went to extreme lengths to repatriate the bones of Orestes, which they had been told were necessary if they were to defeat the Tegeans. Similarly, Cimon had the bones of Theseus returned to Athens in 475 at great expense and ceremony.

The control or favor of panhellenic sanctuaries was also important. During the early days of the Second Peloponnesian War, Athens found itself out of favor at Delphi, the greatest of all oracular sites and panhellenic sanctuaries. This may explain why the Athenians turned to Delos, which was within their control, as an alternative site where they could more readily buy the favor of the gods and the oracular advice that suited them. But even if a state was in favor at a sanctuary and appeared to receive positive advice, it had to interpret responses very carefully. The Lydian king, Croesus, according to Herodotus (1.33), was advised that, if he were to attack the Persians, he would “destroy a powerful state.” Croesus did not realize that the powerful state to be destroyed would be his own.

Delphi was preeminent, not just as the religious and physical center of the Greek world, but because the oracle of Apollo was also the most authoritative. The ancient Delphic Amphictyony, a league of adjacent independent states, acted to protect the integrity of Delphi. Up to four sacred wars, one legendary and three historical, were believed to have been fought over its control. The importance of influence at Delphi is demonstrated by the oracle’s change of attitude to Cleisthenes of Sicyon. The Pythia, the priestess through whom the god gave oracles, first insulted him by calling him a “stone-thrower,” but later Cleisthenes became the oracle’s chief benefactor. This is also evident when noting the privileged treatment granted states in later years. Thebes enjoyed *promanteia* (i.e., the right to consult the oracle early) during its hegemony. Demosthenes accused the Pythia (the priestess who delivered the oracle) of “philippizing” during

the time of a large Macedonian presence at the sanctuary. However, the priestly administration itself seems to have encouraged largesse and it is only occasions of particularly covert and distasteful attempts to bribe it, or instances of outright bullying, which seem to have aroused the rancor of Apollo Pythius.

James McDonald

See also Delos; Delphi; Gods of War; Laws of War; Music; Omens and Portents; Panhellenism; Sepeia, Battle of; Tamynae, Battle of; War Crimes

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Rhodes, Rhodians

Rhodes, a large island in the southwestern Aegean close to the coast of Caria (in the Dodecanese in modern Greece), was originally settled by Dorians, who founded the three major cities on the island: Ialysus, Lindus, and Camirus. The three-way division of the island is attested by Pindar, and the cities were known to Homer. The three cities established colonies in their own right (such as Gela and Rhegium, both settled by colonists from Lindus), and began to mint their own coinage. Individually, they were also all members of the Dorian *hexapolis* (lit. “six cities”), and collectively they were among the founders of Naucratis, the Greek trading colony in the Nile Delta in Egypt. The cities all were renowned for their navies, and all had occupied territory beyond the island of Rhodes itself (mainly in neighboring islands, and in the mainland of Asia Minor). During the fifth century, all three cities allied themselves with Athens, and were tribute-paying members of the Delian League—Ialysus contributing 5 talents in 421/20 and Camirus contributing 10 in 416/5.

There seems to have been a long history of unity among these Rhodian cities. Homer referred to the Rhodians as a discrete ethnic grouping, with Ialysus, Lindus, and Camirus as the names of three different Dorian tribes among which the inhabitants of the island were spread. By the fifth century, this pan-Rhodian unity found expression through a common foundation myth. This claimed that each city was founded by three eponymous brothers, the grandsons of Helios (a popular divinity among the Rhodians). In 411, during the Second Peloponnesian War, this unity was reflected through a common assembly of citizens from all three cities which decided to defect from Athens and join the Spartans. The war with Athens was the common cause that pushed the rhetoric of synoecism into reality, and in 408 the federal state of Rhodes was created, with its capital in the newly created city of Rhodos (Rhodes).

This new capital featured an extensive necropolis, five favorable harbors, and the appropriate state buildings and law courts for the new polity. The constitutional aspects of the federation seem to have been established quickly, with *de jure* merger occurring over a period of time: citizens from Ialysus were still being appointed as hosts for Athenian ambassadors in 394. Despite this, the federation was completed during the early fourth century: priests of Helios attained island-wide political positions and coins were now no longer minted by any individual cities on the island but jointly in the name of Rhodes.

Rhodes' alliance with the Spartans in 411 did not last: the crippling financial obligations exacted (32 talents) saw the island reinstate relations with Athens in 396, followed thereafter by a democratic revolution in 395. Rhodes joined the Second Athenian Confederacy in 378/7, but left Athens again during the general revolt of its allies in the Social War of 357–355. Now alone, the island fell under Persian influence for the next two decades, and was ruled by Mausolus of Caria. Rhodian loyalty to the Great King was amply demonstrated with their assistance to the Persian reconquest of Egypt, and resistance to Philip II of Macedon. This lasted until Alexander the Great's invasion of the Persian Empire and his victory at the battle of Gaugamela in 331.

During the Hellenistic Period, Rhodes tried to remain independent from the wars of the Successors (*diadochoi*). Nonetheless, the ancient and close ties between Egypt and Rhodes were maintained with the Ptolemaic court, an alliance that was to last unbroken for three centuries. This association,

along with its staunch independence, provoked the wrath of Antigonus I Monophthalmus, who besieged the island with his son, Demetrius II Poliorcetes in 305. Rhodes' survival only served to increase its prestige and cement its position as one of the richest Greek states. Leveraging this victory, Rhodes was able to broker a non-aggression pact between the Antigonids and Ptolemies, as well as fund the construction of a giant bronze statue to Helios, bestride the entrance to its chief harbor—the famous Colossus of Rhodes, one of the seven wonders of the ancient world.

Disastrously the Colossus, along with much of the city walls, docks, and buildings, were all destroyed by earthquake in 227/6. With consummate diplomacy, Rhodes was able to exact contributions from many of the Hellenistic monarchs and dynasts, and retained its position as chief sea power and arbiter of Aegean commercial and mercantile interests. Rhodes led an alliance to war against Byzantium in 220 on the grounds that that city had been imposing crippling tolls on ships sailing through the Thracian Bosphorus, to the detriment of trade elsewhere in the Mediterranean. During the second century, Rhodes continued to expand its control and interests in the eastern Mediterranean. Naval bases were established in Crete, a confederacy of Cycladic islands was created, and land conquests were increased throughout Asia Minor, to include Lycia and much of Caria.

Rhodes maintained peace with Rome by siding with it against the Hellenistic kingdoms, whether it was Philip V or Antiochus III the Great. Because of this loyalty, they endured the siege of Mithridates VI Eupator in 88, but were rewarded with a donation of territory from Sulla after the war ended in 64. Rhodes remained independent during the Roman civil wars, even after the battle of Actium in 31, and was not incorporated into the province of Asia Minor until 44 CE.

Russell Buzby

See also Antigonus I Monophthalmus; Asia Minor; Athenian Confederacy, Second; Caria, Carians; Colonies, Colonization; Delian League/Athenian Empire; Demetrius I Poliorcetes; Egypt, Egyptians; Mausolus and the Hecatomnids; Mithridates VI Eupator; Piracy; Rhodes, Siege of; Social War (357–355)

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Rhodes, Siege of (305–304)

Demetrius I Poliorcetes, son of Antigonus I Monophthalmus, besieged Rhodes at his father's instruction. The siege lasted for a year but ultimately failed. Despite this failure Demetrius was known as "Poliorcetes" ("The Besieger"); clearly an ironic nickname.

Rhodes, friendly to Ptolemy I of Egypt, had refused a summons to fight against Egypt but would have surrendered had Demetrius not demanded entry into the city with his fleet. The Rhodians sent away all those unwilling or unable to fight leaving 7,000 men as well as freeing slaves who opted to stay. Demetrius led a large army and fleet with experienced engineers and siege train and employed pirates, possibly as many as 1,000 ships, to blockade Rhodes' harbors.

Demetrius attacked the main harbor and the city walls but failed to prevent reinforcements of supplies and troops from entering the city. After weeks of fighting Demetrius gained a foothold but a storm forced him off, destroying many of his ships and his siege towers, and allowing the Rhodians to regain the harbor. Demetrius delayed for a few days rebuilding his towers, then abandoned the harbors and attempted land assaults. Demetrius failed to prevent Rhodian ships sallying out and capturing valuable supplies, including some renowned engineers and dresses intended for Demetrius' wife. Demetrius attacked repeatedly with the famed siege engine, the Helepolis (ca. 135 feet by 65 feet on eight wheels 15 feet high), but was repulsed when Demetrius, astonished that the Rhodians fired so many missiles so quickly, wanted to save the machine. Demetrius launched

a night attack through a breach but 1,500 mercenary reinforcements from Ptolemy were instrumental in defeating the only foray into the city itself. Antigonos then ordered Demetrius to make peace and the Helepolis was abandoned.

Graham Wrightson

See also Antigonos I Monophthalmus; Cassander; Demetrius I Poliorcetes; Ptolemy I Soter; Rhodes, Rhodians; Successors (*Diadochoi*), Wars of

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Rome, Romans

Rome was a Latin town near the west coast of central Italy. From small beginnings, it eventually came to control the whole of Italy and eventually the whole Mediterranean, including the Greek world. Rome was situated to take advantage of one of the more fordable crossings of the lower Tiber River and nearby low-lying hills for defense. From this vantage point, early Romans were able to dominate the local trade routes heading both north-south and east-west, trading salt with the inland tribes. Bronze Age remains have been found on the western slopes of the Palatine. However, by the eighth century pottery from Euboea and Corinth attests to the presence of Greek traders, and Etruscan influences appear in burial customs. Rome nonetheless remained an inherently Latin city, sharing its heritage with the other small settlements on the plain of Latium.

Union of these Latin communities, with Rome at its head, was achieved during the fifth century, at which point they began to challenge both the inland tribes of the Apennines and the Etruscans to the north. Warfare with its neighbors continued throughout the fourth century, notwithstanding the sack of the city, conventionally dated to 390, by the Celts, possibly a band of mercenaries on their way to fight for Dionysius I of Syracuse.

Drawn into the south of Italy by appeals from the cities of Campania for help against the Samnites in 340–338, Rome later formed an alliance for the first time with a Greek city, Neapolis, in 327/6, and spent the next two decades fighting the Samnites into submission. Drawn northward again against various coalitions of Etruscans, Celts, and Umbrians, Rome was

successful in defeating them in 295. Throughout the 280s, Rome became heavily involved with the Greek cities of southern Italy. After attacking the Romans in 282, Taras (Tarentum) appealed to Pyrrhus of Epirus to intervene on its behalf; Pyrrhus invaded southern Italy, probably in 280.

Facing Hellenistic armies for the first time, the Romans were narrowly defeated in 280 at Heraclea and again in 279 at Asculum. Despite his victories, Pyrrhus sustained such losses that he was no longer able to continue his campaign, coining the phrase “Pyrrhic victory,” and retreating to Sicily in 278. After attempting to fight the Romans again in 275, Pyrrhus withdrew from Italy, leaving Rome unchecked to capture Tarentum in 272.

From this point Rome was steadily drawn into conflict outside Italy, often with Greek cities and kingdoms, and within 250 years extended its empire to include the entire Mediterranean. An alliance between the Syracusans and Carthaginians helped prompt the First Punic War (264–241). During the war Rome captured a number of important Greek cities, such as Acragas, selling their populations into slavery. Rome ended the war in control of Sicily, though Syracuse retained its independence.

After the Second Punic War (218–201), Rome became directly involved in the politics of mainland Greece, stemming from an earlier alliance between Hannibal and Philip V of Macedon, which led to the First Macedonian War (215–205). After victory in the Second Macedonian War (200–196), Rome declared the freedom of the cities of mainland Greece. But the Third Macedonian War (171–168) led to the breaking up of the Macedonian state, while the Fourth Macedonian War (150–148) and the Achaean War (146) led to the annexation of Macedonia and Greece.

The Syrian-Roman War (192–188) had placed a check on Seleucid power, while Rome acquired substantial territory in Asia Minor through the bequest of the last king of Pergamum, Attalus III. Wars against Mithridates VI Eupator further extended Roman territory in the east. The process was completed with the annexation of Ptolemaic Egypt in 30.

Russell Buzby

See also Achaean League; Attalus I of Pergamum; Attalus III of Pergamum; Colonies, Colonization; Cynoscephalae, Battle of (197); Etruria, Etruscans; Italy, Greek Cities in; Italy, Italians; Macedonian War, First; Macedonian War, Second; Macedonian War, Third; Macedonian War, Fourth; Mithridates VI Eupator; Philip V; Pydna, Battle of; Pyrrhus; Sicily; Syracuse; Syrian-

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Conflict in Ancient Greece and Rome

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THE DEFINITIVE POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND
MILITARY ENCYCLOPEDIA

Volume 2: S–Z, Greek Section and A–G, Roman
Section

IAIN SPENCE, DOUGLAS KELLY, AND
PETER LONDEY,
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Sacred Band

“Sacred Band” is a literal translation of the name (*Hieros Lochos*) of an elite Boeotian infantry unit that was formed in 378 and distinguished itself at the battles of Tegyra (375) and Leuctra (371). It was wiped out in a last stand at the battle of Chaeronea in 338.

The Sacred Band was a standing unit of 300 hoplites. Later sources (there are no contemporary sources extant) describe it as consisting of 150 pairs of male lovers. There is nothing in this incompatible with attested Greek social values and behavior.

Douglas Kelly

See also Chaeronea, Battle of; Elite Troops; Leuctra, Battle of; Pelopidas; Tegyra, Battle of

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Sacred Truces and Festivals

An *ekecheiria* or sacred truce was called to allow an important event to be undertaken. A number of festivals were celebrated by the ancient Greeks, which involved the announcement of a sacred truce by *spondophoroi* (sacred heralds) to safeguard the passage of pilgrims and officials to and from festival precincts. Such truces were observed for the four athletic

festivals of the *periodos* or “circuit” of games at Olympia, Delphi, Nemea, and the Isthmus.

Generally, sacred truces were dutifully observed, but some evidence suggests that the free passage of pilgrims may have been compromised during the Peloponnesian War. Sparta’s allies controlled the *periodos* and it is argued that Athens was unable, or unwilling, to send athletes to Olympia. Thucydides also claims that religious traffic to and from Delphi had been disrupted during the Archidamian War and he points the finger at the Phocians and Boeotians. In his record of the Peace of Nicias in 421, Thucydides 5.18.1–2 includes a clause which reads as follows:

Concerning the common sanctuaries, whoever wishes to sacrifice at them, to travel to them, to consult their oracles, and to visit them as delegates, may do so, according to ancestral customs, by both sea and by land, without fear.

There would have been no need to state these rights, if they had not been violated during the Peloponnesian War.

There was good money to be made from pilgrims. Aristophanes’ comic character, Peisthetaerus, jokes that the birds, who control the atmosphere of the earth, are in a position to exact tolls and conditions on the passage of the smoke from sacrifices on altars winding up through the air for the gods. He compares this position with that of the Boeotians, who took advantage of the passage of Athenians wishing to visit Delphi, saying, “if we want to consult the Pythia, we ask the Boeotians for safe conduct” (Aristophanes, *Birds* 187–188).

The *spondophoroi* themselves were sacrosanct and under the safeguard of the god Hermes. They were protected by sworn truces, panhellenic custom, and formal interstate relationships. In fact, it has been argued that the *asylia* (“asylum”) pertaining to envoys may have been a mobile form of *asylia*. Therefore, an athlete, pilgrim, or sacred herald involved in a festival of Zeus may have had a comparable degree of inviolability to a suppliant at an altar of Zeus.

Not all states were genuine in calling a sacred truce. Xenophon notes how the Argives tried to use one to avoid conflict with Sparta. The king, Agesipolis, dealt with this awkward ploy by consulting the oracles at Olympia and Delphi, where he was advised that the Argives were

disingenuous and that the sacred truce could safely be ignored.

James McDonald

See also Agesipolis I; Delos; Delphi; Laws of War; Olympia; Panhellenism; Peloponnesian War, Second; Pindar; Surrender; Truces; War Crimes

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Sacred War, First (ca. 590s)

Causes

The First Sacred War was supposedly a 10-year war fought to protect the sanctuary at Delphi against the people of the nearby town of Crisa or Cirrha (one source also mentions a lawless group, the Cragalidae). Sources variously claim that the Crisaeans or Cirrhaeans had robbed, taxed, or kidnapped visitors to the sanctuary or had plundered or in other ways committed sacrilege against Delphi.

Course

The war was fought by members of the Delphic Amphictyony, the religious league which controlled the sanctuary, under the leadership of either Eurylochus of Thessaly, Cleisthenes of Sicyon, or an Athenian, either Solon or Alcmaeon. The longest account appears in a speech attributed to Thessalus, the son of the medical writer Hippocrates. According to this account, the Amphictyonic army conquered and laid waste the territory of Crisa/Cirrha, before settling down to invest the last stronghold, located on a spur in the plain between Delphi and the coast. The besieging army itself suffered from disease, but eventually was assisted by an ancestor of Hippocrates, who showed them how to poison the fortress' water supply

with hellebore, forcing the defenders to surrender.

Consequences

The Amphictyony set up contests at Delphi to commemorate victory in the war, but the main result was that they dedicated the territory of Crisa/Cirrha, the plain immediately inland from the modern bay of Itea, to Apollo, with the injunction that it must remain uncultivated. The offending city itself was razed, though in later times the port of Delphi on the coast was named Cirrha.

Despite the vivid (though contradictory) accounts in our sources, Noel Robertson has argued convincingly that the entire war is a fiction, invented 250 years later in the fourth century around the time that Philip of Macedon settled the Third Sacred War and thereby became an influential player in Delphic affairs. Philip's role in ending the Phocian occupation of Delphi could easily be seen as analogous to the earlier war against Crisa/Cirrha. In 340, the Athenian orator Aeschines used the precedent of the First Sacred War to argue for action against the Locrian town of Amphissa, whose citizens were allegedly cultivating the sacred land. The Fourth Sacred War was the result.

The First Sacred War can be used to help explain the existence of the uncultivable sacred land in the plain below Delphi. Yet the earliest sources for the war come from the 340s. The failure of earlier writers, such as Herodotus and Thucydides, to mention the First Sacred War, strongly suggests that the earlier war was, indeed, a fiction.

Peter Londey

See also Aeschines; Delphi; Delphic Amphictyony; Philip II of Macedon; Sacred War, Second; Sacred War, Third

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Sacred War, Second (ca. 448)

Causes

What Thucydides (1.112) calls the "sacred war" (the numbering of the Sacred Wars is a purely modern convention) seems to have arisen as a result of great-power rivalry by Sparta and Athens for influence over the panhellenic religious sanctuary at Delphi and in central Greece generally.

Course

The Spartans made an expedition to Delphi and, detaching it from the control of the neighboring Phocians, gave it into the hands of the Delphians: that is, they made Delphi independent (though no doubt loyal to Sparta). In response, an Athenian expedition under Pericles seized the sanctuary and returned it to the Phocians.

Consequences

According to Plutarch, first the Spartans and then the Athenians took advantage of the conflict to have themselves awarded *promanteia*, the right of first consultation of the oracle, and had this fact inscribed on the forehead and the side, respectively, of a bronze wolf in the sanctuary. Athenian supremacy at Delphi was short-lived. After the Athenian defeat at the battle of Coronea in 447, Delphi seems to have returned to the Spartan sphere of influence, and later showed distinct favor to Sparta at the start of the Peloponnesian War in 431.

Peter Londey

See also Athens; Coronea, Battle of (447); Delphi; Phocis, Phocians; Sparta

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Sacred War, Third (356–346)

Causes

The Third Sacred War was a major conflict, initially over control of the sanctuary at Delphi. The war dominated affairs in central Greece for 10 years, from 356 to 346, and ultimately was the catalyst by which Philip II of Macedon became a political player in southern Greece.

The war probably arose out of conflict between the Phocians, on the edge of whose territory lay the sanctuary of Apollo at Delphi, and their neighbor to the east, Thebes, the dominant city in Boeotia. In the 360s, the Thebans gained a dominant position in the Delphic Amphictyony, an international league which controlled the sanctuary. The Amphictyony expelled Thebes' opponents at Delphi, fined Sparta for its occupation of Thebes in 382, and threatened some leading Phocians with a curse for tilling sacred land. In 356, the Phocian aristocrat Philomelus convinced his people that they should seize Delphi, which he regarded as originally a Phocian sanctuary, and annul these decrees. In this venture, he gained at least tacit support from Athens and financial support from the Spartan king Archidamus III, both opponents of the Thebans.

Course

With a mixture of Phocian troops and foreign mercenaries, Philomelus seized the sanctuary at Delphi in 356, killing his opponents and erasing the offensive Amphictyonic decrees. Defeating an immediate attack from the nearby western Locrians, he promised to protect and not to plunder the sanctuary. Expecting more attacks, he increased his forces to 5,000 men and fortified the sanctuary. Philomelus' public relations campaign did not convince the Boeotians and Locrians, who built a coalition to end the Phocian occupation. The groups which joined the anti-Phocian alliance were the Thessalians, Perrhaebians, Magnesians, Achaeans of Phthiotis, and a number of smaller groups in central and northern Greece. Athens and Sparta supported the Phocians, but did not provide soldiers at this stage. Faced with such a broad coalition, Philomelus hired a large mercenary army, possibly with money plundered from the sanctuary.

The war now began in earnest. Acting quickly before his opponents could join forces, in 354 Philomelus took a large army over the hills into

eastern Locris. There he defeated the combined Locrian and Boeotian cavalry, then defeated the Thessalians when they arrived, but refused battle with the Boeotian infantry, the best in Greece, when they came on the scene. Both sides killed prisoners, the allies because the Phocians were temple-robbers, the Phocians in reprisal. Philomelus retired to defend the Phocian heartland in the Cephissus valley, and was forced into battle near Neon (Tithorea). The Phocian forces were defeated by the allied forces led by the Theban Pammenes, and many fled up the slopes of Mount Parnassus. Philomelus himself, trapped by his pursuers, threw himself off a cliff. Thinking the war was over, the allies went home.

Many moderate Phocians wanted to end the war, but Onomarchus, Philomelus' colleague as general, fearing for his own position in any peace settlement, convinced the majority to pursue the conflict and give him supreme command. Plundering large quantities of the riches stored up at Delphi, he hired more mercenaries, bribed enemies, and with forces totaling over 20,000 briefly made Phocis the great power of central Greece. In 353 he took the war aggressively to the enemy, enslaving the inhabitants of Thronium in eastern Locris, sacking the small towns of Doris in central Greece, forcing Amphissa into submission, and invading Boeotia itself, where he captured Orchomenus. By giving support to Lycophron and Peitholaus, the tyrants of Pherae, he ensured that Thessaly was divided and would not for the moment take further part in the war.

But trouble loomed. The Thessalian opponents of Pherae called for help from their ally, Philip II of Macedon. Philip entered Thessaly and defeated a Phocian army of 7,000 under Onomarchus' brother, Phayllus. Onomarchus then marched in full force into Thessaly and defeated Philip in two battles; Philip withdrew, but rather than consolidating his position in Thessaly Onomarchus attacked the Thebans, using passes over Mount Helicon to threaten the whole of western Boeotia. Philip was not done, however, and in 352 returned with a larger army. The result was a comprehensive victory for Philip at the battle of Crocus Field and the death of Onomarchus. According to Diodorus, Philip executed the captives by throwing them into the sea as punishment for robbing the sanctuary: an illustration, if true, of the importance of religious propaganda in the war. Philip advanced to Thermopylae, but found an Athenian force defending it and went home.

Phayllus now took command of the Phocians, and hired yet more mercenaries, paying twice the going rate out of the "inexhaustible supply of

money” from Delphi (Diodorus 16.37.2, indicative of the vast wealth of a major Greek sanctuary). Athens, Sparta, Achaea, and the deposed tyrants of Pherae—all fearful of the Theban–Macedonian axis—now provided troops. Phayllus once again took the initiative and invaded Boeotia, but he was no match for the generals who preceded him. The Thebans defeated him three times before he could extract his forces. Phayllus now adopted more moderate ambitions, securing the coastal route through eastern Locris and the passes over the hills into Phocis, and using the routes over Mount Helicon to harry the Boeotians. The Thebans had no answer, and the war drifted toward stalemate.

The key to unlocking the impasse was Philip. By 346 all the parties were exhausted, and the Phocians were running out of Delphic treasure. Phayllus had died, and Phalaecus, the young son of Onomarchus, was commander. Philip was now master of Thessaly, and could not ignore the Thessalian desire to regain their primacy at Delphi. For some time Philip was busy in the north, but by 346 was ready to act. The Peace of Philocrates ensured that he could do so without Athenian opposition. Athens abandoned the Phocians. So did Phalaecus: he struck a deal with Philip to allow him and his mercenaries to escape. Phalaecus took his 8,000 remaining men to the Peloponnese, leaving Phocis undefended. Philip ended the Sacred War without fighting a battle.

Consequences

As punishment for the 10 years of war, the Phocians had their cities broken up into villages, were barred from having horses or arms, and had to pay enormous reparations, initially set at 60 talents per year, reduced after Philip’s death to a more manageable 10 talents per year. The Phocians were also expelled from the Amphictyony, and their votes given to Philip. In this way Philip ensconced himself in the affairs of southern Greece, a situation that indirectly led a few years later to the Fourth Sacred War and the battle of Chaeronea.

Peter Londey

See also Crocus Field, Battle of; Delphi; Delphic Amphictyony; Onomarchus; Phalaecus; Phayllus; Philip II of Macedon; Philomelus; Phocis, Phocians

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Sacred War, Fourth (340–338)

Causes

The Fourth Sacred War probably began as a boundary dispute between Delphi and the western Locrian town of Amphissa, together perhaps with disputes between various parties in both Amphissa and Delphi. At a meeting of the Delphic Amphictyony in autumn 340, the Athenian orator Aeschines accused the Amphissians of cultivating Delphic territory sacred to Apollo. The Amphissians drove off an Amphictyonic tour of inspection, and a few months later the Amphictyony decided to punish them.

Course

The Amphictyony (though with both Athens and Thebes boycotting proceedings) gathered an army at Thermopylae, commanded by one of the Thessalian representatives on the Council, Cottyphus, and marched south to Amphissa. The Amphissians seem to have submitted without a fight, and agreed to pay a fine and restore a group of exiles. However, the Amphissians later reneged on the agreement, and in 339 the frustrated Amphictyons called on the assistance of Philip II of Macedon to settle this conflict, as he had the Third Sacred War eight years before. Until this point Philip had been busy campaigning in the north, and there is no reason to believe that he had any hand in fomenting the war. It now suited his purposes, however, to march south, secure the Thermopylae area, and then take his army over the hills to central Greek Doris, at the head of the Cephissus valley. But instead of marching further south to Amphissa, he turned east and occupied the eastern Phocian town of Elatea. Athens, long Philip’s enemy, and Thebes, his nominal ally, now joined forces and defended both the pass north of Amphissa and the route down the Cephissus

into Boeotia. Philip tricked the defenders of the former and his general Parmenion ended Amphissian resistance, thus ending the Sacred War proper. Some months later, in mid-338, Philip fought and defeated the combined Theban and Athenian forces at Chaeronea.

Consequences

By giving Philip opportunity and pretext to march into central Greece, this trivial war was the trigger for Macedonian hegemony over Greece as a whole.

Peter Londey

See also Aeschines; Chaeronea, Battle of; Delphi; Delphic Amphictyony; Demosthenes (Orator); Locris, Western; Philip II of Macedon; Sacred War, Third

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Salamis, Battle of (480)

Salamis, an island off Athens, was the site of the decisive naval battle of the Second Persian War. After the Greek land defeat at Thermopylae forced the withdrawal of the accompanying fleet from Artemisium (480), the Greek fleet occupied Salamis.

Although it is difficult to recover the numbers of the combatants, it is clear that the Greeks were outnumbered. Reinforced after Artemisium, the Greek fleet had 378 triremes (310 according to Aeschylus) and some of the older penteconters. Herodotus (7.89) gives the total number of Persian triremes at the start of the expedition as 1207 (a number which he took from Aeschylus, *Persians* 341). Despite his later statement (8.66) that the losses in men (and presumably ships) at Artemisium and elsewhere had been replaced, this seems highly unlikely as his figures record a minimum of 645 losses (excluding those on the final day at Artemisium). Given that the original figure of 1207 was probably exaggerated, a reasonable estimate (although still conjecture) would be that the Persians mustered perhaps a

maximum of 500 triremes at Salamis.

The accounts of the course of the battle are heavily influenced by the postbattle interests of the participating states, and contain the usual contradictions. The main thread, though, is that Eurybiades, the Spartan commander, and the Peloponnesians wanted to withdraw. In a last ditch effort to prevent this, Themistocles sent a messenger to Xerxes telling him that the Greeks planned to withdraw that night. Xerxes' response was to send a squadron around behind the Greeks to block their departure to the west; he also occupied the island of Psyttaleia with troops. The main Persian fleet at Phalerum was already blocking any attempt to leave in an easterly direction. Whatever the truth of Themistocles' ruse, the Greeks fought Salamis in waters to their advantage (unlike the Isthmus) and against a tired enemy who had spent all night at battle stations.

The main Persian fleet advanced from the east, perhaps under cover of darkness, and to take up a position with their sterns to the Attic coast and facing the Greek fleet opposite. As day broke and the battle began, they apparently lost formation as the channel narrowed. Using local experience, the Greeks waited to attack until the daily swell in the channel occurred and the Persian ships were disrupted by it. The net effect of the swell and narrowing was that the Persian ships were crowded together and the contingents were already in some confusion when the Greek assault exacerbated this. The Persians were routed with heavy casualties (increased by the fact that few of them could swim) and the troops on Psyttaleia were slaughtered.

Herodotus does not record the casualties but Diodorus Siculus (11.15) has 200 Persian ships and 40 Greek. The difference between them is probably exaggerated, but the Persian losses were sufficiently heavy to cause Xerxes to withdraw the fleet and to return home with a large part of the army. The battle gave the Greeks naval superiority, ended the Persian naval threat to mainland Greece, and paved the way for the final victories at Plataea and Mycale.

Iain Spence

See also Eurybiades; Mycale, Battle of; Naval Tactics; Omens and Portents; Persian Wars; Plataea, Battle of; Themistocles; Thermopylae, Battle of; Xerxes

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Salamis, Battle of (306)

When Antigonus I Monophthalmus attempted to conquer Greece, he sent his son Demetrius I Poliorcetes to lead an invasion from Ephesus against Athens. As a result, Ptolemy I Soter, the king of Egypt, under the pretext that Antigonus disregarded the freedom of the Greek *poleis*, ventured to conquer Cilicia. Shortly afterward, in 306, the conflict between Antigonus and Ptolemy culminated in the naval battle of Salamis, one of the most critical battles between Alexander’s Successors (*diadochoi*). The battle was off Salamis in Cyprus and between fleets led by Demetrius I Poliorcetes, and Menelaus, the brother of Ptolemy I Soter. Menelaus was utterly defeated. For the first time, in this battle, Demetrius introduced an effective new type of large ship—the “seven” (*hepteres*). Demetrius had the advantage of choosing the site for the battle. He therefore more quickly reached the harbor of Salamis, where he divided his ships in two lines, and kept 10 of his ships in the mouth of the harbor; at some point in the battle these were sent to where the land army was encamped.

Ptolemy’s losses were major. The forces of Demetrius captured 40 warships, as well as 100 supply ships with more than 8,000 infantrymen. Afterward, Ptolemy abandoned Salamis. He had lost almost half of his military force, around 16,000 infantrymen and 600 cavalry, as well as half of his transport ships. After the battle, for 12 successive years (306–295/4), the island of Salamis was under the control of Demetrius. After his victory, his father Antigonus was the first of the *diadochoi* to grant himself the title of king (*basileus*), while Demetrius became his coruler. Despite their victory, Antigonus and Demetrius achieved less success in the following years.

Aikaterini-Iliana Russia

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Samos

An island located in the eastern Aegean Sea off the Turkish coast. Samos is most famous for its monumental temple to Hera, the Heraion, first constructed during the Archaic Period, sometime in the eighth century. Samos has arable slopes and coastal plains despite the mountainous north and western regions of the island. The *polis* of the same name is located on the east of the island, near the coast. The earliest inhabitants are thought to have been Carian. In the tenth century, Ionian colonies were established on the island, mixing the population. Samians colonized in the regions of Cilicia, Propontis, and the Euxine Sea. They also helped found Cyrene (in Libya) and built a temple at Naucratis. In his description and account of Samian history, Herodotus focuses on Polycrates' tyranny and three edifices created by the Samians: the harbor mole, the tunnel of Eupalinus, and the Heraion (temple of Hera).

Major exports of Samos included oil and earth (used for fulling cloth) in Samian transportation amphorae. Samos established trade relations with Egypt, Phoenicia, and the Laconians in the late eighth and early seventh centuries. Euboean and Attic pottery, bronze figures from Caucasus, North Syrian scaraboid seals, and Assyrian cylinder seals began to appear on the island during the eighth century. The Heraion is one of the earliest known Greek stone temples of monumental size and has been credited to the architects Theodorus and Rhoecus. Samos is also known for its ancient fortified city of Pythagoreion.

The earliest established government was an oligarchy comprised of the local *Geomoroi* (land-sharers), likely landowning aristocrats. In the seventh and sixth centuries, Samos was ruled by a tyranny, established by Syloson I. The most famous of these tyrants was Polycrates, who is considered responsible for Samos' naval domination of its neighbors, mostly through piracy—as well as its great architectural achievements. Under Polycrates Samos saw the rise of several gifted intellectuals, such as the physician Democedes and the architect Rhoecus. Pythagoras, renowned mathematician and philosopher, fled Polycrates' tyranny in the 530s. Samos also was home to Aesop, Epicurus, and Duris. During the reign of Cambyses of Persia (530–522), Polycrates was condemned by the Egyptians and the Peloponnesians for his pro-Persian policies which seemed to tempt fate. Sparta invaded Samos in the 520s to remove Polycrates from power. Polycrates was killed by Oroetus, the Persian governor of Sardis, in 522, and was succeeded by his brother Syloson II. Tyranny in Samos came to an end with the establishment of a radical democracy under the Athenians' influence in the fifth century.

Samos was involved in several wars during the Archaic Period, including the Lelantine War in Euboea, and the Meliac War. Further, it played a crucial role in supporting the Ionian Revolt against Persian domination in Asia Minor until the defeat at Lade in 494. Later the Samians joined the Delian League, contributing ships as tribute against Persia until their revolt against Athens in 440. Samos' war with Miletus in 440 resulted in Athens' replacing the Samian oligarchy with a democracy and installing an Athenian garrison. The oligarchs returned with Persian support, leading to a full naval assault directed by Pericles himself. The Samians appealed to Sparta for further support, but Thucydides (1.40) claims that Corinth persuaded the Peloponnesian League not to intervene. The Samian War lasted nine months and resulted in the subjugation of Samos and an indemnity of 50 talents per annum. During the Second Peloponnesian War, Samos sided against Sparta with Athens, contributing ships to the war effort. In 411 when the Athenian democrats were expelled, Samos gave them a temporary home. Afterward, Samos was besieged by the Spartans under Lysander. The Spartans withdrew from Samos in 394, leading to the reestablishment of a democracy. Samos lost its independence in the Peace of Antalcidas (387/6), which declared it part of the Persian Empire. Samos was restored to the Athenians by an 11-month siege in 366–365, resulting in an

Athenian cleruchy in Samos. The entire population was allegedly expelled and replaced with Athenian cleruchs to use Samos as a military base for the Athenians, as proved useful during the Social War of 357–355. The Lamian War of 322 saw Samos restored to independence.

Alexander III of Macedon used Samos as a base against Persia during his military campaigns. Alexander's exiles decree allegedly liberated the Samians, despite its concurrent occupation by Macedonians. Possession of Samos was disputed among Alexander's Successors (*diadochoi*) until 281, when the Ptolemaic forces prevailed. After Philip V of Macedon's attacks in 189, Samos became a part of the Rhodian hegemony, a league sanctioned by the Romans. Samos was bequeathed to Rome as part of the province of Asia Minor in 133. Under the Romans, Samos flourished and was best known for its pottery and as a health resort.

M. Falconer

See also Delian League/Athenian Empire; Ionian Revolt; Lamian War; Lelantine War; Polycrates of Samos; Ptolemy I Soter; Samos, Siege of; Social War (357–355); Successors (*Diadochoi*), Wars of; Tyrants, Tyranny

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Samos, Siege of (440–439)

In 441/40, Samos and Miletus went to war over possession of Priene. Both were members of the Delian League and Miletus appealed to Athens for aid—supported by a group of Samians who wanted to remove the oligarchic government there. Perhaps as part of their general policy of weakening the major states in the Delian League, the Athenians quickly sent out 40 ships, replaced the Samian oligarchy with a democracy, took 50 young male hostages and left. Some Samians, presumably oligarchs, fled to the mainland and persuaded the Persian satrap Pissuthnes to restore them. With 700 of Pissuthnes' men they took the city by surprise, freed the hostages (who had

been left on Lemnos) and revolted from Athens.

This was a serious development for Athens and its control of the Delian League, especially as Byzantium, another important member, also revolted. Because of this, the Athenians reacted decisively. In 440, 60 ships were sent out under Pericles himself. Sixteen of these were detached to get reinforcements from Chios and Lesbos and scout for the Persian navy, the remainder defeated a 70-strong Samian fleet (which included 20 transports). When 40 more ships arrived from Athenians and 25 from Chios and Lesbos, Pericles landed his troops, defeated the Samian army, and besieged the city. Three walls surrounded it on land and the fleet blockaded the harbor. However, when Pericles detached 60 ships to meet a Persian fleet advancing toward the island the Samians broke through the remaining ships blockading them and for 14 days were able to bring in supplies unhindered. Pericles' return, and the arrival of another 60 Athenian ships and 30 from Chios, rapidly restored the situation and after nine months Samos surrendered. It was reduced to subject status, surrendering its war fleet, demolishing its walls, giving hostages, and paying a large indemnity in installments. Byzantium also surrendered.

This incident is fairly typical of revolts against the Delian League, with a medium power trying to break free, a quick Athenian military response, and surrender. In most cases the revolting state, like Samos in this case, lost autonomy and military power, which was diverted to Athens. The net effect was to transform the Delian League over time into the Athenian Empire. The Samian siege is notable for the involvement of Pericles, the leading Athenian politician of the period, and demonstrates the requirement for such leaders to combine political, civic, and military talents.

Iain Spence

See also Athens, Revolts of Allies; Byzantium, Byzantines; Delian League/ Athenian Empire; Pericles; Samos

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Sardinia and Corsica. See Italy, Greek Cities in

Scythia, Scythians

The Scythians were an Indo-European group from eastern Europe and Central Asia. They are generally believed to have been a nomadic people who moved across the Eurasian Steppes with their herds from season to season. In actuality the Scythians were a diverse group of people with a number of different tribes connected by a common language and social structure who were variously nomadic, semi-nomadic, or sedentary—either living in cities and towns, or as agriculturalists. The Greeks interacted primarily with the agrarian and urban Scythians through trade and cohabitation in the Greek colonies around the Black Sea.

The agrarian Scythians of the Black Sea region grew grain, which was exported to Greece. The Crimean Scythians traded slaves, cattle, and animal products in exchange for Greek pottery and art. The graves from these regions are rich in Greek-style burial goods as well as traditional Scythian pieces, indicative of the economic and cultural interchange between the Scythians and the Greeks. The number of Scythian inhabited cities increased during the third–second centuries, suggesting that several of the nomadic tribes were becoming increasingly more sedentary. The nomadic and seminomadic tribes were pastoralists who lived on the goods—meat, milk, and hides—produced by their animals.

Hunting was an essential part of Scythian society. The region was rich in wildlife and the importance of these animals to Scythian culture is reflected in their elaborate animal-style art, which depicts animals both real and mythical, and often in fantastical poses. The animals are often shown in combat with each other—symbolizing the warrior ethos of Scythian society—while more bucolic scenes emphasize the importance of animals to nomadic life.

The Scythians placed a great deal of emphasis on friendship, oaths, and hospitality, elements that are essential components of nomadic societies today. Herodotus (4.70) and Lucian (*Toxaris* or *On Friendship*, 37) both recount stories relating to friendship bonds that are also reflected in a pair of fourth-century plaques from Kul Oba and Solokha depicting two Scythian men drinking from the same *rhyton* in what must be a friendship

ceremony. A gold vessel from Kul Oba portrays the bond that must have developed between friends, both on campaign and in everyday life. In the first scene, one man is binding his partner's injured leg, while in the other a man appears to be pulling a tooth from his companion's mouth. The Kul Oba vessel shows, as do many other Scythian pieces, scenes of daily life in a nomadic warrior society.



A fourth-century gold plaque of a Scythian horseman brandishing a spear, found in a burial mound at Kul Oba in the Crimea. The plaque, typical of the rich art found in upper-class Scythian burials, reflects the centrality of horses in Scythian culture. Located in the State Hermitage Museum, St. Petersburg, Russia. (Werner Forman/Universal Images Group/Getty Images)

Much of what we know about the Scythians has come from their burials—particularly the elaborate kurgans of the elite. Herodotus (4.71–75) provides a lengthy account of Scythian burial practices, much of which correlates with archaeological finds. Some of the best examples of the Scythian kurgans are the fourth–third century Pazyryk burials from the Altai Mountains in southern Siberia, the contents of which were completely preserved by permafrost.

The quintessential Scythian weapon was the recurve composite bow, which they wielded with great skill from horseback. These bows were made of materials that allowed them to withstand repeated extremes of tension and compression, allowing them to be short, light, and powerful. The

composite bow was made of three parts: a central stave of wood (cornel, maple, or mulberry) laminated with horn on the belly and the sinew of cattle or deer on the back. The process of making the bow was exacting and labor intensive. If the various components were not set correctly, the whole weapon could fail and shatter during use.

The Scythian warrior also carried an *akinakes*—a short sword with a broad double-edged blade that tapered to a sharp point. The *akinakes* was well balanced for both slashing downward from horseback or stabbing/thrusting on foot.

For defensive equipment the Scythian wore lamellar scale armor made from overlapping leather, bronze, or iron plates stitched onto a leather backing. Lamellar was relatively lightweight and offered a good degree of mobility, which was advantageous to the mounted archer. They also carried a light, flexible shield—the *pelte*—made of narrow branches woven through leather into a variety of shapes, as can be seen on the Solokha comb. Horses appear to have worn little to no armor, being equipped only with a felt saddlecloth and bridle. Both human and equine equipment emphasize the importance of speed and mobility on the battlefield.

Carolyn Willekes

See also Archers; Cavalry; Colonies, Colonization; *Hippotoxotai*

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Seleucids

The Seleucids ruled an empire centered on Syria for most of the Hellenistic Period. The dynasty was named after its founder, Seleucus I Nicator (reigned

312–281), a general under Alexander the Great. From their base in Syria, the Seleucids ruled an empire consisting of the largest, eastern part of Alexander's conquests. At its largest extent, the Seleucid Empire stretched from the northern Levant and parts of Asia Minor in the west to the Indus River valley in the east.

In the settlement following Alexander's death, Seleucus was made commander of the Companion cavalry under the regent Perdiccas. After Perdiccas' death, Seleucus was put in charge of the satrapy of Babylon, but was soon driven out by Antigonus. He sought refuge at Ptolemy's court in Egypt, and in 312 was restored by Ptolemy to his satrapy. Thereafter, he expanded his kingdom to include nearly all of the former eastern empire of Alexander.

Seleucus was succeeded by his half-Bactrian son Antiochus I Soter (reigned 281–261, but coregent from 292). He defeated an invasion of Celts into Anatolia in 275. He also fought the First Syrian-Egyptian War against the Ptolemies over Coele-Syria.

Seleucus' son Antiochus II Theos (reigned 261–246) succeeded his father. During his reign, the Parthian and Bactrian satrapies broke away from Seleucid control, and the Second Syrian-Egyptian War was fought to a stalemate against Egypt. Peace was made in 253, and Antiochus married Ptolemy II's daughter Berenice, divorcing his first wife Laodice I. But in 246, the king left Berenice and reunited with Laodice, who then allegedly poisoned him. Laodice then had Berenice and her infant son Antiochus killed, and proclaimed her son Seleucus II Callinicus king. To avenge the murder of his sister and nephew, Ptolemy III launched the Third Syrian-Egyptian War, attacking the coast of Asia Minor and marching deep into the Seleucid realm, perhaps as far as Babylon. Civil war (the "War of the Brothers") then broke out between Seleucus and his brother Antiochus Hierax, and was intermittently fought for the next 20 years. Seleucus partially recovered his eastern empire, but lost Asia Minor to Hierax, and then to Attalus I, king of the breakaway kingdom of Pergamum.

Seleucus' son Seleucus III Ceraunus (also called Seleucus III Soter) succeeded in 225 but was assassinated in 223, allowing his brother, Antiochus III The Great (reigned 223–187), to take the throne. After reconquering his eastern empire and Asia Minor, and emerging victorious in the Fifth Syrian War over Ptolemy V (thus reversing the result of the Fourth Syrian War against Ptolemy IV), he lost the Syrian-Roman War, and

the Romans forced him to withdraw from Asia Minor beyond the Taurus Mountains and the River Halys. Antiochus was succeeded by his son Seleucus IV Philopator (reigned 187–175), who plundered the temple in Jerusalem, and was later assassinated by his minister Heliodorus. Seleucus' younger brother Antiochus IV Epiphanes (reigned 175–164) ejected Heliodorus and became king. He was victorious over Ptolemy VI in the Sixth Syrian War, and came within an ace of taking over Egypt itself, but the Romans ordered him to stand down in 168. Antiochus also sacked Jerusalem and persecuted the Jews, thus sparking the revolt of the Maccabees in 167.

Epiphanes' son Antiochus V Eupator (reigned 163–162) succeeded to the throne at nine years of age, even though his cousin, 22-year-old Demetrius I Soter, son of Seleucus IV, was capable of ruling. But Demetrius was in detention in Rome, where he had been living as a hostage since his father's reign. The Romans, being informed that Eupator was in breach of the Seleucid treaty with Rome, sent envoys to Syria to oversee the hamstringing of the king's elephants and the destruction of his ships.

Demetrius escaped Rome in 162, returned to Syria, and deposed his cousin. He recovered Babylonia and Cappadocia, and continued to persecute the Jews. He was deposed by a pretender, Alexander Balas (reigned 150–145), in 150. Balas, in turn, was deposed by Demetrius' son Demetrius II Nicator.

The later Seleucid monarchs exhausted themselves in dynastic quarrels and lost their grip on all but the Syrian heartland of their empire. Tigranes II the Great of Armenia took over the Seleucid Empire in 83, but was forced to surrender to the Roman general, Pompey the Great, in 66. Tigranes' Seleucid holdings were annexed into the new Roman province of Syria in 64/3.

Paul J. Burton

See also Alexander I Balas; Antiochus I Soter; Antiochus III (the Great); Antiochus IV Epiphanes; Antiochus VII Sidetes; Antiochus Hierax; Demetrius II Nicator; Ptolemies; Seleucus I Nicator; Successors (*Diadochoi*), Wars of; Syria; Syrian-Egyptian War, First–Sixth; Syrian-Roman War. *Roman Section:* Pompey

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Seleucus I Nikator (Reigned 312–281)

Macedonian officer of Alexander the Great and one of the Successors (*diadochoi*). After the death of Alexander, Seleucus was appointed commander of the Companion Cavalry by Perdiccas. In the wars that followed Alexander's death he at first centered his power on Babylon, from where he would establish the Seleucid Empire and the Seleucid dynasty.

Seleucus accompanied Perdiccas in his bid to oust Ptolemy from Egypt but appears to have turned on Perdiccas and might even have been one of Perdiccas' murderers. At the Triparadisus Conference ca. 321–320 Seleucus was given the satrapy of Babylonia. However, in 320 he was driven from Babylon by Antigonus I Monophthalmus. Seleucus sought sanctuary with Ptolemy and served under him as a naval commander.

Following the battle of Gaza in 312, which saw Ptolemy and Seleucus defeat Demetrius I Poliorcetes, Seleucus regained Babylon with Ptolemy's support. Seleucus went on to conquer Media and Persia and extended his conquests toward India. In 305, following the example of the other *diadochoi*, he assumed the title of king and as a result of a settlement with the Mauryan king Chandragupta (Sandrokottos or Androcottus in Greek and Latin texts), Seleucus received 500 war elephants in exchange for ceding provinces in the east. This large force of 500 elephants would prove decisive when Seleucus, and his allies Cassander and Lysimachus, defeated Antigonus I and Demetrius I at the battle of Ipsus in 301. Antigonus was killed and Demetrius, isolated from his father's main force, was forced to flee.

After the battle of Ipsus, the victors divided up the Antigonid territorial

possessions between them, with Seleucus receiving Syria. However, Ptolemy I Soter, who had taken no part in the war against Antigonus, had occupied the southern part of Syria, Coele Syria. Seleucus, who had been aided by Ptolemy in the past took no military action against him, but moved his capital from Seleucia on the Tigris and established his new capital at the recently founded city of Antioch on the Orontes. At the same time Seleucus founded three other cities in northwestern Syria: Seleucia in Pieria, Apamea, and Laodicea. This strategic move would halt any further northern expansion by Ptolemy, and these four cities were to be the core of the future Seleucid Empire.

In 292, Seleucus made his son Antiochus satrap of Bactria and his co-regent. In 285 Seleucus took Demetrius I Poliorcetes prisoner and imprisoned him in Apamea. In 281 Seleucus intervened in Lysimachus' affairs, the latter having had his son assassinated and, at the battle of Corupedium, Seleucus was victorious and Lysimachus fell in the fighting. Lysimachus' territory now fell into Seleucus' possession but he was murdered by Ptolemy Ceraunus, a fugitive at his court, the same year. Seleucus was succeeded by his son Antiochus I.

David Harthen

See also Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon; Antigonus I Monophthalmus; Antiochus I Soter; Bactria, Bactrians; Cassander; Corupedium, Battle of; Demetrius I Poliorcetes; Elephants; Hieronymus of Cardia; Ipsus, Battle of; Lysimachus; Perdiccas; Ptolemy I Soter; Successors (*Diadochoi*), Wars of; Syria

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The most western Greek colony in Sicily, Selinus was founded ca. 650 in the territory of the indigenous Elymians, with Phoenician (later Carthaginian controlled) colonies nearby. It was often in conflict with its Elymian neighbors. In 409 Carthage attacked its former ally and Selinus fell into Punic hands, never regaining its former glory.

Selinus was prosperous during the sixth century due to its surplus grain and its good relations with the Phoenicians and Carthaginians. It expanded its territory with the foundation of Heraclea Minoa (ca. 570) in the east, pressed its border inland toward the Elymian city of Segesta, and west toward Mazara del Vallo.

Selinus' territorial expansion caused quarrels with its Elymian neighbors. During a boundary dispute in 416 between Selinus and Segesta the Elymians requested help from Athens. This led to Athenian involvement in Sicily (415–413). After the Athenian defeat, when Selinus attacked Segestan territory again in 410 the Segestans turned to Carthage for assistance. Carthage attacked Selinus in 409 and the city fell after a nine-day siege, with 16,000 Selinuntines killed and 5,000 taken captive.

The Carthaginians allowed the survivors to return to the city, which now paid a tribute to Carthage. A few years after the 409 fall, an attempt to free Selinus from Punic control was made by Hermocrates, a Syracusan general. This endeavor failed and the city remained in Punic hands until 250 when it was abandoned by Carthage and the population was relocated to Lilybaeum.

Christine S. Lane

See also Hermocrates; Carthage, Carthaginians; Sicily

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Sellasia, Battle of (222)

In summer 222, the king of Macedon Antigonus III Doson and the Achaean League fought the army of Cleomenes III, king of Sparta, at a battle near the perioecic village of Sellasia in Laconia. The Spartan army consisted of the 700 Spartiates already in existence, and probably included some of the 6,000 Helots who had recently been given freedom and some of the 4,000 *Perioikoi* recently made into Spartiates. Plutarch states “all the Lacedaemonians died, 6,000, except 200” (Plutarch, *Cleomenes* 28). Plutarch may have deliberately used the term “Lacedaemonians” to indicate that not everyone considered all these persons Spartiates, although they had officially entered the ranks.

Sparta’s defeat was particularly unlucky—Antigonus was called north two days later to defend Macedon from a Celtic army. Without his Macedonians, the Achaean League would have remained on its own at Sellasia and Cleomenes might well have defeated them. Further, a subsidy that Ptolemy had been paying Cleomenes was retracted shortly before the battle, reducing the Spartan ability to pay mercenaries.

Antigonus Doson followed up on his victory by capturing Sparta, installing a Theban governor, and possibly forcing Sparta to enter the Hellenic League that he had reconstituted in 224 from Philip II’s era. Sparta lost territory and Doson interfered in Sparta’s government, rolling back Cleomenes’ recent reforms.

Timothy Doran

See also Achaean League; Achaean League, Wars of; Antigonus III Doson; Cleomenes III; Helots; *Perioikoi*; Sparta

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Sepeia, Battle of (ca. 494)

The battle of Sepeia was important because it allowed Sparta to reestablish control of the Peloponnese by preemptively subduing a traditional rival, Argos. A large Spartan army under King Cleomenes I (reigned ca. 520–ca. 490) met 6,000 Argives at Sepeia, southeast of Argos on the road to Tiryns. There, either through a truce or Argive hesitancy stemming from an unfavorable omen, the two armies camped close to each other but did not engage. Herodotus, who provides the main account, says that the Argives matched the Spartan routine, retiring for meals only when the Spartan herald gave the order to eat. The Spartans attacked when Cleomenes caught wind of this, staged a deceptive order for breakfast, and attacked while the Argives were eating their meal. However, Plutarch says that Cleomenes used the language in the temporary truce to attack in the evening, using the pretense that the truce was only valid during the day, not at night. Either way the Argives were tricked, and the Spartans staged a massacre with tremendous loss of life. The survivors escaped to a sacred grove of Argos where they were trapped by the Spartans. Cleomenes called out the names of soldiers, pretending they had been ransomed, but killed them when they emerged. When those in the wood got wind of this and stayed put, Cleomenes gave the order to surround and burn the sacred grove, completing the slaughter of 6,000 Argive soldiers.

Robert T. Jones

See also Argos, Argives; Cleomenes I; Laws of War; Omens and Portents; Religious Practices before Battle; Sparta; Surrender; War Crimes

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Sestos

Sestos was a strongly fortified city on the Hellespont coast of the Thracian Chersonese. The town had a good harbor, though this seems to have silted

up by late antiquity, and access to excellent farmland across the width of the peninsula; Long Walls connected the city with the harbor. Sitting at the narrowest part of the Hellespont, it was also the European end of the main crossing point, between Sestos and Abydos. First colonized by inhabitants of Lesbos, probably in the seventh century, in the later sixth century it may have been part of Miltiades I's fiefdom, before falling under Persian rule. During the Persian Wars, Sestos was the seat of the Persian governor, Artaÿctes, who was cruelly executed for alleged sacrilege when the Athenians under Xanthippus besieged and captured the town in 479/8.

Thereafter Sestos was part of the Delian League, and in the later parts of the Second Peloponnesian War, especially after 411, was an important Athenian naval base on the Hellespont. It was occupied by Lysander at the end of the war, and remained under Spartan control until captured by Conon in 393. It was then variously under Persian, Athenian and Thracian control, but suffered its greatest disaster in 353/2 when the Athenian general, Chares, captured it and subjected it to *andrapodismos* by executing all the adult males and selling the women and children into slavery. The city and its territory were important to the Athenians as a source of grain: one orator referred to Sestos as the "baker's board of the Piraeus" (Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1411a). In the Hellenistic Period, Sestos shared the fate of the rest of the Chersonese, being fought over by Macedon, Syria, Egypt, and Pergamum, before becoming a free city under the Romans.

Peter Londey

See also Andrapodismos; Athens, Campaigns in Thrace; Chares; Chersonese, Thracian; Conon; Delian League/Athenian Empire; Hellespont; Long Walls; Lysander; Mausolus and the Hecatomnids; Miltiades I, Son of Cypselus; Persian Wars; Thrace, Thracians; Xanthippus (Athenian)

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Seuthes (ca. 430–ca. 383)

Officially Seuthes II, this Thracian leader ruled the southeast portion of the Odrysian kingdom during the period ca. 405–383. United for much of the second half of the fifth century under the rulers Sitalces and Seuthes I, the Odrysian Kingdom showed signs of fragmentation at the end of the century. Seuthes' kinsman, Amadocus, was hailed as the legitimate heir to Seuthes I and became king at some point in the last decade of the fifth century. Seuthes II asserted his own right to rule: he rebelled against Amadocus, and tried to establish his own independent kingdom with the help of the Athenian Xenophon and the remnants of the Ten Thousand on their return from Cunaxa in 400–399. Xenophon and Seuthes managed to combine the cavalry and light-armed peltasts of the Thracians with heavy-armed Greek hoplites into a versatile combined-arms force that enjoyed a measure of success against his enemies. Xenophon's description in the *Anabasis* of life at Seuthes' court is the fullest surviving account of the customs and practices of Thracian rulers. Seuthes and his rival Amadocus were reconciled in 390/89 by the Athenian general Thrasybulus, and both entered into an alliance with Athens. Another Athenian general, Iphicrates, offered his military services to Seuthes in 386, possibly as a private individual rather than an official Athenian agent, and continued to serve Seuthes' successor, Cotys.

Matthew A. Sears

See also Cotys; Iphicrates; Ten Thousand, March of; Thrace, Thracians; Thrasybulus; Xenophon

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Ships, Transport

Transport and merchant vessels were known as “round ships” to the Greeks due to their rounder dimensions, as opposed to warships—“long ships.” There were many different specific types of transport ships: powered by oars, sails, or often both.

Unlike warships, merchant vessels have been found on the ocean floor and excavated archaeologically. In addition to pictorial representations and written sources, this allows a better understanding of the ships’ designs and cargo-carrying capacities than we have of warships.

With more room and less crew than warships, merchant ships could sail for longer periods of time without needing to go ashore. Although the ship’s crew in wartime would have had access to some weapons, transports were still extremely vulnerable to attacks by warships and required protection. In 429 a force of Peloponnesian ships carrying troops was defeated by half as many Athenian warships, whose speed allowed them to avoid being boarded by the superior number of troops in the Peloponnesian ships (Document 8). Certainly in the fourth century, when Athens was reliant on overseas grain imports, transport ships were placed into convoys for protection.

Transports were used to carry three basic cargoes essential to military operations: men, horses, and food. In the late fourth and the third centuries, as siege warfare became more complex, ships were often used to carry heavy siege equipment; for example, at Halicarnassus in 334 Alexander used Athenian ships to transport his heavy equipment. Transport ships could carry more cargo and at greater speed than was possible if going by land. An expeditionary force without transport ships was reliant on obtaining supplies from the local populace and was vulnerable. The Athenian forces at Aegospotami in 405 were forced to forage for food, leaving them open to the surprise Spartan attack that annihilated them.

The Persian force that invaded Greece in 480 was accompanied by a large naval force which, aside from the warships, included light boats and horse transports. Thucydides is more specific in listing the forces sent on the Sicilian expedition in 415, which included 40 transports carrying over 6,000 troops, one horse transport carrying 30 horses, and 30 transport ships carrying supplies. These 30 supply ships carried grain, bakers, stonemasons, carpenters, and the equipment needed to build fortifications. When Ptolemy

I Soter sailed to Salamis in Cyprus in 306 he required 200 transport ships to carry over 10,000 foot soldiers.

Finally, rather than using purpose built transport ships, warships could be converted to carry troops or horses. The 40 aforementioned troop transports sent on the Sicilian expedition were actually triremes fitted out to carry troops rather than equipped as warships. While a workable solution for carrying personnel and horses, warships were still ill-suited to carrying bulk cargo like grain and dedicated transport ships remained a necessity.

John M. Nash

See also Naval Warfare; Salamis, Battle of (306); Ships, War; Sicilian Expedition; Trireme

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Ships, War

Warships evolved slowly over several hundred years, growing in size and in combat power over time. Warships gradually went from small vessels crewed by 40 men to behemoths carrying hundreds of rowers and scores of archers and marines, as well as artillery. The possession of a fleet of warships, even a small number, was a capital-intensive undertaking in terms of both money and manpower.

Warships were fitted with sails and with oars, although large warships such as the trireme were always rowed during battle. The ship's sailing equipment was usually left ashore before a battle to free up space and lighten the ship. This was not always possible, and in some cases the sailing equipment might be kept aboard if it was thought the ship might need to flee or would be unable to find a safe landing spot close by. The main modes of attack were either by boarding, or as ship technology developed and as regular training became more common, ramming attacks.

Warships usually sailed along the coast, but there are numerous examples of fleets sailing across the open ocean. The confined quarters, large

number of crew and limited storage space meant that overnight sailing was not a usual occurrence, but it did happen on occasion if required. Winter usually curtailed sailing and major naval operations, as warships were not designed to endure bad weather and were at the mercy of winds and sea. A fleet of Persian ships was destroyed off the seaward coast of the island of Euboea in 480 by a storm, and the victorious Athenian fleet after the battle of Arginusae was prevented by a storm from rescuing their lost sailors.

Modern knowledge of warship design is based primarily on pictorial representations, written sources and a very small amount of archaeological evidence. Much work has been done on a reconstructed trireme, the *Olympias*, but how representative it is of a fifth century Athenian trireme is debated. No warship has been found archaeologically, aside from the metal rams fitted to them. The remains of large ship sheds have been excavated in Athens and provide a good indication of the size and dimensions of a trireme. Warships are depicted on pots, including scenes of ships fighting one another, back to the twelfth century. Although these are artistic representations, they are useful for demonstrating how early ships were used for fighting and in showing rough pictures of how ships may have looked. With regards to rowing arrangements, much information has been extrapolated from rowing galleys of the fifteenth to seventeenth centuries CE.



The "Lenormant Relief" showing rowers on a trireme, ca. 410–400. The relief may well show the *Paralos*, one of the Athenian state triremes, and commemorate a victory in the Panathenaic Festival boat races. It provided important detail of the trireme's rowing system to scholars who created a replica vessel, the *Olympias*, in 1987. Located in the Acropolis Museum, Athens, Greece. (Ancient Art and Architecture Collection Ltd./Bridgeman Images)

Unlike merchant vessels, which have been found on the ocean floor, warships and especially triremes were neutrally buoyant and did not sink to the ocean floor—if holed or damaged they would float until they broke up. In practice, this meant that ships said to be “sunk” in battle are better described as disabled. The crew would have been required to abandon the ship, effectively taking it out of the fight. Often these ships were recovered by the victorious side after the battle, and sometimes they could be repaired and put back into service. Depending on how a ship was looked after it might be expected to have a serviceable life of 20 to 30 years.

When not in use ships were usually laid up on a beach or in purpose-built slipways such as the large ship sheds built in Athens. While on campaign ships could be either anchored or hauled up onto the beach for crew rest and maintenance. Ships kept in the water for too long a period

became waterlogged and heavy, slowing them down. However, if a ship was left out of the water for too long the shrinking of the timbers as they dried out would cause the seams to leak, leading to excess water ingress. While on campaign in Sicily, the Athenian general Nicias sent a dire warning back to Athens about the state of his ships. He wrote that because their ships had been on campaign for so long and had not been able to undergo maintenance while the Syracusan vessels had, the Athenians were losing their edge at sea and were at risk of defeat (Document 12). Other examples make it clear that proper maintenance had a huge impact on the effectiveness of warships.

Warships used by the Greeks could have a number of rowers varying from 50 to upward of 200. These rowers had to be well trained to operate the ship effectively and were practiced regularly. In Athens, those men unable to afford the equipment required to fight as hoplites were enlisted as rowers for the navy and indeed in time they were paid for this service. Aside from rowers, warships also carried a small crew to handle the vessel, as well as a contingent of marines (*epibatai*). Ancient sources indicate that most sailors could swim, but marines would have been at high risk due to the encumbrance of their armor (see illustration in Naval Warfare entry).

Some of the earliest types of warships were known as a triaconter and penteconter, a 30 and 50-oared ship, respectively. Nine penteconters were present at Artemisium in 480, the entire contingent of the Opuntian Locrians being made up of this warship type. Herodotus lists triaconters and penteconters among the light boats and transports of the invading Persian forces. Although they were superseded in time by the trireme and other larger ships, penteconters could still be found in service into the middle of the third century in Sicily.

The primary warship used by Greek forces in the fifth and fourth centuries was the trireme (*trieres*). Thucydides says that Corinth was the first city to develop the trireme, perhaps as early as the eighth century. The Corinthians are also said to have engaged in one of the earliest naval battles in history. According to Thucydides, it was not until the invasion of the Persians in 480 that triremes became the dominant warship in use and even then the early Athenian triremes didn't have complete decks. This would mark a period of over 150 years during which the trireme was the dominant warship.

Triremes were not of a standard or universal design, varying across

different times and places. During the battle of Salamis in 480 the Athenian ships are described as lighter than the ships of the opposing Persian coalition, including the ships of the Greek islands fighting for Xerxes. The Athenian navy mostly favored light and fast triremes with a ram ideally suited to attacking enemy vessels (see illustration in Naval Warfare entry). The exception to this was in the 460s when the general Cimon focused his tactics on boarding rather than ramming. Although he was successful, these battles incurred a large number of casualties and the Athenians subsequently went back to ramming as their main battle tactic. Other powers favored slower and heavier ships which could carry more marines for boarding. During the Sicilian Expedition of 415–413, the Corinthians and Syracusans modified their ships with reinforced bows and upper-works. In the confined waters of the Corinthian Gulf and Great Harbor at Syracuse this gave their ships an advantage over the Athenian ships, which could not use their speed to maneuver and avoid attacks. They also embarked many marines, used for boarding and acting as skirmishers who could kill and wound enemy oarsmen. However, in more open waters the heavier ships were at the mercy of the fast Athenian ships which could use their speed to attack the vulnerable flanks of the opposing ships. Ship design depended very much on the prevailing operating environment and the anticipated enemy ship design and crew skillset.

Triremes had three types of rowers: *thranitai*, *zygitai*, and *thalamitai*. The orthodox model of the trireme has these three different classes arranged on three distinct levels, though this model has been contested by some, such as Alec Tilley. A fifth-century Athenian trireme carried approximately 14 crew members and 14 marines and, under the conventional model, up to 170 rowers. The equivalent to a captain on such a vessel was known as the trierarch (*trierarchos*), who in Athens at least was responsible for the maintenance and provision of a trireme and its crew for an entire year. A trierarch, who was selected for his wealth, might or might not have had any actual seamanship experience. The executive officer, or the commanding officer when the trierarch was inexperienced, was known as the *kybernetes* or pilot. A skilled *kybernetes* was important to the effective use of a warship. During the Peloponnesian War the island of Samos sent their skilled pilots to the Peloponnesian navy as aid.

The trireme was eventually superseded, but not entirely replaced, by ships known as a “four” or quadrireme (*tettreres*) and soon after the “five” or

quinquereme (*penteres*). The Carthaginians are credited with developing the “four” and Dionysius I of Syracuse with the “five,” an immediate response to the naval threat posed by Carthage. The arrangement of rowers for these ships is unknown, though they could not have been arranged in ships of four or five levels as this was unfeasible from an engineering perspective. Therefore, they will have had more than one rower to an oar. Only one of the rowers on each oar was required to be trained and experienced for the rowing to be effective; the second or third rower merely provided extra muscle power.

The tactics employed by the “fours” and “fives” of skilled and well trained navies, such as Athens and Rhodes, were much the same as for triremes, focusing on maneuverability and ramming attacks. However other navies began to employ a greater number of marines, archers, and artillery as a means of attacking other ships at sea. As demonstrated during the battle of Salamis off Cyprus in 306, triremes could not take on the larger quinqueremes on their own and prevail. Although more maneuverable, the smaller triremes would have had trouble piercing the hulls of the larger vessels and would be left vulnerable to missile weapons and boarding by a superior number of marines embarked in the larger ships.

After the age of the “fours” and “fives” came that of the polyreme (*polyeres*). These ranged in size from “sevens” all the way up to a “forty” of the late Ptolemaic navy. The design and rowing arrangements of these ships are least well known of all, and stupendous dimensions are given for some of these vessels. The largest of these ships supposedly included crews of thousands of men for rowing and fighting. What is easier to assess is the tactics used by such large ships, which would have had to focus exclusively on the use of artillery, archers, and subsequent boarding; they would have been far too large and unwieldy for ramming attacks. It is also possible that the largest of these, such as the “forty,” were only ever used as flagships and prestige pieces and not as actual warships.

Around 190 the Rhodians used the unorthodox tactic of employing fire-pots to attack enemy ships in battle, a dangerous but effective tactic if done carefully. Fire is the greatest of dangers to a ship, especially the wooden ships of this period. In the mid-fifth century during the Athenian expedition in Sicily fire was used as a weapon, the Syracusans launching a fireship at the Athenians and causing a panic until the threat was neutralized by fending it off. Fire would of course destroy an enemy ship or at best make it

unserviceable if captured.

Not all ships employed by navies were the better-known triremes and quinqueremes of the later periods. The Illyrians used a small vessel known as a *lembos* (pl. *lemboi*). The normal meaning of the word is a skiff, but it is often referred to in a naval sense and especially as a vessel used by pirates. Philip V of Macedon in 200 used *lemboi* against Rome, not so much in battle but as a type of auxiliary naval vessel conducting raiding and transport duties. Polybius implies in his narrative that they were used in battle as a small vessel able to dart in between the larger ships and board enemy vessels. This could only be effective in concert with larger vessels, but it nevertheless demonstrates the utility of a range of different warships for different purposes.

Another small vessel used in warfare and especially by pirates was known as a *hemiolia*, meaning “one and a half.” It was an unusual combination of a vessel designed to sail and be rowed at the same time and was primarily designed as a fast ship for overtaking other vessels. From this the Rhodians, in approximately 300, developed the *triemiolia*. How exactly it differed from a trireme is not known, though it must have been a lighter vessel with better sailing characteristics. It was used with great success by the Rhodians to destroy pirates in the smaller *hemioliai* until the Romans stripped Rhodes of its fleet, effectively ending the use of this type of craft in naval warfare.

Warships were often converted into troop- or even horse-carrying transports. A force of Peloponnesian ships was defeated by half as many Athenian ships in 429 because they were fitted out for carrying troops rather than as fighting ships (Document 8). Modifying triremes into troop transports does not appear to have required much, if any, physical modification to the ships and was more a matter of trading oarsmen for troops. In fact Thucydides twice (3.18.3–4, 6.91.4) mentions triremes manned by soldiers who also acted as rowers. Horse transports were used prior to the Peloponnesian War (431–404), but in 430 Thucydides says that for the first time triremes were modified to carry horses. Alexander utilized Athenian triremes to carry siege equipment to the siege of Halicarnassus in 334. Though not ideal, warships could be used as troop and horse transports if needed.

Though the main warship used in naval warfare progressed through several stages—penteconter, trireme, quinquereme, and polyreme—navies

almost always consisted of a mix of different vessels. Triremes remained in use for up to five centuries in one form or another and other smaller craft such as the penteconter and the *triemiolia* could be found in naval forces throughout the centuries. These smaller ships obviously filled important auxiliary roles, in and out of combat operations, demonstrating the complexity of both naval warfare and seafaring in general. The variety of operating environments and unique needs of city-states led to a wide variety of warships being adopted over a long period of time.

John M. Nash

See also Athens, Naval War with Sparta; Command Structures, Navy; Finance and War; Naval Tactics; Naval Warfare; Peloponnesian War, Second; Salamis, Battle of (480); Salamis, Battle of (306); Ships, Transport; Sicilian Expedition; Thucydides; Training; Triarch; Trireme

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Sicilian Expedition (415–413)

The failed Athenian expedition to Sicily (415–413) played a major part in the reactivation of the Second Peloponnesian War (431–404) after a period of pseudo-peace, and significantly contributed to Athens' ultimate defeat.

In 416, Segesta (also known as Egesta) requested help against Selinus, its neighbor, and Syracuse, the main Greek city on Sicily. In 415, after the return of an Athenian fact-finding mission (which had been misled about Segesta's wealth), the Athenians appointed Alcibiades, Lamachus, and Nicias to command an expeditionary force. A subsequent attempt by Nicias to reverse the assembly's decision only resulted in an increase in the force's

size. Thucydides cannot have heard the speeches of Nicias and Alcibiades, but his versions are interesting in setting out the pros and cons of the expedition and the characters of the two main commanders.

The Athenian force was as large as the biggest deployed to date. It had 134 triremes (34 from allies), 2,300 citizen hoplites (700 were *epibatai* or marines) another 2,800 allied or mercenary hoplites, 480 archers, 700 slingers, 120 Megarian *psiloi* (light infantry), and 30 Athenian cavalry. On arrival, the true state of Segesta's finances was revealed and the generals had to rethink. Nicias wanted to force peace between Segesta and Selinus and then sail home, making a demonstration of force along the coast. Alcibiades wanted to mobilize as much of Sicily as possible and attack unless Selinus made peace with Segesta and Syracuse restored Leontini. The best plan, in terms of focusing on the center of gravity, was Lamachus'. He advocated sailing to Syracuse and taking it while it was still unnerved. As the junior general, and unable to convince his colleagues, he ended up supporting Alcibiades.

Soon after this Alcibiades was recalled to Athens charged with profaning the Mysteries, but deserted to Sparta en route. This left the ill and reluctant Nicias as the senior commander. In addition, Alcibiades revealed a plot to betray Messina to Athens and persuaded the Spartans to send reinforcements and a Spartan general to Syracuse.

Meanwhile, Nicias gained an unopposed landing near Syracuse. The Athenians won the first battle, losing 50 men, but failing to inflict more than 260 enemy casualties because of the dominant enemy cavalry. Because of this, Nicias and Lamachus wintered in Catana to arrange more cavalry. They renewed the attack on Syracuse in spring 414 after 250 Athenian cavalrymen and 30 *hippotoxotai* (mounted archers) arrived.

At first things went well—the Athenians won a battle on Epipolae (a hill overlooking Syracuse) and began to isolate the city by building a series of forts and walls around it. The Athenians also defeated two Syracusan attempts to build counter walls at right angles across their wall, although Lamachus was killed in the second engagement. Nicias, increasingly unwell and unable to cope, was now in sole command. Blockaded from the sea and with the Athenian wall rapidly extending, the Syracusans considered coming to terms.

At this point the Spartan Gylippus and 3,000 men managed to run the Athenian blockade and reach Syracuse. His arrival galvanized the defense.

Although they lost the first pitched battle designed to let them complete their third cross wall—Gylippus had deployed them in a narrow space, negating their cavalry advantage—the defenders won the next one. This allowed them to complete their cross wall, ending Athenian hopes of completing their wall.

From this point the Athenians were on the defensive, continually harassed by the enemy cavalry. Eurymedon arrived in winter 414/3 with 10 triremes and money and in spring Demosthenes arrived with 73 triremes, 5,000 Athenian and allied hoplites, and large numbers of slingers and archers. He arrived none too soon—Nicias had suffered a naval defeat in the harbor and had lost a key fort, Plemmyrium. Worse, the Spartans now reopened hostilities in Greece.

Demosthenes quickly organized a daring night attack on Epipolae so work could resume on the Athenian wall. However, as the Athenians and allies were pressing home their initial success, they became confused in the dark and suffered heavy casualties. Demosthenes and Eurymedon argued for a withdrawal but Nicias clung on, first hoping that Syracuse would be betrayed to them, and when this was dashed by the arrival of enemy reinforcements, for religious reasons delayed another 27 days after an eclipse. The delay was fatal. The Syracusans attacked by land and sea. The land attack failed but the Athenian fleet was defeated and Eurymedon killed. A second, heavier naval defeat ruled out a sea withdrawal. The ensuing land withdrawal was relentlessly harried, especially by the enemy cavalry, until it collapsed at the River Assinarus. Around 7,000 Athenians and allies were captured. The prisoners were not very well treated and Nicias and Demosthenes were executed.

The destruction of the Athenian expedition, with its huge loss of men and ships (Athenian and allied) was a major material and psychological blow to Athens and a boost to the Spartans. Revolts broke out in several places and Athens never really recovered. The Sicilian disaster was not the only cause of Athenian defeat in the Second Peloponnesian War but it was an important one.

Iain Spence

See also Alcibiades; Demosthenes (General); Lamachus; Nicias; Peloponnesian War, Second; Selinus; Strategy; Syracuse, Siege of; Thucydides

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Sicily

Sicily, the largest island in the Mediterranean Sea, may have seemed far from the Greek mainland, but once Greeks set colonies on the island in the eighth century it became part of the Greek world. East-west interaction affected warfare in both regions.

Greek traders sailing west were long familiar with Sicily and southern Italy. By the late eighth century, various Greek cities facing population pressure created colonies in eastern and southern Sicily, the most important of which was the Corinthian colony Syracuse. In the western part of the island, Carthaginians established trading colonies. In the interior of the island and along parts of the coast indigenous settlements of Sicel and Elymi peoples continued to exist, occasionally fighting against or siding with one city or another in wars. Trade with Greece, southern Italy, and Africa as well as agricultural wealth of their own permitted Sicilian coastal settlements to prosper.

In the sixth and fifth centuries, the prosperity led to military conflict among the Greek cities and especially against the Carthaginians in the west. These threats made it possible for leaders to seize power. Tyrants ruled many of those cities, like Phalaris and Theron of Acragas, and Gelon and Hieron of Syracuse. These tyrants used military tactics similar to those employed in Greece such as the hoplite phalanx and cavalry in support. Warfare between cities and against Carthage was sufficiently common in this period that the Sicilian Greeks acquired a reputation for military ability. When the Hellenic League faced Xerxes' invasion in 480 they approached Gelon of Syracuse for assistance, but he was busy preparing to fight Carthaginian forces. In 480, Gelon and Theron won an enormous victory

against the Carthaginians at Himera that solidified Gelon's rule, but also brought peace with Carthage.

During the Second Peloponnesian War (431–404) Athens made treaties with several Sicilian cities and sent missions there. The first time, 427–424, they sought assistance in Sicily and southern Italy and sent a small force west. In 415, after Sicilian allies had requested aid, Alcibiades convinced the Athenian assembly that the conquest of democratic Syracuse would be highly profitable and would hurt the Peloponnesian League. The city sent an enormous force of more than 100 triremes and numerous support ships along with more than 5,000 soldiers. Syracuse successfully appealed to Corinth and Sparta for assistance. The expedition went badly from the start and in the end failed to achieve anything for Athens except enormous loss in men and material.

Beginning in 409, the Carthaginians attempted to conquer the entire island, capturing nearly all except the eastern coastal cities. Dionysius I succeeded in establishing himself as tyrant of Syracuse and used his mercenary armies and improved siege techniques to defeat the Carthaginians and push them back to the far west of the island. His innovations in siege warfare had a dramatic impact on the rest of the Greek world as he adopted Near Eastern siege techniques. His victory ushered in an extended period of tyranny in Syracuse (398–367) that ended in more fighting between the Greek cities and with Carthage.

Facing a renewed Carthaginian threat in the second half of the fourth century, at Syracusan request Corinth sent out Timoleon with a small force. He defeated the Carthaginian forces at the Crimisus River in 341 and with mercenaries established Greek rule over most of Sicily by 340. Timoleon's efforts to stabilize the Greek cities ended in failure when oligarchy reemerged in Syracuse. Agathocles came to power in Syracuse after a coup in 316 and was invited to become *strategos* with absolute power—tyrant. Once he consolidated his power he unified the Greek cities militarily and provoked a new war with Carthage. He tried and failed to distract the Carthaginians by invading Africa and finally restored the Sicilian status quo from before he took power in Syracuse. His efforts to unify Sicily and south Italy under his control failed also. After his assassination, his mercenaries, the Mamertines, seized control of Messana.

The Greek cities of Sicily remained at odds and unstable during the first half of the third century. Pyrrhus of Epirus was invited in to settle matters,

but unable to establish himself he returned to Italy. Hieron II, tyrant of Syracuse in 271 defeated the Mamertines in 265, leading directly to Roman involvement in Sicilian affairs. Rome allied with the Mamertines and attacked Syracuse in 264, forcing it to make alliance in the following year.

When in that same year Rome moved against Acragas, a Carthaginian ally, the First Punic War actually began. Fighting ranged over western Sicily and in the surrounding seas, finally ending after the battle of the Aegates Islands in 241. That war made much of Sicily a Roman province and strengthened Hieron's position in Syracuse until his death in 215. Hieron had supported Rome at the outbreak of the Second Punic War, but after his death Syracuse allied with Carthage, leading to its sack by Marcellus in 211. After that Syracusan territory was added to the province which remained under Roman control for the remainder of the Republic.

Sicily may seem a sideshow compared with mainland Greece, but it was an important part of the Greek world and the military activity there had impact in the Aegean.

Lee L. Brice

See also Agathocles; Alcibiades; Athens; Catapult; Colonies, Colonization; Corinth, Corinthians; Dion of Syracuse; Dionysius I; Dionysius II; Gelon; Hieron I; Hieron II; Sicilian Expedition; Timoleon; Tyrants, Tyranny. *Roman Section*: Punic War, First; Punic War, Second

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Sicyon

A city in the northeast Peloponnese, located slightly inland from the Gulf of Corinth, and neighboring Corinth to the west. The city was based around an acropolis on a triangular plateau, and had, in legend at least, been ruled by a dynasty of autochthonous kings, founded by Aegialeus. After the fall of this dynasty, Sicyon was believed to have had close relations with Argos (rather than the closer Corinth). These Dorian connections with Argos were apparently weakened after 660 by the tyrant Orthagoras, under whom the city flourished and emphasized its non-Dorian elements. The city reached the zenith of its power under Orthagoras' grandson, Cleisthenes, who formed a marriage alliance with the powerful Athenian family, the Alcmaeonidae.

Sparta later overthrew the tyranny in the 550s, after which the city became a loyal ally, joining the Peloponnesian League and following Spartan policy, and siding with Sparta against Corinth during the Corinthian War (395–387/6). The city was sacked and razed by Demetrius I Poliorcetes in 304/3. Under Aratus of Sicyon, the city became a prominent member of the Achaean League until the latter was dissolved by the Romans in 146.

Russell Buzby

See also Achaean League; Achaean League, Wars of; Alcmaeonidae; Aratus of Sicyon; Argos, Argives; Cleisthenes of Sicyon; Corinth, Corinthians; Peloponnesian League; Tyrants, Tyranny

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Siege Warfare

Warfare between the Greek city-states of the Archaic and Classical Periods was largely defined by pitched hoplite phalanx battle, but the Greeks also devised a variety of techniques to attack and defend fortified places. However, for much of Greek history, the techniques remained somewhat crude. For example, until the end of the fifth century, methods of siege warfare were largely limited to attempts to storm a site with an infantry assault, usually with the aid of scaling ladders. Failing that, the attacking force might instead settle into a protracted siege, meaning that the attackers would completely encircle the enemy walls with their own fortifications (a procedure known as circumvallation), sometimes combined with a naval blockade as circumstances dictated. The object was either to starve out the defenders or to wait for a traitor to open the gates to admit the attacking force. The legend of Troy, which took 10 years to subdue and mentions no effort to actually storm the city's defenses, probably reflects the frustrations this kind of primitive siege warfare could engender.

By the late eighth century, the armies of Near Eastern empires had perfected techniques of siege warfare well in advance of the Greeks. They had long been using various machines and scientific methods to reduce enemy fortifications, and so the Greeks, who were deeply impressed and even victimized by Persian siegecraft in the era 546–479, began to copy some of these tactics. These tactics included the use of battering rams to tear open an enemy gate or knock down a weak portion of a wall, siege mounds heaped against walls to bring attackers to the top of a wall, and miners tunneling under walls. Yet prior to the Second Peloponnesian War (431–404), our sources mention few sieges that were brought to a successful conclusion, and nearly all of those were through betrayal rather than assault. Traditional Greek warfare did not generally aim to conquer enemy cities and territory, and the devastation of cropland usually incited an enemy to come out from their fortified city to defend its fields. In fact, heavy infantry so dominated Greek armies that they generally lacked the sorts of soldiers necessary for siege warfare, such as archers and slingers. So too, the farmers and craftsmen who made up the hoplite armies of the Greeks could not sustain long campaigns because they could not be away from their livelihoods for extended periods.

Consequently, down through the end of the Second Peloponnesian War

(431–404), sieges were still largely a waiting game, and harbor towns (such as Athens) could almost never be captured without being completely blockaded, by both warships at sea and troops on land. Moreover, as the Greek historian Thucydides remarked, few states were wealthy enough to afford the cost these kinds of military operations would necessarily entail (Thucydides 1.11). The Athenians, for example, spent more than 2,000 talents on the siege of Potidaea, equivalent to nearly three and half years of the annual revenues generated by all of Attica (Thucydides 2.70). Moreover, if the circumstances required a long siege, privation and disease could inflict a crippling toll on the besieging army. At Potidaea, for example, the Athenian general Hagnon claimed that plague had killed more than a quarter of his soldiers in just 40 days (Thucydides 2.58).

For the defender in such cases, sieges were obviously the most demanding and difficult form of warfare. Besides a need to be continuously on guard, working in shifts for months or years on end, the conditions would only worsen with time as disease and privation took hold. The besieged would have needed to mobilize all available resources, including the elderly, women, slaves, and even children in the defense of the city (Aeneas Tacticus 40.4). If the walls were breached, the fighting would be house-to-house, during which heavy casualties would likely be inflicted, on both sides. In such cases, women and children could find themselves taking an active part in the fighting (Plutarch, *Pyrrhus* 34). In cases of circumvallation, starvation could even raise the specter of cannibalism, as was alleged to have occurred at Potidaea in 428 (Thucydides 2.70.1).

The Greek city-states of Sicily may have been more experienced in siege warfare, having learned techniques from the Carthaginians, who were themselves familiar with Near Eastern methods. For example, the historian Herodotus (7.154) said that the tyrant of Gela, Hippocrates, was an expert at siege warfare in the 490s. Herodotus explains nothing about his methods, other than that he employed large numbers of mercenaries, who would have made it possible for extended siege operations—provided they could be paid.

The Second Peloponnesian War (431–404) and its struggle for hegemony between the Athenians and the Spartans altered the conditions and practices of Greek warfare, making siege warfare far more important than it had been. It was now necessary to control strategic points that determined the balance of power, so the taking (or defense) of a fortified position

became one of the central problems of Greek warfare.

This problem became evident in one of the first military actions of the Peloponnesian War, a Spartan-led attack on the small city-state of Plataea. Thucydides' account of the siege reveals the near impossibility of taking a fortified position by one of the most powerful Greek armies. Outnumbered many times over, the 400 Plataean defenders nevertheless thwarted numerous attempts to storm the city. The Spartans and their allies tried every method of assault known to them: scaling ladders, battering rams, siege mounds, and even an elaborate incendiary attack, but nothing could breach the Plataean defenses (Thucydides 2.66–78). The Spartans finally settled for circumvallation instead, and 2 years later, the 200 or so Plataean defenders that remained (more than half had actually made a daring escape) finally surrendered.

The Spartan failures at Plataea typify the Greek experience of siege warfare during the Peloponnesian War, and even the Athenians, who were reputed to be the most experienced at siege warfare, accomplished even less in their own siege of the city of Syracuse (415–13). In fact, there are no instances during the war in which siege engines like the battering ram were successful, except for a novel flame-throwing device employed by the Thebans in an assault against a hastily constructed Athenian fortification at Delium in 424. This drove the defenders from the walls, allowing the Thebans to conduct an assault (Thucydides 4.100).

Treachery was by far the most common and the most successful means of capturing a fortified city. Lengthy sieges placed the whole of a city's population under duress, and in such extremity, the cohesion and morale of the *polis* often fractured, and someone inevitably betrayed the city to the enemy. As the Peloponnesian War progressed, warring states soon discovered that establishing a fortified position in the countryside was just as successful in creating such stresses and denying resources to the enemy. For example, the Athenian general Demosthenes established a fortified outpost in Spartan territory at Pylos in 425, from which he hoped to induce Helots to revolt. The prospect so alarmed the Spartans that they immediately aborted their own invasion of Attica and marched against this Athenian fort, which, not surprisingly, they failed to take by storm (Thucydides 4.3–14). More devastating, late in the war, the Spartans fortified an outpost in Attica at Decelea, which became a magnet for escaping Athenian slaves (Thucydides 7.27).

A shift in the patterns of Greek siege warfare came in about 399 on the island of Sicily when Dionysius I, the tyrant of Syracuse, commissioned craftsmen and engineers from Italy and Greece to devise new weapons with which to defend his city. The result was the creation and development of a new kind of siege machine—the catapult. The earliest type of Greek catapult resembled a giant crossbow, set atop a stand for stability and accuracy. This wooden device shot a single, up to six-foot-long, arrow further and more accurately than a conventional composite bow. Although it was not powerful enough to knock down walls or blast through a gate, the arrow could easily pierce a hoplite armor or shield (or both), hence the Greek name *katapeltes*, “shield-piercer.” Volleys from a number of these catapults would provide covering fire for troops conducting (or defending against) siege operations, so tactically, they were employed no differently from regular archers or slingers.

Although these early catapults had greater range and power than conventional bows or slings, they were more unwieldy and far less mobile, making them vulnerable to a sudden enemy sortie. Therefore, the besiegers’ catapults would often be perched inside large, mobile siege towers. The Greek siege tower, undoubtedly adapted from a Carthaginian design, was a wooden structure, built at least as tall as the enemy wall to be attacked, and often armored against missile and incendiary attack. Elaborate versions of the siege tower would site catapults on internal parapets with portholes facing the enemy through which they could discharge volleys of missiles. The towers were pushed or pulled forward on wheels, and as they approached the enemy wall, other soldiers could prepare the ground ahead to ease its passage. Some siege towers were designed to be pushed right up to the enemy city wall, to bring up attacking troops on internal ladders or to employ a ground-level battering ram. Others may have employed a kind of ramp or bridge that was lowered onto the enemy wall when close enough. Siege towers were obviously expensive and laborious to construct, and difficult to employ in battle, but apart from setting fire to them, hastily heightening a city wall, or undermining the avenue of approach, there was little that could be done to stop these machines from attacking the city walls.

Greek catapults and siege towers were first used by Dionysius in the capture of the Carthaginian island stronghold of Motya, in western Sicily in 398, where they were used in conjunction with a mole to bridge a channel of

water. The immense height of the defensive walls at Motya obliged Dionysius to construct six-story towers, which were rolled the length of the mole, probably with teams of oxen. Catapults situated within the tower drove the defenders off the wall while battering rams housed within the towers attacked it.

The success of Dionysius' dramatic assault on Motya encouraged imitation and improvement by others. Within a generation, a much more powerful type of arrow-shooting catapult was developed, probably in Thessaly under the tyrant Jason of Pherae (reigned ca. 385–370). This new design used the principle of the torsion spring. Instead of a horizontal, bending wooden bow, the torsion catapult featured two vertical cylinders of tautly skeined or twisted hair or animal sinew, set on either side of the front of a long horizontal wooden stock. Jammed into each twist was one wooden arm, extending outward; the arms' outer ends were attached to a bowstring which crossed behind the springs and over the stock. Winched back, the bowstring brought tremendous tension from the twisting skeins of hair or sinew, transferring that power to propel a large arrow (or possibly a round stone) laying in the groove on the stock. These new kinds of catapults were several orders of magnitude more powerful than the earlier versions (which undoubtedly continued in use), but they were also much more complicated, even less mobile, and required highly-skilled and knowledgeable operators to be used effectively. Nevertheless, the basic design could be scaled up, and the largest versions of the torsion catapult were capable of launching projectiles up to 80 kilograms a distance of almost 200 meters. By some accounts, this kind of catapult could completely destroy a wooden gate or palisade, and might also batter down a poorly built stone wall.

Greek siege warfare reached its apogee under the Macedonian kings Phillip II (reigned 359–336) and Alexander the Great (reigned 336–323), both of whom successfully coordinated the use of siege towers, torsion catapults, battering rams, scaling ladders, siege mounds, and even moles.

Philip showed keen interest in military innovation, he possessed significant financial resources, and like Dionysius, Philip attracted skilled craftsmen and engineers to work out new techniques of siege warfare. Philip's catapults were torsion-powered arrow-shooters, but Philip used them in novel ways, always in concert with other kinds of assault tactics. For example, in the siege of Perinthus, Philip used several different kinds of catapult, along with large numbers of slingers, siege towers that far

exceeded the height of the city walls, and sappers who collapsed a portion of the city wall by undermining it. Ironically, Perinthus did not fall, for the defenders had erected a second wall inside the first, and then used the buildings of the city itself, which rose in a kind of conical shape, with tiers of houses acting as concentric lines of defense.

It was Philip's son Alexander the Great who (among other achievements) pioneered the use of rock-firing catapults. Alexander's "stone-throwers" (*lithoboloi* or *petroboloi*) could hurl 170-pound (77-kilogram) boulders more than 190 yards (about 170 meters), to batter apart enemy walls. On occasion, Alexander mounted catapults of this type aboard ships. Machines of this kind helped Alexander to capture the island fortress of Tyre, in one of history's most complex and stunning sieges, conducted simultaneously by land and sea (332). The defenses of Tyre were formidable. It stood on an island half a mile off-shore, with walls in places that were 150 feet (45 meters) high. Alexander had few ships with which to blockade the island, so the only viable means of attacking the city was to construct a mole, an artificial causeway of earth and stone, to connect the island to mainland. To protect the workers constructing the causeway, Alexander had constructed two huge siege towers, each one at least 45 meters tall, reputedly the tallest ever constructed in the ancient world. Each tower was covered with treated rawhide to protect them from incendiary attack, and catapults were mounted in them to provide covering fire for the workers toiling below.

However, the Tyrians destroyed them with fire-ships, essentially a large transport ship stuffed with combustible material, doused in pitch and sulfur. Alexander redoubled his efforts, widening the mole to accommodate new siege towers, and collecting a fleet to protect it. Eventually, the mole came right up to the base of the wall on the mainland side of the island, but attacks against the fortifications there made no impression whatsoever. Alexander then attacked the walls elsewhere with rams mounted on ships, and after a few abortive attacks he finally managed to overwhelm part of the city's defenses. Although the Tyrians abandoned the outer defenses of the city and sought refuge in a citadel at the northern end of the island, here too they were overwhelmed. Alexander gave vent to the frustrations of the seven-month siege and allowed his army to massacre the population. The Tyrian dead numbered at least 8,000, and all the rest of the population, close to 30,000 people, were sold into slavery.

Alexander and his Successors of the Hellenistic Period were the most ambitious besiegers the world had yet seen. The Macedonian prince Demetrius I Poliorcetes won his surname, which means “city besieger,” from his huge—but unsuccessful—siege of Rhodes in 305–304. Demetrius’ armament included two massive battering rams (iron-clad tree-trunks, perhaps 40 meters long, hung inside mobile sheds and worked by hundreds of men) and an armor-plated siege tower called the Helepolis, or “taker of cities,” containing nine levels of stone-throwers and arrow-catapults.

Of course, tactics of siege defense also improved in this era, with catapults on city walls shooting flaming projectiles against wooden siege machines, but generally the advantage had now swung to the besiegers.

Unquestionably, the human cost of war was the greatest in sieges, where not only were there enormous numbers of killed, wounded, or executed, but also large numbers of refugees. Whole city populations might have tried to escape from a city expected to undergo the ordeal of a siege, and rarely could a refugee population find a safe haven that would allow them to remain together. The citizens of Troezen were reputed to have played host to thousands of Athenian refugees during the Persian Wars, and most returned home with the retreat of the Persians after the battle of Plataea (479), but most refugees would be lucky to be reunited after what could amount to years in exile. For most, this meant a life of poverty and want (Tyrtaeus 10.3–12).

Michael Quinn

See also Aeneas Tacticus; Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon; Aornus, Siege of; Archimedes; Catapult; Civilian Populations in War; Dionysius I of Syracuse; Fortifications; Mytilene, Siege of; Peloponnesian War, Second; Philip II of Macedon; Philo of Byzantium; Plataea, Siege of; Potidaea, Siege of; Rhodes, Siege of; Samos, Siege of; Sicilian Expedition; Sogdian Rock, Siege of; Strategy; Syracuse, Siege of; Territory and War; Tyre, Siege of; Women in War

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Siris, Destruction by Croton, Metapontum, and Sybaris (ca. 570 or 550)

The Ionian colony of Siris was destroyed in the sixth century by an alliance of the Achaean colonies of Croton, Metapontum, and Sybaris, spearheaded by Sybaris' expansionist ambitions. Siris and its territory were subsequently incorporated into the sphere of Sybaris.

According to Strabo (6.1.14), Siris was settled by the indigenous Chones who were violently conquered by Ionians from Colophon fleeing their homeland. However, cooperation between the Greeks and the indigenous population is suggested by a communal cemetery.

By the mid-seventh century Siris was renowned for its fertile land, prosperity, and its love of luxury (Athenaeus 12.25). Although Siris was on friendly terms with its indigenous neighbors the nearby Achaean *poleis* were competing for territory. Expansion of Siris was prevented in the south by the presence of Sybarite territory, and the foundation of Metapontum in 630 halted Sirite expansion to the north. The foundation of Metapontum also coincided with the destruction of Incoronata, a Sirite outpost located 18 kilometers north of Siris.

Sybaris' intent on territorial expansion led to a coalition with Croton and Metapontum to take over its wealthy neighbor and rival. Although Locri came to Siris' defense the city was destroyed. The date of the destruction is uncertain but possibilities include ca. 570 or ca. 550. There are signs of continued habitation at Siris but numismatic and epigraphic evidence indicate that it became a dependent of Sybaris until the latter's destruction in 510 by Croton.

See also Colonies, Colonization; Croton; Italy, Greek Cities in; Metapontum; Sybaris/Thurii

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Slaves in War

Herodotus tells the story (4.3–4) of rebel Scythian slaves who successfully carried on warfare against their masters until these attacked them with whips. The slaves were then immediately cowed and defeated. This story can be set against the universal assumption in the ancient Greek world that slaves were subhuman and that fighting in the manly business of war was for free men only.

Excluding slaves from war, or rather not conceiving they could have any part in combat, was virtually invariable. Any exceptions to this were few in number and usually problematic. Thus Pausanias (1.32.3) stated that slaves who fought beside their Athenian masters at the battle of Marathon were buried in the same tomb as the Plataeans. There is however no other evidence that the Athenians used slaves as combat troops then. Such a step goes against the common Greek practice and, if true, could conceivably be explained by arguing that it was an extraordinary measure brought about by the dire straits the Athenians were reduced to in this conflict with non-Greeks. Greek armies invading the territory of other Greeks did not call upon the slaves in enemy territory to rebel. Aristotle notes (*Politics* 2.1269b) that, despite the endemic warfare among Cretan cities, the belligerents all had *perioikoi* (serfs) and so did not call on the *perioikoi* of their opponents

to join in a war. This recognition of common interest among the Cretan states ensured that there were no servile uprisings.

Like Crete, Sparta possessed a peculiar social structure, with a large serf population of Helots (comparable in many but not all respects to the *perioikoi* in Crete). In the great Helot rebellion of ca. 465–456, Sparta called on the help of its allies to suppress the rebels. Exceptionally, the Helot rebels who held out on Mount Ithôme were allowed to depart under a treaty, in effect being treated as free persons. Athens, now hostile to Sparta, settled these refugees in Naupactus, in this instance too treating them as free persons. Messenians from Naupactus later fought on the side of Athens.

In the Second Peloponnesian War (431–404), the Athenian occupation and fortification of Pylos on the west coast of Messenia and later their seizure of the island of Cythera to the south of Laconia, caused the Spartans grave anxiety over the prospect of Helot unrest and even mass defection. Even if the actual outcome in this regard never matched Athenian expectations, it was an important part of the strategy in the war. After the peace of Nicias of 421, a subsequent alliance between Athens and Sparta included a clause that Athens would help Sparta if the slaves (i.e., the Helots) revolted (Thucydides 5. 23). Sparta however gave no such guarantee to Athens in return: an uprising by slaves in Athens was out of the question because it was simply not thought of. Athens clung to the strategy of hoping to put pressure on Sparta by the threat of Helot defection in the Peloponnesian War, but never even entertained the thought of trying to provoke a rebellion among, say, the slaves of Corinth or Chios (the biggest slave-owning state after Sparta, as Thucydides notes: 8.40). Sparta was, as in so many other respects, exceptional and so was the scene of an exceptional kind of warfare involving slaves.

In ordinary practice, slaves were used on campaigns as attendants, porters, and laborers. Athenian hoplites on campaign who could afford it were accompanied by one or more slave attendants but there is no evidence or even likelihood that such slaves took part in combat, even as unarmed stone throwers on the fringes of a battle. If they did, no ancient writer thought so insignificant a thing worth mentioning. Some of the slaves who accompanied armies as menials did desert to the other side. What they expected to gain by doing so is dubious. There was massive defection by slaves from Attica during the Spartan occupation of Decelea in the Second Peloponnesian War; a total of over 20,000 is Thucydides' estimate (7.27).

However, these deserting slaves were bought up at bargain prices by the Boeotians, who were thus unexpectedly enriched by this influx of valuable property (*Hell. Oxy.* 17.4).

In their preparations to withstand the great siege by Demetrius I Poliorcetes, the Rhodian state voted to buy from their owners and to free any slaves who fought well enough in the defense of the city (Diodorus 20.84). Such a promise was dictated by the desperate situation Rhodes was in, and even so these slaves were going to be used in a defensive role only (like the old men and boys commonly used to defend walls). Pressing need overrode the convention that any slaves serving in combat should be freed beforehand, as was the practice of Sparta in freeing suitable Helots who were to do military service as *Neodamodeis*.

Calling upon slaves to rise up and join in internal conflict by offering them freedom was a last resort. Both the oligarchs and the democrats did this in the civil war in Corcyra in 427. Interestingly, most of the slaves who answered the call joined the democrats (Thucydides 3.73). Such appeals did not determine the outcome of the conflict: the military value of slaves, who, if enslaved in childhood, had no experience of using weapons, was slight, even in street-fighting, let alone a pitched hoplite battle. In measures adopted in the frantic preparations in Athens to withstand the expected siege by Philip of Macedon after the defeat of Chaeronea (338), the Athenians voted to free slaves to use in the defense of the city but acceptance of Philip's peace offer prevented the Athenians from going down this path. The terms of the oath imposed by Philip and later Alexander on the Greek states in the League of Corinth included an undertaking not to free slaves for political subversion (Demosthenes 17 [*On the Treaty with Alexander*] 15). The fear was present, even if the eventuality was remote.

Tyrants were regarded as disrupting the normal social order, but only the most extremely repressive tyrants made use of freed male slaves as supporters, even in some cases marrying them off to the widows of dead opponents. When such ex-slaves made up the internal security force of a tyrant, they were bitterly hated. Normally, tyrants relied on mercenaries, recruited from among free men.

In contrast to land warfare, slaves were used in the crews rowing triremes by Athens and other states (e.g., Corcyra: Thucydides 1.55; Syracuse under Dionysius I: Diodorus 14.43). Apparently, rowing was regarded as a form of laboring and so distinct from the gentlemanly

business of combat. In the emergency in Athens in 406 when the Athenians had to improvise a fleet to oppose the Spartan fleet blockading Conon in Mytilene, slaves were used in large numbers to make up the crews needed. That freedom was given to these slaves, even if only to some of them, amounts to a remarkable departure from standard practice. Slaves who routinely rowed in Athenian triremes could not expect to be freed.

Athenian “Casualty Lists,” that is, the state memorials commemorating the war dead, occasionally include slaves, distinguished by the title *therapon* (“attendant,” “menial”), a term hardly ever used of free persons. It is not clear why these slaves, if they were such, and not free men, were so honored. Perhaps they were somehow caught up in combat and such a death was unusual enough to earn special treatment.

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See also Attendants, Military; Internal Security; Prisoners of War and Slavery

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Slingers (*Sphendonistai*)

The sling was a low status weapon. During the Second Peloponnesian War at Sphacteria it was one of the weapons used by Athenian sailors to force the surrender of the Spartan garrison, and in the civil war after Athens’ defeat, the sling was one of the weapons used by the democrats. As opposed to its archers, Classical Athens never organized a corps of slingers.

This was despite the military virtues of the weapon. During their march home the Ten Thousand Cyrean mercenaries suffered from the (presumably Persian) slingers who outranged the Cretan archers. It was only when they formed a body of slingers from some Rhodian hoplites who could use the

weapon that the Greeks could defend themselves, for the Rhodians knew how to sling lead bullets, which had twice the range of the stones “the size of a hand” slung by their enemies. This is the first we hear of lead sling-bullets, and, indeed, it is only from that time that they start to turn up in the archaeological record. During the retreat the Greeks were also attacked by Carduchian (Kurdish) slingers.

The sling was a preferred weapon of several Iranian peoples. Iranian slingers were much used during the wars of the *diadochoi* and the Hellenistic Period. Craterus took 1,000 Persian archers and slingers to Europe on the outbreak of the Lamian War, and Peucestas had 10,000 Persian archers and slingers. After Antigonos deposed Peucestas as satrap of Persis, Persian slingers begin to appear in his army too, 400 Persian archers and slingers in 314, and 500 Persian slingers in 312 at the battle of Gaza. Cyrtian (Kurdish) slingers served in Antiochus III’s army in 220, but those on the rebel Molon’s side are probably Persians recruited in the eastern half of the empire. Persian slingers fought at the battle of Raphia in 217, and the slingers mentioned in Antiochus’ eastern campaign may have been Persians too. Cyrtian slingers were at the battle of Magnesia.

The Iranian peoples adept in the use of the sling probably used it to protect their flocks. It is notable that the areas of Greece noted for their slingers were hilly and probably supported a pastoral economy. Even the Rhodian hoplites who knew how to use a sling may have been pastoralists. In 415 the Athenians took 700 Rhodian slingers to Sicily with them. According to Thucydides the Acarnanians were famous for their use of the sling, and Demosthenes gathered Acarnanian slingers and javelin men en route to Sicily. We are not told the nationality of the 500 slingers Pyrrhus of Epirus took with him to Sicily, but they may have been Acarnanian too. The Boeotians sent to Malis for javelin men and slingers in 424. The Margianians, Letrinians and Amphidolians, peoples living in the border districts of Elis, who supplied 400 slingers who fought on the Lacedaemonian side in the battle of Nemea in 394 were also probably shepherds. It is uncertain whether the 300 slingers sent to join the army of Philip V in 219 by the Achaeans are native troops or mercenaries. The identity of the Attalid slingers at Magnesia in 190 is likewise unknown.

In the western Mediterranean Balearic slingers were famed for their skill. In 206 Mago recruited 2,000 of them on Minorca and sent them to Carthage. They are later found in Italy with Hannibal. The slingers sent by

Hieron of Syracuse in 216 to help the Romans against the Baliares presumably are not. Balearic slingers are found fighting later for the Romans, but the slingers fighting in Anthony's army in Parthia, and later against Caesar, were probably recruited in Greece.

Nicholas Sekunda

See also Athens, Restoration of Democracy; Charidemus; Himeras, Battle of; Light Troops; Magnesia, Battle of; Pylos (Sphacteria), Battle of; Raphia, Battle of

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Social and Economic Effects of War

The frequency of war in the Greek world, the comparative rarity of periods of extended peace and the readiness of Greek states to resort to war all combine to make it plain that war had far-reaching and significant effects upon Greek economic activity and social behavior. That much is beyond dispute, but defining the precise consequences of war for economy and society in the ancient Greek world is more problematic: the scarcity of reliable, or often in fact any, quantitative data on basic matters such as population numbers, age distribution or economic outputs limits the ancient historian mostly to broad-brush, even impressionistic descriptions. However, the trend in recent research is to strive for as much exactness as possible. Even if hard and fast numbers elude the historian, the broad limits and general counters of social and economic phenomena can be plausibly stated, and better efforts at more careful nuancing can always be made.

The problems involved may be illustrated by the universal practice of invading armies of destroying the crops and fruit-trees in enemy territory. Cereal crops could apparently be burnt but it is hardly ever possible to deduce what proportion of annual cereal production was actually destroyed,

nor is it known what reserves of foodstuffs from previous years' production a city had within its walls. That Mantinea under siege from Sparta in 386 expected to put up prolonged resistance because of a good harvest in the previous year (Xenophon, *Hellenica* 5.2.4) is a valuable piece of data, but it is not known how many mouths there were to feed or how much food was going to be given to each one. The same applies to the Spartan siege of the Peloponnesian city Phlius (380–379), which lasted twice as long as expected, 20 months instead of 10, because the besieged endured half-rations (Xenophon, *Hellenica* 5.3.21).

Another case in point is the destruction of olive trees, the other main food source in Greece besides cereals. In the later phase of his invasion of the territory of Corinth in about 390 during the Corinthian war, Agesilaus is said to have "chopped down and burnt any tree that was still standing" (Xenophon, *Hellenica* 4.5.10). This is rather journalistic exaggeration than literal truth. Even if the number of olive trees in the affected part of Corinthian territory is beyond guesswork, any estimate of the amount of hard labor needed to cut through the tough wood of an olive tree at the base (the only way to stop it producing fruit for some years) suggests that Agesilaus' army did not produce a treeless landscape. Even hacking off branches from trees to make bonfires is no small task and burnt olive trees regenerate and produce crops surprisingly quickly. So any quantitative estimate of how much Corinthian olive production was destroyed and how long it took for production to get back to normal is out of the question.

The broad picture though is true and important: warfare had heavy economic costs both in terms of material destruction from enemy action and of the resources, often very heavy, devoted to it. For example, in one rare case we know the cost of one fifth-century military operation—the siege of Potidaea (432–429). This cost the Athenians more than 2,000 talents—according to Thucydides (2.70), the same as almost three and half years of the annual income from the whole of Attica.

Athens, amongst the largest and certainly the wealthiest of Classical Greek city-states, had a reputation in ancient times for holding elaborate and costly religious festivals. It has been thought that this expenditure, together with that on payments to citizens for civic purposes, was detrimental to Athenians' efforts at waging war. However, the relative abundance of evidence from Athens allows for the conclusion, arguable or even plausible, that spending on war typically consumed the major part of

Athenian state expenditure. All indications are that while Athens led the way, such constant expenditure on fighting wars, and on the related matter of the ever-present expenses of improving and maintaining fortifications, was typical of any Greek city-state—within the limits of its resources.

The question has been much debated whether the costs of war created endemic impoverishment in the Greek world. What has been said above should indicate the limited possibilities of such a debate. It has been argued that the massive state expenditure on standing armies and constant wars in the Hellenistic Period was actually a stimulus to economic activity that should be offset against the enormous damage done. Whether this is plausible in any given case is a matter of balancing probabilities.

The same applies to larger questions such as the ability of Greek states to recover from losses of manpower in war. Estimates can be made of fertility rates, but it is also useful to bear in mind Herodotus' assumption (6.78–83), natural to him, that after 6,000 Argive adult males had been massacred after the battle of Sepeia (ca. 494), the next generation of Argives was willing and able to fight a war. It would take some elaborate argument to deny that Greek city-states accepted war as an unavoidable and even honorable part of life. The willingness of Greek states to fight wars confronts the historian in dealing with episodes where the odds are very heavily stacked against one side, such as Cleomenes III of Sparta against the Macedonians and Achaeans at the battle of Sellasia (222) or the Achaean League against Rome (146). Equally a challenge to the historian is explaining the readiness of the Athenians in 395 to enter into a major war against Sparta (the Corinthian War) within 10 years of their catastrophic defeat in the Second Peloponnesian War. If the writing of Greek history since Thucydides has largely centered on war, that is due to the facts of the case, not to any perversity on the part of historians. The society knew the costs of war, but was warlike.

Douglas Kelly

See also Achaean War; Civilian Populations in War; Cleomenes III; Corinthian War; Democracy and War; Demography, Military; Finance and War; Fortifications; Military Service, Greek States and; Ravaging; Sellasia, Battle of; Sepeia, Battle of; Siege Warfare; Social Values and War; Women in War

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Social Values and War

In Plato's dialogue *The Laws* completed at the end of his life (ca. 429–347), a Cretan speaker named Cleinias explains the purpose of laws in Cretan cities regulating physical training and military equipment: Cretan practices, he says, such as common meals, light-armed fighting, and the use of archery are all absolutely necessary because every state is by nature engaged in perpetual warfare against all others, and peace is only a fiction for undeclared war (*Laws* 1.625–6). This bleak view presupposes, as was in fact the case, that the social and political institutions of Greek states were fundamentally determined by their need to fight wars for security, freedom, or survival. Yet Greek states must not be thought of as militaristic in the sense of making war their sole or principal purpose. Cleinias states that human stupidity blinds people to the realities of war and only legislation by an inspired lawgiver ensures the kind of preparedness needed.

In any Greek scale of values, war is regarded as intrinsically destructive and harmful. Cults of the war god Ares are relatively scarce in Greece and always of minor importance in a state's ritual calendar. No one resorted to

war for its own sake and the benefits of peace (quiet enjoyment of prosperity, sons organizing their father's funerals, and so on) are a commonplace. Polybius (12.25k) censured the historian Timaeus (ca. 350–ca. 260) for stupidly putting a speech consisting of such stale clichés into the mouth of the Syracusan leader Hermocrates. To elaborate on such self-evident things in place of strategic and political issues was simply childish in a world in which war was always common and often unavoidable

Everyone knew that war brought death, suffering, and loss but Greek states did remarkably little to avoid it. In wars over disputed territory (the commonest kind of conflict) Greeks did not readily abandon the justice of their own claim. It follows that in Greek wars the other side is always thought of as being in the wrong. The hoped-for material gains from booty were important but the psychological drive to prove moral and physical superiority counted for more. Victory was proof of inherent good qualities and of divine favor.

A reputation as a good soldier, or even better, success in military leadership was the surest and commonest way to political power, prestige, and material rewards. Politicians who had no military record to their credit and who had to rely upon oratory in the assembly or the law courts were overshadowed by the military men. The Athenian Demosthenes (ca. 384–322), a civilian politician, had a long struggle to win public confidence: his slow rise to power can be contrasted with the 40 annual terms as *strategos* of the mediocre soldier Phocion. Yet in 338 Demosthenes, an elderly man of high political standing and considerable wealth, served in the ranks of the Athenian hoplites at the battle of Chaeronea. It was sheer common sense that the offices of state that carried military commands with them were of the highest importance. Accordingly, even a radical democracy such as Athens did not use the indiscriminate device of appointment by lot for its generals but kept to the practice of election.

There was no Ancient Greek term corresponding to the modern term “pacifism.” The principled rejection of war in all circumstances would have struck any Greek as wildly absurd. It was of course sensible to argue for peace in a given case when a war was too costly or unwinnable. The Athenian politician Eubulus (ca. 405–ca. 335), who managed the state's finances and astutely built up its resources, has been loosely and wrongly described as a “pacifist,” although his policy was for Athens to avoid unnecessary wars and to build up resources for when Athens had to fight a

necessary war. His policy was consistent in its aims with what Xenophon advocated ca. 355 in his treatise *Poroi* (*On the Revenues*), and no one has ever labeled Xenophon a pacifist. Greek literature, especially comedy, presents a great deal of examples of mockery of self-important young cavalymen and, in particular, of the boastful, spendthrift mercenary who was really a coward underneath. The resentment evident in such stereotyping was based on class-feeling, not antimilitarism as such. In contrast, later generations of Athenians sentimentally idolized the memory of the *Marathonomachoi*, those Athenians who had fought at Marathon (490).

The same Greek word *agathos* meant, according to context, “morally good” or “brave,” most commonly with reference to bravery in war. A person who failed to carry out his military duties in the right way could not be thought of as a good person. It is worth bearing in mind when evaluating the place of war in Greek social values that the philosopher Socrates, who of all ancient moralists had had the most rigorously defined system of ethics, was proud of his service as a hoplite in Athens’ wars at Potidaea and Delium.

Douglas Kelly

See also *Arête*; Demosthenes (Orator); Gods of War; Hermocrates of Syracuse; Phocion; Plunder and Booty; Sport and War; Territory and War; Xenophon

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Social War (357–355)

Causes

The Social War was fought by Athens against allies who defected from the Second Athenian Confederacy. The war gets its name from the Latin word for ally (*socius*).

The Second Athenian Confederacy was formed in 378/7 to protect the freedom of member states. Athenian policy in the 20 years after the Confederacy was founded placed increasing strain on the allies. The main outcome of the wars against Sparta (378–375/4, 374–371) was the expansion of Boeotia under Theban control (Xenophon, *Hellenica* 6.2.1). In the 360s Athens fought costly wars to recover Amphipolis and extend its power in the northern Aegean, as well as expropriating Samos (365). Athenian naval power had been challenged by the sudden appearance in the Aegean of a Boeotian navy, when Byzantium apparently defected (364). In 358 Athens had begun a war with Philip II of Macedon. Athenian allies had cogent reasons to question whether membership of the Confederacy was worthwhile. At the same time, Mausolus of Caria gave the rebels support, to extend his own power in the southern Aegean.

Course

In 357, two of the biggest states in the Confederacy, Chios and Rhodes, defected. They were joined by Cos and by Byzantium. In 356 an Athenian fleet of 60 triremes under Chares sent out against the rebels was defeated in a battle off Chios and more allies rebelled. Athens sent out more triremes under Timotheus, Iphicrates, and his son Menestheus, to bring Chares' fleet back up to 60. Under the command of these four, the Athenian fleet failed to prevent rebel attacks on loyal allies. When the rebels besieged the Athenian settlement on Samos, the four Athenian generals sailed to the Hellespont to blockade Byzantium. This drew the rebel fleet away from Samos in pursuit. The Athenian fleet turned back and in bad weather off Embata, Chares went against the decision of his fellow generals and led an attack. The others had to follow and the Athenian fleet was badly beaten.

Chares sent denunciations of his fellow generals to Athens and they were deposed. Desperate for money to pay his crews, Chares put his fleet at the disposal of Artabazus, a satrap in revolt from the Persian king. The Persian king responded by threatening to join the rebels with a fleet of 300 triremes. Chares was recalled and Athens had no choice but to make peace with the rebels in 355, acknowledging their departure from the Confederacy.

In the war Athens had been able to mobilize only relatively small fleets that were matched by the rebels in size and outclassed in battle. Athenian financial resources were soon exhausted.

Consequences

The Social War reduced the Second Athenian Confederacy to a small remnant. Athenian capacity and willingness for offensive action in the war with Philip were severely impaired. The politician Eubulus' policy of financial reform and rebuilding resources restricted military ventures abroad. Athens was badly placed in the struggle with an enterprising enemy in Philip.

Douglas Kelly

See also Amphipolis; Athenian Confederacy, Second; Boeotia, Boeotians; Chares; Chios, Chians; Iphicrates; Mausolus and the Hecatomnids; Philip II of Macedon; Rhodes, Rhodians; Samos; Thebes, Thebans; Timotheus

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Social War (220–217)

Causes

The Social War of 220–217 is so called because it was a war fought by an alliance, "social" in this sense being derived from the Latin word for ally (*socius*). The alliance was the panhellenic one established by King Antigonus III Doson of Macedonia, when he joined with the Achaean League against King Cleomenes III of Sparta (225). This alliance provided for joint defense under Macedonian leadership against an attack on any

member.

On the death of Antigonus Doson (221) the Aetolian League expanded its practice of raiding other states. Aetolian privateers using the recently acquired port of Pagasae in Thessaly attacked shipping indiscriminately. An Aetolian force in the Peloponnese attacked Achaëa and Messenia. Achaëa invoked the protection of the panhellenic alliance against Aetolia. The issue was whether Macedonian hegemony could check Aetolian depredations. In 219 the new Macedonian king, Philip V, aged 17 years, convened a congress of the alliance that declared war on Aetolia.

Course

In the first year of the war, Philip had to deal with threats to his northern frontier. The allies in the Peloponnese were inactive and the Aetolians won over Elis and Sparta. On a wider front, the Aetolians sacked the oracle shrine of Dodona in Epirus and the temples at Dium in southern Macedonia.

The panhellenic alliance seemed on the point of collapse but Philip reversed the situation in the winter of 219/18 by a rapid march from Macedonia down to the Peloponnese and, maintaining his speed of movement, dealt with the Aetolian forces there and made a lucrative pillaging campaign into the rich lands of Elis. He then improvised a fleet at Corinth and moved his army across the Corinthian Gulf to invade the heartland of Aetolia, overcoming the obstacles presented by the terrain and the Aetolians' capacity for guerilla warfare. He sacked and destroyed the Aetolian federal sanctuary at Thermon in retaliation for their resorting to this kind of warfare.

In the summer of 218, Philip made another rapid and unexpected movement through the Peloponnese to Sparta, which he knocked out of the war. After a diversion back to Macedonia to defend his frontier, Philip returned in 217 with a siege-train in his army and took by siege the key Aetolian-held city of Phthiotic Thebes in Thessaly. By this time, the Aetolians were ready to accept Philip's proposal for peace negotiations.

Consequences

The Peace of Naupactus (late summer, 217) ended the war on the basis that all participants should retain the territories they held at the time of the treaty. This meant that Aetolia had to accept considerable losses. Although

Philip's brilliant generalship and the proficiency of the Macedonian army reinforced Macedonian prestige, the war had shown that the Greek states in the alliance were slow to cooperate with their Macedonian hegemon. The Aetolians remained discontented and so readily turned to Rome to pursue their hostility to Macedonia when Rome intervened in Greece (First Macedonian War, 215–205). Other Greek states, including the Achaean League, were uneasy about Philip's increasing dominance and his expansionist policies, including his alliance with Hannibal (215). The Social War illustrates the fundamental weakness of institutional attempts to secure peace and cooperation among the Greek states.

Douglas Kelly

See also Achaean League; Aetolia, Aetolian League; Antigonus III Doson; *Hegemon, Hegemonia*; Panhellenism; Philip V of Macedon

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Sogdian Rock, Siege of (327)

A fortified precipitous hill in modern day Tajikistan, where the rebel Oxyartes had placed his wife and daughters for safekeeping during Alexander the Great's campaign to subdue Bactria. In early 327, Alexander was determined to take the rock because it was the last secure refuge for his Sogdian opponents and the defenders had contemptuously rejected his demand to surrender, telling him to find winged soldiers as nothing less would trouble them. Alexander offered lavish rewards to the first men to scale the rock. About 300 with climbing experience scaled the steepest face of the rock, using tent pegs and ropes. They reached the summit above the enemy fort at dawn, with the loss of 30 men. Stunned, the enemy surrendered. Among the captives was Roxane, the beautiful daughter of Oxyartes and Alexander married her. The fall of the "Sogdian Rock" and the "Rock of Chorienes," ended Bactrian resistance.

See also Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon; Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon, Bactrian Campaign; Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon, Invasion of Persian Empire; Siege Warfare

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
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Solon (d. ca. 560)

Solon, from a wealthy Athenian family, rose to prominence in Athens' war with Megara over Salamis in 600. He was archon in 594/3, implementing several major economic, political, and social reforms either then or soon afterward. These reforms were prompted by major tension and conflict over economic and political conditions in Athens. The reforms caused Solon to be credited with liberating the lower classes from indenture to the aristocracy. Solon allegedly left Athens after enacting his laws so they could not be repealed (Herodotus 1.29–33). He is reported to have visited Egypt and Lydia before his death ca. 560.



Marble bust of Solon, Roman copy, perhaps of a fourth-century Greek original. This idealized portrait represents later views of Solon as the father of Athenian democracy. Located in the National Archaeological Museum, Naples, Italy. (De Agostini Picture Library/L. Pedicini/Bridgeman Images)

Solon's legal reforms included the *seisachtheia* (shaking off of burdens), which forgave citizen debts and liberated the *hektemoroi* (sixth-parters), who had been indentured to give (probably) one sixth of their produce to their landlords, as well as freeing those who had been enslaved for defaulting on their debts. Immigrant craftsmen were granted Athenian citizenship. Solon also established a wealth-based division of social classes, placing the citizens of Athens in four categories based on economic status: *Pentakosiomedimnoi* (500 bushelers), *Hippeis* (horse-owners), *Zeugitai* (lower class), and *Thetes*. These classes became the basis of Athenian political rights, over time breaking the aristocratic hold on political power. He further switched the Athenians' currency from the Peloponnesian

standard to the Euboic-Ionic standard weight to encourage external trade. His reforms also banned the export of all Athenian agricultural goods except olive oil. Solon's laws mollified Dracon's harsh punitive measures, except in the case of murder, and created public lawsuits open to all citizens. Despite the apparent success of the reforms in the economic area, political unrest continued. Athens twice failed to elect an archon, Damasias held the office for twice as long as allowed, and Peisistratus became tyrant (561/60). However, despite the discontent of his contemporaries, by the end of the fifth century, Solon's reforms had been idealized by democrats as the foundations for Athens' fifth-century democracy.

M. Falconer

See also Athens; Coinage; Peisistratus; *Stasis*

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Sparta

A city-state in the southeastern Peloponnese. Following territorial expansion in the Archaic Period, Sparta was a major power in the Greek world until the mid-fourth century, after which it irreparably declined. The Spartans were noted for their military prowess in infantry combat, which has been attributed to their unique social structure and educational system.

For the early history of Sparta, we are reliant upon highly mythologized later accounts, and the fragmentary evidence of Tyrtaeus. The city of Sparta was formed by the unification of four villages: Cynosura, Limnae, Mesoa, and Pitane. The village of Amyclae, which lay further to the south, was brought into this union later, sometime in the eighth century. Having

established control over the surrounding area, Lacedaemon, which comprised most of the southeastern Peloponnese, the Spartans next subjugated their neighbor to the west, Messenia. Ancient writers describe this expansion as occurring in the First and Second Messenian Wars, traditionally in the late-eighth and mid-seventh century, respectively. The term Lacedaemon may also refer to the city of Sparta.

Following the conquest of Messenia, the Spartans possessed among the largest territories of any Greek state. This abundance of land allowed the Spartans to establish and maintain a unique social system, which addressed both the ongoing threat posed by the Messenians and tensions within their own society. These tensions are apparent in the case of the *Partheniae*, who were dispatched from Sparta to found the city of Taras/Tarentum. Ancient writers, and the Spartans themselves, attributed their innovations to a single man, the lawgiver Lycurgus. The role played by this individual, and his very existence, is now a matter of debate. It is likely that the “Lycurgan reforms” were in fact incrementally introduced “renovations” of traditional practices that already existed within Spartan society. However, the end-result of this process, often called the “sixth-century revolution,” is reasonably clear. Making use of Sparta’s expansive territories, every Spartan citizen (or “Spartiate”) was granted a portion of land (*cleros*). This ensured that even the poorest Spartiate had the means to provide a regular contribution to a *syssition*—a dining-club, membership of which was a precondition of citizenship. This land may also have been intended to cover the costs associated with the *agoge*, Sparta’s communal upbringing, completion of which formed another precondition of citizenship. Thus, a Spartiate’s *cleros* allowed him to meet an effective property qualification for enfranchisement. Although wealth inequalities remained, all Spartiates were theoretically *homoioi*—“peers” or “equals.”



Remains of the Menelaion, a sanctuary of Menelaus and Helen, near Sparta. Menelaus was the legendary Spartan king at the time of the Trojan War, who fought to recover his wife, Helen. The site's legendary associations may have been inspired by the nearby remains of a Bronze Age palace, but the sanctuary itself does not predate the eighth century. The major building works visible today are from the early fifth century, the period of Sparta's greatest power. (Photo by Peter Londey)

A Spartiate's lands were worked by Helots, the conquered inhabitants of these territories, who occupied a position somewhere between slaves and serfs. Not all of those whom the Spartans conquered were so subjugated, however, and self-governing communities did exist in both Lacedaemon and Messenia. These communities of *Perioikoi*—"neighbors"—were obliged to follow Sparta's lead in foreign policy, and serve in the Spartan army, but were otherwise largely autonomous.

Another distinctive aspect of Spartan society was its system of government. Aristotle described Sparta as an example of the "mixed constitution," combining democratic, oligarchic and monarchic elements. In fact, at any given time Sparta had two kings, the scions of the Agiad and Eurypontid royal houses. The kings' formal roles were principally limited to serving as religious officials and commanders of the Spartan army. However, the kings were generally two of the most influential individuals in Spartan society, and could dominate Spartan politics. The kings were also automatically members of the *gerousia*, or council of elders, which

otherwise consisted of 28 men elected from those over 60 years old. The *gerousia* formed Sparta's senior court and also vetted legislation to be put before the Spartan assembly. The final major office of state, and likely the last to develop, was the board of ephors: five men, elected for a single year, who exercised a number of executive functions, such as calling out the army, receiving envoys, and chairing meetings of the Spartan assembly.

In the mid-sixth century, the Spartans made further territorial gains at the expense of their northeastern neighbor, Argos, capturing the border region of Thyrea in the "Battle of the Champions." However, following mixed results against their northwestern neighbor, Tegea, the Spartans and Tegeans came to a negotiated settlement. The Spartans went on to form numerous such alliances, creating the network of treaties which scholars call the Peloponnesian League. This enshrined Sparta's dominant position within the Peloponnese, particularly against challenges periodically made by Argos, and the internal threat posed by the Helots.

In the late-sixth century, under the leadership of the influential Agiad king Cleomenes I, the Spartans consolidated their position within the Peloponnese, inflicting a major defeat upon the Argives at Sepeia (ca. 494). They also began to intervene in the affairs of Greek states further afield, notably Athens, where the Spartans overthrew the Peisistratid tyranny (511/10). Unlike Athens, Sparta did not provide support to the Ionian revolt which precipitated Persia's invasions of the Greek mainland. However, owing to their preeminence among the Greek states, Sparta provided the commanders of the anti-Persian coalition, both on land and at sea. Thus, it was a Spartan admiral, Eurybiades, who commanded the Greek fleet at Salamis in 480, although the credit for that victory is generally given to the Athenian Themistocles. Similarly, the Agiad king Leonidas was commander at the battle of Thermopylae, and Pausanias, the regent for Leonidas' son, Pleistarchus, at the conclusive battle of Plataea. Although the latter was a victory, and the former a defeat, it was the battle of Thermopylae that above all served to cement the Spartan reputation for bravery and excellence in phalanx warfare.

In 465/4, in the aftermath of a damaging earthquake Sparta faced another significant Helot revolt, sometimes called the Third Messenian War. At the same time, the growth in Athens' power through its leadership of the Delian League created friction between Athens and Sparta. This flared into open warfare in the so-called First Peloponnesian War (460/59–445), a

precursor to the Peloponnesian War proper (431–404). The major contemporary historian of the latter war, Thucydides, attributed its outbreak to Sparta's fear of Athens' power. However, the most significant factor appears to have been the pressure placed upon Sparta by other members of the Peloponnesian League, such as Megara and Corinth, who felt more directly threatened by Athenian expansion and aggression, and expected Sparta to come to their aid. Sparta's repeated invasions of Attica were unsuccessful, and it was only when the Spartans gained Persian aid, at the cost of abandoning to Persian rule the Greek cities of Asia Minor, that the Spartan admiral Lysander was able to secure victory with the sea-battle at Aegospotami (405), and the subsequent siege of Athens by both land and sea.

The defeat of Athens brought Sparta to the peak of its power. However, the alliance with Persia which had been vital to that victory was temporary. The Eurypontid king Agesilaus II led a campaign into Asia Minor, but was forced to turn back by the emergence of a Persian-backed anti-Spartan coalition, against which Sparta fought in the Corinthian War (395–387/6). This conflict, and in particular the defeat of the Spartan fleet at Cnidus in 394, effectively ended Spartan ambitions to dominate both land and sea.

The peace that was imposed upon the Greeks by the king of Persia, ending the Corinthian War—the King's Peace—still sanctioned Sparta's role as the dominant power on the Greek mainland. This hegemony was short-lived, however. In 371, the Spartans were decisively defeated by the Thebans at Leuctra. The Theban victory was in part attributable to developments in infantry tactics, and the deficiency of Sparta's cavalry. However, a more fundamental weakness on the Spartan side was *oliganthropia*—lack of men. Theoretically, a Spartiate's property-holdings allowed him to meet the expenses which were a precondition of citizenship. Over the long term, however, progressive concentration of these property-holdings into fewer hands, which was a natural consequence of Sparta's system of inheritance, resulted in a progressive decline in the number of Spartiates. By 371, this number had fallen to ca. 1500, down from some 8000 in 480. The Thebans consolidated their victory by invading Laconia, and liberating Messenia from Spartan rule, a loss of land, resources, and manpower that ensured Sparta's decline as a major power.

Successive kings attempted to restore Sparta's fortunes. However, whether these attempts were based purely upon military conquest, or

grounded in social reform, they met with little success. Still, Sparta did maintain a powerful legacy. Already in the Classical Period, Sparta's reputation for its distinctive institutions, military excellence, and austere way of life fascinated other Greeks, and this fascination continued into the Roman period and beyond. Historians have used the term "Spartan mirage" to describe the distorting effect which the resultant myth-building has had upon our ability to understand the "real" Sparta. However, from antiquity to the present day, the myth of Sparta as the home of a warrior community, trained from infancy to embrace hardship and frugality, has arguably been far more influential than the historical reality.

Philip J. V. Davies

See also Acrotatus I; Acrotatus II; Agesilaus II; Agesipolis I; Agis III; Agis III, Revolt against Macedon; Agis IV; *Agoge*; Champions, Battle of; Cleombrotus I; Cleomenes I; Cleomenes III; Command Structures, Army; Corinthian War; Helots; King's Peace; Leuctra, Battle of; Lycurgus (Spartan); Messenia; Peloponnesian League; Peloponnesian War, First; Peloponnesian War, Second; *Perioikoi*; Persian Wars; Sparta, Attack on Tegea (Fetters, Battle of); Sport and War; Taras/Tarentum; Thebes, Invasions of the Peloponnese; Thermopylae, Battle of; Tyrtaeus

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Sparta, Attack on Tegea (Fetters, Battle of) (ca. 570)

Tegea, in southeast Arcadia, was widely regarded as the home of formidable warriors. The Spartans' attack on Tegea, known as the "Battle of the Fetters," which occurred about 570, is presented in the ancient literature as a lesson in hubris and a rare defeat for Sparta.

At this time, the story goes, the Spartans were hoping to conquer Arcadia. When they consulted the oracle at Delphi they were told they would not subdue all of Arcadia, but the Pythian priestess appeared to give them a positive response in relation to the city of Tegea, saying: “I will give you Tegea to dance in with stomping feet and her rich plain to measure out with rods” (Herodotus 1.66). Sparta was now so confident of victory that its army took along its own fetters, with which to enslave the Tegean population. But they were defeated and were made to wear the chains themselves and to measure out the Tegean plain, not as victors distributing spoils, but as enslaved laborers. The fetters were later displayed by the people of Tegea in the Temple of Athene Alea. In about 550, after 40 years of hostility, Sparta and Tegea came to terms. Tegea’s resistance earned it alliance as an independent state, rather than as a subjugated people like the Messenians. Thereafter, Tegea served as a relatively consistent ally of Sparta.

James McDonald

See also Arcadia, Arcadians; Delphi; Sparta; Sparta, Wars in Arcadia

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Sparta, Campaign against Olynthus

Sparta campaigned against the Chalcidian Confederacy in the geopolitical context of northern Greece’s power vacuum after King Archelaus of Macedon’s death in 399, which had also attracted Thebes, Athens, and Olynthus. The King’s Peace (387/6) also emboldened Sparta to act with impunity. In 382, the Spartan assembly and Peloponnesian League congress responded positively to delegates from Acanthus and Apollonia who stated that Olynthus’ Chalcidian Confederacy was coercing their *poleis* to join it. Additionally, King Amyntas of Macedon complained to the Spartans about a land dispute with Olynthus.

A 10,000-man expedition was voted, with some Peloponnesian League member states innovatively contributing money rather than soldiers. An advance group of 2,000 was sent out under the Spartiate Eudamidas and his

brother Phoebidas. The latter took over Thebes on his way north on a pretext of Theban disloyalty. Agesilaus' brother Teleutias then took most of the 10,000 soldiers to Chalcidice, fought near Olynthus, and was killed. Agesipolis I took over the operation with additional soldiers and died shortly after the battle of Torone in 381. The harmost (governor) Polybiades then replaced Agesipolis. He blockaded Olynthus until the Olynthians surrendered in 379 and became a subordinate ally of Sparta.

This victory accompanied Sparta's humbling of Phlius, garrisoning of Thebes, and hobbling of Corinth and Argos. The Spartans rearranged their alliance system into ten parts, with Sparta's new Thraceward allies composing one part.

Timothy Doran

See also Agesilaus II; Agesipolis I; Boeotian League; Chalcidian Confederacy; Olynthus; Peloponnesian League

Further Reading

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Sparta, Wars in Arcadia (370–362)

Sparta's longstanding hegemony in the Peloponnese weakened following crushing defeat at the battle of Leuctra (371). After the ratification of peace which granted full autonomy to all Greek cities, factions within Arcadia began reviewing their traditional allegiances. The Mantineans provoked the Spartans by building a wall and then intervening in the Tegean civil war (370). In response, the Spartans sent an army under Agesilaus II into Arcadia to quell the growing rebellion. As the newly formed Arcadian League grew, help came from Thebes, which invaded the Peloponnese for the first time. But afterward, with the Thebans gone, the Spartans invaded Arcadia again and this time defeated the Arcadians, Argives, and Messenians in the "Tearless Battle," in which allegedly the Spartans suffered no loss at all. Over the next six years, territorial skirmishes erupted across the Peloponnese. The Arcadians were squeezed by the Achaeans to the north and by the Eleans at Olympia, but repelled another Spartan invasion.

After years of combat terrorized the region, disagreements split Mantinea from the Arcadian League (363–362). In response, Thebes sent an army in attempt to reestablish control in the Peloponnese, leading to the battle of Mantinea (362). Thebes won the battle, but lost Epaminondas; as Xenophon comments, Greece was left more confused and disturbed than before. The ultimate beneficiary was Philip II of Macedon.

Robert T. Jones

See also Arcadia, Arcadians; Elis, War with Arcadia; Leuctra, Battle of; Mantinea, Battle of (362); Mantinea, Mantineans; Sparta; “Tearless Battle”; Thebes, Invasions of the Peloponnese

Further Reading

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Spartolus, Battle of (429)

A land battle fought in 429 between Athens and Chalcidian rebels. Thucydides provides a contemporary record, while Diodorus’ brief account claims (almost certainly incorrectly) that the Athenian force was half the size given by Thucydides (2,000 hoplites and 200 cavalry). The Athenians, attempting to bring the Chalcidice back under control, ravaged Spartolus’ territory, hoping that pro-Athenians would surrender the city. Instead, the citizens, reinforced from nearby Olynthus, marched out. The Athenian hoplites were victorious but their cavalry and light troops were defeated. Reinforced by more peltasts from Olynthus, the Chalcidians harried the Athenians with javelins. The Athenian hoplites, slowed by their armor, were unable to drive them off and ultimately broke and fled to Potidaea. In a formal recognition of defeat the Athenians requested an armistice to recover their dead—all three *strategoi* (generals) and 430 men. The battle proved a temporary setback to Athens’ attempts to pacify the area and is a good example alongside Pylos and Lechaeum of the vulnerability of hoplites to good cavalry and light troops.

Iain Spence

See also Cavalry; Lechaemum, Battle of; Light Troops; Peloponnesian War, Second; Pylos (Sphacteria), Battle of

Further Reading

Thucydides 2.79; Isaeus 5 (*On the Estate of Dicaeogenes*) 42; Diodorus 12.47.

Speeches, Military

Ancient historians commonly include in their narrative reports direct speech of addresses by politicians and military commanders. Serious and careful historians, Thucydides (1.22) and Polybius (12.25A-B), state that they went to considerable pains to give the substance of such speeches, indicating they attempted to report only speeches actually given. Neither claimed to report speeches with word-for-word accuracy (which was impossible and unimaginable under ancient conditions). The degree of fidelity that they attained in any given case is open to discussion. In contrast, historians with lower standards of accuracy were regarded as being too free in making up speeches that suited an occasion and showed off the historians' rhetorical talents (a charge leveled by Polybius against Timaeus).

Speeches pose a special problem in the interpretation of ancient historical writing. A particular aspect of this has been a focus in recent scholarship on commanders' speeches before battle, such as Pagondas and Hippocrates at the battle of Delium (Thucydides 4.92, 95–6); Nicias at Syracuse (Thucydides 7.61–9); Thrasybulus at the battle of Munychia (Xenophon, *Hellenica* 2.4.13–17).

On one side, it has been argued that surrounding noise and the limitations of the range of the human voice make it impossible for commanders to have delivered speeches of some length, as opposed to a few words of encouragement. It follows from this that the prebattle speeches in ancient historians must be regarded as a type of conventionalized fiction.

The other side of the argument emphasizes that ancient historians often made it plain that commanders moved along their troops as they gave these speeches before battle: that is, they gave much the same speech at different places to reach the ears of as many troops as possible. Also relevant are the power of the rhetorically trained voice (common among the ambitious among the elite) and the psychological advantages of a commander voicing clearly and confidently what his side was fighting for. That troops expected

commanders to deliver such exhortations on the point of joining battle is well attested. Parallels from mediaeval and early modern warfare provide some support for giving speeches before battle.

This controversy points to the value of raising questions about what the evidence from antiquity actually proves. Careful and minute attention to what ancient sources say is needed to advance the discussion, and a clearer understanding of an ancient practice should emerge. However, showing that speeches were delivered before battle is not the same thing as proving that every such speech in ancient historical writing is a credible report of something factual.

Douglas Kelly

See also Delium, Battle of; Polybius; Thucydides; Timaeus; Xenophon

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Spercheius Valley

The Spercheius is a major river of central Greece, flowing east about 75 kilometers into the Malian Gulf. Since antiquity, silting of the gulf has moved the river mouth about 14 kilometers eastward, so that the modern highway from Athens to Thessaloniki crosses a plain that was formerly underwater. The ancient towns of the valley were all, as was typical in Greece, on the hills on its fringes. The lower part of the valley was occupied by the Malians, with their two main cities, Trachis (later Heraclea Trachinia) and Lamia on the south and north, respectively. Higher up, the southern side of the valley was home to the Oetaeans and the Aenianians (the names

sometimes seem to be used interchangeably), while the Dolopians occupied the hills to the north. Much of the population in the upper valley may have lived in villages; the only substantial town on the southern flank was Hypata in Aenis, while the main Dolopian town was Ktimene. These were minor groups, who rarely played a significant historical role. Collectively they generally fell in the Thessalian sphere of influence. They medized in 480; objected to the foundation of Heraclea Trachinia in 426; and were part of the Aetolian League for much of the Hellenistic Period. In 174 it was the Macedonian king Perseus putting down a revolt of the Dolopians that provided the pretext for the Romans to enter the Third Macedonian War. But in the regional politics of central Greece they played a role, with the Malians, Dolopians and Aenianians between them providing a quarter of the tribal membership of the Delphic Amphictyony.

Peter Londey

See also Achaea Phthiotis; Delphic Amphictyony; Heraclea Trachinia; Malis, Malians

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Sport and War

The ancient Greeks believed that sport had practical value for those who fought in the hoplite phalanx. Admittedly the standard events of athletic *agōnes* ("contests") did not rehearse the full skill set which hoplites required. Hoplites, for example, did not engage in boxing bouts or throw discuses at each other. This was the case too with the javelin-throwing of the pentathlon. In this event a sportsman tried, not to hit a target, but to throw his *akon* ("javelin") the greatest possible distance. Hoplites, by contrast, used

a heavier spear, called a *doru*. In the pitched battles of the Classical Period they did not throw it. Instead they used it to stab their opponents in hand-to-hand combat. Indeed the only event that practiced what hoplites actually did was the footrace in armor. Runners who ran it wore a helmet and greaves and carried the hoplite's distinctive round shield. In battle hoplites regularly did run, when their phalanxes were within 50 meters (55 yards) of each other. They also ran away, when they felt that their side had been categorically defeated. Athletes and soldiers thus did employ different skills in their respective contests. But there were many Greeks who still judged athletics to be valuable for preparing citizens for fighting as a hoplite.

The Spartans thought that this was the case. Some ancient historians have argued that this *polis* actually disliked athletics. But this argument relies on a misreading of two passages only (Aristotle, *Politics* 1338b9–13; Tyrtaeus 12.1–2, 10–14 [West]). It ignores too a lot of other evidence that shows a strong commitment among the Spartans to athletics. For example, their high estimation of athletics saw their *polis* both display public lists of its sporting victors and allow individuals to make a wide range of dedications concerning their sporting successes. Thus we find in the sanctuary of Athena Chalcioecus many fragments of prize *amphorae* from the Great Panathenaic Games and inscriptions listing the victories of local sportsmen (e.g. *IG V* 1.213). The Spartans too publicly honored Olympic victors, even if in an idiosyncratic way: they allowed them to join their king's bodyguard in battle. These exceptional “craftsmen of war”—to quote Xenophon's *Constitution of the Spartans* 9.5—had long had athletic contests and athletic training for boys and men. This was done especially as part of the *agoge* or state-organized education of Spartan boys, whose principal aim was to create its fearsome hoplites. Once part of the Spartan army, they were legally obliged to practice athletics on campaign.



The stadium at Delphi. Originally built in the fifth century, the remains visible today are from the second century CE. The starting blocks can be seen in the foreground. Although many Greeks believed that athletics provided useful preparation for war, running, especially the race in armor, was the sport most practically linked to hoplite combat. (Photo by Iain Spence)

Yet, in contrast to the other Greeks, the Spartans may have practiced boxing and the *pankration* among themselves. But they usually avoided competing in these two “heavy” events at games, because they apparently disliked the fact that those who competed in them could concede defeat voluntarily. Conceding defeat clashed with the classical ideal of Spartan *arête* (“courage”). This virtue required a hoplite either to stand his ground or be killed in action. The avoidance of such events suggests that the Spartans believed that athletics could do more than prepare boys and men physically for war: it could also socialize them into the values of the battlefield.

The Classical Athenians famously boasted that their hoplites did not need education and practice in *ponoi* (“toils”) to be brave in battle. Their *arête*, they boasted, flowed naturally from their fine way of life, fine character and fine birth (QQ 36). For most of the Classical Period Athens thus neither organized nor financed military and athletic training for its hoplites. They may have been proud of their amateur hoplites. But this does not mean that they denied the practical value of athletics for military service. Xenophon has Socrates castigate an Athenian youth for being out of shape: one needs *euexia* (“physical fitness”) for the *agōn* (“contest”) of battle just as much as an athlete does for the *agōnes* of the Olympics. Being unfit,

Socrates continued, resulted in those facing “the dangers of war” being killed, captured, or forced into acts of cowardice. His concern for the fitness of hoplites was easy to understand: they had to carry armor and weapons which ranged in weight from 15 to 30 kilograms (33-66 pounds), fight for up to a few hours, when the phalanxes met, and spend most of the rest of the day maneuvering for the actual battle and in a subsequent pursuit or retreat. Plato’s Protagoras said the same thing as Socrates when outlining how each of the three disciplines of education turned boys into courageous men: athletics did so by making sure lack of physical fitness would not cause the young man to be cowardly in war.

Phalanx warfare was bloody and fairly deadly. For a long time there was a simple reason why the Athenians got away with not training their hoplites for it: with the exception of the Spartans, the enemies of the Athenians did not have state-subsidized military training either. The resulting equality of amateurism drastically reduced the dangers of battle for both sides. However, this balance disappeared in the course of the fourth century, because others started to copy the Spartans. The first to do so were the Thebans. In response to Sparta’s repeated invasions of their state in the 380s they created a corps of highly trained hoplites, called the Sacred Band. At the battle of Leuctra, in 371, this band crushed the Spartan army. This quickly led to the unraveling of the Peloponnesian League and the liberation of Sparta’s Helots.

With such a spectacular end to Spartan hegemony, others understandably followed the Thebans in introducing state-sponsored training for soldiers. One to do so was Philip II of Macedon. After his accession to the throne in 359 this king copied the Thebans by imposing a degree of training which no Greek army ever acquired. In only two decades he turned Macedonia into a major military power and then into Greece’s new hegemon with his victory at the battle Chaeronea in 338, where he defeated the combined armies of Athens and Thebes.

This defeat belatedly pushed the Athenians into abandoning the amateurism of their hoplites. In 336, an Athenian politician thus proposed a law “concerning the ephebes.” This took the underfunded and uncoordinated exercises of some 18- and 19-year-old Athenians and transformed them into a state-sponsored training-program for hoplites. For each recruit in this new *ephebeia* (“cadetship”) Athens provided hoplite-equipment and accommodation. First-year ephebes were stationed in the port of Athens,

where they were taught “infantry-fighting, archery, javelin-throwing and catapult firing,” while second-year cadets patrolled Attica and manned its guard posts. Some elements of this state-sponsored training-program were clearly modeled on Spartan practice. What is often overlooked in the Athenian *ephebeia* is its athletics program. For first-year ephebes the Athenians appointed, not just military teachers, but two athletics teachers (*IG II²* 585.9–11). It also obliged each of the units of ephebes to compete in the athletic team event of the torch race at three of the state’s major games.

David M. Pritchard

See also Elite Troops; Ephebes, *Ephebeia*; Leuctra, Battle of; Philip II of Macedon; Sacred Band; Sparta; Training

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Stasis (Civil Strife)

Stasis, or internal strife, was a reasonably common (and feared) occurrence within Greek city-states. Confusingly for modern readers used to the concept of *stasis* as either a state of equilibrium or a pause where life or functions are suspended, the Greek term is almost the opposite. In ancient Greece, “*stasis*” was generally used to describe internal conflict beyond the normal cut and thrust of political life and is not applied to conflict between states. *Stasis* involved varying levels of dysfunction within a city, ranging from internal paralysis up to and including civil war. It does sometimes, though, also imply an evenly balanced struggle, with neither side powerful enough to win, which is presumably why the modern term developed as it did. The most famous description of *stasis* is Thucydides’ description of the

civil war in Corcyra in 427 (Document 9).

As might be expected, *stasis* existed in all periods of Greek history. Its earliest recorded manifestations are the aristocratic feuds common during the Archaic and early Classical Periods. In the Classical Period and later it was generally between opposing political groups, especially oligarchs and democrats, although sometimes aristocrats and democrats. However, Greek politics had a strong personal flavor and it is important not to automatically consider the factions in modern ideological terms—especially in the early periods. In these cases, although clashes could be over policy matters, this was often the result of interpersonal or family quarrels. The policy issues could be incidental—resulting from the interpersonal conflict rather than being its cause. For example, Aristides, after opposing his bitter rival Themistocles on a matter of advantage to Athens, is supposed to have lamented that Athens would never be safe while both he and Themistocles were alive.

However, there could be ideological aspects, especially in the cases of *stasis* from the fifth century onward. While Thucydides' history of the Second Peloponnesian War (431–404) portrays the war as a contest for power between Athens and Sparta, he also identifies the conflict between democracy and oligarchy as an element in the hostilities.

The early aristocratic clashes were between families or clans contesting for power. As is generally the case, the best-documented examples are Athenian. The earliest was the faction fighting which led to the reforms of Solon in the early sixth century. This was rather unusual for the time as later writers saw this as involving strong economic and class elements. At the same time, or perhaps influenced by and influencing, the aristocratic power struggles, economic grievances among the general population added to the tension.

Herodotus' account of the aristocratic families post Solon identifies three broad factions. None was powerful enough to achieve power for long and the period down to Peisistratus' third tyranny ca. 545 (and beyond) is one of shifting alliances as the clans jockeyed for power. The result of this *stasis* was the tyrannies of Peisistratus and later his sons. Tyranny was a reasonably common product of *stasis* and in these cases the element of popular support, perhaps sometimes generated by frustration with the continual *stasis*, was what allowed an individual to break the cycle—at least for a while.

One of the features of *stasis*, which made it a particularly feared condition, was violence. This could range from street fights between opponents, to assassination and civil war. The passions aroused in serious *stasis* could be great and the massacre of opponents, even those taking sanctuary in temples, did occur. The Athenian politician Ephialtes was assassinated during his struggle to reduce the power of the conservative and aristocratic Areopagus, but this seems to have been the only violence involved. Conversely, the murder of opponents was a feature of both oligarchic regimes in Athens in the end stages of the Second Peloponnesian War. This was especially so of the Thirty Tyrants (404–403). Massacres of political opponents are also attested, for example, at Aegina (ca. 490), Corcyra (427), Argos (417), Corinth (392)—which Xenophon particularly condemned for its brutality and disregard for religion, as it was perpetrated during a religious festival and some victims had sought sanctuary in temples—Cynaetha (220s), and Sparta (220 and 189). In 184, Philip V blamed internal faction fighting in Maroneia for a massacre he had himself instigated.

Another feature of *stasis* was resorting to outside assistance to defeat an internal enemy. Greek history is full of examples of groups or factions within a state calling in an external power to assist in their internal power struggle. The oligarchs at Epidamnus attacked their own city with the aid of local tribes—the democrats inside responded by appealing first to Corcyra and then to Corinth. The Peisistratidae at Athens were expelled with Spartan assistance and soon after Isagoras also, but less successfully, called in the Spartans to counter his rival Cleisthenes' popular support. The case of Cleisthenes and Isagoras also demonstrates another feature of the earlier, aristocratic, *stasis*—gaining the decisive advantage by securing mass support.

The reasons why *stasis* was feared are clear: the breakdown of government and social and/or religious conventions, the use of violence (in some cases extreme), and the involvement of external powers. Despite this, it was not uncommon in Greek states, particularly under the stress of warfare.

Iain Spence

See also Assassination; Athens, Oligarchic Movements; Athens, Restoration of Democracy; Cleisthenes; Corcyra, *Stasis* at; Elis, War with Arcadia;

Internal Security; Peisistratidae; Peisistratus; Solon; Tyrants, Tyranny

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Stratagems

While ancient authors emphasize the moral superiority of fair and open combat, cunning stratagems were widely admired. Stratagems include any kind of tactic designed to catch an enemy unaware or off-guard, such as ambushes, feints, tricks, night attacks, and other ruses. Ambushes feature prominently in Homer’s *Iliad*, and such practices continued throughout the Classical and Hellenistic Periods. Celebrated examples include the Athenian general Demosthenes’ sneak attack on an unsuspecting camp of the Ambraciots in 426, and the destruction of Mycalessus by a band of Thracian mercenaries in 413. In both cases, so many were killed that the historian Thucydides counted it amongst the worst disasters to befall any combatant in the Peloponnesian War.

Ambushes, surprise attacks, and other kinds of deceptions were typically employed by a combatant who faced a superior enemy, but even a strong force would be eager to inflict maximum casualties on an enemy with minimal risk of loss to themselves.

Michael Quinn

See also Aegospotami, Battle of; Demosthenes (General); Peloponnesian War, Second; Plataea, Siege of; Strategy; Syracuse, Siege of; Thucydides

Further Reading

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Strategy

Although some modern historians of antiquity use “strategy” and “tactics” interchangeably, “strategy” (from the Greek verb *strategeo* “to be a general/lead an army”) is properly the high-level planning of wars or large scale military operations. Similarly, “tactics” (from the Greek *tasso* “to place/arrange or set in order”) is properly the disposition and maneuvering of troops (or ships) on the way to, from, and on the battlefield. Strategy is the plan prepared at the strategic level of conflict, while tactics is the plan prepared at the tactical level of conflict. These two levels of conflict have been used in military theory, and historical writing, for a very long time, and still form the usual basis of analysis by most modern historians of ancient conflict.

However, since the late twentieth century, in the west at least, modern military theory has recognized three levels of conflict. These are, in descending order: strategic, operational, and tactical. These are not discrete levels as there is some overlap, particularly between the lower end of the strategic level and the upper end of the operational level and between the lower end of operational level and the upper end of the tactical level. The operational level had been identified and incorporated into Soviet military doctrine in the 1920s but was really only accepted in Western theory in the last quarter of the twentieth century.

Ancient warfare was generally less complicated than modern warfare—in traditional hoplite warfare, for example, conflict often involved a single pitched battle and was therefore essentially fought at the tactical level. In

addition, the lack of detailed records often means that identifying planning in antiquity can often only be done by examining what happened and then estimating the original intent. This is subject to risk (plans often have unintended results or consequences), especially at the strategic and operational levels of conflict. Despite this, the three-level model can be a useful analytical framework for ancient conflicts, especially for larger ones like the Peloponnesian Wars or Alexander the Great's conquest of Persia.

At the risk of simplifying modern theory (especially at the operational level) the strategic level of conflict (sometimes also called the "grand strategic" level) operates at the state level. This is exemplified by the allied decision in World War II to place the main effort on defeating Germany before Japan, or by Pericles' "island policy" adopted as the Athenian strategy for fighting the Second Peloponnesian War (see below).

The operational level is subordinate to the strategic level and is best explained as campaign level. Modern examples include Gallipoli and the Battle of Britain; ancient examples include the Sicilian Expedition during the Second Peloponnesian War or Alexander the Great's "naval" campaign against Persia (which involved avoiding naval battle and capturing the Phoenician home ports of the navy).

The tactical level of conflict is subordinate to the operational level and operates at the lower or battlefield level. Examples of this are the way the Thebans disposed and then maneuvered their army at Leuctra, Alexander the Great's plan and execution at Issus, Granicus, and Gaugamela, or the differing plans and maneuvers of the opposing Athenian and Peloponnesian fleets in the initial engagement in the Corinthian Gulf in 429.

In modern theory, the strategy for a conflict is set at the state level, by the civilian and military leadership. This forms the overarching framework for military planning. So, planning at the operational level is designed to achieve the strategic aims, while tactical level planning achieves the operational level aims.

As noted, ancient conflict was often shorter and significantly less complicated than modern conflict and in many cases the focus was on the tactical level. This is not surprising as ancient Greece had nothing like the modern staff or planning systems or the training institutions to prepare people for them. Military training in the ancient Greek world was very limited. When it did occur it was basically at soldier or sailor level and restricted to practicing battlefield maneuvers in formation. While officers

clearly learned from maneuvering their troops or ships in this way, most military training at the officer level was from on the job experience.

Military manuals did exist, but were generally tips or stratagems from experienced practitioners with no recognition of any formal planning process. There is, however, an informal recognition of factors which need to be taken into account at the tactical level, which in conjunction with professional mastery (and natural ability) would help produce sound plans—for example, Xenophon's fourth-century manual, the *Cavalry Commander*.

Despite this, Greek commanders clearly did not simply hope for the best but went through some sort of planning process. For some officers, a mixture of natural ability and considerable practical experience led to highly effective plans. The difference between their process and a modern officer's is that the Greek commander lacked a formal "appreciation process" to aid their planning (in terms of both speed and ensuring no factor is missed), and to some extent standardize it. While the ancient planning process would often be a mental analysis by the commander alone, it might involve a discussion by a group of commanders, such as before Marathon in 490 or by Alcibiades, Nicias, and Lamachus in Sicily in 415. In these cases the decision might be taken by means of a vote (sometimes, as in Sicily, influenced by the prestige and status of the individuals) or, as at Marathon, a vote reinforced by a rotating command system. Under a monarchy, or where there was a single commander, this could involve a discussion between the commander and his senior contingent commanders. Although no doubt influenced by literary embellishment, the differences of opinion between Alexander the Great and Parmenion before Granicus and Gaugamela provide an example of this type of planning.

The Second Peloponnesian War provides a good example of fairly sophisticated planning at all three levels of conflict—and the difficulty of implementing a long term plan in ancient Greek warfare. At the start of the war the two sides had clear strategies. The Peloponnesian League, led by Sparta, simply followed the tried and tested hoplite strategy—march into the enemy's territory, ravage the crops and wage a pitched battle against them when they came out to defend. If they did not defend, the invader left with a moral victory and came back the next year to repeat the process until the enemy came to terms.

The Athenians, however, were persuaded by Pericles to adopt a different strategy—the famous "island policy." Under this, the Athenians were to

avoid major land clashes with the Peloponnesians and focus on preserving the empire which would provide them with their necessary food supplies. It also envisaged (possibly from the start, perhaps in response to unrest when the Athenians observed their land being ravaged) a limited defense of the Attic *chora* (agricultural hinterland) by cavalry, and amphibious raids on the Peloponnese. The intent was clearly to outlast the Peloponnesians who would then come to terms based on the status quo at the start of the war.

This overarching strategy provided the framework for the initial operational level campaign against the Peloponnese. This was predominantly a naval operation, maintaining naval supremacy to enable protection of the empire, blockading the ports of Spartan allies such as Corinth, and conducting amphibious raids on the Peloponnese. The war lasted from 431–404 (with a short period of “peace” from 421–413 during which military action proceeded in various theaters, without any direct clash between Athens and Sparta) and saw various changes to the strategy. The Spartans identified that they could not win using the traditional strategy and instead aimed to weaken the Athenian Empire—or at least those parts of it they could reach by land. This led to the campaign in the Chalcidice (424–422) and ultimately, after Athens was fatally weakened by its Sicilian disaster (413), to alliance with Persia and a strategy of destruction of Athenian naval power as a means of imposing a blockade and starving the city into surrender.

On the Athenian side, Pericles’ plan proved too defensive for many and various attempts were made to win the war by adopting a more offensive strategy. This first involved an attempt to neutralize Boeotia and therefore weaken the Peloponnesian League and later an attempt to dominate Sicily and use its resources against the Peloponnesians. Ultimately, the Spartan strategy prevailed, although Thucydides’ famous analysis is that the Athenians could have won if they had stuck to Pericles’ original strategy.

Iain Spence

See also Aeneas Tacticus; Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon, Invasion of Persian Empire; Asclepiodotus; Leuctra, Battle of; Marathon, Battle of; Naval Tactics; Parmenion; Peloponnesian War, Second; Sicilian Expedition; Stratagems; Training; Treatises, Military; Xenophon

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Successors (*Diadochoi*), Wars of (322–301)

The Wars of the Successors were a series of conflicts that occurred in the Macedonian Empire between 322 and 301. Following the death of Alexander the Great, the Wars took place in four distinct phases.

The First War arose in 321 after the Regent of Macedon, Perdiccas, was suspected of facilitating a power grab. In response, a coalition was formed against Perdiccas that included Antipater, Antigonus, Craterus, Lysimachus, and Ptolemy. Conflict ended in 320 after the death of Perdiccas.

The Second War occurred after Antipater’s death in 319. Cassander, Antipater’s son, initiated hostilities against Polyperchon in Greece. In Asia Minor, Antigonus fought Eumenes, while simultaneously aiding Cassander’s cause. In 317, Cassander expelled Polyperchon. By 315, Eumenes was captured and executed.

Fear of Antigonus’ power compelled Cassander, Lysimachus, and Ptolemy to unite against him in 314, beginning the Third War. Antigonus made peace with this alliance in 311, while focusing eastward on Seleucus.

The Fourth War began in 308 once Antigonus and his son Demetrius resumed hostilities against Cassander in Greece and Ptolemy in Cyprus. Hostilities ended with the battle of Ipsus in 301. Antigonus was killed, his army destroyed, and Demetrius forced back to Greece.

See also Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon; Antigonus I Monophthalmus; Antipater; Cassander; Demetrius I Poliorcetes; Eumenes of Cardia; Ipsus, Battle of; Lysimachus; Perdiccas; Polyperchon; Ptolemy I Soter; Seleucus I Nicator

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Surrender

In Greek battle, there was no certainty of clemency for the vanquished. Some religious principles offered the defeated a degree of protection, but it was largely a decision for the victors to decide who lived, died or were enslaved. However, there were often practical issues at play, such as political considerations, the possibility of reprisals if prisoners were maltreated, and the opportunity of ransom.

Although the victor had the advantage, there was a general expectation that the victor would act honorably. There are many instances of formal terms being agreed before surrender, particularly during a siege, where both parties had more to bargain with, as the outcomes were less certain than in the field of battle. The defeated inhabitants of Plataea threw themselves at the mercy of the Spartans. Thucydides (3.58.3) has them say, “we surrendered to you voluntarily, stretching out our hands as suppliants, and Hellenic law forbids killing in these circumstances.” Earlier Herodotus gives a number of examples of successful supplications. Sometimes surrender (or refuge) could be sought through a strong third party. For example, Themistocles successfully sought protection from Admetus, who agreed to offer him protection against the Athenians.

The most formal form of surrender involved *asylia* (asylum). Scholars have noted that the concept is linked to the derivative verb, *sylao*, denoting the process of “seizure” or “pillage.” *Asylia* is protection against this. Suppliants in conflict not only enjoyed the protection of the deities connected with the altar, sanctuary or temple at which they may have

sought asylum, but Zeus, in his aspect as Zeus Hikesios, carried out the specific role of protector of all suppliants seeking *asylia*. Greek victors were also mindful not to abuse a suppliant lest they invoke what was called “the vengeance of Neoptolemus,” after the fate of the Greek by that name who, for having impiously slaughtered the Trojan king, Priam, at a hearth altar, was killed in retribution at Apollo’s altar in Delphi. Xenophon not only applauded the Spartan king Agesilaus’ pious regard for suppliants, but he denounced Critias’ impious seizure of Theramenes at an altar (Document 13). Although instances of the abuse of suppliants exist, there are many more cases in which their rights were respected.

Wealthy individuals could surrender in the hope of being ransomed. Examples in which the opportunity to profit from a rich captive is thrown away are usually confined to the most bitter of conflicts, in which the hatred of the enemy overrode possible financial and diplomatic gain. As the Athenian general, Nicias, reminded his foe, Gylippus, in 413, “all men are subject to the fortunes of war” (Plutarch, *Nicias* 27). Nicias’ own record of mercy for captured Spartans and his emotional entreaty moved Gylippus, the Spartan commander at Syracuse. He ordered that the Athenians be given quarter. But Plutarch goes on to explain that, “the order was passed along slowly, so that the number of those killed exceeded those spared.” Later, the Syracusans agreed that, while most of the Athenians’ allies would be branded on the forehead and sold into slavery, the hated Athenians themselves would suffer an even worse fate. They were worked to death under appalling conditions in the stone quarries of Syracuse. Despite Gylippus’ clemency and the high ransom that the Syracusans would have received for the two captured Athenian generals, Demosthenes and Nicias, these men appear to have been executed and deliberately dishonored by having their mutilated bodies cast outside the city gates as carrion.

But more often than not, the conditions of surrender were upheld. There was a general expectation among Greeks that in local conflicts, the honor of the victor in adhering to the terms of surrender could be relied upon, but when it came to war with non-Greeks, duplicity was to be expected. A notable example was the murder of the Greek captains of the Ten Thousand by the Persian satrap, Tissaphernes.

Surrender was certainly a more honorable outcome than flight or desertion. There are jibes in ancient verse aimed at those who returned from battle without their shields—that is, having discarded them so that they

could run away unhindered. At Athens discarding a shield was classified as a crime, resulting in disenfranchisement. But it was not just a matter of cowardice, as the interlocking shield is also a key element of the phalanx and its loss, therefore, compromises the strength of the fighting unit. The romantic view of the Spartans' attitude to surrender is that there was too much shame to countenance it. A Spartan mother tells her son to return either with his shield or on it (Plutarch, *Moralia* 235a, 241f). But the situation was not that simple. The downside in Sparta of having a very small military elite was that these individuals were far too valuable to the society to lose. Therefore, we see the Athenians, "to the surprise of the Hellenes" negotiating the surrender of 120 Spartiates trapped on the island of Sphacteria near Pylos in 425 (Thucydides 4.38–40).

James McDonald

See also Laws of War; Nicias; Phalanx; Plunder and Booty; Prisoners of War and Slavery; Pylos (Sphacteria), Battle of; Religious Practices before Battle; Sacred Truces and Festivals; Sicilian Expedition; Ten Thousand, March of; Truces; War Crimes

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Sybaris/Thurii

The Achaean colony of Sybaris was once the wealthiest and most powerful city in Magna Graecia. The destruction of Sybaris by Croton in 510 ended Sybarite dominance and ushered in a period of Croton's supremacy. Several unsuccessful attempts were made to refound the city until the intervention of Athens in 444/3 and the panhellenic colony of Thurii was founded.

Sybaris expanded its territory to the Tyrrhenian Sea with the foundation of Poseidonia (600), Laus, and Scidrus (dates uncertain). In the sixth century,

a coalition with the Achaean colonies of Croton and Metapontum led to the conquest of Siris, and the absorption of this *polis* into Sybarite territory. By the middle of the sixth century Sybaris controlled a large territory, supposedly ruling over four tribes and 25 *poleis* (Strabo 6.1.13).

Traditionally, the destruction of Sybaris in 510 was attributed to a conflict between Telys, the tyrant of Sybaris, who ousted 500 aristocrats, and Croton, which provided refuge to these exiles and refused to return them (Diodorus 12.9. 2–4). After the destruction some citizens sought refuge in Laus and Scidrus, but others remained at Sybaris, which became a dependency of Croton.

Several attempts to refound the city were prevented by Croton. The Sybarites even appealed to Hieron I of Syracuse to help in their plight. In 453 Sybaris was refounded but a few years later the Crotoniates expelled the inhabitants. The Sybarites then requested assistance from the Spartans and the Athenians. In 446/5 the Athenians sent settlers, including Peloponnesians, to Sybaris but a dispute between the original Sybarites and the new colonists led to either the execution or expulsion of the Sybarites. In 444/3 the Athenians founded Thurii on a portion of Archaic Sybaris and invited other *poleis* to send settlers, creating a panhellenic colony (Diodorus 12.10–11).

Shortly after its foundation, Thurii fought with Taras over Sirite territory, resulting in the foundation of Heraclea in Taras' name. In the fourth century, Thurii was a member of the Italiote League and defended itself against Dionysius I of Syracuse, the Lucanians, and the Brettii. In 282 the threat of a Lucanian attack caused the city to ally with Rome, which installed a garrison. Taras attacked Thurii and removed the garrison, sparking a war between Taras and Rome.

Christine S. Lane

See also Croton; Dionysius I of Syracuse; Hieron I of Syracuse; Siris, Destruction by Croton, Metapontum and Sybaris; Syracuse, Campaigns in Italy under Dionysius I; Taras/Tarentum

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Sybota, Battle of (433)

A fairly inconclusive naval battle fought off Sybota (an island to the east of Corcyra) between Corcyra (supported by Athens) and Corinth, which added to the tensions leading to the outbreak of the Second Peloponnesian War (431–404). The battle was the second in the quarrel between Corcyra and Corinth precipitated when Epidamnus, a colony of Corcyra's, appealed for help to Corinth, Corcyra's own mother city, and Corinth agreed. The Corcyraeans decisively won the first naval engagement, off Leucimme, but on learning that Corinth was energetically building an even bigger fleet, asked to join the Delian League. The Athenians reluctantly accepted Corcyra into their alliance; although this was legal under the Thirty Years Peace which had ended the First Peloponnesian War (460/59–445)—neutrals were allowed to join any alliance—the Athenians were worried about degrading relations with Corinth. In the event, the Athenians were swayed by the thought that war with the Peloponnesian League was coming anyway and that they could not afford to lose Corcyra, with its sizeable fleet, as an ally. The Athenians sent 10 triremes to assist Corcyra, with instructions not to engage in combat unless Corcyra was directly threatened.

Corinth mustered 150 ships (90 from Corinth, 10 each from Elis and Leucas, 12 from Megara, 27 from Ambracia, and 1 from Anactorium). Facing them were 110 Corcyraean ships and 10 Athenian ships. The battle began at dawn, with the Athenians initially taking no part in the action. Thucydides (1.49.1) calls the battle "rather old-fashioned" in that the restricted room to maneuver meant that the serious fighting was done by the marines rather than through naval maneuver and ramming. The Corcyraean left wing routed their opposition, pursued them to their camp and began to loot it. The remaining Corcyraean ships, significantly outnumbered, buckled under the pressure and fell back. At this point, the

Athenian triremes began direct engagement of the Corinthians.

The victorious Corinthians recovered their damaged ships and killed any men in the water (mistakenly including some of their own), regrouped and sailed toward Corcyra. Further fighting was avoided when another 20 Athenian ships arrived and the Corinthians withdrew. The next day, the fleets lined up against each other but the Corinthian fleet sailed home when the Athenians assured them that they did not consider themselves at war with Corinth.

Both sides claimed victory and set up trophies. Although the Corinthians had a stronger claim—they had sunk 70 Corcyraean ships and taken 1,000 prisoners—the Corcyraeans thought differently. They had sunk 30 enemy ships, plundered their camp and recovered their own dead without requesting a truce and the Corinthians had refused to engage again on the following day.

Iain Spence

See also Colonies, Colonization; Corcyra, Corcyraeans; Corcyra, Conflict with Epidamnus and Corinth; Corinth, Corinthians; Naval Tactics; Naval Warfare; Peloponnesian War, Second; Ships, War

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Syracuse

Founded by colonists from Corinth led by Archias ca. 734, the first settlement was on Ortygia Island but soon expanded onto the Sicilian mainland at Acharadina. A causeway linked the two and provided Syracuse with two natural harbors: the Lesser Harbor and the Great Harbor (see map). After subjecting the local population, Syracuse began to establish colonies of its own including Camarina. Syracuse rose to become the largest and most important city in Sicily. The city was captured and sacked by the Romans in 212/11.

In 485, Gelon of Gela seized control of Syracuse, easily overthrowing the fledgling democracy that had been established in the city following the expulsion of the oligarchic faction. Gelon settled in Syracuse and transferred the populations of Camarina and Megara Hyblaea to the city. During the First Carthaginian War (480), Gelon and the Syracusans defeated the Carthaginians at the battle of Himera. When Gelon died in 478 he was succeeded by his brother Hieron who ruled Syracuse as Hieron I; during his rule, the Syracusans defeated the Etruscans at the battle of Cumae (474) which halted any further Etruscan expansion southward toward Magna Graecia. After the death of Hieron I, a democracy was established in Syracuse in 466, the chief institutions consisting of an assembly, a *Boule* (or Council), and a board of elected generals (*strategoï*).

During the Second Peloponnesian War Syracuse twice came into conflict with Athens: first during 427–424, and again between 415–413 when the city was besieged by the Athenians. During the siege the Spartans sent Gylippus to the aid of their Syracusan allies. The Syracusans defeated an Athenian fleet in naval engagements in the Great Harbor at Syracuse and the Athenian land forces attempted to retreat into the Sicilian hinterland. The siege of Syracuse ended in a catastrophic defeat for the Athenians.

In 406/5, Dionysius I seized power in Syracuse and during his rule (406/5–367), Syracuse fought three wars against the Carthaginians. His rule also saw the fortification of Ortygia Island, the city walls extended to encompass the Epipolae Plateau and the construction of the Euryalus Fortress at its western edge. Engineers employed by Dionysius I in Syracuse also invented the catapult (*katapeltes*). During his rule, Dionysius I transplanted the inhabitants of Leontini, settling them in Syracuse. Under Dionysius I, Syracuse also extended its influence over and dominance of southern Italy (Magna Graecia) and also sought to extend influence into the Adriatic.

Following the death of Dionysius I in 367, his son Dionysius II ruled Syracuse from 367–357. Dion of Syracuse, the uncle of Dionysius II, drove his nephew from power and ruled Syracuse until murdered in 354. Dionysius II regained power in 347, ruling Syracuse until he was forced to surrender to Timoleon in 344. Timoleon introduced political reform in Syracuse to prevent further attempts at tyranny within the city and also encouraged Greeks from mainland Greece to settle in Syracuse.

However, in 317 Agathocles seized power in Syracuse. He drew support

from the masses for his denouncement of the oligarchic faction within the city—and from his army of mercenaries. Agathocles declared himself king ca. 305–304 and ruled until 289. His expansionist military campaigns to bring the Greek cities of Sicily under his power resulted in war with Carthage (311–306) during which Syracuse was unsuccessfully besieged by the Carthaginians. Agathocles died, allegedly from poisoning, in 289. The Greeks of Sicily, hard-pressed by both Carthage and Campanian former mercenaries of Agathocles who had seized Messina, invited Pyrrhus of Epirus to help them. However the severity and heavy-handedness of Pyrrhus' command alienated the Sicilian Greeks and the Syracusans in particular. Faced with disaffection and insurrections among the Sicilian Greeks, Pyrrhus left Sicily to go to the aid of the Tarantines in 276.

Hieron, a Syracusan who had served under Pyrrhus in Sicily, was elected as their commander by the Syracusan army and seized power in a military coup. He became king (as Hieron II) in 270 and ruled until 215. His rule marked an age of prosperity and building. At first an opponent of Rome, in 263 Hieron II of Syracuse became its ally. He employed Archimedes in helping to strengthen the city's defenses with war machines. Hieron II's successor, Hieronymus, sided with Carthage in Second Punic War, and between 213 and 211 Syracuse was besieged by Rome. The city was sacked, Archimedes being among the casualties.

David Harthen

See also Agathocles; Archimedes; Carthaginian War, First; Carthaginian Wars (409–367); Carthaginian Wars (345–275); Catapult; Dion of Syracuse; Dionysius I; Dionysius II; Fortifications; Gelon; Gylippus; Hieron I; Hieron II; Magna Graecia; Peloponnesian War, Second; Pyrrhus; Rome, Romans; Sicilian Expedition; Siege Warfare; Syracuse, Campaign in Epirus under Dionysius I; Syracuse, Campaigns in Italy under Dionysius I; Syracuse, Siege of; Timoleon. *Roman Section:* Punic War, First; Punic War, Second

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Syracuse, Campaign in Epirus under Dionysius I (385)

In 385, Dionysius I of Syracuse allegedly sought to establish cities in the Adriatic region in the hope of establishing control of the Ionian Sea. With the help of the Molossian exile Alcetas, who was residing at Syracuse, Dionysius allied with the Illyrians, aiming to take control of Epirus and, allegedly, use it as a base from which to plunder the Temple of Apollo at Delphi. Dionysius sent a consignment of 500 panoplies of armor and 2,000 troops to the Illyrians to help them restore Alcetas' rule in Epirus. The Illyrian army, including Dionysius' troops, defeated the Molossians in battle, allegedly slaughtering over 15,000, and restored Alcetas to power. Although the Spartans intervened and expelled the Illyrians, Alcetas remained in power in Epirus. Our main source for this campaign is Diodorus Siculus, who draws on Timaeus. Polybius in particular was highly critical of Timaeus and his work, particularly over Timaeus' lack of military experience.

David Harthen

See also Alcetas; Diodorus Siculus; Dionysius I; Epirus; Illyria, Illyrians; Polybius; Timaeus

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Syracuse, Campaigns in Italy under Dionysius I (391–367)

In 391, Dionysius I of Syracuse's first attempted invasion of Italy was a

disaster. Crossing from Messana to Locri with his troops, he advanced on Rhegium. His fleet, however, was intercepted by 60 triremes from Croton, which were joined by a further 60 triremes from Rhegium. During the battle a storm sprang up and Dionysius barely made it back to Sicily.

In the aftermath of his unsuccessful invasion of southern Italy, he formed an alliance with the Lucanians, with the aid of whom he undertook a second invasion of Italy in 389. Dionysius is said to have been able to muster more than 20,000 infantry, some 3,000 cavalry, 40 warships, and 300 vessels transporting food supplies.

Dionysius began the campaign by besieging Caulonia when he heard that an enemy force of 2,000 cavalry and about 25,000 infantry of the Italian Greek League had set out from Croton toward him and had encamped beside the Elleporus River. Dionysius immediately abandoned his siege and set out to confront the enemy force. Dionysius deployed his army for battle and caught his enemy strung out on the march, slaughtering the vanguard of the enemy. The units following turned up somewhat piecemeal, fled and took refuge on a hill which had no source of water and which Dionysius immediately surrounded. The beleaguered Italian Greeks, allegedly numbering 10,000, surrendered the next day and to their relief and surprise Dionysius let them return home without demanding a ransom for their release. This act of seeming generosity resulted in most of the Italian Greek cities concluding individual peace treaties with Dionysius, even honoring him with the award of golden crowns. Dionysius still remained at war with Rhegium, Caulonia, and Hipponium, but these were now isolated with the breakup of the Italian Greek League.

In 389, Dionysius captured Caulonia, and in the following year Hipponium also fell to him; he razed both cities to the ground and their inhabitants were resettled in Syracuse. In 387, Rhegium fell too, and Dionysius sold the population into slavery. Dionysius' brutality toward other Greeks made him unpopular within the Greek world, but his victory over Rhegium nevertheless made Dionysius I of Syracuse the chief power in Magna Graecia.

In 384, claiming he was aiming to suppress Etruscan pirates, Dionysius sent a force of 60 triremes and launched a raid against the Etruscan port of Pyrgi, plundered the temple there and amassed about 1,000 talents in booty. The loot was to be used to finance a fresh war against the Carthaginians. In 379 Dionysius, returning to Italy, captured Croton and held it until his death

See also Croton; Italy, Italians; Logistics; Magna Graecia; Prisoners of War and Slavery; Ships, Transport; Ships, War; Siege Warfare; Zancle/Messana

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Syracuse, Siege of (414–413)

This siege (see map) was the central activity in the Athenian Sicilian expedition of 415–413 and involved Athens besieging a city almost as big as itself. In 415 the Athenians tricked the Syracusans into marching to Catana, landed unopposed, and occupied the area near the Olympeum (a temple). The Athenians defeated the Syracusan army on its return but then returned to winter in Catana and Naxos. Over winter (415–414) the Syracusans made improvements to their command structure and training, built forts (including at the Olympeum), and built an additional wall to the west of the main city wall to make any attempt to build a siege wall across the Epipolae (a dominating hill to the west of Syracuse) more difficult.

In summer 414 the Athenians returned, occupied Epipolae before the Syracusans could get there and built two forts—one at Labdulum to store equipment and another one near Syce called the Cyclus (“circle”). They planned to starve the city into submission by blockading Syracuse’s harbor with the fleet while building a wall around the city to prevent supplies and reinforcements arriving by land or the inhabitants escaping. The Cyclus was their main base for achieving this. The Syracusan response was to build counter walls from the city across the path of the Athenian construction to maintain external access.

The siege essentially became a wall-building race, with land engagements at various points to ensure local domination to allow the building to occur. The first two Syracusan attempts failed when the

Athenians defeated them and seized their counter walls and the Athenians were able to complete a double wall from the Cyclus to the sea in the south. A force of about 3,000 reinforcements, led by the Spartan Gylippus managed to traverse Epipolae before the Athenians could complete the wall to the north of the Cyclus and got into the city. The Athenians fortified the promontory of Plemmyrium on the south end of the Great Harbor and continued with the wall building north of the Cyclus.

With the arrival of Gylippus, the Syracusans renewed their efforts and eventually won the wall-building race with a victory on Epipolae that allowed them to complete their third cross wall. This cut the Athenian siege line and prevented them from completing the final section of the wall to the northwest of the city. When the Athenian fleet was defeated in the Great Harbor, the Athenians were forced to abandon the siege and almost their entire force was killed or captured during the subsequent withdrawal. The siege is a good illustration of the difficulties of taking a large city before the invention of the catapult, and the alternative techniques available to the attackers and defenders.

Iain Spence

See also Alcibiades; Demosthenes (General); Hermocrates; Lamachus; Nicias; Peloponnesian War, Second; Sicilian Expedition; Siege Warfare; Thucydides

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Syria

In geographical terms, Syria is a region of the Near East bounded on the west by the eastern Mediterranean shore, on the north by the Taurus Mountain range, and on the east and south by the Syrian and Arabian deserts. It includes several major rivers (Orontes, Jordan), mountain ranges

(Lebanon, Antilebanon, Amanus, Bargylos, Judaeen Hills), and valleys (Bekaa, Jordan, Great Rift). As a political entity, Syria has changed shape and size across more than 5,500 years of human civilization and history from the Bronze Age to the present.

The Syrian lands came under the control of a succession of world empires: the Akkadians, Assyrians, Babylonians, Hittites, Egyptians, Neo-Assyrians, and Neo-Babylonians all exerted control over the region until the Achaemenid Persians conquered it under Cyrus I the Great in 539. Alexander the Great conquered the region in the late 330s as part of his victory over Darius III, the last Achaemenid Persian ruler.

After the death of Alexander, one of his generals, Laomedon of Mytilene, was put in charge of Syria. The region briefly passed into the control of Eumenes of Cardia, Alexander's former secretary. Upon the defeat of Eumenes by Antigonus I Monophthalmus in 316, Syria became part of Antigonus' empire. After the battle of Ipsus in 301, Syria came under the control of Seleucus I Nicator, the satrap of Babylon, and remained under the control of the Seleucid dynasty for the next two centuries. The only exception was the region of Coele-Syria, part of which was always controlled by the Seleucids, but which was disputed by the Ptolemies of Egypt.

Tigranes II the Great of Armenia controlled Syria from 83, but was defeated by Pompey the Great in 66, after which Syria became part of the Roman Empire as the province of Syria. After the Jewish Bar-Kochba revolt ended in 135 CE, the province was expanded to incorporate Judea, and was reconstituted as the province of Syria-Palestina.

Paul J. Burton

See also Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon; Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon, Invasion of Persian Empire; Antigonus I Monophthalmus; Antiochus III (the Great); Antiochus IV Epiphanes; Antiochus VII Sidetes; Eumenes of Cardia; Ptolemies; Seleucids; Seleucus I Nicator; Successors (*Diadochoi*), Wars of; Syrian-Egyptian War, First–Sixth; Syrian-Roman War

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Syrian-Egyptian War, First (274–271)

Causes

The First Syrian-Egyptian War was fought between King Antiochus I of Syria and Ptolemy II Philadelphus of Egypt. The root cause of the Syrian-Egyptian Wars was the competing Seleucid and Ptolemaic claims to the lands of Coele-Syria (roughly the area of modern Lebanon, Israel and Palestine). The Seleucid claim was based on the fact that Syria was granted to Seleucus I Nicator in the settlement following the defeat of Antigonus I Monophthalmus after the battle of Ipsus in 301. The Ptolemaic claim was based on the conquests of Ptolemy I Soter in the region in 302/1. Initially in 301, in recognition of his friendship with Ptolemy, Seleucus ceded his claim to Coele-Syria south of the Eleutherus River (the modern Nahr al-Kabir, on the northern border of Lebanon), but later asserted his rights to the land and declared Ptolemy had wrongly taken it from him (Diodorus 21.1.5), thus setting the stage for the Syrian-Egyptian Wars.

The immediate cause of the First Syrian-Egyptian War was the coordinated attack on Ptolemaic possessions by Antiochus II and his son-in-law Magas, who had been in charge of Ptolemaic Cyrenaica since 301, but rebelled against Ptolemy II in 279.

Course

Magas was forced to call off his invasion of Egypt (most likely in 275) even before Antiochus could begin his attack on Coele-Syria. Egyptian forces invaded Syria in 274, perhaps by sea. These were apparently driven out by Seleucid troops, which then moved well south of the Eleutherus River line, perhaps to the borders of Egypt itself, since an inscription locates Ptolemy and his sister-wife Arsinoe at the eastern edge of the Nile delta supervising the construction of defensive works. Ptolemy eventually recovered his position in Coele-Syria and peace was made on the basis of the *status quo*

before the war in 271.

Consequences

The war ended in stalemate with Antiochus preoccupied with Galatian attacks in Asia Minor. Magas remained in possession of Cyrenaica.

Paul J. Burton

See also Antiochus I Soter; Egypt, Egyptians; Ptolemies; Ptolemy I Soter; Ptolemy II Philadelphus; Seleucids; Seleucus I Nicator; Successors (*Diadochoi*), Wars of; Syria

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Syrian-Egyptian War, Second (260/59–ca. 253)

Causes

The Second Syrian-Egyptian War was fought between Antiochus II of Syria and Ptolemy II Philadelphus of Egypt. Around 262 or 261, Ptolemy installed his eldest son, Ptolemy Epigonus, as ruler of Ephesus, thus directly challenging Seleucid control of Asia Minor. Epigonus rebelled against his father in 260 or 259 while his friend Timarchus, ruler of Miletus on behalf of the Ptolemies, set himself up as tyrant of that city. After Epigonus was killed by his soldiers, Ptolemy took direct control of Ephesus. Meanwhile Antiochus II attacked Timarchus in Miletus, which Ptolemy chose to regard as an infringement on his sphere, thus sparking the Second Syrian-Egyptian War.

Course

Ptolemy successfully invaded Syria and Cilicia, but was quickly driven out in unknown circumstances. Meanwhile, Antiochus secured an alliance with Rhodes and wrested Ephesus from Ptolemy's control. Peace was made around 253 and sealed with a marriage alliance: Antiochus married Ptolemy's daughter Berenice.

Consequences

The Ptolemies temporarily lost their possessions in Asia Minor and influence in the Aegean. The costs of the war compelled Ptolemy to intensify his taxation regime in Egypt. While Antiochus was preoccupied with the war, Parthia seceded from the Seleucid Empire. Antiochus also had to acquiesce to the permanent settlement of the Galatians in Asia Minor, and the formation of a separate kingdom of Cappadocia there.

Paul J. Burton

See also Ptolemies; Ptolemy II Philadelphus; Seleucids; Syria

Further Reading

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Syrian-Egyptian War, Third (246–241)

Causes

The Third Syrian-Egyptian War (also known as the Laodicean War) was fought between Seleucus II Callinicus of Syria and Ptolemy III Euergetes of Egypt. When Antiochus II died, allegedly by poisoning at the hands of his divorced wife Laodice, a succession dispute broke out between Laodice, who claimed the succession for her son, Seleucus II, and Berenice, daughter of Ptolemy II Philadelphus, who supported her son Antiochus' claim to the throne. Berenice called upon her brother Ptolemy III to support Antiochus' claim. Meanwhile, Laodice and Seleucus secured the murder of Berenice and her son.

Course

Ptolemy marched north and was welcomed at Seleucia-by-Pieria and then at Antioch, where he discovered that his sister and nephew had been killed. Ptolemy then occupied Cilicia and Syria and marched perhaps as far east as the Euphrates, perhaps reaching Babylon (reports that he reached Bactria are probably exaggerated). Ptolemy regained Ephesus as well. Seleucus mustered a fleet against Ptolemy, but it was destroyed in storms. Ptolemy was recalled to Egypt by an outbreak of unrest there.

The course of the war after this is unclear. Aradus in Coele-Syria fell under Ptolemy's control for a few years, but reverted to near-independence in the Seleucid sphere soon afterward. Ephesus, Miletus, Samos, and parts of Hellespontine Thrace, including Aenus and Maronea, all became Ptolemaic possessions before the war was over. Seleucus retook Damascus before peace was made.

Consequences

By the time peace was made in 241, the Ptolemaic Empire reached its greatest extent at Seleucid expense. Ptolemaic control over Seleucia-by-Pieria was a particularly important prize, though its possession by Egypt virtually guaranteed further conflict between the two kingdoms.

Paul J. Burton

See also Ptolemies; Ptolemy III Euergetes; Seleucids; Syria

Further Reading

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Syrian-Egyptian War, Fourth (221–217)

Causes

The Fourth Syrian-Egyptian War was fought between Antiochus III the Great of Syria and Ptolemy IV Philopator of Egypt. Antiochus was a young man of enormous ambition and energy when he came to the Seleucid throne in 223. He immediately set about trying to restore his empire to its greatest extent. During the succession crisis in Egypt, when Ptolemy IV succeeded his father Ptolemy III amid civil disturbances and court intrigue, including the murder of Philopator's mother Berenice II and his brother Magas, Antiochus began planning the conquest of Coele-Syria. Antiochus' opportunism may have been compounded by his desire for revenge against the Ptolemaic regime for the assistance it provided Attalus I of Pergamum against Seleucid interests in Asia Minor.

Course

Antiochus marched into Coele-Syria in 221 with the aim of retaking Seleucia-by-Pieria, a Ptolemaic possession since the Third Syrian-Egyptian War. Antiochus was forced to call off the invasion, however, after Molon, his renegade commander of the upper satrapies, defeated the king's generals sent against him. After defeating Molon, Antiochus resumed the war against Ptolemy, ignoring the incipient rebellion of his commander in Asia Minor, Achaëus, whose revolt may have been instigated by Ptolemy.

Upon his return to Coele-Syria in 219, Antiochus took Seleucia-by-Pieria. Then Theodotus, Ptolemy's commander in the region, defected to Antiochus, turning over to him Ptolemais and Tyre. Antiochus began advancing southward, laying siege to Ptolemy's cities, while Ptolemy's ministers, Sosibius and Agathocles, managed to secure a four-month truce with the Seleucid king during winter 219/18. This gave Ptolemy the time he needed to assemble and train a massive land army, including 20,000 Egyptian soldiers.

In spring 218, Antiochus resumed operations, taking Ptolemaic cities by surprise and by siege, and also overwhelming Ptolemy's generals in battles on land and sea. In summer 217, the Seleucid and Ptolemaic armies clashed at Raphia in southern Palestine. Antiochus was defeated and sued for peace.

Consequences

Antiochus was forced to withdraw from Coele-Syria entirely, while Ptolemy failed to follow up his victory by attacking Seleucid territory, instead choosing to return to Egypt.

Paul J. Burton

See also Achaëus; Antiochus III (the Great); Egypt, Egyptians; Elephants; Ptolemies; Ptolemy IV Philopator; Raphia, Battle of; Seleucids; Syria

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Syrian-Egyptian War, Fifth (202–195)

Causes

The Fifth Syrian-Egyptian War was fought between Antiochus III the Great of Syria and Ptolemy V Epiphanes of Egypt. Like the Fourth Syrian-Egyptian War, the Fifth originated in Antiochus' taking advantage of a succession crisis in Egypt to attack Coele-Syria. Shortly after the accession of the five-year-old Ptolemy V to the Egyptian throne in 204, Antiochus struck a secret pact with Philip V of Macedon to attack Ptolemaic lands and divide the kingdom between themselves.

Course

Antiochus attacked Coele-Syria in spring 202, and seized Damascus in Palestine. He then began a long siege of Gaza, but it too fell before the end of summer 201. Ptolemy's governor in the region, Ptolemaeus son of Thrasea, defected to Antiochus in late 202 or 201. Ptolemy's ministers charged Scopas the Aetolian with the defense of Coele-Syria. He began his invasion in a surprise winter campaign (201/200) and retook Palestine. In the latter half of 200, Scopas' forces clashed with Antiochus' at the battle of Panium. Antiochus was victorious, and he began reestablishing Seleucid authority in Palestine. He then turned to the Phoenician coastal cities, and blockaded Scopas in Sidon until summer 199, when the city surrendered. He also captured Berytus and Byblus, and successfully besieged Ptolemaïs, Tyre, and perhaps Joppa. By early 198, Coele-Syria was under Seleucid control.

In 197, Antiochus attacked Ptolemaic possessions in Asia Minor. His fleet took all the Ptolemaic ports on the south and Aegean coasts, and his land army removed all remaining Ptolemaic forces from inland Cilicia and Lycia. Peace was made by 195, and Antiochus' daughter Cleopatra was betrothed to Ptolemy. They married in winter 194/3.

Consequences

The Fifth Syrian-Egyptian War undid the results of the Third and Fourth Wars, eliminating all outposts of Ptolemaic power from Asia Minor and Coele-Syria for good. The Seleucid dream of reestablishing its ancestral claims to Coele-Syria had finally been achieved.

Paul J. Burton

See also Antiochus III the Great; Philip V; Ptolemies; Ptolemy V Epiphanes;

Seleucids; Syria

Further Reading

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Syrian-Egyptian War, Sixth (170-168)

Causes

The Sixth Syrian-Egyptian War was fought between Antiochus IV Epiphanes of Syria and Ptolemy VI Philometor of Egypt. Antiochus III's daughter Cleopatra, wife of Ptolemy V and mother of Ptolemy VI Philometor, died in 176, after ruling jointly with her young son since the death of her husband in 180. An anti-Seleucid backlash in Egypt followed, and in 170, Philometor's regents Eulaeus and Lenaeus declared war on Antiochus IV.

Course

By 169, Antiochus defeated an Egyptian army at Pelusium on the eastern edge of the Nile Delta. Eulaeus and Lenaeus were overthrown by an anxious Egyptian populace and replaced with Comanus and Cineas, who negotiated with Antiochus. Antiochus took his nephew Ptolemy VI under his guardianship, making him effectively the ruler of Egypt. Unhappy with this, the Alexandrians appointed Philometor's younger brother, Ptolemy VIII Physcon, king. Antiochus laid siege to Alexandria in 169 but failed to take it and withdrew.

Over the course of the winter, Philometor and Physcon were reconciled, provoking Antiochus into attacking Egypt again. The Ptolemies requested protection from Rome, but the latter was too preoccupied with the Third Macedonian War against Perseus to offer any help. Antiochus took Memphis and Cyprus, and marched on Alexandria. However, at Eleusis, on the city's outskirts, he was met by a Roman delegation led by a former consul, Gaius Popilius Laenas, the Romans having just defeated Perseus at the battle of Pydna. Antiochus held out his hand to Laenas, but the latter refused to shake it, instead handing him a copy of the senatorial decree

ordering him to stand down. Antiochus said he would have to consult his advisers before giving his response, but Laenas drew a circle around the king in the sand with a stick, ordering him to respond before he stepped out of the circle. Antiochus acquiesced, and Laenas took his hand and greeted him as a friend and ally of Rome.

Consequences

The Seleucids withdrew from Egypt and never attacked it again. More significant, however, is the fact that all states in the Hellenistic East had to be mindful of and answer to the power of Rome.

Paul J. Burton

See also Antiochus IV Epiphanes; Macedonian War, Third; Ptolemies; Ptolemy VI Philometor; Pydna, Battle of; Seleucids; Syria

Further Reading

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Syrian-Roman War (192–188)

Causes

The Syrian-Roman War pitted Antiochus III the Great and the Aetolian League against Rome. The war was caused by mutual mistrust, Roman fear of Antiochus' power and ambitions and, according to Polybius, the anger of the Aetolians, who invited the king to liberate Greece, that is, to replace Rome as the arbiter of Greek freedom. Aetolian anger stemmed from perceived slights against the Aetolian League by the Romans, especially Rome's failure to reward them sufficiently for their loyalty and service to Rome during the Second Macedonian War.

Lengthy diplomatic preliminaries, stretching across almost five years, preceded the actual outbreak of war. In 196, Titus Quinctius Flamininus, the Roman liberator of Greece, warned Antiochus not to infringe upon the

autonomy of the Greek states of Asia Minor, and to relinquish control of the former possessions of Philip and Ptolemy in Asia Minor. At the conference at Lysimacheia in September 196, the Roman commissioners in charge of the settlement of the Second Macedonian War demanded that Antiochus leave the Greek cities of Asia alone, evacuate Thrace, and reconcile with Ptolemy. Antiochus defended his activities in Thrace and Asia Minor as a reassertion of traditional Seleucid prerogatives, questioned Rome's right to interfere in his sovereign affairs, and announced a marriage alliance with Ptolemy. In late 194, Antiochus sent envoys to Rome to request a formal treaty of alliance to clarify his status, power, and sphere of interest vis-à-vis Rome's. This the Romans refused, and demanded that Antiochus withdraw from Thrace (while conceding, if he complied, that the king could do as he wished with the Greek states of Asia Minor). The next year, during a conference that was interrupted by the death of Antiochus' son Antiochus, the Romans reiterated their demands concerning Thrace and the Greek cities, while the king's minister Minnio, speaking on the absent king's behalf, reasserted Seleucid ancestral rights. Talks broke down when it was clear that neither side was prepared to budge.

Course

In 192, the Aetolian League made Antiochus its *strategos* for 192/1, and invited the king to cross the Aegean to Greece. Antiochus embarked with 10,000 men—too few to anticipate a war with Rome, which, even at this late date, was by no means a foregone conclusion. War only became inevitable when Antiochus' men attacked a detachment of Roman troops at Delium. The Roman consul Manius Acilius Glabrio crossed to Greece in 191 with a substantial force. Antiochus took his relatively small army to Thermopylae to make his stand against the Romans, as much for strategic reasons (small numbers would be most effective in the narrow space) as for the historical symbolism of the place: like the Spartans in 480, the king could pose as the champion of Greek freedom against the barbarian aggressors, the Romans, who would be cast in the role of the invading Persians. The Romans, however, used the same path around the pass by which the Spartans had been betrayed in 480, and easily defeated the Seleucid forces. Antiochus fled back to Asia.

The Romans, under the command of the consul Lucius Cornelius Scipio launched an amphibious campaign in Asia Minor in 190. The combined

Roman-Rhodian fleet defeated the Seleucid navy (a portion of which was under the command of Hannibal, now exiled from Carthage) in two battles at Side/Eurymedon and Myonessus. The consul Scipio (alongside his brother and adviser Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus, Hannibal's conqueror in the Second Punic War), was escorted to the Hellespont through Macedon and Thrace by Philip V, and launched a land invasion of Asia Minor. Antiochus' attempts to negotiate a solution failed when Scipio demanded that he evacuate Asia west of the Taurus and pay all war-related expenses. The Romans and a coalition of their allies, including Eumenes II of Pergamum, defeated Antiochus' forces at Magnesia-by-Sipylum (Magnesia ad Sipylum) in Lydia in 190.

Consequences

Antiochus sued for peace, which was granted on the following terms in the Peace of Apamea (formalized in 188): the king was to withdraw from all lands west of the Taurus Mountains and Halys River; pay 15,000 talents, 500 immediately, 2,500 upon ratification of the peace, and 1,000 each year over 12 years; hand over Hannibal and other advisors, as well as 20 hostages; and give up all war-elephants and retain no more than 12 warships. Antiochus' territory in Asia Minor was partitioned between Pergamum and Rhodes.

Meanwhile, in Greece, the Romans and Philip V of Macedon fought Antiochus' allies, the Aetolians. After the battle of Thermopylae, the Romans laid siege to the Aetolians at Heraclea while Philip besieged Lamia. Macedonian forces also took control of Athamania, an Aetolian League ally. Heraclea soon fell, and Glabrio ordered Philip to call off the siege of Lamia. In summer 191, the Aetolians sought a truce and talks with the Romans, but negotiations failed when a dispute arose over the nature and terms of surrender. After the truce expired, the war began again. As the war with Antiochus, and Roman attention, shifted eastward, the Aetolians and their allies the Athamanians recovered most of their losses from Philip. After the battle of Magnesia, however, the Romans returned to Greece. The Aetolians, lacking all hope of carrying the war on without Antiochus, sued for peace, which was granted in 189 on condition that they pay a 500-talent indemnity, give up any gains from the recent war, and not expand the League in future. They also signed a treaty of alliance promising to "respect the majesty of the Roman people" in future.

Paul J. Burton

See also Aetolia, Aetolian League; Antiochus III (the Great); Eumenes II of Pergamum; Macedonian War, Second; Magnesia, Battle of; Philip V; Rhodes, Rhodians. *Roman Section:* Flaminius; Hannibal Barca; Scipio Africanus

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T

Tactics. See Naval Tactics; Strategy

Taenarum

Taenarum, at the tip of the Mani peninsula (modern Cape Matapan) in the south of Laconia was the site of an important Spartan temple of Poseidon. In the time of Alexander the Great it became a recruiting center for mercenaries, beginning in 332, with Agis III's attempt to remove Macedonian domination of Greece.

In 324, when Alexander's treasurer Harpalus fled to Greece, he left 6,000 mercenaries at Taenarum. Apparently large numbers of mercenaries disbanded by Alexander's governors or who had served with Persia, with nothing to hope for from Alexander, had already gathered there. Harpalus took 7,000 mercenaries with him to Crete. Thibron, who took over Harpalus' army, recruited another 2,500 in Taenarum. The Athenian general Leosthenes provided shipping for mercenaries from Asia Minor to Taenarum.

In the Lamian War (323–322), Leosthenes was said to have recruited 50,000 mercenaries (Pausanias 1.25, 8.52). The figure is inflated but shows how important Taenarum was as a recruiting depot. In 315 Antigonos I Monophthalmus recruited 8,000 mercenaries from the Peloponnese after getting "permission" (Diodorus 19.60) from Sparta, indicating that Taenarum continued as a recruiting depot. The rogue royal Spartan Cleonymus recruited 5,000 mercenaries there in 303. Afterward, it drops out of history.

Douglas Kelly

See also Agis II; Harpalus; Lamian War; Mercenaries; Thibron

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Tamynae, Battle of (348)

A battle fought in Euboea between Athens (in support of Plutarch—tyrant of Eretria, not the author/biographer) and Euboean rebels, supported by Philip II of Macedon. The Athenians were victorious.

Athens’ involvement in Euboea was to counter Philip II’s spreading influence. The 3,000-strong Athenian force, comprising hoplites (including the *epilektoi*, or elite troops) and cavalry, and commanded by Phocion and Molottus, served alongside Plutarch and his predominantly mercenary troops. The rebel force was of unknown size and commanded by Callias of Chalcis. Phocion refused to march out, citing unfavorable sacrifices, but may have been waiting for reinforcements. Plutarch saw this as cowardice and launched an impetuous attack with his mercenaries; contrary to orders the Athenian cavalry joined them. The rebels held this disorganized attack and pushed Plutarch’s mercenaries and the cavalry back. However, by the time they had reached the Athenian camp the rebels had fallen into disorder. Phocion announced that the sacrifices were now auspicious and attacked, with his *epilektoi* leading; the enemy were routed when the Athenian cavalry re-formed and attacked. Aeschines, the famous Athenian orator, served in the *epilektoi* and received an award for bravery. After the battle the Athenians expelled Plutarch from Eretria, presumably to strengthen Athenian influence there.

The battle demonstrates Phocion’s tactical judgment and the use of prebattle sacrifice. It restored Athenian control of Euboea—although they granted it independence soon afterward.

Iain Spence

See also Aeschines; Elite Troops; Eretria; Philip II of Macedon; Phocion;

Religious Practices before Battle

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Tanagra, Battle of (457)

A Peloponnesian League victory over the Athenians early in the First Peloponnesian War (460/59–445). In the summer of 457, the Peloponnesian League force was returning home from the north and estimating the threat from the Athenian fleet in the Corinthian Gulf as more dangerous than an Athenian land attack, chose the overland route home. The expedition (11,500 strong, including 1,500 Spartans) had forced Phocis to return territory to Doris and, more significantly, reconstituted the Boeotian League. The latter was a major threat to Athens' position and the Athenians, assisted by Argos, attacked the Peloponnesians near Tanagra in Boeotia.

None of the sources provide much detail of the fighting although Diodorus Siculus does describe an immediately subsequent action where the Athenians had the better of the encounter. The main battle seems to have been hard fought, with the Athenians and Argives narrowly losing when their allied Thessalian cavalry deserted to the enemy during the engagement.

The victory had the potential to be a major setback for Athens, giving the newly reformed Boeotian League breathing space to reestablish itself. However, the Athenian victory at Oenophyta soon afterward negated the loss at Tanagra, allowing them to reestablish control over Boeotia.

Iain Spence

See also Boeotian League; Oenophyta, Battle of; Peloponnesian League; Peloponnesian War, First

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Taras/Tarentum

A Spartan colony on the Gulf of Taranto in southern Italy founded in ca. 706 by Phalantus. It was originally named Taras after a mythological hero of that name who was fathered on a local nymph by Poseidon. Despite the hostility of neighboring Italian tribes, the city thrived and soon became the dominant city of Magna Graecia. Taras established colonies of its own including Heraclea (also on the Gulf of Taranto) in 433. The geographical location of Taras made the city the natural stopping point for ships sailing west from mainland Greece. The city's fortunes began to decline from the middle of the fourth century and eventually the city fell to the Romans in 272. During the Second Punic War, Taras, now renamed Tarentum, revolted from Rome and sided with the Carthaginian general Hannibal in 213, but in 209 Tarentum fell again to the Romans, who sacked the city.

Originally a monarchy, a heavy defeat in the first quarter of the fifth century during the Iapygian-Tarentine Wars allegedly wiped out so many of the aristocracy that a democracy was established in the city. During the Second Peloponnesian War (431–404), Taras took the Spartan and Syracusan side against Athens.

Taras reached the height of its economic prosperity and military power in the first half of the fourth century, in part because of the influence and leadership of the scientist, philosopher, and Pythagorean mathematician Archytas, who also served as a general for the city. But after the death of Archytas, in the mid-fourth century, and faced with the hostility and growing power of Italian tribes, the city called upon a succession of generals from elsewhere, including King Archidamus III of Sparta, King Alexander I of Epirus, and Cleonymus of Sparta. In 281 the Tarantines invited Pyrrhus of Epirus to help them, but he was unable to save the city from the growing power of Rome, which took it in 272.

David Harthen

See also Alexander I of Epirus; Archidamus III; Diodorus Siculus; Ephorus; Herodotus; Magna Graecia; Peloponnesian War, Second; Polybius; Pyrrhus;

Further Reading

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“Tearless Battle” (368)

A Spartan victory over a combined Arcadian-Argive force in Arcadia in 368. It was the first significant Spartan victory since their decisive defeat at Leuctra (371). The battle was fought in the context of the collapse of Spartan domination in the Peloponnese and the beginnings of Arcadian assertions of independence from Thebes. The Spartan campaign responded to growing Arcadian ambition and perhaps specifically the foundation of Megalopolis. Although Diodorus Siculus dates this after this battle, the weight of the evidence suggests it preceded it.

The Spartans, under Archidamus III, supported by Celts, Iberians, and cavalry from Dionysius I of Syracuse, captured Caryae and ravaged Parrhasia. After a move to assist his Syracusan allies who were blocked from returning home, Archidamus met with an Arcadian/Argive force marching to cut him off. Spartan morale was high and, when they charged, the bulk of the enemy broke and ran before contact. The Syracusan light troops and cavalry proved especially deadly in the ensuing pursuit. A very large number of Arcadians and Argives were killed (Diodorus specifies 10,000) while not a single Spartan died—giving rise to the name “Tearless Battle.” The victory was a particularly opportune one for Sparta, which was still recovering from Leuctra and suffering a manpower shortage.

Iain Spence

See also Arcadian League; Archidamus III; Argos, Argives; Cavalry; Dionysius I of Syracuse; Light Troops; Megalopolis; Sparta

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Tegea

Tegea was a *polis* located in the southern part of the central Arcadian high plain. In size and importance in Arcadia only its neighbor, Mantinea, matched it.

In early times, Tegea resisted domination by its southern neighbor, Sparta. It won a memorable victory of uncertain date (ca. 570, but probably somewhere between 575 and 560?) in what is referred to the “Battle of the Fetters” (Herodotus 1.66). However, by ca. 550 Tegea was a Spartan ally. At the battle of Plataea (479), Tegea unsuccessfully claimed the post of honor on the Greek left wing on the basis of their military prowess in legendary and recent times (Herodotus 9.26–8). Tegea took part in the Arcadian wars against Sparta in the 470–460s but in the Second Peloponnesian War (431–404) was a firm Spartan ally.

It remained so until 370, when the faction in Tegea supporting the new Arcadian federal state staged an armed uprising after it lost the political argument. Opponents were massacred and some 800 driven into exile at Sparta. When the Arcadian League split ca. 363, Tegea remained on the side hostile to Sparta that fought in the battle of Mantinea (362).

Tegea stayed out of later Greek conflicts with Philip II or Alexander the Great. An important inscription found at Tegea, dating from ca. 324 or soon after, records elaborate measures put in place to deal with the return of exiles in accordance with a decree issued by Alexander the Great.

After Alexander the Great’s death (323), Tegea was caught up in the power struggles in the Peloponnese. In 266 it joined the Greek states opposed to Antigonos II Gonatas in the Chremonidean War (267/6–263/2). In 244 it became an ally of Aetolia. It became subject to King Cleomenes III of Sparta (reigned ca. 235–222) and was liberated by Antigonos III Doson in the campaign that led to the battle of Sellasia (222). After this, it joined the

Achaean League. In 147 Tegea was the scene of a last, abortive conference between envoys of Rome and the Achaean League.

Douglas Kelly

See also Achaean League; Antigonos III Doson; Arcadia, Arcadians; Chremonidean War; Epaminondas; Exiles; Mantinea, Mantineans; Sellasia, Battle of; Sparta, Attack on Tegea (Fetters, Battle of); Sparta, Wars in Arcadia

Further Reading

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Tegyra, Battle of (375)

A Theban victory over a Spartan force in Boeotia in 375. Despite the small number of troops involved it was a significant indicator of the decreasing domination of the Spartan hoplite. Plutarch (*Pelopidas* 16.1) describes it as “a type of precursor to Leuctra”—Sparta’s decisive defeat in 371.

The Theban general Pelopidas had led the Theban Sacred Band (300 hoplites) and a small force of cavalry against Orchomenus, hoping to take it while its Spartan garrison was away in eastern Locris. Learning that the garrison had been replaced, Pelopidas withdrew via Tegyra, on the north shore of Lake Copaïs. En route his army met with the original Spartan garrison (numbering between 1,000–1,800 men) returning to Orchomenus.

Despite being outnumbered, Pelopidas ordered his cavalry to charge, following this with a vigorous charge by the Sacred Band. The Spartan polemarchs were killed in the initial clash and the troops around them gave way, parting so the Thebans could pass through. Instead, Pelopidas turned against the remainder, causing the Spartans to break. There was no real pursuit because of the threat from Orchomenus, so Pelopidas’ men set up a trophy, stripped the dead, and left. The battle was a huge psychological boost to Thebes in its struggle against Sparta and was the first major step in creating Pelopidas’ reputation as an inspired commander.

Iain Spence

See also Pelopidas; Sacred Band

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Teisamenus (ca. 520–450)

Teisamenus came originally from a celebrated family of *manteis* or prophets in Elis. The Delphic oracle had declared he would win the “five greatest contests,” which he first thought meant the pentathlon at the Olympic Games. The story goes that the Spartans realized that the oracle meant success in predicting the outcome of battles and had to accept Teisamenus’ demand of Spartan citizenship (an extremely rare honor for outsiders) for himself and his brother Agias to persuade him to serve them as a *mantis*.

Teisamenus officiated at the battle of Plataea against the Persians in 479 and went on to predict victory for Sparta in four other battles: at Tegea against the Tegeans and Argives (ca. 475?), at Dipaea against Arcadians (ca. 470?), at Isthmus (or “Ithôme”?) against the Messenians (ca. 465?) and at Tanagra against the Athenians and Argives (457).

Douglas Kelly

See also Messenian War, Third; Peloponnesian War, First; Plataea, Battle of; Sparta, Wars in Arcadia; Tanagra, Battle of

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Ten Thousand, March of the (401–400)

The round number, “Ten Thousand” refers to the Greek mercenaries raised by Cyrus the Younger for his attempt in 401 to overthrow his older brother Artaxerxes II. These consisted at the maximum of 9,600 hoplites, 500 Greek light troops, 500 Greek peltasts, 800 Thracian peltasts, and 200 Cretan

archers, a total of 11,900.

Cyrus, supreme Persian commander in Asia Minor, increased his own force of Greek mercenaries and paid for others raised by trusted friends in the Greek world. In this he had the tacit cooperation of Sparta, whose keen ally he had been in the last phase of the Second Peloponnesian War. In the early summer of 401, he assembled all available Greek mercenaries and his Asiatic forces, numbering around 100,000, at Celaenae in western Asia Minor. He marched eastward, saying that his object was to stop raiding by the hill tribes of Pisidia. As he moved beyond Pisidia toward the Cilician Gates, the only route through the Taurus range into Cilicia, the Greek troops became increasingly uneasy. When they reached Tarsus they mutinied but Cyrus reassured them by promising extra pay and saying that he was campaigning against Abrocomas, the satrap of Syria.

Cyrus had entered Cilicia with the connivance of its ruler Syennesis. At Issus, he was joined by his own fleet and also 35 triremes from Sparta, bringing 700 more hoplites under Cheirisophus. Cyrus had called upon Sparta for this open support. Cyrus intended to use his naval forces to turn the Syrian Gates, the pass leading from Cilicia to Syria, if Abrocomas resisted. However, Abrocomas withdrew and Cyrus marched unopposed to the crossing of the River Euphrates at Thapasacus. It was now plain what Cyrus intended and the Greek mercenaries again mutinied. They were won over by speeches from Cyrus' chief mercenary commander, the Spartan exile Clearchus, and Cyrus himself, accompanied by the promise of even higher pay and lavish rewards.

Cyrus marched southward down the left bank of the Euphrates as Artaxerxes' forces fell back. Finally, in about September, at Cunaxa some 45 miles north of Babylon, Cyrus made contact with Artaxerxes' army. Artaxerxes had followed a defensive strategy but had to defend the important city of Babylon.

Artaxerxes had to use Asiatic infantry against Cyrus' Greek mercenaries. On Cyrus' left wing in the battle, these cleared away the Asiatic infantry opposite them. The rest of the battle went against Cyrus, who lost his life in a desperate attack on the Persian center.

At Cyrus' death his Asiatic troops fled or deserted to the other side. The Greeks returned to their camp unmolested by the Persian cavalry. The next day they refused a demand that they surrender. Cyrus' Persian friends were preoccupied with coming to terms with Artaxerxes and the Greeks were left

to make their own arrangements.

Tissaphernes was entrusted with dealing with the Greeks, whom Artaxerxes regarded as enemies deserving vengeance. The Greeks were forced to rely upon Tissaphernes' promises. They could not return by the same the route they had come by. They were without supplies and, in any case, would have been exposed to attack by Tissaphernes' cavalry. Tissaphernes wanted to lure the Greeks out of the area round Babylon which was crisscrossed by irrigation canals and, by promising safe-conduct and supplies, led them south of Babylon to a crossing of the River Tigris at Sittace. They then marched north to the River Zab. There the Greeks' growing suspicions of Tissaphernes led Clearchus to attempt negotiations. With his chief officers and 20 other senior commanders, he was induced to attend a banquet at Tissaphernes' headquarters. There the Greeks were all treacherously seized and sent to Artaxerxes for execution.

In the crisis that followed, the Greeks decided to elect new officers, including the Spartan Cheirisophus as chief and Xenophon, a young Athenian. The army continued its march north in a hollow square, harassed by Tissaphernes' cavalry and slingers. In response, the Greeks improvised some cavalry and slingers of their own but did not even try forcing a crossing of the River Tigris at Jezirah.

At this point the Greeks' only way out was to strike northward through the mountains of Kurdistan in the hope of reaching the coast of the Black Sea, where there were Greek colonies that might help them get back to Greece. This route prevented any further attacks by Persian cavalry but required that the Greeks fight their way through hostile tribes. At the same time, the army had to keep up the march though increasing winter cold and heavy snowfalls. These mercenary hoplites showed the highest resilience and resourcefulness in flanking attacks and feints to force their way through strongly held positions. March discipline was maintained by example and exhortation of the officers, who did everything to keep the army moving.

Finally, in about February, 400, the vanguard of the army caught sight of the Black Sea. Now reduced to about 8,600 in number, the Greeks still had to find their way home. The Greek cities on their route did not have enough ships to transport them by sea and were themselves justifiably anxious at the sudden arrival of such a large and hungry mercenary army. The army now held more frequent meetings to decide on their movement but dissensions became common and separate groups went off on pillaging

missions of their own, at times disastrously. By a combination of land marches and sea transport they finally reached Byzantium in late autumn. The local Spartan commanders had long been unhelpful or hostile to the army. Many mercenaries deserted as winter came on and some 6,000 under Xenophon resorted to service with the Thracian king Seuthes in a winter campaign against rebellious subjects. Seuthes did not keep his promises of pay and in spring 399 what was left of the army willingly took service under Thibron to fight in Sparta's war against Persia in Asia Minor. Some of these mercenaries, including Xenophon, were still in Spartan service at the battle of Coronea (394).

Xenophon's *Anabasis* is a graphic account of the march and is richly informative on the behavior and the thinking of Greek mercenaries. Xenophon also did not underplay his own part as a leader. The spectacular successes of the "Ten Thousand" confirmed the belief among both Greek and Persian commanders in the superiority of Greek infantry to Asiatic. They also stimulated the idea that Greek military conquests in the Persian Empire were possible.

Douglas Kelly

See also Cheirisophus; Clearchus; Coronea, Battle of (394); Cunaxa, Battle of; Cyrus the Younger; Hoplites; Mercenaries; Peltast; Persian (Achaemenid) Empire; Thibron; Tissaphernes; Xenophon

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Territory and War

On the surface Greek warfare, at least in the Archaic and Classical Periods, was rarely fought specifically for territorial gain. Most *poleis* were not interested in territorial aggrandizement so much as acquiring competitive status. At a formal level, hoplite battles were fought for temporary

possession of the actual ground on which the battle was fought, so that the victor would be able to bury their dead without asking the enemy to let them.

There are exceptions. It was generally believed that the Spartans had acquired Messenia by conquest (in the First Messenian War), though we have no way of knowing whether this was true. A much more clear-cut case is Argos, which steadily from the sixth to fourth centuries subjugated and annexed the territory of the small neighboring *poleis*, until Argive territory ended up comprising the whole central plain of the Argolid. In Sicily Syracuse similarly expanded at the expense of nearby cities in the fifth century, while Olynthus in the Chalcidice did the same in the fourth century. In the fifth century, Athens forced states into tribute-paying alliance, but usually did not annex them, though Athenians were settled as cleruchs on allied territory; Aegina was an exception as the Athenians expelled the population in 427 and replaced them with Athenian settlers.

It was the settler societies of the Greek colonies around the Mediterranean who most often fought their neighbors—non-Greeks—to take over their land. Yet we very rarely hear the details of these conflicts, which apparently felt as natural to the Greeks as colonial expansion did to European colonists in recent centuries.

Yet Greek states did often fight wars over borderlands, often of little economic value, but flash points between highly competitive neighboring societies. Herodotus has Aristagoras, trying to induce the Spartans to support the Ionian Revolt, comment that the Greeks fight wars over small pieces of not very valuable land, when they could be plundering Persia. As an example, the conflict that helped spark off the Corinthian War in 395 was over some grazing land near Mount Parnassus, long a point of contention between the nearby Phocians and western Locrians. The *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* tells us that both groups were in the habit of raiding each other's sheep in this area, but in 395 a retaliatory raid by the Locrians was enough to incite the Phocians into a full invasion of Locris. In Asia Minor, Samos and Priene regularly fought over an area known as "the brambles."

Sparta and Argos had a longstanding conflict over a small coastal plain on the east coast of the Peloponnese, known as Cynuria or Thyreae. It was a long way from the Laconian heartland, and not of great value to the Spartans, who were mainly intent on denying it to the Argives. In 431 Sparta gave it to the Aeginetans who had been displaced by the Athenians.

In 424, the Athenians raided the territory, not to claim it but to capture and execute the hapless Aeginetan settlers. In 421 the Argives made the return of the land a condition for renewing their 30-year peace with Sparta, but later proposed a peace which allowed either side to challenge the other to battle over the disputed territory (and nothing else). Territories like this had a symbolic value far higher than any strategic or economic importance.

Such hotspots were scattered all around Greece: between Mantinea and Tegea, between Megara and Corinth, between Boeotia and Attica, but usually had more to do with status and honor than with territorial expansion.

Peter Londey

See also Aegina, Aeginetans; Argolid; Argos, Argives; Champions, Battle of; Colonies, Colonization; Corinthian War; Delian League/Athenian Empire; Locris, Western; Messenian War, First; Olynthus; Peloponnesian War, Second; Phocis, Phocians; Siege Warfare; Syracuse

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Thalassocracy

“Thalassocracy” literally means “rule of the sea” and although it has strong connotations of “naval supremacy,” probably best equates to the broader modern term “sea power.” Sea power is a concept evident in Classical Period Greek thought, especially in the writings of Thucydides and the “Old Oligarch.” In mythical times King Minos of Crete was said to have established his empire through rule of the sea, and Agamemnon was only

able to launch the Trojan expedition because of his strong navy and the fear it induced. The first historical figure recognized as using sea power to great effect was Polycrates, the sixth century tyrant of the island of Samos.

Herodotus says that the naval battle of Salamis was the most important battle of the Persian Wars, more influential than the hoplite battles before and after. Both Thucydides and the “Old Oligarch” (pseudo-Xenophon, *Constitution of the Athenians*) make it clear that Athens established and maintained its empire through rule of the sea, and both authors refer to Athens as a metaphorical island, virtually impervious to land attack and able to strike out by sea.

The Old Oligarch neatly summarizes the advantages of being a sea power, including the ability to raid coastal territory at will and the capacity to control seaborne trade and starve out enemies. Thucydides describes the Second Peloponnesian War (431–404) in such a way that sea power comes out as the central factor in its conduct, with great naval battles, trade disruption, and many amphibious campaigns conducted throughout the Mediterranean. As Thucydides describes the war, it is clear that it was only when Athens began losing its control over the sea that the Spartans and their allies were able to gain the upper hand through their own sea power, not through their traditional power on land.

John M. Nash

See also Delian League/Athenian Empire; Naval Warfare; Peloponnesian War, Second; Thucydides

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Thasos

Thasos is an island situated in the far north of the Aegean Sea, less than 10 miles (16 kilometers) from the Thracian coast. The island’s geographical location was of great strategic and military importance, straddling sea-

routes connecting the Aegean Sea with the Black Sea, and the coast of Asia Minor with Thrace, and as an island from which the resources of Thrace could be exploited.

Tradition had it that Thasos was settled in 680, by colonists from Paros. By the beginning of the fifth century, Thasos had a powerful navy and considerable wealth, derived in particular from mining on the island and in its possessions on the mainland. Nonetheless, despite its powerful navy and strong fortifications, in 492 the island surrendered without resistance to the Persians. In 477, after the Persians retreated from Greece, Thasos joined the Delian League as a contributor of ships. In 465, however, Thasos revolted, and the Athenians besieged the island for three years. When they surrendered, the Thasians had to pull down their walls, surrender their mainland possessions, and pay tribute. During the Second Peloponnesian War, Athens used Thasos as a naval-base. In 410, Thasos became an ally of Sparta, and there followed a long period of intermittent but bloody *stasis* between pro-Spartans and pro-Athenians.

In 378/7, Thasos joined the Second Athenian Confederacy, and regained some of its lost territory on the Thracian coast; in 360, the island founded Crenides near Mount Pangaeum. In 340/39 Thasos was captured by Philip II of Macedon, but seems to have retained its autonomy until 202 when Philip V of Macedon took it. The Romans restored its independence in 196.

Aikaterini-Iliana Rassia

See also Archilochus; Athens, Revolts of Allies (Fifth Century); Delian League/Athenian Empire; Pangaeum, Mount; Philip II of Macedon; Philip V; *Stasis*; Thrace, Thracians

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Thebes, Invasions of the Peloponnese

After the Thebans destroyed much of the remaining Spartiate citizen body at the battle of Leuctra (371), worsening the Spartiate population shortage, they were excluded from peace negotiations at Athens. Sparta was clearly weak and many of Sparta's Peloponnesian allies had already sworn mutual aid oaths with Athens. Taking advantage of this weakness, the Thebans invaded the Peloponnese. Technically, they came to stop Sparta from attacking Arcadia, which was in the process of reorganizing itself into a federal state. Several groups invited the Thebans to invade, including the Arcadians, Argives, Eleians, Laconian *Perioikoi*, and Caryeais, the latter two specifically citing Sparta's low population as an attraction for invasion. The Thebans and Arcadians first invaded Laconia in winter 370. Although stopping short of Sparta itself, they ravaged the port-town of Gytheum and several other Laconian towns. Panic resulted in Sparta: some Spartiates planned revolution, and 6,000 Helots were given freedom and weapons to defend Sparta. The Spartans received help from mercenaries and from Corinth, Phlius, Epidaurus, Pellene, and some other states, and fought for several days. By fighting and perhaps bribery they induced the invading armies to go home when winter storms began.

These campaigns permanently maimed Spartan power. The Thebans freed the Messenians from helotry and established or reestablished the heavily fortified city of Messene at Mount Ithôme as a capital for the Messenians; self-styled Messenians from all around the Mediterranean were then invited to settle there. This took a huge amount of Spartan-controlled farmland away from Sparta, halving its economy. Simultaneously, probably with Theban assistance, the Arcadians created the city of Megalopolis as a capital for an Arcadian League, which became a major Peloponnesian power into the Roman period. In the first campaign, Sparta asked Athens for aid, which was sent, and the Theban army withdrew. In the second campaign (369), Epaminondas defeated Sicyon and Pellene, and attacked Epidaurus, Troezen, and Corinth. Syracusan and Athenian military assistance appeared, causing Epaminondas and his army to withdraw again.

Alongside these invasions and closely following them, oligarchic pro-Spartan institutions in many Peloponnesian *poleis* gave way to civil wars, and then to wider franchises such as in Argos, Elis, and Tegea. Ethnic/national consciousness also flourished in some city-states. Many cities in

northern Greece found Thebes a more sensible ally than Sparta, severely weakening Sparta's Peloponnesian League. Thebes secured Persian trust and received the king's support for Messenia's autonomy. The King's Peace was renewed, involving Sparta's Peloponnesian allies but not Sparta. These losses plus the preexisting Spartiate population decline transformed Sparta from an international to a local player, and crippled the Spartiate aristocratic warrior lifestyle by removing much of the basis of the luxury that had given Spartiates their peculiar privileges and attitudes.

Timothy Doran

See also Agesilaus II; Arcadian League; Boeotian League; Epaminondas; Leuctra, Battle of; Mantinea, Battle of (362); Peloponnesian League; Sparta

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Thebes, Thebans

The city of Thebes was an important Greek center in the Bronze Age, but had declined somewhat afterward. Located on a strategic site on the Boeotian plain, Thebes had long tried to assert its primacy among the cities in Boeotia, with mixed success. Given our limited sources for Thebes little is known with certainty about much of its history before 490. There is little doubt that although militarily it was a notch below Athens and Sparta for much of the period between 490 and 323, Thebes was still an important city that continued to influence Greek affairs.

By 490, Thebes was a member of the Peloponnesian League. When Darius I sent envoys to Greece it deferred to Sparta. The city played no role at Marathon but was part of the Hellenic League in 480 and sent men to Thermopylae. Herodotus suggests that the city would defect to Persia at the first opportunity, but this impression is likely due to his *History* having been written in Athens when it was in conflict with Thebes. Despite Herodotus' assertion, the Theban troops at Thermopylae probably died fighting in the pass along with the Spartans and Thespians. Thebes contributed men to the

fight at Plataea, on the Persian side.

During the period after 479, Thebes does not appear to have played a strong role outside Boeotia. It fought against Athens in several engagements before 457, but failed to keep it out of Boeotia, where Athens dominated for a decade. Thebes contributed in 447 to ejecting Athens from the regions and then formed the Boeotian Confederacy. Thebes attacked Plataea in 431, at the start of the Second Peloponnesian War. During the war it often asserted dominance in the Boeotian Confederacy by defeating other regional cities. When Sparta declined to destroy Athens at the end of the war Thebes left the Peloponnesian League and remained at odds with Sparta.

During the fourth century Thebes was one of several cities competing for hegemony. It was a major participant and the primary loser in the Corinthian War, ended by the King's Peace in 387/6. The terms of the Peace declared all Greek cities autonomous, a condition Sparta interpreted as requiring dismantling of the Boeotian Confederacy. Chafing under Spartan meddling and a garrison, the Thebans, under Pelopidas' leadership, ejected the garrison and prepared for war. Thebes and Sparta met in 371 at Leuctra where the Thebans won a great victory that broke Sparta's reputation for invincibility.

The victory at Leuctra ushered in a period of Theban hegemony in Greece. In 370, Epaminondas led a Theban force into the Peloponnese where he invaded Spartan territory and although not taking the city he freed the Messenian Helots and dismantled Spartan power. Thebes under Epaminondas' leadership used the opportunity to meddle in the politics of Thessaly and the Peloponnese as well as intimidating other parts of Greece for the next several years. The hegemony lasted until 362 when a large alliance led by Sparta and Athens met Thebes at Mantinea. The battle ended in a draw when Epaminondas died, but it was the effective end of the Theban hegemony.

During the next several decades Thebes was impotent as no Greek city was able to become dominant. In the Third Sacred War when Phocis used its looted wealth to dominate central Greece, Thebes invited Philip II of Macedon to assist (347) and he settled the war the following year. During the Fourth Sacred War, Thebes opposed Philip II and allied with Athens at the battle of Chaeronea, which they lost to Macedon (338). Afterward Thebes became a member of the League of Corinth. When Alexander became king of Macedon and confirmed his leadership of the League of

Corinth in 336 Thebes agreed. However, while Alexander was securing his northern frontier, Thebes revolted when they believed he had died. Learning of the revolt Alexander marched south and after a brief engagement he sacked the city and with League permission razed it to the ground as a punishment (335). Later, at the end of his career, Alexander regretted having destroyed the city.

Cassander rebuilt Thebes and actively fortified the Cadmea in 316. The city turned out to be unimportant militarily during most of the third century, but actively took sides in the wars of the second century. It supported Philip V during the Second Macedonian War (200–196) and supported Antiochus in the Syrian-Roman War of 192–188, but sided with Rome during the Third Macedonian War (171–168), a choice that contributed to the dissolution of the Boeotian League until after the war. When the Achaean League sought support in 146, Thebes joined again. In the aftermath of that failure the Boeotian League was dissolved and Thebes was chastised by Rome. During the first century when Sulla invaded and fought Mithridates' general Archelaus in Boeotia Thebes suffered additional damage from Sulla's army, but was not sacked.

Thebes had been an important city-state during the Classical Period, rising to the dominant position in all of Greece for a while during the mid-fourth century. However, although it was rebuilt, it never regained anything like its previous prominence in Boeotia, much less in Central Greece.

Lee L. Brice

See also Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon; Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon, Destruction of Thebes; Antiochus III (the Great); Boeotian League; Cassander; Chaeronea, Battle of; Epaminondas; Hellenic League (against Persians); Hellenic League (under Philip); King's Peace; Macedonian War, Second; Macedonian War, Third; Mithridates VI Eupator; Pelopidas; Peloponnesian League; Peloponnesian War, Second; Persian Wars; Plataea, Battle of; Rome; Sparta; Thermopylae, Battle of. *Roman Section:* Sulla, Lucius Cornelius

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Themistocles (ca. 528–460)

Themistocles, son of Neocles, was an Athenian political and military leader active in the first half of the fifth century. He played the major role in turning Athens into a major Greek naval power in the years before the Second Persian War (480-479) and commanded the Athenian contingent in the Greek fleet during the war.



Marble bust of Themistocles, from the Caseggiato del Temistocle, Roman copy of a Greek original, possibly fifth century. Statues of statesmen were apparently placed in the Athenian Agora only from the fourth century on, and it is impossible to know whether this bust bears any resemblance to Themistocles or, more likely, is an idealized representation. Located in the Ostia Museum, Italy. (Werner Forman/Corbis)

Ancient tradition was that Themistocles came from a non-aristocratic and undistinguished family, had a non-Athenian mother, and came to prominence through sheer ability and force of personality. While there is certainly something in the latter part of this assessment, it seems more likely that Themistocles' family, although undistinguished, was part of the

minor aristocracy. One of the problems is that in antiquity Themistocles was known for his cunning and deceit. Such trickery was in general not a prized attribute for a politician in the literature and Themistocles' eventual flight to Persia did not help. His literary picture therefore tends to be tinged with some hostility, including allegations of greed and extortion. (Thucydides is a welcome exception to this.)

Themistocles first appears in our sources as eponymous archon for 493/2 (i.e., he was the archon whose name was used to date the year)—at that time still an elected and prestigious post. Around this time, he seems to have pushed for a new Athenian port at Piraeus. In 490 he fought in the great Athenian victory at Marathon, perhaps as one of the generals. However, his main claim to fame is his transformation of Athens into a major naval power prior to the Persian invasion of 480. In 483, in the face of opposition from Aristides, he persuaded his fellow citizens to use a large surplus from the silver mines at Laurium to almost triple the size of the navy (from 70 to 200 ships). In later times, this new emphasis on the navy was seen as a major influence on the development of democracy in Athens, probably the basis for the (unfounded) view that he was a radical democrat.

As Themistocles seems to have anticipated, this fleet played a crucial part in defending Greece from the Persian combined land and sea invasion of 480–479. Herodotus at least (8.19, 58ff.) and probably Thucydides (1.74, cf. 1.138) believed that it was Themistocles' plans that delivered Greek success at Artemisium and Salamis in 480. Although Herodotus may be echoing the Athenian version of events—after all, the Spartan Eurybiades was in overall command of the fleet—it is quite likely that his advice would have been listened to—he commanded by far the largest contingent in the fleet and a threat to withdraw it would have been extremely effective.

Despite his successes, Themistocles' influence in Athens waned from 479. He did, however, play a major role in the Athenians' postwar rebuilding of their walls. At some point (Plutarch, *Themistocles* 21) he made himself very unpopular with Athens' allies in the Aegean by levying money from them and by ca. 471 his popularity in Athens itself had declined sufficiently that he lost when an ostracism was put to the vote (see illustration in Ostracism entry). Themistocles went into exile in Argos and when the Spartans accused him of involvement in Pausanias' treasonous pro-Persian plots, he fled to Persia, dying there ca. 460

Iain Spence

See also Aristides; Artemisium, Battle of; Cimon; Delian League/Athenian Empire; Finance and War; Marathon, Battle of; Omens and Portents; Pausanias, son of Cleombrotus; Persian Wars; Salamis, Battle of (480); Troezen Decree

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Themistocles Decree. See Troezen Decree

Theramenes (d. 404/3)

Theramenes was a controversial figure because of his role in the overthrow of the Athenian democracy in 411 and again in 404. Because of his ability to fit with opposing sides of politics, his opponents nicknamed him “the buskin” (a large boot used in stage costumes and which could fit either foot). He came from a well-known family: his father, Hagnon, was the Athenian founder of Amphipolis.

In 411, Theramenes was part of the moderate oligarchic government (the “Five Thousand”) which replaced the democracy. This radical departure from the well-established system failed and Theramenes, who saw the writing on the wall early, helped bring it down.

As a subordinate commander at the battle of Arginusae in 406, he was

one of those tasked by the generals to recover the Athenian survivors. However, they could not be recovered because of a storm. The matter became a cause celebre when the generals were illegally collectively tried and executed for the failure to recover the men. Xenophon clearly believes that Theramenes (successfully) tried to blame the generals for his failure, but a year later Alcibiades was far from critical of him.

At the end of the Second Peloponnesian War, the democracy was overthrown with Spartan help. Theramenes allegedly spun out negotiations with Lysander until Athens was starved into agreeing to surrender and abolish the democracy. He himself became a member of the resulting narrow oligarchy, the “Thirty Tyrants.” However, he fell out with his fellows, especially Critias, over the narrowness of the franchise and the brutality employed.

The Thirty accused him before the council but when it looked as if he would be acquitted Critias intervened, struck him from the list of the Thirty, and sentenced him to death. Xenophon records Theramenes jokingly threw the dregs of his hemlock as if it were wine and he was playing the game *kottabos*, where one toasted the health of a loved one, with the comment “here’s to that lovely fellow Critias” (Xenophon *Hellenica* 2.3.56, Document 13).

Iain Spence

See also Arginusae, Battle of; Athens, Oligarchic Movements; Athens, Restoration of Democracy; Lysander; Peloponnesian War, Second

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Thermopylae, Battle of (480)

Thermopylae, in antiquity (but not today), was a narrow defile (50 feet or 15

meters wide) between the mountains and the sea on the coastal road in Malis and the site of the first land battle in the Second Persian War.

Abandoning a defense further north, the Greek army, in conjunction with the fleet at Artemisium, occupied Thermopylae to block the Persian advance. However, the land component (about 7,000 men) seems woefully inadequate for this purpose. Sparta sent King Leonidas I with 300 men—perhaps the *hippeis* or king's bodyguard. The remainder of the force was drawn from the Peloponnese and from states most immediately threatened if the Persians forced Thermopylae—Boeotia, Phocis, and Locris. The Spartans stated they could only send 300 men because of the Carneian religious festival. This may have been a genuine reason, perhaps reinforced by the view that if Athenians could defeat the Persians at Marathon a small force could hold Thermopylae, at least until after the festival. Similarly, other Greek states did not contribute because of the Olympic festival, and did not expect the Persians to force the pass so quickly. Conversely, Sparta generally did not like committing large numbers of troops outside the Peloponnese and this may also have been so in 480—they certainly were reluctant to do so for the remainder of the war.

On arrival, Leonidas improved Thermopylae's defenses by restoring the Phocian wall there and used the Phocians to secure a mountain track above the pass (the Anopaeian track) which could be used to outflank his main position. Unaware of this track and restricted by the terrain, the Persians were reduced to making frontal infantry assaults in a confined space. As at Marathon, Greek hoplites proved individually superior to the more lightly armed and armored Persians. Although the Persian army probably had at least a 50:1 advantage and perhaps significantly greater (but the 2.6 million fighting men in Herodotus 7.186 is clearly exaggerated) it made no headway for several days while suffering severe losses.

When a local, Ephialtes, offered to guide them over the Anopaeian track, Xerxes sent a force along it to outflank the Greeks. This maneuver was successful—the Phocians guarding it were simply bypassed, but were able to warn the main body. Leonidas sent most of his force home. The remainder (700 Thespians, 400 Thebans, and the 300 Spartans) fought to the end. The fighting was so fierce that Herodotus (7.223) records that the Persian officers had to use whips to force their men against the Greeks, who were reduced to fighting with their bare hands when their weapons broke. Greek tradition, recorded by Herodotus, and probably influenced by Thebes' later

desertion to the Persians, was that the Thebans were forced to stay and surrendered as soon as they could. Once the pass was turned, the Greek navy at Artemisium was also forced to withdraw and the Greeks set their next defensive line at the Isthmus of Corinth. Despite the defeat, the heroic stand boosted Greek morale and significantly enhanced Sparta's reputation.

Iain Spence

See also Artemisium; Ephialtes, Malian; Leonidas; Locris, Eastern; Marathon, Battle of; Mycale, Battle of; Persian Wars; Plataea, Battle of

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Thessaly, Thessalians

The region of Thessaly is located in northern Greece on the southern borders of Macedonia. Topographically, Thessaly is made up of two large plains: the Larissa and Trikala lowlands. These plains are ringed by mountains, which include the Pindus, Ossa, and Pelion ranges, as well as the Olympus Massif. These mountains have a significant influence on the climate of the region: Thessaly has a continental climate with hot, dry summers and cold winters, with extreme variations in temperature between the seasons. On account of its topographical setting, Thessaly only has access to the Aegean Sea through the Gulf of Pagasae with its two ports: Volos (Iolcus/Pagasae/Demetrias) and Almyros (Pyrasos/Demetrion). The Thessalian plains are blessed with deep, fertile soil that produces a surplus of grains and cereals. Likewise, the rich grazing provided by the plains supported large herds of horses, cattle, and sheep in antiquity. Thessaly was renowned for its horses and cavalry, and it is no surprise that the region was supposed to be the home of the mythical Centaurs.

The agricultural and pastoral potential of Thessaly made it one of the

earliest continually inhabited regions in mainland Greece. Over 400 Neolithic sites have been uncovered in the region as well as several Bronze Age/Mycenaean sites, the most important of which are Dimini and Iolcus (home of Jason of the golden fleece/Argonautica fame).

Beginning ca. 1000, a group of people who called themselves the “Thessaloi” began moving into the plains of Thessaly and established control over the existing population. These Thessaloi founded a system of aristocratic rule centered in the cities. Each major city—the most important of which were Larissa, Crannon, Pharsalus, and Pherae—was controlled by a specific aristocratic family. The most notable of the families were the Aleuadae and the Scopadae. These powerful aristocratic families were known for their love of horses and horse racing, and many acted as patrons to poets like Pindar, Simonides, and Anacreon. The entire region was organized into a federation controlled by a single chief/*archon*. By the seventh century, Thessaly had become one of the most successful and stable federations of the Archaic Period.

In the second half of the sixth century a member of the Aleuadae—Aleuas the Red—reorganized the Thessalian state. He split the region into four tetrarchies: Thessaliotis, Hestiaetis, Pelasgiotis, and Phthiotis. Each tetrarchy was ruled by a tetrarch. The tetrarchies were further organized into *kleroi* (land allotments), each of which were expected to provide an allotment of troops for the state army, which was led by the *tagos*. As a result of these reforms, and its dominance of the Delphic Amphictyony, Thessaly was the major power of northern Greece for much of the sixth century. Thessaly formed an alliance with the Athenian Peisistratidae and sent a cavalry force to assist them against a Spartan expedition in 511.

During Xerxes’ invasion of Greece Thessaly was one of the territories to medize and join the Persian side. This was done upon the instigation of several members of the Aleuad family, especially after the Thessalians considered themselves abandoned by their allies.

Throughout the fifth century the old aristocratic families remained powerful, but their political control was slowly being undermined as a result of personal rivalries and a growing demand by the ordinary citizens for a say in local government affairs.

Following the battle of Leuctra in 371, the Boeotians became increasingly more involved in Thessalian affairs. Thessalian cavalry and peltasts fought under Epaminondas during the first Boeotian invasion of the

Peloponnese. Interfamily rivalries came to a head in the early fourth century when the cities of inland Thessaly (later the Thessalian League established by the Boeotian general, Pelopidas) began to rise up against the tyrants of Pherae and turned to Boeotia and later Macedonia for help. When the tyrant Alexander of Pherae was assassinated in 358, the Larissans were quick to take advantage of the situation by inviting Philip II of Macedon to intervene in Thessalian affairs. Macedonia had long viewed Thessaly as a potential problem as the 8-kilometer (5-mile) long Vale of Tempe in northeast Thessaly provided an easy access route into Macedonia, and the opportunity for a formal alliance with the Thessalians was seen as very favorable. Philip's alliance with the Thessalian League led to his involvement in the Third Sacred War when the Amphictyonic Council (of which Thessaly was a member) declared war on Phocis.

Following Philip's intercession in Thessalian affairs the Thessalian cavalry became a mainstay in the Macedonian army. It played a significant role in many of Alexander the Great's battles, where it was typically placed on the left wing. The Thessalians and their cavalry continued to support the Macedonians, except during the Lamian War (323–322) when they sided with the Athenians and their allies against Antipater and the Macedonians. After the Athenians and their allies were defeated, Antipater and Craterus began to lay siege to the Thessalian cities, which quickly rejoined the Macedonian side.

By the third century, Thessaly was split between different powers: the Macedonians ruled part of the region, the other part was controlled by the Aetolian confederacy. From this point onward, Thessaly increasingly became a battlefield for "foreign" wars—especially those of the Romans. It was made part of the Roman province of Macedonia in 148.

Carolyn Willekes

See also Achaea Phthiotis; Alexander of Pherae; Cavalry; Cynoscephalae, Battle of (364); Demetrius; Fetters of Greece; Jason of Pherae; Lamian War; Peisistratidae; Persian Wars; Philip II of Macedon; Sacred War, Third

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Thibron (d. ca. 391)

A Spartiate who was the first commander of the army Sparta sent to Asia Minor in 399 to prevent Tissaphernes bringing the Greek cities of Asia Minor back under Persian control after Cyrus' rebellion. His record shows how few able commanders Sparta could call upon.

After limited success Thibron was ordered by the ephors to invade Tissaphernes' own satrapy, Caria, but was replaced by Dercylidas. He went into exile after being condemned for letting his troops plunder their own allies. Apparently Sparta had not arranged adequate finance or supplies for the expeditionary force. Thibron also did not see the need for adequate cavalry in a war in Persian territory.

When Sparta resumed the campaign in Asia Minor in about 391, Thibron was in command, again. With local troops he raided Persian territory until he negligently let his troops be surprised by Persian cavalry and was killed.

Douglas Kelly

See also Agesilaus II; Cyrus the Younger; Dercylidas; Tissaphernes; Xenophon

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Thirty Tyrants. See *Athens, Oligarchic Movements*

Thrace, Greek Cities in

Thrace, the region between the Aegean Sea and the Danube River, and also the area surrounding the Propontis, or Turkey's Sea of Marmara, was home to many Greek settlements. Beginning with the Athenian Peisistratus in the 550s, if not even earlier, the Greeks established many colonies in Thrace to secure natural resources, including gold and timber, and access to important shipping routes and the passage between Europe and Asia. Most Greek cities were located along the coast, on the periphery between the Greek and Thracian worlds, but there were a few settlements further inland, such as Pistiros, a recently excavated trading post. Because of their strategic location, these settlements were frequently the focus of military conflict. The Greeks also used these settlements as recruiting and mustering grounds for Thracian mercenary soldiers, especially light-armed peltasts.

The city of Amphipolis, established by Athens in 437/6, provides an excellent example of the importance of and conflict surrounding Greek cities in Thrace. Located along the Strymon River, Amphipolis was a crucial source for ship-building timber, and afforded access to the valuable mines of Mount Pangaeum. The Athenians finally established the city only after several previous Greek attempts, beginning before the Persian Wars, had failed. Amphipolis was the cause of great conflict, with Sparta seizing the city in 424, during the Second Peloponnesian War, and Athens trying to regain it by sending several unsuccessful military expeditions over the next several decades.

Two other Greek cities in Thrace feature prominently in Greek warfare. Potidaea, a subject of Athens, revolted from Athenian control and was instrumental in causing the outbreak of the Second Peloponnesian War in 431. Olynthus, another city of importance to Athens, was besieged and destroyed by Philip II of Macedon in 348, further inflaming tensions between Athens and the growing Macedonian Empire. Thrace continued to play an important role even after the conquests of Alexander the Great. In 309, one of the Successors of Alexander, Lysimachus, founded a city in Thrace which he called Lysimacheia, to serve as a strategic center against his rivals in the great struggle for control of Alexander's empire. It is no exaggeration to say that the military history of the fifth and fourth centuries centered largely on the Greek cities in Thrace and the efforts undertaken by major powers to secure influence in the region.

The Greek cities in Thrace provided mercenary soldiers to the major Greek powers on several occasions. As seems likely, these mercenaries were often Thracian, rather than Greek, soldiers, though mustered in Greek cities. Many of the light-armed soldiers used by the Athenians to defeat the Spartans at Pylos in 425, for example, were from Greek cities in Thrace such as Aenus. These Greek cities were also centers of military innovation, based on their experience with native Thracians. The Greeks of Abdera, for instance, developed a skilled cavalry force, rare in mainland Greece, to contend with the horse-loving Thracians.

Matthew A. Sears

See also Abdera; Amphipolis; Chersonese, Thracian; Colonies, Colonization; Lysimacheia; Mercenaries; Olynthus; Pangaeum, Mount; Peltast; Potidaea; Propontis, Greek Cities of; Pylos (Sphacteria) Battle of; Sestos; Thasos; Thrace, Thracians

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Thrace, Thracians

The Greeks considered Thrace to be the region between the Aegean Sea and the Danube River, roughly modern Bulgaria and northern Greece, and also the area surrounding the Propontis, or Turkey's Sea of Marmara. The Romans later organized these regions into the administrative province of Thrace. The Thracians was the name given by the Greeks to the many distinct groups of peoples, or tribes, who lived in Thrace, all of whom spoke their own native languages and practiced their own customs. Though there was not one Thracian nation or ethnicity, the various Thracian groups did share many similarities in cultural practices, social organization, dress, and fighting style. Some of the more prominent Thracian groups were the Triballians, Bithynians, Getans, and the Odrysians. The latter group managed to consolidate many different tribes into one larger kingdom,

known as the Odrysian Kingdom of Thrace, for much of the later fifth and into the fourth century. Thrace and the Thracians, especially the light-armed fighter known as the peltast, were very important to the development of Greek warfare.

The Thracians did not leave any written sources of their own, so we know of them primarily through Greek (and later, Roman) sources—including literature, sculpture, and vase painting—as well as from the material finds of archaeological excavation in Thracian lands. The Greeks stereotyped the Thracians as savage and exceedingly warlike, an image that is not entirely inaccurate. The Thracians lived primarily in scattered villages rather than developed city-states, often in rugged mountainous areas; achieved only very limited and brief political unity; and were famous as skilled and fearsome mercenary soldiers. Thracians also made up a large portion of the slaves in Greek states, especially at Athens. Aside from mercenary soldiers, the Greeks were interested in Thrace because of its vast natural resources, including gold and timber, and the strategic location of many Thracian territories along principal trade routes, including the Hellespont, or Dardanelles. There was therefore a great deal of Greek settlement in Thrace, including important city-states along the northern coast of the Aegean Sea, and trading posts further inland.

Thrace featured prominently in many Greek conflicts. Thrace was under Persian control during the Persian Wars, and contributed soldiers to Xerxes' invasion force. During the Second Peloponnesian War, Athens was allied with the Odrysian king Sitalces, and Sparta deprived Athens of its Thracian settlement of Amphipolis and defeated Athens decisively at Aegospotami in the Hellespont. After the war, Thracian troops took part along with the Ten Thousand in Cyrus' expedition against his brother, Artaxerxes II, fighting at the battle of Cunaxa. On their return, the Ten Thousand hired themselves out to the Odrysian leader Seuthes. In the early fourth century, the Athenian Iphicrates defeated Spartan hoplites at Corinth with a group of mercenary peltasts who probably originated from Thrace; Athens and Sparta fought each other for influence in the Hellespont; and Athens tried in vain to recover Amphipolis. Later, Thrace was a focus of the expansionist policies of Philip II of Macedon, bringing him into conflict with the Greek settlements in the region, and with Athens, which tried unsuccessfully to maintain its own position in Thrace.

As warriors, the Thracians were known both as horsemen and as light-

armed skirmishers armed with javelins. In the *Iliad*, the Thracian king Rhesus, an ally of the Trojans, is famous for his prized horses, which are stolen by the Greek heroes Odysseus and Diomedes. But the Thracian warrior that had the greatest impact on Greek warfare was the peltast, a javelin-thrower named for his distinctive crescent-shaped shield, the *pelte*. Peltasts relied on their relatively light armor to swarm against an enemy, either as individuals or in small groups, to hurl their javelins and then retreat at ease, before coming in for another attack. During the Second Peloponnesian War, the Greeks began to appreciate the usefulness of this type of soldier as a complement to the heavy-armed Greek hoplite. Mercenary Thracian peltasts became a regular feature in Greek armies, particularly in the fourth century, and it seems that Greeks themselves were sometimes equipped as peltasts. In the *Anabasis*, Xenophon describes the ways he tried to integrate Greek hoplites with the more mobile peltasts and cavalry of Seuthes, prefiguring the type of combined-arms force perfected by Philip II of Macedon and Alexander the Great. In 390, at Lechaeum, Iphicrates demonstrated that disciplined peltasts on their own could defeat hoplites. One group of Thracian mercenaries, the Dii from the Rhodope mountain range in modern Bulgaria, was conspicuous in being equipped with sabers, *machairai*, instead of javelins. These mercenaries, hired by the Athenians, committed one of the worst atrocities of the Peloponnesian War when they slaughtered all the men, women, children, and even the livestock of the defenseless Boeotian town of Mycalessus in 413.

Matthew A. Sears

See also Athens, Campaigns in Thrace; Cersobleptes; Charidemus; Chersonese, Thracian; Cotys; Iphicrates; Lechaeum, Battle of; Peltast; Seuthes; Ten Thousand, March of; Thrace, Greek cities in

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Thrasybulus (d. 388)

Thrasybulus, son of Lycus, was an Athenian general and democratic politician active in the last stages of the Second Peloponnesian War and the Corinthian War. In 411, while a trierarch (commander of a ship) in the Athenian fleet at Samos, he organized against the oligarchs who had seized power in Athens and was elected *strategos* (general) by the sailors. He appears in 410 commanding 20 ships, later campaigning on the Thracian coast (407) and in the Hellespont (406). Xenophon paints an unflattering picture of his role as trierarch at Arginusae (406) and in the post-battle trial and execution of six *strategoi*.

Thrasybulus was exiled by the Thirty Tyrants and played a major role in the restoration of democracy by occupying first Phyle and then the Piraeus. Thrasybulus was killed toward the end of the Corinthian War by locals at Aspendus, enraged because his troops had looted their property even though they had paid a contribution to avoid this. Although best known for his staunch defense of the democracy, Thrasybulus was also a competent commander on both land and sea.

Iain Spence

See also Arginusae, Battle of; Athens, Restoration of Democracy; Corinthian War; Peloponnesian War, Second

Further Reading

- Thucydides 8.73–76, 81, 100, 104–105; Xenophon, *Hellenica* 1.1.12, 4.9, 5.11, 6.35, 7, 2.3.42–44, 4.1–7, 3.5.16, 4.8.25–32; *Ath. Pol.* 37.1; Pausanias 1.29.3.
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Thrasyllus (d. 406)

An Athenian *strategos* (general) and democrat active during the later stages

of the Second Peloponnesian War (431–404). Thrasyllus first comes to attention with Thrasybulus in the Athenian fleet in Samos as a leader of the democratic opposition to the oligarchic coup in 411.

Thrasyllus commanded the left wing of the fleet in the victory over the Peloponnesians under Mindarus at Cyzicus (410) but was defeated on land at Ephesus (409). Following that, he successfully worked alongside Alcibiades for the rest of the campaigning season. Reelected *strategos* in the command restructure following Alcibiades' defeat at Notium in 406, Thrasyllus served at Arginusae the same year and was one of the six *strategoi* executed after the battle.

Iain Spence

See also Arginusae, Battle of; Ephesus, Battle of; Hellespont Campaign; Athens, Oligarchic Movements; Peloponnesian War, Second; Thrasybulus

Further Reading

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Thucydides (ca. 462–after 404)

Thucydides wrote one work, a history of the war fought from 431 to 404 between the Athenians and the Spartans and their allies, now known as *The Peloponnesian War*. The rigorous historical method and explicit attention to accuracy that Thucydides set himself defined standards for historical research and greatly influenced historians that were to follow him in the Greco-Roman world. Thucydides' narrow focus on politics and war established them as the primary subject for history. His historical principles laid the foundations for modern historical method.

Thucydides was an Athenian. His father's name was Olorus and his mother's Hegesipyle. He had a son named Timotheus. He was a member of the same aristocratic family as the distinguished Athenian generals Miltiades II and Cimon. His father's name and the fact that he owned

mining concessions in Thrace suggest that he may have been related to Thracian aristocracy too. His dates cannot be determined for certain: in antiquity he was believed to have been born 40 years before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War in 431; this is a reasonable supposition, probably derived from Thucydides' own statement that he was old enough to follow the course of the entire war and that he fought in it himself. He also tells us that he caught and survived the plague of 429 and was appointed to the rank of *strategos* (general/admiral) in 424. This was a prestigious and powerful position; 10 *strategoí* were elected each year by the Athenians for an annual term. It was the highest military position in Athens, brought with it great political influence, and was a role reserved at that time for wealthy and influential citizens. However, Thucydides fell from favor and was sent into exile for 20 years after failure in his command in the Thraceward area, where he lost the key city of Amphipolis to the Peloponnesians. He tells us that his exile allowed him more free time for his research and gave him better access to Peloponnesian sources of information. He recorded the end of the war, but did not finish his history, leading to speculation in antiquity that he died a sudden and probably violent death, perhaps on his way home from exile. Thucydides himself suggests that he saw the remains of the walls of Athens after they had been pulled down in 404 and other sources believe he was recalled with other exiles before the end of the war.

The Peloponnesian War is a narrative history, structured chronologically by each year of the war, summer and winter. The current division of the work into eight books dates from the Hellenistic Period. Book 1 describes events leading up to the outbreak of the war, and includes a brief survey of Greek history down to the Persian Wars (the "Archaeology"), and from the Persian Wars down to the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War (the "Pentecontaetia"). The first 10 years of the war (431–421), known as the "Archidamian War" after the Spartan king Archidamus II, are narrated in Books 2–4. In Book 5, Thucydides describes the Mantinean War, the subjugation of Melos and other military and political actions that took place during a period in which Athens and the Peloponnesians were formally at peace (the "Peace of Nicias" 421–414/3). Books 6–7 describe the Athenian campaign in Sicily (415–413) and the renewal of the war with the Peloponnesians. In Book 8, the Ionian War, the final phase of the Peloponnesian War (also called the "Decelean War"), and the oligarchic coup in Athens are described down to 411, where the narrative breaks off.

Xenophon, a younger contemporary of Thucydides, completed the narrative of the war to 404 in his *Hellenica*.

Thucydides describes land and sea military operations that took place during the Peloponnesian War. Despite his focus on hoplite numbers as a way of defining the strength of a *polis* there were few major battles in this war in which hoplite phalanxes fought against each other. The “greatest battle for a long time,” according to Thucydides, was the battle of Mantinea in 418 and he describes this in some detail. Descriptions of other phalanx battles include Syracuse in 415/4 and Delium in 424. Thucydides’ description of the shock surrender of Spartan *hoplites* to peltasts (light troops, typically armed with a javelin and without the heavy hoplite shield) and archers on Sphacteria in 425 testifies to the effectiveness of such troops in battle on rough terrain but seems to have surprised the historian himself.

Thucydides gives detailed accounts of attempts, both successful and unsuccessful, to capture walled cities. He understood that lengthy sieges with circumvallation were difficult, expensive, and even when well-resourced may not be successful: his fullest example is the siege of Syracuse 414–413; other sieges he describes include Potidaea (432–429) and Plataea (429–427). Thucydides understood that a surprise attack at night, where a city is betrayed from within, was an effective and more efficient way to capture a city, and he gives full descriptions of this strategy too: Torone (424) is a good example; Plataea (431) an example where the initial betrayal and attack failed.

Thucydides recognized that significant power and wealth were derived from naval power. Thucydides had a naval command himself and reveals familiarity with trireme warfare. He provides a good description of naval battle tactics in the account of the engagements off Patrae and Naupactus in 429; “old fashioned” tactics are addressed in the description of the battle of Sybota (433) and developments in ship design and strategy in the account of the battle in the Great Harbor of Syracuse (413).

Thucydides shows a keen perception of the politics of war. While able to draw out the motivation of individual politicians such as Pericles, Cleon, and Alcibiades, and the role of personal politics in directing a state’s war policy, he was also able to look at the bigger picture, at what drove states as collective political bodies to engage in war.

Ian M. Plant

See also Alcibiades; Archidamus II; Athens; Athens, Oligarchic Movements; Cimon; Cleon; Delium, Battle of; Herodotus; Hoplites; Mantinea, Battle of (418); Melos; Miltiades II; Naval Warfare; Nicias; Peloponnesian War, Second; Peltast; Pericles; Plataea, Siege of; Potidaea, Siege of; Pylos (Sphacteria), Battle of; Sparta; Sybota, Battle of; Syracuse; Thalassocracy; Xenophon

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Thucydides, Son of Melesias (Mid-Fifth Century)

Thucydides son of Melesias (possibly the grandfather of the historian Thucydides) was a prominent aristocratic politician in Athens in the middle of the fifth century. Known best for being the last serious opponent of Pericles, Thucydides was ostracized, probably in 443/2. Although he returned in 433/2 he was apparently unable, or unwilling, to take Pericles on again at anywhere near the same level as before.

According to Plutarch (*Pericles* 11), Thucydides introduced the innovation of having all his supporters sit together in the *ecclesia* (assembly) to emphasize their numbers. He is often simply regarded as the leader of oligarchically-inclined Athenians but it has been argued (e.g., by Hignett and de Ste. Croix) that his supporters were the conservative democrats who had once followed Cimon. Aristophanes certainly only refers kindly to Thucydides in his extant plays. Thucydides is known for his criticism of Pericles' major building works, financed from the Athenian Empire. It is generally believed that the criticism recorded by Plutarch (*Pericles* 12.2) that

“...we are gilding and beautifying the city like some painted woman surrounding herself with hugely expensive precious stones, statues, and temples” originated from Thucydides himself.

Thucydides’ career illustrates that Pericles did not entirely have it his own way at Athens. Although he should probably not be taken to be a leader of “the oligarchs” the seriousness of the opposition led by Thucydides also shows that there could be considerably divergent opinions within the democracy.

Iain Spence

See also: Athens; Athens, Oligarchic Movements; Delian League/Athenian Empire; Ostracism; Pericles

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Thurii. *See Sybaris/Thurii*

Timaeus (ca. 350–ca. 260)

Timaeus of Tauromenium in Sicily was the author of the major history of the western Greeks. Exiled ca. 315 by Agathocles, tyrant of Syracuse (on whom he poured vitriol in his writings), Timaeus spent 50 years in exile at Athens.

None of his works survive except in excerpts and quotations. His *Olympionikai* ("Olympic Victors") was a chronological work based upon the four-year interval between each celebration of the Olympic Games, these celebrations being themselves numbered. Timaeus was the first to use this Olympiad-based chronology in historical writing. After him, it became standard, since its timeframe could be applied across the whole Mediterranean world.

Timaeus' 38-book *Sicelica* ("Sicilian History") also covered Carthage and Greek and other cities in Italy, including Rome. It extended from earliest times down to the death of Agathocles (289). Timaeus supplemented this with a separate work on Pyrrhus' wars in Italy and Sicily. The end point of this (264) was where Polybius took up the record.

Timaeus' vast history dealt not just with military history: he was interested in mythology, geography, ethnography, and curious natural phenomena. Herodotus was an obvious model. He criticized other historians sharply and was in turn sharply criticized by, among others, Polybius (12.23–28). He was thought to be excessively bookish, lacking experience of war and politics and overly given to fault-finding. He was also regarded as too kind to those he admired, such as Timoleon, and too harsh on those he hated, such as Agathocles. The criticism shows that his work was standard and irreplaceable. Later writers, such as Diodorus Siculus, Strabo and Plutarch, used it extensively. Timaeus aimed to give the history of the western Greeks a full-scale treatment that matched its intrinsic importance but was missing in mainstream Greek historical writing.

Douglas Kelly

See also Agathocles; Diodorus Siculus; Herodotus; Italy, Greek Cities in; Olympia; Plutarch; Polybius; Pyrrhus; Sicily; Timoleon

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[Timoleon \(d. ca. 334\)](#)

In 345/4, the Sicilian Greeks appealed to Corinth, mother city of Syracuse, for help to rid themselves of Dionysius II. The Corinthians sent Timoleon who, while at Rhegium, received word that Hicetas of Leontini had defeated Dionysius II in battle and had him bottled up on Ortygia, the Syracusan acropolis, and also that Hicetas had thrown in his lot with the Carthaginians. The Carthaginians ferried envoys from Hicetas to meet with Timoleon. The Rhegians, keen to aid Timoleon, helped to deceive the Carthaginians long enough to allow Timoleon to slip away from Rhegium and land at Tauromenium with a small force of 700 mercenaries. Timoleon, whose force had grown to some 1,200 men, caught the 5,000 strong force of Hicetas while they were pitching camp near Hadranum and defeated them. Timoleon's victory brought him further support and he then took control of Syracuse, introducing a moderate oligarchic constitution and exiling Dionysius II to Corinth. Timoleon went on to abolish tyrannies in other Sicilian Greek cities too.

In the spring of 341, the Carthaginians with an escort of 200 warships landed a huge force, supposedly consisting of 70,000 men, and 1,000 transport vessels carrying artillery, four-horse chariots, and provisions at Lilybaeum on the west coast of Sicily. Timoleon decided to meet the enemy before it could venture into Greek territory and in a superb piece of generalship managed to catch the Carthaginians while they were crossing the Crimisus River. During the battle a hail and thunderstorm broke overhead and the hail flew into the faces of the Carthaginians. The battle was a resounding victory for Timoleon and allegedly between 10,000 to 12,500 Carthaginians perished with a further 15,000 being taken prisoner. The victory also brought a huge haul of booty. The Carthaginians sued for peace and accepted that all Greek cities of Sicily were to be free and that they would not aid tyrants who were at war with Syracuse.

Timoleon then set about expelling various tyrants from within Sicily and also sent word throughout Greece calling for new colonists to settle in Sicily. Timoleon also revived various Sicilian Greek cities including Camarina, Gela, and Acragas. He died ca. 334.

David Harthen

See also Acragas (Agrigentum); Carthage, Carthaginians; Carthaginian Wars (409–367); Corinth, Corinthians; Dionysius II; Mercenaries; Sicily; Syracuse

Further Reading

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Plutarch, *Timoleon*; Polyaeus, 5.12.
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Timotheus (ca. 415–354)

Timotheus, son of Conon and a student of Isocrates, was an Athenian *strategos* (general) active in the second quarter of the fourth century. A highly competent military commander but consistently hampered by Athens' lack of resources, he had an unfortunate tendency to alienate allies and, perhaps, to exceed his orders.

First elected as *strategos* (general) in 378/7, the year the Second Athenian Confederacy was founded, Timotheus was regularly elected *strategos* after that, his career closely linked with Athens' efforts to regain naval power and empire. In 375, during an expedition with Chabrias to northwest Greece, Timotheus heavily defeated the Spartan fleet at Alyzia. This expedition, and more particularly the victory at Alyzia, caused Corcyra, and several other states, to ally with Athens and Sparta to make peace. However, the following year Timotheus broke the terms of the peace when he restored exiles to Zacynthus, precipitating a new war Athens could not really afford.

As general in 373, Timotheus was sent with 60 triremes, but insufficient funds and crew, to Corcyra. Timotheus' solution, to sail the islands raising money, caused so much delay he was recalled in disgrace. Supported by Jason of Pherae and the king of Molossia, Timotheus was acquitted but in 372 prudently left Athens to serve as a mercenary commander in the Persian attempt to recapture Egypt.

In 366, Timotheus was back in Athens, reelected as *strategos*, and apparently a major driver of Athens' more aggressive policy which led to hostilities with Persia and ultimately helped precipitate the Social War in 357. His establishment of a cleruchy (military colony) on Samos was a major factor in causing the allied unrest that led to the war, but his interference in Erythrae, part of the Persian Empire, did not help either.

Timotheus' career ended in 356 following the Athenian defeat at

Embata. The defeat seems to have been the fault of Chares, who launched an attack against the advice of his fellow generals, Timotheus and Iphicrates. They were forced to follow his unilateral assault and were then put on trial after Chares denounced them for not supporting him. Iphicrates was acquitted but the less popular Timotheus was fined the huge sum of 100 talents. Unable to pay he went into exile and died in 354. After his death he was rehabilitated at Athens and his fine, inherited by his son, significantly reduced.

Iain Spence

See also Athenian Confederacy, Second; Athens, Naval War with Sparta; Chabrias; Chares; Colonies, Military; Conon; Iphicrates; Social War (357–355)

Further Reading

QQ 56; Xenophon, *Hellenica* 5.4, 6.2; Isocrates 15 (*Antidosis*) 120; Demosthenes 49 (*Against Timotheus*); Cornelius Nepos, *Timotheus*; Diodorus 15.29, 36, 45, 47, 81, 88, 16.85.

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Tiryns

Tiryns, situated in the southern Argolid, was one of the main walled Mycenaean “palace” communities. There is a range of archaeological remains of settlement dating back to around 2800. After 1400 typical Mycenaean features emerge, such as a great gate and two *megara*, or halls with central hearths and decorated with fine frescos, one colonnaded. Its cyclopean walls were renowned. In Homer the city is given the epithet of “great-walled Tiryns” (e.g., *Iliad* 2.559). The myths generally explained the massive walls and tunnels as the work of the Cyclopes.



The mighty Bronze Age fortifications of Tiryns. The site was on a small rocky hill, in antiquity less than one mile from the coast. In the 13th and 12th centuries, the city was one of the great centers of the Mycenaean world, but by the time the traveler Pausanias visited in the second century CE, the site was deserted. (Photo by Peter Londey)

In the late thirteenth century, Tiryns, like Athens and Mycenae, reveals evidence of preparations for siege. The palace was burnt in the Late Helladic IIIB period, suffering a similar fate to other Mycenaean centers. Despite its destruction, Tiryns continued to be occupied until the Classical Period. It sent troops to the battle of Plataea in 480. About 12 years later, it was destroyed by Argos, which dominated the Argolid in Classical times. The survivors fled to Halieis. Argos, which also destroyed Mycenae at this time, seemed jealous of the fame of the two ancient Mycenaean citadels and was keen, as the new regional hegemon, to be seen as the successor of past Mycenaean glory. When Pausanias visited around 150 CE, Tiryns was deserted. Heinrich Schliemann, who was also the first major excavator of Mycenae and Troy, dug Tiryns in 1884–1885.

James McDonald

See also Argolid; Argos; Mycenae

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Tissaphernes (d. 395)

Tissaphernes was a Persian noble and satrap (governor) of Caria, but with overall command of the coastal satrapies or provinces of Asia Minor from 413–408 and 401–395. We know something of him as his command coincided with the latter stages of the Second Peloponnesian War (431–404) and Sparta's post war operations in Asia Minor. Unlike his colleague and subordinate Pharnabazus, who receives a more favorable portrait, Tissaphernes comes across in the Greek sources as an able intriguer whose word could not be trusted.

On Alcibiades' advice, during the end stages of the Peloponnesian War Tissaphernes attempted to keep Athens and Sparta on a par. This involved providing sufficient support to the Peloponnesian fleet to allow it some success against the Athenians, but not enough to allow a decisive victory. This playing off of the two sides against each other helped create Tissaphernes' reputation with the Greeks for being less than honest. In September 411, the Spartan admiral Mindarus was so frustrated by Tissaphernes' prevarications and partial support that he aligned with Pharnabazus.

In 408/7, Tissaphernes' career went into temporary decline. His brother unsuccessfully conspired against Darius II and although Tissaphernes retained his satrapy of Caria (and his life) he was demoted from overall command. Cyrus the Younger replaced him, reversed his policy and began wholehearted support of Sparta.

Tissaphernes' relationship with Cyrus rapidly deteriorated into open conflict. When Cyrus revolted against his brother, the Great King Artaxerxes II, Tissaphernes served alongside Artaxerxes at the battle of Cunaxa (401) and afterward treacherously seized and murdered the generals commanding Cyrus' Greek mercenaries. This also added to his poor reputation with the Greeks, but his loyalty to Artaxerxes regained him the

overall command of coastal Asia Minor and marriage to the king's daughter. His skillful diplomatic maneuvers for a time ensured that the Spartan operations against Persia from 399 under Thibron, Dercylidas, and Agesilaus II focused on the territory of his subordinate, Pharnabazus.

Tissaphernes' luck eventually ran out in 395 when Agesilaus heavily defeated him at Sardis. Artaxerxes had him executed soon afterward.

Iain Spence

See also Abydus; Agesilaus II; Alcibiades; Artaxerxes II; Cyrus the Younger; Darius II; Dercylidas; Hellespont Campaign; Persian (Achaemenid) Empire; Pharnabazus; Ten Thousand, March of; Thibron

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Tolmides (d. 447)

Tolmides, son of Tolmaeus was an Athenian general (*strategos*) active in the mid-fifth century. At the time his reputation rivaled Myronides (and his slightly younger contemporary, Pericles). In 456, during the First Peloponnesian War Tolmides led a major naval expedition around the Peloponnesian coast, taking Methone, burning the Spartan docks at Gytheum, taking Zacynthus and bringing Cephallenia into the Athenian alliance. He also took Naupactus and settled the Messenian rebels from Mount Ithôme there. Around 453 he campaigned successfully in Euboea, establishing 1,000 Athenian cleruchs (military settlers) there.

His successful career ended in 447 during Athens' attempts to secure control of western Boeotia. Tolmides was sent with a small force (1,000 hoplites) to restore recently overthrown pro-Athenian democracies there. Although he recaptured Chaeronea, a force of exiles from Orchomenus, assisted by others from Locris and Euboea attacked him on his way home.

Tolmides and many of his men were killed and the remainder captured.

Iain Spence

See also Coronea, Battle of (447); Myronides; Orchomenus (Boeotia); Peloponnesian War, First; Pericles

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Training

Modern militaries consider “individual” and “collective” training critical to delivering combat capability. Individual training encompasses the initial recruit and trade or officer training, specialist and promotion courses, and formal staff training. This is designed to ensure individual competency in the job requirements. Collective training is aimed at ensuring groups, whether sections or squads, ships, sub-units, or formations such as brigades, divisions, or fleets, are able to perform their tasks effectively. Prior to engaging in combat it is usual to conduct “pre-deployment training” to prepare the force element for the specific theater or mission they are about to undertake.

Although the concept of training did develop over time in ancient Greece (and was always dominant at Sparta where the *agoge* was designed to produce high-quality hoplites), for land forces it was pretty limited until the second half of the fifth century. In broad terms, individual training was seen as the responsibility of the individual, not the state, and collective training was quite basic. This was particularly the case during those periods and in those parts of Greece where hoplites were the dominant troops and hoplite warfare the dominant form of combat.

This is not surprising as (with the exception of Sparta and the elite troops other states established in the fifth and fourth centuries) states did not have professional standing armies. Instead, most state hoplite forces were citizen soldiers who reported for duty when required. Traditional

hoplite warfare involved short sharp campaigns, usually resolved in one battle; in between the majority of hoplites were small farmers or tradesmen who had to earn a living and therefore had little time for training.

Other barriers to training included the desire to avoid onerous activity or the view that it was unnecessary—or even damaging to the spirit of free men. Pericles, for example, espouses the amateur ideal, rejecting Sparta's devotion to training, stating that while Spartans "...undergo a painful regime from birth to instill manliness, we live without these restraints but are just as willing to face danger" (Thucydides 2.39.1). Down to the fourth century, other Greek states largely seem to have been prepared to accept Spartan hoplite superiority rather than institute their own rigorous training regimes. Finally, hiring experienced mercenaries could reduce the need for highly trained citizen forces.

However, as warfare became more complex and less hoplite-oriented, training became more commonplace. Thucydides (6.72) casually notes the link between training and success in war and, as noted, several states (including Thebes and Argos) established standing hoplite contingents trained at state expense. The evidence is often severely limited outside Athens and there are dangers in extrapolating Athenian evidence to other cities. Nevertheless, professional teachers of hoplite weapons are attested in late fifth century Athens and the Athenians also held occasional hoplite reviews involving drill and maneuver demonstrations. It seems likely that this would also be true of other Greek states. In the fourth century Athens also instituted the *ephebeia*, a two-year training program for youths. This included performing garrison duty on the frontiers—although Demosthenes' *Against Conon* suggests discipline was not always good (Document 18).



Athenian red-figure *kylix* depicting training, by the Pistoxenos Painter, ca. 480–460. The men have shields, helmets, and greaves, and are probably training for the *hoplitodromos* (hoplite race) run at the Olympics and other games. In combat, hoplites were also equipped with a spear and generally also with a sword and breastplate. Located in the Antikensammlung, Staatliche Museen, Berlin, Germany. (Photo by Ingrid Geske/Art Resource, NY)

Evidence also exists for the training of specialist troops. Archers and slingers were generally sourced from specialist mercenaries or, if citizens, probably learned their skills as shepherds and hunters and did not need much individual training. However, at Athens at least, there was a cavalry training regime. Xenophon's manual for cavalry commanders (*Hipparchicus*) emphasizes individual and collective training—although he complains not enough training was being conducted. This included the *anthippasia*—a mock cavalry battle between squadrons, conducted at festivals, and with a prize for the best squadron. Mounted javelin practice is also attested on several Attic vases. Given the technical aspects of cavalry warfare it seems highly likely training occurred elsewhere. Even in Thessaly and Macedon, where the large numbers of horsemen reduced the need for individual training, formation maneuver and individual weapons practice would have been required to maintain appropriate standards—even prior to the professionalization under Philip II and Alexander.

The introduction of new troop types such as peltasts, or later the

introduction of the Macedonian *sarissa*-armed phalanx in Greece, must have required training. This is confirmed by the Egyptians who spent 12 months training their newly created phalanx, which performed very well at Raphia (217). The equivalent of predeployment training is also attested, for example Agesilaus II in Asia Minor in 396.

The education of officers was limited to on the job experience, mentoring by older officers, collective training, such as the *anthippasia* or hoplite reviews at Athens (which involved basic maneuvering), or reading. General historians such as Herodotus and Thucydides focused on military matters, and from at least the fourth century specialist military treatises were written (works of Xenophon are early examples). Interestingly, despite this, Alexander the Great is reputed to have carried Homer's *Iliad* with him as his manual. However, unlike his Greek counterparts, Alexander had gone through the Macedonian royal page system, which did provide a military education. In his case this was supplemented in his first campaigns by mentoring from experienced generals. Alexander is recorded as giving his troops rigorous training; the complicated drill maneuvers they executed to overawe the Taulantians attest to the results. The professionalization of the Macedonian army under Philip II and Alexander the Great was based on training as well as experience and this seems to have influenced Alexander's Successors, the *diadochoi*.

Presumably naval training, at least at the individual ship level, was always taken seriously—a ship's captain had to rely on the seamanship of his entire crew from the helmsman to the rowers to avoid risk of shipwreck whether in or out of combat. Sophisticated naval maneuvers such as the *diekplous* must have required collective training to execute properly and there are some examples of such training in the ancient sources. Xenophon's *Hellenica* approvingly notes Iphicrates training his fleet during a voyage around the Peloponnese (373/2). Dionysius of Phocaea had instituted a rigorous training regime for the Greek fleet before the battle of Lade (494) but they found it too onerous and gave up after a week.

Iain Spence

See also Agoge; Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon; *Diekplous*; Elite Troops; Ephebes, *Ephebeia*; Finance and War; Iphicrates; Lade, Battle of; Military Service, Greek States and; Naval Tactics; Peltast; Philopoemen; Raphia, Battle of; Ships, War; Sparta; Sport and War; Strategy; Treatises,

Military

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Trauma, War. See PTSD

Treaties. See Alliances/Allies

Treatises, Military

Ancient Greek military manuals, commonly termed *taktika* or *strategika* (on tactics and generalship), *polior-ketika* (siegecraft), or *belopoiika* (artillery), are characteristic of a theoretical approach to warfare and important sources for historical research. This genre emerged in the fourth century as a result of diverse literary, cultural, and military factors. War forms the background to the earliest Greek literature in both verse and prose. From an early date the Homeric poems were regarded as a repository of military wisdom. Herodotus and Thucydides established warfare, its causes, course, and impact, as the primary interest of historical writing, which provided models of generalship, stratagems, and tactics. The second half of the fifth century witnessed a growth of literary culture and the systematic writing down of knowledge previously transmitted orally. This encouraged a diversification of texts on scientific and technical subjects, including medicine, politics, household management, hunting, and equestrianism. The earliest texts devoted to military matters were possibly

compiled in Athens toward the end of the fifth century by sophists, professional instructors who taught various arts or skills (*technai*) to prepare wealthy clients to assume civic and military offices. The sophists were the first to teach tactics and weaponry drills, and although critics accused them of rhetorical and abstract teaching methods, their educational ideals promoted the acquisition and propagation of specialized knowledge.

Military developments in the first half of the fourth century also created circumstances favorable to the production of specialist instructional handbooks that formulated general principles and offered specific recommendations. In the period of endemic warfare following the Peloponnesian War (431-404), increasing tactical specialization and complexity and technological innovations in siegecraft demanded greater technical expertise and accelerated the professionalization of military personnel, including widespread use of mercenaries.

Against this background, Xenophon wrote a series of monographs on technical subjects and played a pioneering role in defining new fields of enquiry that he considered appropriate to a properly educated gentleman. Written in the 360s–350s, his *Hipparchicus* (*Cavalry Commander*), which discusses the training, organization, and operations of Athenian cavalry, and *Peri Hippikes* (*On Horsemanship*), on strictly equestrian matters, are the earliest surviving examples of theoretical studies relating to war. In both works the topic is narrow and the tone personal but informed, reminiscent of a didactic essay or literary memoir. Different in scope and character was the work written by Aeneas Tacticus around 350. This multivolume compendium seemingly aimed to provide a comprehensive treatment of contemporary military science, including defensive preparations, logistics, finance, stratagems, campaign procedures, and tactics. Only one book survives, conventionally entitled *Poliorketika* (*Siegecraft*), which explains how a city might survive a siege. More impersonal in tone and less literary in style, Aeneas appears to combine firsthand experience of command with an understanding of recent military developments. In both form and content Aeneas' work represents a highly developed professional literature, but the extent of his innovation or debt to earlier, now lost, textual sources remains unknown.

Military authors proliferated in the Hellenistic Period, but virtually nothing survives of their works. Cineas of Thessaly, the minister of Pyrrhus, prepared an epitome of Aeneas' writings. Pyrrhus himself wrote a *taktika*,

as did his son, Alexander II of Epirus. The historian Polybius composed a military manual, which included discussion of tactics and encampments. The Athenian statesman Demetrius of Phalerum is also credited with writing a two-book *strategika*. Other authors are little more than names: Clearchus, Pausanias, and Euangelus, apparently in the third century, and Eupolemus and Iphicrates in the second century. The date of Bryon is unknown. Roman authors later categorized these works as either introductions or specialist treatises. Their content, purpose, and influence are uncertain, though the interest of kings, generals, and statesmen, as both authors and readers, implies that at least some examples of this broad genre were deemed of practical value.

Extant Hellenistic military treatises may be subdivided into two main branches. First, a poliorcetic tradition encompasses texts concerned with siegecraft, machinery, and artillery. At a disputed date in the late third or early second century, Biton wrote a short treatise on siege engines, dedicated to a king of Pergamum. It contains technical specifications and diagrams for constructing six devices built by named engineers in the past. Biton's treatise is the most important source on tension-powered artillery, but it remains unclear why he recommends antiquated devices that had long been superseded by torsion-powered technology. Around 200, Philo of Byzantium, known as Philo Mechanicus, wrote a large compendium on mechanics and civil and military engineering, entitled *Mechanike syntaxis*. Most of this work is lost, but the surviving military sections comprise the *Belopoiika*, on the construction of torsion-powered catapults, *Paraskeuastika*, on fortifications and defensive strategies, and *Poliorketika*, which prescribes equipment and tactics employed by besieger and besieged. Philo's written sources included the surviving poliorcetic section of Aeneas' work and possibly now-lost writings on ballistics by the renowned Alexandrian inventor Ctesibius (ca. 270–230). Later treatises written under Roman rule also provide indirect testimony to lost Hellenistic works: Athenaeus (Mechanicus), probably writing in the 20s, cites numerous ancient authorities, while Hero of Alexandria, writing in the 60s CE, possibly also had access to works by Ctesibius.

Second, a late Hellenistic tactical tradition aimed to explain the terminology, organization and maneuvers of a hypothetical army, based on a highly idealized infantry phalanx, with supporting light infantry and cavalry. Chariots and elephants are also briefly discussed, but declared

obsolete. Insofar as this sub-genre portrays an actual army, it is probably the Seleucid army of the late second century. This tradition originates in a lost treatise by the Stoic philosopher Poseidonius of Apamea (ca. 135–ca. 51). Its form and content are known only through derivative works. The earliest witness is a short tract by Asclepiodotus, commonly identified as a pupil of Poseidonius, which is assumed to be an abridgement of the original work. Later treatises by Aelian (writing 106–113 CE) and Arrian (136/7 CE) derive independently from the same tradition.

The subsequent history of Greek tactical writing during the Roman Empire involved further differentiation of literary forms, notably Onesander's *Strategikos* (49–57/8 CE), a practical and ethical guidebook for readers who aspired to high command, and Polyaeus' *Strategika* or *Strategemata* (161–163 CE), a collection of historical excerpts illustrating stratagems and maxims of commanders of the past. Classical and Hellenistic treatises later became important models for Byzantine military literature.

Philip Rance

See also Aelian; Aeneas Tacticus; Arrian; Asclepiodotus; Biton; Demetrius of Phalerum; Hero of Alexandria; Onesander; Philo of Byzantium; Polyaeus; Polybius; Pyrrhus; Training; Xenophon

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Trierarch

A trierarch (*trierarchos*) was responsible for fitting out a trireme for service,

including assembling the equipment and recruiting the crew. In Athens it was the duty of wealthy citizens to undertake a trierarchy on a regular basis, a duty lasting one year. From the late fifth century, as the Second Peloponnesian War drained Athens' finances, the duty of acting as trierarch was often split between two citizens to lessen the burden.

A trireme at sea was nominally under the command of the trierarch, but it is likely that those trierarchs with little or no experience deferred to the ship's more experienced executive officer, the *kybernetes* ("pilot").

John M. Nash

See also Command Structures, Navy; Finance and War; Ships, War; Trireme

Further Reading

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Triphylia

Triphylia (three tribes) was the name of a state established between the Alpheius and Neda rivers ca. 400. The district that it occupied was often claimed by Elis. Triphylia seems to have included the six "Minyan" foundations, the most significant of which was Lepreum. According to Strabo (8.33.3), during Archaic times the Eleians dominated the territory between the Alpheius and the Neda. By the fifth century, however, we hear of the Eleians ravaging most of the Minyan cities, and 200 Lepreans (but no Eleians) joined the Greek army at Plataea in 479. At some time before 421, apparently as the price of Eleian assistance in a conflict with certain Arcadians, the Lepreans had become subject allies of Elis, but in that year (with Spartan support) they successfully revolted.

Although the Eleians temporarily recovered Lepreum, after their defeat at the hands of the Spartans in the Eleian War ca. 400 it became part of the new state of Triphylia, and Triphylian troops fought as a separate contingent among the Spartan allies in the Corinthian War. Soon after 370, however, Triphylia was incorporated into the Arcadian League, and a hero called Triphylos was proclaimed the mythical son of Arcas, the Arcadian

eponymous hero. Triphylia was regained by the Eleians in 245, but in 217, after the invasions of Philip V, came under Macedonian influence. In 146 the Romans returned it to Elis, which then became part of the province of Macedonia.

Graeme F. Bourke

See also Arcadian League; Corinthian War; Elis; Plataea, Battle of

Further Reading

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Trireme (*Trieres*)

The trireme was the primary warship used from the sixth to fourth centuries in the Greek world. It takes its name from “three,” but whether this indicates three distinct levels of rowers has been debated. It was fitted with sails but was rowed into battle (see illustration in Ships, War entry).

The trireme was a fast and sleek vessel equipped with a large metal ram designed for ramming attacks, although boarding tactics were used, especially by less well trained crews or in confined waters (see illustration in Naval Warfare entry).

John M. Nash

See also Naval Tactics; Naval Warfare; Ships, War

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Troad

The Troad is the name given to territory south of the Hellespont, near modern Hissarlik, where ancient Troy (or Ilion) is believed to have been situated. The excavations of Heinrich Schliemann from 1870 to 1890 and his successors confirmed that Hissarlik was a major Bronze Age site, occupied over a long period, as seen in the table.

Most historians identify the Trojans as a people subject to the Hittites; whether there was a “Trojan War” is still hotly debated. But for the Greeks and Romans the war was very real. The supposed site of Troy and nearby burial mounds which were identified as those of Achilles and other heroes became tourist attractions. Prominent individuals who came to pay their respects included Xerxes, Alexander the Great, Julius Caesar, and the emperors Augustus and Hadrian. In the fourth century CE, Constantine considered setting up the new capital of the empire at Troy, before settling for Byzantium.

~~Majestic~~ Chronology

- Troy 900 – ca. 2500
 - Troy 550 – ca. 2100
 - Troy 2100 – ca. 2050
 - Troy 2050 – ca. 1900
 - Troy 1900 – ca. 1800
 - Troy 1800 – ca. 1700: earthquake damage in VIh
 - Troy 1700 – ca. 1600: Mycenaean pottery
 - Troy 1600 – ca. 1500: Greek occupation
 - Troy 1500 – ca. 1400: “dark ware” suggests a new culture
 - Troy 1400 – ca. 1300: settlement named “Ilion”
 - Troy 1300 – ca. 1200: CE
-

Hissarlik (Troy) Occupation Sequence

Besides the Bronze Age site at Hissarlik, there were a number of significant Greek cities in the Troad. At the northern end, Abydus faced Sestos across the narrowest point of the Hellespont. This was where Xerxes and Alexander crossed with their armies, and it always remained an important route for travelers between Asia and Europe. On the southern side of the entrance to the Hellespont, Sigeum was in a strategically important position, and was one of Athens’ early conquests in the area in

the late sixth century, before the whole area came under Persian control. The other major towns were Assos in the south, where fine fortifications survive today, and the late-fourth century foundation, Alexandria Troas, on the west coast. In the fifth century the cities of the Troad were part of the Delian League, but reverted to Persian rule in the fourth century. After Alexander, the area successively came under Antigonos I Monophthalmus, Lysimachus, the Seleucids, and Pergamum, before finally being handed over to the Romans.

James McDonald

See also Abydos; Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon; Commemoration; Hellespont; Homeric Warfare; Pergamum; Trojan War; Xerxes

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Troezen Decree

The Troezen or Themistocles Decree is an inscribed document (Document 6) purporting to be a decree of the Athenian assembly, on the motion of Themistocles, for defensive measures in 480 during the Second Persian War. The decree directs the evacuation of the women and children to Troezen, the old men and moveable possessions to Salamis and for the able-bodied citizens to man 200 triremes. Half of these are to sail to the Greek defensive line at Artemisium/Thermopylae and half to wait at Salamis. The importance of this decree is that it indicates that the Athenians were contemplating a defense at Salamis earlier than Herodotus' account seems to suggest (although the two accounts are not irreconcilable). However, the decree is controversial as the lettering and other features indicate a third-, not a fifth-century date. On balance it seems likely that the decree is a later, and edited, copy of the original or an amalgam of several decrees and reflects, at least in essence, the original decisions in 480.

See also Artemisium, Battle of; Persian Wars; Salamis, Battle of (480); Themistocles

Further Reading

Document 6; Herodotus 8.41; Demosthenes 18 (*On the Crown*) 303; Diodorus 11.39; Plutarch, *Themistocles* 10.

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Trogus, Gnaeus Pompeius. See Justin/Pompeius Trogus

Trojan War, Causes

The Trojan War was the most important war in Greek mythology. It provides the background for Homer's two great epic poems, the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, and for other poems in the epic cycle (only partially extant). Later Greek authors, such as the Athenian tragedians, constantly reworked stories from the war.

The story begins when the Trojan prince, Paris (or Alexandros), who because of an omen has been abandoned on Mount Ida and brought up by shepherds, judges a beauty contest between three goddesses, Hera, Athena, and Aphrodite. He chooses Aphrodite, who has promised him the most beautiful of women, Helen, the wife of the Spartan king Menelaus. Paris goes to Sparta and either abducts or seduces Helen before returning with her to Troy, which is a rich and splendid city on the Asian side of the entrance to the Dardanelles. Due to earlier promises, leaders from all over Greece join an expedition led by Menelaus' brother, Agamemnon, king of Mycenae, to recover Helen.

Peter Londey

See also Homeric Warfare; Mycenae; Troad

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Trojan War, Course

Agamemnon gathers a mighty force of 1,184 ships, perhaps over 100,000 men, described in detail in *Iliad* 2, and discussed somewhat disparagingly by Thucydides. The fleet gathers at Aulis in Boeotia, but is becalmed: Agamemnon has to sacrifice his daughter Iphigeneia to Artemis to get the winds to blow. When the expedition arrives at Troy, the first man to die is Protesilaus, later worshipped as a hero at Elaious on the Chersonese. For 10 years, the Greeks besiege Troy, but are unable to capture it. Homer's Trojans speak Greek, but have many non-Greek-speaking allies from Asia Minor and Thrace. The war is a stalemate, though the Greeks capture and sack many small towns in the area around Troy.

The events of the *Iliad* take place in a short period in the last year of the war, when the Greeks are wearying of the whole enterprise. The greatest Greek warrior, Achilles, whose mother is a sea-nymph, quarrels over booty with Agamemnon, and withdraws from the fight. Although the Greeks have other great warriors, such as Ajax, Diomedes, and the crafty Odysseus, without Achilles they cannot match the Trojans under their great leader Hector, son of King Priam. The *Iliad* describes a series of battles on the plain between the walls of Troy and the sea shore where the Greek ships are beached. While Achilles sulks, his best friend Patroclus borrows his armor, but is killed by Hector. Grief-stricken, Achilles rejoins the fray, and kills Hector, though he knows from the gods that this seals his own fate. He dishonors the corpse and refuses it burial, until eventually he relents and ransoms the body back to Priam.



An early-fifth-century *amphora* with a scene probably representing two unnamed soldiers fighting in the Trojan War. The soldiers are equipped as hoplites, although the one on the left carries the earlier Dipylon shield, long replaced by the *hoplon*, the round shield that gave the hoplite his name. This is probably intended to give an archaic flavor to the scene. Located in the J. Paul Getty Museum, Malibu, California. (The J. Paul Getty Trust)

After the conclusion of the *Iliad*, but told in flashback in the *Odyssey*, Achilles is killed by an arrow shot by Paris. But eventually the Greeks capture Troy with a ruse: on Odysseus' suggestion, they pretend to depart, but leave behind a giant wooden horse, which has warriors concealed inside. The Trojans in relief take the horse into the city as an offering to the gods, but at night, while the Trojans sleep off their celebrations, the Greeks exit from the horse and open the gates to the other Greeks, who have now returned. They sack the city brutally, killing Priam and many others, and lead the women into slavery.

See also Civilian Populations in War; Homeric Warfare; Laws of War; Mycenae; PTSD; Siege Warfare; Troad

Further Reading

QQ 1–2; Homer, *Iliad* and *Odyssey*; Thucydides 1.9–12; Aeschylus, *Agamemnon*; Euripides, *Trojan Women*; Vergil, *Aeneid* 2.

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Trojan War, Consequences

Despite attempts to find vestiges of the story in Hittite records, the war should be regarded as a complete fiction. The Greeks believed that it heralded a troubled period, symbolized by the difficulties several of the heroes have returning home, and by the subsequent murder of Agamemnon by his wife and their son's later revenge. But, whatever the origins of the story (and it was possibly inspired by the visible but inexplicable remains of Bronze Age citadels at Troy and at various places in Greece—see illustrations in Mycenae and Tiryns entries), it provided a rich ground for Greek story-telling, sometimes with added contemporary relevance. Many have, for example, seen Euripides' *Trojan Women* (415), ostensibly about the women waiting to go into slavery after the sack of Troy, as commentary on the recent Athenian destruction of Melos. The Romans believed that fugitive Trojans had settled in Italy: hence Vergil's great national epic, the *Aeneid*, has a vivid description of the sack of Troy as Aeneas, whom Julius Caesar regarded as his ancestor, escapes the burning city. More recently, Jonathan Shay has used Homer's depiction of Achilles as a way of exploring modern ideas about PTSD.

See also Civilian Populations in War; Homeric Warfare; Laws of War; Melos; Mycenae; PTSD; Tiryns; Troad

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Trophy (*Tropaion*)

A *tropaion* (pl. *tropaia*; trophy) was a formal dedication arranged by the victor, in part to celebrate the victory itself, but also as a means of offering thanks to the gods who had allowed it. The common form was a set of captured arms erected as a display on the battlefield, but spoils could also be relocated to be dedicated in temples and sanctuaries. For example, the Boeotians erected a trophy outside the nearby temple of Athena Itonia, when they defeated Athenians under Tolmides at Coronea in 447.

Tropaia appear very early on. Isocrates goes so far as to claim that the first time Greeks erected a battlefield trophy against a barbarian foe was when Agamemnon sacked Troy. By the Classical Period, the erection of trophies had become a standard procedure. Thucydides alone mentions at least 43 different battlefield trophies. Usually, they were sets of captured arms erected at the point most associated with the victory. But to mark special victories, the dedications could be more elaborate. For example, in 413, to celebrate the riverside annihilation of the large Athenian expedition sent against them, the Syracusans, according to Plutarch (*Nicias* 27.6), “decorated the tallest and finest trees by the riverside with the Athenians’ arms.”

At *temene* (sacred precincts) throughout the Greek world, visitors could view dedicated arms and sculptures displayed as war trophies. The second century CE traveler and antiquarian, Pausanias, mentions 19 *tropaia* that had

survived to his time. One of the most interesting dedications was made by the people of Tegea in their temple of Athene Alea. To celebrate their victory over Sparta, they erected the very fetters that the hubristic Spartans had brought with them to enslave the Tegeates.

The Thebans were criticized for setting up a permanent *tropaion* at Leuctra in 371, but in the Hellenistic Period, *tropaia* could often take a more permanent form, similar to today's war memorials. Representations of *tropaia* also appear in art and could become an important means to establish the public profile of a king or general. The erection of long-lasting *tropaia* was also important, since they could be used as testimony of a poorly remembered event. Demosthenes uses a trophy set up by the Phocians to celebrate the slaughter of 270 Thebans at Hedyleum as solid proof of the victory to make a political point.

Captured arms and booty could also be displayed in the treasuries that some cities built at panhellenic centers, such as Delphi and Olympia. Some treasuries could even be said to have doubled as memorials to particularly important conflicts: an example is the Theban treasury at Delphi, which was built with the spoils of their famous victory over Sparta at Leuctra in 371. The Greeks could also take great trouble to celebrate significant victories with very specific war monuments. A famous example is the bronze Serpent Column. Originally supporting a gold tripod, erected at Delphi to celebrate the Greek victory over the Persians at Plataea, it was relocated from Delphi to Constantinople in 324 CE, and can still be seen in the Hippodrome in Istanbul.

James McDonald

See also Commemoration; Coronea, Battle of (447); Leuctra, Battle of; Megara, Battle of; Panhellenism; Plataea, Battle of; Sparta, Attack on Tegea (Fetters, Battle of); Surrender; Sybota, Battle of; Truces; War Crimes

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Troy. See *Homeric Warfare; Troad; Trojan War*

Truces

Kerykes (heralds) were responsible for negotiating truces. Generally, they were able to travel safely in most conflicts and were dispatched by opposing states to open negotiations and arrange an exchange of ambassadors. The herald was inviolable. The word itself, in the Greeks' view, was derived from *Keryx*, the son of the messenger god, *Hermes*.

The most common truces of the battlefield were called to allow negotiations between the parties (for example, *Nicias* at *Syracuse*) or were sought by the defeated army to bury its dead. It may be argued that truces to bury the dead were so readily agreed because they were, in effect, a clear acknowledgement of defeat by the side which no longer controlled the battlefield. If there were no truce, the army would have to win back the battlefield and its fallen men. If a truce were agreed, the victors could set up a trophy and the defeated side could extract and honor its dead. While truces to bury the dead were often agreed, sometimes a side would feel so aggrieved by their enemy's actions that cessation of hostilities was not possible. The Athenian occupation of a sanctuary at *Delium* during the *Peloponnesian War* angered the *Boeotians* so much that they refused to agree to a truce to allow the Athenians to remove their dead. Truces could also exist which protected passage to and from panhellenic festivals. For pilgrims and athletes to travel across Greece in times of war, *ekecheiriai* (sacred truces) would be announced by *spondophoroi* (sacred heralds).

Ancient commentators were shocked when a truce was contravened or a herald violated. The most famous example was the maltreatment of *Darius'* heralds in 490. *Herodotus* described it as an impious crime, even when the victim represented the barbarian aggressor, who himself had desecrated the most sacred of Hellenic sites. He describes the inviolability of the *keryx* as

one of the “natural laws of humanity” and explained how the Spartans’ abuse of Persian envoys had, in turn, invoked the wrath of Talthybius, the Spartan herald-hero, and how they were to pay for their crime a generation later through the death of the sons of the Spartan ambassadors, Sperchias and Butis (Herodotus 7.133–137). Other legendary and historical examples include the murder of Minos’ ambassador, Androgeus; the death of the Athenian herald, Anthemocritus, allegedly perpetrated by the Megarians; the incarceration of Agesilaus’ heralds, Xenocles and Scythes; and the stoning of the ambassadors of Cerasus by the Ten Thousand.

Surrender could be brokered through a formal truce in which conditions were agreed, particularly in relation to outcomes for the vanquished. Without terms, the army and its state could be executed or enslaved with impunity. There were also long-term truces, which acted as ceasefires at times when sides were exhausted or the political situation compelled a cessation without resolution. For example, Athens and Sparta agreed to a five-year truce in 451 and a one-year truce in 423.

James McDonald

See also Diplomacy; Laws of War; Olympic Truce (*Ekecheiria*); Peloponnesian War, First; Peloponnesian War, Second; Persian Wars; Sacred Truces and Festivals; Surrender; Ten Thousand, March of; Trophy; War Crimes

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Tryphon/Diodotus (Reigned 142–139)

Diodotus, a Seleucid officer, led the troops from the military depot at

Apamea to end a reign of terror in Antioch by the Cretan mercenaries employed by Demetrius II Nicator. He then set on the throne Antiochus (VI), an infant son of Alexander Balas, but soon disposed of him and took the crown himself under the name of Tryphon (142).

Tryphon (the name means “Magnificent”) controlled only Antioch and its hinterland in the Orontes valley. To prop up his rule against Demetrius II, who controlled the southern and eastern parts of the empire, Tryphon made large concessions in Palestine to the Maccabean leaders Jonathan and Simon. However, his treacherous seizure and murder of Jonathan only inflamed Maccabean expansion.

Tryphon abandoned the Seleucid dating era on his coinage, which bore his novel title of *Basileus Autokrator* (“Supreme King”). He thus aimed at establishing a new dynasty, but he lacked legitimacy and was easily overthrown in 139 by Demetrius II’s younger brother, Antiochus VII Sidetes. He committed suicide in defeat.

Douglas Kelly

See also Alexander I Balas; Antiochus VII Sidetes; Demetrius II Nicator; Maccabean Revolt; Seleucids

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Tyrants, Tyranny

When not simply a synonym for *basileus* (king), in the Archaic Period the word *tyrannos* (tyrant) seems to indicate how a ruler came to power, not the nature of the regime—the negative connotations of “tyrant” only developed later. Originally, when the hereditary systems of monarchy or aristocracy were the norm, a tyrant was a man who attained rule without inheriting it. In this period, tyranny almost seems to have had overtones of merit-based selection—a man chosen for the job rather than inheriting it from his father. However, the negative overtones also began fairly early—a feature of several accounts of the early tyrants was that the second generation was less

talented than the first. Examples include the Cypselids of Corinth and Peisistratids of Athens. In later periods, when forms of government other than monarchy or aristocracy were the norm, a tyrant was someone who came to power outside the normal political processes.

Tyrants existed in all periods of Greek history from the seventh century onward. However, the widespread phenomenon of tyranny in the period from the rise of Pheidon of Argos (ca. 675) to the end of the Peisistratids in Athens (510) sometimes led to it being called the “Age of Tyrants.” However, as Pheidon seems to have been a king who wrested his powers back from the aristocracy, the start date of the “Age of Tyrants” is frequently taken as Cypselus of Corinth, ca. 650. Although specific factors were also important in each case, because of the proliferation of tyrannies in this period, historians have identified several underlying causes for it.

The main ones are linked: the breakdown of aristocratic rule and the introduction of hoplite warfare. Hesiod, one of the earliest extant Greek poets (writing ca. 700), presents a view of oppressive and corrupt aristocratic rule. This certainly seems to have been a factor in the rise of Cypselus—often regarded as the archetypal or first “true” tyrant—in Corinth. Here, rule was restricted to one family, the Bacchiadae. The Bacchiads were exclusive, autocratic, and Corinth’s power and prosperity—their main justification for rule—was slipping. The brutality of the aristocratic regime of the Pentilidae at Mytilene was also a factor in their overthrow, and the continual faction fighting between aristocratic clans at Athens created the conditions for Peisistratus’ tyranny there.

The circumstances of Cypselus’ coup are uncertain—there may also have been a military element, but there is no real evidence of Cypselus’ military career, only of his popularity as a magistrate. His tyranny followed (or perhaps established) the traditional pattern of a popular tyrant (although Herodotus’ account is hostile), followed by an oppressive and hated son whose tyranny (or his successor’s) was overthrown.

Pheidon of Argos came to (or restored) power on the back of military success. This was an important factor in itself for gaining popularity. However, the introduction of hoplite warfare gave added impetus to this—it broke down the aristocratic monopoly of warfare and meant a commander who gained popularity with his troops also gained much broader direct community support than before. At the same time, the spread of military service further into a community helped increase expectations for more say

in how it was run. Most assemblies, even if rudimentary, consisted of men of military age and as their service as a hoplite was much more important to the state it seems natural that they would over time want more recognition for this. Other examples of tyrants whose military prowess helped them become tyrants include Orthagoras at Sicyon, Peisistratus at Athens, and Agathocles, Gelon, and Hieron II at Syracuse.

Other factors that played a role in the early tyrannies were tensions between Dorian and non-Dorian elements of cities. This was a factor in the tyranny of Cleisthenes of Sicyon (ca. 600–560), who is reputed to have renamed the Dorian tribes at Sicyon with insulting terms. Other examples include Pantaleon at Elis (if he is a real figure) and there may have been a small racial aspect to Cypselus' tyranny—the Bacchiads were Dorian—although he probably also had support from both Dorian and non-Dorian elements.

After the so-called Age of Tyrants, tyrannies were not so prominent, but continued as a feature of Greek political life. For example, a series of tyrannies occurred in Syracuse (and other states in Sicily/southern Italy) in both the fifth and fourth centuries and Eretria in the first half of the fourth century. Tyranny was also a feature of the Peloponnese in the third century and beyond. In 251, for example, Aratus expelled the tyrant Nicocles from Sicyon, and in 235 (unusually) Lydiadas, who had been tyrant of Megalopolis since ca. 243, abdicated. Even Sparta had a tyrant, Machanidas, at the end of the third century.

In general then, tyrannies rose during periods of conflict, whether internal—between aristocratic (or other factions) or between classes or different racial elements—external, or both combined. Their main feature was the decision by enough people, or enough influential people, in a state that one man could do a better job of dealing with a conflict, whether it was racial, class-based, economic, or military in origin. Tyrants could also be imposed externally. This was a feature of Persian rule over Greek Asia Minor and of Macedonian-dominated Greece post Alexander.

However they came to power, though, most tyrants were concerned with their personal safety—tyrannicides were often regarded as heroes and Athenians, for example, had a legal requirement to oppose tyrants. Tyrants maintained their rule through a mixture of popular measures (often including major public works—Polycrates of Samos and Peisistratus of Athens are good examples), and close attention to their personal security.

Tyrants were generally heavy employers of mercenaries, most (Cypselus of Corinth is an exception) had bodyguards and often relatively sophisticated internal security measures. They also occasionally sometimes used alliances with each other to increase security (Peisistratus and Lygdamis of Naxos provide a good example of this).

Iain Spence

See also Agathocles; Alexander of Pherae; Cleisthenes of Sicyon; Dion of Syracuse; Dionysius I of Syracuse; Dionysius II of Syracuse; Evagoras; Gelon; Herodotus; Hieron I of Syracuse; Hieron II of Syracuse; Homeric Warfare; Hoplites; Internal Security; Jason of Pherae; Mercenaries; Peisistratidae; Peisistratus; Periander; Pheidon of Argos; Polycrates of Samos

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Tyre, Siege of (332)

Alexander the Great captured Tyre, the most important port in Phoenicia, after a bitter seven-month siege. Although the other Phoenician cities surrendered to Alexander after Issus, Tyre did not. The main city, on an island about half a mile (0.8 kilometers) offshore, had strong walls and a good fleet. Alexander's first action was building a mole or causeway out to the city from the mainland. However, this was constantly disrupted by Tyrian naval attacks until Alexander gained naval superiority with the arrival of 200 ships from Cyprus, Byblos, and Sidon, and 24 from elsewhere. The siege engines on the mole had limited effect because of the height and width of the walls, and Alexander began using siege engines on ships

against various parts of the wall. The first breach was made on the south side, but the city ultimately fell to multiple attacks from several directions. The fighting was brutal with 8,000 defenders killed. Alexander made an example of the city to encourage others to surrender—30,000 of the captives were sold as slaves. The fall of Tyre effectively ended Persian naval resistance.

Iain Spence

See also Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon, Invasion of Persian Empire; Fortifications; Siege Warfare

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Tyrtaeus (ca. 680–ca. 620)

Tyrtaeus was a poet in Sparta at the same time as the Second Messenian War (traditionally ca. 650–630). His poems, collected in antiquity in five books, related to two major crises in seventh-century Spartan history.

The first was serious discontent among the citizen body over the rule of the kings and elders (*gerousia*) either before or during the Second Messenian War, leading, it is said, to a demand for land redistribution. Tyrtaeus urged obedience to the divinely-ordained constitution of Sparta. His poem or poems on this were referred to by the title *Eunomia* (“Good Order”), a term often applied to Sparta’s constitution or those resembling it.

The second crisis came from Sparta’s setbacks in the Second Messenian War. Tyrtaeus’ war poems urged Spartans to fight with the utmost courage. Stories clustered in antiquity about this episode. Tyrtaeus was said to be a lame, one-eyed schoolmaster, sent by Athens in derision when, in obedience to an oracle, Sparta requested a leader to make up for past defeats. He rose

splendidly to the occasion. Such stories, including those making him commander in the war, were inventions, based on loose inferences from his actual poems.

The elegiac meter, in which Tyrtaeus wrote, was an accepted vehicle at this time for serious exhortations to fellow-citizens and was so used, for example, by Callinus and Solon. About 250 lines of Tyrtaeus' elegiac poetry survive, giving some indication of his political and moral messages. In his war poems, Tyrtaeus calls upon soldiers to fight bravely, indifferent to death or mutilation. These poems are saturated with language and images drawn from Homeric epic. They are not straightforward evidence for the details of warfare of the time, but it seems reasonable to see in them a call for the kind of self-sacrifice and cohesion demanded by the new style of hoplite fighting in a phalanx.

Douglas Kelly

See also Callinus; Homeric Warfare; Hoplites; Messenian War, Second; Phalanx; Solon

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V

Vergina

Vergina is a small village in northern Greece, on the northern slopes of the Pierian mountains. Its ancient name was Aegeae, and it was the old capital of the Macedonian kingdom. With fertile land and a strategic position, it was occupied by Illyrians, Thracians, and Paeonians from the early Iron Age.

Traditionally around 650, the Macedonian Argead dynasty took control of the area, under the leadership of Perdiccas I. For one and a half centuries Aegeae was the capital of the Macedonian kingdom, until in the late fifth century, Archelaus I moved the capital to Pella nearer the sea. Aegeae remained an important sacred site and continued to be the place where Macedonian kings were buried. In 1978, the Greek archaeologist Manolis Andronikos made one of the most significant archaeological discoveries of the twentieth century, a set of four royal tombs in the Great Tumulus of Vergina. One of them is generally thought to be the tomb of Philip II of Macedon. Archaeologists have also excavated palaces, sanctuaries, a theater, and an *agora* at the site.

Aikaterini-Iliana Rassia

See also Macedon, Macedonia; Philip II of Macedon

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W

War Crimes

A number of acts committed in war were considered to be shameful in the eyes of gods and men. Perhaps the most extreme was human sacrifice. The Mycenaeans may have condoned the practice, as suggested by its survival in the epic tradition (e.g., Iphigenia at Aulis and the 12 Trojan youths sacrificed by Achilles at Patroclus' mound), but it was certainly not accepted in the Classical Period and was considered a grave instance of *asebeia* (impiety). Plutarch (*Pelopidas* 21) describes Scedasus' suggestion that a red-haired virgin be sacrificed on the eve of Leuctra as "unlawful and barbaric." The only apparent instance concerning the fifth century is the account recorded by Phanias of Lesbos (fragment 25), in which Themistocles is said to have succumbed to army pressure and the advice of the seer, Euphrantides, and sacrificed three noble Persian captives on the eve of Salamis, in honor of Dionysus Omestios. However, the account is generally considered late and unreliable.

Offences against sacred precincts were universally condemned. In particular, *hierosylia* (temple-robbing) was regarded as heinous. Herodotus claims that an entire tribe of Scythians was punished with a genetic disease for this crime. Elsewhere he approves of the punishment of the impious Artaÿctes, who, among other outrages, stole the sacred funds of Protesilaus at Elaeus. Pausanias catalogues the attempts by Crius, the Phlegyans, Pyrrhus, Xerxes, the Phocians, the Gauls, and Nero to plunder the richest sanctuary of them all: Delphi. Worse than *hierosylia* was the deliberate destruction of the *temenos* (sacred precinct) itself. Again, it is Pausanias who lists instances, including Cleomenes I's destruction of a sacred grove in Argos, in which suppliants had sought refuge, and the destruction of

Apollo's sanctuary by the Boeotian, Caanthus. But the most notorious example was the Persians' systematic destruction of Greek sanctuaries in 480–479. Aeschylus, in *Persians*, regards a good proportion of Xerxes' humiliation as direct requital for these crimes of war. However, Herodotus claims that the Persians had cited the burning in 498 of the temple of Cybele in Sardis during the Ionian Revolt as a pretext.

Similar to this class of war crime was the abuse of priests, who, it could be argued, were the "property" of the gods. In the *Iliad*, for example, Apollo sends a plague to punish the Achaeans for their maltreatment of his priest, Chryses. The abuse of suppliants, envoys, and heralds was also abhorred. Retribution was often called "the vengeance of Neoptolemus," after Achilles' son who, for having killed Priam during the sack of Troy at an altar, was killed himself at Apollo's altar in Delphi (Pausanias 4.17.4). In Xenophon, we see contrasted Agesilaus' pious regard for suppliants with Critias' impious seizure of Theramenes at an altar (Document 13). Thucydides in his famous denunciation of the excesses of the Corcyraean civil war (Document 9), notes that there was scant regard in this bitter conflict for the rights of suppliants.

Greeks were also obliged to respect their guests and friends, even in war. The Spartan king, Archidamus II, left the estates of his guest-friend, Pericles, unravaged when he invaded Attica early in the Peloponnesian War. This prompted Pericles to hand over his properties to the state, so that he could not be accused of being the only Athenian whose assets were left unharmed. Even without formal friendships existing between two parties, Greeks still expected the rights of the guest to be honored by the host, as if a subtle supplication was in operation through the extension of hospitality. Hence, Isocrates and Xenophon described the massacre of the captains of the Ten Thousand by Tissaphernes, under a truce, as a terrible crime.

Observance of the rights of the dead on the battlefield remained a strong religious consideration throughout the Archaic and Classical Periods. In Book 24 of the *Iliad*, the mutilation of Hector's corpse by Achilles is denounced. Achilles ties Hector's body to a chariot and drags it shamefully around the walls of Troy. Such was their concern that the gods Apollo and Artemis personally intervened to repair the damage to Hector's body. Herodotus describes Cambyses' mutilation of Amasis' corpse as "unholy" (3.16) and condemns the mutilations of Cyrus and Leonidas. Both Herodotus and Pausanias record, in similar language, the revulsion of the Spartan king,

Pausanias at the suggestion that Mardonius' head be cut off and impaled on a spike. The most extreme abuse of the corpse on the battlefield, it could be argued, is the act of cannibalism. A mid-fifth-century bell-crater by the Eupolis Painter captures the moment after Tydeus has begun to gnaw the severed head of his opponent, Melanippus, an atrocity for which he is immediately punished by the gods.

The observance of burial rights even included those of enemies slain in battle. In Sophocles' *Antigone* the priest, Teiresias, explains the consequences for the state of leaving even the corpse of its enemy, Polyneices, unburied. He warns that the altars and hearths will become religiously polluted by human carrion spread by birds and dogs. Pausanias condemns the impiety of Lysander in not burying the dead of Aegospotami and contrasts it with the Athenian respect for the Persian dead at Marathon.

James McDonald

See also Archidamus II; Cleomenes I; Corcyra, *Stasis* at; Dead, Treatment of; Gods of War; Homeric Warfare; Ionian Revolt; Laws of War; Omens and Portents; Persian Wars; Prisoners of War and Slavery; Religious Practices before Battle; Sacred Truces and Festivals; Sepeia, Battle of; Surrender; Xanthippus (Athenian)

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Women in War

Greek women did not normally take any part in combat. Xenophon tells us

that they were believed to have been physically unsuited by nature for any such rigorous outdoor activity (*Oeconomicus/ The Householder* 7.21–5).

The Greeks could nevertheless imagine a race of foreign women warriors, the Amazons, who fought against Greek heroes. Such a role for women in mythological stories was an inversion of the expectation Greek society had of its own women. Weapons found among the grave goods of female Sauromatians, a nomadic people who lived on the Eurasian Steppes from the Early Iron Age, may have provided a historical point of focus for the Greek stories.

Historical examples of Greek women in combat roles are few and generally have a legendary or apocryphal element to them, such as the story of the women of Argos led by a female poet, Telesilla, driving off a Spartan attack in about 494 (Plutarch, *Bravery of Women* 4 [*Moralia* 245]). We do, however, hear of women in extreme circumstances such as the storming of their city, defending themselves by whatever means they could, such as throwing roof tiles and stones from their houses. Examples of this include when the Thebans broke into Plataea in 431, during civil unrest in Corcyra in 427, or the death of Pyrrhus in 272. In emergencies, women might take other roles in defense of their city, such as helping build or repair city walls, cutting their hair to make ropes for artillery, dressing in armor to deceive the enemy about the number of fighting men (Aeneas Tacticus 40.4–5), or cooking food for the city's garrison.

Queen Artemisia of Halicarnassus is an exceptional case: we are told she took on a combat role. Herodotus tells us (4.99) that she commanded five ships sent by the Greek cities under her rule to fight against the Greeks at the battle of Salamis (480). He notes just how extraordinary it was for a woman to hold a military command, how the Athenians had felt it was disgraceful for a woman to wage war on them, and how they had put up a prize of 10,000 drachmas for her capture (8.87–88).

Women were not expected to fight but they could be used as inspirational role models for the men who did—such as the Boeotian virgins before Leuctra (Document 16). There were other legendary stories of heroines such as the daughters of Leos, Hyacinthus (Diodorus 17.15) and of Erechtheus and Praxithea who were sacrificed or killed themselves to save their city (Lycurgus, *Against Leocrates* 98–100).

Women were depicted as upholding the military ethos of a state, transferring cultural values to their children in telling their sons to fight

courageously. Plutarch represents Spartan mothers as urging their sons to win honor by fighting bravely and, when necessary, dying for their city (*Sayings of Spartan Women*). We are told that in 479 the women of Athens stoned the family of a man who had proposed that the Athenians make peace with the Persian king (Herodotus 9.5). In a celebrated Greek comedy, Aristophanes' *Lysistrata*, however, women were depicted as advocates of peace and critical of war and the conduct of war by men.

When a city fell, the victors would normally enslave the women and children, treating them as spoils of war. The massacre of women was rare, though it is reported to have occurred at Mycalessus in 413 (Thucydides 7.29), and Selinus in 409 (Diodorus 13.57). Legendary campaigns for the purpose of seizing women to populate their new cities by the Ionians, Pelasgians, and Romans may be apocryphal. Such stories suggest a more positive outcome for the female inhabitants of a defeated city-state: marriage rather than slavery. Historical examples of the enslavement of the female population of a city are many: Scione in 421 and Melos in the winter of 416/5 are two examples. The lot of such women is taken up in Greek literature as early as the *Iliad* (end of the eighth century) where the plot turns on arguments over the possession of two women taken as prizes of war, Chryseis and Briseis. The suffering of captured women was a theme common in tragedies of the fifth century, most prominently by Euripides. Death, rather than slavery, was the noble choice. The distasteful subject of the rape of captured women was not normally addressed by ancient writers. Herodotus' account (8.33) of the deaths of women in Phocis in 480 after being raped multiple times is an exception. Diodorus (13.57) speaks of the terrible indignities suffered by captured women after the fall of Selinus in 409; Phylarchus, a historian of the third century, was criticized by Polybius (2.56, 58–61) for his graphic scenes of the suffering of captured women. Demosthenes tells the story (19, [*On the False Embassy*] 196–198) of how a woman of Olynthus, who had been captured when her city fell (348), was whipped, mistreated, and forced to behave against her natural modest character and upbringing after being enslaved.

Where possible, women would be evacuated from the countryside into the safety of a walled city. This happened in 431 when Attica was threatened by a Peloponnesian invasion. When a city itself was threatened by a siege attempts might be made to evacuate the women further away: examples include the evacuation of the women and children of Athens to

Troezen, Aegina and Salamis in 480; of Plataea to Athens in 429; and of Sicilian Greeks to Syracuse and Italy in 406.

The chivalrous treatment of women captured in war is reported in a few individual cases. A Greek woman who had been taken from Cos by the Persians was released by the Spartan regent Pausanias after the battle of Plataea in 479 (Herodotus 9.76). Alexander the Great captured the wife (and sister), daughters and mother of the Persian king, Darius III, and the daughter of the previous Persian king: he is remembered for treating these women with great respect but he refused all attempts by Darius to ransom the women and married two of them himself at a ceremony in 324 (Arrian 2.12.3-8, 4.20, 7.4.4-8).

There is evidence that the children of citizens killed in battle would be maintained at the state's expense, but widows were given no public support themselves.

Ian M. Plant

See also Aeneas Tacticus; Amazons; Argos, Argives; Aristophanes; Art (Ancient), Greek Warfare in; Artemisia; Corcyra, *Stasis* at; Gender in War; Herodotus; Melos; Olynthus; Plataea, Battle of; Plataea, Siege of; Plutarch; Polyaeus; Polybius; Prisoners of War and Slavery; Pyrrhus; Salamis, Battle of (480); Siege Warfare; Xenophon; Zancle/Messana

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Wounds

The rate of injury in ancient Greek warfare is far from clear, yet wounds

must have been a reasonably common occurrence, simply due to the violent nature of war itself. War wounds were a significant enough area of medicine that there were once sections within the Hippocratic corpus dedicated to it, although they have unfortunately not survived. Wounds received by notable individuals are occasionally mentioned in the ancient literature (notably and vividly in Homer's *Iliad*), but the sources rarely report the number wounded in battles. This does not mean that we should assume that the number was low.

Many wounds will have been fairly minor or cosmetic in nature. These include superficial wounds from slashes and small projectiles, leaving scars but not impeding movement. The results might have been minor breakages and dislocation of bones and joints, as well as loss of extremities (one or two fingers, toes, and so on) that would have been uncomfortable, but in most cases not life threatening. Scars were held as a sign of valor in war, so any change in quality of life may have been balanced by a gain in social reputation. In some cases, while a wound was debilitating for a short time, the effect was not permanent. For example, a soldier with a dislocated knee might not be able to walk, but with the right medical care he could return to duty reasonably quickly. We know that treatments for these wounds did exist because of the recommendations in the Hippocratic corpus.

In the case of broken bones, the recovery time tended to be longer (in the Hippocratic corpus, there is a recommendation to stay off a broken foot for 20 days) and the consequences were more varied.

Broken bones that were incorrectly set could potentially create a limp that was so severe that an individual would have trouble walking and a visible distortion of their gait. This was more probable if the broken bone was the thigh, which doctors appeared to have more trouble setting due to the thicker bone and greater difficulty in splinting the area. This led to a shortened limb and severe loss of mobility, as well as reducing a soldier's ability to carry arms and equipment.

There were risks associated with other wounds that initially appeared minor. Tetanus was a serious risk for small injuries, whether caused by projectiles, edged weapons, or a doctor's tools. In the Hippocratic corpus, we see a comparable case of a shoemaker eventually dying from tetanus after having a small instrument sink a finger's length into his knee. If you avoided infection, the impact of these wounds would be reasonably minimal. It is conceivable that there were many people with such wounds

actively taking part in warfare, due to the relatively small impact such wounds would have had on movement and functioning.

As with minor wounds, significant impact wounds would have created a risk of tetanus and other infections. This risk would probably have been greater due to the larger surface area of bigger wounds, leaving more areas vulnerable to infection. Wounds with a significant risk of death could also be survived, albeit with some physical consequences. This was sometimes despite seemingly small odds of recovery. A wound to the back may impede movement quite significantly and be life threatening, but we do have examples of individuals receiving such blows and surviving (this type of wound was considered to be embarrassing, because of the idea that the wound would have been received while fleeing). We also see people in literature apparently believably surviving stab wounds to the ribs. Similarly, one case describes an individual surviving an arrow to the groin, with the point of the arrow still remaining in place years later.

Amputation could be necessary following an injury to extremities. It is worth noting that this type of injury could include conditions encountered on campaigns causing frostbite, as well as more traditional causes such as damage from weapons (punctures, slashing). Gangrene developing from another wound was also a common event in the ancient world, with gruesome and occasionally fatal consequences. Ancient Greek doctors usually waited for the blackened extremity to fall off on its own account in the case of smaller areas, like fingers or toes. This was probably in an attempt to avoid the consequences of infection, and differs from Roman medical advice which recommended amputation much sooner than the earlier Greek doctors were inclined to undertake the same procedure.

In terms of limb loss and the amputation of severely damaged limbs, while Hellenistic doctors could successfully treat a number of wounds, they appear to have had difficulty in stopping the massive bleeding caused by amputation of a limb. Shock would probably have killed a patient in this situation. This is especially so considering that ancient Greeks lacked modern methods of pain relief. Yet, we do have evidence of patients surviving significant amputations. In Xenophon, we hear of prisoners of war having their right hands amputated in lieu of a death sentence, a procedure which many seem to have survived. Diodorus provides a rather evocative example of what wounds could be survived when he described Alexander's entry into Persepolis, where he met Greek prisoners of war who had been

severely mutilated. Presumably these individuals must have had limited medical attention available for their injuries, yet some continued to survive. The Hippocratic corpus does advise the partial removal of a limb in certain circumstances, suggesting that a physician only remove already blackened and presumably “dead” flesh. There appears to have been some variation in this area regarding what doctors were prepared to do, perhaps because any time a patient died it was considered a blow to a doctor’s reputation, whether or not the doctor was to blame.

There must have been a group of people who did survive deliberate medical amputations, whether or not because the loss of a hand or foot was inherently more survivable than the loss of an entire limb, or simply due to luck and relatively appropriate medical treatment. Certainly, limb loss in battle or otherwise was common enough for Diodorus to consider limb reattachment to be necessary for a utopia. Whether he wants it to avoid death, or simply to allow a better quality of life, is unclear, but it does represent some anxiety around this area in the Greek mind. Loss of an entire limb would have made it nearly impossible to fight as a hoplite.

Needless to say, there were other wounds in ancient Greek warfare that were so devastating that they were generally fatal. On the most extreme side of this are wounds such as abdominal wounds, which were almost always fatal due to the likelihood of infection. In antiquity, it was a question of how long it would take an individual with an abdominal wound to pass away rather than whether they would recover (and it could take up to a month, in some cases). In Homer, it is explicitly stated that this type of wound would surely mean that the injured individual will not survive long. In this area, medical intervention would probably speed up the process of dying, given that physicians were sometimes inclined to cut into the chest in the spirit of attempting to assist. Given the lack of organ transplants, wounds to organs (such as one to the liver) would have been impossible to survive if full function was lost. Head wounds could also be fatal, due in part to their unpredictable nature. Similarly, impact wounds to the chest were often fatal due to the likelihood of infection.

It is also worth considering how injuries may have occurred off the field of battle: a cavalryman being dragged by a horse, a prisoner of war getting infected wounds from fetters, or even run-of-the-mill accidents occurring when the military was on the move or setting up camp. These wounds would have shared the common dangers of life in the ancient world, being

subject to the same risk of infection that could make even small, mundane injuries fatal.

Adrienne White

See also Medicine, Military; PTSD; Social and Economic Effects of War

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X

Xanthippus (Athenian) (Active 480s)

Xanthippus was a prominent Athenian who married Agariste, a member of the Alcmaeonid family; one of their children was the great Athenian leader Pericles. Xanthippus came into prominence in 489 when he prosecuted Miltiades after an unsuccessful attack on Paros. In 484 he was ostracized, in a period where the same fate befell a number of the Alcmaeonid family and associates, but with other victims of ostracism he was recalled in 480 to fight the Persians. In 479 he commanded the Athenian contingent at the battle of Mycale, and in the following winter (479/8) captured the vital harbor city of Sestos on the Hellespont. Herodotus tells the story of how he proceeded to crucify the Persian governor, Ataŷctes, for alleged sacrilege against the tomb of Protesilaus at Elaious. Afterward he disappears from history. Despite a lack of evidence, he was clearly one of the most significant Athenian commanders as the Athenians began their fifth-century rise to be Greece's most powerful state; there was a statue of him on the Athenian acropolis.

Peter Londey

See also Alcmaeonidae; Miltiades II; Mycale, Battle of; Pericles; Persian Wars; Sestos

Further Reading

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Xanthippus (Spartan) (Active ca. 255)

Xanthippus was a Spartiate serving with the Greek mercenaries recruited in the winter of 256/55 by Carthage to counter the Roman invasion of North Africa during the first Punic War. With his prestige and war experience, Xanthippus convinced the Carthaginian authorities to fight the Romans on open ground.

Utilizing Carthaginian supremacy in elephants and cavalry, Xanthippus placed his elephants in a line before his infantry and strengthened the cavalry on his wings with his best infantry. In response, Regulus made the mistake of increasing the depth of his infantry, instead of adopting an open formation.

Xanthippus' cavalry and infantry on the wings drove back the Roman cavalry and, as ordered, attacked the Roman infantry in the flank and rear. The elephants drove the Roman infantry into a confused and crowded mass, which lost cohesion under attack on all sides. Only 2,000 out of 15,000 Romans escaped from the battlefield. Regulus was among the 500 prisoners; the rest were killed.

Xanthippus was a military professional who had the good luck of defeating an unsophisticated opponent.

Douglas Kelly

See also Elephants; Mercenaries. *Roman Section*: Punic War, First

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Xenophon (ca. 430–ca. 353)

Born into a wealthy family, Xenophon, having served in the cavalry and associated with Socrates, was ill-at-ease in post-civil war democratic Athens and, accepting a friend's invitation, became a mercenary in Cyrus' army (401). After Cyrus' defeat at Cunaxa the mercenaries returned to Byzantium via Mesopotamia, Armenia, and northern Anatolia. As one of those selected to replace five generals seized and executed by the Persians, Xenophon

played a major role in this achievement. After a winter's employment by the Thracian Seuthes the mercenaries (Xenophon included) entered Spartan service to help secure the freedom of Anatolian Greeks from Persian rule. He became closely involved with senior Spartans, notably King Agesilaus II, and when Agesilaus returned to Greece in 394, found himself fighting against fellow Athenians at Coronea. Now an exile, he was settled at Scillus where he lived the life of a country gentleman, served as Sparta's representative at nearby Olympia, sent his sons for education in Sparta, and spent mercenary booty on erecting a small-scale copy of Artemis' famous temple at Ephesus. Sparta's loss of authority after Leuctra (371) caused his expulsion from Scillus and he reportedly settled in Corinth, though here, as in the claim that his Athenian exile was formally repealed, the biographical tradition's authority has been questioned. But *Cavalry Commander* and *Ways and Means* show sympathetic interest in Athens' well-being and some reconciliation is reflected in his sons' service with the Athenian cavalry at Mantinea (362). There is no actual evidence—even in the biographical tradition—that Xenophon himself ever took part in a battle again after 394.

Xenophon's large output is formally varied—individual items are often the earliest surviving examples of particular literary types—but the subject matter characteristically reflects personal experience. A fundamentally instructional agenda is often expressed through historical material: Xenophon's assumption that the past is a tool for promoting political and ethical improvement is deeply embedded. Both his personal life-story and the general history of his times were filled with conflict, and the management of such conflict called for the leadership skills that are a persistent topic throughout his writings.

Warfare can therefore obtrude almost anywhere. *Hiero* compares a tyrant's apprehensions with those of a soldier on campaign. *Socrates* discusses the Persian king's garrisons, the military requirements for Athens to thwart the Boeotians and recover its former greatness, and the qualities needed by its commanders—among which general principles of leadership, persuasive speaking, and awareness of logistics are as important as tactics and weapon-training. *Cynegeticus* presents hunting as a means of promoting military, intellectual, and moral excellence (something neither sophists nor politicians can match). *On Horsemanship* covers war-horses—mostly equestrian issues (acquisition and care, temperament, bits, deportment) but also armor and weaponry. *Ways and Means* seeks ways of

securing Athens' wealth and influence that are not dependent on unpopular military methods. (The answer is to pay citizens a dole from taxes on foreign residents and profits generated by employing state-owned slaves in the silver-mines, and use championship of peace as a route to international ascendancy.) *Spartan Constitution* explores the peculiarities—and weaknesses—of a state whose citizens are “craftsmen of war,” though only three chapters deal with military technicalities. *Cavalry Commander*, by contrast, entirely focuses on such things: its ultimate aim of improving the Athenian cavalry is characteristically pursued by advising the commander how to deal with recruitment and training of men, care of horses, civic cavalry displays, management of subordinates, and a variety of tactical situations.

But for continuous presentation of war one must go to the three long historical works. *Hellenica* describes the last seven years (410–404) of the Second Peloponnesian War and the long-term results of Spartan victory, ending with Greece in an unabated state of disorder after the indecisive battle of Mantinea (362). It forms a substantial part of the database on Classical Greek *polis* warfare, as it describes several large-scale battles of major historical importance (Arginusae, Aegospotami, Coronea, Nemea, Leuctra, Mantinea) as well as mentioning with differing amounts of detail over 140 other military engagements. Where other source-material is available, Xenophon's versions can seem idiosyncratically selective, but basic inaccuracy is hard to demonstrate, and the narratives of campaigns and individual encounters are not infrequently evocatively vivid. That cannot really be said of *Cyropaedia*. This work asks how Cyrus the Great won and ruled a vast empire: the answer is by intelligent and sympathetic leadership, but the story-line is one of warfare and conquest and embraces military reforms (extension of recruitment to a wider social group, creation of cavalry forces), tactical training and deployment, strategic planning, and various other practical details (e.g., the design of camps or the need for medical provision). But narrative pace and literary texture are unlike those of normal historiography and story-telling is subordinate to the instructional purpose. So analytic presentation consistently wins out over evocative detail, and the casual reader can understandably find the result somewhat dull. Here *Anabasis* is different again. This tells the story of Cyrus' mercenary army, providing a uniquely detailed account of Greeks in violent conflict with alien adversaries (Persians, various east Anatolian

tribes, Bithynians, Thracians), often in difficult terrain—and indeed in political conflict with other Greeks. Before deciding to employ them, the Spartans were wary of what was a dangerous accumulation of rather foot-loose professional soldiers. The limited period covered (some two years) and unvarying focus on a single group make this unlike normal Greek historiography too, but the book is rooted in personal experience and instructional issues (the military skills and personal qualities that ensure survival in an exceptional situation, the ambiguities of panhellenist views about dealing with Persia) never overwhelm the telling of a remarkable story. There are comparatively few battle-narratives, but the insight into the dynamics of an ancient military force is without parallel. The only regret is that it is a military force operating in such unusual circumstances, and that one cannot simply transfer what we learn here to the world of ordinary *polis* armies (even ones with mercenary components) operating in a mainland or Aegean environment.

Christopher Tuplin

See also Agesilaus II; Clearchus; Coronea, Battle of (394); Cyrus the Younger; Mercenaries; Ten Thousand, March of

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Xerxes (Reigned 486–465)

Though not Darius I's eldest son, Xerxes was his designated successor and, despite objections from a brother in Bactria, duly became king on Darius' death in November 486. He had to insurrection to confront in Egypt (ongoing since 487) and Babylonia (in 484) and did so successfully: Egypt became "more enslaved than before" (Herodotus 7.7) and there were radical socioeconomic changes in Babylonia. Meanwhile preparations were underway for an invasion of Greece. The enterprise was completely unsuccessful. Co-ordinated land and sea advance did not suit the topography, and Xerxes was too apt to fight on the defenders' terms—a fault not too important at Thermopylae but disastrous at Salamis. The fleet's withdrawal left Mardonius less room for maneuver in 479 and permitted a Greek counter-attack on Anatolia. The consequent defeats at Plataea and Mycale reflected the inherent advantage of Greek hoplites over Persian infantry when numerical superiority and cavalry mobility were neutralized.

The outcome was significant loss of territory in Macedonia, Thrace, and Anatolia and the emergence of an Athenian Empire. A Persian counter-offensive foundered at the Eurymedon (467/6) and Xerxes was assassinated not long afterward. That is scarcely mere coincidence, and it is not unduly Hellenocentric to judge his reign (the first in which expansion completely foundered) something of a failure by his predecessors' standards. The artificially lengthened list of subject peoples and novel symbolic assimilation of political loyalty with worship of the royal patron-deity Ahuramazda in one of Xerxes' inscriptions (XPh) might perhaps be seen against this background.

Christopher Tuplin

See also Darius I; Eurymedon; Persian Wars

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Herodotus 1.183, 4.43, 6.98, 7–9; Ctesias 688 FF13 (24–33), 13b; Plutarch, *Themistocles* 4–20; Kuhrt (cited below) pp. 238–309, 581–582.

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Z

Zancle/Messana

Zancle was a Sicilian Greek city founded by settlers from Cumae and Chalcis ca. 730–725 and named Zancle because its natural harbor resembled the shape of a sickle or scythe. The city prospered from its commercially strategic location on the Strait of Messina between the northeastern corner of Sicily and Italy.

In the early fifth century the city was occupied by Greek refugees from Miletus and Samos who were assisted by Anaxilas, tyrant of Rhegium, then ruling both Rhegium and Zancle. Anaxilas changed the city's name to Messene (though later coins show the name as Messana) in honor of his native homeland of Messenia in the Peloponnese; the city also received settlers from Messenia. During the Athenian interventions in Sicily in the late fifth century, Messana allied itself with Syracuse.

In 396, the city was sacked by the Carthaginians, but resettled shortly afterward by Dionysius I of Syracuse. The city supported Dion of Syracuse in his overthrow of Dionysius II of Syracuse in 357. During Timoleon's campaign in Sicily, he expelled the tyrant Hippo from Messana in 342.

Messana was seized by Agathocles, the tyrant of Syracuse in 315, during his wars with the Carthaginians. Following Carthages' defeat of Agathocles in 311, Messana sided with Carthage.

In 289, Messana was seized by Campanian mercenaries, who called themselves the Mamertini. They slaughtered the leading men of Messana and appropriated their wives, possessions, and lands. At first they called upon Carthage for help against Syracuse and then drew support from Rome—helping cause the outbreak of the First Punic War in 264. When the First Punic War eventually ended, in 241, Messana thrived as a free city and an

ally of Rome.

David Harthen

See also Agathocles; Carthage, Carthaginians; Carthaginian Wars (409–367); Carthaginian Wars (345–275); Chalcis; Cumae; Dion of Syracuse; Dionysius I of Syracuse; Dionysius II of Syracuse; Italy, Italians; Mercenaries; Rome, Romans; Sicilian Expedition; Sicily; Syracuse, Campaigns in Italy Under Dionysius I; Syracuse, Siege of; Timoleon. *Roman Section*: Punic War, First

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Appendix: Quotable Quotes—Greeks on War

Introduction

The quotations below are a mix of famous and less well-known ancient Greek quotations relating to conflict. They are organized alphabetically by speaker; multiple quotations from a single speaker are ordered chronologically. Where necessary, the quotation is preceded by a short comment placing it in context. Some caution is recommended where the author recording the words was considerably later than the incident, especially where they come from collections of sayings such as Plutarch's. For example, his *Sayings of the Spartans* ascribes the Spartan question in response to being shown particularly strong city walls—"what women live there?" to at least half a dozen different Spartans. Where the quotation comes from a speech, it should be noted that in composing the speeches in their works, rather than preserving what the original speaker said, historians in antiquity often regarded this as an opportunity to display their own oratorical skills.

Achilles (Mythical Hero)

1. In the *Iliad*, Achilles' mother, the goddess Thetis, has told him that he has the choice of two fates, as he discloses:
"If I stay here and besiege the city of the Trojans, any chance of a return home is lost to me, but my fame will be undying. If I come home to my dear native land, gone is my great renown, but my life will be long and the end will not quickly come upon me."

In *Iliad* 18, by choosing to avenge his friend Patroclus and kill the Trojan hero Hector, Achilles understands that he is choosing the former of the two fates.

Source: Homer, *Iliad* 9.412–416, translated by Peter Londey.

2. In Homer's *Odyssey*, set after the end of the Trojan War, Odysseus visits the underworld and meets the dead Achilles, who tells him:
"Do not speak lightly of death, glorious Odysseus. I would rather be alive serving another as a hireling in the house of a poor man who does not have much to live on than to lord it over all the spirits of those who have perished."

Source: Homer, *Odyssey* 11.488–491, translated by Peter Londey.

Agesilaus II, King of Sparta (Reigned ca. 401–360)

3. When the Persian satrap Tissaphernes declared war on Agesilaus, even though they had a treaty, Agesilaus responded by deceiving Tissaphernes into thinking he was going to invade Caria and then seized large parts of Phrygia. He stated:
"To act unjustly after swearing a treaty is impious, but to trick the enemy is not only just and noble but also pleasant and profitable."

Source: Plutarch, *Sayings of the Spartans* 2.11 (*Moralia* 209a-b), translated by Iain Spence (similar sentiments are ascribed to Cleomenes I, *Sayings of the Spartans* 45.3 [*Moralia* 223a-b]).

4. "Leaders should be superior to their men in endurance and courage, not in soft living."

Source: Plutarch, *Sayings of the Spartans* 2.19 (*Moralia* 210a), translated by Iain Spence.

5. When asked how far Spartan territory extended, Agesilaus held out his spear and said:
"As far as this can reach."

Source: Plutarch, *Sayings of the Spartans* 2.28 (*Moralia* 210e), translated by Iain Spence (also ascribed to Archidamus III, *Sayings of the Spartans* 20.2 [*Moralia* 218f]).

6. When asked why Sparta had no city walls, Agesilaus pointed to some citizens equipped as hoplites and said:
“These are Sparta’s walls.”

Source: Plutarch, *Sayings of the Spartans* 2.29 (*Moralia* 210e), translated by Iain Spence.

Agis II, King of Sparta (ca. 460–ca. 399)

7. “Spartans do not ask how many enemy there are but where they are.”

Source: Plutarch, *Sayings of the Spartans* 2.19 (*Moralia* 215d), translated by Iain Spence.

Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon (356–323)

8. When Darius III offered to give Alexander 10,000 talents, his daughter as a wife, and all his territory west of the Euphrates River (332), Parmenion said “If I were Alexander I would accept this offer.” Alexander replied: “I would too, by Zeus, if I were Parmenion.” He then wrote to Darius demanding his surrender.

Source: Plutarch, *Alexander* 29.4, translated by Iain Spence (a similar remark is also ascribed to Callicratidas, a Spartan admiral [died 406], Plutarch *Sayings of the Spartans* 43.1 [*Moralia* 222c]).

9. When Parmenion and other senior commanders, overawed by the size of the Persian army facing them at Gaugamela (331) advised Alexander to attack at night, Alexander replied:
“I will not steal the victory.”

Source: Plutarch, *Alexander* 31.7, translated by Iain Spence.

10. Alexander (unsuccessfully) tried to persuade his troops in India to keep

advancing east (326) by saying the following:

“Those who endure toil and dangers achieve great deeds and it is a sweet thing to live with courage and to die leaving behind a deathless renown.”

Source: Arrian 5.26.4, translated by Iain Spence.

Archidamus II, King of Sparta (d. ca. 427/6)

11. In a speech to the Spartan assembly debating whether to go to war against Athens, Archidamus said:

“War is a matter not so much of arms but of resources which make arms of use—especially in a contest with a maritime power.”

Source: Thucydides 1.83.2, translated by Iain Spence.

Brasidas, Spartan General (d. 422)

12. In a speech to encourage the defenders of Amphipolis before making a sally against the Athenian army outside the walls (422), Brasidas said:

“Whoever sees most clearly when the enemy makes such errors as these and, carefully considering the strength of his own forces, attacks not on conventional lines but in the way best suited to the situation will succeed. For these stratagems, which utterly deceive the enemy, bring the greatest glory and the greatest service to our friends.”

Source: Thucydides 5.9.4, translated by Iain Spence.

13. “Remember that willingness, a sense of honor, and obedience to his commanders are what makes a good soldier and, today will make you either freemen and allies of Lacedaemon or slaves of Athens.”

Source: Thucydides 5.9.9, translated by Iain Spence.

Callicrates, Spartan (d. 479)

14. During the prebattle sacrifices at Plataea, Callicrates, reputedly the best looking man in the Greek army, was hit in the side by an arrow. He was carried away and before dying is reported as saying that:

“He did not regret dying for Greece only that he had not struck a blow nor achieved any deed worthy of him despite his eagerness to do so.”

Source: Herodotus 9.72.2, translated by Iain Spence (also recorded with a slight variation emphasizing the bravery of a hoplite over an archer in Plutarch, *Sayings of the Spartans* 69.46 [*Moralia* 234e] as: “It doesn’t worry me that I am dying, but that I should be killed by a woman’s arrow before achieving anything.” Translated by Iain Spence).

Callicratidas, Spartan Naval Commander (d. 406)

15. “I am going to stop you, Conon, from treating the sea like your whore.”

Source: Xenophon, *Hellenica* 1.6.15, translated by Douglas Kelly.

16. On being told his fleet was outnumbered prior to the battle of Arginusae (406), Callicratidas replied:

“Sparta will be no worse off if I am killed but running away is disgraceful.”

Source: Xenophon, *Hellenica* 1.6.32, translated by Douglas Kelly.

17. On being told that the omens predicted his death at Arginusae, Callicratidas said:

“The affairs of Sparta do not depend on one man.”

Plutarch criticized this statement as failing to take into account the importance of a general to his forces.

Source: Plutarch, *Pelopidas* 2.1, translated by Peter Londey.

Clearchus, Spartan Exile and Mercenary Commander (d. 401)

18. “An army without field punishment is absolutely useless.”

Source: Xenophon, *Anabasis* 2.6.10, translated by Douglas Kelly.

19. “A soldier should be more afraid of his general than the enemy.”

Source: Xenophon, *Anabasis* 2.6.10, translated by Douglas Kelly.

Croesus of Lydia (Mid-Sixth Century)

20. Explaining why he considered Apollo (through the Delphic oracle) responsible for his decision to attack Persia, which had just resulted in the Persian capture of his territory and himself (ca. 547), Croesus said:

“For nobody is so stupid as to choose war over peace: in war fathers bury sons, in peace sons bury fathers.”

Source: Herodotus 1.87.4, translated by Iain Spence.

21. Having been reprieved by Cyrus the Great, who had just captured his kingdom and its capital Sardis (ca. 547), Croesus pointed to Cyrus’ troops who were sacking Sardis and asked what they were doing. When Cyrus said they were sacking Croesus’ city and looting his property, Croesus replied:

“They are not looting *my* city and property, for none of it is now mine: they are looting *your* property.”

Source: Herodotus 1.88.4, translated by Iain Spence.

Damis, Spartan (Active 320s)

22. When Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon sent a message to the Greeks requiring that he be proclaimed a god, Damis replied:

“We agree that if Alexander wishes to be called a god he can be.”

Source: Plutarch, *Sayings of the Spartans* 25.1 (*Moralia* 219e), translated by Iain Spence.

Dieneces, Spartan (d. 480)

23. On being told by a man from Trachis prior to the battle of Thermopylae (480) that the Persians were so numerous that their arrows would blot out the sun, Dieneces replied:

“The stranger from Trachis brings good news—if the Persians hide the sun with their arrows, we shall have our battle in the shade and not in the sun.”

Source: Herodotus 7.226.1, translated by Iain Spence (also ascribed to Leonidas I by Plutarch, *Sayings of the Spartans* 51.6 [*Moralia* 225b]).

Demaratus, King of Sparta (Reigned ca. 515–491)

24. When asked why the Spartans disgraced those who lost their hoplite shields but not their helmets or breastplates, Demaratus replied:

“Because these are for their personal benefit, a shield is for the good of the whole line.”

Source: Plutarch, *Sayings of the Spartans* 28.2 (*Moralia* 220a), translated by Iain Spence.

Demosthenes (ca. 384–322)

25. On the war with Philip II of Macedon (351), Demosthenes remarked:

“My view is that the first step is for us to mobilize a force in advance that will carry on the war on a continuing basis and inflict damage on Philip. But, please, no mention of 10,000 or 20,000 mercenaries or of those forces that exist only on paper.”

Source: Demosthenes 4 (*First Philippic*) 19, translated by Douglas Kelly.

26. “There is something rotten in Philip’s position and the course of the war is what will bring it out, so long as we show some determination.”

Source: Demosthenes 4 (*First Philippic*) 44, translated by Douglas Kelly.

Hippocrates, Spartan (Active 410)

27. Hippocrates, the Spartan deputy commander at the naval defeat at Cyzicus, reported the defeat and the death of his admiral, Mindarus, to Sparta in a letter that was reportedly captured and sent to Athens instead. There may be some Athenian embellishment to the report, which is delivered in a suspiciously laconic style:

“Ships are lost. Mindarus is dead. The men are starving. We don’t know what to do.”

Source: Xenophon, *Hellenica* 1.1.23, translated by Iain Spence.

Leonidas I, King of Sparta (d. 480)

28. On being asked why the best men value an honorable death over an inglorious life, Leonidas replied:

“Because they consider one comes from nature, the other from within themselves.”

Source: Plutarch, *Sayings of the Spartans* 51.14 (*Moralia* 225d), translated by Iain Spence.

29. When Xerxes demanded Leonidas surrender his arms at Thermopylae (480), Leonidas replied:

“Come and get them.”

Source: Plutarch, *Sayings of the Spartans* 51.11 (*Moralia* 225d), translated by Iain Spence.

Melesippus, Spartan Ambassador (Active 431)

30. When Athens refused to negotiate on the eve of the Second Peloponnesian War (431), Melesippus commented:

“This day will be the beginning of terrible disasters for Greece.”

Source: Thucydides 2.12.3, translated by Douglas Kelly.

Pausanias Son of Cleombrotus (d. 470)

31. After his victory at Plataea (479), Pausanias was struck by the luxury of the Persian commanders' possessions. He had the captured Persian cooks prepare a meal typical of those they prepared for Mardonius and his own men prepare a typical Spartan meal for him. He then showed these to the Greek commanders, saying:

"Gentlemen of Greece, I brought you here to show you that the Persian King is stupid. He lives in such a way as this but comes here to take away our meager possessions."

Source: Herodotus 9.82.3, translated by Iain Spence (also recorded with a slight variation in Plutarch, *Sayings of the Spartans* 58.6 [*Moralia* 230e-f]).

Paedaretus, Spartan (Unknown Date)

32. When someone commented that the enemy were very numerous, Paedaretus replied:

"Well then, we shall be even more famous because we shall kill more."

Source: Plutarch, *Sayings of the Spartans* 60.1 (*Moralia* 231b), translated by Iain Spence.

Pericles (ca. 495–429)

33. Outlining his strategy on the eve of the of the Second Peloponnesian War (432), Pericles said:

"The Peloponnesians are small farmers, without any money of their own or in the treasury. They have no experience of prolonged wars overseas because poverty lets them conduct only short campaigns against one another."

Source: Thucydides 1.141.3, translated by Douglas Kelly.

34. "I am more anxious about Athenian blunders than enemy strategy."

Source: Thucydides 1.144.1, translated by Douglas Kelly.

35. Encouraging the Athenians to stick to his plan not to engage the

Peloponnesian invaders who were ravaging Attica (431), Pericles said:
“Trees can quickly grow again, even though felled or lopped, but it is not easy to replace men who are killed.”

Source: Plutarch, *Pericles* 31.4, translated by Iain Spence.

36. From Pericles’ funeral speech at the public burial of those who died in the first year of the Second Peloponnesian War, winter 431:

“We trust more in our natural ability than planning processes and stratagems. In education, while they [the Spartans] undergo a painful regime from birth to instill manliness, we live without these restraints but are just as willing to face danger.”

Source: Thucydides 2.39.1, translated by Iain Spence.

37. “The men most justly called the bravest are those who can truly judge between pleasure and pain but never shrink from facing dangers.”

Source: Thucydides 2.40.3, translated by Iain Spence.

38. “Our daring has made every sea and every land open to us and everywhere we have left everlasting memorials to our success and failure.”

Source: Thucydides 2.41.4, translated by Iain Spence.

39. “In the fighting, choosing to stand and die rather than surrender and live, and fleeing only from dishonor, they were taken in one brief moment at the climax of their lives, freed from fear but not from glory.”

Source: Thucydides 2.42.4, translated by Iain Spence.

40. “Heroes have the whole earth for their tomb.”

Source: Thucydides 2.43.3, translated by Iain Spence.

41. Pericles said the following to the Athenian assembly in the first year of the Second Peloponnesian War (431):

“The empire that you possess is like a tyranny. It may seem unjust to have acquired it but it is perilous to let it go.”

Source: Thucydides 2.63.2, translated by Douglas Kelly.

42. On his deathbed (429), Pericles said the following:
“No Athenian ever put on mourning dress because of me.”

Source: Plutarch, *Pericles* 38.4, translated by Iain Spence.

Poseidon (Greek God) in Euripides (415)

43. Poseidon speaks the following in Euripides’ play *Trojan Women*, which is often thought to be a critical response to the destruction of Melos by the Athenians in 416:

“Stupid is the mortal man who plunders cities and temples and tombs, the sacred places of the dead. Having made a desolation, he himself perishes later.”

Source: Euripides, *Trojan Women* 95–97, translated by Peter Londey.

Spartan (Unknown)

44. The epitaph, generally attributed to Simonides, placed by the Spartans over their dead at Thermopylae (480):

“Stranger, tell the Lacedaemonians that we lie here obedient to their laws.”

Source: Herodotus 7.228.2, translated by Iain Spence.

45. An unnamed Spartan prisoner captured on Sphacteria (425), when insultingly asked if those who had fallen in the battle were the best and bravest men replied:

“A spindle (by which he meant an arrow) would be worth a great deal if it could pick the brave men from the cowards.”

Thucydides adds the gloss that “by this he meant that the dead were those who happened to be hit by the stones and arrows.”

Source: Thucydides 4.40.2, translated by Iain Spence (a similar remark is ascribed to Phoebeidas ca. 370, Plutarch, *Sayings of the Spartans* 65.1

[*Moralia* 231f]).

46. When the Thebans were arguing with them about something, a Spartan said:

“You should either have less pride or more power.”

Source: Plutarch, *Sayings of the Spartans* 69.3 (*Moralia* 232e), translated by Iain Spence.

47. When asked why the Spartans used short swords, one replied:

“So we can get close to the enemy.”

Source: Plutarch, *Sayings of the Spartans* 69.5 (*Moralia* 232e), translated by Iain Spence (a similar statement is also ascribed to Antalcidas, *Sayings of the Spartans* 14.8 [*Moralia* 217e]).

48. When someone saw a picture showing Spartans being killed by Athenians and commented “the Athenians are indeed brave” a Spartan replied:

“Yes—in a picture.”

Source: Plutarch, *Sayings of the Spartans* 69.9 (*Moralia* 232f), translated by Iain Spence.

49. When an Argive said “We have the graves of many Spartans in our country” a Spartan replied:

“But we have not one grave of an Argive in ours.”

Plutarch adds the gloss “meaning that the Spartans had often invaded Argos, but the Argives had never invaded Sparta.”

Source: Plutarch, *Sayings of the Spartans* 69.20 (*Moralia* 232c), translated by Iain Spence.

50. When Philip (the V of Macedon?) wrote to the Spartans when he entered their country and asked whether they wanted him to come as a friend or an enemy, they replied:

“Neither.”

Source: Plutarch, *Sayings of the Spartans* 69.28 (*Moralia* 233e), translated by

Iain Spence.

51. When a Spartan was asked what he knew, he replied:
“How to be free.”

Source: Plutarch, *Sayings of the Spartans* 69.37 (*Moralia* 234b), translated by Iain Spence.

A Man of Sybaris

52. Sybaris, a town in southern Italy destroyed in 510, was famous for its luxury, not always approved of by other Greeks. It was natural therefore to attach the following (probably apocryphal) quotation to an anonymous man of Sybaris:

“He said about the Spartans that their desire to die in war was not such a great thing given that it was their means of escape from so many toils and such a way of life.”

Source: Plutarch, *Pelopidas* 1.2–4, translated by Peter Londey.

53. Plutarch quotes the comment above in #52 straight after that of a soldier speaking to Antigonus (Monophthalmus, presumably). The soldier had been very brave, but had also suffered from some chronic disease. Antigonus’ doctors were able to cure him, after which he proved less brave in battle. When asked why, his reply was:

“King, you yourself have made me more cowardly by freeing me from those troubles which left me with little desire to live.”

Source: Plutarch, *Pelopidas* 1.2–4, translated by Peter Londey.

54. Finally, Plutarch quotes the following, sometimes attributed to Simonides:

“They died not reckoning either to live or to die as good, but rather to achieve either one in a noble way.”

Source: Plutarch, *Pelopidas* 1.2–4, translated by Peter Londey.

Themistocles, Athenian Admiral and Statesman (ca. 528–460)

55. During the Greek debate over engaging the Persians at Salamis (480), the Corinthian admiral, Adeimantus, referring to Themistocles' vigorous speech, said:

“Themistocles, in the games, those who start before the signal is given are beaten!”

Themistocles replied:

“But those who are left behind don't win the crown.”

Source: Herodotus 8.59.2, translated by Iain Spence.

Timotheus (ca. 415–354)

56. When another general was showing off the wounds he had received, Timotheus pointed out the folly of a general who exposes himself to danger, and thus risks leaving his forces leaderless:

“I felt great shame when I was besieging Samos and an arrow fell near me, because I was acting more like an inexperienced youth than a general commanding so great a force.”

Despite this wise advice, many Greek generals fell in battle.

Source: Plutarch, *Pelopidas* 2.3, translated by Peter Londey.

Tyrtaeus (ca. 680–620)

57. The Spartan poet Tyrtaeus wrote to exhort men to face the terrors of the new hoplite style of combat, but centuries later Spartan armies still listened to recitations of his poems.

“But let every man stand fast with feet apart, firmly rooted to the ground, biting his lips with his teeth, with thighs and shins below and breast and shoulders covered by the hollow of his broad shield. Let him brandish his mighty spear in his right hand and shake the fearful crest above his head. Doing mighty deeds, let him learn to wage war, and not stand with his shield outside the range of missiles,

but coming up close let him take his opponent, striking him with the long spear or sword, and setting foot beside foot and pressing shield against shield, with crest against crest, helmet against helmet, breast against breast let him fight his man at close quarters, wielding the hilt of his sword or his long spear.”

Source: Tyrtaeus, fragment 11, lines 21–34, translated by Peter Londey.

Xenophon (ca. 430–ca. 353)

58. Xenophon’s advice to aspiring *hipparchoi* or cavalry commanders (ca. 365):

“In order to instill discipline in one’s subordinates it is important both to lecture them on obedience and by your actions to confer advantage on the disciplined and disadvantage on the ill-disciplined.”

Source: Xenophon, *Cavalry Commander* 1.24, translated by Iain Spence.

59. “A man can shape nothing according to his wishes unless the material he molds is ready to obey the craftsman’s will. Nor can anyone make anything of men unless, with the god’s help, they are prepared to view their commander with friendly feelings and to consider him wiser than they in the conduct of operations against the enemy.”

Source: Xenophon, *Cavalry Commander* 6.1, translated by Iain Spence.

60. “It is sufficient to read this advice a few times, but a commander must always decide on the right thing at the right time, considering the current situation and, in light of it, do what is required. To write down everything he ought to do is no more possible than knowing everything which is going to happen.”

Source: Xenophon, *Cavalry Commander* 9.1, translated by Iain Spence.

Zeuxidamus, King of Sparta (Active Third Quarter of the Seventh Century)

61. When an Aetolian expressed the view that for those able to be brave men, war is better than peace, Zeuxidamus replied:

“No, by god, for these men death is better than life!”

Source: Plutarch, *Sayings of the Spartans* 34.2 (*Moralia* 221c), translated by Iain Spence.

Primary Documents

The primary documents are ordered chronologically by author. With the exception of the inscriptions, all the authors included here have a separate, more detailed, entry in the body of this encyclopedia. Where a work is divided into books, chapters, and sections, the document is divided by chapters—a number in square brackets in the text indicates the section. Anything else in square brackets is an explanatory item inserted by the translator and not part of the original work. A gap in the document is indicated by "...". The author's date is given in the author's main heading, the date of the event in the document is in the document heading.

See also: Appendix: Quotable Quotes—Greeks on War

Archilochus (ca. 680–640)

Archilochus was a well-known poet and mercenary soldier from the island of Paros who lived ca. 680–640. Although born on Paros, he lived on Thasos, campaigned in Thrace, and died in battle on Naxos. The two poems below illustrate his very practical attitude toward soldiering, which was probably fairly typical of professional soldiers at the time.

1. Archilochus, Poem 6. “The Shield”

Introduction

Poem 6 deals with the sensitive issue of rhipsaspis—throwing away one's shield to run away from battle faster. In hoplite warfare, the integrity of the line of shields in the phalanx was crucial and throwing away your shield

was seen as cowardly, contemptible, and letting down your fellow citizens (see QQ 24). In Classical Athens, for example, it was an indictable offence (see also Polybius 4.58.1, Document 22). Archilochus may have been serving as a citizen soldier or as a mercenary in this incident, but he chooses to make light of something which would ordinarily have been a cause of shame.

Document

Some Saian rejoices in the shield, an unblemished item, which I unwillingly abandoned beside a bush—but I saved myself. What do I care for that shield?

Sod it. I'll buy another one, just as good.

Translated by Iain Spence.

2. Archilochus, Poem 60. “The General”

Introduction

Poem 60 gives Archilochus’ humorous take on a serious subject—the competence of his military leader.

Document

I do not like a tall general with long striding legs or braids, nor proud of his hair or partly shaved.

Let me have a short general clearly bowlegged around his knees, going firmly on his feet, full of heart.

Translated by Iain Spence.

Herodotus (ca. 485–ca. 425)

Herodotus composed the *Histories* ca. 450–420, basing them on oral tradition and interviews—in some cases of eyewitnesses. Although known as “the father of history,” he has often been criticized for believing, and repeating “tall tales.” However, he makes it clear that his business is to record what he was told, even though he does not necessarily believe it himself—and let the readers make up their own minds. The *Histories* record

the Persian Wars of 490 and 480–479, with much of the work dealing with the background history of the Greeks and Persians and their relationships before the war.

3. Herodotus 6.110–117. The Battle of Marathon (490)

Introduction

This document is the earliest surviving account of the battle of Marathon (490), which ended the Persian attempt to punish Eretria and Athens for their support to the Ionian Greeks during their revolt from Persia (499–493). The Athenians had marched out accompanied by their Plataean allies to meet the Persians on the plain of Marathon and prevent them marching overland to Athens.

Herodotus appears to have had little or no military experience and his descriptions of battles often have problems. In this case, for example, he records that the Persian expeditionary force had a cavalry contingent with it, but makes no mention of its presence or activity in the battle. This has led historians to speculate that it was either still on Eretria, was moving ahead of the army, or had been re-embarked with the fleet. Contrary to the impression given by Herodotus, the strengthening of the Greek wings was highly likely to have been deliberate. According to Herodotus (6.109) the board of ten strategoi (generals) was equally split over whether to fight or not and the decision to engage was made on the vote of Callimachus, the polemarch (“War Archon”), after a convincing speech by Miltiades, who had experience of the Persians from the Thracian Chersonese. Marathon made a huge impact on Athens, significantly increasing its reputation throughout Greece and assuming a major place in the city’s consciousness—the festival referred to at 111.2 is the Great Panathenaea, the largest festival celebrated at Athens. Cynegirus (114) was the brother of the famous tragedian Aeschylus. Finally, 117.2–3 preserves an interesting account of a battlefield epiphany that struck Epizelus blind—perhaps one of the earliest examples of PTSD. In the translation we have used “Persians” throughout, rather than the less familiar “Medes” of the original.

Document

6.110. By saying this Miltiades won over Callimachus. The polemarch’s vote was counted in, and the decision to attack was taken. After this, the generals

who had voted to fight turned the command [literally “presidency”—of the board of generals] over to Miltiades as each one’s day came in turn. He accepted the office but did not attack until his own appointed day to command.

111. When his turn came round, the Athenians deployed for battle, with the polemarch Callimachus commanding the right wing, since it was then the Athenian custom for the polemarch to hold the right wing [the place of honor on the battlefield]. Callimachus led, and the other tribes were counted out in succession next to each other. The Plataeans were marshaled last, holding the left wing. [2] Ever since that battle, when the Athenians are conducting sacrifices at the festivals every fourth year, the Athenian herald prays for good things for the Athenians and Plataeans together. [3] The Athenian deployment at Marathon resulted from making their frontage equal in length to the Persians. The center, where the line was weakest, was only a few ranks deep, but each wing was numerically strong.

112. When they had been set in order and the sacrifices were favorable, the Athenians were ordered forward and charged the enemy [literally *hoi barbaroi*: “the barbarians” or “foreigners”] at a run. The space between the armies was no less than 8 stades [1,600 meters or just under a mile]. [2] The Persians saw them running to attack and prepared to meet them, thinking the Athenians absolutely crazy, since they saw how few of them there were and that they ran up so fast without either cavalry or archers. [3] So the barbarians imagined, but when the Athenians all together fell upon them they fought in a way worthy to record. These are the first Greeks we know of to charge the enemy at a run. They were also the first to endure looking at Persian costume and the men wearing it, for until then just hearing the name of the Persians caused Greeks to panic.

113. They fought a long time at Marathon. In the center of the line, where the Persians and Sacae were stationed, the barbarians were victorious. Prevailing there, the barbarians broke through in pursuit inland, but on each wing the Athenians and Plataeans won. [2] In victory they let the routed barbarians flee, and brought the wings together to fight those who had broken through the center. The Athenians won, then followed the fleeing Persians and struck them down. When they reached the sea they demanded fire and laid hold of the Persian ships.

114. It was in this task that Callimachus the polemarch was slain, a brave man, and one of the generals, Stesilaus son of Thrasylaus, also died.

Cynegirus son of Euphorion fell there, his hand cut off with an ax as he grabbed a ship's stern. Many other famous Athenians also fell there.

115. In this way the Athenians captured seven ships. The barbarians pushed off with the rest, picked up the Eretrian slaves from the island where they had left them, and sailed around Sunium—hoping to reach the city before the Athenians. There was an accusation at Athens that the Persians did this in accordance with a plan devised by the Alcmaeonidae, who it is said held up a shield as a signal once the Persians were in their ships.

116. But while they sailed around Sunium, the Athenians marched back to defend the city as fast as they could and got there ahead of the barbarians. Coming from the sacred place of Heracles in Marathon, they pitched camp in the sacred place of Heracles in Cynosarges. The barbarians lay at anchor off Phalerum, the Athenian naval port at that time. After lying at anchor there for a while, they sailed their ships back to Asia.

117. In the battle at Marathon about 6,400 Persians were killed, and 192 Athenians; these were the numbers who fell on each side. [2] The following marvel happened there: an Athenian, Epizelus son of Couphagoras, was fighting as a brave man in the battle when he went blind, although he was struck or hit nowhere on his body; from that time on he spent the rest of his life in blindness. [3] I have heard that he tells this story about his misfortune: he saw opposing him a tall heavy armed man [literally, “hoplite”], whose beard overshadowed his shield, but the phantom passed him by and killed the man next to him. I learned by inquiry that this is the story Epizelus tells.

Source: Godley, Alfred D., trans. 1922. *Herodotus*. Vol. 3. Loeb edition. London: William Heinemann, modified by the editors.

4. Herodotus 7.9. The Persian View of Greek Warfare (ca. 485)

Introduction

This document is set at the Persian court, ca. 485 and is part of Mardonius' successful advice to Xerxes to persuade him to invade Greece, precipitating the Second Persian War (480–479). Herodotus cannot have been present on the occasion and it is difficult to imagine how he might have learned of the content of the conversation. The advice is therefore almost certainly

fictional, either composed by Herodotus for dramatic effect or preserving Greek oral tradition of the events. The document contains the Greek sentiment that Greeks were united by a common culture and language and so should not fight each other. It also has rather a jaundiced view of the severity of hoplite warfare and its lack of sophistication. Although modern commentators have sometimes accepted this as an accurate picture of hoplite warfare, it is at odds with the course of the campaign of 480–479. On both land (Thermopylae) and sea (Artemisium and Salamis) the Greeks deliberately selected restricted sites to negate the Persian numerical advantage. Even at Plataea, which was the most traditional set piece battle of the war, the Greeks kept to the foothills for as long as possible to reduce the effectiveness of the Persian cavalry.

Document

7.9. Whenever they declare war on each other they find the best-looking and most level ground and go there to fight. As a result, the victors come off with great losses and I will say nothing about the losers for they are utterly destroyed. [2] As they speak the same language, what they ought to do is use heralds and messengers to sort out their differences—anything is better than fighting. If it is absolutely necessary to wage war against each other they each ought to find the most defensible spot and make their stand there.

Translated by Iain Spence.

5. Herodotus 8.6–13. The Battle of Artemisium (480)

Introduction

This document describes the battle of Artemisium—the naval half of the joint land and sea line of defense against the Persians. Although the Greek fleet held its own at Artemisium it was forced to withdraw when the Persians overcame the land half of the defense at Thermopylae. Herodotus' account illustrates the Greek tactic of choosing narrow areas in which to fight and the naval tactics of the time. Although ramming occurred, the main tactic was for the marines to board the enemy ship and here the Greeks showed their clear superiority. However, Thucydides (2.83–84, Document 8) shows how old-fashioned and ineffective these tactics had become by 429/8 when the Athenians literally ran rings around a

Peloponnesian fleet that attempted it. The document also illustrates Herodotus' tendency to highlight the role of the gods and the Athenians.

Document

8.6. In this way then they [the Greek fleet] remained at Euboea and fought a sea battle. It occurred as follows. The barbarians [Persians] had arrived at Aphetae around the early afternoon and having heard even earlier that few Greek ships were at Artemisium, when they saw them they were eager to come to grips, hoping they would capture them. [2] They did not think a frontal attack was a good idea because the Greeks might flee when they saw them coming and night would fall during the pursuit. They believed that in this way the Greeks would escape them but their intent was to ensure not even a firebearer [the man who carried the fire for ceremonial sacrifices and who was inviolable] might survive.

7. To achieve this they therefore devised the following plan. Selecting 200 of their ships, they sent them outside Sciathus so they would not be seen by the enemy, sailing around Euboea past Caphareus and Geraestus to surround the Greeks—those who had sailed around blocking their withdrawal while they attacked from the front. [2] Having decided this they dispatched the selected ships, planning not to attack the Greeks during the day nor indeed before they saw the prearranged signal from the blocking contingent that it had arrived. So, they sent the ships off and mustered the rest at Aphetae.

8. [Scyllias the diver defects to the Greek fleet and warns them of the Persian plan; Herodotus dismisses the tale that he swam underwater the entire distance between the fleets].

9. Having heard the news, the Greeks debated among themselves. After much discussion it was decided to remain there for the rest of the day but to sail out in the dead of night to meet the Persian ships sailing around. But after this, as nobody attacked them [from the main Persian fleet] the Greeks waited for the late afternoon and sailed out against the barbarians [i.e., the main fleet] wanting to test out their tactics and battle drills.

10. Seeing the small number of Greek ships sailing against them, Xerxes' generals and men were convinced they were insane. They put to sea, thinking to easily overcome the Greeks—and quite reasonably so as they saw the Greek ships were few in number and their own much more numerous and more seaworthy. [2] Thinking this, they surrounded the

Greeks. Now, all the Ionians [i.e., Ionian Greeks] who were friendly toward the Greeks and serving unwillingly, were greatly distressed seeing them surrounded and in such a weak position, thinking none would return home. [3] But those who were pleased by the situation competed to be the first to capture an Athenian ship and be given gifts by the king—for the talk in their fleet was all about the Athenians.

11. But when the Greeks received the first signal they gathered their sterns together, with the bows toward the barbarians. On the second signal, even though they were hemmed in in a narrow space, they set to work, head to head. [2] There they captured 30 enemy ships and even Philaon, son of Chersis, brother of Gorgus, king of Salamis and a notable man in the fleet. The first of the Greeks to capture an enemy ship was an Athenian, Lycomedes, son of Aeschraeus, and he was awarded the prize for valor. [3] Nightfall left the battle unresolved and the combatants dispersed. The Greeks went to Artemisium the barbarians to Aphetæ, having done much worse than they expected. In this battle, Antidorus of Lemnos, alone of all the Greeks serving with the King deserted to the Greeks and for this the Athenians gave him land in Salamis.

12. When night fell, as it was midsummer, torrential rain fell throughout the night with violent thunder from Pelion. The corpses and ship wreckage were washed ashore at Aphetæ and tangled around the prows and around the banks of oars. [2] Hearing all this, the sailors there became frightened and were convinced their current evil state would cause their total destruction. For, before they had drawn breath from the storm and shipwreck off Pelion, the hard sea battle had overtaken them and after that now this furious storm, harsh thunder, and torrents of water rushing from land toward the sea.

13. This was the sort of night they had, but to the contingent sent around Euboea the same night was much more cruel because they were caught in the open sea and their end was miserable. The storm and rain hit them while sailing off the Hollows of Euboea, and blown along by the wind and unable to see where they were heading, they crashed into the rocks. All of this was god's work so that he might make the Persian force more equal to the Greeks instead of much greater.

Translated by Iain Spence.

Athenian Inscription (480?)

6. Epigraphic Museum (Athens) 13330. “The Decree of Themistocles” (480)

Introduction

This inscription purports to be an Athenian decree recording a successful motion by the Athenian strategos (general) Themistocles in 480 for evacuating Athens and fighting the Persian invasion by sea. Although Demosthenes mentioned such a decree in 374 and its wording matches a quotation in Plutarch, its authenticity has been strongly contested. The decree was found in Troezen, the lettering is clearly third century, and it is rare to find a proposer listed by both deme and patronymic (father's name) before about 350. It is therefore either a later forgery, perhaps to add weight to Athens' claim to fame from Salamis, or a later copy of an original decree. The weight of modern scholarly opinion is probably slightly more on the side of forgery, but the copy theory is also possible, especially if it was a paraphrase of the original (or a combination of more than one decree). One of the main objections, that the decree is contradicted by Herodotus' account has been rejected (e.g., by Fornara) on the basis that the main contradiction is with modern interpretations of Herodotus rather than Herodotus' text. If the decree is accepted as genuine, it reinforces those passages in Herodotus suggesting that the Athenians decided fairly early to evacuate the city and focus their defense on the navy and Salamis.

The document has several interesting features, including the appointment of ships' captains “from among those who own land and a house in Athens and who have legitimate children.” In Athens, and elsewhere in Greece, it was thought men like these with a real stake in the country would fight hardest for it. The marines referred to were equipped as hoplites and enjoyed a considerable advantage over their more lightly equipped Persian counterparts (see illustrations in Hoplites, Naval Warfare, and Persian [Achaemenid] Empire entries). The “lexiarchic registers” listed all citizens. After Marathon (see Document 3) the Polemarch (“War Archon”) had lost his military function, but had responsibility for various aspects of the city's metics (resident aliens), including registering them.

Note that the document is in the form of a complete translation,

restoring the gaps in the text. This is the most reader-friendly way of providing the document, but has the disadvantage that the reader cannot see which parts are restored. Restoration is done by matching gaps to quotations of the inscription in ancient authors, by restoring formulaic expressions from other inscriptions, or simply deciding what best fits in the gaps. This is aided by the fact that the text was stoichedon, that is, every line had the same number of letters. However, in some cases the restoration can only be conjecture. If the reader wants to see which parts are restored, the original text is accessible in Meiggs, Russell, and Lewis, David. 1969. A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions. Oxford: Clarendon Press and there is a translation indicating restorations in Fornara, Charles W. 1977. Archaic Times to the End of the Peloponnesian War. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Document

To the Gods. Decided by the *Boule* [i.e., the Council of 500] and the People. Themistocles son of Neocles of Phrearrhioi proposed. The city shall be entrusted to Athena, Mistress of Athens, and to all the other gods, for protection and defense against the Barbarian [i.e., the Persians] on behalf of the country. All of the Athenians and the resident aliens who live in Athens shall send their women and children to Troezen ... [there is a gap of 21 letters here] ... the Founder of the land. They shall send the elderly and their movable property to Salamis. The Treasurers and Priestesses shall stay on the Acropolis to guard the gods' property. All the rest of the Athenians and the resident aliens who have reached military age shall board the 200 ships prepared and resist the Barbarian for the sake of freedom, both theirs and that of the other Greeks, together with the Lacedaemonians, Corinthians, and Aeginetans, and all the rest who wish to have a share of the danger. Beginning tomorrow, the *strategoi* [generals/admirals] shall appoint 200 trierarchs [ships' captains], one for each ship, from among those who own land and a house in Athens and who have legitimate children. These men shall not be over 50 years old and shall be appointed to a ship by lot. The generals shall also enlist marines, 10 per ship, from men between 20 and 30 years old, and 4 archers. They shall appoint these [probably the marines and archers, although the Greek term used could mean the specialist crewmen, such as the helmsman] by lot to the ships at the same time they appoint the trierarchs by lot. The generals shall also write on white notice boards the

lists of the rest of the crew by ship, selecting the Athenians from the lexiarchic registers and the resident aliens from the Polemarch's list of names. They shall write them up, assigning them by divisions, 200 [divisions], each about 100 men, and they shall write at the top of each division the name of the trireme, the trierarch and the soldiers [the Greek term could refer to the marines and archers above but also to the specialist crewmen], so that the men know the trireme on which each division shall embark. When all the divisions have been created and allotted to the triremes, after sacrificing to Zeus the All-powerful, Athena, Nike [Victory], and Poseidon the Securer, the *Boule* and the generals shall man all the 200 ships. When the ships have been manned, with 100 of them they shall reinforce Artemisium in Euboea, and with the other 100 they shall take station round Salamis and the rest of Attica and guard the country. In order that all Athenians are united to resist the Barbarian, those exiled for 10 years [i.e., those exiled by an ostracism] shall go to Salamis and stay there until the People [i.e., the *ecclesia* or assembly] decide about them. Those who have lost their citizen rights ...

Translated by Iain Spence.

Thucydides (ca. 462–after 404)

Thucydides lived through the Second Peloponnesian War (431–404). He served as an Athenian general in 424 but was exiled for 20 years for his failure to defend Amphipolis.

7. Thucydides 1.89.2. Sparta and Athens Diverge (479)

Introduction

This document describes the divergence of Greek aims after the Persian defeat at Mycale (479), the final major engagement of the Second Persian War (480–479). This was the start of the split between Sparta and her allies, who were not interested in campaigning against the Persians in the Hellespont and Asia Minor and the Athenians and their allies who wanted to exact further reparation from the Persians. The Athenian aims soon turned to freeing Ionian Greek states and the Aegean Islands from Persian control and increasing their own power—leading to the establishment of the

Delian League and the subsequent Athenian maritime empire.

Document

1.89 [2] When the Persians retreated from Europe, after their defeat by the Greeks both with ships and infantry and those who had fled with their ships to Mycale had been destroyed, Leotychidas, the king of the Spartans, who commanded the Greeks at Mycale, returned home taking with him the allies from the Peloponnese, and the Athenians and the allies from Ionia and the Hellespont who had already rebelled against the king of Persia stayed behind and besieged Sestos which the Persians held. They spent the winter there and took it once the barbarians had left, and after this sailed away from the Hellespont, each to their cities.

Translated by Iain Spence.

8. Thucydides 2.83–84. Phormio's Naval Victory (429/8)

Introduction

This document describes an early naval engagement in the Second Peloponnesian War (431–404). In 429/8, The Peloponnesians had managed to get 1,000 hoplites across the Gulf of Corinth to assist their allies in Acarnania and deployed a fleet and amphibious force to prevent the Acarnanians on the coast from helping those inland. At the same time as the Peloponnesian allies were decisively defeated after an impetuous advance on Stratus, Phormio, the Athenian admiral (strategos) decisively engaged the Peloponnesian fleet. Thucydides' description highlights the disparity between the experienced commanders and sailors of the Athenian fleet and their Peloponnesian opposition—as well as the advances in naval tactics since 480 (see Document 5).

Document

2.83 Meanwhile, the fleet from Corinth and the rest of the confederates in the Crissaeen Gulf, which was to have co-operated with Cnemus and stopped the coastal Acarnanians from joining their countrymen in the interior, was prevented from doing so around the same time as the battle at Stratus by having to fight with Phormio and the twenty Athenian vessels stationed at Naupactus. [2] For, as they coasted along out of the gulf, they

were watched by Phormio, who wanted to fight in open waters. [3] But the Corinthians and allies had started for Acarnania without any idea of fighting at sea, and with vessels more like troop transports. In addition, they never dreamed that the twenty Athenian ships would attempt to engage their forty-seven. However, while they were coasting along their own shore, the Athenians sailed along in line with them. When they tried to cross over from Patrae in Achaea to the mainland on the other side, on their way to Acarnania, they saw the Athenians coming out again from Chalcis and the river Evenus to meet them. They slipped from their moorings in the night, but were seen and eventually forced to fight in mid passage. [4] Each state contributing to the armament had its own general—the Corinthian commanders were Machaon, Isocrates, and Agatharchidas. [5] The Peloponnesians arranged their vessels in as large a circle as possible without leaving an opening, with the prows outside and the sterns in, placed all the small craft together inside it, and had their five best ships ready at a moment's notice to sail out and strengthen any point threatened by the enemy.

84. The Athenians, formed in single file, sailed round and round them and by continually brushing past and making as though they would attack at once forced them to contract their circle. However, they had been ordered by Phormio not to attack until he gave the signal. [2] He hoped the Peloponnesians would not keep their formation like infantry on land, but that the ships would foul each another and the small craft cause disorder. If the wind which usually rose towards morning blew from the gulf—in expectation of which he kept sailing around them—he was certain they would not remain steady for a moment. He also thought that he could attack when he wanted because his ships were better sailers, and that the most effective time to attack was when the wind rose. [3] When the wind did arise, the enemy's ships were crowded in a narrow space, and with the wind and the small craft dashing against them, quickly fell into confusion. The ships fouled each other and the shouting, swearing and struggling of the crews as they pushed each other off with poles drowned out the captains' and boatswains' orders. Lacking experience, they were unable to clear their oars in the rough water, preventing the helmsmen from properly controlling the ships. At this moment Phormio gave the signal, and the Athenians attacked. Sinking one of the admirals' ships first, they then destroyed all the others they came across. In the confusion, none of them

thought of resistance, but fled for Patrae and Dyme in Achaea. [4] The Athenians pursued and captured twelve ships, took most of the men out of them and sailed to Molycrium. After setting up a trophy on the promontory of Rhium and dedicating a ship to Poseidon, they returned to Naupactus. [5] As for the Peloponnesians, they immediately sailed with their surviving ships along the coast from Dyme and Patrae to Cyllene, the Eleian arsenal. Here Cnemus and the ships from Leucas that were to have joined them, also arrived after the battle of Stratus.

Source: Crawley, Richard, trans. 1910. *Thucydides: The Peloponnesian War*. London, J.M. Dent, modified by the editors.

9. Thucydides 3.81–85. *Stasis* (Civil Strife) in Corcyra (427)

Introduction

In this document Thucydides comments on the stasis or civil strife in Corcyra in 427, during the early stages of the Second Peloponnesian War. In the sections preceding this (3.70–80) he provides a detailed description of Corcyra's slide into internal revolution and civil war and Athenian and Spartan interference in Corcyra's internal affairs. They did so to secure Corcyra's support in their war against each other. The passage is interesting not only for the details of internal strife but Thucydides' moralizing on the state of affairs in Greece and the moral decline brought about by the war (see also Documents 13 and 28).

Document

3.81. The Peloponnesians therefore at once set off with all speed by night for home, sailing close to shore. Hauling their ships across the Isthmus of Leucas, in order not to be seen rounding the point, they got away. [2] The Corcyraeans, realizing the Athenian fleet was approaching and the enemy fleet had gone, brought the Messenians from outside the walls into the town, and ordered the fleet which they had manned to sail round into the Hyllaic harbor. While it was doing so, they killed as many of their enemies as they could lay hands on and next, when they landed, killed those whom they had persuaded to go on board the ships. They then went to the sanctuary of Hera and persuaded about fifty of the suppliants to stand trial—and condemned them all to death. [3] When the main body of the

suppliants who had refused to stand trial saw what was happening, they killed each other in the temple; while some hanged themselves upon the trees, others killed themselves however they could. [4] During the seven days Eurymedon [the Athenian general] stayed there with his sixty ships, the Corcyraeans butchered those of their fellow-citizens whom they regarded as their enemies. Although the reason given was that they had attempted to overthrow the democracy, some were killed because of private enmity, others by their debtors because of the money they owed them. [5] Death raged in every form, and, as usually happens at such times, there was no extreme to which violence did not go. Fathers killed sons and suppliants were dragged from temples or killed in front of them; some were even walled up in the temple of Dionysus and died there.

82. So savage was the march of the revolution, and the impression which it made was even greater as it was one of the first to occur. Later on, one may say, the whole Greek world was convulsed; struggles were everywhere with the democratic leaders trying to bring in the Athenians, and the oligarchic leaders the Lacedaemonians. In peacetime there would have been no pretense nor desire to invite them in. But while these two were at war, while either faction in a city could make an alliance to hurt its enemies and advance its own cause, it was easy to bring in outsiders to overthrow a government. [2] Civil strife brought many terrible sufferings on the cities—which happen and always will happen, as long as human nature remains the same; although with varying degrees of severity, and with varying symptoms, according to the different sets of circumstance. In peace and prosperity, states and individuals conduct themselves better, because they are not confronted by dire necessity. But war removes the easy supply of daily needs, and proves a harsh master, reducing most men's characters to a level with their circumstances. [3] So, revolution broke out in city after city, and in the places where it arrived later, having heard what had been done elsewhere, the refinement of the activity was carried to even greater excess, as manifested in the cunning of the attacks and the atrocity of the reprisals. [4] Words had to change their ordinary meaning and take on whatever was now given them. Reckless audacity came to be considered the courage of a loyal ally; prudent hesitation, specious cowardice; moderation was held to hide unmanly weakness; the ability to see all sides of a question considered indecisive. Frantic violence marked a real man and plotting behind someone's back, legitimate self-defense. [5] The advocate of extreme

measures was always trustworthy; his opponent a man to be suspected. To succeed in a plot was to show intelligence, to detect a plot even more intelligent; but trying to avoid having to do either was disrupting your party, being scared of your adversaries. In short, it was equally commendable to strike first someone planning evil, or to denounce someone who planned no evil, [6] until even blood became a weaker bond than party, because party members were readier than those united by the former to dare everything without reservation. For such parties were not formed to enjoy the benefits of established laws but to gain power by their overthrow; and the confidence of party members in each other rested less on the gods' law than on partnership in crime. [7] Reasonable proposals from an adversary were not met with a generous reception by the stronger party but by jealous precautions. Revenge was considered more important than self-preservation. Oaths of reconciliation were only offered by two parties to meet an immediate difficulty and only held good so long as no other weapon was at hand. But, when the opportunity offered, the first person who seized it and caught his enemy off guard, thought this treacherous vengeance sweeter than an open one, because it was not only safer that way but success by treachery took the prize for superior intelligence. Indeed, men are generally readier to call rogues clever than simple men honest, and are proud of being the former and ashamed of being the latter. [8] The cause of all these evils was the lust for power arising from greed and ambition. Once they were engaged in the struggle the violence of parties sprang from these passions. The leaders in the cities, had admirable slogans: on one side the cry of "equal rights for the people," on the other "moderate aristocracy," but while pretending to act in the public interest they sought gain for themselves instead. In their struggle to win they recoiled from nothing, engaging in terrible actions—going to even greater lengths when it was a matter of revenge. They did not stop at what justice or the good of the state demanded, but made the party's whim of the moment their only standard, and were equally ready to use an unjust verdict or the authority of a strong arm to satisfy their current animosities. So, neither party honored piety, but the use of fine phrases to justify disgraceful actions was highly regarded. Meanwhile the moderate citizens perished between the two parties—either for not joining in the quarrel or because of envy they might escape.

83. In this way, every form of iniquity took root among the Greeks because of the civil strife. The simplicity which is the main mark of a noble

nature was laughed at and disappeared and society was divided into rival camps in which no man trusted the other. [2] To put an end to this, no promise could be relied upon, no oath could command respect—all parties considered a permanent solution hopeless and were focused on self-defense rather than trusting others. [3] In this contest the less intelligent were generally most successful. Worried by their own deficiencies and the intelligence of their opponents, they feared being beaten in debate or being surprised by the plots of their more versatile opponents, and immediately and boldly launched into action. [4] Their adversaries, on the other hand, arrogantly thinking that they would know in advance, and that it was unnecessary to secure by action what they could get through intelligence, often fell victim to their own lack of precaution.

84. Meanwhile, Corcyra provided the first examples of most of the crimes above—the revenge exacted when those who had never experienced fair treatment or indeed anything else but arrogance from their rulers finally triumphed; the wicked resolutions of those who wanted to escape from their accustomed poverty and eagerly desired their neighbors' goods; the savage and pitiless extremes of men motivated not by gain but by the ungovernable passion of party zeal. [2] In the confusion into which city-life was now thrown, human nature, always rebelling against the law now mastered it, and gladly showed itself uncontrolled in passion, above respect for justice, and the enemy of all things superior to it. If it had not been for the fatal power of envy, revenge would not have been set above religion, and profit above justice. [3] Indeed, in exacting revenge men too often begin the process of removing those general laws which everyone relies on for salvation in adversity, instead of preserving them against that day of danger when their protection may be needed.

85. While the Corcyraeans first displayed the passions of civil war, Eurymedon and the Athenian fleet sailed away. [2] After this, about five hundred Corcyraean exiles who had escaped took some forts on the mainland and gained control of the Corcyraean territory across the straits. They made this their base to plunder their countrymen on the island, and did so much damage that they caused a severe famine in the town. [3] They also sent envoys to Lacedaemon and Corinth to negotiate their restoration. But, meeting with no success, they later gathered boats and mercenaries and, about six hundred strong, crossed over to the island. Burning their boats, so they had no hope except to conquer the country, they went up to

Mount Istone, and fortifying themselves there, began to harass those in the city and gain control of the countryside.

Source: Crawley, Richard, trans. 1910. *Thucydides: The Peloponnesian War*. London, J.M. Dent, modified by the editors.

10. Thucydides 5.10.2–10. The Battle of Amphipolis (422)

Introduction

Thucydides' account of the Peloponnesian War (431–404) was written during and shortly after the war. Thucydides did not like Cleon, but on this occasion Cleon seems to have blundered in the way he maneuvered his hoplites outside the enemy city of Amphipolis. His opponent, the Spartan Brasidas, was a much more experienced soldier who quickly seized the opportunity provided by the confusion in the Athenian ranks. Both generals were killed in the ensuing engagement. For the vulnerability of infantry to good cavalry, see also Documents 15 and 17.

Document

5.10. [2] Cleon, who had moved forward to reconnoiter, was informed that the entire enemy army was visible in the city and that the feet of many men and horses could be seen under the gates as if they intended to charge out. When he heard this he came forward to look. [3] After seeing it for himself, not wanting to fight until his reinforcements arrived—and judging he had time to withdraw—he gave the signal to do so. At the same time he gave orders that the left wing move towards Eion (which was the only possible way). [4] Thinking he had plenty of time, he personally wheeled the right wing around, exposing its unshielded side to the enemy.

[5] When Brasidas saw the Athenians were moving and the time was right he said to his men, and the other contingents, “These men will not hold their ground against us. That’s clear from the movement of their spears and heads—when troops are doing that they rarely withstand a charge. Someone open the gates as I ordered and let us charge out as fast as we can.” [6] He then sallied out of the palisade gates and the first gate in the long wall which was there at that time. Running at the double along the straight road, past where the trophy now stands as you go past the steepest part of the hill, he fell upon the Athenians. The center of the army, thrown into

panic by its own confusion and caught off-balance by the daring of his charge, was routed.

[7] Clearidas, as ordered, charged out from the Thracian gates in support and also attacked. The Athenians were thrown into confusion by the rapid and unexpected attack from two sides, [8] and the left wing, which had already got some way towards Eion straightaway broke and ran. When the left collapsed Brasidas attacked the right but was wounded; the Athenians did not know he had fallen as his men picked him up and carried him away. [9] The right wing, however, stood its ground better. Cleon himself, though, had no intention of staying and immediately fled—he was caught and killed by a Myrcinian peltast. The hoplites formed up on a hill and beat off two or three of Clearidas' attacks. They finally only gave way under a hail of javelins when surrounded by the Myrcinians, the Chalcidian cavalry, and the peltasts. [10] So, the whole Athenian army was now in flight—those who did not perish in the main engagement or at the hands of the Chalcidian cavalry and the peltasts only got away with difficulty and by various mountain tracks to Eion.

Translated by Iain Spence.

11. Thucydides 6.1. The Size of Sicily

Introduction

This document describes Athenian misconceptions about the size of Sicily which was one of the factors leading to their ultimately disastrous decision to try to take control of the island. As Thucydides notes, this drew them into a war just as large as the Second Peloponnesian War, which was currently suspended under the terms of the Peace of Nicias (421). An attack on Sicily therefore made the Athenians very vulnerable if the Peloponnesians chose to resume hostilities while the Athenians were engaged in Sicily. This is exactly what happened and Athens' involvement in Sicily played a major role in their ultimate loss of the Second Peloponnesian War (404).

Document

6.1. During the same winter, the Athenians decided to sail again against Sicily with a larger force than the one with Laches and Eurymedon [427–426] to subjugate it—if they were able. Many were ignorant of the size of

the island and the number of the inhabitants (both Greeks and barbarians) and that they were taking on themselves a war not much lesser than the one against the Peloponnesians. [2] For sailing around Sicily is not much under eight days by merchant ship and despite its size is separated from the mainland by around 20 stades [around 2.25 miles or 3.7 kilometers].

Translated by Iain Spence.

12. Thucydides 7.10–15. Nicias' Letter from Sicily (414/13)

Introduction

This document is a letter from the Nicias, the senior Athenian strategos (general) with the Athenian expeditionary force in Sicily in 414-413. The expedition was not going well, Nicias was ill and desperate either for reinforcements or the recall of the army. Worried at the possible reaction to his news, and that the messengers might not convey it properly, he sent a lengthy dispatch. As with the speeches in Thucydides, it is impossible to know how much of the text is accurate and how much is Thucydides' creation. He was in exile at the time and so could not have heard the letter read himself, but would have spoken to people who had. Thucydides outlined his own practice in recording speeches (1.22), and if he stuck to this the main thrust of the letter, if not its specific points, should reasonably represent what Nicias said in it. However, it clearly represents Thucydides' own views on the nature of the democracy. As a result of the letter the Athenians sent out a large number of reinforcements only for the expedition to suffer a catastrophic defeat. Nicias was captured and executed by the Syracusans.

Document

7.10. During the next winter [414/13], Nicias' messengers arrived in Athens, said what he had told them personally, answered any questions, and delivered the letter. The secretary (*grammateus*) of the city came forward and read to the Athenians as follows.

11. The previous events, Athenians, you know from many other dispatches. But now, having learned our current situation, it is the right time for you to deliberate. [2] For, after conquering the Syracusans against whom we were sent in most battles and building the walls we now occupy, Gylippus the Lacedaemonian arrived with an army from the Peloponnese

and from some Sicilian cities. He was defeated by us in the first battle but the next day we were overcome by many cavalry and javelin troops and withdrew inside the walls. [3] Now, therefore, we remain quiet, having stopped building the walls around the city because of the size of the enemy (we are unable to use our whole army as a part of the hoplite force has to be left behind to guard the walls). They have built a single cross wall against us, so it is no longer possible to complete our walls around the city unless the cross wall could be taken by a large army [see map of the Siege of Syracuse]. [4] So, we, who seem to be the besiegers are in fact besieged—as far as land operations go—we cannot advance far into the countryside because of the cavalry.

12. They have sent envoys to the Peloponnese for another army and Gylippus has gone to the Sicilian cities to persuade those who are currently neutral to join him in the war and, if he can, to bring from the others [his allies] land and naval forces. [2] For, as I have learned, they intend to attack our walls simultaneously with an army and from the sea with ships. [3] And none of you should think it surprising that it is also by sea because the enemy know that the condition of our fleet was at first good because of the dryness of the timber and the soundness of the crews but now the ships are rotten from already spending so great a time at sea and the crews are reduced. [4] This is because it is not possible to beach the ships to dry them out as the enemy's numbers are greater than ours and we constantly expect an attack. They are clearly visible exercising and the initiative lies with them; their capacity to dry out their ships exceeds ours.

13. Even with a greater number of ships and freed from the need to keep guard with all our ships, this is not possible for us. For if we were to diminish our guard at all, even briefly, we would not have the supplies—which are now only brought in past their city with great difficulty. [2] Because of this our crews have been depleted, and continue to be depleted, as the sailors are killed by the cavalry when foraging large distances for food, fuel, and water. Since we have lost our numerical superiority, our slaves desert. Those of our foreign sailors who were pressed ganged leave as soon as they can for their own cities and when those who were induced by high pay and thought they would get rich without fighting, see, contrary to expectation, the enemy naval force and other resources opposed to us, some leave by deserting to the enemy, others by whatever means they can (Sicily is a large place). Others, also, have bought Hyccaric slaves and persuaded

their ship's captains to take the slaves on board instead of them, thereby reducing the efficiency of the fleet.

14. I am writing to those who know that a crew's peak is brief and there are few sailors who can get a ship underway and row together in time. [2] But the greatest problem of all is that it is not possible for me as general to prevent these things—for you Athenians are by nature difficult to control and although the enemy can draw crews from everywhere, there is nowhere we can get additional crews from; we have to make do with the men we brought with us. This is because the cities that are now our allies, Naxos and Catana, are powerless. [3] If the enemy gains one more advantage the places in Italy which now feed us, seeing the difficulties we are in and that you are not sending help, will go over to them and the enemy will win the war without a battle by starving us out. [4] I could have written other more pleasing things to you than these, but none more useful if it is in fact necessary to see clearly conditions here in order to make a decision. At the same time, knowing your nature is to prefer to hear the most pleasant things but later to attach blame if any of them do not occur as promised, I considered it safer to record the truth.

15. And now, you ought to consider that, in relation to the original purpose for which we came, neither your soldiers nor your generals are to blame. Since all of Sicily has banded together and another army from the Peloponnese is expected to reinforce them and we here cannot hold out against even the current enemy force you must quickly decide whether to recall the expedition or to send out an expedition no smaller than before with a land force, fleet, and supplies just as large as the first—and someone to succeed me as I cannot stay because of an ongoing kidney disease. [2] I am worthy to claim this consideration from you because when I was in good health I did many good things for you while holding commands. Whatever you decide, implement it right at the start of summer and without delay as the enemy will get the Sicilian reinforcements quickly but those from the Peloponnese more slowly. Unless you turn your mind to it the former will get here before you and the latter will get past you, like before.

Translated by Iain Spence.

Xenophon (ca. 430– ca. 353)

Xenophon was an upper-class Athenian. Perhaps because of his association with the cavalry—an unpopular body with the restored democracy because of their support for the oligarchic government of the Thirty—and with Socrates, he left Athens to accompany Cyrus the Younger in his attempt to seize the Persian throne (401). He played a major role in the successful march home by the Ten Thousand and lived for many years in exile at Scillus, near Olympia. Xenophon was a student of philosophy, a thoughtful and experienced soldier, and had good contacts in Sparta and the Peloponnese.

13. Xenophon, *Hellenica* 2.3.47–56. The Death of Theramenes (404)

Introduction

Xenophon wrote the Hellenica in the 350s. This document describes the second half of the Athenian politician Theramenes' defense speech in front of the Boule, or Council of 500 in 404. At the end of the Peloponnesian War (431–404), with Spartan help the Athenian democracy had been overthrown by oligarchs. In theory the government was in the hands of a body called the "Three Thousand" but actually Athens was run by a narrow oligarchy, "The Thirty." Theramenes was a moderate member of the Thirty, but had fallen out with Critias, another member, over Critias' hardline measures. The preceding sections of the Hellenica (not included here) provide Critias' accusations against Theramenes, and the first part of Theramenes' response. The document is interesting for its insights into the extreme end of Athenian politics and the ways in which due process could be subverted and political enemies removed (see also Document 9).

Document

2.3. [47] "He [i.e. Critias] calls me "Buskin," [a large boot used by actors and which could fit either foot] because, he says, I try to fit both parties. But the man who pleases neither party—what in the name of the gods should we call him? For you [Critias] in the days of the democracy were regarded as the strongest hater of the people, and under the aristocracy you have now shown yourself the strongest hater of the upper classes. [48] But I, Critias, am forever at war with those who think there cannot be a good democracy until the slaves and those who would sell the state if they needed a drachma

share in the government, and I am equally forever an enemy of those who think that a good oligarchy cannot be established until they bring the state to the point of being ruled absolutely by a few men. However, to run the government along with those who have the means to serve, whether as cavalry or hoplites—I regarded this as the best way in the past and I have not changed my mind now. [49] And, Critias, if you can cite any case where I joined with either demagogues or tyrants and deprived good men of their citizenship, then speak. For if I am found guilty of doing this now or of ever having done it in the past, I admit that I justly deserve the supreme penalty—death.”

[50] With these words he stopped speaking and the Council’s applause clearly showed it favored him. Critias, realizing that if he allowed the Council to vote on the case, Theramenes would escape, thought this was unbearable. He briefly consulted with the Thirty, and then went out and ordered the men with the daggers to take their stand at the railing in full view of the Council. [51] Then he came in again and said: “Members of the Council, I consider it the duty of a true leader who sees that his friends are being deceived, not to allow it. I shall therefore do just that. Anyway, these men who have taken their stand here say that they will not let us free a man who is clearly harming the oligarchy. Now the new laws state that while nobody on the list of the Three Thousand can be put to death without your vote, the Thirty shall have power of life or death over those not on the list. I, therefore,” he said, “with the approval of all the Thirty strike this man Theramenes from the list. That being done,” he added, “we now condemn him to death.”

[52] When Theramenes heard this, he sprang to the altar and said: “And I, gentlemen,” said he, “ask only simple justice—that Critias not have the power to strike from the list either me or any one of you he might wish, but instead, in both your case and in mine that the judgment is made strictly in accordance with the law these men have made about those on the list. [53] And, by the gods,” he added, “I know only too well, that this altar will not help me at all, but I want to show that the Thirty here are not only most unjust toward men, but also most impious toward the gods. But I am surprised at you,” he said, “gentlemen of the aristocracy, that you are not going to defend yourselves, especially when you know that it is just as easy to strike any of your names off as it is mine.”

[54] At this point the herald of the Thirty ordered the Eleven [the group

in charge of condemned prisoners and their execution] to seize Theramenes; and when they came in with their attendants and led by Satyrus, the most audacious and shameless of them, Critias said: “We hand this man Theramenes over to you, condemned according to the law. And you, the Eleven, take him and lead him to the proper place and do what follows next.”

[55] When Critias had said this, Satyrus, helped by his attendants, dragged Theramenes away from the altar. And Theramenes, as was natural, called upon gods and men to witness what was going on. But the council members kept quiet, seeing that the men armed with daggers at the rail were of the same sort as Satyrus and that the space in front of the council chamber was filled with guards.

[56] So the Eleven led Theramenes away through the market place, while he proclaimed in a very loud voice the wrongs he was suffering. One saying of his that is reported was this: when Satyrus told him that if he did not keep quiet, he would suffer for it, he asked: “But if I do keep quiet, won’t I still suffer?” And when, forced to die, he had drunk the hemlock, they said that he threw out the last drops, like a man playing *kottabos*, [a game where you attempted to flick the wine dregs in a cup into a bowl and wished a loved one good health] and exclaimed: “Here’s to the health of my beloved Critias.” Now I know that these sayings are not really worth recording; still, I think it admirable in the man that with death near at hand, he did not lose the spirit of playfulness nor the ability to think.

Source: Brownson, Carleton L., trans. 1918. *Xenophon Hellenica Books I-V*. Vol. 1 (Loeb). London: William Heinemann, modified by the editors.

14. Xenophon, *Anabasis* 2.6.1–15. Clearchus the Spartan (401)

Introduction

Xenophon probably wrote the Anabasis in the 360s. It recounts the history of the “Ten Thousand,” a force of Greek mercenaries employed by Cyrus the Younger to help overthrow his brother, the Great King of Persia. Xenophon was an eyewitness to their epic return home after Cyrus’ death. This document describes Clearchus, the senior mercenary general, after his execution by the Persians. Xenophon’s description is interesting in his

assessment of the leadership qualities (and deficiencies) of a professional soldier who in modern terms may have been suffering from PTSD.

Document

2.6. The generals, then, having been seized in this way, were taken to the King and beheaded. One of them, Clearchus, by common agreement of all who knew him personally, was a man who was both suited for war and extremely fond of war. [2] For, in the first place, as long as the Lacedaemonians were at war with the Athenians, he stayed with them but when peace came, he persuaded his state that the Thracians were harming the Greeks, and, after gaining his point as best he could with the ephors, set sail to make war on those Thracians living beyond the Chersonese and Perinthus. [3] When, however, for some reason the ephors changed their minds and, after he had already left, tried to turn him back from the Isthmus of Corinth, at that point he refused to obey and sailed off to the Hellespont. [4] As a result he was condemned to death by the Spartan authorities for disobeying orders. Now an exile, he came to Cyrus, and the arguments he used to persuade Cyrus are recorded elsewhere [they do not appear in the *Anabasis*—Xenophon may have intended to add them later and did not]; at any rate, Cyrus gave him 10,000 darics, [5] and he, on getting the money, did not turn to comfortable idleness but used it to recruit an army and made war upon the Thracians. He defeated them in battle and from that time on plundered them in every way, keeping up the war until Cyrus wanted his army. Clearchus then returned, to make war alongside Cyrus.

[6] Such conduct as this, in my opinion, reveals a man fond of war. When he might enjoy peace without dishonor or harm, he chooses war; when he might live in idleness, he prefers the toil of war; when he might keep his money without risk, he chooses to diminish it by carrying on war. Indeed, just as one might spend money on a lover or any other pleasure, Clearchus wanted to spend it on war. [7] He was just this sort of lover of war and, again, seemed to be fitted for it. He was fond of danger, ready to lead his men against the enemy by day or night, and, as everyone who was with him anywhere agrees, he kept a cool head in dangerous situations. [8] He was also said to be fitted for command—so far as this is possible for a man of such a disposition. He was highly proficient, if ever a man was, in planning how to supply his army and in actually achieving this. He was also very proficient in impressing on those with him that Clearchus must be

obeyed. [9] He achieved this by being severe; for he was gloomy in appearance, had a harsh voice, and used to punish severely, sometimes in anger, so that he would also sometimes be sorry afterwards. [10] Yet he also punished on principle, for he believed there was no good in an army without punishment; in fact, he used to say, it was reported, that a soldier must fear his commander more than the enemy if he was to perform guard duty, refrain from harming friends, or without hesitation go into action against the enemy. [11] In dangerous situations, therefore, the troops were ready to obey him implicitly and would choose no other commander. For, they said that at such times his gloominess appeared to be brightness, and his severity seemed to be resolution against the enemy, so that it no longer seemed severity but meant safety. [12] But when they had got past the danger and could go off to serve under another commander, many would desert him. For there was no attractiveness about him, but he was always severe and rough, so that the soldiers had the same feeling towards him that boys have towards a schoolmaster. [13] For this reason, he never had followers there from friendship and good-will, but only those who been placed under his command by a government or were there from poverty or some other necessity. These gave him implicit obedience. [14] Once they began to defeat the enemy in his service, there were important reasons for his soldiers' efficiency—they were confident in the face of the enemy and their fear of his punishments kept them in a good state of discipline. [15] This is what he was like as a commander, but it was said he did not particularly like being commanded by others. He was about fifty years old at the time of his death.

Source: Brownson, Carleton L., trans. 1921. *Xenophon Hellenica Books VI & VII, Anabasis, Books I-III*. Vol. 2 (Loeb). London: William Heinemann, modified by the editors.

15. Xenophon, *Hellenica* 4.8.17–19. Spartan Incompetence in Asia Minor (ca. 390)

Introduction

Xenophon, an experienced soldier and cavalryman, familiar with both Asia Minor and the Spartans, wrote the Hellenica in the 350s. The document describes the conflict between Struthas, the Persian satrap in western Asia

Minor, ca. 390 and the Spartans. It demonstrates that even Spartans could be careless and unprofessional—as well as how vulnerable infantry out of formation could be to good quality cavalry (see also Document 17).

Document

4.8. [17] When Tiribazus had joined him inland, the King sent Struthas to command on the coast. Struthas, however, remembered the damage Agesilaus had done to the King's territory and strongly favored the Athenians and their allies. When the Spartans saw that Struthas [Persian satrap in western Asia Minor, c. 390] was hostile to their side and friendly toward the Athenians, they sent out Thibron to make war on him. He sailed over to Asia Minor and operating from Ephesus and the cities on the Plain of the Maeander, Priene, Leucophrys, and Achilleum, he plundered property and drove off cattle from the Persian King's territory.

[18] As time went on, Struthas observed that time and time again Thibron made counter-attacks in an undisciplined and over-confident fashion. Struthas sent his cavalry into the plain and ordered them to ride over the plain in wild raids and to sweep up anything that they could. At the time Thibron happened to be relaxing in his tent after breakfast with Thersander the pipe-player. Thersander was not only a first-rate pipe player but he also cultivated manly prowess, since he was a partisan of Sparta. When Struthas saw that the first Greeks making a counter-attack were an undisciplined handful, he suddenly broke cover with a large cavalry force in tight formation.

[19] The first they killed were Thibron and Thersander. After these fell, the Persians routed the rest of the Greek army. In the pursuit they cut down a large number of Greeks. Some managed to escape to friendly cities, the greater part of these only because they had learnt of the counter-attack when it was too late. The fact is that Thibron, as on this occasion, often made a counter-attack without giving out any orders.

Translated by Douglas Kelly.

16. Xenophon, *Hellenica* 6.4.3–16. The Battle of Leuctra (371)

Introduction

Xenophon wrote the Hellenica in the 350s. This document describes the pivotal battle of Leuctra, which ended Spartan military domination in Greece and led to Theban hegemony. Although he glosses over detail, Xenophon's description of the battle is the best surviving account, and the only one from a contemporary. The Spartans had invaded Boeotia with 10,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry and outnumbered the Boeotian opposition, who perhaps numbered 6,000 hoplites. Although not entirely clear from Xenophon's account, the Theban commander, Epaminondas, advanced obliquely, with his best troops, unusually, on the left wing and in a deeper than usual formation. His plan, to strike hard at the Spartan line where the king was located worked and demonstrated the increased sophistication of Theban hoplite tactics. Xenophon's account is very much from the Spartan perspective and at several points attempts to salvage whatever comfort is possible from the disaster.

Document

6.4. [3] Now Cleombrotus did not enter Boeotia from Phocis at the point where the Thebans expected him to enter and where they were keeping guard at a narrow pass, but going via Thisbae along a mountainous and unexpected route, he arrived at Creusis, captured its wall, and took twelve triremes belonging to the Thebans. [4] After doing this and marching inland from the coast, he camped at Leuctra, in the territory of Thespieae. The Thebans were camped on the opposite hill not very far away, with no allies except the Boeotians. Then Cleombrotus' friends went to him and said: [5] "Cleombrotus, if you let the Thebans escape without a battle, you risk suffering the most extreme penalty from the state. For they will remember and hold against you not only the time when you reached Cynoscephalae but did not lay waste any Theban territory, but also the later time when you were beaten back from entering—although Agesilaus always got through via Cithaeron. So, if you really have a care for yourself or want to see your fatherland again, you must lead against these men." While his friends said this, his enemies said: "Now is the time when the man will make it clear whether, as rumor has it, he really favors the Thebans."

[6] Hearing this, then, Cleombrotus was spurred on to fight a battle. On the other side, the leaders of the Thebans calculated that if they did not fight, the cities round them would revolt and they would themselves be besieged and, in addition, if the people of Thebes were cut off from supplies,

there was a risk that the city itself would turn against them. And since many of them had been in exile before, they reckoned it was better to die fighting than be exiled again. [7] Besides this, they were also rather encouraged by the oracle which stated that the Lacedaemonians would be defeated at the place of the monument to the virgins, who it is said killed themselves because they had been raped by some Lacedaemonians. So, the Thebans decorated this monument before the battle. In addition, reports came to them from the city that the doors of all the temples were opening by themselves, and the priestesses were saying that the gods were clearly indicating victory. The messengers also reported that the weapons had disappeared from the Heracleium [Temple of Heracles], showing that Heracles had gone out to the battle. Some, certainly, say that all these things were tricks devised by the leaders. [8] But in the battle, at any rate, everything went badly for the Lacedaemonians, while on the other side everything went well, including luck.

For it was after the morning meal that Cleombrotus held his last command meeting about the battle. They had been drinking a little at midday and it was said that the wine had somewhat excited them. [9] Again, when both sides were arming themselves and it was already clear there would be a battle, in the first place, those who had provided the market, some baggage-carriers, and some who did not wish to fight began to withdraw from the Boeotian army. The Lacedaemonian mercenaries under Hieron, the Phocian peltasts, and, from among the horsemen, the Heracleots and Phliasians circled around and fell upon them, turning them and chasing them back to the Boeotian camp. In this way they made the Boeotian army much larger and more densely massed than it had been before. [10] In the second place, as the ground between the armies was a plain, the Lacedaemonians posted their horsemen in front of their phalanx, and the Thebans did the same. Now the cavalry of the Thebans was in good training as a result of the war against the Orchomenians and the war against the Thespians, while the Lacedaemonian cavalry at that time was exceedingly poor. [11] For the richest men kept the horses, and it was only on mobilization that the appointed trooper reported for duty. He would then get his horse and those weapons and equipment provided to him, and straightaway deploy. As for the men, it was those who were least fit and least ambitious who served in the cavalry. [12] Such, then, was the cavalry on either side. Coming now to the infantry, it was said that the

Lacedaemonians led each *enomotia* [half-company] three files abreast, so that the phalanx was not more than twelve men deep. The Thebans, however, were massed at least fifty shields deep, calculating that if they defeated the part of the army around the king, the rest of it would be easy to overcome.

[13] Now Cleombrotus began to lead his army against the enemy, but first—and even before the troops under him realized he was advancing—the cavalry had already engaged and the Lacedaemonian horse quickly routed. In their flight they had fallen foul of their own hoplites, and, in addition, the Theban *lochoi* [companies] were now charging upon them. Nevertheless, that Cleombrotus and those around him were at first winning in the battle is clearly indicated by the fact that they could not have taken him up and carried him off still alive if those who were fighting in front of him had not held the advantage at that time. [14] But when Deinon, the polemarch, Sphodrias, one of the king's tent-companions, and his son Cleonymus, had been killed, then the *Hippeis* [royal bodyguard], those called the “aides of the polemarch,” and the others fell back under the pressure of the Theban mass, and those on the left wing of the Lacedaemonians saw the right wing being pushed back and gave way.

Despite the fact that they had been defeated and many had fallen, after they had crossed the trench which happened to be in front of their camp they grounded their arms at the spot from which they had set out. However, the camp was not on entirely level ground, but on the slope of a hill. After this disaster, some of the Lacedaemonians, finding it unbearable, said that they ought to stop the enemy from setting up a trophy and try to recover the bodies of the dead, not by a truce, but by fighting. [15] The polemarchs, however, saw that almost a thousand of all the Lacedaemonians there had been killed and further, that among the seven hundred or so Spartiates there, about four hundred had fallen. Seeing, too, that none of the allies had any appetite for fighting, while some were even pleased at what had happened, they gathered together the most important personages and deliberated about what they should do. And as all thought it best to recover the bodies of the dead by a truce, they finally sent a herald to ask for one. After this, then, the Thebans set up a trophy and gave back the bodies under a truce.

[16] After these things had happened, the messenger sent to report the calamity to Lacedaemon arrived there on the last day of the festival of the

Gymnopaediae, when the chorus of men was in the theatre. When the ephors heard of the disaster, they were, as I consider inevitable, indeed distressed, but did not withdraw the chorus, allowing it to finish its performance. Further, although they gave the names of the dead to their relatives, they ordered to the women not to make any outcry, but to suffer the calamity in silence. And on the following day you could see those whose relatives had been killed going about in public with bright and cheerful faces, while you saw few of those whose relatives had been reported as living, and these were walking about gloomy and downcast.

Source: Brownson, Carleton L., trans. 1921. *Xenophon Hellenica Books VI & VII, Anabasis, Books I-III*. Vol. 2 (Loeb). London: William Heinemann, modified by the editors.

17. Xenophon, *Hellenica* 7.1.21. Sicilian Cavalry in Greece (369)

Introduction

Xenophon wrote the Hellenica in the 350s. This document describes an engagement in 369 between Sicilian cavalry supporting Sparta and a Boeotian force which had invaded the Peloponnese. It illustrates the effectiveness of good quality cavalry operating against heavy infantry—the combination of missiles and the mobility of the horse were very difficult for hoplites to counter. Similar tactics could also be used by light infantry against hoplites, as at Lechaeum in 390 (Xenophon, Hellenica 4.5.11–18)—see also Documents 10 and 15.

Document

7.1 [21] As few as they were, Dionysius' cavalymen scattered here and there, and riding alongside the enemy charged and hurled their javelins at them. When the enemy charged out at them they would retire and then turn about and hurl their javelins. During this procedure they would dismount from their horses and take a break and if anyone charged out at them while they were dismounted they would leap on their horses and retire without any trouble. In addition, if any pursued them far from the army, when these retired they would press upon them and wreak havoc with their javelins. So, they forced the whole army to advance or retreat as they themselves

wished.

Translated by Iain Spence.

Demosthenes (ca. 384–322)

Demosthenes was a fourth-century Athenian orator and statesman who consistently opposed Philip II of Macedon. Arguably the most accomplished orator of his time, Demosthenes committed suicide in 322 when the Greeks lost the Lamian War, and their opportunity to free themselves from Alexander the Great's control.

18. Demosthenes 54 (*Against Conon*) 3–5. Indiscipline in an Athenian Garrison (ca. 355–340)

Introduction

This passage is part of one of Demosthenes' forensic, or legal, speeches. Athenian legal procedure was for an individual to deliver their own case in court, but this could be written for them by professional orators. In this instance Demosthenes wrote the speech for Ariston to deliver in his prosecution of Conon and his sons for an assault which he claims nearly killed him. Although perhaps exaggerated to gain sympathy (Athenian law courts did not operate to modern standards of evidence or include cross-examination), the passage gives a good example of indiscipline among nonprofessional soldiers on garrison duty.

Document

3. Two years ago I went out to Panactum, where we had been ordered to do garrison duty. So, the sons of Conon were camped near to us—I wish it was not so. For the enmity and quarrels which affected us originated there and the causes of these you shall hear. These men were accustomed to drink the whole of each and every day as soon as they had finished lunch and they continued to do so as long as we were in the garrison. But we behaved ourselves there, outside the city, just as we are accustomed to do here.

4. So, whatever time the others were dining, these men were already drunkenly abusive, generally toward our attendant slaves but ultimately toward us too. For, after accusing the slaves of blackening them with smoke

while preparing the meal or of abusing them—or whatever else they might fancy, they used to beat them and empty their chamber pots on them and urinate on them and desist from no insult or violent action whatever. Seeing this we were annoyed and tried to protect ourselves, but as they mocked us and didn't stop, the whole mess together—not just me alone—went to the general and told him of the matter.

5. After he had abused and censured them not only for their brutal treatment of us but also over their entire behavior in the camp, they were so far short of being ashamed or desisting that no sooner had night fallen they immediately burst in on us, at first using verbal abuse and then laying blows on me. They made such a shrieking and uproar around the tent that the generals and taxiarchs and some of the soldiers came, who prevented us from suffering, or doing ourselves, anything irreparable, being drunkenly mistreated by these men.

Translated by Iain Spence.

19. Demosthenes 9 (*Third Philippic*) 48–50. Reasons for Philip II's Success (342)

Introduction

This passage is part of one of Demosthenes' political speeches, contrasting lethargic Athenian military action with Philip II's energetic campaigning. One of the reasons for Philip's success was his departure from the traditional pattern of hoplite warfare, which involved an annual invasion at the time the crops were ripening and then a return home and inaction over winter. This tempo was driven by the fact that the hoplite armies of Greek cities were part-time. Philip's creation of an army that was virtually professional allowed him to campaign year-round.

Document

48. For, firstly, I am told, that in those days the Lacedaemonians [Spartans] just like everyone else would spend four or five months in the summer attacking and ravaging a territory with hoplites and citizen troops and then go home again. They were so old fashioned, or rather such good citizens, that they never used money to buy any advantage from another but their warfare was legitimate and transparent.

49. But now you certainly see that most disasters result from traitors and none from pitched battles. You hear of Philip marching wherever he wants, not with a hoplite phalanx but with *psiloi* (light infantry), cavalry, archers, mercenaries, and other such types of troops.

50. Whenever with these advantages he falls upon some people suffering internal strife and through distrust nobody comes out to defend their land, he brings up his engines and besieges them. I don't need to tell you that Philip makes no distinction between winter and summer and chooses no season for a pause in military exercises.

Translated by Iain Spence.

Pergamene Inscription (ca. 263–241)

20. *Orientis Graeci Inscriptiones Selectae* 1.266. An Agreement between Eumenes I of Pergamum and His Mercenaries (ca. 263–241)

Introduction

*This document is an inscription from Pergamum dating to around 263–241. Although the meaning of parts of it is disputed, it appears to be a formal agreement between Eumenes I of Pergamum and a group of mercenaries in north Pergamum who had been in revolt. Although mercenaries were costly, Eumenes had hired a large mercenary force and used them first to defeat Antiochus I Soter of Syria at Sardis in 262 and then expand his own territory into the nearby coastal areas and Mount Ida, which had important pitch and timber resources required for shipbuilding. The document is an important one for outlining the type of contract existing between mercenaries and Hellenistic monarchs—and what was important to both parties to the agreement. Although there were regional variations in measurement, a medimnus was generally about 60 liters or 15 US gallons and a metretes was generally about 39.4 liters or 10.4 US gallons. See also the entry *Contracts, Military*.*

Document

Demands which Eumenes son of Philetaerus granted to the soldiers at

Philetaerea and Attalea:

Payment of the price for grain at four drachmas a *medimnus*; and wine at four drachmas a *metretes*.

Regarding the year: to ensure that it may be reckoned as 10 months and that he will not reckon any intercalary month.

Regarding those who have rendered the appropriate number and become out-of-service: to ensure that they receive pay for the time previously employed.

Regarding the matter of orphans: to ensure that the next of kin or any person to whom one bequeaths it receives it.

Regarding taxes: to ensure that the immunity from taxes that applied in the forty-fourth year is in force. If any man becomes out-of-service, or makes an application, he is to be discharged and be tax-exempt when he exports his goods and chattels.

Regarding the pay, which he agreed to for a four-month period: to ensure that the agreed amount is paid and it is not to be reckoned against the pay.

Regarding the White Poplars: to ensure that they receive their grain for the period in which they receive their crowns.

The oath and the agreement is to be inscribed on four stone pillars, and one is to be set up at Pergamum in the sanctuary of Athena, one at Gryneum, one on Delos, and one at Mytilene in the Asclepeum.

The oath that the following swore: Paramonus, the officers and the soldiers under their command at Philetaerea below Mount Ida; Polylaus and the officers and soldiers under his command at Attalea; Attinas the cavalry commander and the cavalrymen under his command; Homoloichus and the Trallians under his command.

"I swear by Zeus, Earth, Sun, Poseidon, Demeter, Ares, Athena Area, the Tauropolus, and all the other gods and goddesses. I am reconciled on the best basis with Eumenes son of Philetaerus, I shall show good will to him and his family; I shall not plot against Eumenes son of Philetaerus or bear arms against him; I shall not desert Eumenes but shall fight on his behalf and on behalf of his interests, throughout life and at the point of death. I shall render service in general with good will and without shirking, with full commitment to the utmost of my ability. If I become aware of anyone plotting against Eumenes son of Philetaerus or performing any action contrary to him or his interests, I shall not tolerate this and I shall give

information immediately, or as soon as possible, about the person engaged in any action of this kind, to Eumenes son of Philetaerus or to any person who I judge will report this to him promptly. I shall guard anything that I receive from him, city, fortress, ships, or valuables, or anything else that is handed over to me. I shall restore it properly and fairly to Eumenes son of Philetaerus or to any person that he may designate, so long as he is acting in accordance with the agreement.

I shall not accept any letter from his enemies or admit any envoy from them nor shall I send any dispatch to them. If someone brings anything to me, I will bring and deliver the letters under seal, and the person who brought them, as quickly as I am able, to Eumenes or to any person who I judge will report them promptly to him.

I will not engage in any sharp practice whatsoever regarding the oath by any subtlety or contrivance. I release from their oath Eumenes son of Attalus and those who took the oath along with him, now that the agreement has been carried out.

If I keep my oath and abide in goodwill toward Eumenes son of Philetaerus, may it go well for me personally and for mine. If I commit perjury and violate the agreement in any way, may I personally and my family perish from the face of the earth.”

Oath of Eumenes: “I swear by Zeus, Earth, Sun, Poseidon, Demeter, Ares, Athena Area, the Tauropolus and all the other gods and goddesses. I shall show goodwill to Paramonus, the officers and the others on the payroll: to those stationed in the military district of Philetaerea under Mount Ida under the command of Paramonus; to Arces and the garrison troops under his command, to Philonides and the discharged soldiers who have taken part in this oath; to these and their families, and also to Polylaus and the officers and soldiers stationed under his command at Attalea, infantry, cavalry, and Trallians all alike. So long as they continue to serve with me, I shall not plot against them nor shall anyone else on my behalf. I shall not betray any of them or anything belonging to them to any enemy, neither ... of them nor those elected by their assembly, not by means or any contrivance, nor will I bear arms against

Translated by Douglas Kelly.

Polybius (ca. 200–118)

Polybius was born into a prominent family in Megalopolis ca. 200. He had extensive military experience, including serving with Publius Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus in the Third Punic War, and had good contacts in the upper echelons of Roman society. His *Histories* cover Greece and Rome's early foreign wars from 264 to 146.

21. Polybius 12.17–22 Callisthenes' Errors about the Battle of Issus (333)

Introduction

This document criticizes the historian Callisthenes' account of Alexander the Great's victory over Darius at Issus (November 333). Callisthenes was a historian not a soldier but he was present at the battle. Polybius criticizes Callisthenes on the basis of internal inconsistencies and, according to Polybius, the physical impossibility of fitting the armies in the formations described into the space and terrain described. The passage sheds further light on the operation of the Macedonian phalanx, this time also including the other parts of the army—and the difficulties even near contemporaries had in analyzing earlier military history. Callisthenes' history of Alexander's campaigns does not survive. See also Documents 26 and 27.

Document

12.17. In order that we may not appear to insist arbitrarily on implicit belief in my criticism of such famous writers, we shall take one battle and a very famous one, a battle which took place not very long ago and, most importantly, one at which Callisthenes himself was present. [2] I refer to Alexander's battle with Darius in Cilicia. Callisthenes tells us that Alexander had already crossed the gap and the so-called Cilician Gates, while Darius had marched through the pass known as the Gates of Amanus and had descended with his army into Cilicia. [3] On learning from the locals that Alexander was advancing in the direction of Syria he followed him up, and when he approached the pass, encamped on the banks of the river Pinarus. [4] The distance, he says, from the sea to the foot of the hills is not more than 14 stades [about 1.6 miles or 2.5 kilometers] and [5] the river runs obliquely across this space, with gaps in its banks just where it

issues from the mountains, but in its whole course through the plain, as far as the sea, it passes between steep hills difficult to climb. [6] Having given this sketch of the country, he tells us that Darius and his generals, when Alexander turned and marched back to meet them, decided to draw up the whole phalanx in the camp itself in its original position, protected by the river, since it ran close past the camp. [7] After this he says they drew up the cavalry along the sea-shore, the mercenaries next to them beside the river, and the peltasts next to the mercenaries who stretched as far as the mountains.

18. It is difficult to understand how they posted all these troops in front of the phalanx, considering that the river ran close past the camp, especially in view of their numbers. [2] For, as Callisthenes himself says, there were 30,000 cavalry and 30,000 mercenaries, and it is easy to calculate how much space was needed for them. [3] To be really useful cavalry should not be drawn up more than eight deep, and between each *ile* [squadron] there must be a space equal in length to the front of a squadron so there is no difficulty in wheeling and facing about. [4] Therefore, a stade will hold 800 cavalry, 10 stades 8,000, and 4 stades 3,200, so that 11,200 cavalry would fill a space of 14 stades. [5] If the whole force of 30,000 were drawn up, the cavalry alone would almost form three such bodies [i.e., of 11,200], one placed close behind the other. [6] Where, then, were the mercenaries posted, unless indeed they were drawn up behind the cavalry? But he tells us this was not so, as they were the first to meet the Macedonian attack. [7] It is therefore necessary to understand that the cavalry occupied that half of the space that was nearest the sea and the mercenaries the half nearest the hills. [8] From this it is easy to calculate the depth of the cavalry and how far away from the camp the river must have been. [9] After this he tells us that on the approach of the enemy, Darius, who was half way down the line, called the mercenaries himself to come to him from the wing. It is difficult to see what he means by this. [10] For the mercenary and cavalry contingents must have joined just in the middle of the field, so that how, why, and where could Darius, who was actually among the mercenaries, call them to come to him? [11] Lastly, he says that the cavalry from the right wing advanced and attacked Alexander's cavalry, who received their charge bravely and delivering a counter charge fought stubbornly. [12] He forgets that there was a river between them and such a river as he has just described.

19 His statements about Alexander are very similar. He says that when he crossed to Asia he had 40,000 infantry and 4,500 cavalry, [2] and that when he was on the point of invading Cilicia he was joined by a further force of 5,000 infantry and 800 cavalry. [3] Suppose we deduct from this total 3,000 infantry and 300 cavalry, a liberal allowance for those absent on other tasks, there still remain 42,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry. [4] Assuming these numbers, he tells us that when Alexander heard the news of Darius' arrival in Cilicia he was 100 stades away [about 11.4 miles or 18 kilometers] and had already crossed the pass. [5] He therefore turned and marched back through the pass with the phalanx in front, followed by the cavalry, and last of all the baggage-train. [6] Immediately he entered the open country he re-formed his men, passing to all the word of command to form into phalanx, making it at first 32 deep, afterwards changing it to 16 deep, and finally as he approached the enemy to 8 deep. [7] These statements are even more absurd than his former ones. For with the proper intervals for marching order a stade [about 200 yards or 180 meters], when the men are 16 deep, will hold 1,600, each man being at a distance of 6 feet [about 2 meters] from the next. [8] It is evident, then, that 10 stades [about 2,000 yards or 1,800 meters] will hold 16,000 men and 20 stades twice as many. [9] From all this it is quite plain that when Alexander made his army 16 deep the line necessarily extended for 20 stades, and this left all the cavalry and 10,000 of the infantry over.

20 After this he says that Alexander led on his army in an extended line, being then at a distance of about 40 stades [about 4.5 miles or 7.2 kilometers] from the enemy. [2] It is difficult to conceive anything more absurd than this. Where, especially in Cilicia, could one find a stretch of ground where a phalanx with its long spears could advance for 40 stades in a line 20 stades long? [3] Indeed, the obstacles to such a formation and such a movement are so many that it would be difficult to number them all. A single one, mentioned by Callisthenes himself, is enough to convince us of its impossibility. [4] For he states that the torrents flowing down the mountains have formed so many ravines in the plain that most of the Persians in their flight perished in such fissures. [5]

By Zeus, it may be said, Alexander wished to be prepared for the appearance of the enemy! [6] But, what can be less prepared than a phalanx advancing in line broken and disunited? How much easier would it be to move from proper marching-order into order of battle than to straighten out

and prepare for action on thickly wooded and fissured ground a broken line with numerous gaps in it? [7] It would, therefore, have been considerably better to form a proper double or quadruple phalanx, for which enough marching room could have been found, and which could quickly and easily be brought into battle formation—since he was able to get from his scouts enough warning of the enemy's approach. [8] But, other things apart, Alexander did not even, according to Callisthenes, send his cavalry on in front when advancing in line over flat ground, but apparently placed them alongside the infantry.

21 But here is the greatest of all his mistakes. He tells us that Alexander, on approaching the enemy, made his line 8 deep. [2] It is evident, then, that now the total length of the line must have been 40 stades [about 4.5 miles or 7.2 kilometers]. [3] And even if they closed up so that, as described by Homer, they actually jostled each other, still the front must have extended over 20 stades [about 2.25 miles or 3.6 kilometers]. [4] But he tells us that there was only a space of less than 14 stades [about 1.6 miles or 2.5 kilometers], [5] and as half of the cavalry were on the left near the sea and half on the right, the room available for the infantry is still further reduced Add to this that the whole line must have kept at a considerable distance from the mountains to reduce the risk of attack by those of the enemy who held the foot-hills. [6.] We know in fact he drew up part of his force in a crescent formation to oppose these men....

I omit to reckon here also the ten thousand infantry more than his purpose required. [7] So the consequence is that the length of the line must have been, according to Callisthenes himself, 11 stades [about 2,200 yards or 1,980 meters] at the most, and in this space 32,000 men must have stood closely packed and 30 deep, whereas he tells us that in the battle they were 8 deep. [8] Now for such mistakes we can admit no excuse. [9] For when the actual facts show a thing to be impossible we are instantly convinced that it is so. [10] So, when a writer gives definitely, as in this case, the distance from man to man, the total area of the ground, and the number of men, it is perfectly inexcusable for him to make false statements.

22 It would take too long to mention all the other absurdities of his narrative, and it is enough to point out a few. [2] He tells us that Alexander in drawing up his army was very keen to fight opposite Darius in person, and that Darius also at first wished the same, but afterwards changed his mind. [3] But he tells us absolutely nothing as to how they informed each

other where they were stationed in their own line, or where Darius finally went when he changed position. [4] And how, we ask, did a phalanx of heavy-armed men climb the bank of the river which was steep and overgrown with brambles? [5] This, too, is inexplicable. Such an absurdity cannot be attributed to Alexander, as it is universally recognized that from his childhood he was well versed and trained in the art of war. [6] We should rather attribute it to the writer who is so ignorant as to be unable to distinguish the possible from the impossible in such matters. [7] Let these words suffice for Ephorus and Callisthenes.

Source: Paton, William R., trans. 1925. *Polybius: The Histories*. Vol. 4 (Loeb). London: William Heinemann, modified by the editors.

22. Polybius 4.57–58. A Failed Night Attack: Aegyrium (219)

Introduction

This extract from his Histories describes a failed Aetolian night attack on Aegyrium in Achaia in 219. It illustrates the difficulty and confusion of ancient Greek night operations, as well as the problems caused by a lack of discipline or professionalism that could be a feature of nonstanding armies. Another good example of a failed night attack (in Sicily in 413) is given in Thucydides 7.43–44.

Document

4.57. [2] Alexander and Dorimachus formed a plan against Aegyrium. They collected 1,200 Aetolians at Oeanthia in Aetolia, which is situated opposite Aegyrium, provided boats for them and waited for the right weather for the attack. [3] There was an Aetolian deserter who had spent a long time in Aegyrium and had observed that the guards on the gate at Aegyrium were heavy-drinkers and negligent in their duties. [4] He made the risky crossing a number of times and urged Dorimachus' men to make the attempt since they were old hands at this kind of enterprise.

[5] Aegyrium is located in the Peloponnese on the Corinthian Gulf between Aegium and Sicyon and is on steep hill-site difficult of access. It faces Parnassus and its region and on the other side of the Gulf and is almost 7 stades [a mile or 1.6 kilometers] from the sea. [6] When the weather turned right for Dorimachus, they sailed across and anchored in the

night at the river that flows past the town. [7] Alexander and Dorimachus, together with Archidamus son of Pantaleon, advanced on the town with the Aetolian main body along the road leading to Aegium. [8] The Aetolian deserter took 20 men especially suited for this kind of action and by avoiding pathways made his way up the cliffs ahead of the main body thanks to his knowledge of the ground. He got into the city though a drain and found the gate detail asleep. [9] He at once killed them in their beds. He chopped through the bars on the gate with axes and opened the gates to the Aetolians.

[10] The Aetolians stormed into the city with the maximum noise and so failed to exploit the situation intelligently. This was the cause of Aegyrium's preservation and the Aetolians' destruction. [11] They thought that all that has to be done to occupy an enemy city is get inside the gates and they behaved accordingly.

58. They stayed in formation in the market-place for only a short time and then scattered because of their passion for plunder. They started breaking into the houses and looting the contents just as it was getting light.

[2] The situation the people of Aegyrium found themselves in came as an utter surprise and shock. Those who had enemy troops forcing their way into their houses panicked and in terror all tried to escape outside the city, believing it was already securely held by the enemy. [3] Those in houses that were still untouched rushed out to see what was happening, heard the din and all fled to the citadel. [4] These increased in numbers and confidence, while on the contrary the Aetolian force was becoming less effective and more disorganized for the reasons indicated. [5] Dorimachus and his men saw the danger they were in. They regrouped and made an attack on those holding the citadel, expecting that bold and vigorous move would over-awe and scatter those who had rallied for a stand. [6] The men of Aegyrium cheered each other on: they put up resistance and bravely met the Aetolians in close combat. [7] The citadel was unwallled, so the fighting was hand-to-hand. At first the struggle was as desperate as is to be expected with one side fighting for their homeland and children, the other for survival. In the end, the Aetolian intruders were routed. [8] The men of Aegyrium took advantage of the Aetolian recoil and attacked the enemy in determined and intimidating fashion. The result of this was that most of the Aetolians were trampled to death by one another at the gates in the wild panic of their attempt to escape. [9] Alexander fell in close combat in the

thick of the action, Archidamus died in the suffocating crush round the gates. [10] The rest of the Aetolians were trampled to death or broke their necks while trying to escape down the cliffs where there were no paths. [11] The remnant that got way to the boats had the disgrace of throwing away their shields and made the crossing back in a way they never expected. [12] The people of Aegyrium lost their native city through negligence but recovered it against all expectation through courage and valor.

Translated by Douglas Kelly.

23. Polybius 4.8.9–11. Military Prowess: Regional Differences (Second Century)

Introduction

This document discusses differences in military aptitude, illustrating the fairly common ancient idea that these had a state or regional character.

Document

4.8. [9] Some men are fearless in the hunting-field in facing encounters with wild animals but are also cowardly in the face of combat with the enemy. Some men are expert and proficient in individual combat but useless in a massed formation. [10] Thessalian cavalry are irresistible when in squadron or line but out of formation they are slow and helpless in individual action to exploit any opportune moment or position. Aetolian cavalry are the exact opposite. [11] On land and sea Cretans are irresistible in ambushes, raids, stealth attacks, and night attacks, in fact in any kind of small-scale warfare involving deception. In a pitched face-to-clash of phalanx against phalanx, Cretans are cowardly and natural shirkers. Achaeans and Macedonians are the exact opposite.

Translated by Douglas Kelly.

24. Polybius 11.13.3–8. The Quality of Troops: Citizen Soldiers versus Mercenaries, Mantinea (207)

Introduction

This document describes mercenaries and their employers, proposing the

theory that mercenaries and citizen troops exhibit different characteristics according to the nature of their state or employer.

Document

11.13. [3] After some time the superior numbers and skill, thanks to their training, gave the mercenaries of Machanidas, tyrant of Sparta, the upper hand over those of Mantinea [at the battle of Mantinea, 207]. [4] This is generally likely to be the outcome. [5] It is the case that the troops of constitutional republics show more spirit in battle than the subjects of tyrants. However, by the same degree the mercenaries under despots are naturally superior to and outclass those mercenaries serving in constitutional republics. [6] For citizen troops the fighting is about freedom or slavery, but by the same token for mercenaries it is about obvious economic advantage or a matter of honor in face of clear and present danger. [7] When a constitutional republic has done away with those hostile to it, it no longer relies upon mercenaries to keep its freedom, but a tyranny has greater need of mercenaries because it is playing for higher stakes. [8] A tyranny has more people hostile to it because it is more oppressive. The security of despots depends in general on the goodwill and the capacity of its mercenaries.

Translated by Douglas Kelly.

25. Polybius 11.14.2–4. Success in War: A General's Competence, Mantinea (207)

Introduction

This extract from Polybius' Histories discusses the nature of a commander's competence.

Document

11.14. [2] That most successes in war depend upon either the competence or the incompetence of the commanders is a question that has occasioned some debate but on this occasion [the battle of Mantinea, 207] it was settled once and for all. [3] It is no small thing to seize an initial advantage and put the finishing touch to it. It is a far greater matter to keep one's presence of mind when the first attack has gone wrong, to observe the enemies'

hesitation in the moment of success and to launch an assault that capitalizes on their mistakes. [4] There are numerous cases of the side that appeared to have the advantage in the early stages meeting with complete failure and of the side that appeared to have come to grief at the outset pulling off a complete reversal through sheer determination.

Translated by Douglas Kelly.

26. Polybius 18.29–32. The Advantages and Limitations of the Macedonian Phalanx in Comparison with the Roman Army (Early Second Century)

Introduction

This extract discusses the difference between the Macedonian phalanx (widely adopted across Greece by this time) and the Roman army. It is designed to explain to Greek readers how the legendary Macedonian phalanx was defeated during the Roman conquest of Greece. The description of the sarissa, a long two-handed spear used by the heavy infantry, and the phalanx probably also applies to the phalanx under Philip II and Alexander the Great and his successors, although the original sarissa appears to have been around 3 feet (1 meter) longer. The weaknesses of the phalanx on rough terrain would also have applied under Philip and Alexander, although their use of cavalry and other infantry seems to have been more sophisticated and effective than under Philip V and would have considerably mitigated the limitations. Of additional interest is the respect still accorded to Homer in military matters, even as late as the second century. See also Documents 21 and 27.

Document

18.29. For many reasons it is easy to understand that when the phalanx has its own inherent character and strength nothing can sustain its frontal attack or withstand its charge. [2] For, when it has closed formation for action, each man with his arms, occupies a space of three feet [1 meter] in width, and the length of the *sarissa* according to the original design is 16 cubits [24 feet, or 7.4 meters]. [3] As adapted for actual need it is 14 cubits [21 feet, or about 6.5 meters], of which four cubits [6 feet, or just under 2 meters] are taken up by the distance between the bearer's hands and the

length of the weighted portion of the *sarissa* behind him that keeps it level. [4] It is evident then that the *sarissa* must extend 10 cubits [15 feet, or about 4.6 meters] in front of each hoplite when he charges the enemy grasping it with both hands. [5] As a result, while the *sarissae* of the second, third, and fourth ranks extend farther than those of the fifth rank, those of the fifth rank extend 2 cubits [3 feet, or around 1 meter] beyond the men in the first rank, when the phalanx has its characteristic close order in both depth and breadth, [6] as Homer expresses it in these verses:

Spear crowded spear,
Shield, helmet, man pressed helmet, man, and shield.
The hairy crests of their resplendent helmets
Kissed close at every nod, so close they stood.
[Homer, *Iliad* 13.131]

[7] This description is both true and fine, and it is evident that each man of the first rank must have the points of five pikes extending beyond him, each one two cubits [3 feet, or around 1 meter] from the next.

30. From this we can easily imagine the nature and force of a charge by the whole phalanx when it is 16 deep. [2] In this case those further back than the fifth rank cannot use their *sarissae* so as to take any active part in the danger of battle. [3] They therefore do not individually level their spears, but hold them slanting up in the air over the shoulders of those in front of them, in order to protect the whole formation from above, keeping off by this serried mass of spears those missiles which, passing over the heads of the first ranks, might fall on those immediately in front of and behind them [see the second illustration in the Phalanx entry]. [4] These men, though, by the sheer pressure of their body weight in the charge add to its force—and it is quite impossible for the front ranks to face about.

[5] This being in general and in detail the disposition of the phalanx, for purposes of comparison, I must now speak of the characteristics of the Roman equipment and formation and the points of difference in both. [6] Now in the case of the Romans also each soldier with his arms occupies a space of three feet [1 meter] in width, [7] but in accordance with their mode of fighting each man must move separately. As he has to cover his person with his long shield, turning to meet each expected blow, and as he uses his sword both for cutting and thrusting [8] it is obvious that a looser order is required and each man must be at a distance of at least three feet from the

man next him in the same rank and those in front of and behind him, if they are to be of real use. [9] The consequence is that one Roman must stand opposite two men in the first rank of the phalanx, so that he has to face and encounter ten pikes, [10] and it is both impossible for a single man to cut through them all in time once they are at close quarters and by no means easy to force their points away, as the Roman rear ranks can be of no help to the front rank either in forcing the *sarissae* away or in using the sword. [11] So it is easy to see that, as I said at the beginning, nothing can withstand the charge of the phalanx as long as it preserves its characteristic formation and force.

31. What then explains the Roman success, and what is it that defeats the purpose of those who use the phalanx? [2] It is because in war the time and place of action is uncertain and the phalanx has only one time and one type of terrain in which it can perform its proper function. [3] Now, when a decisive battle was impending, if the enemy [the Romans in this case] had to adapt themselves to the times and terrain needed by the phalanx, those who use the phalanx would in all probability, for the reasons I stated above, always get the better of their enemies. [4] But if it is not only possible, but easy, to avoid the onset of a phalanx, why should anyone still dread an attack by such a formation? [5] Again, it is acknowledged that the phalanx requires level and clear ground with no obstacles such as ditches, gullies, clumps of trees, ridges and water courses, [6] all of which are sufficient to impede and break up such a formation. [7] Everyone would also acknowledge that it is almost impossible, except in very rare cases, to find spaces of say 20 stades [about 2.25 miles or 3.6 kilometers] or more in length without such obstacles. [8] But even if we assume it to be possible, supposing those who are fighting against us refuse to meet us on such ground, but move around sacking the cities and devastating the territory of our allies, what is the use of such a formation? [9] For by remaining on the ground that suits it, not only is it incapable of helping its friends but it cannot even ensure its own safety. [10] For an enemy in complete control of the open country will easily prevent the arrival of supplies. [11] But if the phalanx leaves the ground appropriate for it and attempts an engagement, the enemy easily defeats it. [12] Again, if it is decided to engage the phalanx on level ground, and instead of using the total force when the phalanx has its one opportunity for charging, an enemy keeps out of action even a small part of it at the moment of the shock,

32. it is easy to tell what will happen from what the Romans always do at present. The likelihood of the result I now indicate needs no argument but only the evidence of actual facts. [2] For the Romans do not make their line equal to the enemy and expose all the legions to a frontal attack by the phalanx, but keeping part of their forces in reserve the rest engage the enemy. [3] Afterwards, whether the charge of the phalanx drives back the force opposed to it or is repulsed by it, its proper formation is broken up. [4] For whether following up a retreating enemy or fleeing from a pursuing one, parts of their own army are left behind. [5] This creates gaps in the space formerly held by the phalanx in which the enemy's reserve has room to attack—no longer in the front but on the flank and rear of the phalanx. [6] When it is therefore easy to guard against the opportunities and advantages of the phalanx, but impossible to prevent the enemy from taking advantage of the right moment to act against it, the one kind of formation [Roman] naturally proves in reality superior to the other [the phalanx].

[7] Again, those who use the phalanx have to march through and encamp in every variety of country; they have to occupy favorable positions in advance, besiege certain positions and be besieged in others, and to meet attacks from unexpected directions. [8] For all these contingencies are part of war and victory, sometimes wholly and sometimes very largely, depends on them. [9] Now in all these situations the Macedonian formation is at times of little use and at times of no use at all, because the phalanx soldier is not useful either in detachments or alone, while the Roman formation is efficient. [10] For every Roman soldier, once armed and sets about his business, can adapt himself equally well to every place and time and can meet attacks from every quarter. [11] He is likewise equally prepared and equally in condition whether he has to fight together with the whole army or with a part of it, or in maniples or alone. [12] So since in all particulars the Romans are much more serviceable, Roman plans are much more apt to result in success than those of others. [13] I thought it necessary to speak on this subject at some length because on the actual occasions when the Macedonians suffered defeat many Greeks considered the event as almost incredible, and many will still continue to wonder why and how the phalanx comes to be conquered by troops armed in the Roman fashion.

Source: Paton, William R., trans. 1927. *Polybius: The Histories*. Vol. 5 (Loeb). London: William Heinemann, modified by the editors.

Asclepiodotus (First Century)

Asclepiodotus was a first-century philosopher who wrote a technical treatise on the organization and tactics of a model army. This was designed to provide instruction to those interested in warfare.

27. Asclepiodotus, *Tactics* 5. The Phalanx (First Century)

Introduction

In this passage, Asclepiodotus describes the equipment and formation of the Macedonian phalanx. Although very similar to the description in Polybius (Document 26, see also second illustration in Phalanx entry), Asclepiodotus provides different lengths for the sarissa, a long two-handed spear used by the heavy infantry. If he is accurate here, it seems likely that represents a further shortening of the sarissa from the original design under Philip II of Macedon. There is no evidence that anyone designed sarissae of different lengths to ensure a uniform line of spear points in front of the phalanx. See also Document 21.

Document

5. The best shield for use in the phalanx is the Macedonian, of bronze, 8 palms [24 inches, or 62 centimeters] in diameter, and not too concave. In addition, their spear is not less than 10 cubits [15 feet, or about 4.6 meters], so that the part that projects in front of the rank is not less than 8 cubits [12 feet, or about 3.7 meters]—but in no case is it longer than 12 cubits [18 feet, or just under 6 meters], in which case it projects forwards 10 cubits. Now when the Macedonian phalanx uses such a spear in a close formation it appears irresistible to the enemy. For it is obvious that the spears of the first 5 ranks project beyond the front, since the soldiers in the second rank, being 2 cubits [3 feet, or around 1 meter] back, extend their spears 8 cubits [12 feet, or about 3.7 meters] beyond the front, those in the third rank 6 cubits [9 feet, or just under 3 meters], those in the fourth rank 4 cubits [6 feet, or just under 2 meters], and those in the fifth rank 2 cubits. So, 5 spears extend beyond the first rank. [2] And the Macedonians, men say, with this line of spears not only terrify the enemy by their appearance, but also motivate every file-leader, protected as he is by the strength of 5 spears. The men in the ranks behind the fifth, although they cannot extend their spears beyond

the front of the phalanx, nevertheless push forward with their bodies and remove any hope of flight from their comrades in the front ranks. But some, who wish to bring all the projecting spear-points to the same distance in front of the line, increase the length of the spears of the rear ranks.

Source: Translation by Illinois Greek Club. 1928. *Aeneas Tacticus, Asclepiodotus, Onasander*. (Loeb). London: William Heinemann, modified by the editors.

Plutarch (ca. 45–120 CE)

Plutarch (Lucius(?) Mestrius Plutarchus), from Chaeronea in Boeotia wrote parallel biographies of many of the important ancient Greek and Roman political and military leaders. He may have held some civil administration posts, but apparently had no military experience. His work preserves much valuable information from earlier writers, but should be read as biography and not history. This is because Plutarch's aim was to reveal the moral character of his subjects, and draw lessons from these, rather than to construct an accurate historical picture.

28. Plutarch, *Pelopidas* 5–6. Conflict between Sparta and Thebes—Phoebidas' Attack on Thebes (382)

Introduction

This document describes the Spartan seizure of the Cadmea, the citadel of Thebes in 382. Relations between the two cities had deteriorated after their victory over the Athenians in the Second Peloponnesian War (431–404) and 382 marked a significant increase in Sparta's external ambitions. In addition to Phoebidas' attack on Thebes the Spartans had already dispatched an expedition against the Chalcidian Confederacy and soon after seizing the Cadmea rebuilt Plataea as a counterweight to Thebes. Although Phoebidas' attack was supposedly unauthorized, Sparta kept its garrison in Thebes. This gave Sparta control of the city, and Boeotia, although at some cost to its reputation for honest dealings. However, the control was relatively short. Plutarch Pelopidas 7–13 has an interesting account, too long to reproduce here, of how Pelopidas and his party regained control in a coup in 379. They

preserved their independence with the assistance of an alliance with Athens. The request for Spartan intervention by a faction in Thebes is a good example of the phenomenon described by Thucydides in Document 9.

Document

5. After this the Spartans ostensibly treated the Thebans as friends and allies, but they really looked with suspicion on the ambitious spirit and the power of the city, and above all they hated the party of Ismenias and Androcleides, to which Pelopidas belonged, and which was considered to be friendly to freedom and democracy. [2] Therefore Archias, Leontidas, and Philip, men of the oligarchic faction who were rich and exceedingly ambitious, tried to persuade Phoebidas the Spartan, as he was marching past with his army, to seize the Cadmea by surprise, expel the party opposed to them from the city, and bring the government under Lacedaemonian control by putting it in the hands of a few men. [3] Persuaded by this, Phoebidas attacked the Thebans when they did not expect it (it was the festival of the Thesmophoria), and got possession of the citadel. Then Ismenias was arrested, taken to Sparta, and a little later executed, while Pelopidas, Pherenicus, Androcleides and many others fled and were proclaimed outlaws. Epaminondas, however, was allowed to remain in the city; because of his philosophy he was looked down upon as a recluse, and because of his poverty considered powerless.

6. The Lacedaemonians removed Phoebidas from command and fined him 100,000 drachmas, but nevertheless still occupied the Cadmea with a garrison. All the rest of the Greeks were amazed at their inconsistency, since they punished the wrong-doer, but approved his action. And as for the Thebans, they had lost their ancestral form of government and were enslaved by Archias and Leontidas. Nor had they any hope of escape from this tyranny, [2] which they saw was protected by the dominant military power of the Spartans and could not be overthrown unless somehow the Spartans might be deposed from their command of the land and sea. Nevertheless, Leontidas and his associates, learning that the fugitive Thebans were living at Athens, where they were not only in favor with the common people but also honored by the upper class, secretly plotted against them. Sending men who were unknown, they treacherously killed Androcleides, but failed in their plot against the rest. [3] Letters also came from the Lacedaemonians charging the Athenians not to harbor or

encourage the exiles, but to expel them as men declared by the allied cities to be common enemies. The Athenians, however, not only yielding to their traditional and natural instincts of humanity, but also making a grateful return for the kindness of the Thebans, who had been most ready to aid them in restoring their democracy, and had passed a decree that if any Athenians marched through Boeotia against the tyrants in Athens, no Boeotian should see or hear them, did no harm to the Thebans in their city.

Source: Perrin, Bernadotte, trans. 1917. *Plutarch's Lives*. Vol. 5 (Loeb). London: William Heinemann, modified by the editors.

Polyaenus (Active ca. 162–166 CE)

Polyaenus was a Macedonian rhetorician who ca. 162–166 CE wrote the *Strategemata*, a collection of military stratagems and tricks apparently to help Marcus Aurelius and Lucius Verus in their Parthian War. The *Strategemata* is rather an academic collection, but it does preserve some interesting snippets of history.

29. Polyaenus 3.14. The Capture of Ilium (ca. 357–355)

Introduction

Charidemus was an Athenian general and his capture of Ilium (on the site of Troy) in Asia Minor probably took place during Athenian operations in the Hellespont either during or around the time of the Social War (357–355) between Athens and her rebellious allies. The accuracy of the account is unverifiable but is typical of the types of ruse or stratagem collected by ancient military writers.


Document

3.14. When the people of Ilium were raiding a town held by Charidemus, he captured a slave from Ilium who had come out on a plundering raid. Charidemus induced him by large bribes to betray the city. With the object of making this slave appear trustworthy to those guarding the gates, he gave him some sheep and some slaves as plunder two or three times. The guards took their share of these and allowed him to go out at night a number of times, along with a large body of men to round up the plunder.

Then one night Charidemus seized the men accompanying the slave and put them in chains. He dressed some of his own men, who were fully armed, with the prisoners' clothes and gave them some booty, including a horse they could say was captured. The guards opened the gates wide to let the horse in. Charidemus' troops charged in behind the horse and killed the guards. They then picked up the rest of his army and took control of the city. The result was, joking apart, that Ilium was once again the victim of a successful horse stratagem.

Translated by Douglas Kelly.


Maps



ITALY AND MAGNA GRAECIA




PERSIAN EMPIRE, C. 500 BCE




GREECE DURING THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR, 431 - 404 BCE



THE SIEGE OF SYRACUSE, 415 - 413 BCE



THE EMPIRE OF ALEXANDER THE GREAT



Greatest expansion of the empire

Areas dependent on Alexander

Cities founded by Alexander the Great


Alexander's route 334-323 BCE

Voyage of Nearchus 325 BCE

0 750 miles

0 750 kilometers

ASIA MINOR IN 189 BCE



Glossary

This glossary is designed to help with specialist or technical Greek words or phrases used in writings about Greek conflict. Although it lists most of the commonly used specialist terms, as this book is not a Greek dictionary it cannot pretend to include all conflict-related Greek terms. Entries are listed alphabetically and words in italics are transliterations of Greek words. An asterisk indicates a more detailed entry or discussion appears under the same name in the main body of the encyclopedia (where the main entry name is in a different form, this is supplied in brackets after the asterisk). Note that Greek has no “c” and if you are looking up latinized/anglicized forms (such as “*crypteia*” or “*cataphractoi*”) these may appear under “k” (“*krypteia*,” “*kataphractoi*”).

Agema: military contingent; sometimes elite troops (Macedonian and Seleucid armies).

Agoge: rigorous Spartan state physical and military training regime applied to all male Spartiates from childhood.*

Agōn (plural, *agōnes*): contest, competition, battle; also an assembly or gathering.

Agora (plural, *agorai*): market place. The *agora* of a city was often its main social center, as was the case at Athens where “Athenian Agora” (or just “the Agora”) is often used to reflect its significance and distinguish it from other *agorai*.

Aichmalotos (plural, *aichmalotoi*): captive, prisoner of war, but can also apply to captured livestock or goods (literally, “taken by the spear”).

Akolouthos: attendant.

Akon (plural, *akontes*): javelin.

Akontistes (plural, *akontistai*): javelin-equipped soldier.

Amentum (Latin term): a loop attached to a javelin to allow the thrower to impart spin to the weapon and increase the distance thrown.

Andreia: manliness, bravery.

Anthippasia: mock battle between sections of the Athenian cavalry staged as both a training exercise and public display.

Apoikia: colony, settlement away from home.

Arche: rule, empire, power; also official, magistrate.

Archon (plural, *archontes*): chief magistracy at Athens (after ca. 487 it was supplanted in importance by the *stratego*).

Arête: excellence, virtue, courage; the reward of excellence, especially fame, distinction; in plural (*aretai*): great deeds.*

Argyraspides: Silvershields—infantry unit in the armies of Alexander the Great and his Successors.

Argyrologia (or *argyrologos*): raising or levying money.

Aristeia: the feats or deeds of a hero or the prize awarded for them.

Aspis (plural, *aspides*): the large round shield carried by hoplites.

Astrateia: crime of avoiding military service; also, exemption from military service.

Asyilia: sanctity, inviolability.

Boule: the Council of 500 at Athens which prepared the agenda for the assembly and handled day-to-day administration between assembly meetings; similar institutions existed in most Greek cities.

Chalkotheke (literally “bronze store”): a building on the Acropolis used originally to store the metal offerings to Athena but later as an arsenal to store weapons and naval equipment.

Chora: the territory of a *polis*; its agricultural hinterland.

Cleruch: Athenian military settler or colonist.

Cleruchy: Athenian military settlement or colony.

Deilia: cowardice.

Dekadarch (*dekadarchos*, plural, *dekadarchoi*): literally “leader of ten”; a rank in the Spartan infantry.

Dekate: tithe or dedication of a tenth part (e.g., of booty).*

Deme (*demos*, plural, *demoi*): The basic Athenian social and political organizational unit under Cleisthenes' reforms; *demos* also refers to the people as a whole.

Diadochoi (literally "successors"): the men who took over and ruled the various parts of Alexander the Great's empire after his death.* [Successors (*Diadochoi*), Wars of].

Diekplous: naval maneuver, involving sailing through an enemy's line then turning and attacking from the rear.*

Dieres: bireme (warship with two rows of rowers).

Doriktetos chora: conquered territory (literally "spear-won land").

Doru (plural, *dorata*): spear.

Drachma (*drachme*, plural *drachmai*): unit of weight or currency; at Athens a drachma = six obols.

Eirene: peace.* [Peace (*Eirene*)].

Eisphora: special wartime tax levied to pay for the war.

Ekdromos (plural, *ekdromoi*): a soldier who charged out of the ranks (as part of a designated group) to drive off an enemy.

Eleutheria: freedom.* [Freedom (*Eleutheria*)].

Enchos: spear.

Enomotia: infantry unit of the Spartan army (also any group of soldiers bound together by oath).

Enomotiarchos: leader of an *enomotia*.

Eparittoi: picked or elite troops of the Arcadian Confederacy.

Ephebeia: Athenian state youth-training system from the mid-fourth century.* [Ephebes, *Ephebeia*].

Epheboi (singular, *ephebos*): ephebes (boys between the ages of 15 and 20); at Athens, also youths undergoing the *ephebeia*.* [Ephebes, *Ephebeia*].

Ephor (*ephoros*, plural, *ephoroi*): annually elected magistrate at Sparta.

Epibatai (singular, *epibates*): hoplites serving as part of a ship's complement; marines.*

Epilektoi: picked or chosen troops who formed a permanent or semipermanent force in many Greek states in the fourth century.

Epimachia: defensive alliance.

Epiteichismos: building fortifications near or inside an enemy frontier,

often to serve as a forward base for operations.*

Gastrophetes: a tension-powered weapon probably similar to a large crossbow, fired with its butt resting on the firer's stomach.

Gymnoi: light-armed troops.* [Light Troops (*Psiloi*, *Gymnoi*)].

Hamippoi (singular, *hamippos*): infantrymen (usually light) who operated with cavalry.*

Hegemon: leader, commander in chief.*

Hegemonia: command, rule (especially of a coalition force or of an empire).* [*Hegemon*, *Hegemonia*].

Hellenotamiai: financial officials of the Delian League (literally "Stewards of the Greeks").

Helots (singular, *heiloi* or *heilotes*, plural, *heilotes* or *heilotai*): serf-like class at Sparta.*

Hetairoi: literally "companions"; a title of the Macedonian cavalry.

Hieros Lochos: the Sacred Band (Theban elite troops).* [Sacred Band].

Hipparchos (plural, *hipparchoi*): hipparch, or cavalry commander, at Athens and elsewhere.

Hipparmostes: a cavalry commander at Sparta.

Hippeis (singular, *hippeus*): cavalry; in the singular, it denotes a cavalryman or rider. It also has specialized usage at Athens to denote members (who had a military obligation to serve in the hoplites or cavalry) of the second highest of the census classes established by Solon, and at Sparta, the kings' bodyguard.*

Hippotoxotai: (singular, *hippotoxotes*): horse-archers.*

Homoioi: (singular, *homoios*): full citizens of Sparta (literally "equals" or "the same in rank").

Hoplitagogos: troop ship.

Hoplite (*hoplites*, plural, *hoplitai*): heavy infantryman equipped with *aspis* (shield) and spear and perhaps (but not always) breast-plate, helmet, and greaves.*

Hypaspistes (plural, *hypaspistai*): shield-bearer, attendant; in plural, a type of infantry in Macedonian and later armies.

Hyperesia: ship's crew, rowers; also attendants.

Hyperetes (plural, *hyperetai*): assistant or aide (either a free man or a slave,

depending on the context).

Ile: troop (or squadron) of cavalry.

Kamax (plural, *kamakes*): term (literally “pole”) used by Nicholas Sekunda and subsequently other modern writers to denote a cavalryman’s thrusting spear; probably the same as the hoplite spear or *doru*, but possibly referring to a longer weapon, closer to the *sarissa*.

Katalogos: Athenian register of citizens liable for military service.* [*Catalogus* (*Katalogos*)].

Kataphraktoi: heavily armored cavalry.* [*Cataphractoi*].

Katastasis: establishment; at Athens, the establishment grant paid on enlistment in the cavalry; also the placement or deployment of troops on the battlefield.

Keryx (plural, *kerykes*): herald, envoy.

Kopis (plural, *kopides*): sword, probably of Persian origin, of the same or similar type as the *machaira*.

Krypteia: Spartan secret police/internal security force.* [*Crypteia*].

Leistai: (singular, *leistes*): bandits/pirates.* [Bandits; Piracy].

Lembos: light warship, favored by pirates.* [Ships, War].

Lochagoi: (singular, *lochagos*): subordinate commanders; at Athens, commanders of *lochoi*, or infantry sub-units.

Lochos (plural, *lochoi*): infantry sub-unit; at Athens it may have been the *trittys* contingent of a tribal regiment.

Logades: picked or chosen troops.

Machaira (plural, *machairai*): sword, probably with curved blade, not unlike a larger version of the Gurkha kukri.

Mantis (plural, *manteis*): seer, soothsayer, diviner of the future.

Metic (*metoikos*; plural, *metoikoi*): resident alien (especially at Athens).*

Mina (*mna*, plural *mnai*; “mina” is the Latin form): unit of weight or currency; at Athens a *mina* = 100 drachmas and was a sixth of a talent.

Monomachy: duel between champions; single combat.

Mora (plural, *morai*): a unit (infantry or cavalry) of the Spartan army.

Nauarchos (plural, *nauarchoi*): navarch, office of admiral at Sparta.

Neodamodeis: newly freed—Spartan term used of freed helots.*

Nome: administrative district or province in Egypt.

Obol (*obolos*, plural, *oboloi*): unit of weight or currency; at Athens six obols = one drachma.

Oikistes: leader of a colonizing expedition, founder of a colony.

Ostracism: Athenian political mechanism to reduce political tension by voting to exile a politician for 10 years.*

Othismos: pushing, generally of shield against shield in hoplite warfare.*

Ouragos: commander of the rearguard.

Paean: hymn sung before battle.

Palton (plural, *palta*): javelin.

Pandemei (of armies): to march out at full-strength; with the entire state's forces.

Panoplia: panoply, full set of hoplite equipment.

Panstratii (deploying, or accompanied by): the whole army.

Peiratai: pirates.* [Piracy].

Peltast (*peltastes*, plural *peltastai*): light infantryman originating in Thrace, equipped with a crescent shaped shield (*pelte*), sword, javelin, or thrusting spear.*

Pentakosiomedimnoi: literally “five-hundred measure men,” the highest Athenian property classification established by Solon, with full military service and finance obligations.

Penteconter also “pentecontor” (*pentekontoros*, plural, *pentekonteroi*): a fifty-oared ship. *[Ships, War].

Perioikoi (singular, *Perioikos*): inhabitants of the outlying villages of Lacedaemonia who did not have the same rights as full Spartiates (the term *perioikoi* is also used of similar groups outside Sparta).*

Periplous: literally “a sailing around,” often used of a naval expedition but can denote sailing around an enemy fleet.

Pezhetaroi: foot companions (a Macedonian troop classification).

Phoros: tribute paid to a ruling state; levied, for example, by Athens from members of the Delian League/Athenian Empire.

Phratry (*phratra*, plural, *phratrai*): literally “brotherhood” but used in a political sense as a tribe or (later) part of a tribe; later usage could encompass any league or association, often with the negative overtone

of a conspiracy.

Phylarchos (plural, *phylarchoi*): commander of a *phyle*.

Phyle (plural, *phylai*): a tribe (the largest internal subdivision of citizens in a city—kinship groups which served administrative and military functions) or a military contingent furnished by a tribe; (at Athens) a 100-man tribal cavalry contingent or squadron.

Pleonexia: greed.

Polemarchos (plural, *polemarchoi*): literally “war leader”; the title of senior military officers in several Greek states.

Polemos: war.

Polis (plural, *poleis*): city or city-state.

Presbeis (singular, *presbys*): generally used in the plural, ambassadors (literally “elders” or “old men”).

Prodromoi (singular, *prodromos*): cavalry scouts.*

Promachos (plural, *promachoi*): a champion, or someone who fought in front of the line; after the introduction of the hoplite phalanx it was a sign of ill-discipline and a punishable offence in some states.

Proskynesis: Persian court practice of prostrating oneself before the Great King as a sign of reverence; controversially introduced to Alexander the Great’s court after his conquest of the Persian Empire.

Protostates (plural, *protostatai*): the man on the extreme right of a rank or (in plural) men of the front rank; also leader of a contingent.

Psilos (plural, *psiloi*): light-armed soldier; could range from archers, slingers, or peltasts to men equipped with nothing more than a dagger or stones.* [Light Troops (*Psiloi*, *Gymnoi*)].

Rhypsaspis: throwing away one’s shield in battle (in order to flee more quickly); an indictable offence at Athens.

Rhyton: cup in a conical or horn shape, often in the shape of an animal or animal’s head and very ornate.

Salpinx: trumpet.

Sarisophoroi (singular, *sarisophoros*): soldiers carrying the *sarissa*; a cavalry unit of the Macedonian army.

Sarissa (plural, *sarissai*): long Macedonian two-handed spear or lance, carried by both infantry and (at least some) cavalry.

Sitos (literally “grain”): an allowance for food for soldiers or, at Athens, for cavalry horses (*hippios sitos*).

Skeuophoros (plural, *skeuophoroi*): attendant to a hoplite, or more generally a baggage carrier or pack-animal.

Skiritai: an infantry unit of the Spartan army recruited from Sciritis in Arcadia.

Speira: Ptolemaic army unit, equated with a Roman manipule (or, later, with a Roman cohort).

Sphagia: (singular, *sphagion*): sacrificial victims.

Sphendonistai (singular, *sphendonistes*): slingers.* [Slingers (*Sphendonistai*)].

Stasis: civil strife or conflict.*

Stele: (plural, *stelai*): a stone block or slab with an inscription and/or artwork used as a monument, public record, or gravestone.*

Strategoia: the office of *strategos* (general/admiral) at Athens.

Strategos (plural, *strategoï*): one of an annually elected board of 10 generals/admirals at Athens.

Stratia (plural, *stratiai*): army.

Stratiotes (plural, *stratiotai*): soldier.

Stratiotides (singular, *stratiotis*): troopships.* [Ships, Transport].

Syntagma: contingent of troops.

Talent (*talanton*, plural, *talanta*): unit of weight or currency; it was generally the largest unit and at Athens consisted of 60 *minae* or 6,000 drachmas.

Taxiarchos (plural, *taxiarchoi*): taxiarch, commander of a *taxis* or infantry company at Athens.

Taxis (plural, *taxeis*): an infantry sub-unit of approximately company size at Athens; the term may also have been used of a cavalry squadron or *phyle*.

Thalamites (plural, *thalamitai*): rower on the bottom row of a trireme.

Thalassokratia: naval power, naval supremacy; control of the sea.* [Thalassocracy].

Thetes (singular, *thes*): lowest Athenian property classification established by Solon, with no military obligation except (later) service as a rower.

Thorax (plural, *thorakes*): breastplate, cuirass.

Thranites (plural, *thranitai*): rower on the upper row of a trireme.

Time: honor, worth (of a thing or individual).

Toxotes (plural, *toxotai*): archer.* [Archers (*Toxotai*)].

Trierarch (*trierarchos*): a citizen who paid for the equipping of, and normally captained, a ship in the Athenian navy for one year.*

Trireme (*trieres*, plural *trierei*s): warship with three vertical banks of rowers —the standard Greek warship in the Classical Period.*

Triittys (plural, *trittyes*): Athenian social and political unit, one-third of a tribe.

Tropaion: trophy* [Trophy (*Tropaion*)].

Tyche: fortune, luck.

Xenia: friendly relations between states (or between individuals or an individual and a state).

Xenos (plural, *xenoi*): stranger, foreigner; guest-friend (i.e., someone from another state with a mutual obligation to provide hospitality); mercenary.

Xiphos: straight sword.

Zeugitai (singular, *zeugites*): second lowest Athenian property classification established by Solon, with the military obligation of service as a hoplite.

Zygites (plural, *zygitai*): rower on the middle row of a trireme.

Bibliography

This bibliography provides a selection of mainly English-language material on ancient Greek warfare and other forms of conflict. It is designed to guide the reader in key areas of conflict in the ancient Greek world.

However, “Ancient Greece” covers a very large geographical and chronological span. This creates problems with organizing a bibliography—most adopt either a chronological or a geographical structure. Both have advantages and disadvantages so this bibliography combines separate thematic listings, with listings focusing on periods. We consider this provides the clearest way to find both the wider picture and a closer examination of a topic.

To avoid repetition, a work will generally only appear in one section. So, material relating to “Hellenistic Warfare” may be in a category like “Logistics, Finance, and Organizations.”

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Part 2

Conflict in Ancient Rome

Introduction: Conflict in Ancient Rome

Conflict in Ancient Greece and Rome: The Definitive Political, Social, and Military Encyclopedia provides a comprehensive overview of Greek and Roman warfare, military organization, and civil and social conflicts short of war. This introduction provides a general, chronological, and organizational orientation for the reader. The next section, Reader Information and Abbreviations, introduces the reader to the structure of the encyclopedia entries in more detail. For specific dates, the reader may consult the Chronology section. For a more detailed narrative, see the entry Rome (History) and individual entries on persons and wars.

Conflict in Ancient Greece and Rome is intended to fill a gap between general reference works, such as general encyclopedias, and reference works by and for academic specialists in classical studies. These works tend to assume familiarity with the ancient sources, with Latin, Greek, and modern European languages, and with ancillary disciplines. They frequently invoke familiarity with controversies in the discipline and with the history of scholarship. Academic monographs and papers also frequently employ the exhaustive citation and use of untranslated Latin and Greek passages. In the encyclopedia, disputes in modern scholarship have been kept to a minimum, except when the dispute is essential to the study of the topic as is the case currently with Roman demography, Roman imperialism, and Roman strategy. In these cases, an overview of the controversies is included in the entries. Longer entries on major conflicts, divided into Causes, Course, and Consequences, may also discuss controversies. Where Latin and Greek quotes are used, we have also provided translations.

The entries in the Rome section reflect current trends and interpretations in Roman historical and military studies, covering not just the basic

structures of military institutions but their relationship to society. Thematic articles on imperialism, strategy, tactics, promotion in the army, demography, and war and gender (to name only a few) reflect current scholarship, and more traditional biographical and narrative articles also are based on up-to-date bibliography.

General Orientation

How and why the ancient Romans waged war or engaged in conflict continues to be a subject of fascination across the centuries. Roman legendary and historical conflicts have inspired great works of art and drama, including Shakespeare's *Coriolanus*, *Julius Caesar* and *Antony and Cleopatra* (as well as many Italian operas that remain untranslated), and in the present Hollywood has taken a renewed interest, beginning with Ridley Scott's *Gladiator* (2000) and more recently the HBO Rome series. What made the ancient Romans conquer the rest of the Mediterranean world, and how were they able to do it? Why did they turn on each other in civil war (beginning with Marius and Sulla, the better-known Caesar and Pompey, and the triumvirs, and continuing with civil wars during the empire)? Why did the Roman Empire fall?

The Encyclopedia seeks to answer such questions not just in personal terms (hostility or rivalry) but also in terms of social and political structures and institutions. Warfare was built into Roman men's political careers, as they had to serve for a certain number of campaigns before they could run for office. The competition for political office was fierce. Offices such as the consulship and the less prestigious praetorship were also military commands. A Roman politician of the traditional Republic expected to go to war during his year of office and hoped for a victory that would bring him fame and glory and bring wealth in the form of plunder and enslaved captives. If the Roman Senate permitted, he would celebrate his victory in a triumphal procession that was a festival for the whole city of Rome, and expend some of the wealth on public amenities.

Rome nearly met its match in Carthage, fighting the three Punic Wars (264–241, 218–201, and 149–146 BCE). It also encountered formidable enemies in other peoples, Greeks and "barbarians." The entries on these external wars examine the causes, course, and consequences of these wars, leading to the expansion of the Roman Empire to cover the known Mediterranean

world. Other articles describe various enemy regions and peoples, including the Germans, Britons, and Persians (the Arsacid and Sassanid Empires). Forty articles describe important battles and sieges.

Social and group roles and identities, and historical change, brought with them additional conflict. Solutions to some conflicts tended to engender future conflicts. The resolution of the Struggle of the Orders in the early Republic incorporated the tribunes of the plebs into the Roman Republic's mainstream magistracies. New conflict arose when tribunes of the plebs, beginning with Tiberius Gracchus, exploited the powers of the tribunate to block regular political processes. The recruitment of Italian allies to fight for Rome greatly expanded Rome's military resources in the middle Republic, but the increasingly dissatisfied allies revolted in 91 BCE (the Social War). The recruitment of landless citizens as volunteer soldiers (begun on a large scale by Gaius Marius, the first of the late Republic's great warlords) created its own problems: armies dependent on generals to pay and reward them for service.

The late Republic saw other innovations, such as the growth of extended military commands, which greatly raised the stakes of conflict; the aforementioned armies of volunteer soldiers supported warlords with these commands such as Pompey, Caesar, and Octavian, the future emperor Augustus (27 BCE– 14 CE). Their wars and civil conflicts tore the Republic apart. Augustus sought both to put the Republic back together (in appearance), thus discouraging future conflict such as the assassination of his adoptive father, Julius Caesar, by disgruntled senators, and to assure the stability of the new autocracy dependent on military power. His solutions employed traditional forms configured in new ways. The Romans were both highly conservative and extremely adaptable; many terms for institutions were reused and reworked, as explained in entries on these terms.

New conflicts arose during the Principate (imperial Rome, ca. 27 BCE– 235 CE). Emperors, Senate, and army were often in conflict. Speaking from their exalted social status, senators such as Cassius Dio (writing in the early third century CE) disapproved of imperial expenditure on the army. Some emperors, paranoid about conspiracies, cut a swathe through the Senate and even members of their own families whom they suspected of treason.

The Roman emperors faced a new strategic demand: how to maintain their own power and prevent civil war. In the absence of a formal hereditary monarchy, various alternative modes of imperial succession were

tried, including selecting family members and adopting unrelated individuals. Unfortunately for these, because the emperor's power depended on the army, "emperors could be made elsewhere than at Rome," as the imperial historian Tacitus remarks. The result was outbreaks of civil war in 69 CE, 193–197, 217–222 and from 235 to 284.

During the late Republic and early Empire, Rome evolved from military conquest to government of its conquests. This development has traditionally (in nineteenth- and much earlier twentieth-century scholarship) been treated positively, depicting the Roman peace as bringing civilization to less civilized parts of the Mediterranean and Europe. Many leftist classicists regard this view of "Romanization" as a projection of modern colonialism. Even in antiquity, some authors were skeptical or at least imagined how provincial subjects might articulate their resistance to Rome. In Tacitus' *Agricola*, an encomium of his father-in-law who was a Roman governor and general in Britain in the 70s–80s CE, Tacitus' Scottish leader Calgacus says that "the Romans make a desolation, and call it peace" (Tacitus, *Agricola* 31). Peace was itself a political concept, intended to resolve conflict; specifically, the *Pax Augusta* (Augustan Peace) announced the end of civil warfare.

Dissent and provincial resistance contested this peace. Some of the senatorial aristocrats accused of treason during the Julio-Claudians (27 BCE–68 CE) were critical of the imperial autocracy; others aspired to seize power for themselves; others were allegedly victims of paranoid emperors. The evidence for provincial revolt is somewhat firmer. Besides the over 35 battles and sieges that are the subject of individual entries, there were several large-scale provincial revolts, the most famous being the German revolt (termed the Varian disaster, *clades Variana*) in 9 CE and the Jewish War of 66–70 CE, as well as the British Revolt in 60/61 CE and the major Gallic revolt in 70 CE. A second Jewish revolt, named the Bar Kochba revolt for its leader, broke out in 132–135. The Romans crushed the Jewish War, the British Revolt, the Gallic revolt of 70, and the Bar Kochba revolt severely.

Roman government brought with it both opportunity and conflict for inhabitants of the empire. Military service offered opportunities for members of the equestrian order (a "middle class" of sorts, though a status group rather than a modern economic class) to become elite officers. It also offered a steady income and discharge benefits for ordinary legionaries and praetorians, and the grant of the citizenship on discharge for noncitizen

auxiliaries and fleet soldiers. However, government also brought with it potential conflict. To a great extent, the government was the army; in the absence of a large civil service, the Romans employed soldiers as police and low-level functionaries. The army conflicted with provincial civilians, both directly and over economic interests. Roman troops were tasked with policing rebellious or uncooperative subjects, sometimes described as bandits or brigands. The army had a well-developed logistic system, but soldiers also exacted potentially abusive on-the-spot requisitions, especially during military travel and active campaigns.

Finally, *Conflict in Ancient Greece and Rome* covers the conflicts of the later Roman Empire (traditionally, from 284), including the fall of the western Roman Empire in 476 CE. Diocletian (284–305) and Constantine (306–337) reorganized the later Roman state for more intensive control and faster military response, forming a larger bureaucracy and fast-moving central field armies. But the combination of external incursions and recurrent civil warfare, and the recruitment of allied Germanic fighting forces (effectively mercenaries), fatally weakened the western empire. The western empire succumbed to a series of usurpations; the last successful usurper, Odoacer, chose to make himself a king of Italy rather than emperor of Rome.

The Roman entries also examine topics not directly related to external and civil warfare that nonetheless relate to violent conflict, such as how the Romans defined, tried, and punished capital crimes, and how they maintained public order and imposed “states of emergency” (the ancient analogue to martial law). The Roman scale of punishment varied sharply with social status and rank: the upper classes expected immunity from corporal and capital punishments which were routinely and brutally inflicted on social inferiors—slaves and, in the Principate, free persons of low status. The persecutions of the Christians, which became empire-wide in the mid-third and early fourth centuries, illustrated the vulnerability of ordinary citizens who opposed the authorities. These forms of political violence short of war also conditioned warfare. Civil wars might be revenge for previous atrocities, as in the Marian-Sullan conflict (88–82 BCE). Rivals in civil wars might be labeled “bandits” or “pirates” to discredit them, as Augustus did with one of his rivals, Sextus Pompeius (the son of Pompey the Great).

Historical Outline

The Roman half of *Conflict in Ancient Greece and Rome* covers the period from the beginnings of Rome to the fall of the western Roman empire in 476 CE. The material on the Roman monarchy (753–510 BCE) focuses on the fall of the monarchy and establishment of the Republic. This is a relatively shadowy period in Roman history, for which no contemporary literary sources survive; later authors, such as Livy, filled out a thin political narrative with legend and vividly imagined scenes. The articles on the early Republic (ca. 509–264 BCE) accordingly reflect scholarly debate on their period, though their main thrust provides traditional content as a foundation for such debate.

With the First Punic War (264–241 BCE) the history of the Roman Republic emerges into the light of day, provided by more contemporary sources (Polybius, who wrote in the mid-second century BCE). This period, from 264 to 133 BCE, is termed the middle or classical Roman Republic. It is sometimes termed the “traditional” Roman Republic in our articles, for the Roman elite regarded its political institutions as time-honored. The middle Republic includes the Second Punic War (218–201 BCE), in which Carthaginian armies, led by the formidable general Hannibal, invaded Italy and almost destroyed the Roman state; the Romans, led by the young and highly talented general Scipio Africanus, were victorious in the end. The middle Republic also includes Rome’s expansion overseas, defeating Macedon and acquiring dominance over the eastern Mediterranean, and the Third Punic War (149–146 BCE), in which Rome finally destroyed Carthage and razed the city of Carthage.

The late Republic extends from 133 BCE (the outbreak of political and social conflict in the tribunate of Tiberius Gracchus) to the end of the Republic with the victory of Octavian over Mark Antony and Cleopatra in 31 BCE. This period is marked by civil war and civil conflict short of war, including the civil war of Marius and Sulla (termed the Marian-Sullan conflict, as not all of it took place as war) and the conspiracy of Catiline against the Roman state. The late Republic also saw the growth of extraordinary commands, such as Pompey’s to combat Mediterranean piracy and the Asia Minor king Mithridates VI, culminating in Julius Caesar’s conquest of Gaul and the division of the Roman Empire among the triumvirs Octavian, Antony, and Lepidus. Octavian emerged from the civil

war that ensued, as the victor and sole ruler of the Roman Empire.

The imperial period extends from Octavian's adoption of the name Augustus and the consolidation of his political powers in 27 BCE, to the fall of the Western Empire. However, its temporal divisions include the Augustan period (27 BCE–14 CE) and the Julio-Claudian dynasty (14–68 CE), then a period of civil war (68–69), leading to the establishment of the Flavian dynasty (69–96). That dynasty was overthrown with the assassination of the emperor Domitian in 96. Five stable reigns followed, in which succession was assured by adoption.

The empire, however, descended into a period of crisis (repeated civil wars, usurpations, and exterior incursions) from ca. 193 to 284, though the “third-century crisis” is conventionally dated from 235 to 284. The period termed the later Roman Empire conventionally begins in 284, with the reign of the emperor Diocletian (284–305), though many features of the later Roman Empire began earlier than this. The later Roman Empire faced new threats, such as a more aggressive Persian Empire and incursions of Germanic peoples, and continued to face civil war and usurpation. How the western later Roman Empire became unstable and finally ended as a political entity is covered in this encyclopedia, but the Byzantine (eastern Roman) empire from 476 to 1453 is not included.

General Organization

The Reader Information and Abbreviations section explains in greater detail how to use the entries. It is followed by a historical chronology intended to orient the user in space and time. The section also contains a discussion of Roman nomenclature and dating systems and a list of frequently used abbreviations. It is followed by a thematically and alphabetically organized Guide to Related Topics.

The Further Reading section of each entry presents key primary sources and current or recent and accessible scholarship in English related to the entry. The editors hope that with these references as a starting point, a curious and adventurous reader may delve further into the sources and into more detailed scholarship. Distinct from the specific Further Reading, the general Bibliography section is topically organized, intended to provide a survey of scholarship on Roman military, political, and social institutions.

The Primary Documents section is a selection of Greek and Latin

sources in translation. These are intended to present the highlights of ancient authors on relevant topics, and are organized by author (21 works by 14 authors, plus 2 inscriptions). The Documents section is necessarily highly selective. Many more comprehensive collections of Greek and Roman sources in translation have been published. In the Primary Documents section, each document provides introductory material on the author and the topic; citation numbers and the sources of the translations are included. A Glossary lists and explains common Greek and Latin terms. Both the Glossary and the entries for those terms differentiate the tendency of the Romans to use the same word for multiple institutions over time. The Bibliography follows this section.

Reader Information and Abbreviations

Entries

The body of an entry is followed by two sections. “See also” directs the readers to associated entries which either provide background context or additional detail on the main topic, or to separate entries on individuals, places or events, mentioned in the entry. Where there is no possibility of confusion, the headwords in the “See also” may be abbreviated—for example, just “Hadrian” rather than the full “Hadrian (emperor)” or “Cynoscephalae” rather than “Cynoscephalae, Battle of (197 BCE).”

Further Reading directs the reader to additional reading on the topic. The first part of this (if appropriate) lists the relevant ancient sources. These supply the main references for the topic, and the evidence to support any statements made in the body of the entry (direct quotations and paraphrased statements from an ancient author are generally given a reference at the relevant point in the body of the entry).

The ancient works are listed in chronological order, which means that the source closest in time to the topic, which is usually the most useful, is listed first. However, this is not always the case. Ancient references are listed for biographical and narrative articles, not for institutional articles where the evidence is often much more widespread.

In classical scholarship, ancient authors and titles have standard abbreviations such as “Tac. *Ann.* 1.17.4–5” for Tacitus, *Annals* 1.17.4–5. The abbreviations are one of the barriers to entry for students of the classics and have been expanded. For authors of single works, the title is omitted and is listed in the Abbreviations.

The ancient references follow the standard book/chapter/section systems, which are more precise than a page number in a translation and

allows the reader to check any available version of the text. Prose works, such as histories or biographies, were divided in antiquity into books, chapters, and sometimes also sections. However, in some cases short works are just divided into chapter and sections or just chapters. For example, “Dio 52.27.5” or “Tacitus, *Annals* 1.17.4–5” mean, respectively, “Cassius Dio, *Roman History*, Book 52, chapter 27, section 5” and “Tacitus, *Annals of Imperial Rome*, Book 1, chapter 17, sections 4–5.” References to poetry or drama are by line number, so “Virgil, *Aeneid* 11.1121–1210” means “Virgil, *Aeneid*, Book 11, lines 1121–1210.” References to speeches, such as Cicero’s orations, are by title (e.g., *Pro Lege Manilia*) and section. In the ancient source section of the Further Reading the authors are separated by a semicolon, with internal separation within an author, or between works by the same author, indicated by a comma.

The Further Reading section also includes references to the Documents in the back matter, listed by number and to the Quotable Quotes appendix, abbreviated QQ and listed by number.

The list of ancient references is followed by modern works. These are listed alphabetically and concentrate on the most important and accessible English-language works on the topic. Non-English works are only listed where there is no appropriate English-language work on the topic.

Roman Names

A traditional male Roman’s name was, like Gaul, divided into three parts. The first part, or praenomen, was restricted to a small number of possible names: *Appius*, *Aulus*, *Decimus*, *Gaius*, *Gnaeus*, *Lucius*, *Manius*, *Marcus*, *Numerius*, *Publius*, *Quintus*, *Sextus*, *Spurius*, *Tiberius*, *Titus*. Praenomina are often abbreviated to initials. The second part was the gentilician or family name, for example, *Claudius*, *Cornelius*, *Julius*, *Tullius*. The third part was the cognomen (pl. cognomina) or “personal” name, which originally may have denoted a personal attribute. Over time, since cognomina were also handed down, they denoted branches of families rather than individual attributes, and an individual might distinguish himself with a fourth name or agnomen, often referring to a personal trait or exploit, as in *Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus*.

An adoption from one family into another was shown by the adoptee’s taking the adopter’s family names, adding an agnomen consisting of his

original family name stem plus *-ianus*. Thus the two sons of Lucius Aemilius Paullus who were adopted by the Fabii Maximi and the Cornelii Scipiones became, respectively, Quintus Fabius Maximus *Aemilianus* and Publius Cornelius Scipio *Aemilianus*. A famous Roman is most often designated in modern scholarship by his cognomen and agnomen, if both are necessary to distinguish him from others of his lineage.

Traditionally, Roman women bore only the female form of the gentilician name, e.g., *Cornelia*, but a second name to indicate birth order was sometimes added. These rules of nomenclature for both genders broke down in the Principate and especially in the middle and later empire. Names were combined more freely (often becoming long strings of names) and women's names became more distinctive.

In this work, for clarity, we have chosen to use the familiar English names of famous Romans, except at the first instance in their biographical articles. Thus Caesar is introduced as Gaius Julius Caesar in his biographical article and is elsewhere termed Caesar. Crassus (the triumvir, d. 53 BCE) is introduced as Marcus Licinius Crassus and is elsewhere termed Crassus. Marcus Antonius, after being introduced, is termed Mark Antony or simply Antony. The most famous Roman of all, Augustus, was known to contemporaries first as Gaius Octavius, then, following his adoption by Caesar, Gaius Julius Caesar Octavianus, or Octavian. After Caesar was assassinated on the Ides of March, Octavian was termed Caesar by contemporaries, but modern scholars refer to him as Octavian to avoid confusion, and as Augustus after 27 BCE. Due to this division and the length and importance of Augustus' life, we have provided two articles, one on Octavian (from his birth to 27 BCE) and one on Augustus (27 BCE–14 CE).

The emperors are also denoted by their most familiar English and historical names rather than by their imperial names and official titles. Thus Caracalla (211–217) is best known by this nickname (he liked to wear a *caracallus* or Gallic hooded cloak) rather than his imperial name, Marcus Aurelius Antoninus, often abbreviated Antoninus in legal documents. Another Roman emperor, Antoninus Pius (137–161), is usually termed Antoninus Pius. A short-lived emperor, Antoninus Elagabalus (218–222), took the name of his god, El Gabal or Elagabalus, and is usually termed Elagabalus (older spelling Heliogabalus).

Less well known Romans are introduced with full tria nomina and then abbreviated to the cognomen when possible.

Dates and Dating

All dates in the articles in the Roman Section employ BCE (Before the Common Era) or CE (Common Era). This is a relatively new system, replacing the traditional BC (Before Christ) and AD (Anno Domini, “(in the) Year of our Lord”). In terms of the dating, “BCE” exactly equates to “BC” and “CE” to “AD.” Although becoming more widespread, the new system has not been universally accepted by ancient historians. This means that many of the titles of works in the Further Reading sections listed for the articles and in the Bibliography use the earlier BC/AD system.

The Romans themselves employed consular dating, for example, the year 63 BCE was “the year of Marcus Tullius Cicero and Gaius Antonius Hybrida,” who were both consuls during that year. Before 153 BCE, the consular year began in March and ended 12 months later in the following year, so dates before that time may be given as two-year dates, for example, 198/197 BCE, unless more precise information is available. The consular date system continued to be used during the imperial period, except that the emperor was often one of the consuls for the *n*th time. Consular dates are long and cumbersome and when used in the Primary Documents, they have been rendered as BCE/CE dates.

Abbreviations

The following abbreviations are used in the entries in the Roman Section of this encyclopedia.

Abbreviations of Classical Sources

A full list of abbreviations of classical sources is found in the *Oxford Classical Dictionary* (4th edition, 2012). In *Conflict in Ancient Rome*, ancient authors with multiple titles are cited by both author and title in the text. Ancient authors with only one title are cited by author name only in the text. Their titles are listed below:

Ammianus	Ammianus, <i>Res Gestae</i> (<i>History of Rome</i>)
CIL	Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum
Dio	Dio Cassius, <i>Roman History</i>

Diodorus	Diodorus Siculus
Dionysius	Dionysius of Halicarnassus, <i>Roman Antiquities</i>
Gellius	Aulus Gellus, <i>Attic Nights</i>
Herodian	Herodian, <i>History of Rome</i>
<i>ILS</i>	<i>Inscriptiones Latinae Selectae</i>
Livy	Livy, <i>Ab Urbe Condita</i> (History of Rome)
Polybius	Polybius, <i>Histories</i>
<i>RGDA</i>	<i>Res Gestae Divi Augusti</i>
Valerius Maximus	Valerius Maximus, <i>Memorable Deeds and Sayings</i>
Velleius	Velleius Paterculus, <i>Roman History</i>
Zosimus	Zosimus, <i>New History</i>

Abbreviations of Journal Titles

<i>AJA</i>	<i>American Journal of Archaeology</i>
<i>AJPh</i>	<i>American Journal of Philology</i>
<i>ANRW</i>	<i>Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt</i>
<i>AW</i>	<i>The Ancient World</i>
<i>BICS</i>	<i>Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies</i>
<i>CA</i>	<i>Classical Antiquity</i>
<i>CAH</i>	<i>Cambridge Ancient History</i>
<i>CJ</i>	<i>Classical Journal</i>
<i>CPh</i>	<i>Classical Philology</i>
<i>CQ</i>	<i>Classical Quarterly</i>
<i>CW</i>	<i>Classical World</i>
<i>EMC</i>	<i>Echos de Monde Classique/Classical Views</i>
<i>G&R</i>	<i>Greece & Rome</i>
<i>HSCPh</i>	<i>Harvard Studies in Classical Philology</i>
<i>IHR</i>	<i>International History Review</i>
<i>JHS</i>	<i>Journal of Hellenic Studies</i>
<i>JRS</i>	<i>Journal of Roman Studies</i>

MEFRA

PCPhS

RSA

SCI

TAPA

Mélanges de l'École française de Rome

Proceedings of the Cambridge

Philological Society

Rivista di storia antica

Scripta Classical Israelica

Transactions of the American

Philological Association

Chronology of Conflict in Ancient Rome

753–510 BCE	Roman monarchy
509	First year of Republic
499/6	Battle of Lake Regillus
493	<i>Foedus Cassianum</i>
451	First Decemvirate
450	Second Decemvirate; overthrow of Decemvirs
406–396	Siege of Veii
390/87	Battle of Allia River; Gauls sack Rome
367	End of Patrician/Plebeian Conflict
343–341	First Samnite War
341–338	Latin War (revolt)
340	Battle of Veseris
326–304	Second Samnite War
298–290	Third Samnite War
295	Battle of Sentinum
280–275	War with Pyrrhus of Epirus
264–241	First Punic War
218–201	Second Punic War
214–205	First Macedonian War
218	Battle of the Trebia
217	Battle of Lake Trasimene
216	Battle of Cannae
209	Siege of New Carthage
207	Battle of the Metaurus
205	Roman invasion of Africa

202	Battle of Zama
200–197	Second Macedonian War
197	Battle of Cynoscephalae
196	Isthmian Declaration
171–167	Third Macedonian War
168	Battle of Pydna
149–146	Third Punic War
146	Destruction of Carthage and Corinth
134–133	Siege of Numantia
133	Tribunate of Tiberius Gracchus; death of Tiberius Gracchus
123–122	Tribunates of Gaius Gracchus
121	Death of Gaius Gracchus
112–105	Jugurthine War
107	Marius' first consulship; reforms of the army
105	Battle of Arausio
104–100	Marius' second through sixth consulships
102	Battle of Aquae Sextiae
101	Battle of Vercellae
91–87	Social War
88	Sulla's first capture of Rome
87–83	Sulla campaigns in Asia Minor and Greece
86	Marius and Cinna take over Rome; Marius' seventh consulship and death
82	Sulla's second capture of Rome
82–81	Dictatorship of Sulla; Proscriptions of Sulla's opponents
72–71	Revolt of Spartacus
67	Pompey given extended <i>imperium</i> against and defeats pirates
66	Pompey commands Mithridatic War
65	"First Catilinarian Conspiracy"
63	Catilinarian Conspiracy; Cicero, as consul, executes conspirators

62	Defeat of Catiline near Pistoria
60	First Triumvirate formed
58–50	Caesar's conquest of Gaul
49–45	Caesarian-Pompeian Civil War
49	Caesar invades Italy; campaign of Ilerda; Caesar's first dictatorship
48	Battle of Pharsalus; death of Pompey; Caesar's second dictatorship
47	Caesar defeats Pompeians at Thapsus; Caesar defeats Pharnaces at Zela
46	Caesar's Spanish campaign against Pompeians
45	Caesar defeats Pompeians at Munda; Caesar's third dictatorship
44	Caesar becomes "dictator perpetuus"; Caesar assassinated (15 March)
43	April Battle of Mutina August Octavian claims consulship November Second Triumvirate formed; Triumviral proscriptions
42	October Battles of Philippi (3 and 23 October); deaths of Brutus and Cassius
40–41	Perusine War
40	Treaty of Brundisium; Antony marries Octavian's sister Octavia
39	Pact of Misenum
37	Pact of Tarentum
34	Donations of Alexandria
33	Antony marries Cleopatra
32–31	War of Octavian and Antony
31	Antony defeated by Octavian at Actium
30	Suicides of Antony and Cleopatra
27	Augustus' "First Settlement"
23	Augustus' "Second Settlement"

13	Augustus reorganizes army
2	Augustus named “Pater Patriae”
9 CE	Varian Disaster
14	Death of Augustus; Rhine and Danube mutiny
14–37	Reign of Tiberius
19	Death of Germanicus
20	Trial of Cn. Calpurnius Piso
27–33	Tiberius retires to isle of Capri; ascendancy of Sejanus
31	Sejanus arrested and executed
37	Death of Tiberius
37–41	Reign of Gaius (Caligula)
41	Assassination of Gaius
41–54	Reign of Claudius
42	Revolt of Camillus Scribonianus
43	Conquest of Britain
54	Alleged assassination of Claudius
54–68	Reign of Nero
59	Death of Agrippina
64	Great Fire at Rome
65	Pisonian conspiracy; coronation of Tiridates
66–70	Jewish War
67	Execution of Corbulo
68	Revolt of Vindex and Galba
68–69	Reign of Galba
69	Reigns of Otho and Vitellius
	January Acclamation of Vitellius; usurpation of Otho; murder of Galba
	April First Battle of Bedriacum; defeat and suicide of Otho
	July Acclamation of Vespasian as emperor
	October Second Battle of Bedriacum; Flavians defeat Vitellians
	December Flavians take Rome;

	Vitellius murdered by populace
	Gallic Revolt begins
69–79	Reign of Vespasian
70	Vespasian takes control of Rome
	Suppression of Gallic Revolt
74	Siege of Masada ends in Judaea
79	Eruption of Mount Vesuvius
79–81	Reign of Titus
81–96	Reign of Domitian
	Dacian War
96	Assassination of Domitian
96–98	Reign of Nerva
98–117	Reign of Trajan
101–102	First Dacian War
105–106	Second Dacian War
114–117	Persian War
117–138	Reign of Hadrian
132–135	Bar Kochba Revolt
138–161	Reign of Antoninus Pius
161–180	Reign of Marcus Aurelius
166–173	Marcomannic War
161–169	Lucius Verus co-emperor with Marcus
169–180	Commodus co-emperor with Marcus
180–192	Reign of Commodus
192	Assassination of Commodus
193	Reign of Pertinax; Praetorians assassinate Pertinax; “auction of the empire”
	Reign of Didius Julianus; acclamation and revolt of Septimius Severus
	Didius Julianus is assassinated
	Severus takes control of Rome and dismisses Italian Praetorians
193–211	Reign of Septimius Severus
193–194	Severus’ civil war with Pescennius Niger
194–196	Severus’ Persian War

194–197	Severus' civil war with Clodius Albinus
197–198	Severus captures Ctesiphon
198	Severus makes Caracalla co-Augustus
211–217	Reign of Caracalla; Caracalla assassinates Geta
212	Constitutio Antoniniana
217	Assassination of Caracalla
217–218	Reign of Macrinus; revolt of Elagabalus
218–222	Reign of Elagabalus
222	Revolt of Alexander Severus; murder of Elagabalus
222–235	Reign of Alexander Severus
235	Revolt of Maximinus I; Alexander Severus is assassinated by his soldiers
235–238	Reign of Maximinus I
235–284	Conventional dates of third-century crisis; this list omits many minor emperors
238	Revolt of Gordians; Capellianus defeats Gordian II; Gordian I commits suicide Maximinus I forced to elevate Gordian III as Caesar; Senate elevates Pupienus and Balbinus Maximinus I assassinated by his soldiers
238–244	Reign of Gordian III
244–249	Reign of Philip
249–251	Reign of Decius; persecution of Christians; Decius killed in battle against Goths
251–260	Reign of Valerian and Gallienus Persecution of Christians
260	Valerian captured by Persians
260–268	Reign of Gallienus alone

268–272	Reign of Zenobia
268	Gallienus murdered by his officers
268–270	Reign of Claudius II Gothicus
270–275	Reign of Aurelian; reconquest of Palmyra
	Reconquest of Gaul
	Abandonment of Dacia
275	Aurelian assassinated by his officers
276	Reign of Tacitus
278–282	Reign of Probus
282	Probus assassinated by his soldiers/by praetorian prefect Carus
282–283	Reign of Carus
283–284	Reign of Numerian; Numerian dies under mysterious circumstances
284–305	Reign of Diocletian
286–305	Reign of Maximian
286–296	Revolt of Britain; reigns of Carausius (286–293) and Allectus (293–296); reconquest of Britain by Constantius
293	Elevation of Caesars Constantius and Galerius; First Tetrarchy
296–299	Tetrarchic Persian War; Peace of Nisibis
303–311	“Great” Persecution
305	Abdication of Diocletian and Maximian; Constantius and Galerius become Augusti; Maximinus II and Severus become Caesars
306	Death of Constantius I; Constantine I acclaimed at York
307	Revolts of Maxentius at Rome and of Maximian; defeat of Severus
308	Council of Carnuntum; Maximian abdicates for second time
310	Second revolt of Maximian; defeated and captured at Marseilles; commits

	suicide
311	Death of Galerius; end of “Great” Persecution
312	Constantine I defeats Maxentius in Battle of Milvian Bridge
313	Death of Diocletian; defeat and death of Maximinus II
313–324	Joint reign of Constantine I and Licinius
316–317	Civil war of Constantine I and Licinius
324	Civil war of Constantine I and Licinius; Licinius defeated, imprisoned
	Constantine I founds Constantinople
325	Licinius executed; Council of Nicaea
337	Death of Constantine I
337–340	Reign of Constantine II; defeated by Constans and killed in 340
337–350	Reign of Constans; assassinated by Magnentius in 350
337–361	Reign of Constantius II
351	Constantius II defeats Magnentius at Mursa
351–354	Constantius II elevates Gallus as Caesar; execution of Gallus
355	Constantius II elevates Julian as Caesar
357	Battle of Strasbourg; Julian acclaimed for first time
361	Julian acclaimed for second time at Paris; begins civil war with Constantius II, who dies from an illness before their armies clash
361–363	Reign of Julian
363	Julian’s Persian campaign; Julian wounded in battle and dies; officers

	select Jovian
363–364	Reign of Jovian; dies from suffocation by charcoal fumes
364–375	Reign of Valentinian I
364–378	Reign of Valens
367–382	Reign of Gratian; killed in mutiny
383–388	Revolt of Magnus Maximus
375–392	Reign of Valentinian II
378	Goths cross the Danube; battle of Adrianople; Valens dies in the battle
379–395	Reign of Theodosius I
392	Death of Valentinian II; revolt of Arbogast, who elevates Eugenius
394	Battle of the Frigidus; Theodosius defeats Arbogast and Eugenius
395	Death of Theodosius I; accession of Arcadius (eastern empire) and Honorius (western empire)
395–408	Dominance of Stilicho
407–409	Revolt of Constantine III
408	Death of Arcadius; downfall of Stilicho
408–450	Reign of Theodosius II (eastern empire)
410	Alaric captures Rome; abducts Galla Placidia
412–415	Alaric's brother Athaulf marries Galla; is assassinated
417–421	Constantius III marries Galla Placidia
419	Birth of Valentinian III
421	Reign of Constantius III (western empire, with Honorius)
423	Death of Honorius
423–425	Usurpation of Johannes; Galla and Valentinian III flee to Constantinople
425–455	Reign of Valentinian III (western empire); dominance of Galla Placidia

429	(425–437) and of Aetius (killed 454)
430s–451	Vandals occupy Africa
450–457	Dominance of Huns
451	Reign of Marcian (eastern empire)
	Aetius defeats Attila and the Huns at Châlons
454	Valentinian III assassinates Aetius
455	Valentinian III assassinated by Petronius Maximus
455–457	Reign of Petronius Maximus (west)
455–456	Reign of Avitus (west)
457–461	Reign of Majorian (west)
457–474	Reign of Leo (east)
461–464	Reign of Libius Severus (west)
467–472	Reign of Anthemius (west)
472	Reign of Olybrius (west)
473–474	Reign of Glycerius (west)
474–491	Reign of Zeno (east)
474–475	Reign of Julius Nepos (west)
475–476	Reign of Romulus Augustulus (west); deposed by Odoacer, who becomes king of Italy

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Authors and Sources

Ammianus (ca. 330–395 CE)
Appian (ca. 90/95–ca. 160/65 CE)
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Cassius Dio (ca. 164–235 CE)
Cicero (106–43 BCE)
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Dionysius of Halicarnassus (ca. 60–7 BCE)
Documentary Sources
Eusebius (ca. 260–339 CE)
Frontinus (ca. 30–after 100 CE)
Herodian (d. 240 CE)
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Horace (65–8 BCE)
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Josephus (37–ca. 100 CE)
Lactantius (ca. 240–320 CE)
Livy (59 BCE–17 CE)
Lucan (39–65 CE)
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Pliny the Elder (ca. 23–79 CE)

Pliny the Younger (ca. 61–ca. 113 CE)

Plutarch (ca. 50–120 CE)

Polybius (ca. 200–ca. 118 BCE)

Res Gestae Divi Augusti

Sallust (86–ca. 35 BCE)

Senatus Consultum Ultimum

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Suetonius (ca. 69–ca. 140 CE)

Tacitus (ca. 56–after 113 CE)

Vegetius (Active Late Fourth Century CE)

Virgil (70–19 BCE)

Zosimus (Active Late Fifth–Early Sixth Centuries CE)

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Aetius (d. 454 CE)
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Agrippina II (d. 59 CE)
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Antonius Primus (Active 69 CE)
Antonius Saturninus, Lucius (d. 89 CE)
Appuleius Saturninus, Lucius (d. 100 BCE)
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Arminius (d. 21 CE)
Attila (d. 453 CE)
Augustus (Emperor) (27 BCE–14 CE)
Aulus Caecina (d. 79 CE)
Aurelian (Emperor) (270–275 CE)
Avidius Cassius (d. 175 CE)
Balbus, Lucius Cornelius (ca. 21–13 BCE)
Boniface (d. 432 CE)
Boudicca (d. 61 CE)
Brutus (Junius Brutus, Lucius) (ca. 509 BCE)
Brutus (Junius Brutus, Marcus) (ca. 85–42 BCE)
Burebista (Reigned 80s–44 BCE)
Caecilius Metellus Macedonicus, Quintus (d. 115 BCE)

Caecilius Metellus Numidicus, Quintus (Active Late Second Century BCE)
Caecilius Metellus Pius, Quintus (ca. 130–ca. 63 BCE)
Caesar, Gaius Julius (100–44 BCE)
Calgacus (Active 80s CE)
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Camillus (Furius Camillus, Marcus) (Active Early Fourth Century BCE)
Camillus Scribonianus (ca. 5 BCE–42 CE)
Caracalla (Emperor) (211–217 CE)
Carausius (Usurper) (286–293 CE)
Carinus (Emperor) (283–285 CE)
Carus (Emperor) (282–283 CE)
Cassius Chaerea (d. 41 CE)
Cassius Longinus (ca. 85–42 BCE)
Cassius, Spurius (d. 483 BCE)
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Cerialis, Petilius (Active 60s–70s CE)
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Claudius II Gothicus (Emperor) (268–270 CE)
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Cornelius Lentulus Gaetulicus, (d. 39 CE)
Cornelius Scipio, Publius (d. 212 BCE)
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Eugenius (Usurper) (d. 394 CE)
Fabius Maximus (275–203 BCE)
Fabius Valens (d. 69 CE)
Fimbria, Gaius Flavius (d. 85 BCE)
Flamininus (228–174 BCE)
Fulvia (d. 40 BCE)
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Licinius Mucianus (ca. 19–74/77 CE)
Livius Drusus the Younger, Marcus (ca. 124–91 BCE)
Lucius Verus (161–169 CE)
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Macrinus (Emperor) (217–218 CE)
Maelius, Spurius (d. 439 BCE)
Magnentius (ca. 305–353 CE)
Magnus Maximus (d. 388 CE)
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Manius Curius (d. ca. 270 BCE)
Manlius Capitolinus, Marcus (d. ca. 384 BCE)
Manlius Torquatus, Titus (Active 360s–340s BCE)

Manlius Vulso, Gnaeus (Active 190s–180s BCE)
Marcellus (ca. 268/5–208 BCE)
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Milo, Titus Annius (d. 48 BCE)
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Philip Arabus (Emperor) (244–249 CE)
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Ricimer (d. 472 CE)
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Scipio Africanus (236–183 BCE)
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Sextus Pompeius (ca. 75–35 BCE)
Stilicho (d. 408 CE)

Suetonius Paulinus (ca. 11–after 69 CE)
Sulla, Lucius Cornelius (138–78 BCE)
Sulpicianus (d. 197 CE)
Tacfarinas (d. 24 CE)
Theoderic (ca. 454–526 CE)
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Valentinian I (Emperor) (364–375 CE)
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Valerian (Emperor) (253–260 CE)
Varus, Publius Quinctilius (d. 9 CE)
Vercingetorix (Gallic Leader) (d. 46 BCE)
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A

Acclamation

Acclamation was the collective expression of statements or sentiments en masse by a group to a superior individual, such as a magistrate, commander, or emperor. It may be described as organized cheering, which today is practiced only by political demonstrators and professional sports fans at games, but which in the Roman world was a significant social and political phenomenon. Imperial acclamation, in which soldiers hailed a general or other leader as *imperator*, began as a republican custom associated with Roman victory and the triumph, but in the imperial period signified that the leader in question was claiming the rank of emperor.

Crowds might express their opinions or wishes through acclamation, chanting in unison especially at large gatherings such as the games, where they could express their approval or disapproval of policy without the risk of individual punishment. This practice also existed in the army, where it gave ordinary soldiers a voice. In the imperial period, the only way that the mass of the people could express their political sentiments was through mass cheering or derision. Even the Roman Senate addressed the emperor through acclamation. In a notorious example preserved in the *Historia Augusta*, after the death of Commodus, an emperor highly unpopular with the Senate, the senators chanted for the ritual humiliation of his corpse: “*unco trahatur*” (let him be dragged by the hook) (*Historia Augusta*, *Commodus* 18.5). The Senate’s acclamation of the publication of the Theodosian Code in 438, praising the measure and the emperor Theodosius II (408–450), fills many pages.

Acclamation should be distinguished from imperial acclamation, the creation of emperors by the army. Traditionally, Roman soldiers acclaimed

their victorious general as *imperator* (commander), a term that became closely associated with victory and the triumph. Imperial acclamations retained these features, but *imperator* now denoted the emperor (loosely, since Latin *imperator* might still be used in its traditional sense as “commander” or “general”). Caesar as dictator allegedly had the Senate bestow the title of *imperator* on him. Augustus was unable to defuse the spontaneous element, though he adopted *Imperator* as a *praenomen* (replacing his former praenomen Gaius), which was used again by Otho and Vespasian in 69 CE and became a permanent imperial title. Emperors were saluted as *imperator* after victories and recorded such instances in their titlature.

Acclamation may have been a formality in the successions (justified by dynastic relationship and already designated as successor) of Tiberius, Gaius (Caligula), and Nero. In the accession of the emperor Claudius (41–54 CE) and in the civil war of 69 CE, acclamation by the troops reappeared as a “live” form of transfer of the imperial power. After Gaius was assassinated, for a short time there was no authority in the palace; the praetorians allegedly ran through it, searching, and discovered Claudius hiding behind a curtain. They dragged him out and hailed him as emperor (Suetonius, *Claudius* 10). In January of 69, Vitellius was hailed as emperor by the troops of Lower Germany, and Otho was hailed by the Praetorian Guard. Tacitus depicts Vitellius’ acclamation as somewhat spontaneous, but Otho encouraged his with speech-making, bribery, and promises of future benefits. Vespasian was also acclaimed spontaneously by his troops in the Near East. Tacitus depicts the acclamation of Vitellius as a phenomenon of irrational crowd behavior, but that of Vespasian as due to his superior qualities as a leader.

As this summary shows, it became part of imperial ideology (emphasizing the legitimacy of a ruler) that he was acclaimed spontaneously by the army due to his ideal qualities rather than purchasing their support with payments or other promises. The ideal emperor might even attempt to refuse the imperial power when his acclaiming troops offered it, however unbelievable such stories now appear. It becomes uncertain whether some acclamations (especially of successful usurpers, who managed to hold onto their power and consolidate their rule) were actually spontaneous and not stage-managed or purchased. The later Roman emperors attempted to formalize salutation as *imperator* as a yearly ritual.

See also Augustus; Claudius I; *Imperator*; Succession (Imperial); Triumph; Usurpation; Victory; War of Four Emperors

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Achaean Revolt (146 BCE)

The Achaean Revolt occurred in 146 BCE and pitted several Greek states supporting the Achaean League against Roman armies in Greece. It resulted in Roman forces defeating the Achaean armies and destroying Corinth altogether. This began a new era of the Roman domination of Greece.

The roots of the Achaean Revolt lie in Roman flouting of Achaean League policy by entertaining Spartan ambassadors who sought help seceding from the League in the 180s, creating a precedent for other secessionist states (Polybius 23.9.13–14). The Roman victory at Pydna in 168 and consequent punishments and geopolitical rearrangements increased Roman expectations for Greek acquiescence to Roman wishes. In 164, the Senate upheld Pleuron's desire to secede, which Pausanias (7.11.2) saw as a Roman desire to dismember the League. However, the Senate also recognized the League's sovereignty in several matters of the period 168–146, and appeared ambivalent and unwilling to enforce its own wishes from time to time: hence, a consistent imperialist policy is hard to define from its actions.

In 147, when the League commenced military mobilization against secessionist members, a Roman ambassador informed the League that the Roman Senate desired neither Sparta, Herakleia, Argos, Corinth, nor Orkhomenos in Arkadia to remain as members. This sparked a murderous

anti-Spartan riot. Another embassy from Rome repeated the Senate's wishes, but popularizing Achaean leader Kritolaos stated that no decision could be made until the next League Assembly six months hence. He spent the meantime denouncing Roman interference (Polybius 38.11), preparing for war against Sparta, and enacting populist debt reforms, probably only temporary measures to maximize military participation, but surely inflaming some dissatisfactions regarding the economic status quo in Greece.

A Roman embassy appeared at the Achaean Assembly at Corinth in spring of 146, offering a final chance to acquiesce to Roman demands. This received jeers. Kritolaos, riding a wave of anti-Roman sentiment, denounced several Greek politicians as pro-Roman, proposed a decree giving Achaean generals monarchic powers, and declared war against Sparta, which, Polybius notes, meant war against the Romans (38.12.5). An Achaean army then traveled toward Herakleia to force its readmission into the League, but was surprised and defeated by a Roman army, killing Kritolaos. Another Achaean populist leader, Diaios, then freed 12,000 slaves and demanded Achaean women to sell their jewelry for the war effort; Polybius describes Greece as frenzied in anti-Roman sentiment (38.16.7).

The Roman army prevailed, entered Corinth, killed and enslaved its inhabitants, looted its artworks (Strabo 8.6.23) and destroyed it completely as a warning. After this, the Romans disbanded most Greek federal leagues and gave the governor of Macedon the power to interfere in Greece. Scholars regard this as the end of political freedom for Greece.

Why the Romans finally decided to act in the 140s after decades of ambivalent warnings is a key question. It is best answered by Roman desire to not countenance the Achaean League embarking on war against would-be secessionists in Greece precisely when the Romans were occupied with Andriskos' revolt in Macedonia and its aftermath.

Timothy Doran

See also Macedonian War, Third; Polybius. *Greek Section*: Achaea, Achaeans; Corinth, Corinthians

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Actium, Battle of (31 BCE)

The battle of Actium is one of the most famous battles in antiquity, a sea battle on September 2, 31 BCE in which the naval forces of Octavian and Agrippa defeated those of Antony and Cleopatra. Widely regarded as marking the end of the civil war, and with hindsight often seen as heralding the beginning of the Principate, it is also one of the most debated by scholars, dismissed by Sir Ronald Syme as "a shabby affair." Nevertheless, the idea of Actium as a crucial historical turning point developed in Roman times during the decade or so after the battle, and was firmly established by the end of Augustus' lifetime. Descriptions of the battle are distorted by hindsight and by the dominance of the historical record by the winning side.

The battle of Actium concluded a period of civil warfare that began with the assassination of Julius Caesar in 44 BCE, when his great-nephew and heir, Octavian, was only 18 years old. Antony, at one time Caesar's legate, became Octavian's sometime ally against the "Liberators," the assassins of Julius Caesar, and joined forces with Octavian in the Second Triumvirate (43 BCE). However, as their other enemies dropped away, Antony and Octavian emerged as rivals for the control of the Roman Empire. Octavian's forces were based in the western Mediterranean, Antony's in the eastern Mediterranean, where Antony allied with and conducted a long-term love affair with Cleopatra VII of Egypt. Before the battle of Actium, Antony was initially in the stronger position, supported by several hundred senators and by both consuls, as well as by various independent kings such as Alexander of Emesa and Adiatrix, Tetrarch of Galatia. However, his supporters fell away.

The battle took place near the promontory of Actium at the entrance to

the Ambracian gulf off the north-western coast of Greece. Octavian's naval forces were ably commanded by Agrippa, who had already shown his prowess in winning the naval war against Sextus Pompeius in 36 BCE. Despite debated naval skirmishes between the two sides in this region in the months leading up to the final battle, Antony's forces gradually became isolated and cut off from their supplies. Sickness may also have played a part in weakening his forces. These accounts of Antony's dwindling support may have been intended to glorify Octavian.

Octavian had, moreover, pursued a propaganda campaign in the lead-up to the battle, attacking Antony for his non-Roman loyalties in supporting the queen of Egypt. He had revived (or perhaps even invented) the ancient "fetial" rite of casting a spear onto land ritually denoted as foreign at the Temple of Bellona in Rome to reinforce the impression that he was declaring war against a foreign foe. By contrast, Octavian claimed in the *Res Gestae Divi Augusti* that he was leading the whole of Italy into battle: "The whole of Italy of its own accord swore an oath of allegiance to me and demanded me as its commander for the war in which I conquered at Actium" (RGDA 25). This propaganda campaign yielded fruit, with many important supporters deserting Antony before the battle.

In the battle itself, Octavian's forces, commanded by Agrippa, deployed perhaps 200 ships, while Antony and Cleopatra had only 170. The Antonian ships were larger, but Agrippa's smaller ships were faster and employed an artillery weapon known as the harpax, a grapple aimed by shipboard catapults at enemy vessels. In the accounts of the battle, intended to flatter Octavian, Antony's forces are depicted as lacking enthusiasm and as rapidly falling back when Antony signaled to Cleopatra to retreat. Antony soon followed Cleopatra's retreat, escaping with her to Egypt. Most of his fleet was lost or surrendered to Agrippa.

Many poets, such as Virgil, Propertius, and Horace, celebrated the battle not as part of a civil war, but as a war against foreigners, representing it as a struggle between the traditional gods of Rome against the exotic gods of Egypt, and the battle forms a memorable central scene on the shield of Aeneas in Virgil's *Aeneid*. The spectacle of a woman engaging in battle provoked moral outrage among Romans, and Antony was represented as being in thrall to the queen and her ill-assorted retinue of eunuchs. Virgil also invented a new etiology for the games at Actium, linking them to Rome's founder, Aeneas. The battle became iconic for the new regime, as

Octavian then gradually established himself as sole ruler of Rome, with some Hellenic cities redating their calendar according to an Actian era. Actium is often described as a crucial turning point in the civil war, but it was not in fact the decisive moment: the final capitulation only took place the following year in 30 BCE, at Alexandria, when both Antony and Cleopatra committed suicide.

Octavian commemorated Actium by founding a new city nearby, Nikopolis ("Victory City"), and dedicating spoils at the location where his troops had encamped, where he constructed a monumental altar to Actian Apollo. There was already a sanctuary to Apollo at Actium, leading to his adoption by Octavian as the deity presiding over the battle. A tithe of the different types of ships captured at Actium was dedicated to Neptune and Mars at the campsite memorial, where the prows of captured ships featured along a massive podium. He also established four-yearly Actian games there from 27 BCE, on the model of the Olympics. At Rome, the battle was celebrated on the middle day of the triple triumph of August 13–15, 29 BCE, even though victories in civil war could not qualify for a triumph. Some reluctance to accept the validity of the triumph is perhaps hinted at by an inscribed calendar, the *fasti Barberini*, which entirely omits the Actian day. The victory was, however, monumentalized by displaying the beaks of captured ships on the speakers' platform by the temple of deified Julius (Caesar). In 28 BCE, four-yearly victory games on a Greek pattern, with athletics, were instituted at Rome; these were the first games to be held there on a regular cycle, marking a new departure for Roman festival culture. From then on Actium was firmly established within the foundation myth of Augustus' reign.

Alison E. Cooley

See also Augustus; Civil Wars (II) (44–31 BCE); Cleopatra; *Fetiales*; Gender and War; Mark Antony; *Res Gestae Divi Augusti*; Second Triumvirate

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Adlocutio

Speeches (*adlocutiones*, sg. *adlocutio*) made by generals to their troops are a regular feature of contemporary accounts of Roman warfare. Such speeches before battles served to inspire the troops, improve morale, and rouse the soldiers to attack the enemy. Thus Julius Caesar delivered an address to his troops before the battle of Pharsalus (Caesar, *Civil War* 3.90.1). The general's speech to his troops was a standard element in narrative histories, which often feature paired speeches by opposing leaders. Such an arrangement gave historians an opportunity for rhetoric, and invention is most plausible for barbarian enemy leaders' speeches which were surely in native languages (cf. the Caledonian leader Calgacus' speech, Tacitus, *Agricola* 30–32). Nonetheless, there is substantial nonliterary evidence for the Roman *adlocutio* in other political contexts.

Under the Principate, the *adlocutio* had political value for an emperor in allowing him to communicate directly with his soldiers. Imperial speeches took place on a designated platform whose location formed a key component of legionary camps. The concept of the *adlocutio* was sufficiently important to feature on the imperial coinage and on the reliefs of the Columns of Trajan and Marcus Aurelius. *Adlocutio* scenes showing the emperor addressing members of the praetorian cohorts were used under Caligula and Nero (coin issues *BMCRE* I p. 151 nos. 33–35, *RIC* I p. 111 no. 40; *BMCRE* I pp. 218–219 nos. 122–126, pp. 259–260 nos. 303–304). Hadrian issued a coin that showed him with a group of soldiers and the legend COH PRAET S C, which formed part of his wider coin series issued to the provincial armies (*RIC* II p. 457 nos. 908–911). Advertised through the wider circulation of coins, the *adlocutio* supported the propaganda of the imperial regime through evidencing the close relationship between the emperor and his soldiers.

The *adlocutio* allowed an emperor to communicate his political position to the assembled soldiers, which was particularly critical during periods of political instability. In Tacitus' *Histories*, Otho addresses the praetorians, his supporters in his coup from Galba, invoking their loyalty and the justice of his cause (1.37–1.38); he quiets their near-mutiny (1.83–1.84); after losing his

battle with the Vitellians, he urges his soldiers to accept an end to the civil war (2.47).

The speeches made by Hadrian to the various army units based in Africa in 128 CE were recorded in a shortened form on a monument sited on the parade ground of the legionary fort at Lambaesis (*ILS* 2487; 9133–9135). Unit pride was deliberately cultivated in the emperor's comments. In one section, he tells Viator, the commander of his horse guard, to perform on the parade ground of another unit rather than on that of the *ala* he has just seen train and who evidently need no such demonstration. By scrutinizing the training maneuvers of his soldiers, the emperor showed his interest in their affairs and his desire for military efficiency.

Cassius Dio describes the *adlocutio* of Marcus Aurelius to his Danubian troops when news broke of Avidius Cassius' revolt (Dio 71[72].24.1–26.4). The emperor began his oration by calling the troops "fellow soldiers" and proceeded to describe how the treachery of a friend (Cassius) had forced him into yet another war. He emphasized his reluctance to fight and claimed to be willing to surrender his power for the good of the State, but stated that Cassius would not permit this. The emperor compared Cassius' army unfavorably to his own and concluded by stating his wish to forgive the usurper. The speech is designed to persuade the soldiers that the emperor has no responsibility or desire for the inevitable bloodshed to follow.

Jonathan Eaton

See also Army in Politics; *Commilito*; Emperor as Commander; Emperor as Patron

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Adrianople, Battle of (378 CE)

On August 9, 378 CE, Rome's eastern emperor Valens led his army out of their fortified camp to engage Gothic rebels and their allies about eight miles north of the city of Adrianople (Hadrianopolis). The emperor intended the coming battle to end the Gothic War that had started two years earlier because of Roman mistreatment of the Gothic *foederati* (barbarians allied with Rome) whom Valens had allowed to settle on Roman lands south of the Danube River. The Goths had been driven from their lands by the Huns. However, corrupt Roman officials denied them promised food supplies and local towns denied them entry and trade, driving the Goths to the edge of starvation. The emperor ignored their protests, triggering the Gothic revolt. The Thervingi Goths' King Fritigern commanded the Gothic army, but he was assisted by Alatheus and Saphrax, coregents of the Greuthungian Goths. They had joined Fritigern in early August, bringing mostly cavalry.

With approximately 15–21,000 troops under his command, including 5,000 cavalry, Valens enjoyed a numerical advantage. Moreover, most of his troops were combat veterans, his infantry was more heavily armored, and Roman armies to the west had defeated every Gothic force they engaged, albeit without gaining a decisive advantage in the war. Although Valens' generals urged him to await further reinforcements from western emperor Gratian, Valens decided to attack the Gothic camp, hoping to claim sole glory. He left the imperial administrators, treasury, and a legion in the Roman camp, taking approximately 10–15,000 troops to the battlefield. He reached the Goths' encampment after a grueling seven-hour march that left his troops disorganized, dehydrated, and fatigued. Warned of the Roman approach, the Goths had encircled their wagons atop a hill, converting their camp into a lager with the families, possessions, and supplies protected inside.

Stationing his infantry in front of the camp, Fritigern recalled his cavalry, which was out foraging. To buy time, he set fire to the fields along the Roman march route and upon the Roman army's arrival, initiated negotiations for a hostage exchange. The Roman troops waited impatiently in the hot afternoon sun. In the late afternoon, frustrated imperial troops attacked without orders or support. They were repulsed. The Roman left wing surged forward, reaching the wagon lager just before dusk. Unfortunately for Valens, the Roman cavalry fled as the Gothic cavalry

returned. The Goths attacked the Roman infantry's flank and rear, encircling them by dusk. The Romans retreated to the base of the hill, but their discipline collapsed as exhaustion set in. The troops dropped their shields. Rout ensued. The Gothic cavalry gave chase, slaughtering hundreds. The emperor and most of his senior leaders and staff were killed. Only about a third of the Roman army survived, inflicting a severe blow to the empire.

Adrianople is most significant for its long-term political and military impact. It did not trigger the empire's fall but did signal the beginning of its military decline. To make up for the immediate need for manpower, Valens' successor Theodosius I recruited barbarian peoples as allied forces serving under their tribal leaders, rewarding them by allowing them to settle within the empire. These clients were often unreliable and their settlement eroded the territorial boundaries of the empire. As parts of the empire were lost during the fifth century, the government was no longer able to recruit and tax these areas, causing further erosion. It is not clear that the Roman army proper (troops still recruited from citizens and trained in the Roman manner) was barbarized.

The main source for the battle of Adrianople is Ammianus Marcellinus' history of Rome, which describes the circumstances leading to the battle and the battle itself and ends with the aftermath.

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See also Ammianus; Federates; Goths; Huns; Ostrogoths; Theodosius I; Valens

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Adultery (Political)

Adultery, previously a private matter, became a public (capital) crime in the early empire with the marriage legislation of Augustus (emperor 27 BCE–14 CE). Consequently, adultery with women of the imperial family became a form of sedition, seen in the downfall of the two Julias (the daughter and granddaughter of Augustus) and of Messalina, the wife of Claudius I (41–54 CE).

In the *lex Iulia de adulteriis* of 18 BCE, adultery became a public (capital) crime. As attested by later jurists, a woman apprehended for adultery was forced to divorce her husband, was prosecuted, and if convicted, lost part of her property, and was deported to an island. Her adulterous lover, if convicted, also lost his property and was deported to a different island. If the woman's husband or father caught the adulterous lovers in the act, they had the right to kill the woman and her lover if he was of low status. The husband who did not divorce his wife within a required time span could also be prosecuted.

In 2 BCE, Julia, the daughter of Augustus and Scribonia, was exiled for alleged adultery with numerous Roman aristocratic men (Velleius 2.100.2–5; Seneca, *De beneficiis* 6.32; Suetonius, *Augustus* 65; Dio 55.10.12–16). She was exiled to the small island of Pandateria (mod. Ventotene), off the Italian coast. One of her lovers, Iullus Antonius, was forced to commit suicide; others, all aristocrats with distinguished names such as Sempronius Gracchus, a Cornelius Scipio, an Appius Claudius, and Titus Quinctius Crispinus Sulpicianus, were exiled. Julia and her lovers were probably tried by Augustus himself; details are lacking. According to Cohen, Tacitus (*Annals* 3.24) depicts the exile of Julia to an island as harsher than the law on adultery warranted, because with Julia Augustus introduced the practice of deportation to islands.

The adultery of Julia was critical because of her importance to the Augustan succession. Julia was Augustus' only child; she had been married to Marcus Vipsanius Agrippa, Augustus' most trusted lieutenant, and then

to Tiberius (the future emperor, 14–37 CE). Julia's sons by Agrippa, Gaius and Lucius Caesar, were adopted by Augustus as his probable successors and were given numerous honors. Though the Principate was not a hereditary monarchy, and though the actual parentage of Gaius and Lucius was not questioned, Julia's adulteries endangered Augustus' quasi-dynastic succession model. As argued by Fagan for Messalina (below, Fagan 2002: 575–577), if marriage to the emperor's daughter promoted the stability of the imperial house, adultery with the emperor's daughter could be regarded as sedition, threatening imperial stability. At the very least, it brought disgrace and dishonor to the imperial family. Whether Julia's lovers were engaged in concrete plot(s) to overthrow the Augustan regime is much less clear, though it has been argued by numerous scholars, including Sir Ronald Syme. Due to popular outcry, Julia was permitted to return from Pandateria to the mainland (Dio 55. 13.1).

Julia's daughter, Julia the Younger, was also implicated in adultery, convicted of adultery with Decimus Junius Silanus (Tacitus, *Annals* 3.24; 4.7.4; Suetonius, *Augustus* 65). Her husband, Aemilius Paullus Lepidus, also fell to suspected conspiracy. Junius Silanus had family connections with the lovers of Julia the Elder, suggesting that the second episode of adultery continued the first Julia's conspiracy, though relatively little is known about it and even the exact date (around 8 CE) is uncertain. Levick argues that since Gaius and Lucius were dead by 4 CE, and Tiberius' succession to Augustus was assured, Tiberius and his mother Livia wanted to remove the Julian line (the direct descendants of Augustus) from the succession. Therefore the Julias were disgraced and exiled. However, Julia the Elder's daughter Agrippina was married to Germanicus, the nephew of Tiberius.

Valeria Messalina, the wife of Claudius I (emperor 41–54) committed adultery with Gaius Silius (Tacitus, *Annals* 11.26–38; Suetonius, *Claudius* 26, 29; Dio 60[61].31.1–5). In Tacitus' vivid account, Messalina and Silius celebrated a Dionysian wedding while Narcissus, one of the imperial freedmen secretaries, disclosed their crimes to Claudius and managed the suppression of the alleged conspiracy, even ordering Messalina's death without the emperor's permission. Ordered to commit suicide, Messalina hesitated out of cowardice and was killed by a praetorian. Claudius' lack of agency throughout is stressed by Tacitus. Whether Silius and Messalina intended a coup is also unclear; the ancient authors stress her excessive sexual desire rather than political ambition. Nonetheless, as with both

Julias, Messalina's sexual impropriety destabilized the imperial regime. Other depictions of imperial women's adultery (for example, Gaius banished his sisters Julia Livilla and Agrippina the Younger for adultery) probably have a similar import.

Adultery committed by male emperors or members of the imperial family, though often alleged by gossipy biographers such as Suetonius and the *Historia Augusta*, was not in itself regarded as destabilizing the imperial succession. In this respect, imperial and nonimperial adultery both observed a gendered double standard. However, an emperor's adultery with the wives of prominent subjects might give those subjects cause for disaffection from him and even for assassination.

Sara E. Phang

See also Augustus; Criminal Procedure; Empresses; Exile; Succession (Imperial)

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Aedile

An aedile (Latin singular *aedilis*, pl. *aediles*) was a junior magistrate in the political system of the Roman Republic. His duties were primarily administrative and local to the city of Rome, but the aedileship grew in importance in the late Republic because aediles' expenditures on public amenities might assist their subsequent careers.

Aediles originated at the time of the first secession of the *plebs* in 494 BCE, created to assist the two tribunes of the plebs. Their duties at that time pertained to the temple (*aedes*) of Ceres on the Aventine. These early aediles

were members of the plebeian order. Later, ca. 367 BCE, the Senate created two more aediles, termed curule aediles and drawn from the patrician order. Plebeian aediles were elected by the *concilium plebis*, curule aediles by the *comitia tributa*. Presumably the Senate regarded the administration of city life as too important to be monopolized by representatives of the *plebs*.

Aediles did not possess *imperium* or the power to wield force. They had no military duties. They supervised public works and amenities in the city of Rome itself, including streets, water, sewers, the grain supply, markets, firefighting, funerals, and gladiatorial games. Aediles also served as prosecutors of certain public crimes, defending the people's interests.

In the *cursus honorum* the aedileship ranked above the quaestorship and below the praetorship, but was not an essential step. However, in the late Republic, young politicians exploited the aedileship as an opportunity to spend lavishly on the games and other public amenities, to make a favorable impression on the populace and win future votes. The aedileship waned in importance in the Principate but continued to exist.

Sara E. Phang

See also Cursus Honorum (Republic); Praetor; Quaestor; Republic, Political Structure

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[Aemilius Paullus, Lucius \(ca. 228–160 BCE\)](#)

Lucius Aemilius Paullus is most famous as the victor of the Third Macedonian War, which consolidated Rome's domination over Greece and Macedon. A commander in the Second Macedonian War, he was praetor in 191 BCE, a command extended through 190–189. He participated in the commission that imposed peace terms on the Seleucid monarch Antiochus III after the Peace of Apamea (188 BCE). He was subsequently elected consul 182, commanding a war against the Ligurians, a people of the modern northwestern Italian coast who stubbornly resisted Roman conquest.

Aemilius Paullus was elected consul for 168, taking command of the Third Macedonian War from allegedly incompetent predecessors. He defeated Perseus of Macedon in the battle of Pydna and took Perseus prisoner, selecting from the booty of Pydna only Perseus' library. The subsequent triumph of Paullus was marred by the death of his two younger sons from illness.

Aemilius Paullus was also best known for his family connections. He had four biological sons; the two older sons were adopted by the Fabii Maximi and the Cornelii Scipiones, becoming, respectively, Quintus Fabius Maximus Aemilianus and Publius Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus (born 185/4). Fabius Aemilianus and Scipio Aemilianus retained a close relationship with Aemilius Paullus, whose sister Aemilia was the widow of Scipio Africanus (the Elder). Africanus' elder son Publius had no sons and adopted Scipio Aemilianus before dying prematurely.

Aemilius Paullus was elected censor in 164 and died of natural causes in 160. He was very highly regarded in his time as a moral exemplar and philhellene, views probably promoted by the historian Polybius, Paullus' friend and client, and persisting in Plutarch's biography of Aemilius Paullus. However, after Pydna, Paullus imposed the punitive sack of 100 cities in Epirus (an area of northern Greece) for supporting Perseus. The tradition dissociates Paullus from such brutalities, but modern historians have expressed greater skepticism.

Sara E. Phang

See also Macedonian War, Second; Macedonian War, Third; Polybius; Pydna, Battle of; Scipio Aemilianus; Scipio Africanus

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Aerarium Militare

A state treasury founded by the Roman emperor Augustus, probably at the

time of his other army reforms in 6 CE, to provide Roman military veterans with discharge pensions.

In the traditional Republic, Roman veterans had not needed pensions, because they were recruited from small property owners known as *assidui*. This property qualification was established by the ancient Servian constitution. The number of recruits able to meet this property qualification declined through the second century BCE, and Gaius Marius took the step of enrolling recruits from the landless (*capite censi*). Such men were dependent on the army and the Roman state for pay and whatever benefits they received.

Accordingly, the benefits of veterans were a source of repeated conflict in the late Republic, especially when successful generals who achieved political dominance, such as the dictator Sulla, confiscated land from their political enemies to give to their veterans. The Second Triumvirate (Octavian, Mark Antony, and Lepidus) also confiscated land from their enemies to reward their veterans. Pay, rewards, and benefits were also often causes of mutinies in the late Republic, as when, after their defeat of Pompey, Caesar's legionaries mutinied demanding back pay and discharge.

To reduce a source of mutiny and political conflict, Augustus created the *aerarium militare* or military treasury, funded by the *vicesima hereditatium* or a five percent tax on inheritances and by a one percent tax on auction sales. He capitalized the treasury with 170 million sesterces of his own money (*Res Gestae Divi Augusti* 17). A legionary veteran received 12,000 sesterces upon discharge; praetorians received 16,000. Initial experiments with the purchase of land for veterans were discontinued in the early empire as unpopular.

However, ca. 5 CE Augustus also lengthened the period of legionary service to 16 years plus five years in reserve and then to 20 years plus five years in reserve. It is likely that the extension of service was intended to reduce the expenditure of the *aerarium militare*; the longer soldiers served, the more likely they were to die before their discharge, so there would be fewer veterans requiring discharges. Legionaries in the 14 CE mutinies complained about the extended period of service. Later in the first century CE, legionary service was extended to 25 years, and soldiers were discharged every two years, probably also to reduce the burden on the *aerarium*.

Auxiliaries served 25 years and probably did not receive cash pensions.

Sara E. Phang

See also Augustus; Auxilia; Caesar, Gaius Julius; Marius; Mutiny; Octavian; *Praemia Militiae*; Recruitment of Army (Imperial); Sulla, Lucius Cornelius; Veterans

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Aetius (d. 454 CE)

Flavius Aetius was supreme commander (*magister utriusque militiae*) of the western Roman army between 434 and 454. According to contemporary sources, he spent his youth as a hostage among both Visigoths and Huns, where he learned native fighting techniques and horsemanship. Aetius then joined the Roman army as a member of the imperial guard, though little is known of his early career. During the reign of the western usurper Johannes (423–425), Aetius was instructed to recruit an army of Huns. However, he arrived in Italy three days after the eastern Roman army had already defeated and executed Johannes. After an inconclusive battle with eastern forces, a compromise was negotiated in which the Huns were paid and sent back to Danubian territory.

In return, Aetius received a generalship in Gaul (first as *comes*, later as *magister militum per Gallias*). Between 425 and 431, he campaigned annually against the Visigoths and Franks in Gaul, and the Alamanni in Noricum. During this time Aetius was able to foster strong ties with the local aristocracy and pacify the left bank of the Rhine frontier.

Aetius' rise to the supreme generalship (*magister utriusque militiae*, Master of Both Services) was marked by alleged intrigue and conflict. Galla Placidia, the daughter of Theodosius I and sister of the emperor Honorius (d. 423), ruled as regent for her son Valentinian III. She did not like Aetius and favored Boniface, the *comes Africae*. In 430, Aetius assassinated Felix, the western Roman supreme commander, allegedly after hearing rumors of a plot against his own life. Galla Placidia was forced to grant the supreme

command to Aetius, but the next year she recalled Boniface from Africa. Aetius was cashiered, while Boniface marched against him. Both warlords engaged each other at Rimini during the winter of 432. Aetius lost the battle, but may have personally wounded Boniface who died shortly afterward. Fleeing to Pannonia, Aetius was able to enlist Hunnic aid and returned to Italy with this new army in 433. He persuaded Galla Placidia to restore his command, after which he became the most powerful man in the imperial west.

Between 435 and 440, Aetius campaigned in Gaul and inflicted a crushing defeat on the Burgundians and fought a major war with the Visigoths. As seen before, his most successful tactic was to employ Hunnic troops as federates. During the war with the Visigoths, most of his Hunnic auxiliaries were slaughtered, and it is likely he received no further Hunnic aid afterward. After the Vandal capture of Carthage in 439, the western Roman Empire lost its major source of tax revenue, the grain-producing province of Africa, depleting the troops available. The western Roman army rarely campaigned during the 440s, but Aetius did enact a policy of resettling diverse barbarian auxiliaries in Gaul, such as the Burgundians near the Rhône and Alans at Orleans and Valences. This strategy helped Aetius gather the necessary manpower for the battle of the Catalaunian Plains in 451, a significant battle in which Aetius' Romans and his barbarian allies, including the Visigoths, defeated the Huns.

Aetius was unable to stop Attila's invasion of Italy in 452. After the latter's death in 453, Aetius wished to strengthen his influence over Valentinian III by having his son marry the emperor's daughter. However, allegedly persuaded by the courtier Petronius Maximus, Valentinian III stabbed Aetius at Ravenna on September 21, 454. Valentinian III himself was assassinated by Petronius Maximus the following year.

Aetius belonged to a line of supreme commanders, such as Arbogast and Stilicho, who dominated the western Roman court. He retained his power far longer, due to his independent control over armed forces at a time the imperial state's central authority was progressively diminishing.

Jeroen W. P. Wijnendaele

See also Attila; Boniface; Catalaunian Plains, Battle of the; Galla Placidia; Goths; Huns; Valentinian III

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Africa

Except for brief explorations, the classical world's knowledge of Africa was restricted to modern North Africa, above the Saharan Desert. In particular, "Africa" refers to the heartland of the Carthaginian Empire, Africa Vetus or "Old Africa," reorganized by the Romans as a province, Africa Proconsularis. However, the entire North African region, from modern Morocco to modern Libya, might also be regarded as Africa. The Romans regarded Egypt as a separate region.

The Carthaginians, originally from Phoenicia, colonized North Africa and established their seagoing commercial empire centering on the area of modern Tunisia, with the great city of Carthage at its tip, which flourished during the sixth to second centuries BCE. In the Third Punic War, the Roman destruction of Carthage in 146 BCE ended the Carthaginian state. The remaining significant regional power was the kingdom of Numidia until its defeat in the Jugurthine War and its annexation after the battle of Thapsus.

In the late Republic and Principate, the Romans recolonized Africa Vetus and reorganized it as the province of Africa Proconsularis, governed by a proconsul. Numidia was held by the legate of the Legio III Augusta, the only legion in the entirety of Africa, but did not become a separate province until 196 CE. In the 40s, the emperor Claudius added the provinces of Mauretania Caesariensis and Mauretania Tingitana (roughly modern Morocco). These provinces were subdivided in the Diocletianic reorganization of the provinces.

In the Carthaginian and Roman period, North Africa was more agriculturally productive than it is today due to extensive irrigation, and was the second largest supplier of grain to the Roman Empire, after Roman

Egypt. North Africa was highly urbanized and produced one emperor (Septimius Severus, 193–211 CE) and many notable Latin intellectuals, including the orator Cornelius Fronto, the novelist Apuleius, and St. Augustine. Africa became highly Christianized by the third and fourth centuries CE.

The Vandal invasion and occupation in 429 onward severed the African provinces from the Roman Empire, crippling the western empire economically. The Byzantine emperor Justinian (527–565) attempted the reconquest of Africa from the Vandals. A North African culture that had merged native, Punic (Carthaginian), and Roman and Christian elements was finally submerged by the Arab conquest in the seventh century CE. However, due to the arid climate, many classical urban and villa sites in North Africa are remarkably well preserved today, as are many Latin inscriptions.

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See also Carthaginians; Inscriptions; Jugurthine War; Punic War, Third; Septimius Severus; Vandals

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Agricola (40–ca. 93 CE)

The career of Gnaeus Julius Agricola is one of the most well known of all members of the Roman imperial administration. This is due to his biography, which was written by his son-in-law Cornelius Tacitus and provides an unparalleled insight into the activities of a Roman provincial governor. Agricola is the only known senator to have held all of his military posts (tribune, legionary legate, and governor) within the same province (Malone 2006, 76). His seven-year tenure of the governorship of Britain is also one of the longest on record.

Gnaeus Julius Agricola's family came from Forum Julii in Gallia Narbonensis. He was born on June 13, 40 CE. Agricola's father, Julius Graecinus, was executed under the emperor Caligula. The young Agricola

was educated in Massilia where a youthful infatuation with philosophy (sometimes associated with elite dissidence) was suppressed by his mother (Tacitus, *Agricola* 4).

Agricola served as a military tribune in Britain under the command of Suetonius Paulinus during the Boudiccan Revolt (60/61 CE). Tacitus praises Agricola's conscientious attitude toward his military service, in contrast to the majority of his peers (Tacitus, *Agricola* 5). It is possible that Agricola met the future emperor Titus during this period, as Titus served as a tribune in Britain shortly after the Boudiccan Revolt. On returning to Rome, Agricola was elected to the quaestorship in 62 CE. At the same time, he married Domitia Decidiana, who soon bore him a daughter. In 63–64 CE, Agricola served as quaestor in Asia. On returning to Rome, Agricola's political career continued smoothly. He became tribune of the plebs in 66 CE and obtained the praetorship two years later.

In late March or early April, 69 CE, rampaging Othonian soldiers murdered Agricola's mother and looted much of her estate at Intimilium in Liguria (Tacitus, *Agricola* 7). Perhaps in light of this crime, Agricola became an early adherent of the Flavian cause. He was initially tasked by Mucianus with recruiting troops to secure the new regime. Shortly afterward, he was dispatched to Britain to take command of the XX Legion, which had a reputation for poor discipline. Under the command of Petilius Cerialis, he took part in a number of campaigns in the territory of the Brigantes.

Agricola returned to Rome in 73 CE and was appointed to the governorship of Aquitania by the emperor Vespasian. Agricola was elevated to the consulship in 76 CE. His daughter married the future historian Tacitus shortly afterward.

In 77 CE, Agricola arrived in Britain as provincial governor. His first campaigning season was focused on fighting the Ordovices and imposing control over north Wales and Anglesey, thus completing the task begun by his former superior Suetonius Paulinus prior to the outbreak of the Boudiccan Revolt. The attack on Anglesey utilized the element of surprise by using auxiliary troops to swim across to the island rather than relying on the fleet. The following winter was spent on addressing corruption within the provincial administration. Agricola ensured that only trustworthy candidates were appointed and reformed the taxation system to introduce a fairer quota for the provincials.

Agricola's second campaigning season was conducted on the edge of

Roman territory in southern Scotland where, according to Tacitus, his raids and impressive camps forced the tribes to sue for peace. By winter, Agricola focused on encouraging civilian development. He encouraged the construction of public and private buildings in the Roman style (Tacitus, *Agricola* 21). Agricola also promoted the education of the sons of tribal chiefs as a means of ensuring their future loyalty to Rome.

The following three campaigning seasons saw continuing advances made in Scotland. By 80 CE, the Forth-Clyde line was held by Roman garrisons, providing a suitable frontier from which to launch further expeditions, including the crossing of the Clyde the following year. If Tacitus is to be believed, Agricola also considered an invasion of Ireland. He offered refuge to a fugitive Irish prince in the hope of utilizing him at a future date. Tacitus (*Agricola* 24) records that Agricola would later claim that Ireland could be conquered and held by a single legion and accompanying auxiliary troops.

The summer of 82 CE witnessed a major revolt by the Caledonian natives against Roman authority, which culminated in a daring night assault on the camp of the IX Legion. Although the attack was repulsed, it was clear that Agricola would need to deal decisively with the Caledonian resistance. In 83 or 84 CE, Agricola defeated a force of over 30,000 Caledonians at Mons Graupius in a victory which was to prove the climax of his campaigns (Tacitus, *Agricola* 35–37).

The emperor Domitian rewarded Agricola with triumphal ornaments and a public statue. Tacitus claims that Domitian was jealous of Agricola's military prowess and devised an elaborate plan to lure Agricola from Britain with the promise of the prestigious governorship of Syria (Tacitus, *Agricola* 40). This proved unnecessary, as Agricola left the province of his own accord. On his return to Rome, to avoid Domitian's further displeasure, Agricola spent his final years in retirement. Agricola probably died in 93 CE.

Any understanding of the life and career of Agricola is reliant upon the account written by Tacitus. This is problematic as the *Agricola* is not simply a biography. It also has a political message in that good men may do good deeds even under bad emperors (Tacitus, *Agricola* 42). Tacitus clearly admired his father-in-law and this necessarily obscures the historical reality. In the past, scholars have been quick to use the *Agricola* as a definitive source for Roman Britain in the first century CE and have linked archaeological sites in southern Scotland to events described within the text.

Recent archaeological research has instead indicated that Agricola's successes may have been less spectacular than those of the earlier governor Petilius Cerialis.

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See also Britain, Conquest of; Britain, Roman; Domitian; Mons Graupius, Battle of; Scotland; Senate, Senators; Tacitus; Triumph

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Agrigentum, Battle of (261 BCE)

The battle of Agrigentum (mod. Agrigento, Sicily) was the first major confrontation of the First Punic War (264–241). The strategically positioned Greek city, on the southern coast of Sicily, had allied itself with Carthage in 264 and by 262 it had become their chief base. It controlled the major routes of the region and was important to any potential Carthaginian advancement into Italy. The Romans, who were expanding southwards, were determined not to allow further infringement. A number of diplomatic efforts between the belligerents failed to defuse the mounting tensions, and with Carthaginian forces gathering apace, the Romans dispatched the new consuls Lucius Postumius Megellus and Quintus Mamilius Vitulus at the head of 40,000 troops. In charge at Agrigentum, was the Carthaginian commander, Hannibal Gisco, who controlled a small garrison there.

Details of the conflict are sketchy, but it took the form of a double siege followed by a battle. Hannibal remained in the city while the Romans took advantage and began a blockade constructing ditches to starve the city into

surrender. During the standoff, lasting five months, Hannibal requested reinforcements from Carthage. Another Carthaginian commander named Hanno arrived at the head of some 30 to 50,000 troops and began to lay siege to the Roman camp. The face-off lasted a further two months with both factions fearing starvation, but the Romans were able to rely on their ally, Hiero II of Syracuse, for much needed supplies and Hanno was forced to submit to battle. Hanno was defeated and the Romans sacked the city selling the population into slavery.

The taking of Agrigentum was crucial for Rome at this juncture of the war but short-lived as the Carthaginians retook it in 255. However, from there they were able to control their supply lines, and it also gave them the impetus to further their attentions abroad.

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See also Carthage (State); Carthaginians; Punic War, First; Siege Warfare; Stratagems; Strategy

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Agrippina I (d. 33 CE)

Born ca. 14 BCE, Agrippina I was the daughter of Marcus Vipsanius Agrippa and the elder Julia, Augustus' daughter. In 4 CE, Agrippina married Germanicus. Fulfilling the expectations of a traditional Roman marriage, Agrippina gave birth to nine children, six of whom grew to adulthood. Most notable among her children were the future emperor Gaius (Caligula) and Agrippina II, mother of the emperor Nero. The life of Agrippina the Elder was marred by conflicts with members of the imperial household over the issue of dynastic succession. Tacitus describes Livia's and Tiberius' contempt as unjust, but Agrippina was not immune to Livia's taunts.

Agrippina accompanied Germanicus to his posts in Germany and Syria. Tacitus relates several incidents in which her behavior won popular support. When Germanicus unsuccessfully attempted to quell a mutiny among the troops in Lower Germany in 14, it was only the pregnant Agrippina's departure from camp, along with their son Caligula and the wives of other Roman officials, which ended the mutiny (Tacitus, *Annals* 1.40). In 15, her decisive action prevented the destruction of a bridge over the River Rhine at Vetera (Xanten) and preserved an escape route for Roman soldiers fleeing the army of German rebel Arminius. Agrippina herself stood on the bridge, praising and thanking all who crossed it, and doling out food, clothing, and medicine (Tacitus, *Annals* 1.69). Tacitus relates that Tiberius, hearing of Agrippina's actions, feared her influence over the troops and saw her as a potential threat to his power, claiming the prerogatives of a commander.

When Agrippina accompanied her husband to Syria, Tacitus notes that Tiberius and Livia continued to harass the couple. Tacitus alleges that Piso, the provincial legate of Syria, was certain that his posting to the province was to check Germanicus' ambitions and that Piso's wife Plancina had received instructions from Livia to persecute Agrippina. Plancina also took part in cavalry exercises and military maneuvers. Thus she failed to observe *decora feminis*, behavior fitting for good women, thereby incurring Tacitus' disapproval (*Annals* 2.55). On October 10, 19, Germanicus died, probably of natural causes but allegedly poisoned by Piso and Plancina.



Marble bust that may depict Agrippina the Elder (17 BCE–33 CE), wife of Germanicus (d. 19 CE) and mother of Gaius (Caligula) (emperor 37–41 CE). This bust may be a copy of the early imperial original. Located in the Capitoline Museums, Rome, Italy. (Araldo de Luca/Corbis)

Upon her return to Rome, amidst extreme public grief for the popular Germanicus, Agrippina was further entangled in the politics of the imperial household. Tacitus notes that Livia and Tiberius were absent from all public manifestations of grief for Germanicus. The grieving people spoke of Agrippina as the glory of the country, the sole surviving offspring of Augustus, and a singular example of ancient virtue; they prayed that her children might survive their oppressors. Tiberius, Tacitus notes, was deeply troubled by these expressions of public sympathy. At about this time, Sejanus, Tiberius' unprecedentedly powerful praetorian prefect, began to use Agrippina's celebrated virtues against her. Rather than being a faithful

wife and exemplary mother, he alleged, she was arrogant for having produced so many children, and dangerous for encouraging factionalism. He charged her with inciting civil war by promoting her children for dynastic succession. A number of Agrippina's friends were prosecuted in the trials for *maiestas*, treason, which plagued Rome after Tiberius left the city for Capri in 26, handing matters of state to Sejanus.

Sejanus launched his final attack on Agrippina after Livia's death in 29. Tacitus reports that Tiberius sent a letter to the Senate, denouncing Agrippina for her haughty language and arrogant spirit, and her son Nero for depravity. Despite tremendous public outcry for Agrippina and Nero, Tiberius repeated his accusations and rebuked the people for their resistance to his wishes. Although there is no information in the accounts of Tacitus and Dio about the subsequent trials, Agrippina and Nero were declared *hostes*, public enemies, a verdict that implies a charge of political misconduct. Nero was exiled to Pontia, where he died of starvation, and Agrippina to the island of Pandateria. There, according to Suetonius, she lost an eye when she was severely beaten by a centurion. In 33, Agrippina died, allegedly as the result of a self-imposed hunger strike despite attempts to force-feed her. Tacitus, however, suggests that food may have been withheld from her, and that her death was made to appear a suicide.

Mary R. McHugh

See also Agrippina II; Arminius; Assassination; Augustus; Caligula; Claudius I; Emperor as Commander; Exile; Gender and War; Germanicus; *Imperator*; Mutiny; Plancina; Rhine and Pannonian Mutinies; Sejanus; Suicide; Tacitus; Tiberius (Emperor)

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Agrippina II (d. 59 CE)

Agrippina the Younger was an important member of the Julio-Claudian family: descendant of Augustus, sister of Caligula, wife of her uncle the emperor Claudius, and mother of the emperor Nero. She spent her childhood with her great-grandmother Livia, from whom she may have learned to gain and retain supporters and eliminate enemies. Agrippina witnessed the forced exiles and violent deaths of family members who were victims of disputes over dynastic succession, casualties of treason trials, and assassinated rulers, crazed by their own power and paranoia. Nor was she immune to such dangerous people or circumstances herself, as she, too, suffered exile and, eventually, assassination.

Agrippina's intelligence, political shrewdness, and ambition were remarkable, although not surprising for someone of her position and lineage. That it was a woman who acted on these characteristics, however, historians could not forgive. Their rhetorical strategies allege her inappropriate interference in politics, manipulative use of her sexuality (both extending and withholding favors), excessive jealousy and cruelty, greed for power and possessions, and even a reputation as poisoner and murderer. These insinuations criticized and discredited the by-then unpopular Julio-Claudian dynasty, whose last ruler was Nero.

Throughout her life, perhaps drawing on her own experience as daughter of the popular commander Germanicus, Agrippina supported soldiers and veterans. Her mother was pregnant with Agrippina at the time of the Rhine mutiny. In 17, Agrippina and her siblings participated in Germanicus' triumph at Rome. In 50, the year after Agrippina married Claudius, he adopted her son Nero from her first marriage, and Agrippina arranged for the establishment of a colony of veterans in the place of her birth, Ara Ubiorum, now known as Cologne, Germany. The colony was named for both Agrippina and Claudius: *Colonia Claudia Ara Augusta Agrippinensium*. In 51, Claudius dedicated at Rome a triumphal monument

celebrating his British victory. The defeated British chieftain Caratacus, his wife, and his brothers, paid homage not only to Claudius, but also to his wife, Agrippina. According to Tacitus, that a woman should sit in state before Roman standards was an innovation without precedent. When Nero came of age that year, the occasion was recognized by a donative, a bonus awarded to the troops, among other measures Agrippina had suggested to gain popular support.

Agrippina seems to have been sensitive to the military's potential for abuse of power in the provinces. Josephus credits her with having interceded on behalf of the Jewish people, when they rebelled against the abusive treatment of a Roman centurion. She was especially concerned to ensure the loyalty of the Praetorian Guard, perhaps because she recognized the value of her parents' popularity among the troops, and the means by which Claudius succeeded Caligula when the praetorians proclaimed him emperor. After her marriage to Claudius she sought the removal of the praetorian prefects who had remained loyal to Claudius' executed wife Messalina and appointed Afranius Burrus as the new praetorian prefect. In 59, Nero decided to have his mother assassinated. The praetorians refused, leaving the task to members of the Roman naval fleet at Misenum.

Mary R. McHugh

See also Agrippina I; Assassination; Claudius I; Donatives; Emperor as Commander; Exile; Gender and War; Germanicus; Josephus; Judaea; Nero; Succession (Imperial); Suetonius; Suicide; Tacitus; Tiberius (Emperor); Veteran Settlement

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Alae

An *ala* (Latin, pl. *alae*) is the term for a Roman cavalry unit as well as the formation of cavalry attached to a legion in battle. The term derives from the Latin word for “wing.” This was mostly due to the cavalry’s look in relation to the rest of the unit and its role in battle formations. The cavalry normally was positioned at both sides of the infantry in an elongated line that flowed backward and forward to ward off or encircle the enemy as needed. As the *alae* looked and moved like a bird’s wings, this name was applied to them.

Each *ala* was composed of 16 *turmae*. Each *turma* was composed of 32 troopers. This gave one *ala* a strength of 512 men. It was also not uncommon to find Roman cavalry formed into *alae milliariae*. These were double strength *alae* composed of up to 32 *turmae* each and having a strength of approximately 1,000 men.

Each *turma* was led by a decurion. Each *ala* was led by a *praefectus alae* or *praefectus equitum*. The exact difference between these two ranks is unknown. It is thought that they are actually the same office. The *praefectus equitum* is the older of the two, being common throughout the republican and triumviral periods, and the term *praefectus alae* came into existence during the early imperial period. This switch also coincided with the use of names and numbers to signify specific cavalry units (i.e., *praefectus alae Gallorum V* would be the *praefectus equitum* of the fifth cavalry unit composed of Gauls). Prior to this, it is thought that cavalry units were known by the name of their commander and changed names when they changed commanders. While there are some examples of non-Romans in these leadership roles, these offices were most often held by Roman citizens. The title indicating the ethnic composition of an *ala* refers to its original recruitment when first formed and does not necessarily indicate its ethnic composition in a later period.

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See also Arms and Armor; Cavalry (Imperial); *Praefectus*

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Alae Sociorum

The *alae sociorum* (sing. *ala*) were troops raised by the Italian peninsular city-states in permanent alliance with Rome, from the early Republic down to the Social War (91–87 BCE). Each year when Rome levied a new consular army, the Italian allies, or *socii*, were expected to raise an equivalent amount of troops. Each consular army was traditionally composed of two Roman legions. As a result, the *socii* raised an additional two *alae*, giving each consul a total force equating four legions.

Each *ala sociorum* was the same size as a Roman legion, approximating 5,100 total men under arms. Only about 4,200 were infantry, however. The *socii* were expected to provide more cavalry than the standard Roman legion did: for example, 900 horsemen per legion instead of 300. However, the proportion of troops and of infantry vs. cavalry were probably negotiated with each allied community. Since most allied communities had problems raising this amount of manpower on their own, several communities may have banded together to outfit each *ala*. Allowances were also made for communities famed for producing one type of soldiers (specifically cavalry) to provide more cavalry and less infantry. The manpower obligations of each allied community or group of communities were recorded in a document known as the *formula togatorum* (identified with the *lex agraria* of 111 BCE).

The command of each *ala sociorum* was given to as many as six *praefecti sociorum* chosen from the equestrian order of Roman citizens by the consul in charge. All cavalry in the army was usually detached from the parent legions and placed under a *praefectus equitum*, who was usually of senatorial rank.

In addition to raising these troops, the *socii* were expected (after the early Republic) to equip them in the same manner as a Roman legion and provide them with basic rations for the initial part of the campaign season.

Their support would be the responsibility of the Roman general from that point on, as for the Roman legions. In exchange for fighting, the *alae sociorum* would receive a percentage of any loot gained, although at a lower rate than the Roman soldiers received. It is also thought that serving in a campaign would result in the awarding of Roman citizenship to the *socii* soldiers, or at least an increase in status to *ius Latini* (the legal rights of a Roman citizen).

This practice is thought to have originated in the early portion of the fifth century BCE with the Treaty of Cassius (*foedus Cassianum*). It was maintained throughout the republican era until Rome granted full citizenship rights to the *socii* at the end of the Social War in 87 BCE.

The name “ala(e)” is applied to these troops for the same reason it is applied to cavalry formations. They flanked the main Roman troops, like the wings on the body of a bird. While cavalry did make up a component of these formations, almost all *alae sociorum* were mixed cavalry and infantry and not to be confused with standard Roman cavalry *alae*, which were purely horsemen. The latter are best known as the Roman auxiliary cavalry in the Principate.

Ian A. Martin

See also *Alae*; *Allies*; *Auxilia*; *Legion*, *Organization of*

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Alaric (Ruled ca. 400–410 CE)

Leader of the Visigoths, Alaric was one of the most ambitious barbarian leaders to take advantage of the relative power vacuum in the western Roman Empire due to the emperor Honorius' weak leadership. Theodosius I (379–395) promoted the widespread use of barbarian federates (allies) as troops; the minority of his sons resulted in the dominance of military policy by the *magistri militum* or senior generals. The chief of these was Stilicho, who was virtually a regent for Honorius until his own downfall in 408. Alaric ensured his historical notoriety by besieging and sacking Rome in 410 CE, though he achieved no lasting benefit.

Very little is known about Alaric's family or youth. Sixth century historiography, as preserved by Jordanes and probably derived from Cassiodorus, imagined him as descending from a Gothic clan with royal pedigree. However, contemporary sources indicate that Alaric started as an obscure figure serving in the eastern Roman army. He originally commanded a unit of Gothic auxiliaries in Theodosius' army during the battle of the Frigidus. After Theodosius' death, he was dismayed that he did not receive a proper generalship as a reward for service. Gothic resentment was high considering the heavy casualties their ranks had suffered during the battle. Alaric was able to exploit these grievances to raise a mutiny in 395, which rapidly spread across Thrace. The Balkans were virtually defenseless, since the eastern forces were still under Stilicho's command in Italy. When the latter tried to attack Alaric in Greece, his forces displayed poor discipline, and the court in Constantinople forced Stilicho to return the eastern units and vacate Greece. Alaric continued pillaging Attica and the Peloponnese, until Stilicho returned with a new force in 397. Some fighting occurred in the peninsula, but Stilicho was forced again to withdraw after Constantinople declared him a public enemy. In return, Alaric was allowed to retreat into Epirus and received the senior generalship of the eastern army in Illyricum (*magister militum per Illyricum*). He held this post until 400, when he probably had to relinquish it in the aftermath of a failed coup by a different Gothic general in Constantinople. Alaric then decided to invade Italy in 401. This may have been the first occasion that he took on the title of king, but his ultimate goal still remained a senior generalship in the Roman army. He entered Italy virtually unopposed and was able to besiege Milan for several months, until Stilicho descended upon him with his forces from Raetia. Two stalemate battles were fought at Pollentia and Verona, but Stilicho ultimately held the upper hand and was able to capture Alaric's family and baggage train. Alaric lost a significant number of men through battle, hunger, disease, and desertion, but still retreated with a considerable force into western Illyricum.

By 405 at the latest, Stilicho granted him a western Roman command. In 407, Alaric was instructed to retreat into Epirus where he lingered for a year. Stilicho was preoccupied with the usurpation attempt of Constantine III, so Alaric moved his forces into Noricum and demanded payment for his services instead. In 408, Stilicho himself succumbed to a court intrigue, accused of sedition by his enemies among the chief officials. Stilicho's

execution caused thousands of his federates (barbarian auxiliaries) to defect from Italy into Alaric's camp. When Honorius' government rebuffed his requests, Alaric marched into Italy and started the siege of Rome at the end of 408. His goal was to pressure Honorius into negotiations, but he was constantly thwarted as Honorius refused to concede. Abandoning any hope of further promotion by the Romans, Alaric allowed his army to sack Rome. It is only after this event that the Visigoths as a people came into being, with Alaric as their first king. He died shortly afterward, while taking his forces to southern Italy. Alaric's fame in Western culture rested on his sack of Rome, which reverberated around the Roman world.

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See also Fall of the Roman Empire (West); Federates; Frigidus, Battle of; Rome, Siege of; Stilicho

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Alesia, Siege of (52 BCE)

The siege of Alesia was one of the most significant operations of the late Republic—a massive blockade-and-battle rather than a conventional siege. Caesar's victory broke the back of the Gallic revolt of 52 BCE, ushering in five centuries of Roman rule in Gaul and freeing him to confront Pompey in the final struggle for dominance—but it was a near-run thing.

Caesar responded to the massive Gallic revolt with customary boldness, marching on important Gallic towns and forcing Vercingetorix, the leader of the Gallic coalition, to fight and risk defeat rather than continue to gather his strength. But when Caesar marched his army toward the large hill fort of Alesia (near Dijon in east-central France) he was running out of time,

and he must have been placing his hopes on a quick victory by assault—otherwise, his besieging army would have been pinned against Alesia and smashed by the Gallic relief army (this was certainly Vercingetorix’s plan). But, as Caesar tells us in the *Gallic Wars*, he saw upon arrival that Alesia “seemed impossible to capture, unless by blockade.” Although the hill fort was indeed a place of great natural strength, it was still approachable from the west. The real problem was that Vercingetorix’s army was too large to simply assault, and Caesar did not have the time to both contain it and approach it with siege works that would diminish the advantages of the Gallic position.

Alesia, which has been very extensively excavated, is the great showpiece of Rome’s highly labor-intensive approach to siege warfare. Caesar’s men built a fortification system—a trench, then obstacle fields, a double ditch, and finally an earthen rampart topped with a wooden palisade and towers every 80 feet—11 miles in circumference, cutting Alesia off from outside aid. To meet the expected relief force Caesar then constructed a similar fortification system facing outward, this one 14 miles in circumference (all of this took about a month, and Caesar seems to have exaggerated the comprehensiveness of the works, but most of what he claims was built has been identified by archaeologists).

Caesar’s vastly inferior numbers led him to depart from his usual practice of headlong offensive warfare, cleverly returning Vercingetorix’s challenge by adopting a sort of passive-aggressive posture: he dug himself into a trap and dared the Gauls to attack. His smaller army might be attacked from two sides, but now they had two important tactical advantages: short interior lines (they could rush back and forth within the ring of fortifications) and the fortifications themselves, which allowed the few Roman troops on any length of wall to do great damage with arrow-shooting artillery, bows, slings, and volleys of heavy throwing spears while the Gauls struggled to approach the walls. And Caesar had taken care to store provisions: if the Gauls did not attack, Vercingetorix’s army would starve before his—so attack they did.

For better or for worse, our only real source for the fighting at Alesia is Caesar himself, and he provides a gripping description of several days of fighting: skirmishes outside the ring, a night attack on his walls, and finally an all-out assault from both armies on many points of the wall. With his men unable to effectively defend every area under attack, Caesar found a

vantage point and dispatched reserve cohorts to hard-pressed areas, leading the last reserves himself. When the Gauls within were thrown back from the walls, Caesar also personally led the general breakout against the besieging army—he had a knack for appearing at the decisive point of his victories, at least when he is telling the story. Nevertheless, the sudden Roman breakout routed the Gauls, Vercingetorix surrendered, and the campaign was over.

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See also Caesar, Gaius Julius; Gallic Wars; Siege Warfare; Vercingetorix; *Virtus*

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Alexander Severus (Emperor) (222–235 CE)

Born Marcus Iulius Gessius Bassianus Alexianus in Syria ca. 208 CE, Alexander Severus was Roman emperor from 222 to 235 CE. His mother Iulia Mamaea was the niece of Iulia Domna, wife of the emperor Septimius Severus (193–211 CE). The young Alexianus lived at Emesa in Syria until his cousin Elagabalus became emperor in 218 CE. In 221 CE, Elagabalus adopted Alexianus as his heir. Less than a year later, Elagabalus was murdered by the soldiers and Alexianus ascended to the throne as Marcus Aurelius Severus Alexander.

The *Historia Augusta* portrays Alexander as the ideal prince, but there were many serious problems at court. The praetorian prefect Ulpian was murdered in a power struggle in 223 CE. Alexander's mother Mamaea was almost universally unpopular, earning a reputation for greed and cruelty. In 225 CE, Alexander married a woman from a senatorial family, Sallustia Barbia Orbiana, but she was exiled by Mamaea less than two years later.

Orbiana's father was accused of treason and put to death.

The last years of Alexander's reign were dominated by warfare. In 230 CE, the Sassanid Persians attacked Roman settlements along the eastern frontier, forcing the emperor to take to the field in the following year. The campaign lasted until 233 CE, and successfully stemmed the Persian advance, but not without casualties on both sides. In 234 CE, Alexander embarked on an expedition against the Alamanni, who had crossed the Rhine frontier in Germany. However, the army staged a mutiny in March 235 CE and murdered Alexander and Mamaea at Mainz.

The depiction of Alexander in Herodian, who wrote a history of Rome from Marcus Aurelius to 238 CE, is more accurate and much less flattering than the unreliable depiction in the *Historia Augusta's* Life of Alexander, which depicts Alexander Severus as an ideal emperor.

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See also Elagabalus; Maximinus Thrax; Septimius Severus

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Allectus (Usurper)*. See *Carausius; Constantius I

Allia River, Battle of the (390/87 BCE)

The battle of the River Allia, a tributary of the Tiber approximately 18 kilometers north of Rome, took place in either July of 390 or 387 BCE. It was a decisive victory for Gaul and an embarrassing defeat for Rome that paved the way for the sacking of the city of Rome. The conflict arose when the Senones, a Gallic tribe, attempted to settle on Etruscan land, namely Clusium (mod. Siena). The Etruscans, feeling vulnerable, appealed to Rome for help. The Romans had recently exercised military control in the area and responded by dispatching a delegation, which included members of the influential Fabii family, for talks. However, diplomatic efforts failed, and the Clusians sent an army to force the Senones off their land. In the commotion that ensued, Quintus Fabius slew a Gallic chieftain, which enraged (the)

Brennus, chieftain of the Senones and leader of the Gauls. He deemed the Roman action a breach of neutrality. The Gauls sent their own commission to Rome to demand justice, but instead the Romans rewarded the Fabii with military commands. This offense enraged the Gauls who pledged war on Rome.

Ancient and modern versions of the encounter vary significantly, particularly concerning the confusion surrounding troop numbers for both sides and in the after effects of the battle, but the sequence of events is as follows. The Gauls marched from Clusium to Rome where they were met by a Roman contingent, led by Quintus Sulpicius, at the Allia. The Roman armies at this time were part-time forces who were called upon in times of crises, and their amateur status is clearly visible in the ensuing battle. The Romans adopted a phalanx formation of fighting with poorly equipped conscripts out on the flanks. This enabled the Gauls to attack the outer edges of the phalanx to work their way to the center to cut down the richer better-armed Roman soldiers. In the panic that ensued, surviving Roman soldiers fled to take refuge in Veii (mod. Veio) and Rome. In the aftermath of Allia, Rome was left defenseless, and it endured a seven-month siege that nearly destroyed it. The Gauls were later bribed with gold to leave the City.

The defeat at Allia ranks among Rome's worst military confrontations. Indeed, the Gallic victory forced Rome to take stock of the situation, and it quickly brought in measures to prevent such a thing from happening again. These included the building of a more robust stone wall, known as the Servian Wall, to defend the city from external attacks, which would not happen again in fact until the fifth century CE. The Romans also needed to appease their Italian neighbors who felt shaky after the defeat. Indeed, once confidence was reestablished, the Gauls would be driven out into France as opposed to settling on the Italian peninsula. Finally, the Romans had to improve their military systems, particularly armaments and tactics. They learned how ineffective the phalanx was but how effective Gallic weaponry had been in their defeat, particularly the sword and the shield, and made changes to suit. It would become the starting point of future successful Roman armies.

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See also Gallic Empire; Gallic Wars; Gaul, Gauls; Rome (City); Rome, Siege of

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Alliances

Alliances (Latin *societates*, sg. *societas*) typically refer to partnerships between Rome and other states whose rules and mutual obligations are set down in a formal document, such as a treaty (Latin *foedus*, pl. *foedera*). Rome struck treaties with other states for the purposes of establishing zones of influence and activity (e.g., Rome's first treaty with Carthage, dated to 509 BCE: Polybius 3.22–23), pledging mutual assistance in the event of war (e.g., Rome's third treaty with Carthage, against Pyrrhus, king of Epirus, who invaded Italy and Sicily in the 270s: Polybius 3.25.1–5), coordinating military activity in the face of a common enemy (e.g., Rome's treaty with the Aetolian League in 211: Livy 26.24.8–14; *SEG* 13.382), or establishing a peace “for all time” after wars (e.g., the Peace of Apamea between Rome and the Seleucid king Antiochus III: Polybius 21.42). All treaty forms seem to have implied a promise of permanent mutual friendship between the treaty partners (even when not explicitly stated in the opening formula, typically, “there shall be [peace and] friendship between...”).

Alliances were often guaranteed through an exchange of hostages and/or oaths before the gods, although violations of alliance terms often took place, resulting in enmity and outright warfare. Polybius describes the Roman procedure for taking an oath, originally sworn by Jupiter Lapis, but then by Mars and Quirinus, as follows: “the man swearing the treaty takes a stone in his hand, swears in the name of the state by saying, ‘If I abide by this my oath may all good be mine, but if I do otherwise in thought or act, let all other men dwell safe in their own countries under their own laws and in possession of their own substance, temples, and tombs, and may I alone

be cast forth, even as this stone,' and so saying he throws the stone from his hand" (Polybius 25.6–7). Rome's partners typically swore by their own gods. In earlier periods, the Roman priestly *fetiales* signed the treaties, but later oversaw their religious aspects, while Roman commanders in the field signed them. All treaties, however, only took effect after being ratified by the Roman people in the centuriate assembly in Rome.

The sources use three main formulas for referring to Roman international partners—*socius*, *amicus*, and *socius et amicus*. It was once believed that the latter formula was a distinct technical-legal category referring to those who had a "treaty of friendship" (as opposed to a treaty of alliance) with Rome, but there is no evidence whatsoever for a distinct treaty of friendship. Strictly speaking *socius* refers to a state that has a formal treaty with Rome, *amicus* to a nontreated relationship without formal mutual obligations or rules, and *socius et amicus* (usually) to an *amicus* without a treaty, but the literary (and even epigraphic) sources are not so careful in making these distinctions.

It also used to be thought that *foedera aequa* ("equal treaties") and *foedera iniqua* ("unequal treaties") referred to two distinct types of Roman treaty. The *foedera iniqua*, therefore, came to be associated with treaties that included a "*maiestas* clause," that is, a statement that pledged Rome's treaty partner "to preserve readily and without fraud the majesty of the Roman people" (*maiestatem populi Romani comiter et sine dolo malo conservare*, as in the Roman treaty of peace with the Aetolian League in 189 BCE: Livy 38.11; cf. Polybius 21.32; and the treaty of alliance with Spanish Gades in 78: Cicero, *Pro Balbo* 35). It is now generally acknowledged, however, that *foedera aequa* and *iniqua* are rhetorical descriptions by Roman historians and do not refer to a technical-legal difference between two types of treaty.

In contrast to the rarely used "*maiestas* clause," most Roman treaties contained clauses mandating that the partner states "were to have the same friends and enemies," and would provide mutual assistance, "if they were able" (an "escape clause" of sorts).

One of the earliest treaties Rome struck within Italy itself was the Cassian Treaty, traditionally dated to 493 BCE, between the Romans and the other Latins. Its provisions indicate that it was an equal mutual defense pact (Dionysius *History of Rome* 6.95). The Hernici were later included in the *foedus Cassianum*. After the dissolution of the Latin League in 338, the treaty's terms covered only Roman-founded Latin colonies.

Rome established alliances with other states in Italy, collectively referred to as *socii*, *socii Italici*, or *foederati*, sometimes using formal treaties to enshrine mutual rights and obligations. There are only 14 securely documented Italian *foedera* before 265 BCE. The many hundreds of other Italian communities with which Rome entered relations before 265 were probably bound to Rome only by virtue of having performed *deditio*, unconditional surrender, and thus were brought under Roman *dicio* (jurisdiction). Regardless of how they were regulated, however, all these relations were unequal, favoring Roman priorities over those of the Italian *socii*. The inequality was most prominently manifested in the unilateral obligation of the allies to provide troops to fight in Rome's wars under Roman commanders.

When the Romans began expanding overseas in the third and second centuries BCE, especially in the eastern Mediterranean, they adapted their own alliance-making practices to the Greeks', but were less inclined than the Greeks to tie themselves down by formal treaties, instead preferring the loose, bilateral bond of international *amicitia*. Excluding limited treaties of peace (such as the Peace of Phoenice ending the First Macedonian War in 205 BCE) and temporary wartime pacts (such as the Roman-Aetolian treaty of 211), the Romans struck only eight *foedera* in the eastern Mediterranean before 146, with the Aetolian League (189 BCE), Antiochus III of Syria (188), the Achaean League (before 183), Rhodes (164 or 163), Cibyra in Phrygia (after 167), Alabanda in Caria (unknown date), Heraclea Pontica (unknown date), and Maronea in Thrace (sometime after 167, but quite possibly after 146). Others followed 146, but not many are attested (e.g., Callatis, Methymna [after 129], Epidaurus [ca. 112], Astypalaea [105], Thyrrheum [94], the Lycian League [46], Cnidus [45], and Mytilene [25]). Outside of Greece, Rome apparently struck even fewer formal treaties, such as with the Jews in 161, Spanish Gades in 78, and Sicilian Messana, Tauromenium, and perhaps Netum, at unknown dates.

Paul J. Burton

See also Allies (Status); *Amicitia*; *Deditio* (Surrender); Federates; Treaties and Alliances

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Allies (Status)

Allied status (Latin *societas*, thus *socius*, "ally" [pl. *socii*]) sometimes refers to those states that entered formal partnerships with Rome (usually via a treaty), in contrast with those who enjoyed informal relations of *amicitia*, or "friendship."

Within Italy, *socii* refers to states that were obligated to provide military contingents to Roman armies, sometimes mandated by treaty, but more often by virtue of having performed *deditio*, unconditional surrender, to Rome and thus brought under Roman *dicio* (jurisdiction). In exchange for surrendering this control over their foreign policy, the Italian *socii* had a claim on Roman protection, (usually) tax-exempt status, and a share in the spoils of Rome's victories (both movable property and captured territory).

Italian allied status contrasted with Latin status, a set of rights and obligations the Romans at first extended only to their own ethno-linguistic group, the Latins. Latin status came to be seen as more privileged than the looser allied status as Roman power grew since it resembled a half-way house to full Roman citizenship, whereas allied status usually involved no such mechanism and was reserved for those Italian peoples who were more distant from the Romans in terms of geography, ethnicity, language, customs, and laws (e.g., the Etruscans, the Greeks of southern Italy). Typically, allies enjoyed full control over their domestic affairs, but this changed as Roman power grew, and Roman magistrates increasingly interfered in the internal politics of allied states. The *formula togatorum* ("the list of togate peoples"), kept at Rome, specified the number of troops each ally contributed to the Roman army. The only extra-Italian ally listed in the *formula* was Sicilian Messana.

Eventually, the Italian allies, who shouldered immense military burdens in Roman wars, came to resent Roman interference in their internal affairs, their lack of judicial and social rights, and their vulnerability to the arbitrary exercise of *imperium* by Roman magistrates. This led to the so-called Social War (or the War of the Allies) in 91–87 BCE, when a significant number of central and southern Italian states revolted against Roman rule. The war and its rationale were ended by 87 when the Romans granted full Roman citizenship to allied states south of the Po River in northern Italy.

Paul J. Burton

See also Alliances; *Amicitia*; *Federates*; *Latin*, *Latins*; *Social War* (91–87 BCE); *Treaties and Alliances*

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Amicitia

“Friendship,” derived from the Latin *amare*, “to love” (so, too, *amicus*,

“friend”). Alongside *clientela* (the patron-client relationship, patronage), *amicitia* was one of the most important social relationships in Roman society. It was an informal bond, unfettered by institutional or legal rules, but cemented through personal *fides* (“loyalty,” “good faith”). *Amicitia* usually describes partnerships between status equals or near-equals, although formal equality in all aspects of the relationship was, in practice, difficult to achieve. Like many other states throughout human history, Rome naturally extended the language, behaviors, and psychology of friendship to the international sphere, identifying its functional (informal) allies as “friends” (*amici*) and the relationship as “friendship” (*amicitia*).

In Roman political life, *amicitia* between Roman aristocrats had a significant impact on the formation of political alliances and the distribution of political influence, particularly in the support and assistance aristocratic *amici* provided each other in trials, campaigning for election, and in an advisory capacity. Although similar in some respects to modern, western modes of friendship (which also involve reciprocal trust and affection, and the mutual performance of services), Roman *amicitia* (particularly between aristocrats) appears to have been a more instrumental relationship, openly based on the mutual performance of tangible duties, favors, and services. In contrast, *amicitia* could (and often did) describe intense, highly emotional, and physically close relationships. Friendship breakdown and dissolution could be equally intense and emotional, frequently leading to violent and destructive enmities and feuds.

Friendships are usually understood to describe relationships between status equals (or near-equals), but Roman *amicitia* seems to have been more tolerant and open about status differences between partners. This does not mean that unequal (or asymmetrical) friendships were euphemistic of some other type of informal relationship between unequals, such as *clientela*. The latter typically lacked the mutual affection, equality of self-determination, and level of intimacy characteristic of *amicitia*. The status gap separating patrons from clients was much greater than that separating inferior and superior friends. Exactly how much inequality had to occur before the friendship sank into a patron-client relationship varied by case, but the tipping point was probably reached when the inferiority of one partner could no longer be attenuated or compensated for by the performance of more and greater counter-favors and services.

In the international sphere, interstate *amicitia*, in contrast to

relationships governed by formal treaties of alliance (*foedus*, pl. *foedera*), describes loose, bilateral relationships governed by no formal legal rules. Such *amicitiae* amounted to mutual understandings that the two states were in a state of amicable relations, and that they were obligated (through the bond of *fides*) to assist each other during times of crisis if they were in a position to do so. The latter “escape clause” (which also appeared in some formal treaties) is indicative of the looseness of and flexibility afforded by international *amicitia*. This was clearly the intention behind the use of *amicitia* as a tool of diplomacy, since the Romans preferred not to restrict their own freedom of action in the international sphere by formally obligating themselves to help friendly states whenever called upon to do so. The response-flexibility of international *amicitia*, enjoyed by both sides, was desirable because of constraints on resources, the slowness of long-distance communication and travel in antiquity, and the number of competing claims on a state’s *fides* by the many states with which it had established relations.

During the middle Republic, the period of Rome’s rapid acquisition of an overseas empire, the Romans established scores of international *amicitiae* but very few formal treaties of alliance. The latter were typically used only as a last resort, after the bond of *amicitia* proved too loose to secure the consistent loyalty of Rome’s international partners (e.g., the Aetolian League in 189 BCE), or at the insistence of Rome’s partners (the republic of Rhodes in 163 BCE). The Romans often turned down requests for formal treaties of alliance (e.g., Antiochus III in 193). International *amicitia* was established in various ways: through wartime cooperation or mutual diplomatic agreement in the face of a common enemy, and through formal surrender to Rome (*deditio*) after defeat by Rome or to secure Roman protection against aggressors.

The first recorded Roman international *amicitiae* were established during the period of Rome’s conquest of Italy (fourth century BCE), but the earliest securely attested overseas *amicitiae* occurred during the second year of the First Punic War (263 BCE), when perhaps as many as 67 Sicilian towns and cities, in addition to Syracuse under the rule of King Hiero II, sought Roman protection and became Roman international *amici*. The First Illyrian War (229 BCE) against the Illyrian Ardiaei along the eastern coast of the Adriatic Sea resulted in Rome establishing friendships with actual and potential victims of Ardiaean aggression, including Corcyra, Apollonia,

Epidamnus, the Parthini and Atintani tribesmen, and the island state of Issa. Other cases include Ptolemaic Egypt, which became a Roman *amicus* in 273 BCE, Rhodes (likely) in 306, the Aetolian League in 211, King Attalus of Pergamum (probably) in winter 209/208, Athens (perhaps) in 208 or 209, the Seleucid king Antiochus III in 200, Masinissa of Numidia in 206, and the Achaean League in 198.

The Romans continued to use the language of *amicitia* to describe and construct their interstate relationships until well into the principate (e.g., Mytilene in 25 BCE), although the ever-increasing disparity of power between Rome and its friends may have made it increasingly anachronistic (and euphemistic) to do so.

Paul J. Burton

See also Allies; Cicero; Client Monarchs; *Deditio* (Surrender); Federates; *Fides*; Masinissa; Patronage; Punic War, First; Treaties and Alliances

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[Ammianus \(ca. 330–395 CE\)](#)

Ammianus Marcellinus, a Roman Syrian born possibly at Antioch, was a Roman officer and the last significant Latin historian of the Roman Empire. Little is known about his life. What we do know comes primarily from autobiographical references in his *Res Gestae*. Ammianus came from a military family and spent much of his life serving in the Roman army. In his later years he composed a 31-book history of the Roman Empire from the reign of Nerva to the death of Valens (96–378). Ammianus intended his history to be a continuation of Tacitus’ history. The first 13 books quickly covered the years 96–353 and were lost by the sixth century. The remaining

18 books span a 25-year period, contain greater detail, and were drawn in many places from Ammianus' own experiences. Ammianus' work was most heavily influenced by Cicero and Sallust. Yet Ammianus also appreciated the works of Herodotus, Thucydides, Polybius, Homer, Virgil, Eunapius, Juvenal, and Valerius Maximus. He was a traditional Roman polytheist, and although he criticized Christians for their moral shortcomings, he did not support Julian's intolerance of Christianity.

Ammianus seemingly was born into a local aristocratic family in Syria, and his father likely was a successful career soldier. Ammianus followed his father into the officer corps of the Roman army. This indicates that he was of decent social standing and that he came from a military family. Ammianus was in opposition to Julian's policy of limiting the privileges of the *curiales*. Therefore, he might have been of a curial background as well.

Ammianus joined the Roman army around 350. Additionally, he was enrolled into the elite *protectores domestici* (household guards), demonstrating his privileged background. Soon after joining the army, Ammianus was assigned to the personal staff of general Ursicinus by Constantius II, where he served in several campaigns in both the east and west. Ammianus and his unit were called to Italy by Constantius in 355 to accompany him to Gaul to fight against the usurper Claudius Silvanus. After the assassination of Silvanus, Ursicinus was given temporary command of the Gallic armies. However, Ursicinus and his staff soon returned to the east because of the rising Sassanid Persian threat. In 359, Ammianus found himself trapped in the Sassanid siege of Amida. He was able to escape the fall of the city, but Constantius removed Ursicinus from command. Ammianus took a hiatus from the army until Julian's arrival in the east in 362. His last military campaign was Julian's ill-fated invasion of the Persian empire in 363. Ammianus spent much of the next 20 years traveling through the eastern half of the empire. By the mid-380s he had reached Rome and had begun writing his history. The work was likely finished soon after 391.

His extant work begins with an account of his service under Ursicinus. This portion of his history is the most influenced by Ammianus' personal experiences and the most biased. Ammianus sometimes provides considerable detail of events and commentary in an account that appears much like a personal memoir. The major section of his work is the life and career of Julian. Although Ammianus served in Julian's army, his accounts

of Julian's campaigns rely a good deal on other written sources and eyewitness accounts. Ammianus was an adamant supporter of Julian. Although Ammianus disagreed with and disapproved of some of Julian's religious decisions, such as his emphasis on divination and sacrifice or his banning of Christian intellectuals from teaching, he deeply admired Julian as a military leader and courageous soldier, depicting Julian as the ideal emperor as commander. Ammianus lamented Julian's early death and viewed it as a negative turning point in the history of Rome. Ammianus' accounts of Jovian, Valentinian I, and Valens are less detailed, and the setbacks of the Roman Empire after Julian's death are his focus. The finale of his work is the disastrous Roman defeat at the hands of the Goths at Adrianople in 378 and the death of Valens.

Ammianus' writing style is formal and elaborate, and his portrayal of events and development of characters is vivid. He utilized traditional rhetorical speeches, and satire noticeably influenced his work. His experiences as a soldier were fundamental to his judgments and writing approach. His ethnographical digressions, most notably his digression on the culture of the Huns and Alans, are a valuable addition to his history.

Ammianus' history generally is well received by modern historians. Edward Gibbon, whose high estimate of Ammianus was carried on by scholars such as A. H. M. Jones and M. L. W. Laistner, considered Ammianus a reliable and mostly impartial historian. John Matthews follows in this opinion. He argues that Ammianus fairly and accurately depicted the society in which he lived and that Ammianus provides an accurate picture of the second half of the fourth century CE. Timothy Barnes, although cautious about the impartiality of Ammianus, states that his history is fundamental to our understanding and interpretation of the fourth century. The value of Ammianus' work to the study of Late Antiquity for this period is unmatched.

The manuscript transmission of Ammianus' work is poor and unfortunate. Of the remaining eighteen books, corruptions and lacunae are found in numerous places. The text is transmitted solely by two Carolingian manuscripts of the ninth century: *M*, known as the *Fragmenta Marburgensia*, of which only six leaves survive; and *V*, the Vatican lat. 1873, from Fulda. Fourteen manuscripts of the fifteenth century are based off of *V*, and *V* was copied from *M*. Finally, the 1533 printed edition of Gelenius utilized *M* before it was dismembered, making Gelenius' edition an

important witness to the textual tradition of Ammianus' *Res Gestae*.

Nikolaus Leo Overtoom

See also Adrianople, Battle of; Constantius II; Julian; Persian Wars, Sassanid

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Anthemius (Emperor). See Fall of Roman Empire

Antoninus Pius (Emperor) (138–161 CE)

Antoninus Pius, Roman emperor in 138–161 CE, was born Titus Aurelius Fulvus Boionius Arrius Antoninus at Lanuvium in Italy in 86 CE. Antoninus was of distinguished senatorial family (both his father and grandfather had been consul), and he married Annia Galeria Faustina, a distant relative of the emperor Trajan. He embarked on a senatorial career, serving as consul in 120 CE and proconsul of Asia in 135/136 CE, but did not take on any posts with military responsibilities.

The emperor Hadrian had no children, and initially adopted Lucius Aelius Caesar as his heir. After Aelius' untimely death in 138 CE, Hadrian selected Antoninus in his place; Antoninus in turn adopted Aelius' son, Lucius Verus, and his nephew Marcus Aurelius, securing the imperial succession for subsequent generations. Antoninus' first act was to ensure Hadrian's deification by the Senate; this was no easy feat given his predecessor's turbulent relationship with the senators. In recognition of his loyalty toward Hadrian, Antoninus was granted the name of Pius

(“dutiful”).

Antoninus’ reign witnessed a small campaign in Scotland, after which the 60-kilometer long Antonine Wall was constructed between the firths of Forth and Clyde, extending Roman territory beyond the limits established by Hadrian. The emperor sought to secure the empire’s borders by a war in Mauretania and by appointing new kings of the Quadi (a barbarian tribe across the Danube), and the eastern kingdom of Armenia. Antoninus himself never left Italy, and earned a reputation as a fair and considerate ruler. He died peacefully in 161 CE and was afterward deified by the Senate.

Caillan Davenport

See also Hadrian; Lucius Verus; Marcus Aurelius

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Antonius Primus (Active 69 CE)

Conspirator and legate of the legion *VII Galbiana* in Pannonia on the Danube, Marcus Antonius Primus was a key adherent of Vespasian during the civil war known as the War of Four Emperors in 69 CE. The civil war began with the revolt of Vindex and Galba in 68. Between June 68 and December 69, the empire witnessed the rise and fall of the emperors Galba, Otho, and Vitellius, until the accession of Vespasian in July 69 and the death of Vitellius in December.

Little is known of Antonius Primus’ early career except that he was born in Tolosa, Gaul, and that in 61 he was ejected from the Senate by Nero on the grounds that he had conspired to forge a will. Following the death of Nero in June 68, Primus attached himself to the new emperor, Galba, and he was rewarded with the restoration of his senatorial rank as well as the command of the legion *VII Galbiana*. When Otho conspired to seize imperial power in January 69, Primus declared in favor of the new emperor. Vitellius, however, initiated a secondary civil war, supported by the legions of the lower Rhine. Primus offered his assistance to Otho; however, the

Pannonian legions were left out of the conflict.

Antonius Primus' decisive role in the events of the year 69 did not come until the latter half of the year. In August 69, motivated by the poor treatment of the Danubian and Pannonian legions by the newly instated emperor Vitellius, Primus declared his support for a new challenger to the throne—Vespasian. Primus gained the further support of the legions of Dalmatia and Illyricum for the Flavian cause. In September, despite warnings from Vespasian not to venture beyond Aquileia, Primus advanced into Italy ahead of the Flavian vanguard. Primus' bold move was rewarded by a decisive victory against the Vitellian forces at Cremona (also termed the Second Battle of Bedriacum) on October 24–25, which sparked the defections of Spain and Britain from the Vitellian cause and led Primus and his men all the way to Rome itself. For a short period after his victory, Primus functioned as the ruler of the capital. Nevertheless, his personal success was short-lived and Licinius Mucianus, upon his arrival in January of the following year, deprived Primus of his influence.

In the *Histories*, Tacitus devotes a great deal of space to his description of the exploits and character of Antonius Primus. Tacitus hails Primus for his eloquence, his bravery in action, and his skill in stirring up discord among his enemies; he however scorns Primus for his extravagance and greed during peacetime. The historian is particularly critical of the Flavian sack of Cremona, for which he blames Primus. Although Primus was directly responsible for the Flavian victory over the Vitellians, Tacitus emphasizes that Primus' rash invasion of Italy was contrary to Vespasian's wishes. The poet Martial was also a vigorous admirer of Primus, devoting four epigrams to the general.

Thomas Caldwell

See also Corbulo; Galba; Nero; Otho; Tacitus; Vespasian; Vitellius; War of Four Emperors

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Antonius Saturninus, Lucius (d. 89 CE)

Lucius Antonius Saturninus was a governor of Upper Germany who, perhaps inspired by the rise of Vitellius, rebelled against the emperor Domitian at Mogontiacum (Mainz) in early 89. He secured the support of several German tribes, who were unexpectedly prevented from joining him due to the thaw of the Rhine River. The governor of Lower Germany, Lappius Maximus, met Antonius Saturninus in battle and defeated him.

After the death of Antonius Saturninus, Domitian purged his allies and punished the two rebellious legions, relocating one to Pannonia. Domitian allegedly became more paranoid about senatorial conspiracies after the revolt and set a limit on the *deposita ad signa*, the savings bank that each legion kept with the standards, to deter future usurpers from claiming it.

Gaius Stern

See also Deposita ad Signa; Domitian; Revolt; Usurpation

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Appian (ca. 90/95–160/65 CE)

Appianos of Alexandria, better known as Appian, was a Greek historian born in the Greek enclave of Alexandria, Egypt, around 90–95 CE. Little is known of his early life but what survives can be found in a few lines of the concluding part to the Preface of his *Roman History* and the letters of his friend the orator, Marcus Cornelius Fronto. He was in Alexandria at the time of the Jewish insurgencies in ca. 115–117 CE and worked there in an official capacity. He arrived in Rome sometime during Hadrian's reign, became a Roman citizen and worked as a legal expert in the reign of Antoninus Pius who awarded him an honorary procuratorship through the intercession of Fronto. He died ca. 160–165 CE.

Appian wrote an autobiography, which is now lost, and a history of

Rome, written in Greek, in 24 books of which nine survive complete and seven are in fragments. Appian's range of history is vast, and his approach to writing it was predominantly to give accounts of the different peoples conquered by the Romans. His intended audience was the Greek upper classes whom he wanted to inform about the greatness of Rome's empire. He focused particularly on Italians, Iberians, Carthaginians, Celts, Sicilians, Macedonians, Greeks, and so forth. These books were written in the order that the Romans subjugated each nation, and it would be safe to assume that the dominance of Appian's method of ordering by nation is seen especially in his important treatment of Rome's civil wars in the second half of his history, where they form part of the narrative of Rome's conquest of Egypt, which was of course a major concern to Appian as a native of Alexandria. Added to the mix of history were books entitled Hannibal and the Mithridatic Wars.

Appian's ability to write history was dependent not only on his source material, but also on how he used it to compose his monumental history. The debate about this evidence continues to be the subject of much discussion among modern historians, but Appian wrote in the second century CE and would, therefore, have had a range of sources available to him as well as materials that are now otherwise lost. Frustratingly, he provided no bibliography but he knew Latin well and Greek and Latin authors accessible to him would have included the likes of Polybius, Plutarch of Chaeronea, Sallust, Livy, Rutilius Rufus, Gaius Asinius Pollio, Hieronymus of Cardia, Claudius Quadrigarius, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Caesar, and other authors. With this variety of writers at his disposal, it is often cynically argued that Appian simply transmitted the most pertinent parts of their works to which he added mistakes, thus making his history unreliable. However, recent scholarship has turned this view around arguing that he was a conscious contributor whose work was orderly and written in a lucid dramatic style. Although prone to some bias, being a keen enthusiast of the Romans, he was generally impartial and attacked the Romans and praised the conquered when necessary. Appian often got muddled. His knowledge of geography was sometimes poor: for example, in his *Iberikê* (*Spanish Wars*) his placing of Saguntum (mod. Sagunto) north of the River Ebro and his description of that river emptying into the northern sea are significant blunders. Geography, however, was not the key concern of many ancient writers. In terms of dates, chronology was not uppermost in his

mind even though he made a promise in the Preface to his *Roman History* to only date important events when he thought it necessary. Although careless, he occasionally adopts the Olympiad system of dating noting, for example, that the Hannibalic war occurred in the 140th Olympiad and Sulla's arrival in Brundisium (mod. Brindisi, Italy) was in the 174th Olympiad but declining to fix a date more precisely.

Perhaps his most important surviving work is the Roman *Civil Wars* in five books (from the Gracchi to Actium). It is the only available substantial narrative of an extraordinary period in Roman history that survives and is thus of vital importance to today's historians. Despite some confusion about the late Republic, he does exhibit some appreciation of the social, economic, and political issues of the day thus preserving this information in a way that his contemporaries did not. However, Appian's *Civil Wars* do require attention when interpreting the sequence of events as they have a propensity to concentrate purely on violence to the exclusion of the crisis of the late Republic, thus distorting the narrative. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to dismiss this work due to its frustrating nature.

Until recently, Appian has been given a bad press by modern historians. This is perhaps because of the expectations required when writing history, in his case, an inability to analyze the sources available to him. Appian simply gathered the evidence, jotted the important information down and added errors of his, and for this reason he has been deemed inaccurate. However, most ancient historians, such as Tacitus, Cassius Dio, and so on, often made errors in their works. Recent sober reassessments have recognized Appian as a narrator of facts who used his sources critically. This is particularly notable in his important compilation of the Roman civil wars, for the faults of the account cannot detract from its position as the one continuous narrative of the history of the late Roman Republic.

Juan M. A. Strisino

See also Cassius Dio; Civil Conflict (Late Republic); Civil Wars (I) (49–45 BCE); Civil Wars (II) (44–31 BCE); Livy; Plutarch; Polybius; Sallust; Tacitus

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Appuleius Saturninus, Lucius (d. 100 BCE)

Lucius Appuleius Saturninus was twice a tribune of the plebs and leader of the *populares*, as a spiritual heir of the Gracchi and an opponent of the old aristocracy exemplified by the Caecilii Metelli and later Sulla. Appuleius Saturninus was killed in civil upheaval in Rome in 100 BCE.

Appuleius Saturninus rose in politics as a *popularis*, supporting policies that benefited the lower social strata at Rome and that opposed the wishes of the oligarchy. He was elected tribune for 101 BCE. He supported Marius and legislation to give land to Marius' veterans. Although Marius had ended the military crisis (the invasion of the Cimbri and Teutones) that required he hold four more consecutive consulships (104, 103, 102, and 101) after his consulship against Jugurtha, Marius chose to run for office again for the year 100. Appuleius Saturninus supported Marius' sixth bid for consul and himself ran for tribune a second time. Both of them won.

As tribune for the second time, Appuleius Saturninus proposed a bill to give land to Marius' veterans in north Italy and Africa, inspired by bills from the Gracchan era. In addition, he required that all senators must swear to uphold these laws within five days of their passage or be expelled from the Senate. Marius added a hedging clause that persuaded most senators to swear, but Quintus Caecilius Metellus Numidicus, formerly the patron but now an enemy of Marius, refused to swear and was forced into exile. This victory induced Appuleius Saturninus and his closest allies to abuse their power, alienating Marius.

Appuleius Saturninus decided to run for a third consecutive tribunate in 100 and was elected, even though it was not customary for tribunes of the plebs to hold multiple consecutive tribunates. When his allies killed the leading optimate candidate for the consulship, leaders in the Senate approached Marius with an offer of cooperation and future inclusion if he would break with Appuleius Saturninus. They then passed a *senatus consultum ultimum* to declare a state of emergency, and troops put many followers of Appuleius Saturninus to death. Although Appuleius Saturninus had sought refuge in the Capitol, he was induced to surrender with the

agreement that he would be spared execution. He and his surviving followers were imprisoned in the Senate House, where their opponents killed them by stoning them from the roof. As with his forerunners the Gracchi, Saturninus was thus murdered without a trial.

Gaius Stern

See also Caecilius Metellus Numidicus, Quintus; Factions; Marius; Tribune of the Plebs

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Aquae Sextiae and Vercellae, Battles of (102 and 101 BCE)

In the battles of Aquae Sextiae and Vercellae, Gaius Marius defeated the Germanic Cimbri and Teutones. Since 109 BCE, the Romans had suffered a series of military setbacks at the hands of wandering Germanic tribes, notably the devastating defeat in 105 at Arausio (near modern Orange) by the Cimbri and Teutones. Rome was alarmed, and feared an invasion of Italy so it broke with tradition and re-elected Marius, who had been victorious in the recent Jugurthine War, as consul for a second time. The dreaded offensive did not occur immediately. This gave Marius time to reorganize the Roman army into an efficient well-organized force. By 102, the tribes took the decision to invade Italy, but this time Rome was ready. Marius was re-elected again in 102 and 101 and given a commission to end the threat.

The Teutones, with the Ambrones, marched on Italy via the Mediterranean coast while the Cimbri and Tigurini, sought to cross the Alps from the northwest and northeast, respectively. This division proved fatal for the tribes. Marius' tactics were fundamental to the success of his heavily outnumbered Roman troops. His first mission was to engage the Teutones and Ambrones on his terms, and so he moved quickly to counter their advance by establishing a fortified base to control the Rhône valley. He

remained there thwarting the tribes by refusing to fight on their terms. This delay allowed Marius to choose the arena of battle: he selected Aquae Sextiae (mod. Aix-en-Provence), a wide flat and wooded river plain suited to the Romans. Marius occupied the high ground and dispatched a unit of 3,000 soldiers, under Claudius Marcellus, to hide in the wooded area so as to ambush the tribes on his instructions. They would be trapped with the river behind them. The impatient Ambrones tried to attack Marius on higher ground but were slaughtered losing around 30,000 men. When the Teutones attempted the next phase of the assault, Marius was able to employ Marcellus, destroying the remaining tribes. Inflated figures suggest 100,000 Germans were killed. The first phase of Marius' assignment was complete. He returned to Rome for a triumph, but postponed it because the Cimbri were pressing into Italy.

Marius' colleague for 102, Quintus Catulus, failed to hold off the advancing Cimbri. He left Rome to join Catulus whose command was extended to 101. Their joint forces, numbering around 53,000, were again heavily outnumbered forcing Marius to engineer the terms of engagement. He chose the plain at Vercellae (near Vercelli in northeast Italy). Once more, superior strategy and discipline enabled the Romans to block their enemy in a confined space, thus restricting use of their weaponry. Again, exaggerated numbers suggest between 120,000 and 140,000 tribesmen were slaughtered with 60,000 imprisoned. The consuls shared the honors, but Marius took the credit and was rewarded a sixth consulship in 100.

These two victories stemmed almost a decade of Germanic threats that had been troubling northern Italy and catapulted Marius to his greatest fame. Politically, the consequences were disastrous. Marius and his legate, Lucius Cornelius Sulla, would become rivals precipitating the first of several Civil Wars. And Marius ignored the Senate when granting Roman citizenship to his Italian allies. Future generals would again defy the Senate.

Juan M. A. Strisino

See also Civil Conflict (Late Republic); Civil Warfare; Germanic Wars; Germans; Jugurthine War; Marian-Sullan Conflict; Marius; Sulla, Lucius Cornelius

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Aquilonia, Battle of (293 BCE)

The battle of Aquilonia was the last significant battle in the Third Samnite War (Livy 10.38–43), following upon the greater battle of Sentinum (295). The Roman forces were led by Lucius Papirius Cursor (the son of the Lucius Papirius Cursor sub vid.) and Spurius Carvilius Maximus. They defeated the Samnite “Linen Legion” of warriors bound by an allegedly cannibalistic oath. The Samnites retreated to Bovianum; the Romans sacked the town of Aquilonia. The subsequent course of the Samnite War is obscured by the abrupt end of the surviving text of Livy, which resumes in the Punic Wars era. However, the Samnites never recovered from the battles of Sentinum and Aquilonia.

Sara E. Phang

See also Samnite Linen Legion; Samnite Wars; Samnium, Samnites; Sentinum, Battle of

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Ara Pacis

A Roman monumental altar called the *Ara Pacis Augustae* (Altar of Augustan Peace), which commemorated the end of the late Republic’s civil wars and the prosperity of the Roman Empire under the first emperor, Augustus (27 BCE–14 CE). This altar embodied Augustus’ promise that he

would bring peace and stability to Rome after decades of war. The Roman Senate voted for the altar on July 4, 13 BCE and dedicated it on January 30, 9 BCE. The altar faced the Via Flaminia, along which Augustus returned from pacifying the western provinces. To the west, steps led into the Campus Martius in line with Augustus' monumental sundial. The pieces of the altar, found between 1568 and 1938, were reconstructed in a museum along the Tiber River, 450 meters from the altar's original location.

The altar, made of white Luna marble, rests on a podium (11.65 × 10.635 meters) and is surrounded by an enclosing wall with two doorways (3.60 meters wide). The reliefs within the enclosure depict a sacrifice motif. Outside of the enclosure, 1.55-meter tall carvings portray a procession including Augustus, his family, priests, and senators in togas. Next to the doorways, the reliefs represent King Numa (or Aeneas) and goddesses which may be Roma and Peace. These goddesses are symbols of Augustus' message of peace and prosperity, as well as the promise of a stable government based on ancient customs.

Amanda J. Coles

See also Augustus; Cult of the Emperor; Peace

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Arabia

Roman Arabia, roughly contiguous with modern Saudi Arabia, was divided into Arabia Deserta, the arid areas of the north Saudi Arabian peninsula, and Arabia Felix, the southern end of the peninsula, termed "Felix" for its prosperity as a producer of incense and spices and as an entrepôt for the Red Sea trade with India. The Romans did not incorporate Arabia, which originally lay beyond the empire's eastern frontier, as a province before the reign of Trajan (98–117). The kingdom of the Nabataeans, a pre-Islamic Arab people, was used as a buffer and Roman client. Trajan's eastern conquests allowed the annexation of the Nabataean kingdom and the

creation of a Roman province termed Arabia. Its main cities were Bostra, garrisoned by a legion, and Petra, the ancient capital of the Nabataeans. Controlling the overland routes to Arabia Felix became less necessary due to the development of the Red Sea ocean route to India.

Sara E. Phang



View of the Ara Pacis Augustae (Altar of Augustan Peace). Erected by the emperor Augustus (27 BCE–14 CE), the Ara Pacis was dedicated in 9 BCE. The Ara Pacis glorifies the reign of Augustus as bringing a triumphant end to civil war. Located in Rome, Italy. (Gabriele Croppi/Grand Tour/Corbis)

See also Client Monarchs; Frontiers; Persian Wars, Arsacid; Trajan

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Arausio, Battle of. See Aquae Sextiae and Vercellae, Battles of; Marius

Arbitration

Also known as “third-party, binding arbitration,” this was a formal, legal process whereby two (or two groups of) quarreling states submitted their disputes to a third, usually neutral state for a decision, which would then be binding on the parties to the dispute. Conceptually related to arbitration is mediation, an informal, cooperative process whereby a neutral or allied state offered to broker talks between hostile or warring states to resolve a dispute peacefully. In mediations, the disputants did not bind themselves to agree to the outcome.

Examples of binding arbitration occur in mythology, and the practice became a fixture of interstate relations in Classical Greece. After Macedonian hegemony over Greece was established, individual city-states continued to arbitrate between other city-states (e.g., Cos in a boundary dispute between Klazomenai and Teos, ca. 302 BCE: *SEG* XXVIII.697), but under Philip II, Alexander the Great, and the Hellenistic successor kings, the Greeks increasingly turned to powerful kings for arbitration (as when Lysimachus decided in favor of Samos in a border dispute with Priene: *OGIS* 13 = Welles, *RC*, no. 7). The Greeks also used nonbinding, informal mediations to resolve disputes.

The Romans, in contrast to the Greeks, seemed to have been very reluctant to submit their disputes with others to binding, third-party arbitration and often displayed an aversion to nonbinding mediations as well. The offer of Rhodes to mediate Rome’s dispute with Perseus, king of Macedon, in 168 BCE is perhaps the most famous example of this, but is also exceptional in terms of the hostility with which the Romans treated the Rhodian offer (even though the mediation had been suggested by a Roman commander in the first place). The problem was not the offer itself, but the timing: the Rhodians made their offer in the Roman Senate immediately after news of Perseus’ decisive defeat at Pydna had been announced in Rome, which made the Rhodian offer appear in retrospect to benefit Perseus more than Rome.

Despite the fact that according to the Roman principle of *iustum bellum*, “the just war,” whereby the gods had already judged that Rome was in the right in undertaking wars, the Romans seem not to have been averse *in principle* to offers by other states to mediate these wars once they were underway. “Mediation,” in this context, however, approximated the modern

diplomatic practices of “good offices” or “conciliation.” In modern diplomacy, mediation usually involves a third party who actively participates in discussions and regards (and treats) the disputants as equals, while “good offices” or “conciliation” refers to the actions of a third party who encourages disputants to come together and talk, but does not actually take part in discussions or prod them into settling their dispute. Ancient “mediation” often consisted merely of “(apologetic) deprecation,” when a third party begged one of the disputants to lay aside his anger and make peace for the sake of all concerned (including the mediator, whose livelihood may suffer from the effects of war). Because they regarded themselves as always being in the right (and believed that the gods had already decided the matter in their favor), the Romans were constitutionally averse to being regarded by mediators as their opponents’ equals, and they were less likely to agree to compromise solutions, as usually happens in modern mediations.

Besides the Rhodian case, there are many examples of the Romans trying to upset mediations that they perceived were contrary to their own best interests. In 207 BCE, for example, Ptolemy IV tried to mediate a “comprehensive peace” between the Roman-Aetolian alliance on the one hand, and Philip V of Macedon and his allies on the other, but the Roman commander, Publius Sulpicius Galba, sabotaged the talks by declaring that he was not authorized to commit Rome to a peace settlement (Appian, *Macedonian Wars* 3). By contrast, there are several good examples of the Romans willingly engaging in a mediation process (mediation being understood, as always, as the equivalent of modern “good offices,” “conciliation,” or “[apologetic] deprecation”). In 212 BCE, the Roman commander Marcus Claudius Marcellus accepted an offer by various Sicilian *amici* of Rome to mediate between Syracuse and Rome. In addition to the Ptolemaic mediation of 207, mentioned earlier, there were many more attempts to mediate an end to the First Macedonian War between 209 and 207 when Rome participated in (or at least tolerated) mediation attempts between the Rome-Aetolia alliance and Philip V. In 205, the Epirotes brokered the peace talks between Macedon and Rome, which resulted in the Peace of Phoenice, ending Rome’s first war against Philip V. The Epirotes also successfully brought the Romans and Philip V to the table at the Aous conference of 198.

The Achaeans and Aetolians intervened in 195 between the Romans and

Boeotians. Heraclea Pontica intervened in 190 between Rome and Antiochus III, which resulted in the Romans delaying their campaign against the king by several months, and Roman *amicitia* with the mediator. Between 190 and 189, both Athens and Rhodes tried to “deprecate the anger” of the Romans against the Aetolians. In 188, Rome’s mythical kinsmen, the Trojan Ilians, attempted to “deprecate the anger” of the Romans against Lycia.

Paul J. Burton

See also Alliances; *Amicitia*; Diplomacy. *Greek Section*: Alexander III (the Great) of Macedon; Philip V

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[Arbogast \(d. ca. 394 CE\)](#)

Frankish supreme commander of the western Roman army (ca. 389–394),

Arbogast is first attested, together with his compatriot and possible relative Bauto, as *magister militum* of the western emperor Gratian (375–383). Both generals were sent to Macedonia in 380 to assist the eastern emperor Theodosius I against the Goths. Bauto was Valentinian II's dominant *magister militum* after the murder of Gratian by Magnus Maximus in 383. When Bauto died, somewhere after 385, Valentinian II's army nominated Arbogast as their supreme commander. During Magnus Maximus' invasion of Italy, Valentinian and his court fled to Thessalonica where they requested aid from Theodosius. Arbogast was one of the senior commanders who assisted the eastern Roman campaign to crush Maximus.

After defeating Maximus in 388, Arbogast was instructed to eliminate further resistance in Gaul, including Maximus' young son Victor at Trier. While Theodosius took on the government of Italy and the rest of the empire, Valentinian II was sent to Gaul where Arbogast was instructed to supervise the young emperor. Arbogast's barbarian background did not affect his loyalty to the empire: in 390, he launched a punitive campaign over the Rhine to pacify those Frankish tribes who had used Maximus' civil war in Italy as an opportunity to pillage the Rhineland. Arbogast's campaign was the last Roman military operation on the German side of the Rhine frontier, before its collapse in 407.

Meanwhile, Arbogast confined Valentinian to Vienne under virtual house arrest, while taking over governmental affairs in Gaul and appointing key officials. After Theodosius' departure to Constantinople in 391, tension between the young emperor and his generalissimo came to a climax. Arbogast allegedly killed one of Valentinian's counselors in the latter's presence, while the emperor tried to cashier him afterward. Arbogast simply ignored his dismissal, pointing out that he did not owe his appointment to Valentinian—a reference to either the army or Theodosius being Arbogast's real patrons. In May 392, Valentinian II was found dead, apparently by hanging, in the palace. Most likely, Valentinian had committed suicide, though later eastern sources accused Arbogast of having murdered him.

After waiting months for instructions from Theodosius, Arbogast saw no other alternative than elevating an emperor of his own choice, Eugenius, a professor of rhetoric. Both Arbogast and Eugenius tried appeasing Theodosius, who instead proclaimed his son Honorius as western emperor and declared war in 394. Later historians accused the pagan Arbogast of preparing aggressive anti-Christian policies. However, Eugenius was a

Christian and the conflict between Arbogast, and Theodosius was inherently secular. Officials of diverse religions worked in both governments. Arbogast successfully led the western Roman army during the first day of battle at the Frigidus, but Theodosius ultimately prevailed on the second. Afterward, Arbogast fled into the mountains nearby, wandering around for days until he threw himself upon his sword. Arbogast's career highlights the evolution of power relations in the western Roman Empire, where the emperor's authority became increasingly marginalized and dominant generals took over government.

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See also Assassination; Eugenius; Frigidus, Battle of; Gratian; Magnus Maximus; Suicide; Theodosius I; Valentinian II

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Arcadius (Emperor) (395–408 CE)

Arcadius (eastern Roman emperor 395–408), the son of Theodosius I, was born in 377/378. He was proclaimed co-Augustus in 383 and served as regent of the eastern empire while his father was campaigning in Italy. After the death of his father in 395, he and Honorius became joint rulers of the empire. Arcadius was married to Aelia Eudoxia, the daughter of Flavius Bauto, a Romanized Frank and one of Theodosius' generals.

Arcadius was a notoriously weak ruler, falling under the influence of several successive regents. The first was Rufinus, the praetorian prefect, who was assassinated in 395. He was killed by Gothic troops; this may have been at the behest of Stilicho. Then the eunuch Eutropius rose to power, having gained the favor of Arcadius. Eutropius was deposed by the Gothic general and *magister militum* Gainas, who used a revolt by the Ostrogoth Tribigild in Phrygia to discredit Eutropius. Gainas colluded with Tribigild, deliberately allowing the revolt to grow. Tribigild demanded the resignation

of Eutropius as a condition of peace. Eutropius had lost the favor of the empress Eudoxia and he rather unwisely nominated himself for consul in the year 399. These factors, combined with senatorial resentment of Eutropius, were enough to lead to Eutropius' dismissal and banishment.

In 399, Gainas joined his Gothic troops with the rebels and marched on Constantinople. Arcadius surrendered and Gainas ruled the capital for six months. Gainas was not particularly adept at ruling Constantinople; he was also an Arian and a Goth, which led to friction with the orthodox Roman population of Constantinople. While Gainas was away from the city, a popular revolt broke out. He began to withdraw his troops, but a fifth of them were trapped and slaughtered. He attempted to attack Constantinople again in 400, but was defeated by his successor the Gothic *magister militum* Fravitta. Gainas fled across the Danube and was killed by the Huns. The Praetorian Prefect Anthemius entered into this power vacuum, influencing Arcadius until the emperor died in 408.

Following what occurred with Gainas, there seems to have been a brief period of antibarbarian popular feeling, which manifested itself in an aversion to barbarian generals. Fravitta, though he had defeated Gainas, was deposed and executed soon after. Drastic conscription of Roman citizens was undertaken to create a more Roman army. This policy lasted into the early years of the reign of Theodosius II.

Arcadius seems to have been more tolerant of paganism than most other later Roman emperors. He refused to order the destruction of the pagan temple in Gaza, despite pressure from the Church and his wife. Arcadius spent most of his life in Constantinople and the presence of the imperial court in Constantinople led to a rise in prominence for the local bishop. John Chrysostom, the famous Antiochene orator, was appointed bishop of Constantinople in 397, lending an increased dignity to the office. John proved impolitic for the job, feuding with the Alexandrian bishop and the Empress Eudoxia and he was exiled in 405.

Nathan Schumer

See also Goths; Honorius; Huns; Theodosius I; Theodosius II

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Arch of Constantine

The Arch of Constantine is a marble triple triumphal arch erected in 315 CE to celebrate the *decennalia* (10th anniversary) of Constantine the Great (306–337). Around 21 meters tall and 26 meters wide, the arch stands in the monumental heart of Rome, next to the Colosseum and near the entrances to the Palatine and the Via Sacra, leading into the Forum.

The arch's plan echoes that of the Arch of Septimius Severus, and the decorative scheme involves elaborate use of *spolia*, pieces of older monuments reused alongside new sculpture. These are taken from monuments erected by Trajan (98–117), Hadrian (117–138), and Marcus Aurelius (161–180), three well-loved emperors; the emperors' heads have been recarved as portraits of Constantine, and in two cases as (probably) his father Constantius I.

A series of long friezes around the Arch narrates Constantine's 312 Italian campaign against Maxentius. The style of the frieze is late antique, with squat figures and unusual proportions intended to convey symbolic or ideological messages, rather than the more realistic classical style seen in the *spolia*. The narrative begins on the western side with Constantine's departure from Milan, continues along the south face with the siege at Verona and battle of the Milvian Bridge, an entry into Rome on the east face, and finally scenes of public address and largesse on the north, facing the Via Appia. Such triumphalist celebration of civil war is startling. The long inscription, repeated on the long north and south faces, hails Constantine as "liberator of the City" and "founder of peace," as do two short inscriptions inside the main arch, paired with Trajanic battle scenes.

Eight columns, topped with freestanding sculptures of Dacians, originally from a monument to Trajan, flank the archways. The bases of the

columns depict figures of Victory and captive prisoners. The *spolia* are set above the main frieze on two levels: rectangular panels from the period of Trajan or Marcus Aurelius, above circular Hadrianic panels. Charging Trajanic cavalry appear on the west and east faces, while the north and south show mid-second century CE scenes of imperial virtues. These connect with the events shown on the narrative frieze. Along the south side, martial actions are celebrated: presenting a barbarian king, granting *clementia* to prisoners, addressing the troops, and the ritual purification of the army. On the north, civil virtues appear: ceremonial arrival and departure, liberality, and the dispensing of justice. The eight circular panels show alternating scenes of hunting (south: riding and a bear; north: boar and lion) and sacrifices (to Silvanus, Diana, Apollo, and Hercules). On the west and east faces, newly made round panels show Luna descending into the sea, and Sol rising in his chariot.

The Arch of Constantine is a complex piece of propaganda. The clear message concerns Constantine as victorious liberator of Rome from the “tyrant” Maxentius, while the use of *spolia* deliberately connects Constantine to the great emperors of the past and their virtues, both civilian and military, suggesting a return to a golden age. The celebration of a victory in civil war is unusual, but at this date Constantine had no major victories over barbarians to depict, as would be more usual in triumphal art. No Christian imagery appears, though the inscription refers with studied ambiguity only to the “inspiration of the divinity” (*instinctu divinitatis*). It also declares the monument was dedicated by the Senate and People to the emperor. The propaganda is most likely Constantine’s own devising, but may contain a message from the Senate about admirable models.

Christopher Malone

See also Arch of Septimius Severus; Arch of Titus; Civil Warfare; Column of Trajan; Constantine I; Emperor as Commander; Great Trajanic Frieze; Maxentius; Triumph

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Arch of Septimius Severus (Rome)

The Arch of Septimius Severus was dedicated in 203 CE at the northwest end of the Roman forum to mark the tenth anniversary of the emperor’s ascension to the throne and to commemorate his and his sons’ two victories over the Persians. Severus chose this location for his arch because he had dreamt that the former emperor, Pertinax, here fell from his horse, after which Severus mounted the animal. The arch is much larger than the Arch of Titus, standing 75 feet high and 80 feet wide. It has several vaulted interior chambers, a staircase, and three archways. Originally a large statue of Severus and his two sons in a six-horsed chariot graced the roof of the arch. Like the Arch of Titus it was built of Pentelic marble, but unlike Titus’ arch it was built upon a platform and was not meant to function with a road running through it. Covered on both sides with reliefs of the Persian wars, the use of art on the arch to display warfare differs from the styles used on the columns of Trajan and Marcus Aurelius and moves further away from classicism. The Arch of Severus is a unique, masterfully crafted structure that denotes the authority of Rome over its enemies and the influence of Severus’ new dynasty.

Originally the bronze inscription on the arch praised the accomplishments of Severus and his sons, Caracalla and Geta. However, when Severus died in 211 CE, his eldest son Caracalla had Geta murdered and inflicted *damnatio memoriae* upon him, destroying all inscriptions and images of Geta. The fourth line of the inscription on the arch concerning Geta was replaced.

Situated in a central position to the five forums of Rome and directly below the Capitoline Hill, the Arch of Severus is a commanding structure that overshadows the Arch of Titus with its craftsmanship and grandeur. Although Severus’ arch lacks the religious impact enjoyed by that of Titus, it does however commemorate the virtual destruction of Rome’s most powerful enemy and displays Rome’s most successful eastern campaign.

Severus conducted two successful wars against Persia (195 and 197-198 CE). The second of which ended in the reconquest of much of the lands that had been lost since the invasion of Trajan 80 some years before. Severus' forces sacked the Persian capitol of Ctesiphon and reestablished Rome's Mesopotamian provinces. His invasions proved highly successful and helped lead to the fall of the Arsacid Persian Empire. The reliefs on the arch illustrate in a continuous narrative Severus' campaigns against the Persians. Additionally, there are well-preserved reliefs on the bases of the arch of Roman soldiers and Persian prisoners. Severus' arch is distinctive in its art and architecture and is a structure of great importance for its reliable display of the Roman military and the events of Severus' Persian wars.

Nikolaus Leo Overtoom

See also *Damnatio Memoriae*; Persian Wars, Arsacid; Septimius Severus; Triumph; Victory

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Arch of Titus

The Arch of Titus is an honorific arch that was built to memorialize Titus' military victory in the Jewish War of 66–70 CE by his brother, the emperor Domitian, in 82 CE. The arch is situated to the southeast of the Roman Forum, on the Via Sacra, near the Colosseum. There was also another arch built in 71 CE in the Circus Maximus, which honored Titus' victory; the surviving Arch of Titus has proved both more memorable and durable. The Arch of Titus served as an icon of Flavian power. The Flavians came to power in the War of Four Emperors in 69 CE, during which Vespasian was



Scene from the Arch of Titus. The Jewish War (66–70 CE) ended with the fall of Jerusalem, plundered by the Romans. Shown in this scene, the menorah and other treasures of the Jewish Temple were carried in the triumphal procession of Vespasian and Titus. Arch of Titus, Rome, Italy. (Luke Jones)

See also Domitian; Jewish War; Titus; Triumph; Vespasian; War of Four Emperors

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Armenia

Ancient Armenia was located east of Cappadocia, north of Syria and Mesopotamia, and west of Media Atropatene, part of the Persian Empire. In the Hellenistic period, Armenia was claimed by the Seleucids, who established two satrapies, Greater and Lesser Armenia. Following the Seleucid king Antiochus III's defeat by the Romans at the Battle of Magnesia (190 BCE), the satrapies revolted and established independent

kingdoms. The Romans dealt with these kings as client monarchs.

The most notable king of Armenia, Tigranes II (ca. 95–56 BCE), allied with Mithridates VI of Pontus in the latter's revolt against Roman hegemony. Sulla's war against Mithridates broke their alliance, but Tigranes began a campaign of expansion, claiming Syria, Phoenicia, and Cilicia in 83 BCE and the title "King of Kings." Lucius Licinius Lucullus waged a successful war against Tigranes, capturing his capital Tigranocerta. After Pompey's final victory over Mithridates VI, Tigranes surrendered to Pompey and was restricted to Armenia and to the role of Roman client.

In the Principate, the early emperors continued to employ Armenian client monarchs as a buffer against the Arsacid Persian Empire. In the reign of Nero, Roman policy toward Armenia became more aggressive. Gnaeus Domitius Corbulo captured Armenia and installed Tigranes V as king of Armenia. After the Persians invaded and ejected Tigranes, Corbulo (initially recalled) was reinstated and negotiated a settlement with Persia in which a Persian candidate, Tiridates, was installed as king of Armenia. Tiridates traveled to Rome to be formally crowned by Nero.

Armenia continued to be a pawn in the Roman-Persian conflict. Trajan (98–117) invaded Armenia and used it as a bridgehead to a major campaign against the Persians. In the mid-third century, the accession of the more aggressive Sassanid dynasty intensified the conflict.

Sara E. Phang

See also Persia, Arsacid; Persian Wars, Arsacid

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Arminius (d. 21 CE)

Arminius was a German tribal chief who led indigenous resistance to the Roman conquest of Germany, first by masterminding the ambush of three Roman legions at Teutoburger Wald in 9 CE and subsequently resisting Roman efforts to reconquer the lost province in 15–16 CE.

Arminius was the son of Sigimer, chieftain of the Cherusci. Arminius

and his brother Flavus enlisted in the Roman army as noncitizen auxiliaries and received both promotions and citizenship as a reward for their services. In 6 CE, Tiberius recommended Publius Quinctilius Varus for the command of the *provincia* of Germania. Arminius joined Varus' staff and served under him in 7–9 CE, but plotted against him in 9 CE, leading to the battle of Teutoburger Wald (the Varian disaster). Arminius died in 21 CE.

In this period, the traditional military assignments (*provinciae*) were becoming regularized as provinces, which Roman proconsuls and legates were expected to govern. As governor, Varus introduced urban, Roman institutions, such as a forum-style market, law courts, roads, and taxation. According to the Roman historian Tacitus, Arminius began to fear that Roman culture would erode and overwhelm the Germanic identity. He plotted to drive out the Romans, rallying his countrymen against Roman taxes.

Another prominent chief, Segestes, detected Arminius' conspiracy and informed Varus, but Varus refused to believe Segestes, so complete was his trust in Arminius. In September 9 CE, Varus marched his three legions from Vetera (Xanten) toward his winter headquarters, Moguntiacum (Mainz), when word reached him that a rebellion had arisen deep in the interior of Germany. The uprising occurred according to Arminius' plan. Arminius offered to raise additional forces for Varus and was dispatched. Instead, he raised forces to attack Varus, once the Romans were deep in the forests of Westphalia at Teutoburger Wald. The death blow was struck at the site of modern Kalkriese. Seeing no escape, Varus and many others committed suicide. Of those who surrendered, Arminius sacrificed some to native gods in a gesture of piety and/or psychological warfare, the rest were enslaved.

Arminius and his followers, distracted by the opportunity to plunder the Romans, failed to follow up their victory. By the time Arminius reached the Rhine, Varus' nephew, Lucius Nonius Asprenas, had destroyed the bridges, thus preventing a German invasion of Gaul and Italy. As it was, Arminius freed the Germans from Roman rule.

For the next few years, Arminius stood among the foremost German leaders. Meanwhile, Tiberius secured the Rhine frontier, only infrequently crossing the Rhine on short raids. Tiberius regarded the province as lost. Tiberius' general and nephew, Germanicus made every effort to reconquer Germany. Tacitus, *Annals* 2.9–10 records a conference between Arminius and Flavus on the banks of the Weser in which the brothers called each

other a traitor and nearly came to blows over their diverse allegiances. Although Germanicus defeated Arminius at the battle of Idistaviso in 16 CE, he was unable to break the Germans. Germanicus took Arminius' pregnant wife captive and brought her to Rome; their son was born in captivity.

Having survived the Roman challenge, Arminius also fought and defeated King Maroboduus of Bohemia, but he did not live long to enjoy it. The very decentralization of power he rebelled to maintain also kept him from becoming king of all the Germans. He was slain by a conspiracy from among his own family. Tacitus, *Annals* 2.88 rightly proclaims him the liberator of Germany. In future, Arminius and Flavus were not the only auxiliary veterans to lead native revolts.

Early modern and modern German nationalists have regarded Arminius as a proto-nationalist leader and hero, building on the ancient accounts.

Gaius Stern

See also Auxilia; Germanic Wars; Germanicus; Human Sacrifice; *Provincia*; Revolt; Tiberius (Emperor); Varian Disaster; Varus, Publius Quinctilius

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Arms and Armor

Arms and armor, the personal weapons and protective equipment of Roman

soldiers, included the cuirass (*lorica*) or body armor, helmet, shield, sword (*gladius* or *spatha*), sword belt, javelin (*pilum*) or spear, and optional greaves. The expense of metal armor, which had to be made by hand, constrained military recruitment before the late Republic. In the late Republic and Principate, the supply of armor became partly public. Types of Roman armor were closely related to changes in tactics. However, partly private supply and recycling meant that the armor worn by any particular military division or unit was not standardized, in contrast with modern concepts of military supply and uniform. Hence one-to-one inferences from armor about tactics are difficult to conclude.

In the early Republic, heavy-armed infantry were equipped like Greek hoplites and recruited from a propertied stratum, according to the Servian constitution, that could afford such armor. The manipular army of the middle Republic (third and early second centuries BCE) is described by Polybius (6.21.7–23.16). Manipular legionaries were equipped with a large curved shield or *scutum* (wood with iron reinforcements), *lorica* (cuirass), *galea* (helmet), *gladius* (short sword), and *pila* (sg. *pilum*, javelin). In this period, the *lorica* was made from ring mail (*lorica hamata*). The *hastati*, *principes*, and *triarii* were outfitted similarly and were all recruited from the *assidui* or small farmers who met a minimum property requirement. These families probably handed down arms and armor among the male descendants who were liable for service. In contrast, the *velites* or light-armed troops were recruited from a poorer social stratum and were less well equipped. According to Polybius, *velites* bore a round shield, a helmet or cap, and *pila*. Instead of full body armor they wore a chest protector, a metal plate worn above the heart. However, this chest protector seems to have been popular among early Italian warriors and not necessarily correlated with low status. Notably, the Romans acknowledged that their equipment was inspired by many other cultures: the typical helmet of the late Republic and early empire was Celtic; the *gladius* was originally Spanish.

When the cohort system of legionary organization and tactics was introduced, beginning in the early second century BCE, and consolidated by Marius, the *velites* were eliminated; all infantry fighters constituted heavily armed troops. The change to cohort tactics did not require extensive changes in the arms and armor of heavy infantry. The relatively short *gladius* or Spanish sword was designed for thrusting, and the *scutum* covered most of the body, implying that legionaries in this period used close-order tactics.

The expense of arms and armor contributed to the crisis in recruitment in the late second century BCE. Poor recruits from landless families could not afford arms and armor. Gaius Gracchus proposed a law that the Roman state should equip its soldiers. In practice, the warlords of the late Republic, among them Pompey and Crassus, equipped their legions themselves. Crassus, allegedly the richest man in Rome in the mid-first century BCE, boasted that no man could call himself rich who could not equip an army at his own expense (Plutarch, *Crassus* 2.7). According to Suetonius, Julius Caesar provided his men with ornate armor chased with gold and silver, so that they would fight harder out of fear of losing them (Suetonius, *Iulius* 67).

As the latter anecdote shows, Roman armor was a form of military display as well as protection. Uniform as such (military clothing that displays unit identity and pride) did not exist; to some degree, armor played this role. In the late Republic and early empire, Roman officers (of tribune rank and above) were able to afford the most ornate armor, including the heroic “muscle” cuirass, a Hellenistic import often adorned with relief ornament. However, even plainly equipped soldiers were expected to keep their arms sharp and their armor bright and in good condition; as the military treatise writer Vegetius says, “the splendor of arms terrifies the enemy” (Vegetius, *Military Affairs* 2.14).

Arms and armor were closely associated with *virtus* (courage) and with military discipline. Losing or throwing away arms and armor were at all times severely punished. Marcus Porcius Cato, the son of Cato the Censor, lost hold of his sword in the battle of Pydna (168 BCE); he returned to the mêlée to retrieve his sword rather than face the disgrace of losing it (Plutarch, *Cato Maior* 20.7–8). Bearing the weight of armor and shield (depending on type, a cuirass could weigh between 10 and 20 kg) displayed a soldier’s physical fitness, endurance, and morale. Roman anecdotes of poor discipline routinely accuse personnel of not wearing their armor or letting it deteriorate (Tacitus, *Annals* 13.35; Fronto *To the Emperor Verus* 2.1.19; Vegetius 1.20). A mid-first century CE commander, Gnaeus Domitius Corbulo, executed soldiers for not wearing their armor or weapons in the field (Tacitus, *Annals* 11.18). In the early third-century CE sources on military law, a soldier who fails to wear or loses his sword or armor in the field earns severe punishment (Digest 49.16.3.13, 14.1).

However, in noncombat conditions soldiers often did not wear body

armor but were distinguished by the military belt (*cingulum*), supporting a sword and dagger. The belt originally helped to support the weight of the *lorica hamata*, but became so essential a feature of the soldier's costume that *discingere*, to remove the belt, meant "to quit/be expelled from the service." Soldiers' tombstones frequently depicted unarmored soldiers wearing the military belt. The other item of clothing closely associated with soldiers was *caligae*, boots with distinctive hobnails on the soles.

Roman armor underwent shifts in design. In the late first century BCE, the more famous *lorica segmentata*, the laminated or strip cuirass, was introduced, made from strips of iron that overlapped and curved to fit the body and that were articulated upon leather straps. It is most famous from Trajan's Column, commemorating the Dacian Wars in the early second century CE. However, ring mail and a third type of body armor, the *lorica squamata*, made from overlapping metal scales like fish scales, coexisted with the *lorica segmentata*. Scale armor became more popular in the third century CE and later. Cavalry armor included elaborate display armor, worn in formal riding exercises (the *hippika gymnasia* of Arrian's *Tactica*), including ornate metal masks that covered the entire face.



Bronze statuette of a Roman soldier. The *lorica segmentata* or metal strip cuirass, commonly used in the early Empire, is shown here in stylized form. Located in Greek and Roman Antiquities, British Museum, London, United Kingdom. (The Trustees of the British Museum/Art Resource, NY)

Shifts in types of arms and armor may have reflected changes in tactics, from an emphasis on infantry to one on cavalry. A shift in the type of sword occurred in the third century CE, from the shorter *gladius* to the longer *spatha* associated most with cavalry but also used by infantry. In this period as well, round shields became more prevalent, as more appropriate to cavalry than the infantry *scutum*. In the fourth century and later, an extreme form of cavalry armor, arising in competition with the Persians, extensively armored the horse as well as the rider; these riders were known as *cataphractarii*. The advantage of cataphracts was as shock troops; the weight of this armor soon exhausted both horse and rider.

There is debate over whether different branches of the service wore different types of armor, as one might expect in a modern army. It was long asserted, based on Trajan's Column, that legionaries wore the *lorica segmentata* and auxiliaries wore mail shirts. On the Column, the differing body armor is intended to differentiate the groups and thus make the scenes more legible. It may not reflect actual practice. Other art and archaeological finds show that legionaries also wore mail shirts, seen for instance on the *Tropaeum Traiani* at Adamklissi, and scale armor. To standardize armor for a division or unit may have been too expensive (see below). Branch and unit differentiation may have employed less costly details such as helmet badges and painted insignia on shields, details that were likely to be painted on stone monuments and thus do not survive in art.

Furthermore, within a unit, individual soldiers' armor probably did not present a uniform appearance. We have seen that legionaries might wear the *lorica segmentata*, ring mail shirts, or scale armor. Legions had armorers and *fabricae* (workshops), producing armor and equipment, but the constraints of ancient production probably made it prohibitively expensive to equip a unit with all-new, uniform armor, except at its formation. The Praetorian Guard and the *equites singulares*, elite divisions constantly on display in the city of Rome, may have presented a more uniform appearance (cf. Tacitus, *Histories* 1.38). In legionary and auxiliary units, some equipment was probably relatively old and others new; inscriptions on pieces of equipment suggest more than one owner. Armorers constantly repaired and recycled parts of equipment. Supply may also have been semi-privatized: some soldiers received equipment from the unit (deducted from their pay, as in Tacitus, *Annals* 1.17). Other personnel may have brought equipment from home or purchased it privately, adding their choice of

ornamentation (particularly to helmets, sword belts, and horse trappings) and employing regional styles. This lack of uniformity renders inferences about tactics difficult, except for the broad shift to cavalry weapons and armor discussed above.

The evidence for Roman arms and armor includes passages in Greek and Roman authors (such as those cited above); Roman triumphal art and funerary monuments; and archaeological finds. Overall relatively little triumphal art and archaeological evidence survive from the early, middle, and late Republic. The political instability of the late Republic did not favor the production of permanent victory monuments, and bronze and iron equipment was probably melted down and reused. Early imperial sources of evidence are much richer, including above all, the Column of Trajan and the Column of Marcus Aurelius at Rome; other victory monuments at Rome and in the provinces, including the *Tropaeum Traiani* near Adamklissi, Romania; coins, despite their small scale; and individual soldiers' tombstones. Artistic sources present challenges of interpretation and lost detail. Like other ancient sculpture, Trajan's Column and the Column of Marcus were originally painted in bright colors, bringing out details that now are lost. Plain-looking jerkins with zigzag edges, worn by the auxiliaries on Trajan's Column, were probably mail shirts and possibly painted gray or covered in gesso (plaster) that enabled carving of ring detail. On the Column of Marcus, auxiliaries' mail shirts are represented with a pattern of drilled holes.

Metal equipment tended to be recycled, so that survivals of equipment are fortuitous. After a battle, armor would be recovered and reused or recycled if too damaged to use. Burial with arms and armor was considered a barbarian custom, not Roman. However, archaeologists have found chance remains of body armor. Since the *lorica segmentata's* plates were soft iron, they have often rusted away *in situ* and what survive are the copper-alloy buckles and other fittings for the straps. Small amounts of ring mail and scale armor have also been found.

Besides professional archaeology and art history, another mode of researching Roman arms and armor is reconstruction and reenactment. Mail shirts are relatively easy to make, though time-consuming (50,000 to 100,000 rings, depending on ring size, must be linked together by hand). The reconstruction of the *lorica segmentata* has been more challenging; its representation on Trajan's Column and other victory art was probably

stylized and in any case does not show how the internal straps were configured. Reconstruction shows that soldiers probably wore some form of padding under their armor to cushion against blows and prevent chafing. Reenactment furthermore tends to produce better-quality, newer equipment, and brighter clothing (thanks to modern dyes) than the average nonelite unit was likely to display at any one time. However, reenactment and live-action wargaming have answered questions that ancient authors took for granted and continue to draw popular attention and interest in the subject.

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See also Column of Trajan; Military Discipline; Recruitment of Army (Imperial); Recruitment of Army (Republic); Servian Constitution; Tactics; *Tropaeum Traiani*; *Velites*

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Army in Politics

By the late Republic, the Roman army had become a group differentiated from the civilian citizen body and with distinct and competing material interests. The late Republic's generals and political leaders exploited these material interests, a pattern that continued in the empire. In the imperial

period, the Praetorian Guard played the largest role in politics because of its proximity to Rome and the emperors.

Nonetheless, in sociological terms, the army did not resemble a modern political party, modern social and economic class, or ancient order (a group defined by formal status rather than by wealth). It was staffed by a cross-section of Roman society, from senators down to common men and even slaves (soldiers' servants). Except for the martial values and some religious cults, Roman soldiers do not seem to have had aspirations that were very different from "civilian" society.

Soldiers' support of aristocratic leaders (commanders and emperors) was conditioned by their respect for hierarchy. Under normal conditions, they felt a bond of loyalty that was reinforced by oaths and by religious rites presided over by the commander (consul in the traditional Republic) or emperor as commander-in-chief or his deputies.

Commanders and the emperor as commander-in-chief reinforced this bond of loyalty by conferring honors and rewards on their men. The payments to soldiers (pay, donatives, and *praemia militiae*) were seen as honors and rewards. However, soldiers withdrew their support from leaders whom they perceived as dishonoring them, through arrogant or immoral behavior, mistreatment of soldiers, or the withholding of material rewards. This is the most plausible explanation for the defections and mutinies in the late Republic and for military revolts against emperors and acclamation of new emperors in the imperial period. The emperor Galba (68–69 CE) refused to give a promised donative to the praetorians, saying, "I levy my soldiers, I don't buy them" (Tacitus, *Histories* 1.5). The praetorians defected from Galba, supporting the coup of Marcus Salvius Otho (emperor 69 CE). The historian Tacitus blames their mercenary nature, but also indicates that they felt that Galba's refusal had dishonored them; a token payment would have sufficed (Tacitus, *Histories* 1.18).

In imperial politics, soldiers seem to have favored dynastic continuity, the probable reason for the praetorians' support of Claudius I (41–54 CE) as emperor, though he followed his accession with a large donative to the praetorians. Claudius was a member of the Julio-Claudian imperial family, though an unlikely choice as emperor (he was disabled and had held no public or military offices). The soldiers also supported Marcus Aurelius' choice of his son Commodus (180–192 CE) and Septimius Severus' choice of his son Caracalla (211–217). Sources favorable to Constantine the Great

(306–337) depict the army as supporting his hereditary claim, as the son of Constantius I, one of the Tetrarchs, even though the Tetrarchic system was markedly nonhereditary. For similar reasons the army supported Valentinian I's choice of his brother Valens and his young son Gratian as co-emperors and subsequently elevated Valentinian's even younger son Valentinian II.

It is less certain whether Roman soldiers were persuaded to support or defect from leaders for general political reasons, for example, to support a political position. The armies of the late Republic seem to have been loyal to personalities, not to political programs. Many soldiers in the late Republic, especially after the Social War (91–87 BCE) enfranchised Italians, were recruited from outside Rome and probably knew little about the civic traditions and institutions of Rome. This trend increased as soldiers were recruited abroad. Though Brutus and Cassius presented themselves as defending the traditional Republic, their soldiers were recruited from Roman citizens and allies in the eastern Mediterranean who probably knew little or nothing about republican traditions. In the Principate, soldiers were increasingly recruited from the provinces and frontier regions. But Roman leaders probably could sway their armies with basic xenophobia, as Octavian did in his civil war against Antony and Cleopatra, depicting Cleopatra as an alien "Egyptian" (her dynasty was Macedonian Greek in origin).

Soldiers may have cared about the moral conduct of their leaders and emperors, especially related to masculinity (*virtus*, courage or manliness, was one of the martial virtues). Nero's public singing and acting on the stage and homosexual experimentation (he is alleged to have entered a same-sex marriage) alienated military officers and soldiers, as did the effeminate homosexual conduct of the teenage emperor Elagabalus. However, soldiers were probably not hostile to a leader's homosexual conduct *per se* as long as the leader demonstrated his *virtus* (manliness) and his fitness to command, as was the case with the emperors Trajan and Hadrian.

The most extensive apparent sources for "propaganda" directed at soldiers are the prebattle speeches in ancient authors, usually given by the commander of each side before battle. These, however, are almost always the rhetorical creations of the ancient historians, not verbatim records of what was said. They reflect the historians' views of what was important

rather than what might have actually persuaded the armies. However in a few instances in civil wars, we know that pamphlets were distributed to soldiers, assuming their basic literacy or that comrades would read to illiterate soldiers. Documentary sources also attest the emperors' addresses (*adlocutiones*) to the troops.

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See also *Adlocutio*; Civil Warfare; Donatives; Emperor as Commander; Loyalty (Republic); Military Oaths; Mutiny; Praetorians; Recruitment of Army (Imperial); Revolt; Usurpation

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Asia Minor

The region known to the Romans as Asia is termed today Asia Minor, approximating the modern nation of Turkey, bounded on the west by the Aegean Sea, to the south by the Mediterranean Sea, and to the north by the

Black Sea. Earlier, Asia Minor, including the Greek Ionian coast, was part of the Persian Empire. After Alexander the Great (336–323 BCE) conquered the Persian Empire and died prematurely, his empire was fought over by his generals, founders of the Hellenistic royal dynasties. Asia Minor was ruled by the Antigonid dynasty, then by the Seleucids until the Romans defeated the Seleucid king Antiochus III at the battle of Magnesia in 190 BCE.

The Romans allowed the Seleucids to retain only a small part of Asia Minor; its other kingdoms, notably Pergamum, became clients of Rome and eventually bequeathed their realms to Rome. Thus by the early first century BCE Rome controlled Asia Minor, financially exploiting it. The native king Mithridates VI of Pontus, a realm on the Black Sea, provoked a revolt in 88 BCE that allegedly killed 80,000 Romans and Italians, mostly traders and tax farmers. In revenge Sulla led a Roman army against Mithridates in 85/84, but it was Pompey who ultimately defeated Mithridates for good. The inhabitants of Asia Minor sided with Pompey in the civil war of Caesar and the Pompeians (49–45 BCE) and with Brutus, Cassius, and Antony in the triumviral wars that led to the triumph of Octavian as sole ruler of the Roman world.

To the Romans of the imperial period, “Asia” usually meant the largest Roman province in Asia Minor, rather than the entire western Asian continent. Other provinces in Asia Minor were Bithynia (added in 74 BCE and later merged with Pontus), Galatia, Cappadocia, Lycia and Pamphylia, and Cilicia. Asia Minor’s western (Ionian) coast boasted many wealthy, famous Greek cities, such as Ephesus, Sardis, Smyrna, Pergamum, Miletus, and Apamea. These cities retained local self-government. They sent representatives to the Council (koinon) of Asia, as did the various peoples of the mountainous, less developed interior. The Council was responsible for the provincial imperial cult; its chief priests, the Asiarchs, were highly prominent notables. However, the most powerful person in Asia Minor was the Roman proconsul of Asia, the governor. His seat was at Ephesus, but he traveled from city to city holding assizes. The proconsulship of Asia was one of the most prestigious public offices that an imperial Roman senator could hold.

Asia was a wealthy province and its cities had a high reputation for Greek culture, producing many Greek public intellectuals (rhetors and sophists). These elites considered the interior to be rustic. Christianity spread rapidly in Asia Minor, especially in the interior. In the third century

CE, Asia suffered from economic decline and from the raids of the Goths in the 250s and 260s. Asia Minor's provinces were subdivided and reorganized by Diocletian (284–305). In the fourth century, the imperial power shifted its interest to Constantinople (founded 324) and the route to the eastern frontier and the war with Persia, exacerbating the decline of the Greek cities, magnificent ruins of which still stand today.

In terms of civil-military relations, Asia Minor is one of the regions where conflict is attested in various surviving inscriptions. The conflicts arose because Asia Minor was the main route from the Danubian provinces to the eastern frontier. Troops frequently traveled through Asia Minor and requisitioned transport from civilians. Civilians could turn to still-strong civic institutions to petition the emperors to repress abusive requisitions.

Sara E. Phang

See also Civil-Military Relations; Cult of the Emperor; Mithridatic Wars; Pompey; Sulla, Lucius Cornelius

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Assassination

Assassinations in ancient Rome show a shift in motive from the republic, when assassinations and related violent deaths were politically motivated but did not result in coups, to the empire, when the assassination of emperors often played a role in usurpations or coups, transferring power to the next ruler. In the imperial period, the motive of coup is not always present; some early imperial assassinations had the motive of restoring the republic, and others were motivated by revenge. However, imperial assassinations as coups or usurpations dominate the historical record.

The earliest assassinations in Roman history date from the early Republic and thus are shadowy in detail, despite their dramatization and elaboration by Livy and Dionysius of Halicarnassus. The first king of Rome, Romulus, is said to have killed his brother Remus when the latter leaped

over the furrow he had ploughed to mark the walls of Rome (Livy 1.7). The story is given as a variant, and perhaps was elaborated when politically motivated violence became more common in the late Republic.

According to Livy 4.13, during a famine the Senate appointed the elderly Cincinnatus dictator for a second time in 432 BCE. A wealthy merchant named Spurius Maelius was believed to be distributing free grain to the people at his own expense to curry favor with the people and accelerate his rise as the champion of the people against the Senate in the Greek model of the demagogue or would-be *tyrannos*. To eliminate this threat, Cincinnatus ordered his *magister equitum* Servilius Ahala to assassinate Maelius. Servilius Ahala slew Maelius, and upon arrest he explained that he had followed the direct orders of the dictator, whose word was absolute. Ahala went down in legendary history as a tyrannicide, which was equal to a liberator in Roman psychology.

At the start of the first century BCE, the Italians clamored for full rights, which the Romans refused to grant. The one man who seemed capable of finding a solution was the tribune of the plebs Marcus Livius Drusus, but he was killed by an unknown assassin in 91 BCE. His assassination provoked the Italians to revolt against the Romans in the Social War (91–87 BCE), a *de facto* civil war on a far greater scale than the upheavals that accompanied the deaths of the Gracchi brothers. If Livius Drusus' assassin was an opponent of Italian rights, the result was the exact opposite of the assassin's goal and at the cost of tens of thousands of lives on both sides, for the Social War ended with the Romans granting full citizenship to those Italians who agreed to make peace.

A generation later, a real and an alleged assassination changed the course of history. A group of bankrupted aristocrats allegedly conspired to overthrow the government, led by Catiline (Lucius Sergius Catilina) and his ally, Gnaeus Calpurnius Piso (not the same Piso as the subject of the CAGR article, s.v.). Sensing the danger, the Senate sent Piso to govern Spain to separate him from Catiline and tempt him with the opportunity to plunder the province. However, Piso was so rapacious that the locals assassinated him, thereby weakening Catiline's faction by the loss of this influential figure. Cicero and less emphatically Sallust claim that Catiline, having failed to win election twice, tried to assassinate Cicero. When that failed, Catiline invited slaves to rebel and assembled an army to overthrow the state. It is uncertain whether Cicero's version is accurate, but a short civil war

followed (the Catilinarian War, 63–62 BCE) that ended with the destruction of Catiline's army and his death in battle.

Another provincial governor whose assassination changed history was Sextus Julius Caesar, cousin and protégé of Julius Caesar. Sextus was sent to govern Syria as part of his training, possibly to succeed to power. However, Sextus was assassinated by disgruntled ex-Pompeians in revenge for their defeat in the Caesarian-Pompeian civil war. His death forced Julius Caesar to turn to his three great-nephews as heirs, of whom he chose Gaius Octavius (Octavian, the future emperor Augustus) for adoption.

These assassinations are distinct from other forms of violent death in political conflicts, such as the deaths of the Gracchi brothers and of Lucius Appuleius Saturninus (Appian, *Civil Wars* 1.28–32). Tiberius Gracchus and his followers were beaten to death by angry senators in a riot (133 BCE). After the Senate's passage of the *senatus consultum ultimum* authorizing any necessary force, Gaius Gracchus and his followers were hunted down in a purge (121 BCE). As his capture was imminent, Gaius committed suicide by ordering his slave to kill him. Appuleius Saturninus and his followers, imprisoned in the Senate House by Marius, were killed by their enemies who climbed onto the roof and stoned them with the roof tiles (Appian, *Civil Wars* 1.32). No one person claimed these deaths as assassinations.

Of course, the most famous assassination in Roman history is that of Julius Caesar himself in 44 BCE. A conspiracy of 23–35 senators (as many as 60 in later sources) agreed to murder the dictator on the Ides of March (March 15) days before he was to depart Rome to invade the Persian Empire. The assassins had various motives, ranging from personal resentment (Cassius) to political freedom and restoring the republic (Brutus). In error, Brutus insisted that the assassins spare Mark Antony and assassinate only Caesar to send a message against tyranny. Brutus felt a keen duty to live up to his ancestors Ahala the tyrannicide and the original Lucius Junius Brutus, who had opposed King Tarquinius Superbus. Caesar's death eliminated the man, but not his followers; Mark Antony and Caesar's heir Octavian survived. Subsequently, the Second Triumvirate took revenge upon the assassins and killed most of them in the next two years (two survived until 30 BCE). The Republic never returned. Rome reverted to monarchy under good emperors and tyranny under the rest.

A large number of Roman emperors were murdered or otherwise died violently, distorting an attempt to estimate their longevity and natural

mortality (Scheidel 1999). Some of the early assassinations or alleged attempts were politically motivated attempts to restore the republic. Augustus himself survived numerous conspiracies and a few near assassination attempts to die at the old age of 76. Few emperors were so fortunate in their longevity. While campaigning in Germany in 10 CE, Tiberius also survived an assassination attempt (Suetonius, *Tiberius* 19), but no attempts are known during his principate. The assassination of Gaius (Caligula) is particularly significant because it is often regarded as the last gasp of the republic. The conspirators were largely motivated by personal hatred, but the Senate seized the opportunity to declare a restoration of the republic. Much to the discomfort of the Senate, the Praetorian Guard hailed Claudius emperor and forced the Senate to reverse course and acknowledge Claudius. As the nephew of Tiberius, brother of Germanicus, and uncle of Gaius, Claudius' dynastic claim was clear. There was never again a plausible attempt to restore the republic. Thereafter, whenever an emperor was assassinated, the goal was always replacement of the individual.

Most assassinations of emperors were coups or usurpations, seeking to replace one emperor with another. Victims of coups include Claudius (41–54), whose wife Agrippina and step-son Nero wanted him out of the way; Galba (69), supplanted by Otho; Domitian (81–96), supplanted by Nerva (96–98), and others. A palace conspiracy that probably included Marcus Cocceius Nerva, the main beneficiary of the plot, brought down Domitian. Very similarly a century later, Commodus was also assassinated in 192 by a palace conspiracy, to the benefit of Helvius Pertinax, the City Prefect and next emperor. It seems likely that the successor was at least aware of the plot, if not a participant.

The assassination of emperors often features revenge, the assassin being motivated by resentment or vengeance. This was the case in the assassination of Caligula by Cassius Chaerea, a praetorian officer whom Caligula had singled out for mockery. The individual praetorians who murdered Galba at Otho's instigation resented Galba's parsimony and his insult to them by failing to give a donative. Victims of assassinations motivated by revenge or resentment include Pertinax (193) by the praetorians, Alexander Severus (222–235) and Maximinus I Thrax (235–238) by their soldiers, and Aurelian (270–275) by his officers.

In some cases not enough is known to identify the type of murder. In the civil wars of the third century, the acclamation of an officer as emperor by

his army often meant that the incumbent would be assassinated, often by his own staff. Some other violent deaths of emperors were lynchings by the public, as with Vitellius, murdered by the Roman urban rabble (December 69), and Elagabalus (222). Lynchings or revenge killings often created confusion and inspired multiple claimants to the throne, seeking official recognition (especially in the case of the year 238, when Balbinus and Pupienus were also killed), unless an obvious successor could be found quickly or arrived on the scene to take control.

The long interlude between the assassinations of Domitian and Commodus owes to the peaceful transitions of power from Nerva (96–98) through Marcus Aurelius (161–180), but Rome would not again experience such stability or general peace. From the death of Commodus forwards, emperors succumbed to assassination (or murder) with increasing regularity, especially during the crisis of the third century (235–284), when almost every emperor was assassinated or murdered. Many of the third-century crisis emperors were usurpers who hoped to establish a dynasty, but instead were assassinated after only a short reign of under four years—frequently along with their family. Assassinations recurred as well in the fourth and fifth centuries, such as that of Constans by Magnentius (350), Gratian by Magnus Maximus (383), possibly Valentinian II by Arbogast (392), Valentinian III by Petronius Maximus (455), and a flurry of short-lived emperors thereafter. Notably, many of the assassinated fourth-century emperors were relatively young men who lost the support of their military officers.

Assassination and usurpation were responses to crisis, including frequent invasions, economic crisis, epidemics, and internal turmoil. Whereas the conspirators often saw an incapable emperor as the problem, it turned out that the instability created by frequent revolts and frequent assassinations were the problem that sent the empire into a downward spiral.

Gaius Stern

See also Caesar, Assassination of; Civil Warfare; Mutiny; Succession (Imperial); Third-Century CE Crisis; War of Four Emperors

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Associations

Voluntary associations, common in the Roman world, were also liable to government surveillance and repression as possible sources of civil unrest. The term *collegium* (plural *collegia*) sometimes also refers to the priestly colleges of *pontifices* and *augures*, which were limited to the aristocracy. In general, *collegia* were voluntary associations with a broad social range of membership. They might be professional or occupational, religious, or purely social.

Roman professional or occupational *collegia* are sometimes termed “guilds” but unlike medieval guilds or modern unions, they did not regulate the economic activities of a given profession or occupation. A typical *collegium* of tradespeople or craftsmen met, held formal meals, and voted for magistrates who presided over the *collegium*; the members donated money to a common fund for the food and drink and for funerary services for deceased members. Many Latin inscriptions attest these *collegia*, their members, and their by-laws. Religious *collegia* represented the worshippers of a particular god, and organized cult activities as well as meals and funerary services. Social *collegia* were usually local in nature, “neighborhood” organizations, in the city of Rome centered on the *vici* or “wards.” Religious and social *collegia* might overlap, as in the cult *collegia* termed *Compitales*, venerating the *Lares Compitales* or deities of street

corners in the city of Rome; these were also local neighborhood organizations.

Collegia came under suspicion either because they represented new cults that were suspect (see “Cults, Pagan”) or because political leaders exploited them to raise supporters. Clodius and other *popularis* leaders recruited supporters for mob-like activities from the *collegia* of the city of Rome (e.g., Cicero, *Pro Sestio* 34; Dio 38.13; Sallust, *Bellum Catilinae* 50.1). Due to the urban violence of this period (the 60s BCE), the Senate passed a decree banning any *collegia* known to be involved in seditious political activity (Asconius 7c on Cicero, *In Pisonem* 9, *Pro Sestio* 55). During his tribuneship Clodius overturned this decree. Caesar and Augustus also restricted new *collegia* (Cicero, *To His Brother Quintus* 2.3.5; Suetonius, *Iulius* 42, *Augustus* 32.1). Despite the instance of the Bacchanalia (see “Cults, Pagan”), associations with a religious purpose, especially for time-honored cults, were permitted to exist.

Augustus brought the *Compitales* or crossroads associations into the imperial cult; the *Lares Compitales* were renamed *Lares Augusti* and their priests became priests of the imperial cult, typically freedmen. The inscriptions of *collegia* made public and advertised the respectability of their membership and activities. Many religious *collegia* also honored holidays of the imperial cult, such as the birthdays of the emperor and members of the imperial family. Nonetheless, provincial governors were advised and required to investigate potentially seditious *collegia*, in particular secret ones, and shut them down (Digest 47.22). This policy forms a background to the Roman persecutions of the Christians.

Sara E. Phang

See also Augustus; Christianity in the Later Roman Army; Christians, Persecution of; Civil Conflict (Late Republic); Clodius Pulcher; Cult of the Emperor; Cults, Pagan

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Astrologers

The Roman authorities distrusted astrologers and other prophets of various types that were not affiliated with state religion and that they regarded as a threat to public order. Periodically, such persons were ejected from the city of Rome. For persons of high rank, consulting astrologers, prophets, or magicians might incur suspicion of sedition. Treason trials featuring magical “witch hunts” occurred most prominently in the later Empire, but also occurred in earlier periods.

The traditional state religion of Rome featured public divination, or *auspicium*: the attempt to foretell future events using religious/magical methods. The taking of auspices (the examination of a predetermined area of the sky for birds, lightning and other significant atmospheric events) was used to determine lucky and unlucky days for public business, such as holding the assembly or jury trials. Haruspicy, the inspection of the entrails of a ritually sacrificed animal, might be used to sanction major decisions and events. *Auspicium* was a prerogative of Roman higher magistrates (consuls and praetors). These rituals were regarded cynically by some of the late republican elite, men with extensive Greek educations, and were probably manipulated (unlucky auspices could bring political or judicial proceedings to a halt).

Private divination (by persons calling themselves astrologers, prophets, or magicians) was frowned upon. The astrologers were sometimes lumped together with Greek philosophers. Except for the philosophers, many of these persons were of markedly lower social status. They might be representatives of non-Roman, native religions, as with the Druids of Gaul and Britain. The danger was that prophecies would persuade the populace to support a revolt or usurpation; would-be rebels or usurpers might seek such prophecies. Accordingly, the Senate expelled astrologers from the city of Rome many times.

In the empire, elite consultation of astrologers or magicians to discover the succession was regarded with particular suspicion. This predates the alleged “decline of rationality” in the later Empire. In the early first century CE, the young Marcus Scribonius Libo Drusus was accused of treason for magical practices, tried by the Senate, and committed suicide. When Germanicus, the nephew and putative heir of the emperor Tiberius (14–37 CE), died in 19 CE, probably from disease, Gnaeus Calpurnius Piso Pater, the governor of Syria and Germanicus’ host, was accused of poisoning him and working magic against him. Piso was condemned and committed suicide. Ironically, imperial biographers such as Suetonius and the *Historia Augusta* relate many prophecies or portents of emperors’ future rule; astrologers and prophets had to be suppressed due to the public belief in prophecies.

Persecution of magical practices increased in the later Empire. Diocletian and Maximian legislated against *mathematici* (astrologers). In the late fourth century CE, the emperors Valentinian I and Valens persecuted members of the senatorial elite who were suspected of magical practices and of consulting astrologers. Ammianus relates an incident in which several conspirators, hoping to discover the name of the next emperor, used a device that pointed to successive letters of the alphabet to spell (in Greek) THEOD... (Ammianus 29.32) The luckless conspirators believed that one Theodorus would succeed Valentinian and Valens; the real successor was Theodosius I (379–395). Christianity does not seem to have an impact on the credence in astrology and magical practices.

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See also Germanicus; Portents; Religion and Warfare; Treason; Usurpation

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Attila (d. 453 CE)

Attila, the ruler of the Huns, between 434 and 453, posed the most serious threat to the western Roman Empire in the mid-fifth century, and was

defeated at the Battle of the Catalaunian Plains (Châlons) in 451. He was the nephew of Rua, the first Hunnic ruler to unite the diverse Hun tribes in central Europe (ca. 425–433). After Rua's death, Attila and his brother Bleda succeeded him. The Huns supplied barbarian troops to the Romans, contributing significantly to the defense of the empire against other barbarian invasions (though the Hunnic coalition included subject peoples, such as the Gepids and Ostrogoths). However, Attila developed greater ambitions and extracted large subsidies from the Roman government.

Attila commenced a policy of extortion from the eastern imperial government, starting by demanding increased tribute in 435. In 440 Attila raided the Illyrian provinces and sacked cities such as Viminacium, Singidunum, and Naissus. The success of this strike can be explained by the Romans' simultaneous eastern campaigns against Persia and the Vandals, which left the regional field army of the Balkans seriously under-strength. Constantinople agreed to pay double tribute to the Huns, after which they recalled their armies and gradually started refortifying eastern Roman positions in the regions. By 444/445 Bleda had died, probably murdered by Attila, who then became sole ruler of the Huns.

In 447, Attila organized a devastating campaign through Moesia, Thrace, and Greece. He defeated the eastern Roman army in two set-piece battles near Marcianople and Chersonesos. Another humiliating treaty was arranged, which saw further concessions by the eastern Roman government to the Huns and a staggering tribute of 2,100 pounds of gold per annum. In 449, an embassy was dispatched to Attila's camp in Pannonia with the secret aim of assassinating the Hun ruler. The fragmentary history of Priscus of Panion preserves a vivid account of this embassy. Attila easily saw through this strategy and sent the embassy back to Constantinople, but surprisingly enough agreed to a much more favorable treaty the next year. Most likely, he wanted to secure his southern front before launching his invasion of the western Roman Empire.

As pretext for invading the western empire, Attila used an invitation by the western Roman princess Justa Grata Honoria (the sister of Valentinian III) to save her from an arranged marriage, claiming half of the imperial west as his dowry. His armies crossed the Rhine in the spring of 451 and overran northern Gaul until he was stopped by a joint force of the western Roman army and barbarian allies at the battle of the Catalaunian Plains (451).

Attila launched an invasion of Italy the following year. The Huns managed to destroy Aquileia and sack several cities in the Po valley, such as Milan. However, Attila's armies suffered hugely from famine and disease, while an eastern Roman army invaded his Danubian territories, forcing the Huns to leave Italy. Attila was planning an invasion of the eastern Roman Empire in 453, but unexpectedly died during his wedding night with a new wife. In 454, his sons were defeated by the tributary barbarian tribes' revolt from the Huns at the Nedao River. The Huns swiftly disappeared as a major political force in Europe. Nevertheless, during Attila's life the Huns had nearly established a barbarian "empire" in central Europe capable of humiliating both the eastern and western Roman Empires.

Jeroen W. P. Wijnendaele

See also Aetius; Catalaunian Plains, Battle of the; Huns; Theoderic

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Augustus (Emperor) (27 BCE–14 CE)

Born in 63 BCE, Augustus (conventionally termed the first Roman emperor, 27 BCE–14 CE), came to power by bringing an end to the bitter civil war era of 44–31 BCE, finally defeating his last rival Antony in 31 BCE. Augustus then retained that power for more than four decades until his death in 14 CE, gradually creating what we now recognize as the Principate through a series of experiments and compromises. This was largely the result of his success in expanding the Roman Empire while consolidating his power at home. Augustus doubled the size of the empire, adding territories to north and south, east and west. Given that the Romans believed that success in warfare reflected the gods' support, and, conversely, civil war their discontent, Augustus' successful foreign expansion and settlement of domestic affairs was believed to reflect his divinely appointed destiny, reflected in his titles and building program. Augustus imposed extensive stabilizing reforms on the Roman governing class and army, impacting

public and private life (and thus creating new conflicts). He attempted to designate successors and was finally succeeded by his stepson/adopted son Tiberius, but the lack of a stable mode of succession was a persistent disadvantage of the imperial system and source of conflict.

Augustus faced the problem that he was sole ruler of a state that traditionally abhorred kings; his adoptive father Julius Caesar had perished for this reason. Instead of presenting himself as a monarch, he acquired and expanded a number of traditional powers. He held the consulship from 31 through 23, and may also have been granted consular power for life from 19 BCE, but in 27 BCE he formally “restored” the republic. The consuls and other magistrates continued to be elected (or chosen by the emperors) down through the later Roman Empire, though their powers were greatly reduced. In return, Augustus was granted an unprecedented extent of proconsular *imperium*, overriding that of regular governors (and thus termed *imperium maius*). In 23 BCE he was also granted *tribunicia potestas*: This gave him authority to summon the Senate whenever he wanted and submit a motion to it; summon the popular assembly and propose legislation; impose a veto on the actions of other magistrates; intervene on behalf of citizens who were being unfairly treated by other magistrates; and force citizens to obey his orders, the right of sacrosanctity traditionally held by the tribunes of the plebs. In addition to these traditional powers, in 27 he was granted a new name, that of *Augustus*, by which he was known to posterity. The Latin word *augustus* had many connotations, including “majestic, venerable,” but implicit in it was the idea of increase (from the Latin verb *augeo*), an increase that was acted out under Augustus not just in general terms, in Rome’s increase in prosperity, but and specifically in terms of increasing the boundaries of the Roman Empire. To his titles were added *pontifex maximus* (chief priest of the Roman state) in 12 BCE and *Pater Patriae* (“Father of the Fatherland”) in 2 BCE.



The Prima Porta Augustus. This full-length statue emphasizes the emperor's role as symbolic commander-in-chief, though in practice Augustus deputed field commanders, often imperial family members such as Tiberius (the future emperor), Drusus, and Germanicus. From the Villa of Livia at Prima Porta, now located in the Vatican Museum, Italy. (Leemage/Corbis)

Having returned to Rome and celebrated his triple triumph in 29 BCE, Augustus turned to expanding the Roman Empire. Early campaigns consolidated his conquest of Egypt. The boastfulness of the prefect of Egypt, Cornelius Gallus, in celebrating his penetration into southern Egypt, led to his disgrace and suicide in 27/26 BCE. As a result, after the triumph of Cornelius Balbus in 19 BCE celebrating victory over the Garamantes in North

Africa, no further nonimperial commanders celebrated triumphs. Augustus probably vetoed on a technicality the dedication of the *spolia opima* (the spoils offered by a Roman general who had killed an enemy leader in single combat) by Licinius Crassus in 30/29 BCE. Augustus made clear that he intended to be sole ruler and would not tolerate any rival competitors.

During the period from 26 to 7 BCE Augustus was absent from Rome for several years. As with his actual combat during the civil wars, it is not clear that Augustus himself fought in person during his campaigns. Indeed, even after the pacification of the Iberian peninsula in 25 BCE, the Cantabri and Astures revolted as soon as Augustus left Spain, and it was Agrippa who finally managed with some difficulty to suppress the Cantabrian rebels in 19 BCE. Nonetheless, his campaigns in Gaul and the Iberian peninsula during the 20s were celebrated with great fanfare upon his return to Rome and he was credited with establishing Roman control of western Europe as far as the Atlantic, which was regarded by the Romans as none other than the great Ocean bordering the edge of the world. Given that Augustus steadfastly refused to celebrate any further triumphs, alternative ways of commemorating his military success were devised. The *Ara Pacis Augustae* (“Altar of Augustan Peace”) was vowed by the Senate on the day of Augustus’ return from the west on July 4, 13 BCE, and dedicated on January 30, 9 BCE. The altar was situated within an enclosure imitating the shrine of Janus Quirinus, and displayed a complex decorative scheme, reflective of Augustan ideology. This was the first known instance of an “August(an)” deity: the new deity’s title encapsulated the idea that Rome could now enjoy a special relationship with the gods specifically through the mediation of Augustus.

In addition to these conquests, a great diplomatic coup was represented as if it had been a military victory. In 20 BCE, Augustus secured the return of legionary standards from Persia, which had earlier been captured from Crassus and Antony. He achieved this by a combination of bargaining with the Persian king Phraates IV over the return of his son, who had been kidnapped and delivered into Augustus’ hands; by traveling to the region in person; by encouraging the claims of the Persian pretender Tiridates; and by the presence nearby of a Roman army commanded by Tiberius. The return of the standards was celebrated in poetry, publicized on coinage, and commemorated on a triumphal arch in the Roman Forum. The famous Prima Porta statue of Augustus is thought to allude to this episode. The

Senate dedicated an altar to Fortuna Redux (“Fortune the Home-Bringer”) at the end of 19 BCE, to celebrate Augustus’ return to Rome after his absence in the east since 22 BCE.

After 7 BCE, Augustus did not leave Italy again, instead delegating the task of commanding the armies to junior members of his family and other leading Romans. Their campaigns, however, were fought under his auspices, meaning that he was ultimately regarded as responsible for their successes. His two stepsons Tiberius and Drusus were conspicuous in their achievements, conquering swathes of Germany and the Balkans, and subduing the Raeti and Vindelici in the Alps, completing the pacification of the Alpine tribes. The massive Tropaeum Alpium at la Turbie (near Monaco) was a victory monument commemorating this, built in 7/6 BCE, with its inscription listing the names of over forty conquered tribes. Drusus received the honorific title “Germanicus” in recognition of his success in the Rhineland, but he died after falling from his horse in 9 BCE. Augustus’ grandson, Gaius, born in 20 BCE whom he adopted as his son in 17 BCE, was sent to the eastern frontier in 1 CE, where he campaigned in Armenia. Despite the flattering optimistic account of this in the *Res Gestae*, these attempts to impose a settlement in Armenia were doomed, with Gaius himself dying from a wound in 4 CE, and the problem of Armenia and Persia rumbled on into the reign of Tiberius. Augustus also designated Gaius’ brother Lucius, born in 17 BCE, as his potential heir, but Lucius also died in 2 CE, leaving Tiberius the most likely heir. Though the mature and competent Tiberius succeeded Augustus without opposition, the succession from one emperor to another was never assured, in contrast with a hereditary monarchy.

The last decade of Augustus’ lifetime witnessed military reverses. A serious revolt in the Balkans in 6–9 CE (known as the Pannonian revolt) threatened Rome’s stability, putting military manpower under such pressure that emergency conscription was put in place into the legions, even of freedmen. This sense of crisis was only further increased by the massacre of Quinctilius Varus’ three legions in the Teutoburg forest of Germany in 9 CE. It is against this background that we should place reports that Augustus advised Tiberius not to expand the empire further. Nonetheless, by the end of his life, Augustus was able to claim that he had conquered the whole world, and his conquests figured large in the *Res Gestae*. He declared that in addition to newly conquered territories, Rome’s influence had spread

through diplomacy and friendship even as far as China, India, and Britain.

Several factors underpinned Augustus' military success. First of all, Augustus established the army on a secure financial footing, regularizing conditions of service and thus discouraging soldiers' future support of potential rival emperors. The *Res Gestae* boasts of giving immense sums as donatives to soldiers: in 29 BCE, 120,000 veterans received 1,000 sesterces each. Though soldiers had long received a *stipendium* (wage), Augustus ensured that on completing their service, veterans were given generous allocations of land or cash. He spent 600,000,000 sesterces for Italian estates, and about 260,000,000 for land in the provinces, followed by cash payments of 400,000,000 sesterces. In 6 CE he established a new military treasury, the *aerarium militare*, to meet the cost of rewards on retirement for veterans, devoting to it a capital sum invested from his own funds, which was then topped up by new taxes. This continued to suggest that the soldiers owed their livelihood to Augustus in person. Second, Augustus fundamentally transformed the character of the Roman army, changing it from an ad hoc force raised by individual commanders as need arose into a permanent professional force. Third, Augustus reorganized the Roman army for long service, decreasing the availability of veterans for rivals' campaigns. In the Roman Republic, soldiers were recruited for 6 up to 16 years at a time. Veterans of one tour of duty were still young and vigorous men who readily enlisted again; thus Octavian himself and Antony had recruited Caesar's veterans. Soldiers were now required to provide a lifetime of service, praetorians for 12 years, extended to 16 years in 5 CE; legionaries for 16 years, extended in 5 CE to 20 years and later to 25 years. A legionary recruit of twenty would be forty or more when he was discharged, worn out by a strenuous and dangerous career and unlikely to fight again. The soldiers swore an oath of loyalty to Augustus himself: gone were the days of competition between rival generals. Lastly, Augustus was fortunate in his commanders: the military ability of individuals such as Agrippa, Tiberius, and Drusus, and their loyalty toward Augustus played no small part in securing his power within the state.

Augustus also changed the role of the Roman elite in military affairs, besides restricting triumphs and military glory to the imperial family. He divided the provinces into "public" provinces, in which few no legions were stationed, and "imperial" provinces, which had active legions. Proconsular governors now were restricted to public provinces; these governorships

conferred greater honor but were less likely to offer military power. Imperial provinces now had legates (*legati Augusti*) for governors, ranking above the legionary legates (commanders) of individual legions. Augustus restricted the prefecture (governorship) of Egypt to equestrians to discourage exploitation of Italy's grain supply by potential usurpers. In all cases the emperor could override his governors. The result was that, despite grumbling by traditionalist historians such as Tacitus, the Roman senatorial aristocracy played a much smaller role in military affairs. A greater source of elite resentment was Augustus' marriage legislation, requiring members of the upper orders to marry and procreate or face financial penalties, and criminalizing adultery.

Military glory was central to the Augustan regime. Poets praised his ending of the civil wars and expansion of empire. Coins, inscriptions, art, and architecture all paraded imperialist images of conquest, and the message of world conquest visualized via figures of Victory, captured long-haired barbarians, and spoils of war was disseminated into the newly conquered provinces. At Rome itself, the ceremonial closing of the gates of Janus declared the outbreak of Augustan peace throughout the world.

Alison E. Cooley

See also *Aerarium Militare*; *Ara Pacis*; Arminius; *Breviarium Totius Imperii*; Drusus; Emperor as Commander; Extraordinary Levies; Forum of Augustus; Germanic Wars; Imperialism; Military Oaths; Pannonian Revolt; Peace; Persian Wars, Arsacid; *Princeps*, Principate; Recruitment of Army (Imperial); *Res Gestae Divi Augusti*; Succession (Imperial); Tiberius (Emperor); Tiridates; Triumphs; Varian Disaster; Varus, Publius Quinctilius; Veteran Settlement; Victory; Virgil

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Aulus Caecina (d. 79 CE)

Aulus Caecina was a Roman senator and officer involved in the War of the Four Emperors (69 CE). With Fabius Valens, Caecina initially supported the acclamation of Vitellius, governor of Lower Germany, as emperor. Caecina invaded Italy in the name of Vitellius, winning a victory against the forces of the emperor Otho at Bedriacum. After occupying Italy, Vitellius rewarded Caecina with a consulship, but Caecina betrayed him by declaring for Vespasian, who had been acclaimed emperor in the east. Caecina was richly rewarded by Vespasian, and spent 10 years in imperial favor before being executed on suspicion of conspiracy in 79 CE.

Caillan Davenport

See also Fabius Valens; Vespasian; Vitellius; War of Four Emperors

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Aurelian (Emperor) (270–275 CE)

A Roman emperor (270–275 CE) during the third century crisis, Lucius Domitius Aurelianus was born in Dacia Ripensis in 214 CE, the son of a tenant farmer. He joined the Roman army, rising to the position of senior general under the emperor Gallienus. Together with other leading officers, including the future emperor Claudius II Gothicus, he conspired to murder Gallienus at Milan in 268 CE. Claudius II died less than two years later after contracting the plague, to be succeeded by his brother Quintillus. But the army preferred Aurelian, who claimed the throne for himself in September 270 CE.

Aurelian's reign was not without its problems. He faced several rebellions from senators and other officials, including the moneyers' revolt at Rome led by the financial administrator Felicissimus in 271 CE. But his reputation as a successful military leader was well deserved. Shortly after his accession he repelled assaults on Italy by the Alamanni and Juthungi, and by the Vandals in Pannonia. In 272 CE he was engaged in campaigns against the Goths, who had invaded the Danubian provinces; this resulted in the decision to abandon the province of Dacia across the Danube that had been established by Trajan. In its place, Aurelian created two new Dacian provinces from the territory of Moesia (though some scholars date this to 274 CE).

In the same year, he turned his attention to Zenobia, queen of Palmyra, who had claimed authority over the eastern provinces, including Egypt. She was defeated in battle at Antioch and Emesa before being captured while trying to escape to Persia. In late 272 CE, Aurelian travelled to the Balkans to fight the Carpi, but was forced to return to the east to suppress a second Palmyrene rebellion in 273 CE. Zenobia was exhibited at Aurelian's triumph in Rome, but was permitted to remain a free woman and even married into the senatorial aristocracy. In 274 CE, Aurelian embarked on a campaign against the Gallic Empire in the west. He defeated the forces of Gaius Esvivius Tetricus, the last ruler of this breakaway state, in battle on the Catalaunian Plains. Tetricus surrendered and later became the governor of a region of Italy. In less than five years Aurelian had restored the Roman Empire to its former extent, and became known as the *restitutor orbis* ("restorer of the world").

His legacy included construction of the Aurelian Wall, which enveloped

the city of Rome in a 19 kilometer circuit. Flanked by impressive towers every 30 meters, the wall (parts of which still stand today) demonstrated Aurelian's ability to protect the citizens of the empire. Aurelian also constructed a new temple of Sol Invictus (the "Unconquered Sun") in Rome and attempted to reform the coinage. He embarked on a Persian war in 275 CE, but was murdered on the way to the front as a result of a plot hatched by one of his secretaries. Aurelian proved himself one of the most successful soldier emperors of the third century in his efforts to reunify the empire while tackling barbarian incursions. However, he earned a reputation as a harsh ruler, which was one of the factors that prompted his assassination.

Caillan Davenport

See also Claudius II; Gallic Empire; Gallienus; Third-Century CE Crisis; Zenobia

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Auxilia

The *auxilia* or "helping" troops were infantry and cavalry units, originally recruited from non-Roman peoples but commanded by Roman officers and subject to Roman military training and discipline. An innovation of the last century BCE, they are most prominent in the first three centuries CE.

Auxiliary units, which were smaller than legions, might be deployed alongside or in place of legionary forces and comprised the entire garrison of some small provinces. Auxiliary *alae* ("wings" or cavalry regiments) or cohorts (infantry units) might comprise 480 to 500 men each; introduced in the Flavian period, milliary *alae* or cohorts contained 800 to 1,000 men each. Mixed *cohortes equitatae* contained 120 cavalry and 480 infantry. The total number of *auxilia* in the Flavian period is estimated as 180,000 men.

The recruitment of non-Italian units by treaty agreement with Rome predated the first century BCE, but Julius Caesar and Augustus employed

auxiliaries on a more permanent basis, incorporating them into the Roman army. Early auxiliaries were recruited from non-Italian peoples from regions recently incorporated into the empire. These recruits retained traits of “warlike peoples” and did not yet possess the Roman citizenship. After completing 25 years of service, the Roman citizenship was granted to auxiliaries upon their discharge, along with *conubium* (the right to marry) with their wives or future wives. These privileges are attested in many surviving military diplomas, copies of official documents engraved on bronze tablets.

Though the titles of auxiliary units often denoted their original ethnic origin, and were retained, the legal status and ethnic composition of the auxiliaries themselves shifted as the provinces became more Romanized. By the second and third centuries CE, many auxiliaries were already Roman citizens on enlistment and bore Roman-style names. The citizenship ceased to be an inducement to recruitment well before the emperor Caracalla (sole reign 211–217) granted the citizenship to nearly all inhabitants of the empire in 212 CE.

Auxiliaries were commanded by Roman citizen officers (usually equestrian prefects) and were subject to the Roman military oath, training, and discipline. They were thus distinct from *numeri*, ethnic units that retained local fighting specialties, such as Syrian bowmen or slingers from the Balearic Isles (off the coast of Spain). Besides the citizenship issue, the main distinctions that made auxiliaries “second-class” troops was command by equestrians, not senators; a longer period of service; and a lower rate of pay, perhaps 5/6 the legionary rate. However, auxiliary cavalrymen received higher pay to help maintain their horses and grooms (usually slaves). In the provincial setting, service as an auxiliary *equus* (cavalryman) might be more attractive than legionary service.

It has been suggested that Roman battle tactics deployed auxiliaries differently from legionaries, exposing the former to greater danger, but this point is controversial. It assumes that the legionaries became less “warlike,” being recruited from Italian and more Romanized provincials. Trajan’s Column depicts some differentiation of legionary and auxiliary tasks, emphasizing the legionaries’ role as builders and engineers and the auxiliaries as fighters; however, this may only suggest that the auxiliaries were not trained as engineers.

It is difficult to trace the history of auxiliary units in the later Roman

Empire, due to the later Roman army's restructuring as a central field force of cavalry (the *comitatenses*) versus lower-status border troops (*limitanei*).

Sara E. Phang

See also *Alae*; Cohorts; Divisions of the Army (Imperial); Legion, Organization of; Military Diplomas; *Praefectus*; Tactics; Warlike Peoples

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Avidius Cassius (d. 175 CE)

Avidius Cassius was a Roman senator and general. The son of an equestrian officer, he entered the Senate and served as a commander in the Persian War (162–166 CE) of Lucius Verus. While Verus remained in Antioch, Cassius successfully captured the Persian cities of Seleucia and Ctesiphon. After the war, he was appointed consul and governor of Syria, later receiving supreme authority over all the eastern provinces. In 175 CE, Cassius claimed the purple when he heard that Marcus Aurelius had died, and did not relent when this rumor turned out to be false. His usurpation lasted only three months before he was killed by one of his own men. He is idealized in the *Historia Augusta*'s unreliable Life of Avidius Cassius.

Caillan Davenport

See also Civil War (Pertinax–Septimius Severus); Lucius Verus; Marcus Aurelius

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B

Balbus, Lucius Cornelius (ca. 21–13 BCE)

Lucius Cornelius Balbus (the younger), proconsul of Africa in 21/20 BCE, achieved a victory over the Garamantes and was the last private citizen to celebrate a triumph, marking a change in the nature of the triumph in the imperial era. Balbus was not a Roman citizen by birth; from a wealthy family of Gades (Cádiz) in Hispania Baetica (southern Spain), he and his homonymous father received the Roman citizenship due to Julius Caesar's patronage. Balbus senior was the first consul born outside Italy. Balbus junior celebrated his triumph over the Garamantes of North Africa (Libya) on March 27, 19 BCE, the last entry in the *Fasti Capitolini* at Rome. After the triumph of Balbus, only emperors and their family members were permitted to celebrate triumphs. Senators not belonging to the imperial house were permitted triumphal ornaments, the highest honor they could receive for victories. Balbus also dedicated a theater and associated portico on the Campus Martius at Rome in 13 BCE to commemorate the occasion.

Alison E. Cooley

See also Augustus; *Campus Martius*; Elite Participation; Emperor as Commander; Triumph; Victory

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Bandits and Brigands

Bandits and brigands were a pervasive source of low-level violence in the Roman world. They resulted from the relative inability of the Roman state to exert power over vast rural spaces. Banditry constituted an escape for the bored, the entrepreneurial, or the local power broker. It provided peasants, fugitive slaves, and other refugees from Roman society with a place on the periphery of the state.

Banditry was pervasive during the Roman Republic and the Roman Empire. Many sources mention bandits setting upon travelers and leaving them for dead. Pliny the Younger recounts the disappearance of one Metilius Crispus, who was traveling to the frontier to take up a centurionate (*Letters* 6.25), as if it was not unusual for people to vanish on such journeys; another friend, Robustus, had also disappeared. Legal codes classify banditry with other extenuating circumstances, such as floods, hurricanes, volcanoes, and other acts of God. Comparative analysis of other premodern states also suggests that banditry was a pervasive, structural problem.

In terms of the actual practice of banditry, little can be gleaned from the ancient sources. Bandits formed the nucleus of rebellions in the Roman Empire. This was especially true of the Jewish War of 66–70. Banditry was undertaken by men who operated in small groups far from urban settings and who employed natural features of the landscape, such as mountains and swamps, to evade pursuit. Their primary targets were travelers, and they probably stole from farmers in the region that they operated. There is some evidence of collusion between large landowners and bandits. Large landowners may have employed bandits to enforce their will in rural areas.

Since banditry was such a pervasive threat, the apprehension and execution of bandits was one of the primary duties of a Roman governor. In provinces with military garrisons, Roman legions were responsible for catching bandits and guarding the roads. Roman legions were stationed not only to protect against external enemies, but also to maintain internal security.

Romans viewed banditry as a catch-all term for illegitimate antistate violence. The relevant passage in the Digest of Justinian declares that “Enemies are those who have declared war on us, or whom we have declared war on. All the rest are bandits or plunderers” (Digest 60.15.86). Indeed, the term banditry was linguistically imprecise. It could be defined as

any illegitimate form of violence. This imprecision led to the use of bandit as a term of invective, directed against political enemies.

These invectives appear to emerge primarily in times of turmoil and rebellion, when it was difficult to determine who was fighting for the state and who was fighting against it. In the late Roman Republic, the term bandit was thrown around loosely in political discourse. Cicero called the most powerful men of his time period brigands, using this terminology to delegitimize their use of force. The Roman view of banditry gave these accusations their force. It is important to understand that in Roman sources, the use of the word bandit does not always mean that the person in consideration was a bandit. Two egregious examples suffice: in the *Res Gestae Divi Augusti*, the emperor Augustus termed Sextus Pompeius and his followers “pirates” (bandits who operated at sea); in 285 CE, the emperor Diocletian (284–305) raised to Caesar his comrade Maximian to combat the “bandits” Aelianus and Amandus, who struck their own imperial coins. This ideology of banditry found in Roman sources existed in tension with the actual practice of banditry, by persons of far lower social status.

Nathan Schumer

See also Cicero; Civil Wars (I) (49–45 BCE); Civil Wars (II) (44–31 BCE); Conspiracy of Catiline; Low-Intensity Conflict; Piracy; Revolt

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Bar Kochba Revolt (132–135 CE)

The Bar Kochba revolt was the second Roman-Jewish war. It was fought from 132 to 135 CE in the province of Judaea. The causes of this war were rooted in the political situation that followed the first Jewish War of 66–70 CE. After 70 CE, the Romans annexed Judaea, making it into a Roman province with an equestrian governor. The Tenth Legion (Legio X Fretensis) was stationed in Jerusalem. In the 120s, another legion was brought into

Palestine, to be replaced by Legio VI Ferrata in 130, which was stationed in south Galilee.

In 130 CE, the emperor Hadrian visited the province of Judaea and ordered the city of Jerusalem to be refounded as the pagan city Aelia Capitolina. He built a temple to Jupiter Capitolinus, the chief Roman god, on the site of the Jerusalem Temple, insulting the defeated Jewish God. This was presumably the main cause of the rebellion. Another literary source, the highly tendentious *Historia Augusta*, suggests that Hadrian banned circumcision, precipitating the revolt, though most historians consider this unlikely. This could have incited a revolt among the Jews, because the rite of circumcision was fundamental to Jewish identity. Other factors may have been resentment from the first war, and messianic, apocalyptic fervor, as evidenced by Jewish literature from the interwar period.

Simon Bar Kochba led the revolt, styling himself the nasi, the rank below king among the Jews. The course of the revolt is impossible to reconstruct, based on the sources that have been preserved. Bar Kochba's army enjoyed some initial success, routing the forces of the Roman governor Tinnieus Rufus. To crush the rebellion, Hadrian sent seven more legions to join the two there. These were placed under the command of Julius Severus, the former governor of Britain, who was transferred into the province to quell the rebellion.

Bar Kochba's name means "son of a star," suggesting that the rebellion had messianic overtones. His army built a vast array of underground caves and fortifications, such as those found at Beth Guvrin, from which they harried the Romans. Some of Bar Kochba's letters have been discovered, revealing him to be a petty, cruel, and ineffective leader. In Christian literature, Bar Kochba is portrayed as a persecutor of the early Church. The revolt probably had other leaders, but the sources do not preserve their names.

In response to the Bar Kochba revolt, the Roman army annihilated the district of Judaea. Archaeological evidence suggests that the district was depopulated after the war. Most of the population was slain or enslaved. The war culminated with the siege of Betar, a city southeast of Jerusalem, where Bar Kochba died. In rabbinic literature, the Bar Kochba revolt is remembered as a catastrophe on par with the destruction of the Temple during the First Revolt.

This rebellion had massive costs in manpower and money for the

Roman Empire. The Roman army was utterly unprepared for the revolt. More seriously, Legio XXII Deiotariana appears to have been disbanded, because of heavy losses. The suppression of the revolt was celebrated widely by the Romans, and a triumphal arch honoring Hadrian was erected at Tel Shalem, south of the city of Scythopolis, at the edge of Judaea. Hadrian renamed Judaea Palestine after this rebellion, to punish the Jews.

Nathan Schumer

See also Hadrian; Jewish War; Judaea

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Barbarians

“Barbarian” in Greek and Roman sources indicates people of non-Greek and non-Italic ethnicity, who were considered foreign and alien. The Greeks applied the term *barbaroi* to Near Eastern peoples whose languages they found incomprehensible, sounding like “bar bar” to Greek ears. The early Greek historian Herodotus depicts many non-Greek peoples, tending to stereotype their cultures as inverting Greek social practices and customs. Herodotus’ *Histories* focuses on the Greek-Persian wars (490–479 BCE) and is relatively fair to the Persians; other Greek texts from the early Classical Period show that the Greeks regarded the Persians as effeminate, luxurious, and inevitably defeated by tougher, more masculine Greeks. The stereotype of “eastern” barbarians as effeminate had a long subsequent history, applied to the Hellenistic Greeks themselves by the Romans during the period of the Roman conquest of the Hellenistic east. Stereotypes however could run both

ways; the Romans themselves might seem barbarous to the Greeks, setting up a pattern of ambivalence in which the Romans were eager to acquire Classical Greek culture but regarded contemporary Hellenistic Greeks as decadent.

Greco-Roman views of nonclassical peoples in northern and western Europe (the Balkans, the Danube basin, Alps, Germany, Gaul, Spain, and Britain) were framed differently. The dominant cultures in these regions of pre-Roman Late Iron Age Europe were Celtic and Germanic. These cultures were patriarchal and hierarchical but, in contrast with the Near East, were less organized and complex than Greek and Roman civilizations. The Greeks and Romans viewed the Celts and Germans as representing an earlier stage of development, societies of warriors and raiders. As such, the Celts and Germans were stereotyped as courageous and bold warriors but lacking in education, prudence, and self-control. They were violent and prone to anger. The Romans regarded the northern barbarians as a potential threat due to their impulsivity and their propensity to raiding.

Other “barbarian” peoples whom the Romans encountered were the Carthaginians and the Jews. The Carthaginians were of Phoenician origin, a Semitic people in religion and language, with a complex state organization. The Romans respected the Carthaginians but stereotyped them as devious and untrustworthy. The Greeks and Romans regarded the Jews as more alien because the Jews were strict monotheists, worshipping only the Jewish God.

Images of “barbarians” were transmitted in various genres: in historiography, as with Herodotus above; in ethnography, the genre describing various peoples and their customs; and in visual arts, for instance Roman triumphal art. These images tended to be frozen in time, changing little even though the ethnic composition and cultures of Roman provincial society changed greatly over the centuries and the peoples beyond the frontiers were influenced by contact with Greco-Roman civilization. The Roman elite drew on such static images in formulating their strategy toward nonclassical states and peoples.

“Barbarian” might also be used very loosely by the Greco-Roman urban elite as synonymous with “uncultivated.” For instance, Cassius Dio criticizes the decision of Septimius Severus (emperor 193–211) to replace the Italian praetorians with Danubians promoted from the legions, describing the new praetorians as “most savage in appearance, most terrifying in speech, and

most boorish in conversation” (Dio 74[75].2.6). Classical authors might term “barbarian” emperors whom they regarded as brutal and uncultivated, such as Maximinus I (235–238) or Galerius (Caesar 293–305, Augustus 305–311).

The heavily loaded and often negative semantics of “barbarian” make it a difficult term for modern scholars to use in describing the non-Greek and non-Roman peoples of the classical world, even though Greek and Latin sources often do so. In the Roman section of *Conflict in Ancient Greece and Rome*, we have often used other and more specific terms, for example “Germans” or “Germanic peoples” for “barbarians” in late antiquity. When “barbarian” is used in the articles, it is a generic term and should not be viewed as imparting a value judgment.

Sara E. Phang

See also Carthaginians; Dacia, Dacians; Gaul, Gauls; Germans; Persia, Arsacid; Strategy; Triumph. *Greek Section*: Persian (Achaemenid) Empire

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Bedriacum, Battles of (69 CE)

The First and Second Battles of Bedriacum (also called the First and Second Battles of Cremona) were important turning points in the War of Four Emperors (69 CE). They occurred in northern Italy in the vicinity of the small town of Bedriacum and the larger city of Cremona, hence the variant names.

In the First Battle of Bedriacum (April 14, 69 CE) the forces of Vitellius,

Rhineland legionaries commanded not by Vitellius himself but by his legates Aulus Caecina Alienus and Fabius Valens, approached Bedriacum. The forces of emperor Marcus Salvius Otho, led by Otho himself and his generals Salvius Titianus and Annius Gallus, numbered about 10,000, and were drawn from the troops quartered in Italy, including the praetorians and urban cohorts. As was still usual for emperors at this time, Otho chose not to fight in the battle in person, withdrawing to nearby Brixellum. The Vitellians defeated the Othonians. When Otho heard the news, he chose to commit suicide on 16 April, so as to spare his army further battle. Most of his officers went over to Vitellius.

In the Second Battle of Bedriacum, on October 24–25, the Vitellians fought against the Flavian forces led by Antonius Primus, comprising Legiones III Gallica, VII Claudia, VII Galbiana, VIII Augusta, and XIII Gemina. The Vitellians were led by Caecina and Fabius Valens and comprised the remaining Rhineland troops brought to Italy, along with urban troops that had gone over to Vitellius. Tacitus depicts the Vitellian legionaries as debilitated by their stay in Rome, having been exposed to the city's diseases, and weakened by Vitellius' failure to enforce discipline and training (Tacitus, *Histories* 2.93). The battle, depicted as intermittent and chaotic, lasted through the night, but Primus' men were clearly the victors. Elated by their victory, the Flavians both stormed the Vitellian camp, and besieged and sacked Cremona in reprisal for the Cremonese support of Vitellius. The Flavian sack of an Italian city was regarded as one of the most atrocious deeds of the war (Tacitus, *Histories* 3.33–34).

Sara E. Phang

See also Antonius Primus; Aulus Caecina; Fabius Valens; Otho; Vitellius; War Crimes; War of Four Emperors

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Bellum Iustum

The concept of “just war” in the Western tradition has roots in Biblical, Greek, and Roman traditions. In all three cultures, there is an attempt to connect just war to religious and legal ideals. Still, in Plato’s *Republic* (1.338–347c-e) we have Thrasymachus argue that “justice is in the interest of the stronger.” The concept is echoed in Thucydides’ Melian Dialogue in the *History of the Peloponnesian War* (5.89): “the strong do what they will, the weak do what they must.” From Cicero’s *De Officiis* 1. 11.36 and Livy 1.32 we learn that the Roman tradition allowed no war to be “just” unless its beginnings first adhered to the following legal and religious processes. The chief fetial priest, the *pater patratus*, traveled to the Roman frontier to approach the enemy and demand restitution for the perceived wrong that initiated the confrontation. According to Livy, the priest must approach the first man he meets at the border, the next man he meets on the way to the city center, a man at the gates of the city, and finally, someone at the enemy’s forum. If, after approaching all these people no satisfactory restitution results, there follows an official declaration of war on behalf of the Senate and People of Rome. The examples from Cicero and Livy demonstrate a legalistic concern for following proper procedure in negotiation with the enemy and giving fair warning. The college of fetial priests served Jupiter, the chief state deity of Rome. Part of their charge was sustaining right relationships with foreign powers and following proper procedure in diplomacy. Cicero argues that discussion or negotiation must precede war because discussion is the “characteristic of man” while warfare is the characteristic of “the brute.” The only excuse for going to war, he wrote, “is that we may live in peace unharmed” (1.11.35). Therefore, the ritual demands for restitution reflect that Rome went to war to right wrongs committed against the state and her people. There was also a desire to engage in diplomatic negotiations to avoid war.

While these religious rituals and diplomatic overtures were the ideal, in practice, the just cause for Roman warfare related to the interests of state. Political concerns trumped religious, ethical, and legal conventions. St. Augustine refined the concept in a Roman Christian context in the fifth century CE, crafting a formula that required warfare be conducted by a just authority, for a just cause, with right intention (creating and keeping the peace), and only as a last resort after all diplomatic initiatives had been

exhausted (*Quaestiones in Heptateuchum* 6.10). We can see Cicero's influence in Augustine's philosophy that, in turn, shaped the work of Thomas Aquinas in the thirteenth century.

Cheryl L. Golden

See also Cicero; *Deditio* (Surrender); Formal Declaration of War; *Ius Fetiale*; War Crimes

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Boniface (d. 432 CE)

Boniface commanded Late Roman Africa as *comes Africae*, ca. 422–432. Boniface distinguished himself at Massilia by wounding the Visigothic king Athaulf in 413. He was then stationed in Africa as a tribune of Gothic auxiliaries, where he enforced order over native tribes (ca. 416–421). In 422, Boniface was assigned a subordinate command under the *magister militum* Castinus against the Vandals in Spain, but was dismissed by the latter in Italy. Boniface married the Visigothic princess Pelagia at this time, who granted him a warrior retinue. Returning to Africa, Boniface achieved the position of *comes Africae* through the patronage of the empress Galla Placidia, sister of the emperor Honorius (395–423) and mother of the emperor Valentinian III (425–455).

When Placidia and Valentinian were exiled, prior to Honorius' death, Boniface played a pivotal role to restore them. He safeguarded Africa during the civil war (424–425) between the western usurper Johannes and eastern Roman armies. After Johannes' execution, Valentinian III was installed as the western Roman emperor. As a result Boniface was awarded the dual position of *comes Africae* and commander of the imperial guard (*comes domesticorum*) in 425. The new *magister militum* Felix conspired against Boniface, declaring him a traitor in 427. Forced to fight, Boniface defeated

one Italian army, but was forced by a second army to retreat into the interior of Mauretania. Boniface was pardoned by Galla Placidia in 428 and reinstated as *comes Africae* to combat the Vandal invasion of Africa in 429. Though defeated by the Vandals, Boniface managed to successfully defend the city of Hippo against them in 430–431. In 432, Boniface was recalled to Italy by Placidia and appointed *magister militum* to oust Aetius from power. Boniface defeated Aetius at the battle of Rimini but was fatally wounded. The Romans were unable to displace the Vandals from Africa and were forced to recognize Vandal possession of the North African provinces.

Jeroen W. P. Wijnendaele

See also Aetius; Africa; Fall of the Roman Empire (West); Galla Placidia; Valentinian III; Vandals

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Boudicca (d. 61 CE)

Boudicca, queen of the Iceni (a British people in the region of East Anglia), led the Iceni and Trinovantes tribes in revolt against the Romans in 60/61 CE. Other tribes, though their names are unknown, are believed to have fought with Boudicca in addition to the Iceni and Trinovantes. Boudicca was said to be one of many women to lead British tribes and even to command British armies. Her role as a warrior queen was a foreign and frightening concept to the Romans. Her position as the leader of a rebellion that sacked three Roman settlements was shameful to the Romans.

Prasutagus, husband of Boudicca, left his kingdom to his two daughters and the emperor Nero (54–68 CE). Roman maladministration of the British provinces, including Roman tax farmers' recall of loans, was a major cause of the revolt of the Iceni, culminating in Roman soldiers' flogging of Boudicca and rape of her two daughters. These abuses forced the Iceni into a desperate situation. Boudicca became the leader of a campaign that stretched from Camulodunum (Colchester) to Londinium. Britons destroyed

the Roman veteran colony of Camulodunum, including the temple of the deified Claudius. Verulamium (St. Albans) and Londonium were also destroyed in the uprising. The Britons slaughtered the infantry of the Ninth Legion. According to Dio (62.1.1), the Boudiccan Rebellion killed 80,000 Romans. However, it was soon suppressed. In Britain, the Roman legions typically concentrated their efforts in one territory at a time. At the time of the Boudiccan Rebellion, the legions were on campaign in North Wales. The Roman legions were able to defeat Boudicca in organized combat at an unknown location. To avoid capture, Boudicca committed suicide by poison.

Robyn Rider

See also Britain; Conquest of; Britain, Roman; Female Warriors; Roman Citizen Colonies; Suetonius Paulinus

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Breviarium Totius Imperii

The *breviarium totius imperii* was a document created at the order of the emperor Augustus and bequeathed to his successor Tiberius (14–37 CE), describing the size and disposition of imperial forces, the revenue and expenses of the empire, and the direction of imperial foreign policy. It is not preserved and is attested by the imperial biographer Suetonius, the historian Tacitus, and the historian Cassius Dio in slightly conflicting accounts. Nothing is known of how it was compiled, presumably from military strength reports, or whether it was updated in subsequent reigns.

Augustus had reduced the number of legions to 28 (25 after the Varian disaster), but had placed on a regular footing the Praetorian Guard, urban cohorts, and *vigiles* or fire watch, based in the city of Rome; the fleets at Misenum and Ravenna; and the *auxilia* in the provinces. It is likely that the

breviarium enumerated these forces, but the level of detail is unknown.

The most controversial aspect of the *breviarium* was Augustus' alleged directive to Tiberius not to extend the boundaries of the empire further. Some scholars of Roman grand strategy have interpreted this directive too broadly to suggest that after the Roman Republic's aggressive imperialism, imperial Rome shifted to a defensive concept of grand strategy. After Augustus, such a defensive strategy is commonly attributed to Hadrian (117–138). However, though after the 20s BCE he did not campaign in person, Augustus' public image was hardly a pacific one. His presentation of *Pax* (Peace) as a deity (in the famous *Ara Pacis* monument in Rome) celebrated the end of civil warfare, not the end of Roman conquest of external enemies. Augustus' reign added parts of Germany and the Balkans and commemorated the recovery of captured Roman standards from Persia, expunging the disgrace of the defeat of Crassus at Carrhae (53 BCE). Before his accession, Tiberius himself had commanded in the field and had extensive military experience, as did Germanicus, Tiberius' nephew. Germanicus was permitted to wage a punitive expedition against Arminius, avenging the Varian Disaster (9 CE) by defeating Arminius at the battle of Idistaviso (16 CE).

Subsequent emperors did not refrain from military conquest. Claudius' reign saw the lasting conquest of Britain. One of its generals was the future emperor Vespasian (69–79), who rose to power with his defeat of the Jews in the Jewish War. Vespasian's son Domitian (81–96) followed by Trajan (98–117), achieved the Roman conquest of Dacia (modern Romania). If the *breviarium totius imperii* advised Tiberius not to extend the boundaries of the empire, this policy may have been only of immediate application based on straitened financial circumstances. The loss of three legions in the Varian disaster of 9 CE had been very costly. Augustus and Tiberius kept many legionaries in service past their discharge dates to avoid paying pensions, contributing to the mutinies on the Rhine and Danube in 14 CE.

Sara E. Phang

See also Arminius; Augustus; Bureaucracy (Roman Military); Carrhae, Battle of; Documentary Sources; Germanicus; Hadrian; Idistaviso, Battle of; Imperialism; Pay and Finances, Military (Imperial); Strategy; Varian Disaster

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Bribery and Corruption

In modern nations, which emphasize the rule of law and rational bureaucracy, bribery, and corruption—defined as extrainstitutional exchange of material favors for goods, services, or access to office or power—are regarded as indexes of misgovernment. Modern government bureaucracies are likely to have elaborate rules restricting or prohibiting gifts to office-holders and donations to political campaigns. Furthermore, modern governments are able to exert effective surveillance of office-holders and officials. Such standards, rules, prohibitions, and surveillance were much less prevalent in the ancient world.

The late Roman Republic and the Roman Empire were predominantly patronage societies with only partially developed bureaucratic institutions. In such societies, power and influence were exerted by the transfer of gifts, whether horizontally (between peers), upward (as in tribute to a ruler), or downward (to clients or dependents). Such gifts were socially expected: a Roman noble showed hospitality toward fellow aristocrats, a patron gave gifts to his clients or represented them in court, and a Roman magistrate bestowed gifts on the populace such as games and public amenities. In return, the gift-giver received political support and votes. For a politician to blatantly, buy his way into office was not as routine as has been thought (despite Sallust's *Romae omnia venalia esse*, "at Rome all things are for sale," *Jugurthine War* 8) but the bestowal of gifts/bribes was part of the route to power.

In Classical Athens, the system of office-holding provided some checks against patronage and corruption. Officials underwent formal scrutiny (*dokimasia*) before they entered office, and were subject to another examination (*euthyne*) on leaving office, intended especially to ensure that they had not enriched themselves illegally. The Roman Republic's political system lacked such built-in checks.

By the middle and late Republic, patronage became a source of undue

political influence, and some steps were taken to check it. In the early and middle second century BCE, a series of sumptuary laws probably targeted horizontal influence by restricting expenditure on luxury foods that might appear at Roman nobles' banquets for their peers and political allies. Laws restricting *ambitus*, bribery specific to political campaigns, were passed. However, there was no systematic scrutiny of politicians before and after holding office. The censors, elected every 5 years for a period of 18 months, might scrutinize the moral conduct of individuals.

Since the prosecution of bribery and corruption depended on private prosecutors, accusations of bribery and corruption became a political weapon from at least the late second century BCE onward. A politician could take down, or at least inconvenience, his rival by accusing him of bribery or extortion. The famous Scipio Africanus and his brother Lucius Cornelius Scipio Asiagenes fell from political prominence in 187–184 BCE due to accusations of corruption; they may have been targeted out of jealousy and political rivalry.

In the Principate, the emperors attempted to repress bribery and corruption; in Roman ideology, a good emperor reined in his subordinates, while an incompetent or vicious emperor failed to do so. However, the inducements to extortion remained because officials in the provinces were still poorly paid; a salary structure eventually developed, but probably did not keep up with inflation in the late second and third centuries CE. In this respect, the Roman Empire resembled modern developing nations where government is relatively weak and officials are underpaid, resulting in a high incidence of bribery and extortion.

Accusations and allegations of corruption increase in later Roman sources, partly reflecting the expanded size and role of the government and the increased competition for posts in the government and army. As before, a good ruler checked the misbehavior of his officials, soldiers, and civil servants; some emperors, such as Julian (361–363) sought to a greater extent to clean house. Whether corruption in itself increased the burden on the later Roman government such that it contributed to the fall of the western Roman Empire (MacMullen 1988) is unproven.

Sara E. Phang

See also Cicero; Civil-Military Relations; Criminal Procedure; *Dediticii*; Plunder; Verres, Gaius; War Crimes

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Britain, Conquest of (43 CE)

Interaction between Rome and Britain began as early as around 100 BCE, with the southern kingdoms coming into the orbit of Roman politics and trade. Such contact suggests that at the time of conquest, much was already known about the island and travel across the English Channel. The first military contact between Rome and Britain occurred during the campaigns of Julius Caesar in 55 and 54 BCE, which may have done nothing more lasting than make the Roman public aware of Britain, but further diplomatic ramifications resulted.

In 55 BCE, Caesar brought two legions and cavalry units across the Channel, landing probably near Dover in the area of Deal in the southeast. His cavalry never joined him and his landing was delayed and frustrated by setbacks, but Caesar was eventually successful in battle, the Britons sued for peace and the Roman troops returned to the Continent. The second campaign was far larger in scale with five legions plus thousands of cavalry. The primary British opposition was led by Cassivellaunus, a British tribal leader from an unknown people north of the River Thames. These campaigns brought Roman troops just north of the Thames but no further,

where Cassivellaunus sued for peace, offering hostages to Caesar.

There was no lasting Roman military presence in Britain for a century after Caesar's campaigns, so we cannot speak of Britain as a Roman province at this time. However, these campaigns did produce important and lasting political associations and diplomatic linkages with Rome, particularly within the strong southeastern kingdoms. Minting and use of coinage in Britain increased significantly at this time, reflecting that perhaps certain kingdoms engaged in a broader dialogue of power with the rest of Britain and Rome. Augustus (Dio 53.22, 25) and Caligula (40 CE; Suetonius, *Gaius* 44, 46) are said to have contemplated or planned the conquest of Britain. These plans or attempts came to nothing and Britain lacked a Roman presence until the reign of Claudius, but the century after Caesar's initial contact certainly set the stage for the full military occupation to come.

Claudius began the full-scale conquest of Britain in 43 CE (Suetonius, *Claudius* 17). The campaign was led by Aulus Plautius and was undertaken with four legions (ca. 20,000 men) and perhaps as many noncitizen auxiliary units. The details of landing and the beginning of this campaign are still debated in scholarship. The landing is commonly thought to have occurred at Richborough in Kent in southeast Britain, focusing on gaining control of the eastern kingdom. However, there is also evidence for a landing in the southern kingdom at the Solent, perhaps where Roman forces would find a more pro-Roman group at their arrival. From either starting point, the initial goal was to reach the River Thames, secure the crossing, and capture the capital of the eastern kingdom at Colchester (Camulodunum) in the heart of Trinovantes territory. Claudius himself was present at the battle for Colchester, after which he accepted the surrender of at least 11 British kings. Those still resisting Rome were at that point rallied to form an organized opposition by the British leader Caratacus, particularly among the Silures and Ordovices in Wales. Caratacus was not captured by Roman forces until the late 40s during campaigns in Wales.

Through the 40s CE the conquest of the island was waged against tribes to the west and north, eventually penetrating into Wales. The armies at this point were broken into groups to carry out various tasks of subjugation: Legio XX remained in Colchester and the area of the Trinovantes; XIV Gemina and IX Hispana moved north and west; and II Augusta, led by the future emperor Vespasian, remained in the southwest subduing the

Durotriges and Dumnonii peoples. The primary evidence for this stage in the conquest is the archaeological evidence, pointing toward a violent end to many of the hillforts in the southern part of the island, with siege works and British cemeteries dating to the period of conquest, most famously at Maiden Castle and Hod Hill. Under command by Ostorius Scapula in 47 CE, campaigns continued into Wales against the Deceangli in the north and the Silures in the south, both particularly brutal campaigns according to Roman sources. The rebellious leader Caratacus was captured during these campaigns, having been handed to the Romans by Cartimandua, queen of the Brigantes. Events such as this and other information in the sources point to the disunity of the British people and their varied response to the conquest by Rome.

Though many groups and their leaders succumbed to Roman forces and sued for peace, several at first becoming Roman clients before complete subjugation, there was also significant resistance to Roman conquest. Caratacus led this resistance through the 40s CE, escaping Roman capture several times and spurring new groups to oppose the Roman advance. Roman troops also experienced serious setbacks, particularly in the wars with the Silures, during which an assault on a legionary vexillation resulted in the death of camp leaders and several soldiers. Rome probably experienced significant losses in these campaigns in Wales, an area that became known for its unyielding resistance and persistent raiding outside its territory through the 50s CE. Because of this characteristic, the Roman response was also exceptionally violent in dealing the final blow to Wales, particularly in the north and on the island of Anglesey (Mona) when facing the Druids and the last of the anti-Roman resistance. Wales was not fully conquered until the 70s CE when Frontinus and Agricola finally completed subjugation of northwest Wales. Elsewhere there were serious revolts, particularly in 60/61 CE, which gravely threatened the Roman occupation, taking the lives of many Romans and threatening the success of new Roman colonies and municipia (see British Revolt).

The conquest of Britain remained stagnant for much of the 60s CE, with efforts renewed only after the death of Nero. During the reign of Vespasian, who had served in Britain during the initial conquest, efforts were renewed in Britain to move the conquest of the island northward. In the early 70s CE, the general Petillius Cerialis, a man who had already seen serious fighting in Britain during the Boudiccan Revolt in 60/61 CE, accompanied legion II

Adiutrix into Britain (replacing legion XIV). Cerialis sought to bring Cartimandua and the Brigantes into the Roman Empire, ending their role as a client kingdom, to stop the ongoing aggression between peoples in the north. Conquest pushed in a northwesterly direction, with fort construction at Carlisle in ca. 72–73 CE, which may mark the establishment of a frontier across northern Britain along the Tyne River. Early military entrenchment took place at Corbridge and possibly also at Vindolanda in the center of this northern line. These early attempts to consolidate Roman interests in the north of Britain were completed by Agricola in the late 70s and 80s CE, who hoped to complete the conquest of the entire island.

Agricola and his armies (ca. 30,000 men) pushed well into Scotland and in seven campaigning seasons subjugated areas north of the highlands and probably almost to the northern limits of Scotland. A last decisive battle was fought at Mons Graupius in 83 or 84 CE in this northernmost region, though the exact location of the battle is debated. Throughout these campaigning seasons, many areas were consolidated with the construction of forts, particularly across the Forth-Clyde isthmus (roughly westward from modern Edinburgh) and in the area south down to the River Tyne. The countryside is dotted with marching camps that mark the movement of Flavian period campaigning in Scotland and a large legionary fortress at Inchtuthil was partially constructed in the early 80s on the River Tay, guarding the primary route of travel to and from the Scottish Highlands.

Abandonment of the far northern areas of Scotland occurred within a few years and the “frontier” line was created along the Tyne-Solway line (between modern Newcastle and Carlisle), defended with a series of forts today called the Stanegate. This is almost the same defended line later adopted by Hadrian in the 120s CE after he decided to consolidate the empire and end the period of conquest begun by his predecessor Trajan.

The north would see further conquest again under Antoninus Pius when Hadrian’s Wall was abandoned in ca. 142 CE and the frontier was moved northward along the Forth-Clyde line with the turf and timber Antonine Wall. This frontier lasted only ca. 20 years; after that time, Hadrian’s Wall was again used as the defensive line of the empire.

Elizabeth M. Greene

See also Britain, Roman; British Revolt; Claudius I; Mons Graupius, Battle of

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Britain, Roman

Britain was in contact with the Roman world certainly by the late second century BCE and was known to the classical world generally earlier still through trade and travel. The region that became the Roman province of Britannia came into serious contact with Rome in two expeditions by Julius Caesar in 55 and 54 BCE. Caesar describes his reasons for invading Britain as in part motivated by his desire to stop the Britons from abetting Gallic resistance to his conquest of Gaul (58–50 BCE). Caesar’s campaigns resulted only in greater contact and the full-scale conquest of the island occurred a century later in 43 CE under the emperor Claudius. During the intervening

century, the island had its own conflicts among the native peoples and their leaders.

The broad group of peoples living in Britain in the Iron Age and at the time of Roman conquest were called “Britons.” Britain comprised many separate states across a large and varied geographical area, groups which cannot be seen as homogeneous at any point. There seems to have been as many forms of authority at the time of initial interaction with Rome as there were states in Britain (at least 36 according to Ptolemy in the second century CE). Power centers were located in various areas including an “Eastern Kingdom” in the southeast that included the well-known Catuvellauni and Trinovantes, and a southern kingdom, including the Atrebates. For a time, these peoples made various treaties and agreements with Rome and became client kingdoms until the whole of the island was brought under Roman control later in the first century CE. Power was also concentrated in the religious priesthood, the Druids, who may have bolstered resistance to Rome, although little is known with certainty about them. At the time of Roman contact, power was centered in the *oppida*, large protected population centers, which emerged toward the end of the Iron Age in Britain in the first century BCE.

The conquest of the island and incorporation into the Roman Empire was completed in various stages through the second half of the first century CE. Conquest progressed from the south to the north. Some tribes were particularly difficult to bring under Roman power, such as the Silures of southern Wales. Their stalwart resistance and expert local knowledge of terrain and landscape helped them deflect Roman invasions for extended periods of time. They were finally conquered in the 70s CE by Sextus Iulius Frontinus. Conquest continued north subduing tribes in northern Wales and up toward what would become the frontier for much of the Roman period in Britain. A particularly brutal campaign was waged against the Druids. They were targeted by the Romans with particular zeal because of their mysterious practices, such as alleged human sacrifice, and extra-tribal organization, which may have allowed them an advantageous position for organizing resistance. They held out on the isle of Mona (Anglesey) off north Wales and were eliminated by the governor Suetonius Paullinus in 60 CE, with Anglesey finally taken by the governor Agricola in 77 CE. Major setbacks occurred in 60/61 CE during the so-called Boudiccan Revolt when the Icenii tribe, together with the Trinovantes, roused a large rebel army that

ravaged major Roman centers and killed thousands before the Roman legions could recover and prevail. Small revolts occurred all over the island and were quickly subdued by Roman troops.

Conquest was considered complete when Agricola led an army to the highlands of Scotland in the late 70s and early 80s CE and defeated northern peoples at the battle of Mons Graupius in 83 or 84 CE. The location of this battle is still unknown, but modern scholars have suggested various spots in northern Scotland. Quickly the Highlands became too difficult to maintain control, and the Roman army abandoned the single legionary fortress still unfinished at Inchtuthil, north of Strageath. The frontier was brought down to the line between the Tyne River and the Solway Firth with outpost forts north of the frontier.

Various emperors attempted to either extend or consolidate the province of Britain, but the lands north of Hadrian's Wall mostly remained volatile and out of reach of Roman consolidation. In the 120s CE, Hadrian made native communication and travel around the north of Britain more difficult with the construction of a wall across the country from east to west. "Hadrian's Wall" effectively created a military zone in a cordon across the country and allowed the Roman army to control activity in the north. Soon after Hadrian's death, however, Antoninus Pius abandoned the stone cordon and built a turf and timber wall along the shorter Forth-Clyde line in Scotland (west of Edinburgh). This frontier was occupied for only ca. 20 years, after which time Hadrian's Wall was reoccupied and garrisoned as the frontier line once again. Septimius Severus would again attempt control of the north in the early third century, but the campaigns were abandoned when he died at York in 211 CE.

Between 260 and 274 CE Britain was part of a separatist government known as the "Gallic Empire." This period actually brought greater stability to the western provinces but only lasted 14 years, ending when the empire was reunited again under Aurelian in 274 CE. Britain broke away again in 286–296 with the revolt of Carausius and Allectus. The general instability during the third-century crisis period had already led to opportunist raids by native peoples beyond the frontiers throughout the West. The result in Britain was a reconsolidation of the frontiers in the early fourth century and continued occupation along the wall and at northern forts throughout the fourth century. Britain was ultimately abandoned by the Roman Empire in 410 CE, its armed forces being withdrawn to fight invasions in continental

Europe. The Britons, Romanized and native, were left to fend for themselves, and Rome would offer no further assistance for their defense.

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See also Britain, Conquest of; British Revolt; Carausius; Hadrian's Wall; Vindolanda

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British Revolt (60/61 CE)

Among all the revolts and rebellions in Britain during the Roman period, the worst was the revolt of the Iceni in 60 or 61 CE, the so-called Boudiccan Revolt. The rebellion was sparked when the client kingdom of the Iceni, led by Prasutagus and his queen Boudicca, was incorporated into the Roman Empire in a brutal and disorganized way after the death of the king. Boudicca gathered the Iceni and was helped by the neighboring Trinovantes while the Roman governor Paullinus was busy with two legions in the conquest of northern Wales and Anglesey. The rebellious Britons first ravaged the city of Colchester and continued their march to London and St. Albans (Verulamium) before the Romans could make any serious successful counter attack. A large part of the Legio IX led by Petilius Cerialis, was slaughtered (approximately 2,000 casualties) in the initial confrontations, while the Legio II Augusta was stationed further south, out of reach. Roman forces were severely outnumbered but were nonetheless finally successful in stopping the rebellious forces somewhere in the Midlands in an area that leveled the differences in number by terrain advantageous to the Romans. Many of the cities and towns involved display strata of massive burning and

destruction in the archaeological record of this period. The numbers dead seem always to be exaggerated but the figures offered by Tacitus (*Annals* 14.37) for the decisive battle are 400 Roman soldiers dead to 80,000 Britons, which is generally agreed to be an overstatement. All told the revolt reportedly took the lives of 70,000–80,000 in the towns and cities sacked and burned by rebels, but realistically this number should probably be halved.

The reasons for the revolt seem to be many and to some extent the details are unclear. What is certain is the general mistreatment of the client kingdom, probably by lower governmental officials, during its annexation into the province after the death of Prasutagus. Tacitus reports maltreatment of the Icenii royal family in the form of rape, flogging, and land seizure by Roman soldiers and officials. The Trinovantes had apparently been infuriated by the treatment that they received from legionary veterans living in the colony at Colchester, who plundered the countryside and enslaved Britons. Generally, the process of conquest and colonization pushed the native Britons to rebellion in under 20 years of initial colonization in 43 CE. Relationships must have been strained between the various groups at stake in a newly forming province: Roman officials, local elites, the army, and the many individuals associated with military and political conquest who would change dramatically the face of the population of Britain. Almost constant pressure was exerted in Wales through the 40s and 50s CE against Roman forces and incorporation into the Roman state, and elsewhere small rebellions are given less treatment by classical authors but are hinted at in other ways. Other significant revolts did take place in Britain, most well known is the trouble arising when Trajan died and Hadrian came to power as emperor. There are still few references in classical literature about this event except for a few lines that hint at rebellion and deaths inflicted by the Britons that took a significant number of lives.

Elizabeth M. Greene

See also Britain, Conquest of; Britain, Roman

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Brundisium, Treaty of (40 BCE)

The Treaty of Brundisium in October 40 BCE was an agreement between Octavian and Mark Antony to settle their differences and resume cooperation and mutual dominance over the Roman Empire. Relations between Octavian and Antony had become tense following the victories at Philippi in 42 BCE. In 41, Lucius Antonius and Fulvia (wife of Antony) had fought Octavian in the Perusine War until they were forced to surrender in February/March, 40 BCE. Antony, summoned by his brother and wife, came to Italy too late to relieve them. Fulvia met Antony in Sicily and briefed him on the situation. Joined by Domitius Ahenobarbus, formerly an admiral under Brutus and Cassius, Antony landed near Brundisium, but he was refused entry into the port (Appian, *Civil Wars* 5.56.1: because he was bringing with him an enemy—Domitius Ahenobarbus). Thereupon, Antony attacked Servilius Rullus, a lieutenant of Octavian in charge of Brundisium, and made overtures to Sextus Pompeius.

Octavian and his senior officers Salvidienus Rufus (designated consul 39 BCE) and Marcus Agrippa came to southern Italy to fight Antony. Some of their soldiers deserted, but when confronted returned to service. Nevertheless, the soldiers agreed secretly to try to reconcile Octavian and Antony, but Antony refused reconciliation, choosing to fight Octavian. The forces of Octavian then laid siege to Antony in Brundisium. The soldiers on both sides reproached one another for raising arms against their former friends. News now came that Fulvia had died in Sicily, changing dramatically the interests of both commanders.

No longer fighting for his wife's cause, Antony was susceptible to compromise. A mutual friend of both commanders, Lucius Cocceius Nerva,

along with his brother Marcus (an ancestor of the future emperor Nerva) and Antony's mother Julia, brokered a peace between the disgruntled leaders (Appian, *Civil Wars* 5.60–63). According to Dio and Appian, they agreed that Octavian should control Sardinia, Spain, Gaul, and Dalmatia; Antony would control all Roman territory in Europe and Asia across the Ionian Sea. Lepidus would retain the provinces in Africa, and since Sextus was holding Sicily, Octavian and Antony in common would wage war against Sextus Pompeius. In addition, Octavian agreed to pardon all those who had helped Lucius Antonius, including Domitius Ahenobarbus (consul 32) and Tiberius Claudius Nero (praetor 42). Finally, and most importantly, now that Fulvia had died, Antony agreed to marry the recently widowed and still pregnant Octavia, Octavian's sister, to secure the peace (Dio 48.31.3). Their marriage required a special law to be passed in the Senate to allow Octavia to remarry before her mandatory 10-month widowhood had ended.

As the greatest consequence of the Treaty of Brundisium, the Second Triumvirate was essentially renewed right at its breaking point. Sextus, unaware that Antony had betrayed him, landed in Calabria to join forces with Antony against Octavian. When he heard of the Treaty of Brundisium, he withdrew and sent his lieutenant Menas to conquer Sardinia. Finally, the Treaty of Brundisium elevated Agrippa to become Octavian's top commander by eliminating Salvidienus Rufus, who had secretly offered to betray Octavian to Antony. As a show of good faith, Antony revealed this treachery to Octavian, who at once ordered Salvidienus Rufus to be punished. Salvidienus Rufus was either prosecuted and executed, committed suicide, or was executed (Velleius 2.76.4; Appian, *Civil Wars* 5.66; Dio 48.33.1–3).

Gaius Stern

See also Civil Wars (II) (44–31 BCE); Fulvia; Mark Antony; Octavian; Perusia, Siege of; Second Triumvirate

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Brutus (Junius Brutus, Lucius) (ca. 509 BCE)

According to Roman tradition, Lucius Junius Brutus (consul 509 BCE) was one of the founders of the early Republic, overthrowing Tarquinius Superbus, the last king of Rome. Tarquinius Superbus' son raped Lucretia, the wife of Tarquinius Collatinus, and Lucretia committed suicide. To avenge her death Collatinus and Brutus became allies, overthrowing the monarchy and driving out the Tarquins. They held the first consulship together. However, Brutus proceeded to sever relations with Collatinus, forcing Collatinus to abdicate and go into exile as a member of the Tarquin family, suspected of plotting against the newborn Republic. Brutus is said to have put to death his sons for conspiring to restore the Tarquins. The level of intrigue may reflect the chaotic conditions of early Rome, when Rome was not yet the dominant power in Italy but a rival of other city-states in central Italy.

However, legend also accreted around Brutus as the founder of the Roman Republic, dramatized in Livy's *History of Rome*. The assassins of Julius Caesar in 44 BCE invoked the memory of Brutus as the defender of liberty. Marcus Junius Brutus was allegedly provoked to participate in the assassination by people who reminded him of his illustrious ancestry. Such ancestry was notional and political; due to Roman naming conventions and the frequency of adoptions, Marcus' direct descent from Lucius Junius Brutus over 400 years seems unlikely.

Sara E. Phang

See also Brutus (Junius Brutus, Marcus); Caesar, Assassination of; Monarchy; Overthrow of the Monarchy

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Brutus (Junius Brutus, Marcus) (ca. 85–42 BCE)

One of the most famous assassins of Caesar, Marcus Junius Brutus was the son of a man with the same name (executed by Pompey in 77 for his part in Lepidus' rebellion) and Servilia (a half-sister of Cato and later Caesar's mistress). Brutus was adopted about 59 by his uncle, Quintus Servilius Caepio, and took the name Quintus Caepio Brutus, until reverting to his birth-name some years later. He was brought up by another uncle, Cato the Younger, who trained him in Stoicism.

In the 50s, the young Brutus was hostile toward Pompey, as to be expected, but took his side when Caesar invaded Italy in 49, serving under him in Greece. Following Caesar's victory at Pharsalus in 48, Brutus was captured but pardoned by Caesar, possibly through his mother's influence. He was Caesar's appointee as governor of Cisalpine Gaul from 47 to 45, and designated urban praetor for 44, with Cassius Longinus as peregrine praetor. Both were named in advance by Caesar to be consuls for 41.

Brutus had served on Cato's staff when he governed Cyprus from 58 to 56, enriching himself by lending money at high interest. When he returned to Rome, he married Claudia, sister of Clodius Pulcher the tribune. However, after Cato's suicide in 46, he suddenly divorced Claudia and married Cato's daughter Porcia. Earlier Cassius had married Junia Tertia, a half-sister of Brutus. So there were extensive family connections between all these men.

Alarmed at Caesar being named perpetual dictator and at plans for his deification, Brutus joined Cassius and other leading senators in the plot to assassinate Caesar on the Ides of March, 44. Conscious of his descent from Lucius Junius Brutus who, according to tradition, led the expulsion of the kings from Rome, and reviving his adoptive name to show his connection with Gaius Servilius Ahala, another famous tyrannicide, Brutus was ideologically inclined to join the plot.

Popular outrage over Caesar's murder drove Brutus and Cassius from Rome and then from Italy, to take up the provinces of Asia and Syria assigned by the Senate. When Octavian seized a consulship in 43 and had the assassins declared murderers and enemies of the state, he put aside differences with Mark Antony and formed the Second Triumvirate with him and Lepidus, to confront Brutus and Cassius, who had gradually acquired control of armies and treasuries in the eastern Mediterranean and who were

heading back toward Italy. The sides fought two battles at Philippi on October 3 and 23, 42; Cassius committed suicide after losing the first, and Brutus did likewise after losing the second. He was given an honorable burial by Antony, while Porcia committed suicide too on the news of her husband's death.

Despite Stoic principles, Brutus was arrogant, greedy, and cruel in his treatment of inferiors. He was an accomplished orator, using the plain Attic style, and a writer of many works, none of which has survived. He was much admired by Cicero and others, and, though not the organizer of the plot against Caesar, he was regarded as its spiritual leader. In death, he became a symbol of resistance to tyranny, like his uncle Cato.

Bruce Marshall

See also Caesar, Assassination of; Caesar, Dictatorship of; Cassius Longinus; Civil Wars (II) (44–31 BCE); Mark Antony; Octavian

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Bureaucracy (Roman Military)

The imperial Roman army had an extensive bureaucracy that documented and sought to control recruitment, the distribution of equipment, resources, and pay, daily orders and tasks, furlough, and discipline. Though literary sources refer to record-keeping, few documents are extant before the first century CE. Documents survive mainly from arid regions in Roman Egypt and the Near East, but also have been found in anaerobic conditions in Roman Britain near Hadrian's Wall. The army staffed specialists to maintain its records. The bureaucracy both required and trained literate personnel, who might be promoted into line management ranks, contributing to social

mobility within the Roman army. However, literate Roman military personnel also used bureaucracy to control and intimidate provincial subjects.

The Republic's consuls and quaestors (who were in charge of military finances and logistics) undoubtedly kept records of some kind. Commanders might be accompanied by writers, as Scipio Aemilianus, commander during the latter part of the Third Punic War, was by his friend the Greek historian Polybius. Commanders might be themselves talented writers, as was Julius Caesar, the author of the *Gallic Wars* and *Civil War*, or Cicero, who waged an undistinguished campaign in Cilicia. But these top-down, analytical and rhetorical viewpoints are distinct from daily documentation.

Such documentation mainly survives from arid areas of the Roman Empire, such as Roman Egypt (annexed after 30 BCE) and the Mesopotamian frontier, where many documents from Dura-Europos, a Roman base during the early third century, have been found. These documents are mainly papyri and wood tablets. In the late twentieth century, archaeologists discovered wood tablets used as a writing material preserved in anaerobic bog-like conditions outside the Roman fort of Vindolanda, near Hadrian's Wall in Roman Britain. These thin slabs of wood were written on in ink, like papyrus. Similar wood tablets have been found at Carlisle on Hadrian's Wall and at Vindonissa, a base in Roman Germany. Ostraka, pottery sherds large enough to offer a relatively flat writing surface, were also used to record more ephemeral or casual documents; many have been found at Roman bases in North Africa and Egypt. It is likely that the Roman army employed the same type and extent of documentation throughout the empire.

The army had clerks (*librarii*) and record keepers (*cornicularii*); junior staff officers (*beneficiarii*) also had administrative roles. Though they were among the *immunes*, personnel exempt from fatigues, the *librarii* and *cornicularii* did not form a cadre of noncombatant clerical workers. They gained experience of administration, and they might be promoted to tactical roles, leading eventually to the centurionate. It is likely that all personnel in the legion were expected to train for combat and to fight if necessary, though this is still controversial. *Beneficiarii*, detached to assist provincial governors, might be less likely to see combat.

New recruits were documented in an effort to ensure that they were of free birth and free status and lacked a criminal history, preventing slaves,

convicts, and deserters from enlisting. However, the Roman Empire lacked widespread proofs of identification. As the letters of Pliny the Younger to the emperor Trajan show, one role of the recruiting officers (or governor's staff) was to investigate the status of suspect recruits before they could be entered in the rosters of their units. Extant rosters show that new soldiers were identified by their name, age, any distinguishing marks such as scars, and the date on which they were enrolled. A serving soldier was also identified by his unit (legion, praetorian or urban cohort, auxiliary cavalry ala or infantry cohort, fleet) and subunit within it, such as his legionary centuria. These details were all necessary because many soldiers had the same name, and the Roman Empire had not invented unique identification numbers.

New recruits were given a stipend (*viaticum*) to fund their travel to their unit; this was drawn against their pay, as was their equipment, including arms and armor, a substantial expense that must have left many soldiers indebted to their unit. The new soldier might also find himself indebted for a tent or a horse. Records were kept of the distribution of equipment, since it was bought back by the soldier's unit when he was discharged or died during service, as surviving receipts show. Other surviving documents attest the receipt of pay (from which these stoppages for equipment, clothing, and fodder were made) or receipt of fodder for horses or money with which to buy it. These receipts show that many common soldiers, even in the *auxilia*, could at least sign their names, though they may have been "slow writers" (as the *subliterate* were termed in Roman Egypt) and needed to have the documents read aloud to them. More extensive private letters written by soldiers (or at least dictated by them to professional scribes) have also survived.

Other documents survive that show the assignment of personnel to daily and long-term duties. A so-called duty roster from Cyrenaica in Roman North Africa (modern Libya) displays the assignments of a list of personnel over a sequence of days, including routine fatigues (such as sweeping) and punishment. Longer term assignments were also recorded in surviving documents, attesting the assignment of soldiers to detached duties, usually involving the collection of supplies, which would take them away from their base for days or weeks at a time.

From Dura-Europos in the early third century, are found a series of "morning reports" (so termed by the modern specialists who discovered and

edited them). The report took a standard form, giving the formal name of the unit and listing its total strength and its subunits with their officers. Personnel departing and returning were listed. The orders of the day and the watchword were read out. The soldiers recited an oath of obedience, saying “we are ready for all orders.” Personnel who performed rites that were part of the cult of the standards were listed. These reports give a glimpse of formal routine and ceremonial in the army, an auxiliary unit in Roman Syria, in which personnel may have been assembled in the camp before their presiding officers, religious rites were performed, and the orders of the day and watchword were given.

Cumulative documentation was also employed by the Roman army, seen in the surviving *pridiana* or “strength reports” that list the total number of personnel in a unit, its officers, and changes to personnel (departures and returns, promotions, transfers, deaths, and discharges). These documents gave the Roman administration, probably at the level of a governor and his staff, concrete information about available military forces and were probably used for planning and to compile reports sent to the emperors, such as the Augustan *breviarium totius imperii*.

Documents were used to grant personnel furlough and prove their right to furlough, which were important in an empire without fast or reliable transport and communications. Though signal fires may have been used in emergencies, they were not used in routine matters. A soldier on leave had no way to contact his base faster than he himself could travel on horseback. Surviving documents from Vindolanda show that a soldier might petition his commanding officer for furlough. According to Roman ideals of discipline, a good commander granted furlough sparingly. If he received permission, he might obtain a pass that he carried with him (attested in Roman Egypt) to prove that he was not absent without leave or a deserter.

Finally, documentation in general served to maintain discipline and reduce internal conflict (the reason for an article on “bureaucracy” in *Conflict in Ancient Greece and Rome*). Documentation provided an objective record maintained over time, important in a profession in which personnel were frequently transferred and risked death or incapacitation on campaign. Documentation was a resource to which individual personnel could appeal if they were accused. For example, the soldier on furlough submitted documentation to this effect and may even have carried a permit with him. He could prove that he was not a deserter. But documentation

also promoted the physical and social control of personnel, recorded as assigned to duties or punishment. Overall, the imperial Roman army's bureaucracy was highly developed for an ancient society's and contributed to the effectiveness and continuity of the Roman army.

Sara E. Phang

See also Breviarium Totius Imperii; Desertion; Documentary Sources; Military Discipline; Pay and Finances, Military (Imperial); Promotion in Army (Imperial); Recruitment of Army (Imperial)

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Burebista (Reigned 80s–44 BCE)

Burebista was a major Thracian warlord in central and eastern Europe, the most important Dacian leader before King Decebalus in the late first century CE. Burebista led the Thracian Getae from obscurity and conquered a large, multiethnic empire that extended from the Black Sea to Pannonia (eastern Austria/Hungary). The main Greco-Roman literary accounts for Burebista are Strabo 7.3.5 and 7.3.11 and Jordanes *Gothic History* 67; Ptolemy's *Geographica* 3.8.1–4 describes the region. A Greek inscription from Dionysopolis also attests Burebista's claim to be "king of kings" in the Danube region and "friend" of Pompey.

According to Strabo, Burebista unified the Dacians and Getae, fought the Celts and Illyrians, subjugated the Greek colonies of the western Black Sea littoral and raided south through Thrace into Roman Macedonia. Strabo attributes the destruction of the Celtic Boii (Bohemia) and Taurisci (Slovenia) to the king. Greek history shows archaeological evidence of destruction in this time. Burebista built citadels around Costești high in the southern Carpathians that exhibited sophisticated Greek military

architecture and secured obedience internally through the priestly class, later powerful in the Dacian kingdom, through his collaborator, Deceneus. In the Roman civil war of 49–45 BCE, Pompey courted Burebista's support through the king's envoy, Acornion of Dionysopolis. Julius Caesar's subsequent assassination in 44 BCE prevented his intended campaign against Burebista, and Burebista himself was soon overthrown.

However, after Burebista's death his empire disintegrated into smaller kingdoms, facilitating the Roman conquest of the Pannonian region in the late first century BCE and of Dacia in the early second century (annexed as a Roman province in 106 CE). After Burebista, the next king to unify the Dacian region and pose a major threat to Roman extension was Decebalus, defeated by Trajan (Roman emperor 98–117). Subsequent major kingdoms did not arise in central Europe before the period of migrations (late fourth and fifth centuries CE).

Stephen Chappell

See also Dacia, Dacians; Dacian Wars; Decebalus; Pannonia, Pannonians; Pannonian Wars

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Burgundians

A Germanic people, possibly of Scandinavian origin. The first mention of the Burgundians is in the Roman geographer Pliny, who notes them with the Goths among the eastern Germanic peoples. Claudius Ptolemy, writing in the fourth century, is more specific and places the Burgundians between the modern Oder and Vistula rivers in what is now central Poland. According to Jordanes, the Burgundians were attacked and almost annihilated by the Gepids, a people living near the mouth of the Vistula.

This probably caused at least some Burgundians to migrate westward, as Burgundians appear on the east bank of the Rhine in the late third century. In 278, the emperor Probus defeated a Burgundian raiding party in eastern Gaul. The Burgundians seem to have remained on the eastern bank of the Rhine throughout the fourth century. In 406 various peoples, including the Alans, Vandals, and Suebi, crossed the Rhine and entered Roman territory. The Burgundians do not appear to have joined them. In 411, Gundahar, the king of the Burgundians, along with the Alans, supported Jovinus in the latter's bid to make himself emperor. In return for their support Jovinus settled the Burgundians along the Rhine inside Roman territory, giving them the status of *foederati*. After the death of Jovinus, their status was reaffirmed by the emperor Honorius (395–423). Despite their status as *foederati* Burgundian raids on Roman territory continued throughout the early fifth century. These raids ultimately provoked a Roman response.

In 437, the Roman warlord Aetius encouraged his Hunnic allies to attack the Burgundians, decimating the Burgundians and killing Gundahar. The defeated Burgundians surrendered to Aetius, who settled them in the region of modern Savoy under Gundahar's son Gundioc. During Gundioc's rule, Burgundian relations with the Visigoths seem to have strengthened, as indicated by the presence of Burgundian warriors, led by Gundioc and his brother Chilperic, in the Visigothic campaign against the Suebi in 455. After the death of Aetius in 454, Gundioc backed the warlord Ricimer in the latter's bid to dominate the western Roman Empire. In 472, Ricimer conspired with Gundobad, who had replaced his father Gundioc as king of the Burgundians, in killing the western Roman emperor Anthemius and appointing Olybrius as western Roman emperor. Olybrius and Ricimer died of natural causes soon thereafter, leaving Gundobad to elevate Glycerius to the throne. Glycerius, however, was soon deposed in favor of Julius Nepos. After the overthrow of Glycerius Gundobad abandoned Roman politics and focused on consolidating his power among the Burgundians.

Michael D. Blodgett

See also Federates; Franks

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C

Caecilius Metellus Macedonicus, Quintus (d. 115 BCE)

Quintus Caecilius Metellus Macedonicus was a Roman general and politician during the mid-second century BCE, famous for his victories in Macedonia. His career began in 168 BCE in the Third Macedonian War. He was sent as an envoy to Rome by the commander Lucius Aemilius Paullus to report on his success at Pydna. Following this victory, the Romans abolished the Macedonian monarchy and organized the region. The enforcement of strict conditions culminated in the uprising of a royal pretender, Andriscus, in 150 BCE. In 148 BCE, after initial negotiations failed, the Senate sent Macedonicus as praetor to wage war against him. Backed by a strong force, he successfully secured the region and captured the false king.

Macedonicus continued his military activity throughout Macedonia and Thrace as promagistrate. He was also unsuccessful in preventing the Achaean League from engaging in battle with Sparta and Rome. He defeated the Achaean forces at Scarpheia and Chaeroneia, important strongholds in central Greece. Macedonicus returned to Rome and celebrated a triumph in 146 BCE for his victory in Macedonia over Andriscus, earning the honorary name Macedonicus.

After failing on two occasions, he was elected consul in 143 BCE and allotted the province of Nearer Spain. Prior to his departure, he was enlisted to suppress a slave revolt at Minturnae, south of Rome. In Spain, he was immediately active in the Celtiberian War. His command was renewed for the following year, which allowed him to capture Contrebia and attack Numantia in central Spain.

Macedonicus died in 115 BCE and was considered to have been most

fortunate in his life. Not only did he achieve the highest political offices and military honors, but his four sons also had similar political and military success, and his daughters' noble marriages. Although an imposing and authoritative figure, he is said to have always gracefully opposed his political adversaries.

Kimberley Webb

See also Macedonian War, Third; Scipio Aemilianus; Spanish Wars

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Caecilius Metellus Numidicus, Quintus (Active Late Second Century BCE)

Quintus Caecilius Metellus Numidicus was a prominent politician and military figure. He was active during the late second century BCE until his exile in 100 BCE. Numidicus is notable for his military achievements in the war against Jugurtha, ruler of Numidia.

In 110 BCE, Numidicus was elected consul for 109 and assigned the command against Jugurtha in Numidia. After retraining an undisciplined army, he achieved victories at the River Muthul and at Vaga in eastern Numidia. He then attempted to lay siege to Zama, closer to the Roman province of Africa. Gaius Marius, his legate, was instrumental in this campaign. However, Marius requested to return to Rome to stand for the consulship when Numidicus' command was renewed for another year. Numidicus denied him leave and Marius reluctantly remained at war, assisting in the recapture of Vaga, which had been betrayed to Jugurtha.

Numidicus entered into an agreement with Bomilcar, a Numidian commander close to Jugurtha, who promised the leader to the Romans in exchange for amnesty. Jugurtha learned of this treason and executed Bomilcar, causing Numidicus to prepare for immediate war. Marius was allowed to return to Rome to pursue his political career and was elected consul. The Senate had already prorogued Numidicus' command. However,

the tribunes stripped him of this and selected Marius as his replacement. In the meantime, Numidicus followed Jugurtha, capturing Thala and proceeding to Cirta, in northeastern Numidia. At this point, Jugurtha convinced King Bocchus of Mauretania to lend protection.

Numidicus learned that he had been succeeded and departed for Rome before Marius arrived. Despite the incomplete campaign, Numidicus celebrated a triumph in 106 BCE and assumed the name Numidicus.

In 102 BCE, Numidicus held the office of censor with his cousin Gaius Caecilius Metellus Caprarius. He attempted to expel the *populares* Lucius Appuleius Saturninus and Gaius Servilius Glaucia from the Senate, but his colleague disapproved. Numidicus also suffered personal attack after refusing to enroll a freedman, who was posing as the son of Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus, as an equestrian.

In 100 BCE, Saturninus, as tribune, passed an agrarian law that allotted land for the settlement of Marius' troops. It included a clause that all senators must swear an oath to uphold it. Numidicus opposed the measure and failed to swear to its provisions. Instead, he went into voluntary exile at Rhodes and a bill that officially exiled him was passed in his absence. In 98 BCE, the efforts to recall him were eventually successful, and, although he did return to Rome, he was no longer politically active.

Significantly, Numidicus was the first commander to be at war and stripped of his authority by the tribunes at Rome, against the wishes of the Senate.

Kimberley Webb

See also Jugurtha; Jugurthine War; Marius

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Caecilius Metellus Pius, Quintus (ca. 130–ca. 63 BCE)

Quintus Caecilius Metellus Pius was a member of the powerful Metellan family which had produced numerous consuls (10 alone in the period from 119 to 60). He earned the additional name Pius (“the faithful”) for his efforts

in securing his father's recall from exile. His father, Metellus Numidicus (consul 109), had been replaced by Marius in the command against Jugurtha, and exiled by him in a dispute in 100. Consequently in Metellus Pius' time, his family sided with Sulla.

Metellus Pius held commands during the Social War (91–87 BCE), most notably defeating the Marsi, and went on to the praetorship of 89. When Sulla left for the campaign against Mithridates in the east, Metellus Pius was given proconsular command over southern Italy, but he was unable to defend it against Cinna, a supporter of Marius, and left for North Africa. Here he raised a private army of clients, eventually joining Sulla when he landed back in Italy in 83.

Metellus Pius played a role in Sulla's victory over the Marians, and was rewarded by appointment as *pontifex maximus* in 81 and consul with Sulla in 80. He was then sent to Spain to campaign against Quintus Sertorius, the last remaining Marian general. He struggled initially until joined by Pompey in 77, which led to a series of victories and an end to the war.

Metellus Pius returned to Rome in 71 to celebrate a triumph. Despite cooperation with Pompey, his politics were conservative, and he opposed the granting of extraordinary commands to Pompey and other activities of the *popularis* politicians. He died probably in the year 63, replaced as *pontifex maximus* by Caesar.

Bruce Marshall

See also Sertorius; Social War (91–87 BCE); Sulla, Lucius Cornelius

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Caesar, Assassination of (44 BCE)

On March 15, 44 BCE, in Pompey's Theater in the city of Rome, the dictator Gaius Julius Caesar was murdered by a group of senators, led by Marcus Junius Brutus and Gaius Cassius Longinus, both pardoned opponents in the recent civil war, and including former supporters Decimus Junius Brutus Albinus and Gaius Trebonius.

The most obvious reason for the conspiracy was the unchallenged

dominance of Caesar. The final defeat of Pompeian forces in the Caesarian-Pompeian civil war, at Munda in March 45, meant that Caesar had no rivals left. He had been appointed dictator in late 49, a republican office that granted temporary supremacy to a single man to deal with a crisis. The dictatorship was conventionally held for a short period but in 44, following his victory at Munda in March 45, Caesar was appointed “dictator for life.” Roman political tradition was very hostile to monarchy, and there are many historical and legendary examples of assassination of would-be rulers. Caesar also held consulships simultaneously with his dictatorships, another shunned practice. Caesar also received the legal right to appoint half the magistrates each year and award command of provinces, meaning that he could reward and punish men through access to magistracies, and this added to the appearance of monarchic rule. The Roman nobility felt deprived of their traditional *libertas* (freedom) to compete for office.

From late 45 onward, many excessive honors, such as the right to use the title *imperator* permanently, usually reserved for those who had been awarded a triumph, and to wear triumphal clothing at all public events, were voted to Caesar by the Senate, some of which he accepted. It has been suggested that some were proposed by his enemies to make him unpopular. His own behavior intensified this, however. When two tribunes of the plebs, Caesetius and Marullus, attempted to punish a man who had hailed him as “King,” he stripped them of their office, a grave breach of the tribunician right to sacrosanctity. At the Lupercalia festival on February 15, Mark Antony, his fellow consul, attempted to crown him. Although he refused, it was rumored that only the negative reaction of the crowd prevented him from accepting.

Finally, Caesar intended to invade the Arsacid Persian Empire, centered on modern Iran. He planned to leave on March 18, 44 BCE on a three-year campaign. There were rumors that he intended to transfer administration to the east, and move the capital to Alexandria, due to his liaison with the Ptolemaic queen Cleopatra. All these allegations increased Caesar’s unpopularity with the Senate.

Brutus and Cassius were the central figures of the conspiracy: Brutus was allegedly descended from Lucius Junius Brutus and Gaius Servilius Ahala, both famed tyrannicides, and with Cassius had supported Pompey before his defeat at Pharsalus in summer 48. Both men had been pardoned, and were praetors in 44. Decimus Brutus and Trebonius, legates of Caesar

during the Gallic War, seemed more motivated by a lack of political opportunity within Caesar's Rome. The conspirators numbered between 23 and 35 men, expanded in later sources to approximately 60, largely senators, divided between former supporters of the dictator and his forgiven adversaries, and allegedly held numerous small-scale meetings to avoid detection.

The conspirators clearly planned the attack itself. One conspirator, Trebonius, was to keep Antony outside the theater to prevent interference. Antony himself was not to be harmed, on Marcus Brutus' instruction so that the murder would not seem like a coup. Decimus Brutus had hired gladiators to protect the group. When Caesar entered the theater, the group approached him, as if in support of a petition from Lucius Tillius Cimber. Two brothers, Publius and Gaius Servilius Casca, struck the first blows, and were followed by the whole group. Each man present sought to strike a blow; Caesar received between 23 and 35 wounds, though only one was fatal.

The assassination provoked panic among those present, who scattered, and the conspirators occupied the Capitol. Some, notably Publius Cornelius Dolabella and Marcus Tullius Cicero, offered their support, but it was clear that Antony, and Marcus Aemilius Lepidus, Caesar's *magister equitum*, held local military supremacy. On March 17, the Senate met and struck a compromise proposed by Antony and Cicero: an amnesty would be declared and all of Caesar's acts and decrees would be implemented. However, the urban populace rioted over Caesar's assassination, allegedly encouraged by Antony's speech in Caesar's honor, and besieged Brutus and Cassius on the Capitol. The conspirators were forced to flee the city. Some went to their provinces, granted by Caesar, but Marcus Brutus and Cassius held urban magistracies, requiring Antony to grant them permission to leave. The nature of the compromise made a return to a republican system of government impractical.

The assassins lacked a clear plan for the aftermath. Cicero complained that Antony should have been removed, as he appeared to assume Caesar's position. The arrival of Caesar's legal heir, Octavian, forced Antony to take a more aggressive tone. By November, the compromise had broken down, with a confused civil war beginning in northern Italy around the town of Mutina, between Antony, Octavian, and Decimus Brutus. Although Marcus Brutus and Cassius seized control of the eastern empire in early 43, the

reconciliation of Antony and Octavian resulted in the condemnation of the assassins for treason. Brutus and Cassius were defeated at the two battles of Philippi on October 3 and 23, 42 BCE and subsequently committed suicide.

The assassination of Caesar is highly important to the understanding of the period. It is firmly rooted in a period of tumultuous political change between republic and empire. Caesar was killed due to his autocracy and the appearance of monarchy, but the Roman republican system was not restored after his death. Partly, this was due to a lack of foresight by the conspirators, but this was compounded by the compromise that gave them amnesty. Caesar's acts continued to have force of law, and their beneficiaries continued to owe allegiance to his memory. Caesar's legacy was taken up by Octavian, his great-nephew and heir, who, as Augustus, would end the civil wars and inaugurate a new period, the Principate.

Bradley Jordan

See also Assassination; Brutus (Junius Brutus, Marcus); Caesar, Dictatorship of; Caesar, Gaius Julius; Cassius Longinus; Civil Wars (I) (49–45 BCE); Dictator; Mark Antony; Monarchy; Octavian

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Caesar, Dictatorship of (49–44 BCE)

A Roman dictator was traditionally a short-term magistrate, a single chief executive replacing the joint powers of the two consuls, appointed to cope with an emergency and expected to resign his powers when the emergency had passed or after six months. Lucius Cornelius Sulla, dictator in 82–81 BCE, had done much to give "dictatorship" its tyrannical connotations, but Julius Caesar, dictator in 49–44 BCE, contributed greatly to the autocratic meaning

of the modern term.

Caesar began his course toward dictatorship by crossing the River Rubicon, the southern boundary of Cisalpine Gaul, on January 10, 49 BCE. In this action, Caesar was actually committing treason, since it was illegal for a commander to go outside the border of his province without senatorial permission, and thus he brought on a civil war. The ostensible issue for Caesar was his desire to move straight into a second consulship in 48 and thus avoid prosecution for the use of force to pass legislation during his consulship in 59. "They [his political enemies] would have it so," he remarked as he surveyed the dead at Pharsalus. "Despite all my achievements, I, Gaius Caesar, would have been condemned to death, if I had not sought the help of my army." Rivalry with Pompey was the real issue, and Caesar had found himself being maneuvered into a showdown by demands that he quit his province and disband his army, without a corresponding decrease in Pompey's legions.

Caesar gained control of Rome when Pompey retreated across the Adriatic to regroup his forces. But before confronting Pompey, Caesar undertook a lightning campaign against pro-Pompeian forces in Spain. In August 49, while still in Massilia (Marseilles) during that campaign, he was named dictator. He returned to Rome and exercised this office for just 11 days to conduct elections, and was himself elected consul for the second time for 48 (this was the point at issue in the lead-up to the civil war). He then left to conduct the campaign in Thessaly against Pompey, which ended in victory at Pharsalus.

Later that year he was named (in absence) dictator again, this time for one year, probably in October when news of his victory over Pompey reached Rome. The office would expire in September 47. Meanwhile Caesar had pursued Pompey to Egypt where he dallied with Cleopatra while coping with a blockade of his small army. He followed that up with a lightning campaign against Pharnaces, ruler of Pontus who had overrun Cappadocia and Armenia Minor. The five-day campaign in June 47 ended with a victory at Zela, summed up in the famous laconic placard, "I came, I saw, I conquered."

Though there had been little communication from him, Caesar was back in Rome by October 47. Due to civic unrest, his presence in Rome was needed, but he did not stay long. Electoral rules required a 10-year gap between offices, and it was not normal for a person to hold more than one

position at a time, but Caesar now held several positions together and without the usual gap. He was elected to a third consulship for 46, with Lepidus, and soon after was named dictator for the third time (again in absence) for 10 years. Caesar had left for Africa to campaign against the Pompeians who had gathered there under Metellus Scipio and Cato. He scored a resounding victory at Thapsus in April 46, and news of that victory had led to the renewed dictatorship. The 10-year appointment was unprecedented and highly unusual, and exercised alongside the consulship.

He was soon on the move again. Gnaeus and Sextus, Pompey's sons, had escaped from Africa and raised opposition in Spain; to deal with them Caesar left in November 46, and defeated them at Munda in March 45. Caesar was now elected to a fourth consulship, this time without a colleague; he resigned in October and replacement consuls were appointed. In 44, he became consul for the fifth time, with Mark Antony, and early in the year his dictatorship was made for life (*perpetuus*); again he held both offices together.

Despite long and frequent absences from Rome, Caesar was able to initiate an extensive legislative program, ranging from debt relief and interest reduction, colonization schemes and land grants to help the poor, to increases in the number of magistracies and senators, to reform of the calendar and codification of civil law. He undertook a large public works program that helped the economy as well as advertising himself, and planned more. He may have been more comfortable leading troops than trying to sort the state out, and at the time of his death he was planning a major campaign against the Persians, perhaps to get away.

In addition to the consulships and dictatorships, Caesar was already pontifex maximus (elected in 63); in late 47, after the victory at Pharsalus, he was given tribunician privileges, extended in 45 probably to include tribunician sacrosanctity; in 46 he was made *curator morum* ("guardian of public morals") that carried something of the authority of a censor.

There was more: he was given a string of unusual awards, privileges, honors, and titles. For example, after Thapsus, he had the right to sit in a curule chair between the two consuls; a triumphal chariot was set up in the temple of Jupiter on the Capitol with a statue of Caesar; after Munda, he was allowed to wear triumphal dress on official occasions; an ivory statue of him was carried with images of the gods in processions before games; a statue inscribed "to the unconquerable god" was set up in the temple of

Quirinus; the seventh month was renamed July in his honor; in 44 there were plans to establish a divine cult in his name. And the list went on. Mark Antony publicly offered Caesar a crown, which he rejected, but some thought he did it reluctantly and suspected him of aiming at kingship.

It is hard to know whether Caesar sought these unusual titles and honors himself, or whether flatterers proposed them to gain his favor. But this accumulation of exceptional offices and honors and Caesar's disregard for republican traditions made some aristocrats jealous—and fearful—of his overwhelming power, and they decided to remove him to preserve freedom and the Roman Republic.

Bruce Marshall

See also Brutus (Junius Brutus, Marcus); Caesar, Assassination of; Caesar, Gaius Julius; Cassius Longinus; Dictator; Munda, Battle of; Pharsalus, Battle of; Sulla, Lucius Cornelius

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Caesar, Gaius Julius (100–44 BCE)

Gaius Julius Caesar was one of the most controversial yet intriguing figures of Roman history. A charismatic general of great personal courage, Caesar was also a talented and unscrupulous politician, an orator and one of the most famous Latin authors, but he was arguably most responsible for the final destruction of the Roman Republic. Conquering all Gaul within 10

years, he proceeded to win a civil war against Gnaeus Pompeius (Pompey) and his followers. The victorious Caesar established himself as dictator. His new concept of political power led to his assassination on the Ides of March (March 15), 44 BCE. In the longer term context, Caesar is a transitional figure, paving the way for the first emperor, his great-nephew and adopted son Octavian (Augustus, 27 BCE–14 CE).

Caesar was born in Rome in 100 BCE to a patrician family that traced its ancestry to earliest Rome, but had faded from prominence in recent centuries. Because the young Caesar was allied with Cinna, Marius' supporter, through his marriage to Cinna's daughter Cornelia, Sulla ordered Caesar to divorce Cornelia. Caesar refused. The angry Sulla proscribed him, an action that deprived Caesar of his civil rights as well as his property, Caesar went into exile.

After being recalled from exile, Caesar's career resembled many ambitious young men of his class. During the late 80s and 70s BCE, Caesar served as junior staff to several promagistrates and returned to Rome upon Sulla's death in 78. Caesar prosecuted several court cases as a way to make his name. From there he spent several years studying rhetoric in Rhodes. His first elected position was to military tribune in 71 BCE. Every year, six tribunes were elected for each of the first four legions that were mustered. The military tribunate's degree of responsibility had been declining relative to the commander's *legati* (personal staff officers). Even so, the military tribunate was an important elected position for a young politician to hold.

Upon his election to quaestor for 69 BCE, Caesar entered the Senate. Before he left for Hispania Ulterior, his appointed province, he gave funerals for two women of his family: his wife Cornelia and his aunt Julia, the widow of Marius. Caesar's orations for Cornelia and Julia won him great popularity. In Julia's funeral procession, Caesar displayed the *imago*, or portrait bust, of Marius: the first time that Marius' likeness had been displayed in public since his death. Caesar thus allied himself with the memory of Marius, endorsing *popularis*-style politics and simultaneously highlighted his opposition to Sulla and his policies. The time was opportune: a number of Sulla's reforms, which in general undermined popular power, had been reversed during the consulship of Crassus and Pompey in 70 BCE, enabling open anti-Sullan statements.



Bust of Caesar. One of several differing images of the famous general, politician, and dictator Julius Caesar (100–44 BCE). This one may have derived from a cult image of Divus Iulius, as Caesar was deified after his death. Located in the National Museum and Gallery of Capodimonte, Naples, Italy. (Bridgeman Images)

Caesar held an aedileship in 65 BCE in which he further emphasized his dedication to the *popularis* cause through his staging of lavish spectacles. Aediles organized and funded state religious festivals, events that increased greatly in scale in the late republic as politicians used them to gain popular favor. Politicians in this period also funded campaign expenses, private funerals, and public entertainments. To do so, they often went deep into debt. Caesar appears to have indebted himself seriously to fund his aedileship's spectacles, including gladiatorial games with 320 pairs of fighters wearing armor decorated with silver. According to Suetonius (*Iul.* 10), in response to this spectacle, legislation was passed limiting the number of gladiators allowed in the city.

Unlike many other politicians who cultivated a *popularis* image, Caesar,

as a patrician, could not hold the tribunate of the plebs and propose legislation that would directly benefit the populace. He needed to seek the praetorship and consulship to attain more power over policy. Instead, he made a lateral move, running for the office of *pontifex maximus*, the most prestigious priesthood in the Roman state. Since this office was normally held by men of consular rank, many nobles were offended by Caesar's running for the pontificate when he had not yet even been praetor. However, Caesar won the pontificate by a landslide. His bribery, according to the ancient sources, won him the position, though some modern scholars point to Caesar's strategic display of support to ensure his popularity, particularly for the great military hero of that period, Pompey the Great.

Caesar was now in huge debt, motivating his alliance with Crassus, probably the wealthiest man at Rome. Debt may have motivated his sympathy with the Catilinarian conspirators, as Catiline had advocated general debt relief. Caesar advocated merciful treatment for the Catilinarians, but was opposed and overruled by the conservative Cato the Younger, his enemy. In 61, Crassus provided surety to Caesar's creditors, enabling Caesar to take up his propraetorial command in Spain. In Spain, Caesar had to abort his campaign and pass up the chance of a triumph-qualifying victory to run for the consulship at Rome, which he very much wanted to win. Candidates had to present themselves personally at Rome, and because promagistrates with *imperium* could not cross the boundary of Rome without laying down that power, Caesar was forced into a position of having to choose.

During this period, Caesar, Crassus, and Pompey formed an informal and at first secret alliance, the so-called First Triumvirate. However, unlike the later Second Triumvirate of Mark Antony, Lepidus, and Octavian, this agreement was not legally sanctioned. The First Triumvirs agreed that any action that each member might take could not cause harm to the other two, though otherwise each member was independent. Although Caesar had less influence than the other two, he, unlike the others, was eligible for election. Pompey and Crassus needed a strong ally in power to ensure passage of legislation favorable to them: Pompey needed to reward his soldiers from the Mithridatic Wars, and Crassus needed to provide relief to the *publicani* in Asia, who due to overbidding for tax contracts were likely to suffer substantial financial losses. The group of politicians led by Cato the Younger strongly opposed these policies.

Pompey and Crassus did, however, ensure Caesar's election to the consulship of 59. As consul, Caesar proposed a land bill that incorporated rewards for Pompey's veterans with land grants to civilians. To avoid obstruction by Cato and his supporters in the Senate, Cicero proposed this bill directly to the assembly, an unc customary action for a consul, and ignored his fellow consul Marcus Bibulus' attempts to stop him on religious grounds. The matter provided the substance for prosecution of Caesar by his enemies.

Caesar's actions for the rest of 59 included many favors for his allies, but also serious state reforms, such as wide-ranging legislation against corruption. Later, as dictator, he also displayed such a combination of cronyism and progressive reform. Caesar also took steps to ensure his proconsulship. At this time, proconsular commands were usually determined prior to the elections. Caesar's political maneuvering enabled the *lex Vatinia*, which gave him a five-year command of Transalpine Gaul (originally Illyricum) and Cisalpine Gaul. Such a command protected him from prosecution by his enemies, and also gave him the chance to win great wealth and glory.

Caesar launched the Gallic Wars with war on the Helvetii, an Alpine people, and against Ariovistus, leader of the German Suebi, whom Caesar expelled from Gaul. For these accomplishments, he received unprecedented honors from the state. In subsequent years Caesar made the first Roman expedition to Britannia. Serious setbacks ensued, such as the semi-coordinated Gallic attack on Rome's winter camps in 54–53, and the more dangerous and better organized Gallic revolt of 52 led by the Arvernian prince Vercingetorix. Caesar's victory at Alesia broke the strength of the Gallic opposition, however, and in 51–50 his armies consolidated Roman control over Gaul. The conquest of Gaul made Caesar and his supporters enormously wealthy and created an army notable for its courage, skill, and loyalty to Caesar. It also gave Caesar a military reputation that equaled Pompey's.

At the same time, Caesar attended to the duties of a governor in Cisalpine Gaul and remained in touch with politics at Rome. At Luca in 56, Caesar, Pompey, and Crassus renewed the Second Triumvirate, also renewing Caesar's appointment in Gaul, assigning Crassus to Syria and Pompey to Spain. However, Crassus perished in his Persian campaign of 53, and Pompey's loyalty to Caesar weakened after the death of Pompey's wife

Julia, Caesar's daughter. However, Caesar and Pompey did not become open rivals until the civil war began in 49.

The civil war began because of political conflict. Caesar sought a second consulship (running in absentia) and his enemies wanted to remove him from his governorship. Caesar's allies, tribunes of the plebs, vetoed unfavorable motions from the Senate. Caesar also won support through extensive bribery. Despite the rising tension, much of the Senate was reluctant to resort to civil war against Caesar. In late 50, matters escalated: the tribune Curio proposed that Pompey and Caesar both give up their armies, a motion that passed by an overwhelming Senatorial majority. However, it was blocked by the anti-Caesarians. By early January 49, the tribunes Mark Antony and another Caesarian, Quintus Cassius, fled Rome after threats to their safety, joining Caesar close to the border of Cisalpine Gaul, where he awaited with three legions. When Caesar was declared a public enemy at Rome, he decided to cross the Rubicon into Italy, beginning the civil war (January 10, 49 BCE).

Caesar advanced quickly through northern Italy, securing the loyalty of the inhabitants of this region. He marched through Picenum and Samnium to prevent Pompey and Domitius Ahenobarbus from recruiting troops in their respective home territories. The Pompeians depended on new recruits, no match for Caesar's veteran legions. Accordingly, the Pompeians withdrew south of Rome and, after Domitius surrendered to Caesar at Corfinium, crossed the Adriatic to the east, hoping to recruit manpower there.

Caesar first waged a short campaign against the Pompeians in Spain, where Pompey had stationed several veteran legions. Caesar forced the Pompeians to surrender at Ilerda and disbanded their legions, thus depriving Pompey of manpower. He then followed the Pompeians eastward. Though Caesar was outmaneuvered and besieged by the Pompeians at Dyrrhachium, the decisive battle took place at Pharsalus (August 48), where Caesar's experienced troops routed the much larger Pompeian army. Pompey survived and withdrew to reorganize forces, but was assassinated on his arrival in Egypt by order of the Ptolemaic king, who was hoping to win favor with Caesar. Caesar followed him to Egypt and became embroiled in dynastic politics at Alexandria, putting Cleopatra VII on the throne as ruling queen.

Though the victory at Pharsalus was decisive, the remaining Pompeians

did not give up easily. Caesar followed them to North Africa, defeating them at Thapsus, and to Spain, where he inflicted a final defeat on the Pompeians in the battle of Munda (March 45). Between phases of the war, Caesar spent at least short periods in Rome, acting as either dictator or consul. As dictator, he increased the number of magistracies available and enlarged the Senate, both to improve governance and also to reward his supporters, integrating more Italians into Roman government. He established many veteran colonies, mostly outside Italy, and paid his soldiers in land and cash bonuses.

Caesar's plans for his own future at Rome are difficult to discern, overshadowed by his assassination. From 49 until his death, he repeatedly held the consulship, also holding the dictatorship at least four separate times, the last with an undefined term (*dictator perpetuus*). He slated candidates for office for many years ahead who were invariably elected, leaving very little room, his opponents perceived, for meaningful opposition. Yet while he had strong allies, notably Mark Antony, he had no clear successor. Whether he planned to rule as an autocrat is unclear. When Mark Antony offered him a crown at the Lupercalia of February 44, Caesar refused it. But during the months before his death, he was voted numerous unprecedented honors by the Senate, including the already mentioned dictatorship for life, in addition to an uninterrupted consulship, and the naming of a month of the year after him, as well as honors typically only given to the gods. Were these honors originally suggested by Caesar, or was the Senate testing the situation by seeing how far he would go?

Caesar's dictatorship created enormous resentment within the aristocracy. His outsized influence made it impossible to conduct a political career on traditional terms, destroying the "freedom" (*libertas*) of the traditional nobility to compete for office. Caesar's policy of *clementia*, "mercy," sparing many of the Pompeians, only preserved the lives of his enemies. Two former Pompeians, Brutus and Cassius, and some of Caesar's former supporters formed the conspiracy against him.

The time and place set for the attempt was the Senate meeting of March 15, the Ides, and was likely not decided upon far in advance. Caesar planned to set out on a Roman campaign against Persia in only a few days; the time to act was now. Soon after Caesar entered the location set for the meeting, Pompey's Theater, he was surrounded by senators asking him for favors, part of the plot. As they tugged on his toga, he attempted to pull away, and

the attack began. He was stabbed numerous times, and left to die at the foot of Pompey's statue.

The assassination solved nothing. Brutus and Cassius, the so-called Liberators, were surprised by the popular outrage at Caesar's death and had to leave Rome for their safety. The assassination also solved none of the recent problems of Roman Republican government, that is, the alienation of the ruling class from the general population, the failure of the Roman state to accommodate its much larger territory and population, and the factionalism within the ruling class that delayed or distorted meaningful attempts to reform.

Civil war began anew. Caesar's great-nephew and heir, Gaius Julius Caesar Octavianus (Octavian), later the first emperor Augustus, called on Caesar's loyal veterans and exploited Caesar's name and wealth in his own rise to power. Octavian allied first with Antony to defeat the "Liberators" and then progressed to civil war with Antony, finally becoming the sole ruler of the Roman world.

Caesar has been made an exemplum for blind arrogance and ambition, seen as representative for the consequences of imperialism, as well as set up as a model statesman and commander. His writings have been studied for their clarity and incisive intelligence, while several of his innovations, notably his calendar reform, have survived to this day. Without doubt, Caesar, however he is understood, will remain as a figure inspiring debate in Western culture and thought.

Rosemary Moore

See also Alesia, Siege of; Caesar, Assassination of; Caesar, Dictatorship of; Civil Wars (I) (49–45 BCE); Civil Wars (II) (44–31 BCE); Gallic Wars; Ilerda, Battle of; Marius; Munda, Battle of; Pharsalus, Battle of; Pompey

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Calgacus (Active 80s CE)

Calgacus (or Galgacus) was a Caledonian leader who fought at the battle of Mons Graupius in 83 or 84 CE. He appears in Tacitus' *Agricola*, a biographical work that the historian wrote about his father-in-law, Gnaeus Julius Agricola, a general under the Flavian emperors and the governor of Britain, where he campaigned for seven years. Calgacus' name occurs only once in the *Agricola* where Tacitus calls him a leader "most distinguished by birth and valor" (Tacitus, *Agricola* 29.5). He orates to the assembled tribes in advance of the battle, emphasizing that the Caledonians are fighting at the ends of Britain with nothing but sea behind them and Romans in front. The Romans he calls "robbers of the earth," vain and greedy, and included is the famous line, "they [the Romans] make a desert and call it peace." He reminds the tribes of their probable fate, and advocates death in preference to slavery. There is some question about the veracity of Tacitus' inclusion of Calgacus as a historical personage and even more question about his speech, which, delivered to a Roman enemy in a foreign tongue, was unlikely to have been known to the Romans. The speech is almost certainly a Tacitean invention. It may present the author's own criticisms of imperial policy and Roman greed, or it may simply be a rhetorical exercise in presenting the enemy's viewpoint without endorsing it. In the ensuing battle, the Caledonian tribes suffered a heavy loss. The name of Calgacus never occurs again, and his ultimate fate is unknown.

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See also Agricola; Britain, Conquest of; Mons Graupius, Battle of; Revolt; Scotland

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Caligula (Emperor) (37–41 CE)

Gaius Julius Caesar Germanicus, better known as Gaius (Caligula), emperor from 37 to 41 CE, was born in 12 CE in the city of Antium. Gaius was the third son of Germanicus and Agrippina the Elder. Germanicus was the nephew of the emperor Tiberius (14–37 CE), a successful general and a potential successor of Augustus and Tiberius. Gaius earned the nickname *Caligula*, “little boots,” because he wore the costume of a Roman soldier when he accompanied his father and mother to the Rhine frontier where Germanicus suppressed the mutiny of 14 CE.

After his father Germanicus died in 19 CE, Gaius lived in Rome with his mother. When Gaius was 18 years old, Tiberius’ praetorian prefect Lucius Aelius Sejanus convinced Tiberius to eliminate his mother and two elder brothers. Tiberius turned over much of the government to Sejanus and retreated to the island of Capri. In 29 CE, Gaius was called to join Tiberius on Capri, where he was adopted by the emperor. Although Gaius had not received a proper education in oratory and public affairs, he continued to gain authority, holding the consulship four times.

In 37 CE Tiberius died and Gaius, with the help of the praetorian prefect Macro, was declared emperor. Gaius’ accession was generally accepted with joy and relief by both the Senate and the people, for the paranoid and much-feared Tiberius had become very unpopular.

In 39 CE Gaius, following in the footsteps of his father Germanicus, headed north to prove his worth as a commander and possibly conquer Britain. Although he took four legions with him, Gaius only reached the coast of the English Channel, where he made his soldiers collect seashells as trophies of victory over the Ocean (Suetonius, *Gaius* 46). Modern scholars have questioned whether a rational policy underlay this anecdote. However, Gaius expanded the empire by adding the client kingdom of Mauretania. In 40 CE, Gaius had the Mauretanian client king executed and made preparations for the incorporation of Mauretania as two Roman provinces.

One of Gaius’ biggest failures was his handling of the Jewish people and their relationship with Rome. There were several severe riots in the Jewish community of Alexandria. Second, the Jews had destroyed an altar honoring the emperor as divine. To punish them, Gaius ordered a statue of himself dressed as Jupiter to be placed inside the Temple of Jerusalem. Herod Agrippa, one of the Jewish leaders and friend to Gaius, finally

persuaded him to cancel the command. Gaius and his mishandling of the Jewish community and its relationship with Rome promoted Jewish hostility toward Rome, leading to a full-scale revolt in 66–70 CE, crushed brutally by the Romans.

From 39 CE until his death, Gaius' relationship with the Senate deteriorated. Breaking an old promise, Gaius reopened Tiberius' records of trials and ordered new investigations of senators for suspected treason. He replaced consuls, forced them to run alongside his chariot, executed many senators for conspiracy, and even threatened to have his horse made consul. His two surviving sisters, Julia Livia and Agrippina the Younger (the subsequent mother of Nero), were banished due to their involvement in conspiracy against him.

In early 41 CE, members of the Praetorian Guard, senators, and several freedmen assassinated Gaius, his wife, and his daughter as Gaius walked through his secluded palace corridors. Gaius had ruled Rome for three years and 10 months and was arguably one of Rome's least successful emperors, generating his reputation as a "monster" (Suetonius, *Gaius* 22) with many lurid anecdotes. Some scholars have attempted to rehabilitate him.

Marshall Lilly

See also Agrippina I; Germanicus; Jewish War; Tiberius (Emperor)

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Camillus (Furius Camillus, Marcus) (Active Early Fourth Century BCE)

Camillus (Marcus Furius Camillus) was a general and politician of the early republic during the Etruscan Wars in the early fourth century BCE. According to the Fasti, he was a military tribune with consular power

(similar to the consulship) six times between 401 and 381. He held the dictatorship five times (396, 390, 389, 368, and 367) and the censorship once (403). He defeated the Etruscan cities of Veii in 396 and Falerii in 394. The main sources are Livy, Diodorus Siculus, and Plutarch's *Life of Camillus*, with dramatic and legendary content due to the remote period.

Camillus' very distinguished career paralleled later generals such as Scipio Africanus and Marius, so that legends about Camillus may reflect the concerns of a later time, when politicians' monopoly of power was associated with the downfall of the republic. This plot arc is clearly apparent in Livy and in Plutarch's *Camillus*. Camillus was said to have become arrogant due to his victories and offices, holding a triumph in which his chariot was pulled by white horses, sacred to Jupiter (Livy 5.23.5). He was tried and exiled in 391, but was permitted to return because the Roman state needed him: according to legend, he drove the Gauls off from the sack of Rome in 390.

Sara E. Phang

See also Etruria, Etruscans; Etruscan Wars; Livy; Plutarch; Veii, Siege of

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Camillus Scribonianus (ca. 5 BCE–42 CE)

Lucius Arruntius Camillus Scribonianus was a Roman statesman, general, and usurper, who held the consulship in 32 CE. His biological father Marcus Furius Camillus (consul in 8 CE), a descendent of one of Rome's oldest noble republican families, commanded a victorious campaign in Africa against Tacfarinas, for which he won triumphal insignia. Camillus Scribonianus' mother was the maternal first cousin of the future emperor Claudius, so the Camilli were already closely tied to the equally illustrious Claudii. Camillus Scribonianus' sister was betrothed to the future emperor Claudius, but died young. Lucius Arruntius (consul in 6 CE), a top courtier in the courts of Augustus and Tiberius, adopted Camillus Scribonianus.

Camillus Scribonianus held the consulship of 32 CE with Gnaeus

Domitius Ahenobarbus (father of the future emperor Nero), and subsequently commanded the legions in Germany, a crucial post for the security of the empire. Upon the assassination of Caligula in CE January 41, the Roman Senate discussed the qualifications of several potential imperial candidates, including the future emperor Galba and perhaps Camillus Scribonianus. However, the Praetorian Guard forced the Senate to choose Claudius, who had a clear dynastic claim. Shortly after obtaining the empire, Claudius executed on flimsy charges his own father-in-law, Gaius Appius Junius Silanus. The execution of Silanus frightened many aristocrats, for it suggested that no one was safe, and that Claudius was as capricious as Caligula. Thereupon, Annius Vinicianus encouraged Camillus Scribonianus, now the legate of Dalmatia, to rebel (Dio 60.15.2–3).

Camillus Scribonianus induced the legions VII and XI to revolt and sent a letter to Claudius demanding that he resign from power (Suetonius, *Claudius* 13.2). Claudius was so concerned that he summoned a council of his advisers to discuss whether or not to resign. Contemporary sources called the rebellion a civil war. However, within days the soldiers turned against Camillus Scribonianus, allegedly due to a bad omen. Camillus Scribonianus fled to the island of Issa, where he either committed suicide or was killed by his soldiers. Surprisingly, Claudius spared his son. Other conspirators, including Caecina Paetus (suffect consul 37 CE), were forced to commit suicide or executed.

Gaius Stern

See also Caligula; Claudius I; Dalmatia; Usurpation

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Campania

This region of southern Italy, between the River Liris (Liri) and the Sele, centers upon the Bay of Naples on the Tyrrhenian Sea. The most notable Campanian cities in Roman antiquity were Capua, Cumae (the site of a famous prophetess), and Neapolis (modern Naples). Misenum, also on the

Bay of Naples, was the base of a Roman naval fleet. Inadvertently, the towns of Pompeii and Herculaneum became famous when they were buried by the eruption of Mount Vesuvius in 79 CE, preserving the daily life of these towns for future archaeologists. Before the eruption, Mount Vesuvius and the surrounding area provided rich volcanic soil for agriculture, and in consequence the Bay of Naples, settled by Greeks who founded Neapolis, became a wealthy area popular with well-to-do Romans.

Campania, however, had a more conflicted past due to its border with Samnium, a poorer and more warlike region of Italy. Campania was first settled by Etruscans and Greeks as well as native Oscan speakers. The Campanians, then a coalition of Oscan speakers centered on the city of Capua, formed an alliance with Rome in 343 BCE to ward off the highland Samnites. The first Roman highway, the Via Appia, linked Rome and Capua in 312, and the Campanians were incorporated as citizens without the vote (*cives sine suffragio*) in 290. Capua had been given the status of *civitas sine suffragio* as early as 338. Many Latin colonies were also founded in Campania with the intention of holding the Samnites in check. The Samnite Wars were over by 290, and Rome thence controlled Campania.

In 214, Capua and other Campanian communities revolted following the massive Roman defeat at the battle of Cannae (216) and sided with Hannibal, convinced that Rome was destined for defeat and perhaps dissatisfied with their status as junior partners. Rome captured Capua in 211, abolishing the city's political institutions and confiscating large tracts of Campanian land; Campanian citizenship rights were restored in 188.

Michael J. Taylor

See also Cannae, Battle of; Punic War, Second; Samnium, Samnites

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Campus Martius

The Campus Martius was a plain on the east bank of the Tiber, outside the ritual boundary of Rome, that was employed for mustering troops and military training. It was also a location for rites associated with warfare.

Dedicated to Mars as early as the regal period, the Campus Martius plain stretched along the eastern bank of the Tiber. It was located outside the *pomerium*, the ritual boundary of Rome that could not be crossed by armed soldiers, until the Aurelian Wall extended the *pomerium* in the 270s CE. This location outside the *pomerium* made the Campus Martius a major zone of military activity. In the republic, Roman troops used the flat grassland of the Campus Martius for military training. In time, the Campus Martius was adorned with trophies from Rome's conquests. Macedonian ships were exhibited on the Campus Martius, along with the Column of Marcus Aurelius commemorating the Marcomannic War.

The Campus Martius also had religious significance. It served as a location for religious ceremonies related to war. The opening of the war season was marked by animal sacrifices, such as the *suovetaurilia*, performed in the Campus Martius. The closing of the war season was marked by the October Horse ceremony, also performed in the Campus. The triumphal procession started from the Campus Martius. Throughout the republic, military victories brought the construction of temples to foreign deities in the Campus Martius.

Executions, including crucifixion, took place on the Campus Martius. During one October Horse celebration on the Campus Martius, Julius Caesar ordered the priest of Mars to ritually execute two soldiers for military insubordination. Despite the presence of armed soldiers and executions, the field only once received a stigma of religious pollution, resulting from the improper execution of Manlius Capitolinus in 384 BCE.

Additionally, male citizens assembled on the Campus Martius to hold the *dilectus*, the *comitia centuriata*, and the census. Augustus reorganized the area of the Campus Martius, dividing the open land from building zones.

Kristan Ewin Foust

See also Augustus; *Comitia Centuriata*; *Dilectus*; *Pomerium*; Religion and Warfare; Triumph

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Cannae, Battle of (216 BCE)

The battle of Cannae was one of the most important battles of the Second Punic War, fought on August 2, 216 BCE, in which Hannibal and the Carthaginians inflicted a major defeat on the Romans, who were commanded by Lucius Aemilius Paullus and Gaius Terentius Varro. It took place on the plain between the ruined citadel of Cannae and the River Aufidus, some 200 miles to the southeast of Rome. Hannibal had been moving his army south since entering Italy in November 218, and had already inflicted two significant defeats on Roman forces, at the River Trebia in northern Italy in 218, and then, crossing the Apennines, on the shores of Lake Trasimene the following year. In 217, the Roman dictator Fabius Maximus had instituted a strategy of refusing battle, hoping to deplete Hannibal's forces through small-scale skirmishing and to force him into a war of attrition on foreign soil. Making a loop through the Italian peninsula via Beneventum and Capua, Hannibal evaded Fabius and wintered in Gerunium. In June 216, he headed his army south to Cannae, a Roman food magazine, with the intent of provoking the Romans to a pitched battle.

The two Roman armies of the previous year were still in the field, under the consuls of 217, Gnaeus Servilius Geminus and Marcus Atilius Regulus. The latter had replaced the consul Gaius Flaminius, who had been killed at the battle of Lake Trasimene. These men were voted proconsular powers by the Senate, while Lucius Aemilius Paullus and Gaius Terentius Varro were elected consuls for 216. The Romans therefore brought their largest force to date into the battle: eight Roman legions matched by eight allied legions, with contingents of cavalry attached to each. This amounts to some 87,000 men, a figure given by Polybius, and Appian, Livy, and Plutarch all give similar figures. The Romans drew up their forces at sunrise, with Paullus in command of the Roman cavalry on the right wing, and Varro in command of the allied cavalry on the left. The plan seemed to be to contain the movements of the dangerous Carthaginian cavalry units, similarly

occupying the right and left wings, especially on Paullus' side where the proximity to the River Aufidus restricted the field of battle. This, the Romans supposed, would allow the Roman center of infantrymen to exploit their numerical superiority and push through the Carthaginian lines. It seems, however, that Hannibal anticipated the stratagem, and he stationed all his heavy Spanish and Celtic cavalry opposite Paullus, under the command of Hasdrubal, one of his generals. Its crucial order must have been to break through the Roman lines before the center collapsed. In the center, Hannibal placed his infantry in a convex line to slow the Roman advance. In front, he stationed Balearic slingers and spearmen. On his right, he placed Maharbal in charge of the light infantry.

When battle was joined, combat was bitterest on the Roman right wing, where both sides knew victory was vital. Trapped between the river and the infantry, the cavalry units grappled man to man, with no room for maneuver. Aemilius Paullus was wounded at the beginning of the battle by a stone from one of Hannibal's Balearic slingers, and the superior numbers of the Celtic and Spanish cavalry forced the Romans to turn and flee, an escape hindered by the fact that many of them had dismounted with their wounded commander. With a gap opening up in the right wing, Hasdrubal was able to lead the cavalry through, galloping behind the Roman lines to fall upon Varro's cavalry contingent on the Roman left wing. These too turned and fled. In the center of the lines, the Romans had pushed back the enemy infantry but had been drawn into the curve, with the middle of the line in advance of the fighting at the sides. This compressed the Roman legions closer together and restricted their fighting space, but the real danger was that the legions had passed two uncommitted contingents of African heavy infantry which Hannibal had stationed on the wings. Now he ordered them to attack the rear of the Roman lines, completely encircling the infantry and precipitating a massacre. Livy's numbers are more convincing than those of Polybius, which contradict themselves. He records 45,500 infantry and 2,700 cavalry were killed, while 19,300 men were captured and 14,550 escaped. Hannibal's losses are recorded by Polybius at 5,700 and by Livy at 8,000. Aemilius Paullus was killed, according to Livy, waving away a soldier who tried to rescue him from the battlefield with the words, "let me die here with my slaughtered troops." Also on the casualty lists were the proconsul Geminus, the former Master of the Horse Marcus Minucius, and some 29 military tribunes and 80 men of senatorial rank.

At Rome the populace believed that Hannibal would appear at the gates at any moment, and his decision not to march on Rome was later debated by Roman schoolboys as an exercise in rhetoric. The specter of Cannae haunted the Roman consciousness as an icon of catastrophic defeat. The ancient accounts tend to place responsibility for this defeat on the consul Varro, who was in overall command on that day. They simultaneously show Paullus as favoring a policy of declining pitched battle, such as that championed by Fabius Maximus the year before, and portray him as pressured into battle by Varro and his over-excited soldiers. This, however, is extremely unlikely, as Varro survived and was entrusted by the Senate to further commands. The blaming of Varro is now thought to be the product of anti-plebeian bias and a propaganda campaign on the part of the powerful family of the Aemilii. The Lucius Aemilius Paullus who commanded Rome's victory in the Third Macedonian War was Polybius' patron, so Polybius had a motive to flatter Paullus' ancestors. But Polybius had a larger motive. For Polybius, the battle of Cannae was the lowest moment of Rome's fortunes, but also her turning point. Polybius' expressed purpose was to explain how, having been brought so near to absolute destruction, Rome recovered and rose as a great Mediterranean power.

Kathryn H. Milne

See also Aemilius Paullus, Lucius; Casualties; Fabius Maximus; Hannibal Barca; Punic War, Second

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The *capite censi* were Rome's poorest citizens during the republic, who had no real property to declare in the census other than their own selves (*caput, capitis* literally means "head," but also meant one's life or personhood). *Capite censi* were looked down on as untrustworthy, having no stake or contribution to the community as a whole (e.g., Sallust, *Jugurthine War* 86). They were practically disenfranchised in the voting assembly that elected upper magistrates, and populist leaders who reached out to them were often feared by *optimates* as would-be demagogues. During the early and middle republic this landless, increasingly urban group was deemed unfit for military service, but this stricture was relaxed amid the *popularis* politics and real military crises of the late second century BCE. Gaius Marius took the decisive step of recruiting the *capite censi* into the legions, creating armies that depended on military service for their pay and benefits. Over the course of the next century, Rome's urban poor played a major role in the political disorder that brought down the Roman Republic.

In this encyclopedia the term *capite censi* is used preferable to *proletarii* (its synonym) because the translation "proletarian" is anachronistic.

Christopher J. Fuhrmann

See also Censors and census; *Comitia Centuriata*; Marius; Recruitment of Army (Republic); Servian Constitution

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Caracalla (Emperor) (211–217 CE)

A Roman emperor (joint 198–211 CE, alone 211–217), born Septimius Bassianus in 188 CE, Caracalla was the eldest son of the African senator Septimius Severus and his Syrian wife Julia Domna. He took the imperial name Marcus Aurelius Antoninus when elevated to the rank of Caesar by his father in 195 CE; promotion to the rank of Augustus followed in 198 CE. The new name was designed to link the Severan dynasty with the Antonines, as Septimius claimed to be a son of Marcus Aurelius. The

nickname Caracalla was given to him as a result of his fondness for wearing a hooded Gallic cloak called the *caracallus*. In 202 CE, Caracalla married Plautilla, the daughter of Septimius Severus' powerful praetorian prefect Gaius Fulvius Plautianus.

Caracalla was groomed as the heir apparent of Severus and received preferential treatment to his younger brother Geta. Caracalla was depicted as noticeably older on coins, even though Geta was only a year his junior. The two brothers disliked each other enormously, which led to a hostile atmosphere at court, much to the despair of their mother Julia Domna. In 205 CE, Caracalla engineered the downfall of Plautianus, alleging that he had conspired against Severus: Plautianus was murdered, and Plautilla exiled. When Septimius Severus embarked on a campaign in Britain in 208 CE, he took both Caracalla and Geta with him in attempt to resolve their enmity. He died of gout at York in 211 CE, and his sons assumed his place as joint emperors. They returned to Rome, and Caracalla had Geta and his associates murdered before the year was out in a bloody coup. Geta's name was effaced from inscriptions and his portraits destroyed throughout the empire.



Bust of Caracalla (Marcus Aurelius Antoninus, 211–217 CE), ca. 212. The portrait's tough expression may represent a more "military" style of leadership, which, however, failed to prevent Caracalla's assassination by his soldiers. Located in the Ny Carlsberg Glyptotek, Copenhagen, Denmark. (Prisma/UIG via Getty Images)

As sole emperor, Caracalla doubled the pay of the soldiers, with whom he identified strongly, styling himself their *commilito* ("comrade"). His administrative measures included the introduction of a new coin denomination, the *antoninianus*, and the so-called *Constitutio Antoniniana*, which granted Roman citizenship to all free inhabitants of the empire. According to the historian Cassius Dio, who is generally very hostile to the emperor, this was an attempt to increase proceeds from taxation to pay the army.

Caracalla spent most of his reign outside Rome. He embarked on

campaigns against the Alamanni in 213 CE and the Carpi in 214 CE before traveling through Asia Minor to the eastern provinces. His intention was to launch an expedition against Persia in emulation of his idol, Alexander the Great. Caracalla journeyed to Alexandria to pay homage to Alexander in 215 CE, but the visit ended in a riot and the massacre of many inhabitants of the city. Plans for a new campaign were aided by the fact that Persia was divided by civil war. When one of the candidates for the Persian throne, Artabanus, refused to marry his daughter to Caracalla, the emperor resolved to seek revenge by invading their territory. The war was as yet unfinished when Caracalla was murdered by one of his soldiers in April 217, as part of a plot orchestrated by the praetorian prefect, Marcus Opellius Macrinus.

Caillan Davenport

See also Assassination; *Commilito*; Macrinus; Septimius Severus

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Carausius (Usurper) (286–293 CE)

A Roman officer and later emperor in Britain (r. 286–293 CE), Marcus Aurelius Mausaeus Carausius was born in Menapia (in northern Gaul) and began his career as a helmsman. Carausius entered the Roman army and served under the emperor Maximian (286–305), then Caesar, in his campaigns against the Bagaudae in Gaul in 285 CE. In the following year, Carausius was appointed commander of the English Channel fleet, with a special remit to hunt down Saxon pirates and seize their plunder. Maximian accused Carausius of taking the plunder for himself and ordered his execution. In response, Carausius revolted as emperor in Britain as well as parts of northern Gaul. Carausius' revolt seems to have motivated Diocletian to promote Maximian to co-Augustus (286).

Carausius minted coins proclaiming his reign as a new golden age for the Roman Empire. He also sought legitimacy by portraying himself (without their permission) as an associate of the emperors Diocletian (284–305) and Maximian: one of his coins depicted all three rulers with the legend “Carausius and his brothers.” However, Carausius was not recognized as emperor. Diocletian and Maximian did not feel any fraternal loyalty toward Carausius, and tried to unseat him unsuccessfully for several years. A naval campaign launched against Britain in 290 CE ended in disaster when the fleet was destroyed by a storm.

In 293 CE, Maximian’s deputy, the Caesar Constantius, successfully captured Carausius’ stronghold of Boulogne in northern Gaul. Soon afterward Carausius was murdered by Allectus, probably his praetorian prefect. Constantius launched an invasion of Britain in 296 CE in which he defeated and killed Allectus and reincorporated the island into the Roman Empire.

Main sources for the career of Carausius are the *Panegyrici Latini*, which include contemporary orations praising Maximian that relate the events in Britain, and the epitomators, who summarize the history of the Tetrarchy.

Caillan Davenport

See also Britain, Roman; Constantius I; Diocletian; Maximian; Panegyric

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Carinus (Emperor) (283–285 CE)

A Roman emperor (283–285 CE), Carinus ruled with his brother Numerian following the death of their father Carus in 283 CE. Carinus campaigned against the Quadi in Germany, and possibly also in Britain. When Numerian was found dead in 284 CE, the imperial power was claimed by Diocletian, commander of the imperial bodyguard. Carinus suppressed a

revolt staged by his praetorian prefect, Iulianus, and then marched to Moesia to face Diocletian in battle in mid-285 CE. Carinus was victorious in the ensuing confrontation at the River Margus, but was killed immediately afterward by one of his soldiers, allegedly because he had slept with the man's wife, enabling his officers and army to go over to Diocletian.

In his civil war with Carinus, Diocletian probably emphasized Carinus' immorality; the *Historia Augusta's* unreliable Life of Carus, Carinus, and Numerian emphasizes Carinus' bad character.

Caillan Davenport

See also Carus; Diocletian; Third-Century CE Crisis

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Carrhae, Battle of (53 BCE)

Carrhae (June 9, 53 BCE) was one of Rome's most notorious military defeats, alongside the battles of Cannae (216 BCE), Arausio (105 BCE), the Varian disaster (9 CE), and Adrianople (378 CE).

Marcus Licinius Crassus was over 60 when he undertook the campaign against the Persians. His military experience was limited, going back to the 80s and against Spartacus in 72–71, but he may have wanted a victory to equal those of Pompey and Caesar: only a victory over a major enemy would bring the necessary prestige. In hindsight, Crassus' ambition is depicted (e.g., by Plutarch's *Crassus*) as overreaching and motivated by greed.

Crassus secured a command in Syria to follow his second consulship in 55. It is not clear whether his *provincia* included the right to make war on the Persians. The size of his army—seven legions (probably) and about 4000 cavalry—would suggest it did. There was also instability on Rome's eastern frontier, which the Romans may have wanted to deal with.

Crassus arrived in the spring of 54. He crossed the Euphrates and spent time reconnoitering and establishing garrisons, especially along the river Belikh. He returned to winter in Syria to train his troops and to organize his supply lines by extorting large sums of money and plundering temples (taken as a sign of his greed). In the following spring, Crassus crossed the Euphrates again and traveled along the river. Support promised by the Armenian king Artavasdes failed to materialize, as he had been diverted by a Persian attack. The claim of Abgar (or Ariamnes), an Arab chieftain and guide, that tracks heading southeast from the Euphrates indicated a retreating Persian force, induced Crassus to head away from the Euphrates toward the garrisons along the Belikh.

After a desert crossing, Crassus did not rest his troops but pressed on, not wanting the supposedly retreating Persians to escape. At this point Abgar deserted, but Crassus kept going. The enemy was led by the Surenas, who devised tactics suited to his troops—heavy-armed cavalry and a camel-train to keep his archers supplied with arrows. The forces met near Carrhae on June 9, 53. Hemmed in by the heavy cavalry, the Romans fell to the continuous hail of arrows. Crassus' son Publius, who had brought 1,000 horsemen from Caesar, led a rash cavalry action away from the main battle and was killed.

The Romans headed for Carrhae, but staying there was untenable, so they moved north toward Sinnaca, another garrison. Near there, the Surenas offered a parley to which Crassus reluctantly agreed, but he was taken prisoner and killed.

Despite heavy casualties a number escaped: some to Syria which they capably defended, while around 10,000 prisoners became mercenaries in the Persian army. Some of these gradually worked their way east, one group even ending up settling in western China. The standards lost by Crassus' army were eventually recovered during the principate of Augustus in 20 BCE.

Losers usually receive a bad press: Crassus was no exception. His loss is credited to his greed, but he did actually make adequate military preparations. Nor did he lead his army through a trackless and waterless desert: he had reconnoitred the area the year before, and the snow melt meant that rivers would have had water. Where he can be blamed is his reliance on untrustworthy guides and his failure to learn enough about the tactics and resources of a better opponent.

Bruce Marshall

See also Cassius Longinus; Crassus; Persia, Arsacid; Persian Wars, Arsacid

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Carthage (State)

Carthage was founded in 814 BCE as a colony. The inhabitants of the colony came from the city-state of Tyre in Lebanon and were Phoenicians in both language and material culture. In various mythological stories related to early Carthaginian history, the city-state appears to be ruled by a monarchy. However, the existence of this monarchy and its duration from the ninth to sixth centuries BCE cannot be established with any degree of historical accuracy. Rather, the Carthaginian state and its organization is only well documented for its imperial period, which lasted from the sixth to the second centuries BCE. During this period, power in the Carthaginian state was distributed between three offices: the Shofet (Judge), the Rab (General), and the Rab Kohanim (Chief Priest).

The term Shofet denotes a “judge.” At Carthage, however, the office included more responsibilities than judicial affairs. The Shofets served as the head of civil administration for the city-state itself. Thus the Shofet was the most powerful official who permanently resided in Carthage for his term of office. Two Shofets were appointed annually at Carthage. The Shofets (*suffetes* in Latin) were eponymous magistrates: their names were applied to the year in which they served, in the same manner that the Romans denoted years by the names of the consuls who held office. Carthaginian inscriptions attest that certain Carthaginian families were able to earn the position of Shofet for multiple generations. It is not uncommon to encounter a Shofet, whose father, grandfather, and great-grandfather had also served as Shofet.

Every year, the Carthaginians appointed two Generals (Rab, pl. Rabbim) to share military command responsibilities. The office likely developed in the sixth century BCE, during the earliest period of Carthaginian imperialism in North Africa. While on campaign, Carthaginian generals enjoyed total autonomy and possessed powers that are most akin to those held by a king. Carthaginian generals not only decided military strategy and tactics but

also received embassies from foreign states, made treaties, coined money and acted as the chief priest for the army. Most importantly, Carthaginian generals were responsible for the establishment of Carthaginian colonies during military campaigns.

It appears that selection to the office of Rab was to some degree hereditary. The Magonid family of Carthage had numerous members elected to the generalship during the sixth and fifth centuries BCE. In the third century BCE, the Barcid family (including the famous Hannibal) rose to prominence and dominated the office. These family dynasties were essential in providing continuity of leadership for the Carthaginian military during the two periods of its greatest activity.

The Magonids were primarily responsible for Carthaginian actions in Sicily and Sardinia. Mago, who founded the dynasty, and his sons were involved in some of the earliest Carthaginian campaigns in Sicily and Sardinia during the period 550–480 BCE. The last two important Magonid generals known from the sources, Hannibal Mago and Himilco, were responsible for the most successful Carthaginian invasions of Sicily in the late fifth century BCE. Hannibal Mago led initial successful campaigns in 410 and 409 BCE, through which Carthage was able to destroy two important Greek city-states in northern and southern Sicily, Himera and Selinus. His death in 406 BCE transferred power to Himilco. Himilco continued the Carthaginian eastward march across Sicily, and he destroyed numerous Greek city-states in Sicily: Akragas, Gela, and Camarina. After a short interval of peace between 404 and 398 BCE, Himilco resumed his invasion of Sicily and attacked Messina and Catana. By 397/396 BCE, he was so successful that his armies had besieged Syracuse. After a plague decimated the Carthaginian army at Syracuse in 396 BCE, Himilco sued for peace and negotiated the withdrawal of his army from Syracuse along with the maintenance of the majority of Carthaginian conquests in Sicily.

The Chief Priest (Rab Kohanim) was the most important religious official at Carthage. Carthage was a polytheistic society. Some of the most common gods worshiped were Baal Hammon, Tanit, Melqart, Eshmoun, and Ashtart. The priests of each temple were subordinate to the Rab Kohanim who was responsible for the administration of all cults at Carthage. The most widely represented deity in Carthaginian art and iconography is Tanit, a goddess whose cult developed at Carthage in the fifth century BCE. However, the most important god in the Carthaginian

pantheon was Baal Hammon. These two deities were worshiped together at the Carthaginian Tophet, a religious complex and cemetery for the burial of dead infants. Though the Greco-Roman sources believed that the Carthaginians sacrificed infants at the Carthaginian Tophet, archaeological evidence only reveals that the ritual complex served as a crematorium and burial zone for infants. Whether or not these infants were sacrificed remains a matter of active debate.

To administrate its empire, Carthage replicated the office of Shofet at its colonial foundations in North Africa, Sicily and Sardinia. In colonial contexts, the office of Shofet acted as the primary official responsible for local administration. Due to the heavy concentration of Carthaginian colonies in the area of modern Tunisia, the office of Shofet is widely attested in North Africa, while attestations of the office are sparser in Sardinia and Sicily. In Sardinia, the most important Carthaginian colonies were located at Cagliari, Tharros, and Olbia. From these foundations, Carthage was able to develop a series of secondary colonies in Sardinia. In Sicily, the most important Carthaginian colonies were located at Lilybaeum (modern Marsala, Italy) and Selinus (Selinunte, Italy). Both were foundations of the early fourth century BCE. From these two foundations, Carthage secured the necessary ports to supply its colonial armies in Sicily, who remained engaged in nearly constant warfare for 170 years (410–241 BCE).

The presence of legislative assemblies at Carthage remains a matter of conjecture. Though the Greco-Roman sources argue that Carthage possessed both an aristocratic and a people's assembly, no evidence has ever been recovered at Carthage or in Carthaginian inscriptions to confirm the existence of these assemblies. Based on the reconstructions of the Greco-Roman sources, Shofets may have presided over an assembly of aristocrats (a senate) with whom they consulted about matters of administration relevant to the city-state. It is further possible that this assembly of aristocrats was responsible for the election of Shofets from the fifth to the third century BCE. The history of the people's assembly is especially murky at Carthage. In Greco-Roman sources, though the institution may have always existed, the people's assembly only begins to exert power in the third century, when it appears to have assumed the powers once reserved to an aristocratic senate.

The Punic Wars of 264–146 BCE brought about the destruction of the Carthaginian Empire. During the First Punic War, Carthage lost all of its

claims in Sicily and was forced to evacuate its subjects before the transferring control of the island to Rome. After the First Punic War, Carthage's weakened condition allowed Rome to successfully invade and conquer Sardinia, the most important Carthaginian overseas possession. In response to these losses, the Barcid dynasty rose to power in Carthage. The Barcids (Hamilcar and his son Hannibal) attempted to found Carthaginian colonies in the Iberian peninsula during the period 240–220 BCE. The most successful foundation was located at New Carthage (Cartagena, Spain). Carthaginian possessions in Iberia were very short-lived. In the Second Punic War (218–201 BCE), Carthage lost all its colonies in Spain to invading Roman armies. More importantly, Rome followed its victories in the Iberian peninsula with an invasion of the Carthaginian home territory in North Africa. In 202, the Romans and Carthaginians fought the decisive battle of the Second Punic War at Zama. The Roman victory led to the end of the Second Punic War and the final end of the Carthaginian Empire.

Carthage, the city-state, survived another half century until the Third Punic War. A border dispute with its neighbor led the Carthaginians to undertake their first military actions since the Second Punic War. The Romans viewed these actions as a violation of their peace treaty with the Carthaginians. The Romans dictated unrealistic terms, and when Carthage could not meet these terms, invaded North Africa in 149 BCE. Over the next three years, the Romans systematically dismantled Carthaginian supply networks and slowly established a firm siege of the city. By 146 BCE, the Carthaginians were no longer able to resist and the city-state was destroyed by the Romans.

The Romans converted the Carthaginian home territory in North Africa into the province of Africa Proconsularis. Within the province, Carthaginian institutions survived long after the destruction of the city-state. The Carthaginian language, known as Punic, continued to be a commonly used language in the province for the next two centuries. Carthaginian institutions, such as the Shofet, were continued by the Romans to administrate local city-states in the territory. Only in the third century CE do the final vestiges of Carthaginian power finally disappear from the historical record.

Nathan L. Pilkington

See also Carthaginians; Hannibal Barca; Punic War, First; Punic War,

Second; Punic War, Third; Treaties, Rome and Carthage; Zama, Battle of

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Carthage, Siege of (149–146 BCE)

The siege of Carthage is practically coterminous with the Third Punic War because after the Second Punic War, Carthage's territories were greatly reduced. The strategy of the siege emphasized cutting Carthage off from its remaining territory and from relief by land or sea. The city of Carthage was built upon a peninsula that projected into the Gulf of Tunis, protected by a wall between it and the mainland.

In 149, the consuls Gaius Manilius and Censorinus began the siege. Manilius camped his army near Lake Tunis, but had to vacate it because of the unhealthiness of the region. Censorinus blockaded the approach from the sea. After Censorinus returned to Rome to conduct elections, the Carthaginians attacked Manilius' camp. Manilius' forces were saved by the arrival of Scipio Aemilianus. In 148, the consuls Lucius Calpurnius Piso and Lucius Hostilius Mancinus continued to prosecute the siege. Mancinus attacked the Carthaginian suburb of Megara, but was cut off and rescued by Scipio Aemilianus, who had arrived recently in Africa. The efforts of Piso and Mancinus were not successful.

Scipio returned to Rome, where he intended to run for curule aedile. However, the Roman populace called for his consulship and allotment to the African campaign, and by popular acclaim he was made consul even though he was still too young and had not yet held the praetorship. He was also assigned Africa instead of being assigned a province by lot.

Arriving at Carthage, Scipio blockaded Carthage and planned to starve

the city out. He cut off access to the city by land and sea. The Carthaginians built a new channel from the city to their harbor and attempted to sail out, but Scipio's naval forces attacked and defeated them.

In 146, the Romans began to destroy the city, house by house. Reaching the citadel of Byrsa, they stormed it and took the city. Five hundred Roman deserters made a last stand. Scipio sold 50,000 captives and razed the city of Carthage. The nearby African cities that had remained loyal to Carthage were also destroyed. The Romans created a new province, Africa (later Africa Proconsularis).

Sara E. Phang

See also Carthage (State); Punic War, Third; Scipio Aemilianus; Siege Warfare

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Carthaginians

Carthage was colonized by Phoenicians from Lebanon in the late ninth century BCE. The colonists spoke a Semitic language, Phoenician. During the first three centuries of its existence (the ninth to seventh centuries BCE), Carthage was a small colonial outpost in North Africa. It acted as a trading post, agricultural center, and fishing port.

In the sixth century BCE, the Carthaginians began to found colonies in North Africa. The earliest Carthaginian colony, Kerkouane, was constructed at the head of a small peninsula 45 miles to the east of Carthage. This peninsula, Cap Bon, would become territorial heartland of Carthage during its imperial period, the sixth to second centuries BCE. From Kerkouane, the Carthaginians founded numerous colonies, forts, garrisons, and villages throughout the entire Cap Bon peninsula. The geography and climate of the Cap Bon were particularly favorable for the cultivation of grain, olives and grapes. By the fourth century BCE, the countryside of the Cap Bon peninsula had been converted into a series of large agricultural estates controlled by the Carthaginian elite. Mago, a Carthaginian writer, produced the first-

known agricultural manual in the western Mediterranean.

Through colonization in North Africa, Carthage acquired dominance over a pre-existing indigenous population. The proliferation of Carthaginian colonies led to creation of hybrid Libyo-Carthaginian culture. Libyo-Carthaginians, in turn, became the manpower basis from which Carthage acquired the necessary soldiers and sailors to sustain its overseas campaigns in Sardinia and Sicily during the fifth to third centuries BCE. Through contact with indigenous populations, Carthaginian language and material culture begin to undergo a series of subtle transitions that differentiate them from other Phoenician populations in the western Mediterranean. The resulting language and material culture are traditionally identified by the term “Punic.”

Punic Carthage was imperial Carthage. During the fourth century, Carthage controlled colonies in North Africa, Sardinia, Sicily, and possibly the Iberian peninsula. The scale of the Carthaginian Empire is best evidenced by two of its engineering achievements: its ports and ships.

The ports of Carthage represent a massive public works project, through which two natural lagoons were converted into monumental harbors. The construction required the removal of ca.120,000 cubic meters of earth for the rectangular harbor and another ca.115,000 cubic meters of earth for the circular harbor. Dry docks, which surround the circular harbor, could store ca. 200 warships during periods of inactivity.

Recovered Carthaginian warships of the third century BCE indicate an industrial arrangement for their construction. The planks that form the outer shell of the ship were prefabricated and labeled with a specific letter or mark. Thus the ship builder was required only to assemble the ship according to the established design. Furthermore, individual workshops fabricated a single plank type, which allowed for consistency in manufacture and by extension consistency in ship construction.

Carthage's defeat in 146 BCE was followed by the destruction of the city-state. However, due to Carthaginian imperialism, Roman conquest did not destroy Punic culture, Punic language or even Carthaginian political systems in North Africa. These would last for centuries after the collapse of the city-state and its empire.

Nathan L. Pilkington

See also Carthage (State); Punic War, First; Punic War, Second; Punic War,

Third

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Carus (Emperor) (282–283 CE)

A Roman emperor (282–283 CE), Marcus Aurelius Carus, of Gallic origin, was an army officer who served as praetorian prefect to the emperor Probus. After successfully revolting against and deposing Probus and seizing the throne himself, Carus embarked on a campaign against the Sarmatians in the Balkans. He soon turned his attention toward the Persian Empire, which he invaded together with his youngest son Numerian. His elder son, Carinus, remained in Europe to administer the western provinces. Carus successfully captured the Persian city of Ctesiphon but died in 283 CE after his tent was struck by lightning. Carus is treated briefly by the epitomators Eutropius and Aurelius Victor; the longer Life of Carus, Carinus, and Numerian in the *Historia Augusta* is unreliable.

Caillan Davenport

See also Carinus; Probus; Third-Century CE Crisis

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Cassius, Spurius (d. 483 BCE)

Spurius Cassius Vecellinus was an important political figure in the very early republic. Consul three times, he provides an early example of a demagogue who incited unrest against the Senate.

Cassius first appears as consul in 502 BCE. He celebrated a triumph, though whom he fought is unclear. A year later he was selected by Titus Larcus Flavus, the first dictator, as his second-in-command, becoming the first *magister equitum* or commander of cavalry. In 493, as consul for the second time, Cassius achieved his most recognized political success, negotiating a treaty with the Latin cities, the so-called *foedus Cassianum*. This was a defensive alliance, which included some reciprocal citizenship rights. Finally in 486, in his third consulship, he defeated the Hernici, celebrating a second triumph.

This was the height of his political career: Cassius was accused of attempting to make himself king and was executed the following year after a trial for treason. According to the sources, he proposed populist measures including granting state land to the urban poor and Latin allies. The actions reported are anachronistic, anticipating the Gracchan reforms of the late republic, but, as with Spurius Maelius soon after, the bare fact of attempted revolution is usually accepted. The significance of Spurius Cassius is that he represented for the Romans the earliest example of a demagogue: the archetypal would-be tyrant.

Bradley Jordan

See also Gaius Gracchus; Latin Wars; Maelius, Spurius; Patrician-Plebeian Conflict; Tiberius Gracchus

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Cassius Chaerea was a tribune in the Praetorian Guard who headed the conspiracy to assassinate Gaius Caesar (Caligula). When he was younger, Chaerea served as a centurion under Germanicus in Lower Germany, where he distinguished himself as a skilled fighter during the mutiny that followed the death of Augustus. As an older man, he served in the Praetorian Guard under emperor Gaius who relentlessly mocked Chaerea for his supposed effeminacy. Enraged by these taunts, he headed the conspiracy to murder Gaius and struck the first blow with his own sword. The emperor Claudius would later execute him for his role in the assassination.

J. Michael Ferguson

See also Assassination; Caligula; Gender and War; Praetorians

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Cassius Dio (ca. 164–235 CE)

Cassius Dio was a Roman consul and historian who is known primarily for his composition of the *Roman History*. Cassius Dio was born ca. 164 CE, as a native of Nicaea in Bithynia. His father, Cassius Apronianus, became a senator not long after Dio's birth, and it is likely that Dio spent a large portion of his boyhood at Rome. During his adult years, Dio was a member of the Senate under nine emperors—Commodus, Pertinax, Didius Julianus, Septimius Severus, Caracalla, Geta, Macrinus, Elagabalus, and Alexander Severus. Dio's own *cursus honorum* is frequently disputed by modern scholars. It is almost certain that he held a praetorship in the year 194. Dio explicitly states in book 73 of the *History* that, upon the accession of Pertinax in 193, he received from the emperor an appointment as praetor for the following year. Given Dio's date of birth, it is also likely that Dio had previously held a quaestorship under Commodus in approximately 189, as well as a tribunate in about 191. During the latter half of his career, Dio likely held two consulships—initially as suffect consul under Septimius Severus around 205 or 206 and subsequently as consul with Alexander ca. 229. Prior to his second consulship, Dio also served as proconsul of Africa

ca. 223 as well as imperial legate of Dalmatia, then as legate of Upper Pannonia ca. 224–228.

Cassius Dio authored several no longer extant works, including a short book on dreams and omens that lead up to the accession of Septimius Severus and a biography of his fellow countryman Arrian, who lived ca. 90–160 CE. Dio's pre-eminent work is the *Roman History*, written in 80 books. Modern scholars debate when Dio composed his history. In book 72 of the history, Dio identifies a period of 22 years in which he both collated material for and composed the *Roman History*. This period almost certainly took place either during the reign of Severus (193–211) or just after the emperor's death, and may have extended up until Dio's own death in 235.

Dio's history begins with legend, including the arrival of Aeneas in Italy and the founding of Rome in 753 BCE and follows with the rise of the Roman Republic and its decline into civil war, continuing with the reign of Augustus and the subsequent emperors until the reign of Alexander Severus ca. 229 CE. Dio's history has an annalistic structure. However, Dio frequently diverges from this structure by introducing observations about historiographical problems associated with Republican or imperial sources or ethnographic and geographical digressions. Moreover, Dio makes extensive use of speeches, which he regularly includes in the imperial portion of his history as both a means of characterizing the key players and signposting the most important events.

Although Dio's text offers one of the most extensive histories of the Roman Republic and empire, there are several problems with using Dio as a primary source. Dio's original text has only survived today in a fragmentary form. Dio's original text is preserved only in books 36–54, substantial fragments of books 55–60 and in a section containing parts of books 79 and 80, from the death of Caracalla to the middle of Elagabalus' reign. There are, however, three main sources from which the missing text can be restored, the earliest being tenth century CE Byzantine scholars' excerpts. These excerpts are of great value for the restoration of Dio's text because they largely preserve Dio's own wording and cover the entire range of Dio's history. During the eleventh century, the monk Xiphilinus of Trapezus composed an epitome of books 36–80. The epitome fills gaps in books 56–60 and comprises the majority of Dio's work, as we know it today, from book 61 onward. Half a century after Xiphilinus, Zonaras composed an epitome from creation to 1118, using Dio for his books 7–9. His epitome is

the most important source for reconstructing the republican period of the *Roman History*.

The second major problem with Dio's work concerns the historian's use of sources. The fragmentary nature of Dio's surviving text has damaged our ability to identify the historian's original sources. Dio only cites two sources explicitly in the *Roman History* – Augustus' biography and Hadrian. Dio, nonetheless, claims to have read "virtually everything written by anyone about [the Romans]" and modern scholars have identified references in the *Roman History* to authors such as Livy, Sallust, Arrian, Pliny the Elder, Cicero, and Septimius Severus.

Despite the ambiguities associated with Dio's use of sources, the *Roman History* remains a valuable resource. Dio's history is one of the few continuous accounts of the empire from Nerva to Commodus as well as the Severan dynasty. The only other primary sources for the period consist of the *Roman History* of Herodian; Aurelius Victor's short history of imperial Rome, *De Caesaribus*; Eutropius' *Breviarium*; the *Epitome de Caesaribus*, of unknown authorship; and the notoriously unreliable *Historia Augusta*, a collection of imperial biographies. Second, even for the period of the early Empire, where alternative sources are abundant, Dio offers a largely unique account of events. Finally, as a senator whose public career encompassed the reigns of Commodus and the Severan emperors, Dio was well placed to record the vicissitudes of Roman political life. Dio himself protests that, after the inception of the empire, accurate information had become increasingly difficult to come by as rulers commonly kept their acts and discussions secret; and their censored accounts, when made public, were looked upon with doubt and suspicion. Yet the historian nonetheless records evocative details of the court rivalries, treason trials and the personalities of the individual rulers under which he served. As a first-hand witness to Commodus' performances in the arena, Dio and his fellow senators observed the emperor behead an ostrich and, brandishing the bird's head, threaten them with the same fate (Dio 73[72].21.1–2). Dio also observed the series of civil wars, coups and assassinations from 193 to 222 with a mordant eye. Prosenatorial in his views, Dio disapproved of the rise of the provincial armies in imperial affairs; and he regarded the Pannonians, whom he governed in the mid-220s, as brutal and uncivilized (Document 25). Most famously, Dio regarded the history of his own time as passing from an "age of gold" under Marcus Aurelius to an "age of iron and rust"

(Dio 72[71].36.4).

Thomas Caldwell

See also Alexander Severus; Commodus; Herodian; *Historia Augusta*; Livy; Septimius Severus; Tacitus

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Cassius Longinus (ca. 85–42 BCE)

Gaius Cassius Longinus, one of the most famous assassins of Caesar, belonged to an aristocratic family that had produced numerous consuls. Little is known of his early life, apart from a story that he showed dislike of despotism while still at school by quarreling with the son of the dictator Sulla. He studied philosophy and Greek at Rhodes. He was married to Junia Tertia, a daughter of Servilia, and thus a half-sister of Brutus, and they had one son, born about 60.

He served as quaestor under Crassus against the Persians; following the disaster at Carrhae he escaped with remnants of the army and successfully defended Syria against Persian attacks for the next two years. Returning to Rome in 50, just before the civil war between Caesar and Pompey started, he was elected tribune for 49 and took the side of the optimates. Shortly after Caesar invaded Italy, Cassius left for Greece to join Pompey, and was appointed commander of part of the fleet. His most notable success was off Sicily in 48 when he destroyed a large part of Caesar's fleet.

When Cassius heard of Pompey's defeat, he headed for the Hellespont, but was overtaken by Caesar's troops and forced to surrender. Like Brutus, he was pardoned by Caesar, absorbed into his organization and appointed legate in the Alexandrian War. He refused, however, to join the campaign against Cato in Africa, retiring to Rome instead.

Cassius spent the next two years without office, until made praetor peregrinus for 44; the appointment of Brutus, his junior, to the more

prestigious urban praetorship offended him. Alarmed at Caesar's growing domination, Cassius plotted against him and persuaded others to join the cause of removing the tyrant, including Brutus, who came to the conspiracy late but who was nevertheless seen as the leader.

Celebration over the tyrant's removal, however, was short-lived, as popular outrage forced the conspirators to leave Rome. Mark Antony had seized control, and Cicero criticized the assassins for not removing him as well. Cassius had wanted to, apparently, but Brutus vetoed the move. Both Cassius and Brutus soon left Italy to take up commands in Syria and Asia assigned to them by the Senate. When Octavian seized a consulship in 43 and had the assassins declared enemies of the state, he put aside differences with Mark Antony and formed the Second Triumvirate with him and Lepidus, to pursue Brutus and Cassius, who had systematically acquired control of armies and treasuries in the eastern Mediterranean and who were heading toward Italy. The sides fought two battles at Philippi on October 3 and 23, 42; Cassius lost the first to Mark Antony and committed suicide, unaware that Brutus had been victorious against Octavian in his sector of the battle. He was buried in Thasos in Greece, mourned by Brutus as "the last of the Romans."

Cassius was interested in philosophy from an early age, when he studied in Rhodes. Initially he was an adherent of the Academy, but sometime between 48 and 45 he converted to Epicureanism. This school of thought advocated withdrawal from politics, but in Rome many public figures accommodated their careers to their belief in it. It is not clear whether Cassius tried to justify the removal of Caesar on Epicurean grounds. There was a family history of defense of *libertas* (= "freedom"), judging from the images and legends on coins issued by the Cassii, particularly in the 50s, and by Cassius himself, so he may have followed that tradition also.

Bruce Marshall

See also Brutus (Junius Brutus, Marcus); Caesar, Dictatorship of; Caesar, Gaius Julius; Carrhae, Battle of; Civil Wars (I) (49–45 BCE); Civil Wars (II) (44–31 BCE); Pompey; Second Triumvirate

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Casualties

For Roman warfare, we possess no accurate or precise casualty statistics. Though Roman generals and their staff who planned campaigns presumably knew the exact number of their troops to pay and supply them adequately, these exact numbers (attested in military strength documents from the early empire) were not recorded by literary authors. Ancient literary authors preferred round numbers (e.g., 5,000, 10,000, or 80,000) written as words rather than digits. Ancient numbers are particularly prone to being garbled in manuscript transmission (repeated copying of texts by medieval monks). Furthermore, the Roman cultural emphasis on victory meant that they did not list their war dead on most war monuments. The only surviving instance is the altar of Domitianic date (*ILS* 9107), near Adamklissi in Romania, listing over 3,800 Roman soldiers who died during war with the Dacians in the 80s. Nearby, Trajan built his own monument to his victories over the Dacians in 101–102 and 105–106, the *Tropaeum Traiani*, which does not list the dead.

In the republic, the custom of the triumph probably recorded enemy casualties, but little information has come down to us. Commanders were required to report Roman and enemy casualties to the Senate (Livy 2.8.1); according to Valerius Maximus (2.8), a commander needed 5,000 enemy casualties to be awarded a triumph, while according to Appian, *Civil Wars* 2.44, he needed 10,000 enemy casualties to be hailed as *imperator* (during the republic, before *imperator* signified the emperor). These conflicting statements are not supported by extensive other evidence. In the second century BCE, many generals who requested triumphs from the Senate were challenged by political rivals to defend their claims. These “triumphal debates” do not focus on numbers of enemy casualties (Pittenger 2008). In any case, commanders seeking triumphs were probably likely to inflate their numbers.

Aside from great military disasters, Roman losses in battles were

relatively light. Greek soldiers and Hellenistic mercenaries (such as Hannibal used) were comparably trained and equipped. Barbarian enemies from less developed or poorer societies often were not. The ancient authors record huge numbers of slain and captured non-Roman enemies, sometimes on a genocidal scale; allegedly, Julius Caesar's Gallic Wars resulted in the death of one million Gauls and the enslavement of one million Gauls (Pliny the Elder, *Natural History* 7.92). At the battle of Mons Graupius, according to Tacitus, 360 Romans died, or about three percent of 13,000 Roman auxiliary troops; 10,000 Britons died (Tacitus, *Agricola* 37). In the suppression of the Boudiccan revolt (60/61 CE), 400 Romans died, in contrast with 80,000 Britons (Tacitus, *Annals* 14.37). In the Roman suppression of the Bar Kochba revolt (132–135 CE), 580,000 Jews died, according to Cassius Dio (69.14).

Roman casualties from military disasters are subject to the same numerical inflation, but their impact can be estimated from subsequent recruitment policies. After the battle of Cannae (216 BCE), the Roman state instituted extraordinary levies, freeing and enlisting slaves, who were normally excluded from the army. At the battle of Arausio (105 BCE), 80,000 Romans allegedly died; Gaius Marius introduced the recruitment of the propertyless *capite censi* around the same time. Three legions were lost in the Varus disaster of 9 CE, or about 15,000 men; to replace the losses, Augustus enlisted freedmen and freeborn citizen volunteers. After the disastrous battle of Adrianople (378 CE), the emperor Theodosius I (379–395) stepped up the incorporation of barbarian allies, the *foederati*, organized under their own leadership rather than incorporated into Roman auxiliary units as in the earlier empire.

In military disasters, Roman commanders and officers were expected to face death with their men rather than risk the humiliation of capture by the enemy; survival itself might bring humiliation. It is not possible to estimate how many Roman officers routinely died in combat, but literary narratives provide anecdotal evidence that, at least during the Hannibalic War with its staggering Roman defeats at the battles of the Trebia (218 BCE) and Lake Trasimene (217 BCE) and Cannae (216 BCE), Roman nobles died in disproportionate numbers. The ideology of self-sacrifice manifested as scorn for the survivors of these defeats. Thus the Roman Senate repudiated the survivors of Cannae as cowardly, refused to reincorporate them into the army, and exiled them (Livy 22.61.14, 23.25.7–9, 24.18.9, 25.7.3–4). At a later

date, the Senate leader Marcus Aemilius Scaurus refused to admit his son to his presence after the latter survived the Roman defeat at Arausio (105 BCE). The younger Marcus Aemilius Scaurus committed suicide out of shame (Valerius Maximus 5.8.4). As an extreme form of self-sacrifice in battle, a Roman warrior might practice *devotio*, vowing his life to a god in return for victory; however, such practices are usually attributed to the earlier and more legendary republic.

Even if they did not die in battle, Roman fighters gained prestige from displaying the scars of battle wounds. Ideally such wounds were all on the front of the fighter's body, indicating that he had not turned and fled from the enemy. Plutarch's *Roman Questions* ch. 49 (*Moralia* 276c–d) claims that Roman nobles campaigning for office used to wear togas without tunics so as to display battle scars on their upper bodies and attest the *virtus* (courage) they had displayed in combat. The display of battle scars might also be a claim of “new men” such as Cato the Elder and Gaius Marius (Sallust, *Jugurthine War* 85.29), depicting their rivals as effeminate. Battle scars added to the prestige also gained by military decorations and single combats. However, this rhetoric of scars is also attributed to the earlier and mid-republic.

The Roman nobility's personal experience of combat and of combat probably declined in the late Republic, but did not die out. A shift in the depiction of battle wounds and scars occurs in Julius Caesar's *Gallic Wars* and *Civil War*, emphasizing the bravery, deaths in combat, and wounds of his common soldiers, of centurion rank and below, rather than his noble officers. Though not attested in Caesar himself, according to Florus, Plutarch and Appian, before the battle of Pharsalus (48 BCE) Caesar ordered his men to strike at the faces of the young Pompeian nobles so that these men would turn and flee rather than risk scars that would damage their good looks (Florus 2.13; Plutarch, *Pompey* 69; Appian, *Civil Wars* 2.76). However, Roman officers and commanders continued to die in combat, as did Marcus Licinius Crassus at Carrhae (53 BCE), the rebel leader Catiline at the battle of Pistoria (62 BCE), and the consuls Hirtius and Pansa at the battle of Mutina (43 BCE). In civil warfare, a defeated Roman commander and his officers might commit suicide rather than face the humiliation of seeking clemency from the rival leader; Cato the Younger, Brutus, and Cassius chose to kill themselves thus in the civil wars of the late Republic. In the Principate, Roman senatorial officers also participated in and died in combat, for

example, Quinctilius Varus and his officers in the Varian disaster of 9 CE or the commanders in Domitian's Dacian Wars (85–89 CE), so that to speak of the imperial aristocracy as “demilitarized” in comparison with the republic is an exaggeration.

In addition to deaths on the battlefield, modern casualty estimates should include soldiers who died from the complications of their wounds. In Western nineteenth-century warfare, such as the Crimean War or the American Civil War, 17–20 percent of wounded soldiers died from infected wounds. Wounds from bullets and artillery shells were particularly liable to infection. In contrast with bullet and artillery wounds, slash or stab wounds from swords and spears are lower in energy, introduce less dirt into the wound (if the enemy has not deliberately tainted the blades), and result in less tissue damage. Thus Roman sword and spear wounds to the limbs may have been more survivable, as long as the injured man was not crippled and did not succumb to loss of blood (Rosenstein 2004). Military medical personnel attended the battlefield; on Trajan's Column they are depicted binding up wounds. Blade wounds that penetrate the head, thorax or abdominal cavity and lacerate vital organs are much more serious, but these areas of Roman soldiers' bodies were protected by armor.

In peacetime, more Roman soldiers probably died from contagious diseases than in combat or from infected wounds. Living in communal conditions promoted the spread of disease. The Praetorian Guard, recruited from Italian towns and stationed in the city of Rome, were exposed to the megacity's diseases and, as a result, some died untimely (attested by grave epitaphs). The Antonine plague of the 160s–170s CE, possibly measles or smallpox, was brought to the Roman Empire by soldiers returning from the Persian frontier, and decimated the Roman army.

Sara E. Phang

See also Bureaucracy; Cannae, Battle of; Demography; Extraordinary Levies; Praetorians; Triumph; War Dead

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Catalaunian Plains, Battle of the (451 CE)

The battle of the Catalaunian Plains was one of the major battles of the later Roman Empire, in which the western Roman army supported by the Visigoths and other barbarian allies defeated the Hunnic confederation led by Attila the Hun. The battle took place at an unidentified location in northeastern Gaul, probably between modern Châlons-sur-Marne and Troyes, in the summer of 451.

In 450, the new eastern Roman emperor Marcian refused to pay tribute to the Huns. Therefore, Attila decided to raid Italy on the pretext of marrying the imperial princess Honoria, sister of Valentinian III. Honoria allegedly had invited Attila to rescue her from an arranged marriage, offering to marry Attila. To facilitate his invasion, Attila decided to collect followers among the western Franks, Visigoths, Vandals, and *bacaudae* (independent brigands and militia led by lesser aristocracy). The Vandals remained neutral, while the Visigoths decided to side with the western Roman government. Various Frankish groups joined both sides.

Attila crossed the Rhine in April 451, sacking various cities such as Metz and Trier. The Huns and their tributary allies had marched hundreds of

miles from their heartland in central Europe. Attila's forces, which did not have sophisticated logistics, spread widely over northern Gaul as they raided various cities. Eventually they converged on and besieged Orléans in June. The city was a headquarter of the western Roman military, defended by an Alan garrison. However, the timely arrival of Aetius' armies forced Attila to retreat on June 14. Eventually both armies collided a week later.

A full description of the battle can be found in Jordanes (*Getica*, 191–218). Aetius took command of the right flank with the western Roman field army, with the Alans in the center and the Visigoths on the left flank. Attila commanded the center of his forces, supported by Gepids, Rugi, and various Gothic groups who later became the Ostrogoths, on both flanks. The Visigothic king Theoderic I (not the same person as Theoderic the Ostrogothic king of Italy, s.v.) was killed during the first charges, but his son Thorismund took over his command and, aided by Aetius' cavalry, occupied a strategic hill on the battlefield. After a day-long battle, both sides retreated at nightfall without a clear victory. Attila and his Hunnic forces, however, withdrew to central Europe.

It is impossible to estimate how many combatants were involved. Jordanes claims that 160,000 fell on both sides while one western chronicler states that 300,000 people fell. These numbers are severely exaggerated, given that field armies of this era rarely exceeded more than several 10,000 soldiers. Another chronicle describes an incalculable slaughter on both sides. Tactically, the battle was a stalemate. However, Aetius and his allies scored a considerable strategic victory due to the retreat of the Huns. After this setback Attila never regained his past success; his fortuitous death from natural causes caused the Hunnic confederation to collapse. The battle was unusual in ancient European history for the sheer diversity of political groups involved—ranging from the Atlantic to the Black Sea.

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See also Aetius; Attila; Huns; Vandals

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Cataphractarii

Equites cataphractarii were the most heavily armored cavalry utilized by the imperial and late Roman armies. The Roman army adopted cataphract units in response to its experiences battling Sarmatian and Persian cataphracts along the Danube and on the eastern frontier. The Sarmatians and Persians had inflicted numerous defeats upon Roman legions, one notable example being the battle of Carrhae in 53 BCE. While the Romans maintained some *cataphractarii* units in the western empire, they primarily served on the eastern frontier. Unlike the cataphracts of their opponents, who represented the wealthy elite, Roman *cataphractarii* were professional soldiers from no particular social stratum.

Cataphractarii were covered from neck to toe in armor, usually scale or mail, and their horses were armored likewise. Their primary weapon was a long lance called the *contus*, though they also carried a sword or mace as a secondary. Some also carried bows or darts. Their heavy armor gave them excellent protection in battle, and their impact in battle can be likened to a modern “tank.”

The use of *cataphractarii* varied greatly from regular Roman cavalry, which traditionally were lightly armed and used more for skirmishing than for offensive onslaughts. *Cataphractarii* excelled at shock charges against an enemy’s flank, though they suffered two key weaknesses from their cumbersome equipment. They had to maintain tight formation, as lone riders could be surrounded and overcome quickly. In addition, horse and rider alike could quickly overheat and tire in pitched combat, leaving them vulnerable.

The first Roman *cataphractarii* were *auxilia* during the reign of emperor Trajan (98–117 CE). Though they remained relatively scarce during the Principate, by the sixth century, *cataphractarii* had become elite units of the Roman army. The unit would become a staple in the eastern Roman Empire, and the future Byzantine army would become famous for its *kataphraktoi*.

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See also Carrhae, Battle of; Cavalry (Imperial); Cavalry (Republic); Legion, Organization of; Persian Wars, Arsacid; Persian Wars, Sassanid

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Catiline (108–62 BCE)

Catiline (Lucius Sergius Catilina) was one of the late republic's most notorious political agitators, plotting against the Roman state in 63–62 BCE. He was born into an old patrician family, but one not prominent for many generations—their last consulship had been in 380 BCE. Catiline seems to have been motivated to revive his family's reputation by securing a consulship for himself and restoring his finances.

After service in the Social War in 89, we next hear of him on Sulla's side in the civil war (83–82). He benefited from the rewards provided by Sulla, but there are stories of unscrupulous conduct: for example, he is alleged to have beheaded his brother-in-law, Marius Gratidianus, and then asked Sulla to add his name to the proscription lists to legalize the murder. There were accusations of other murders and even incest. In 73, he was tried for adultery with the Vestal Fabia, but leading senators secured his acquittal. Such stories probably resulted from later hostile propaganda, promoted by opponents such as Cicero.

After a praetorship in 68, Catiline was governor of Africa for two years. On his return in 66, he tried to run for supplementary consular elections, held because the originally successful candidates had been found guilty of electoral corruption. Around the same time African provincials came to Rome complaining of Catiline's misconduct while governor, so his candidature was disallowed. Tried for misconduct the following year, Catiline was acquitted, again helped by distinguished senators, though bribery was suspected. Cicero actually considered defending him in court, even though he commented privately that his guilt was clear.

In 65 came rumors of the so-called First Catilinarian Conspiracy. Supposedly, Catiline conspired with Gnaeus Piso and the two displaced consular candidates to kill the new consuls on the day they entered office, along with some senators. The sources, written after the event, when it was

known how Catiline turned out, give differing accounts, laying the blame on various individuals, including Crassus and Caesar. Cicero, at least later, asserted that Catiline was the ringleader. It is thus not clear who participated, or whether such a “conspiracy” even existed. The whole thing was probably fabricated from the vague mutterings of some disgruntled political players.

Catiline still hoped to obtain the consulship legitimately. He ran for the elections in 64 on a joint ticket with Gaius Antonius Hybrida, both possibly financed by Crassus, but Catiline lost to Cicero and Antonius. Though a “new man,” Cicero was preferred by the conservatives, who may have been concerned about Catiline’s powerful backer, while Cicero himself ran a successful scare campaign.

Catiline was prosecuted again later that year under a special court investigating those who had profited from the Sullan proscriptions. Catiline was acquitted yet again, possibly through bribery supplied by Crassus, or perhaps through the influence of the court president, Caesar.

Catiline tried a third time to secure a consulship in 63. However, he had now lost much of his political support, while his policy of cancelling debts, ostensibly to help the urban plebs, but more likely to benefit spendthrift nobles like himself, alienated the conservatives. The elections were conducted by Cicero as consul, theatrically wearing a breastplate beneath his toga to suggest he needed to protect himself. Catiline lost again and now turned to more desperate measures to secure the office he thought that he as a patrician he was entitled to.

He collected together a conspiratorial gang of ex-senators and equestrians, whose ambitions, like his, had been thwarted or who sought restoration of their senatorial status and lost political power; men such as Lentulus Sura, consul in 71, who had been removed from the Senate by the censors, Autronius who had lost the consulship of 65, and Cassius Longinus who had failed at the consular elections in 64. With his policy of debt relief, Catiline appealed to the poor both in the city and in the countryside, including large numbers of Sulla’s veterans, who had failed to make their land allotments productive.

Catiline sent Gaius Manlius, a Sullan ex-centurion, to collect an army in Etruria, where many of Sulla’s veterans were; others were sent to foment trouble in other parts of Italy. Meanwhile, Catiline continued preparing the conspiracy in Rome—or so Cicero claimed. The plans included arson and

murder of senators, after which the conspirators would leave to link up with Catiline and Manlius' army, return to the city, and take control. Cicero was kept informed of these plans by Fulvia, the mistress of Quintus Curius, one of the conspirators. For some months Cicero tried to warn the Senate, but failed to convince them. Foiling an attempt on his own life on the morning of November 7, 63, he called a Senate meeting the following day and denounced Catiline, who was present. That night Catiline abandoned Rome and joined Manlius in Etruria to proceed with his plans for armed insurrection.

Some associates left in Rome continued the conspiracy there. They negotiated with envoys from the Allobroges who happened to be in the city, hoping to gain their support. They provided the envoys with letters, but in a trap prearranged with Cicero the letters were seized, giving him finally the evidence needed to arrest five leading conspirators. Cicero had the incriminating letters read to the Senate the next day, and after a long debate the conspirators were condemned to death without a trial, despite a strong speech by Caesar against the death penalty. Cicero had them executed in prison immediately.

The news of the executions was a major setback to Catiline. On hearing it, many deserted his army, reducing it to just 3,000 men. The consul Antonius was sent against this small, badly equipped army; despite moving around north Italy to avoid a confrontation, Catiline was eventually caught between Antonius' army and that of Metellus Celer in the north and forced to fight. He chose to engage Antonius' army, commanded by Petreius, near Pistoria (Pistoia). In his account, Sallust says that Catiline fought bravely in the battle: when the corpses were viewed, all of Catiline's soldiers were found with frontal wounds, while Catiline's body was found far in advance of his own front line.

After Catiline's death, many of the poor still regarded him with respect and not as a renegade. Even Cicero admitted later (Cicero, *Pro Caelio* 12–14) that he himself had once nearly been taken in by Catiline and that he was a strange mixture of the greatest virtues and the worst vices.

Bruce Marshall

See also Cicero; Civil Conflict (Late Republic); Conspiracy of Catiline; Proscriptions; Sulla, Lucius Cornelius

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Cato the Elder (234–149/8 BCE)

Cato the Elder (Marcus Porcius Cato Maior) was a general and politician born in Tusculum in 234 to an affluent equestrian family. He was a *novus homo* (new man) who, with the backing of the patrician Lucius Valerius Flaccus, climbed swiftly up the *cursus honorum* (ladder of offices) to become consul in 195 and censor in 184. He is perhaps better known as a political personality with immense oratorical skills and a vast literary output. His treatise on agriculture is extant, but only fragments of his other works and orations survive.

As a soldier, he served successfully in southern Italy, in the Second Punic War, particularly at the Siege of Tarentum (mod. Tarento) in 209, and then two years later at the decisive battle of Metaurus (mod. River Metauro, north Italy) defeating Hannibal's brother Hasdrubal. Ever wary of Carthage, he coined the phrase: *Carthago delenda est* (Carthage must be destroyed).

In the year of his consulship, Cato was assigned to Nearer Spain where his tactical and ruthless martial skills enabled him and his forces to reduce much of the area to subjection. He won a decisive battle at Emporiae (mod. Ampurias) and exploited the region's minerals. His successes were rewarded with a Roman triumph. In 191, as a military tribune, he was instrumental in the defeat of Antiochus III at Thermopylae. Toward the end of his career, Cato urged Rome to the Third Punic War (149–146 BCE).

Cato lived to the ripe old age of 85 and was given a biography by Plutarch of Chaeronea. Better remembered as an accomplished statesman, Cato was also an exemplary and respected soldier.

Juan M. A. Strisino

See also Carthage (State); *Cursus Honorum* (Republic); Plutarch; Punic War, Second; Punic War, Third; Republic, Political Structure; Spanish Wars

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Cato the Younger (95–46 BCE)

Cato the Younger (Marcus Porcius Cato Minor) (also called Cato Uticensis) was a politician and statesman born in Rome in 95. He was the great-grandson of Marcus Porcius Cato Maior and noted for emulating his ancestor. Little is known of his early life but his uncle, Marcus Livius Drusus, raised him. Cato the Younger gave intellectual support to the optimate (conservative) faction in the late republic. His ideology was based on Stoic philosophy and he demanded respect for Roman traditions.

Very early on in his political career, Cato became leader of the *optimates* (“best men” or oligarchic faction) in 63 and was vehemently opposed to Caesar, clashing with him over the execution of the followers of Catiline. Indeed, Cato tried to incriminate Caesar in that conspiracy. For this, Cato was shifted aside to Cyprus in 59 to administer its annexation. His antagonism to Caesar intensified and he, perhaps reluctantly, followed Pompey to Dyrrhachium (mod. Durres, Albania) in 48, which he held for him until Pompey was defeated at Pharsalus in August of that year. Cato then left for Africa with Quintus Caecilius Metellus Scipio to continue the Pompeian struggle and took command at Utica. But, when Scipio was defeated at the battle of Thapsus (in mod. Tunisia) in 46, Cato committed suicide rather than accept Caesar’s pardon.

Like his great grandfather before him, Cato was given a biography by Plutarch of Chaeronea, which finishes with the famous scene of his death. Perhaps not as adept a soldier as Cato Maior, Cato the Younger is best remembered for his principled hostility to Caesar and his rigorous support of the traditional republic.

Juan M. A. Strisino

See also Caesar, Gaius Julius; Catiline; Cato the Elder; Civil Conflict (Late Republic); Civil Wars (I) (49–45 BCE); Conspiracy of Catiline; Livius Drusus the Younger, Marcus; Pompey; Republic, Political Structure; Suicide

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Caudine Forks, Battle of the. See Samnite Wars

Cavalry (Imperial)

The development and use of cavalry in the Roman military systems during the imperial period is complex. While there is advancement in the cavalry branch, development was slow and reactive through this period. It was influenced by peoples from outside the empire who had much more familiarity with horses than did the Romans; some of their practices diffused through the empire from extended contact or may have been deliberately adopted by the Romans.

During the first two centuries CE of the empire, Roman cavalry continued to be raised and utilized in the same manner as during the late republic. Most cavalry recruited from citizens was attached in small squadrons (*alae*) to individual infantry legions to give those legions the ability to function independently. The men who became cavalry commanders were Roman citizens from the wealthy equestrian order, sons of rich merchants and large landholders. By the late first century CE, a typical cavalry commander had served as *praefectus cohortis* (commander of an infantry cohort) and *tribunus militum* (legionary tribune) before becoming a *praefectus alae*. The lower ranking officers (decurions) and soldiers within cavalry units, if citizens, were recruited from below the equestrian order, typically from rural Italians or provincials. The larger

independent cavalry units were predominately raised from non-Roman allies with a strong horse-riding tradition. These units were allowed to name their own chiefs as low and midlevel officers of the unit, but Roman citizens were usually placed in overall command of the unit. It was not unheard of, however, for trusted chieftains to be granted command, especially outside the borders of the empire. Over time, however, the ethnic identities of imperial cavalry unit members may not have stayed the same as the tendency became to recruit locally.

The Roman cavalry began to change as the Roman army began to engage more and more with the horse-riding peoples of present day central and eastern Europe and the Persians in the Middle East. These peoples introduced new horse technologies and cavalry tactics to the Romans that the Romans would slowly adopt over the next few centuries. These new types of cavalry included light cavalry such as horse archers as well as heavy cavalry such as cataphracts. While the Romans never raised indigenous units of either type, they did adapt to using allied troops that were proficient in both forms as well as hiring mercenaries to fill their need for both, especially in the eastern imperial region.

Major changes in the imperial cavalry system began in the mid-third century CE under the emperor Gallienus (253–268). Gallienus created a mobile defense and strike force composed mostly of cavalry. This force was comprised of medium and heavy cavalry and located at Milan, a central location capable of responding to threats from the border region or from rivals to the imperial throne in the western provinces of Gaul.

The next advancement in Roman cavalry was under Diocletian (284–305) and accompanied the reorganization of the Roman administrative system. Reorganizing the Roman governmental structure supported a larger military institution. This allowed Diocletian to raise more cavalry units and to increase the size of the ones already in existence. It also allowed him to create specialized cavalry units for the first time, including imperial guard cavalries. Once created, these units would become a permanent part of the Roman military system. It is unclear what policy Diocletian took toward the central cavalry force.



Monument of cavalryman. The tombstone of Flavius Bassus, a first-century CE horseman of the ala Noricorum depicts a Roman cavalryman riding down a barbarian. This motif is one of the most common images on Roman military tombstones. *CIL* XIII 8308. Located in the Romano-Germanic Museum, Köln, Germany. (CM Dixon/Print Collector/Getty Images)

Constantine (306–337) placed even more emphasis on cavalry than infantry in the organization of the Roman army. Under Constantine, the need to rapidly respond to threats, both foreign and domestic, motivated the change to a more mobile system instead of the slower moving infantry troops of the past. With the need for more and better trained cavalry, the later Roman army emphasized the development of cavalry equipment and training of cavalry troops. Both Zosimus (2.55, on Constantine's reorganization of the army) and Vegetius regard the fourth- and fifth-century emphasis on cavalry as detrimental to the Roman army, since infantry legions had formed the backbone of the traditional Roman army. Cavalry would continue to dominate the Roman military until the fall of the western empire in 476, and it stayed the core of the eastern empire forces until its fall to the Muslims in 1453.

Roman cavalry during the Principate, both indigenous and allied, was predominately light cavalry. Light cavalymen rode small, fast horses, wore little to no armor, and were armed with a spear (*contus*). While mounted archers were common throughout the imperial period, horse archers never became a standard of the Roman cavalry force. The primary role of Roman light cavalry was to scout for the main force, provide couriers and convey communications, and assist in foraging. During battle, they would be used to guard the flanks of the main infantry force, attack the flanks and rear of the enemy, and pursue a fleeing enemy to prevent them from regrouping. This began to change during the latter years of the first millennium CE as the Romans encountered more peoples better versed in the use of horses.

Heavy cavalry became a standard part of the Roman military system in the latter half of the third century CE. Called cataphractarii or *clibanarii*, these horsemen wore heavy metal armor from head to foot and were armed with shields, swords, and heavy spears. Elite forces were raised as imperial bodyguards. Although heavy cavalry of this type existed as far back as Alexander the Great, the Romans regarded them as less useful since they were ineffective against formed infantry units. With the advent of the Sassanid Persian Empire, however, the combination of improvements in cavalry capabilities coupled with a reduction in infantry capabilities made heavy cavalry much more effective. With their improved production, this style of heavy cavalry would remain a mainstay for the Romans.

Roman cavalry was never truly the equal of its opponents. The Romans continued to rely on allied cavalry and mercenaries for the majority of their horsemen throughout the empire period and never developed an indigenous cavalry force of note. The Persian cavalry (Arsacid and Sassanid) east of the Roman Empire was always a threat and able to fight the Romans as equals. The migratory groups which raided the empire in the later period (fourth and fifth centuries CE) were much better horsemen than the Romans and continually bested the Roman cavalry. The best example of this was the Huns under Attila.

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See also Alae; Arms and Armor; Auxilia; Cavalry (Republic); Persian Wars, Arsacid; Persian Wars, Sassanid; Praefectus; Recruitment of Army (Imperial); Tactics; Training

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Cavalry (Republic)

A balanced premodern army has three parts: foot troops (infantry), horse troops (cavalry), and large crew-serviced weapons (artillery). The Roman army is no different. It is well known for its legions of infantry and for its superbly engineered artillery, relying on torsion-powered devices such as catapults. Less attention is paid to the cavalry branch of the Roman military, however. This is largely due to the nature of Roman combat and the economic restrictions involved in raising large numbers of cavalry troopers.

The geography of the Italian peninsula does not lend itself to the raising and training of large numbers of horses. Because of this, horses in the Roman Republican era were very expensive. Most animal power was provided by other, nonmilitary animals such as mules and oxen. This hampered the ability of the Romans to develop a cavalry army on par with their infantry forces. Early Romans also never developed horse-based technologies of later premodern eras. The Romans never used stirrups. They also did not shoe their horses, instead relying on a temporary covering for the hoof when needed called a *hipposandal*. The lack of advanced equitation technology hampered the growth and development of the Roman cavalry arm.

The early Roman military was composed of citizens. According to ancient custom, each citizen was required to provide service to the city in times of war according to his ability. Attributed to King Servius Tullius (578–535 BCE), the Servian constitution as described by Livy 1.42–43 represents a somewhat later period in the fifth century BCE. The citizens were

divided into classes by wealth: nobles, first, second, third, fourth, and fifth. The nobles, the wealthiest class of citizens, were responsible for forming the cavalry arm of the military. Originally, these nobles formed six centuries (or approximately 600 men) of cavalry. This represented the aristocratic core of the cavalry, dating to the monarchic period. Twelve more centuries were later added. These were drawn from the social class known as *equites*; men wealthy enough to provide the equipment necessary to be cavalry but not of noble families. All cavalymen provided their own arms and armor, but were awarded a horse by the state for the duration of their service. Because of this they were called *equites equo publico* (horsemen using communally provided horses). They also received special consideration in terms of service. They were paid three times the daily rate of an infantryman, and were only required to serve 10 campaigns instead of the infantry's 16.

The cavalry section of the Republican Roman military was always small and it provided a limited service in actual combat. It was used to protect the flanks of the infantry while on the march. The army also used the cavalry as scouts, as skirmishers in small confrontations (performed by light infantry called *velites*), to maintain communications, and to forage or gather supplies from the local inhabitants for the main bulk of troops. During a battle, the cavalry was formed into two wings (called *alae*) on the sides of the main infantry body to cover the flanks of the main body or, if needed, attack the flanks of the enemy. The main goal of the Roman cavalry during battle was to neutralize any enemy cavalry if possible, and attack the enemy from the sides and rear, breaking up enemy formations and causing the enemy soldiers to panic.

Republican Roman cavalry were equipped much like their infantry counterparts. Each man was required to provide his own armor which was either chainmail or scale, a helmet, greaves (lower leg guards), a sword, spear, and shield. The cavalry arms and shield were all slightly different from the infantry versions. The spear (*hasta*) was a thrusting spear between four and six feet long with a heavy barbed point. The sword (*spatha*) was longer than the infantry *gladius*, had a heavier blade which would crush armor, and a rounded tip to prevent the cavalryman from injuring himself or his horse. The cavalry shield was round for easier use on horseback and only covered the trooper from shoulder to waist.

The tactics most commonly used by Roman cavalry was that utilized by most heavy cavalry units: the massed charge. This worked well against the

flanks and rears of enemy formations as these areas were very weakly defended. It also worked well against other European cavalry units that tended to fight in massed groups since the Roman cavalry was usually more heavily armed and armored than their opponents. The Roman cavalry was less effective when faced with light cavalry units. These types of units (such as the Numidian cavalry used by Hannibal) did not fight in dense formations. They also tended to be faster than the Roman cavalry since their horses carried less weight (light cavalymen wore lighter or even no armor). However, in general Roman cavalry was considered to be very good, although it was decidedly ineffective against elephants (encountered in the wars with Pyrrhus and Hannibal) as horses proved to be terrified of them.

Roman Republican cavalry was at a decided disadvantage, as was most cavalry of the day, when charging the front of an infantry unit in dense formation. Horses will not normally charge a solid object such as a shield wall. If the enemy formation does not break up (usually caused by the men running away due to fear), the cavalry most likely stopped its attack with little to no effect. Such unsuccessful attacks can tire the horses and put the cavalry at a serious disadvantage when called upon to perform other actions during the same battle.

As the Roman army increased in size with the expansion of the republic, the numbers of cavalry units also increased. Since the cavalry was recruited from the aristocracy, which also supplied the officers for the infantry and the army in general, a shortage of men available for service in the cavalry caused the Romans to change service requirements. As the divisions between patrician and plebeian began to weaken in the fifth century BCE, the cavalry was opened to the first class of plebeians, which had been restricted to the infantry to this point. These plebeian cavalymen (called *equites equo privato* because they provided their own horse instead of receiving one from the state) were not given the same privileges as the noble cavalry (their pay and terms of service remained equal to that of the infantry). When this proved to still be insufficient, the Roman government began to shift the responsibility of raising cavalry from the Roman citizen population to non-Roman conquered and allied peoples. By the Second Punic War (218–201 BCE), the majority of the republican-era cavalry had become *equites equo privato*. By the time of Caesar's campaigns in Gaul, the Roman cavalry was composed almost entirely of non-Romans, usually from tribes, such as the *Belgae* in northern Europe (in current Belgium), which had a history and

culture of horsemen.

Over this same period, the order of *equites* or equestrian order differentiated and diverged from the archaic Roman cavalry, becoming a relatively large group of well-to-do landowners and businessmen who intermarried with the senatorial order and who might have little to do with cavalry service.

Ian A. Martin

See also *Alae*; *Alae Sociorum*; Allies; Arms and Armor; *Equites*, Equestrians; Persian Wars, Arsacid; *Praefectus*; Recruitment of Army (Republic); Tactics; Training

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Celtiberians

Between the tenth and sixth centuries BCE, Celts crossed the Pyrenees into Spain and settled and adopted the native Iberian way of life. They brought with them language, religious traditions and customs of warfare and amalgamated them with the Iberians' more developed urbanized systems. This fusion resulted in the, often misused, term "Celtiberian" which Graeco-Roman historians used to describe the tribes that inhabited the north-eastern-central region of Spain.

The Celtiberians controlled their boundaries, which were centered on hill-forts known as *oppida*. The tribes included: the Titti, the Belli, the Lusones, the Berones, and perhaps the most powerful of them, the Arevaci. The construction of their forts and their weapons, particularly their double-edged sword (later to be used by the Romans), suggests a warlike culture.

Each tribe was headed by a chieftain who exercised supreme martial, political, and religious control. In times of war, alliances were established against familiar opponents with designated war leaders chosen for gallantry in conflicts. Indeed, the Celtiberians had a reputation for being the finest mercenary troops in western Europe and were employed because of their hit-and-run tactics, surprise attacks, night raids and guerilla strategies. The Carthaginian armies often used their services, particularly in the Second Punic War (218–201 BCE) and they formed part of Hannibal's invasion army of Italy (218).

When the Romans expelled the Carthaginians from Spain in 206 and began the process of pacification, the greatest defiance came from the Celtiberians. Known as the Celtiberian or Numantine Wars, they lasted from 153 to 133. The first of these involved the Lusones who revolted after their territory had been reduced. It lasted until 179 BCE when the consul Quintus Fulvius Flaccus was dispatched to curb it. The most memorable resistance came when the Romans attempted to capture the chief Celtiberian stronghold of Numantia (143–133). They failed to subdue it on numerous occasions due to the tenacity of the natives, and Scipio Aemilianus only suppressed it through starvation in 133.

By the first century BCE, Celtiberian resistance had begun to decline. It is only during the Sertorian War (80–71), which formed part of the Marian-Sullan conflict, that further opposition to Roman domination is attested. Indeed, Celtiberian tribes formed alliances between both camps. Sertorius, who had won the respect of the Arevaci, utilized them against Rome and neighboring Spanish tribes who were hostile to him. Nevertheless, many of their towns had been destroyed by the end of the war, which is generally considered to mark the cessation of the Celtiberian threat. By the end of the first century BCE the Romanization of Spain had begun and Celtiberian independence had ceased.

The Celtiberians can be seen as perhaps the most superior bellicose culture among the Celts of Spain. They forcefully defended their territories and people against the Roman conquest and were fundamental in protracting the war in Spain for close to 200 years.

Juan M. A. Strisino

See also Marian-Sullan Conflict; Numantia, Siege of; Punic War, Second; Scipio Aemilianus; Sertorius; Spanish Wars

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Censors and Census

The Roman census was a thorough evaluation of each adult male Roman citizen's property and lifestyle. According to Roman tradition, the kings, and then the consuls performed the census. In 443 BCE, the new specialized office of censor was created to relieve the consuls of this burden. By the middle republic, two censors were elected every five years for a term of 18 months, and the office became the pinnacle of a successful public career, held subsequent to the consulship. Censors inquired into men's livelihood and wealth, which determined the position of each male citizen in the *comitia centuriata* voting assembly (notionally a military assembly), and in the legions. At least by the era of the Punic Wars, the census classes ceased to map directly onto military organization, except for the minimum property requirement for legionary service.

The Roman censors' famed scrutiny of public and private morals struck some outside observers as excessive and invasive. If both censors agreed that an individual led an immoral life, the censors placed a literal black mark beside that person's name on the list of all citizens they compiled. Immorality might feature improper sexual behavior, but more damning was

financial extravagance, which diminished a citizen's property qualification, disarranging the timocratic organization of the state.

The censors enrolled new citizens into one of the traditional 35 voting tribes, and managed the Senate's membership. They also supervised Rome's budget, rented out public land, and took bids on major state contracts (most famously, for tax farming in Roman provinces). Censors therefore had a major impact on Roman public life. The office and its responsibilities fell into disuse amid the disorders of the late republic, but the emperors partially revived and performed the censors' duties.

Smaller-scale censuses occurred in the Roman imperial provinces, sometimes controversially (notably Judaea in 6 CE), and typically for the purpose of determining optimal taxation arrangements.

The republican census figures themselves, recorded by literary authors, have sustained extended modern scholarly debate upon their interpretation and the significance for mid- and late republican manpower and demography. Not enough is known about how the republican censors administered the census. The only province from which documentary census records survive in detail is imperial Roman Egypt.

Christopher J. Fuhrmann

See also *Capite Censi*; *Comitia Centuriata*; *Cursus Honorum* (Republic); Demography; Recruitment of Army (Republic); Senate, Senators; Servian Constitution

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Centuria, Century. See Legion, Organization of

Centurion (Imperial)

Imperial centurions were the immediate superior officers of the rank and file soldiers, and were responsible for the command of centuries in battle, where they fought close to the front. They enjoyed considerable prospects of promotion, and their careers ranged widely over the empire. Centurions were also the Roman officers with whom the civilian population was probably most familiar.

The main responsibility of the centurion was the supervision of the men under his command. Centurions were the most immediate authority figures in the daily lives of the soldiers. As the primary enforcers of military discipline, it is not surprising that some centurions aroused the enmity of the troops. The mutineers of 14 CE were particularly violent against centurions who, they believed, were unnecessarily harsh in maintaining discipline. The Pannonian mutineers executed a centurion who bore the nickname *cedo alteram* on account of his habit of calling for another stick when he had broken the first on a soldier's back (Tacitus, *Annals* 1.23). The German legions attempted to give every centurion 60 lashes, one for each of their number in a legion (Tacitus, *Annals* 1.32).



Monument of centurion. Marcus Caelius died in the Battle of the Teutoburg Forest, one of Rome's worst military disasters (9 CE). Caelius holds a short staff, a Roman centurion's badge of office, also used to punish recalcitrant soldiers. *CIL* XIII 8648 = *ILS* 2244, located in the Rheinisches-Landesmuseum, Bonn, Germany. (Alfredo Dagli Orti/The Art Archive/Corbis)

The authority and leadership of the centurions extended onto the battlefield. Since the surviving evidence suggests that, at a tactical level, individual cohorts lacked an overall commander, it is likely that the centuries were commanded by their centurions as individual combat units. The prevailing opinion of modern scholars is that centurions fought in the front rank during battle (Goldsworthy 1996:182). This assumption is made on the basis of the high mortality rate of centurions in combat which suggests that the centurions were present in the very forefront of the action. But there may be other reasons for the high mortality rate of centurions. An individual fighting in the front rank of the army was incapable of any command function, literally fighting for his life and unable to give orders.

For him to exercise control of the century, the centurion would need to separate himself from the fighting while remaining close enough to observe what was happening and make on the spot command decisions.

Assuming that cohorts were usually deployed in three ranks, centurions may have stood in the second rank and their high casualty rate can be explained by their consequent role in battle. It is plausible that high numbers of centurions were killed during moments of crisis on the battlefield, when they tried to physically hold the army together. If they survived, centurions might be handsomely rewarded for courage. A funerary epitaph for a *primus pilus* records that he received 75,000 sesterces and a promotion from Caracalla for his bravery in battle against the Carpi (ILS 7178). This indicates the importance of prowess in battle for the centurionate as a whole as a means of obtaining rewards and promotions.

Promotion into the legionary centurionate involved a substantial pay increase. After Augustus' military reforms, centurions in cohorts II–X received a salary of 13,500 sesterces. Centurions in the first cohort earned 27,000 sesterces and a *primus pilus* earned 54,000 sesterces. Membership of the *primi ordines* also guaranteed a far better standard of accommodation than that enjoyed by other centurions. The accommodation provided for the centurions of the first cohort in most legionary forts was double the size of the housing used by the other centurions and often included a courtyard. Unlike the rank and file before the Severan period, it seems likely that centurions were able to legally marry.

The advantages of a career as a legionary centurion are attested by the number of equestrians who gained commissions directly into the centurionate rather than pursuing a military career within their own order. A number of equestrian officers even transferred into the centurionate after beginning an equestrian military career path.

The geographical origins of legionary centurions varied over the imperial period. During the first century CE, there was a clear distinction between the centurions of the western and eastern legions, in particular between the Greek speaking east, Egypt, and Africa and elsewhere in the empire. Centurions from legions based in the western provinces who were involved in campaigns in the east invariably returned to their original legions on the cessation of hostilities. From the reign of Trajan onward, the transfer of centurions between legions in the east and west was facilitated and the geographical separation ceased to exist.

From the early second century CE onward, the centurionate across the empire became a remarkably heterogeneous body. This diversity was fostered by the variety of routes by which men entered the centurionate. Italians were present in small numbers in both the legions and the centurionate and there is no evidence to suggest that they were ever deliberately excluded from the army. However, the better pay and privileges available to members of the Praetorian Guard presumably tempted most Italian recruits to seek a post in the Rome cohorts. If their career progressed satisfactorily, such men could then be transferred into the legionary centurionate. Equestrians commissioned as centurions came from a variety of Italian and provincial backgrounds. It is only to be expected that the majority of centurions who began their military careers in the ranks would share the provincial background of their men, particularly as recruitment became more localized. However, the prevalence of multiple centurionate careers ensured that, although a centurion may have shared a common background with the soldiers of the legion in which he was first promoted, he could be transferred through a number of legions in different provinces.

As an illustration of the social gulf between the Roman senatorial aristocracy and centurions, Pliny the Younger relates that the wife of a (senatorial) *tribunus laticlavus* “disgraced herself and her family” by an affair with a centurion (*Letters* 6.31.4–6). To senatorial aristocrats, centurions (those who rose from the ranks) were lowly. From the perspective of common soldiers and of imperial society below the elite, centurions were men of considerable importance and social standing. This is displayed by the centurion’s words in Matthew 8:9: “For I myself am a man under authority, with soldiers under me. I tell this one, ‘Go,’ and he goes; and that one, ‘Come,’ and he comes. I say to my servant, ‘Do this,’ and he does it.”

For many of the average inhabitants of the empire, the figure of the centurion represented the Roman imperial administration which governed their lives. The Icenian revolt in Britain was, in part, provoked by the ruthless depredations of centurions (Tacitus, *Annals* 14.31). Certain regions of Roman Britain were placed directly under the control of a *centurio regionarius* (RIB 152). Papyri from Roman Egypt show that this district centurion acted as a local deputy of the imperial administration, and even as a police inspector, receiving and at least forwarding and possibly investigating petitions that reported crimes.

See also Centurion (Republic); Legion, Organization of; *Primus Pilus*; *Principales*; Promotion in Army (Imperial)

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Centurion (Republic)

During the Roman Republic, centurions were the class of officers who commanded individual subunits of a legion. They provided both small unit leadership and communication between the legionaries and the senior officer class above them, the military tribunes. In the early and middle republic, centurions were ranked according to the century and maniple that they commanded, and in turn to the seniority of that maniple in the Roman line—the *triarii* were senior to the *principes* that were senior to the *hastati*. Each maniple was made up of two centuries, and each century had two officers attached to it: the centurion who commanded from the front, and the second-in-command called the *optio* who stayed near the rear to discourage the legionaries from fleeing. The highest ranking centurion in the legion was thus the "first spear" (*primus pilus*) centurion of the first century of the *triarii*, which was always stationed on the far right of the fighting line. The *primus pilus* of each legion was a man of considerable experience, and was a member of the commander's *consilium*, or war council.

In the late republic, the standard fighting unit of the army became the cohort, made up of six centuries, which represented three maniples of the old army organization with the addition of a portion of the light-armed infantry, the *velites*. The new rankings of the centurions, which continued to be used into the empire, reflect this origin. Each cohort had six centurions,

whose ranking differed from the centurions and *optiones* of the maniples, which were now known as *prior* and *posterior*. The senior centurion in overall command of the cohort was called the *pilus prior*; however, requiring the interpretation of inscriptions, the precise order of the ranks below this position is controversial. The options are (1) that the *pilus prior* was followed in order of seniority by the *princeps prior*, the *hastatus prior*, the *pilus posterior*, the *princeps posterior*, and lastly the *hastatus posterior*, or (2) that the order was *pilus prior*, *pilus posterior*, *princeps prior*, *princeps posterior*, *hastatus prior*, *hastatus posterior*. As before, the first cohort ranked higher than the second, and so the six centurions of the first cohort were the most senior. They were collectively known as the *primi ordines*, or “first ranks,” and they were all members of the council of war. The *primus pilus* of the first cohort of each legion was placed in charge of the legionary eagle introduced in the early first century by Gaius Marius. This standard was of great significance and its loss could lead to severe punishment of both the centurion and his men.

The normal duties of a centurion were training recruits, distributing tasks, and drilling soldiers. When a Roman army was in the field, the centurions supervised most day-to-day activities, such as entrenchment and stockading during the construction of camps. Often it was an experienced centurion who had been sent to choose the appropriate site. The *primus pilus* was responsible for making sure that a trumpet signaled the change of the watch. It was the job of the centurions to disseminate orders and messages from the commander and tribunes down through the ranks. The senior centurions also accompanied their commander when discussing terms with the enemy and were responsible for giving good advice about tactics and strategy in war councils. In battle, the centurion was not only required to direct his soldiers but also to be an example for them, often leading from the front.

In the early and middle republic before the amalgamation of the three lines into the cohort, the centurion was armed with the same equipment as his legionaries, throwing spears if commanding *hastati* or *principes*, and a thrusting spear if *triarii*. In the very early period, he carried a Greek style sword made for slashing, and in later eras the ubiquitous *gladius*, a thrusting sword which originated in Spain. A centurion was distinguished by wearing his *gladius* on the left side of his belt; legionaries carried their swords on the right side. The *gladii* carried by centurions were longer than

those of the legionaries. Centurions are depicted with small hoplite type shields until the first century BCE when they adopted the rectangular shield known as the *scutum*. Perhaps the most famous and distinctive sign of a centurion's rank was his transverse crest, a crest set crosswise over the top of the helmet. This provided a visual cue for the legionaries to recognize him in battle. The symbol of a centurion's authority was the vine-staff, with which he could inflict corporal punishment on citizen soldiers.

In early periods, centurions could be elected, appointed by the Senate, or promoted from the ranks for military bravery, but by the late republic promotion from the ranks was the commonest means of becoming a centurion. During the third and second centuries BCE, the centurion was the very image of the stalwart, skilled, veteran soldier. Polybius describes the type of man necessary for such a job as less showy than steady, and less inclined to adventure than to steely determination: the ideal centurion would die in defense of his post. By the first century BCE, the image of centurions had evolved into bold and competitive leaders, such as Caesar's famous Vorenus and Pullo from the Gallic Wars, who competed constantly to outdo each other in valor. In the late republic, the mortality rate of centurions was extraordinarily high, encouraged as they were to conspicuous acts of courage, such as being first over the wall of an enemy camp, or pushing first into the thick of battle. Caesar often portrays centurions as experienced soldiers, who can organize themselves in battle formation without orders from above.

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See also Centurion (Imperial); Cohorts; Maniples; Legion, Organization of; Promotion in Army (Republic)

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Cerialis, Petilius (Active 60s–70s CE)

Quintus Petilius Cerialis Cassius Rufus was a Roman general of the late first century CE who is best known for his suppression of the Gallic Revolt of 70 CE. He escaped the destruction of the Legio IX Hispana during the British revolt of 60/61 CE. In 70, he was assigned the governorship of Lower Germany to put down the Gallic Revolt, completing the suppression by the end of 70. He governed Britain in 71–73/4, suppressing the revolt of the Brigantes (a tribe of northern Britain) and holding the consulship *in absentia* in 74. The main source for Cerialis is Tacitus' *Histories* and *Agricola*.

Sara E. Phang

See also Britain, Roman; British Revolt; Gallic Revolt; Tacitus

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Christianity in the Later Roman Army

The military context of the story of Constantine I's (306–337) conversion in 312 CE introduced Christian elements to the Roman army. Most important was the *labarum*, the new Christian battle standard, topped with the *Chi-Rho* symbol. Christians viewed the *labarum* as a powerful object in its own right, protecting its bearers and able to harm and defeat enemies (particularly pagan enemies). Other features of Roman military religion were also Christianized, but ordinary soldiers seem to have been little affected for decades after Constantine's conversion. Christian theologians, for their part, had to assimilate secular military service into their worldview.

Constantine himself had a tabernacle-tent carried with his army, like Moses in the desert; other Christian practices, attributed to him, developed in the army as Christian and imperial identities came into alignment. Leave was given on Sundays for church (or a safely ambiguous monotheistic prayer for non-Christian troops). The military loyalty oath (*sacramentum*) is

attested in a Christian form by Vegetius, and by the fifth century military chaplains traveled with the armies. Evidence for permanent chapels in military bases also appears around this time. The sixth century army was completely Christian in its rites, as can be seen from Maurice's *Strategikon*, down to the Latin warcry *Deus nobiscum!* (God with us!).

Roman state religious cult had long helped consolidate military identity, and it was natural for the Christian emperors to foster their religion in the armed forces. Nonetheless, traditional religious elements did not suddenly disappear from the army in 312, and it is difficult to discern the religious convictions of ordinary soldiers. There had been some Christians in Roman armies since the late second century, though their numbers cannot be determined. Prominent commands were still held by pagans in the fifth century, and Christianization among the soldiery was slow. Christianity was a religion of the cities, while the majority of recruits were from the rural northern and western frontiers. The civil wars of the late empire do not seem to have had religious motivations, and the same soldiers served emperors of different creeds apparently without trouble. When Emperor Julian (361–363) had reverted to paganism, his soldiers were happy to feast at his grand pagan sacrifices at Antioch (Ammianus 22.12.6), but after his death went on to serve Christian emperors again. It is notable that no clear Christian symbols appear in the shield designs recorded in the *Notitia Dignitatum*, although the *Chi-Rho* appears on shields on coinage and in Justinian's Ravenna mosaic.

Objections from theologians and moralists—most notably Tertullian—outlined the disjunction between Christian and army life (the latter idolatrous and violent), but there was no unified doctrine on the subject, and Christians served in the legions despite their objections. Martyrologies report numerous Christian soldiers making a stand against serving, but many more must not have: The Tetrarchic persecutions began by purging the armies of Christians. These persecutions, in which soldiers were often the agents, must have, at least temporarily, made military service more unpopular with Christians.

Constantine's position as champion of the Church meant objections to Christian military service were undercut. Already in 314 the Synod of Arles accepted it. Although major Christian thinkers of the late Empire retained an ambiguous and uncomfortable relationship with warfare, earlier pacifistic currents now encountered more opposition. Ambrose and

Augustine in particular produced ethics and models of justified Christian warfare, based largely in traditional Roman ideas. Augustine even reversed the traditional military metaphor of spiritual warfare to encourage Boniface to prefer the army to the monastery (*Ep.*189). Even Basil, who rejected bloodshed, drew distinction explicitly between killing in war and homicide; the former found much easier atonement. Accommodation between Church and empire worked, but left the dilemma of Christian warfare largely unresolved, and it would continue to exercise church thinkers.

Christopher Malone

See also Bellum Iustum; Christians, Persecution of; Constantine I; Military Oaths

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Christians, Persecution of

The Roman repression of the early Christians is probably the best-known Roman suppression of religion. Christians were not the only religious group Rome opposed. Bacchic cults were repressed in 186 BCE, for example, and around 300 CE Diocletian, perhaps worried over that faith's Persian origins, persecuted Manichaeism. Nor was Christian martyrdom the only model of heroic death resulting from bravely witnessing truth to power: Socrates and later Stoic philosophers died for their beliefs, as did pious Jewish traditionalists in the era of the Maccabees (160s BCE). Nevertheless,

Christianity's uncomfortable encounter with Roman power provides insight into the mentality of Christians and Romans alike.

Following Jesus of Nazareth's execution by crucifixion in 30 or 33 CE, the religious movement based on his memory would be unlawful until the conversion of Constantine in the fourth century. Ordinary Christians could normally avoid uncomfortable encounters with Roman authority. Indeed, since Christianity began as a sect of Judaism, it was not a clear target for legal repression until Romans understood basic differences between the strange, new cult versus its established parent religion. But during the first century, Judaism was itself factious and turbulent; conflicts surrounding figures like John the Baptist and Jesus, as presented in Christian sources, jibe with Flavius Josephus' detailed description of the tumultuous period. Christians stirred up opposition within traditional Jewish circles, and according to the Acts of the Apostles, the first Christian martyr, Stephen, was killed by an outraged mob of pious Jews. Aggressive proselytizing missionaries such as the apostle Paul, who preached abandonment of Jewish traditions, aggravated further discord in synagogues and houses of prayer (for instance, Acts 18; Jewish villains in later texts are fictitious topoi).

Christian missionaries fared little better among gentiles (non-Jews). Conversions to a faith that preached pacifism, separation from the world, and inversion of many social norms proved disruptive, as the novel religion divided families and seemingly undermined the traditional fabric of community religion. The growth of asceticism (renouncing bodily pleasures), especially from the second century on, led some women to reject marriage, sex, and other facets of ordinary life; this caused further social disruption in mainstream society, which prescribed women's roles as wives and mothers. Most people who heard about Christianity rejected it as an unseemly superstition that appealed to women, slaves, and social outcasts, centered on a marginal provincial subject who died as a criminal. (Indeed, Christian art avoided depicting the cross until crucifixion was no longer practiced.)

As the New Testament was taking shape in the first century, the authors of these texts took it for granted that Christian believers might face harassment, beatings, imprisonment, and possibly death. At the same time, these early Christians were already trying to carve a safer place for themselves in the Roman world by stressing their obedience to secular authority.

Many historians consider the first known incident of specific persecution to have taken place in Rome under Nero, just after the great fire of 64. Nero exploited the Christians as scapegoats because of their unpopularity, killing a multitude with theatrical mockery to distract and entertain the populace (Tacitus, *Annals* 15.44). Few details are known about the spread of Christianity after this time, but it is clear that they were becoming well known as a difficult fringe minority. Circa 112, Pliny the Younger, then governor of Bithynia in Asia Minor, sought advice from emperor Trajan on dealing with accused Christians brought before him (Plin. *Ep.* 10.96–97). Here Trajan approved of the governor's forcing Christians to recant their faith or die, but emphasized that they should not be proactively hunted out and also rejected anonymous accusations. These early sources are important for establishing a number of valuable facts.

First, although Christians were unfairly suspected of crimes and debauchery in their clandestine meetings, in fact, merely *being* Christian was illegal and provided sufficient grounds for the death penalty. To the Romans, their sheer stubbornness in refusing to pay religious respect to the gods and the Roman emperor merited execution. Roman officials generally just wanted Christians to rejoin the mainstream community, and at least take part in outward expressions of loyalty to gods and emperor when called upon to do so. Indeed, polytheists feared that the presence of Christians in their communities would cause divine wrath and punishment, and this fear seems to have prompted many of the sporadic persecutions during Christianity's first two centuries. Finally, emperor Trajan's letter to Pliny is often cited as proof that Roman authorities did not engage in "witch hunts" of Christians. This was not always the case: for instance, in 177 CE, Christians in Lyon and Vienne (neighboring cities in southern Gaul) were zealously hunted out and arrested.

A new aggressive phase of top-down, empire-wide persecutions of Christianity began when the Roman Empire was practically collapsing from economic, military, and political emergencies of the third century crisis. Late in 249 the emperor Decius (249–251) commanded everyone to sacrifice to the gods, with special written certification that they had done so. He apparently wanted divine favor and a display of religious unity; attacking Christians was not necessarily his main goal, but Decius must have known his orders would cause them problems. Decius' eventual successor Valerian (253–260) began a more ambitious persecution in the last years of the

decade, banning Christian meetings and targeting Christian leaders. These emperors' edicts were largely enforced—to the extent they were enforced—by soldiers attached to the various provincial governors. Again, most ordinary Christians could avoid trouble, and enforcement of the persecution edicts was extremely uneven. Nevertheless, state pressure was serious enough to disrupt Christian leadership and inflict serious tension within the Christian communities.

After Valerian's fall in 260, Christians had respite from state persecution. Diocletian came to power in 284 as an ambitious reformer who also sought to restabilize the Roman state on traditional religious grounds (as best he understood them). In 299, he expelled Christians from the Roman army. Early in 303, a mysterious fire in an imperial palace seems to have prompted extreme action on Diocletian's part. Christians were removed from the imperial service and other honorable professions, and clergy were systematically arrested. Churches, holy books, and other Christian property were confiscated, looted, or burned. Initially there was an effort to avoid actual bloodshed, until rumors of Christian resistance stiffened Roman resolve. There was another order for universal sacrifice to the gods, which generated a number of martyrdoms, but again actual manhunts targeted Christian leadership. Official follow-through was lax in many areas, including much of western Europe (where Constantine's father ruled as a deputy emperor or "Caesar"). Yet the overall severity of this "Great Persecution" was evident in Rome, North Africa, and many eastern areas.

Constantine's victory in the Tetrarchic civil war, and conversion to Christianity in 312 put an end to the Great Persecution in the western empire. Despite the so-called Edict of Milan, Christians in the eastern Roman Empire would not be safe until Constantine won the entire empire in 324. With one exception, subsequent rulers of Rome's empire were all Christians, and by the end of the fourth century Christianity was the state religion. Constantine's conversion did not actually end imperial persecution of Christians, unfortunately, only now the persecutors were fellow Christians aligned with state authority, and the victims were Christians deemed heretical or schismatic (see Heresies, Persecution of). The last pagan emperor, Julian the Apostate, was ironically the last of Constantine's relatives to rule (361–363). Julian pursued some anti-Christian policies, such as barring Christians from teaching, but he mainly undermined the Church by refusing to referee conflicts between bickering Christians, thus letting

them tear each other apart in dissension.

After the dust settled from the persecutions, memories of martyrs became contested territory. Some Gnostic Christians rejected the necessity of martyrdom during persecutions, while at the other extreme were Christians (e.g., north African Donatists) who rigorously avoided contact with those who had betrayed the faith. Mainstream Christianity found a middle way of honoring martyrs between these extremes, and these shifting interpretations shaped the highly imperfect source record (martyr accounts, Lactantius, and the church chronicler Eusebius). From a Roman perspective, the persecutions were obviously unsuccessful, but they reveal an important new level of ambition on the part of a government that was increasingly inclined to interfere in the lives of its subjects.

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See also Associations; Constantine I; Criminal Procedure; Cult of the Emperor; Cults, Pagan; Decius; Diocletian; Heretics and Polytheists, Persecution of; Nero; New Testament; Public Order; Tetrarchic Civil War; Third-Century CE Crisis; Valerian

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Cicero (106–43 BCE)

Marcus Tullius Cicero was a Roman senator, politician, and orator famous

for his forensic speeches and philosophical writings. Cicero is most often associated with the *optimates* or oligarchic politicians, although he was never fully accepted by them. Much is known of Cicero's life through his philosophical works, his political career, and an extensive collection of personal letters. He was born on January 3, 106 BCE and died on December 7, 43, a victim of the triumviral proscriptions.

The son of a well-to-do equestrian, Cicero began his career as a *novus homo*, "new man," meaning that none of his family had previously been senators. After distinguishing himself as a legal advocate and studying rhetoric and philosophy in Athens and Rhodes, Cicero ran for the quaestorship (75 BCE), enabling him to enter the Senate. In 70, Cicero attained his greatest fame so far as an orator by prosecuting Gaius Verres, the corrupt governor of Sicily, for extortion. In 66, Cicero supported the *Lex Manilia* empowering Pompey with a special command in Asia Minor, extending over several provinces, to campaign against Mithridates VI of Pontus. Cicero himself was elected praetor in 66.

Cicero was elected consul for 63, defeating Catiline. Catiline then allegedly spearheaded a plot to overthrow the Roman government, garnering support from all social classes, including some senators. Cicero was informed of the plot and secured summary authority over the crisis by the Senate's quick passing of a *senatus consultum ultimum*, "ultimate decree." Cicero moved quickly to apprehend those implicated in the plot, forestalling the full implementation of the Catilinarian Conspiracy. The Senate then debated the fate of the five captured conspirators. Despite Caesar's urging for clemency, Cato the Younger persuaded the Senate to vote in favor of a quick execution for the prisoners without a trial. Cicero approved Cato's sentence and executed it immediately. Cicero's action in apprehending the Catilinarian Conspiracy earned him significant public support and admiration, securing his place as the most well-regarded orator in Rome. He received the unprecedented title *Pater Patriae*, "Father of His Country," equating him with Romulus, the mythical founder of Rome. However, it is notable that accounts of the conspiracy (e.g., Sallust's *Bellum Catilinae*) are based heavily on Cicero's own *Catilinarian Orations*. Because Cicero was the chief opponent of the plot and received credit for its defeat, Cicero's account is probably biased, if not outright propagandized.



Bust of Marcus Tullius Cicero (106–43 BCE), the Roman statesman, orator, and philosopher. The portrait dates from the mid-first century BCE, though the bust support is modern. Located in the Capitoline Museums, Rome, Italy. (Araldo de Luca/Corbis)

Cicero, although sometimes accused of questionable political tactics for his own gain, nonetheless earned a reputation for probity. In 61 BCE Publius Clodius Pulcher, the rabble-rousing politician, faced trial for violating the secret female nocturnal ritual of the *Bona Dea*, the “Good Goddess” festival, by infiltrating them in women’s clothing. Cicero’s testimony shattered Clodius’ alibi, and although Clodius bribed his judges to acquit him, Cicero and Clodius became fierce political enemies. Cicero demonstrated this adherence to principle further in 60, when Crassus, Pompey, and Caesar invited him to a political alliance that became known as the First Triumvirate. Cicero declined the invitation. The next year (58), Clodius was

elected tribune of the plebs, presenting significant risks for Cicero, since Clodius could use the special powers of the tribunate to prosecute him. Caesar offered Cicero a position as one of his legates in Gaul, protecting Cicero from prosecution as well as physically removing him from the danger of remaining at Rome. Cicero (who did not have a military temperament) again declined. While these decisions did not make Cicero an outright enemy of Caesar, Caesar declined to aid Cicero in the future.

As tribune of the plebs, Clodius passed a law exiling any politician who executed citizens without trial. This law was a transparent attack on Cicero, who fled the city before its enactment. Clodius then passed a law officially exiling Cicero. In August 57, at the urging of Pompey and with significant popular support, a measure was passed to recall Cicero from exile. However, Cicero was expected to offer no resistance to the First Triumvirs' consolidation and expansion of their own power.

In 51, Cicero received governorship of the province of Cilicia, part of Rome's eastern frontier, at a time when Roman leadership feared invasion. Cicero did not take part in the eventual defeat of Persian forces, but repressed supposedly disloyal Cilician tribes and besieged and captured the city of Pindenissum. Such "small wars" were typical of Roman generals. Cicero set himself apart from many Roman governors by not taking financial advantage of his province, instead attempting to win the loyalty of the locals through restraint and beneficent practices. For his military efforts, Cicero petitioned the Senate for a triumph but failed to receive one, although he was given the title *imperator* for his reduction of Pindenissum.

In 49, Cicero grew alarmed at the escalating conflict between Caesar and Pompey, eventually judging that Caesar's aspirations were outside the moral and constitutional principles of Rome. While Cicero did not necessarily have personal sympathies or bonds with the optimates, he sided with them in the Caesarian-Pompeian Civil War mostly out of personal devotion to Pompey. Cicero fled Rome upon Caesar's invasion of Italy, traveling with Pompey's forces until Caesar secured victory. Cicero returned to Rome in 48 and received a full pardon from Caesar the next year.

In 44, Caesar's assassination prompted many senators and the public to look to Cicero for leadership, although he had not been involved in the plot. Cicero rallied the Senate in opposition to Mark Antony, then consul, who had established himself as the executor of Caesar's will. Octavian, Caesar's

adopted heir, soon arrived in Rome and Cicero attempted to coopt him in the cause against Antony. In a series of speeches titled the *Philippics*, Cicero attacked Antony in favor of Octavian. After Cicero urged the Senate to declare Antony a public enemy, Antony allied with Octavian and Marcus Aemilius Lepidus, forming the Second Triumvirate. The Second Triumvirs set about proscribing their enemies. Despite Octavian's reluctance, at Antony's insistence Cicero was placed on the list of the proscribed.

Although the public largely supported Cicero and was reluctant to report on his whereabouts, Antony's agents eventually captured and immediately executed Cicero as he attempted to flee to Macedonia on December 7, 43. Antony ordered Cicero's hands and head nailed to the Rostra, the public speakers' platform. Cassius Dio records that Antony's wife Fulvia pulled Cicero's famous tongue out of his severed head to publicly stab it repeatedly with a hairpin.

Cicero enjoyed a favorable reputation as a learned man of great philosophical import. As a politician, his reputation is more mixed. Despite trumpeting idealistic principles, he was often compromised as he attempted to remain at peace with his political peers. However, despite his distaste for violence, Cicero could not escape the conflict that surrounded him in the turbulent times of the late Roman Republic.

Michael Hankins

See also Caesar, Dictatorship of; Caesar, Gaius Julius; Catiline; Clodius Pulcher; Conspiracy of Catiline; Civil Conflict (Late Republic); Civil Wars (I) (49–45 BCE); Civil Wars (II) (44–31 BCE); Mark Antony; Octavian; Pompey; Proscriptions; Second Triumvirate; Tribune of the Plebs

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Cilicia

The southern coast of Asia Minor east of Lycia-Pamphylia and running toward the coast of Syria was known as Cilicia. The western part of Cilicia, or “Rough” Cilicia (Cilicia Tracheia), was mountainous and harbored bandits and pirates. The eastern part, “Smooth” or “Plains” Cilicia (Cilicia Pedias), was flatter and more fertile. Cilicia nominally was part of the Hellenistic Pergamene kingdom, bequeathed to Rome by Attalus of Pergamum in 133 BCE. The Romans needed to establish control over Cilicia to secure the Cilician Gates, the pass through the Taurus Mountains that led eastward to Syria.

Early in the last century of the Republic, the Romans made Cilicia Pedias into a province to campaign against the pirates who used the Cilician coast as a base, its many small harbors offering pirates refuge from pursuit (Appian, *Mith.* 92). The boundary between piracy and low-intensity resistance is vague. Pompey’s campaign against piracy in 67 BCE eliminated the Cilician pirates and enlarged the province. The mountain tribes of Tracheia continued to resist Roman rule. Cicero governed Cilicia in 51–50 BCE and campaigned against these tribes. In the late first century BCE, the Romans were content to establish client rulers in Cilicia Tracheia, but in the imperial period all of Cilicia was incorporated. The capital of Cilicia was Tarsus, the birthplace of St. Paul. Cilicia became Christianized early.

Cilicia Tracheia continued to be a source of bandits and “warlike peoples” into late antiquity. Such “warlike peoples” were recruited into Roman auxiliary forces and later *foederati*. The Byzantine emperor Zeno (474–491) hailed from Isauria, a region of the Taurus Mountains bordering on Cilicia.

Sara E. Phang

See also Asia Minor; Cicero; Low-Intensity Conflict; Piracy; Pompey;

Vespasian; Warlike Peoples

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Cinna (Cornelius Cinna, Lucius) (ca. 130–84 BCE)

Lucius Cornelius Cinna was a military and political figure of the late Roman Republic, closely associated with the Marian faction. Evidence for his early life is speculative, but he was born ca. 130 BCE to a patrician family and is notable for fighting in the Social War (91–87) and then the Marian-Sullan conflict (88–82) against Sulla and his followers. Cinna served as a legate in the Social War and fought against the Marsi (a central Italian people) in 89. He was elected consul four times between 87 and 84.

In 88 BCE, Sulla had marched on Rome with an army and had exiled and driven out many prominent Romans, such as Marius himself and Publius Sulpicius Rufus, who still had support there. In the treacherous arena of Roman politics at this time, Cinna's first job as consul was to remove Sulla, who had reluctantly supported him to his election. Cinna attempted to prosecute Sulla, but the nature of the charge is unknown and rather than face it, Sulla departed to fight Mithridates VI of Pontus. More importantly Cinna worked to have the Italian tribes, promised citizenship after the Social War, gained their right to that status. With Sulla temporarily out of the way, Cinna argued for their privileges. However, this was vetoed by the tribunes and in the ensuing violence in the Forum, Cinna was unlawfully removed as consul and forced out of Rome by his colleague and Sullan supporter, Gnaeus Octavius. He regrouped in the same year with Gnaeus Papirius Carbo, Quintus Sertorius and Marius to march on Rome in an attempt to seize it back. Unable to breach the City's defenses, the Cinno-Marian armies strategically positioned themselves around Rome, cut off supplies and starved it into submission. After some opposition, the Senate had no choice but to reinstate Cinna as consul.

Cinna was reelected again in 86 with Marius, but on the latter's death

that year Lucius Valerius Flaccus was appointed suffect consul with him. Historians know this period of Cinna's consulship as the *Dominatio Cinnae* in which an attempt was made to reestablish the finances drained by the Social War as well as strengthening the citizenship of Italian groups.

However, Cinna's major enemy remained Sulla and he sent Flaccus to fight Mithridates, which Sulla saw as a threat. With Flaccus soon removed in a doublecross instigated by the pro-Marian, Gaius Flavius Fimbria, Sulla negotiated a peace with Mithridates and prepared to return to Italy informing the Senate that he would punish those who caused suffering. Cinna engineered his reelection again in 85 and 84 with Carbo, due to this looming threat. He geared himself up for the fight but, unfortunately, Cinna would not be killed in battle. In the subsequent preparations, Cinna was murdered in the spring of 84 by his own troops who took offence to his rigorous standards and their refusal to go to Illyricum (mod. Albania, Croatia, and Bosnia).

Cinna's life is not well documented in the surviving evidence. But, he was important militarily and politically in the turmoil of the late Roman Republic, especially in the clash between Marius and Sulla. He lived in a world not of his own making, where supporters and enemies' advancement to the top was achieved by solicited alliances, violence and/or manipulation. His goal was no different and he perhaps used Marius in his own individual advancement. He was a pivotal character in the demise of the Roman Republic.

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See also Civil Conflict (Late Republic); *Cursus Honorum* (Republic); Marian-Sullan Conflict; Marius; Mithridatic Wars; Sertorius; Siege Warfare; Social War (91–87 BCE); Sulla, Lucius Cornelius

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Cisalpine Gaul

The region of “Gaul this side of the Alps” in Italy is bounded by the Alps to the north, the Apennines and the Rubicon River to the south. The region was settled in the fourth century BCE by Celtic tribes, including the Senones, who sacked Rome in 390. When the Insubres of Cisalpine Gaul threatened to invade Italy, the Romans countered in 284, taking Mediolanum (Milan) and establishing colonies. The Boii and Insubres allied with Hannibal in the Second Punic War. In 81, Cisalpine Gaul became a Roman province and in 49, at the limits of his *imperium*, Julius Caesar crossed the Rubicon, launching Rome into civil war. Cisalpine Gaul was incorporated into Italy in 42. Cisalpine Gaul is distinct from Transalpine Gaul (Gaul across the Alps), the southernmost part of Gaul, later the province Gallia Narbonensis, and in general from continental Gaul (the area of modern France).

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See also Caesar, Gaius Julius; Civil Wars (I) (49–45 BCE); Gaul, Gauls; Hannibal Barca; Punic War, Second

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Cives Sine Suffragio

Cives sine suffragio were “citizens without the vote,” referring to an inferior grade of Roman citizenship, but generally connoting Italian allies enjoying good relations with Rome. They possessed all rights of a full citizen,

including *conubium* (the right to marry Roman citizens) and *commercium* (the right to trade with Romans), except for the right to vote in the assemblies in Rome. As Italian cities came under Roman control, their members could be granted this status, but they were not enrolled in the Roman tribes and thus could not vote. They provided an important source of Roman military manpower, and formed close ties with Rome. This distinction, which may have been rooted in geographical distance of some allies from Rome (making voting impractical), played a role in the Social War (91–87 BCE), since almost all these citizens sided with Rome. However, the concept of *civis sine suffragio* is somewhat disputed.

William Weaver

See also Civis Romanus; Latin, Latins; Social War (91–87 BCE)

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Civil Conflict (Late Republic)

The late Republic (133–31 BCE) showed a marked increase in civil conflict, or episodes of public violence short of civil war. Some of these episodes were spontaneous riots, while others were urged on by popular leaders. In other incidents, individuals were assassinated. The Roman state resorted to violence in repressing such episodes or their threat, enacting the *senatus consultum ultimum* that suspended the normal civil rights of Roman citizens. It is possible that these episodes of civil conflict eroded the spirit of cooperation that had marked the middle Republic and promoted further violence and civil warfare.

The first, and most famous, episode of civil conflict was the tribunate and death of Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus (133 BCE). Tiberius’ legislation for land redistribution to landless Roman citizens had a solidly traditional motive: to increase the recruitment of citizen soldiers by enabling them to meet the property qualification for legionary service. However, his program antagonized the wealthy (both citizens and Italians). Tiberius Gracchus also

resorted to unorthodox tactics, deposing his fellow tribune Marcus Octavius by a vote of the popular assembly and claiming the estate of King Attalus III of Pergamum, who had just died, to fund the land redistribution program. These methods caused Tiberius' opponents to accuse him of seeking *regnum* (monarchy, tyranny). Tiberius then ran for tribune for a second time, also uncustomary. In the assembly, a spontaneous riot broke out between Tiberius' supporters and his enemies, including many senators, who followed the lead of Scipio Nasica in attacking the Gracchans. Tiberius Gracchus and his followers were beaten to death with broken furniture and whatever was at hand. The death of Tiberius Gracchus was a shock to the Romans, since within the *pomerium* (sacred boundary) of the city of Rome, military activity and the carrying of weapons were forbidden.

Tiberius Gracchus' brother Gaius (tribune 123 and 122 BCE) introduced more wide-ranging legislation, including land redistribution, the repression of elite corruption, jury panels of equestrians for trying senators for extortion, and extension of Roman citizenship to the Italian allies, all policies that many of the Roman oligarchy opposed. Gaius ran for a third tribunate for 121, but lost. In 121, the Senate supported tribunes who proposed undoing some of Gaius' policies; at the popular assembly, spontaneous violence broke out between Gracchan supporters and the anti-Gracchans. The consul Lucius Opimius' attendant was killed in the riot, motivating Opimius to enact a new decree of the Senate, the *senatus consultum ultimum* or "Last Decree," which authorized the consuls or other executive magistrates to "see to it that the state came to no harm" (Cicero, *In Catilinam* 1.4, *Philippics* 8.14). The SCU enabled the magistrates to use whatever degree of violence needed to restore the public safety. In this case, the anti-Gracchans equipped a de facto army and hunted down and killed the Gracchans. When his capture was imminent, Gaius committed suicide by ordering his slave to kill him (Appian, *Civil Wars* 1.28; Plutarch, *C. Gracchus* 17). The Gracchans were treated as public enemies; their corpses were unburied and desecrated, being thrown into the Tiber. Gaius' head was cut off by anti-Gracchans who hoped to claim a reward. This brutal episode further eroded the social fabric of the Roman Republic.

Nonetheless, civil conflict did not break out again for a generation. In 100, Gaius Marius (consul in 107 and 104–100) allied with the tribune of the plebs Lucius Appuleius Saturninus, who promised land distributions for Marius' veterans and also proposed the extension of the Roman citizenship

to Italian soldiers. Saturninus imposed a clause in the bill that required all magistrates and senators to swear to uphold it; this was unwelcome to most of them, and Marius added an escape clause, “insofar as the law is valid,” to the bill. The senators and magistrates swore to uphold the bill, except for Metellus Numidicus, who refused and went into exile.

So far there had been no public violence, but feelings ran high. Saturninus ran for a successive tribunate; at the assembly, the supporters of Saturninus and his ally Glaucia beat to death a rival tribune, Lucius Memmius, and captured the Capitoline. The Senate declared the *senatus consultum ultimum* against Saturninus and Glaucia. Marius and his army reasserted order, arresting Saturninus and Glaucia and their supporters and locking them inside the Senate House as a makeshift prison. The enemies of Saturninus and Glaucia climbed onto the roof of the Senate House, removed the tiles, and stoned to death Saturninus and his followers with the tiles (Appian, *Civil Wars* 1.32).

The tribune Marcus Livius Drusus the Younger also met a violent end. Proposing the grant of citizenship to all the Italians, he met with opposition from the Senate. He was stabbed to death in a gathering inside his own house; the assassin was not identified. His death touched off the revolt of the Italian allies, the so-called Social War (91–87 BCE). The Social War was only resolved when the Roman authorities adopted the tactic of granting the citizenship to those allies who came over to their side. The Roman state then was faced with how to assimilate these new citizens. Since voting in the centuriate assembly was by property class, the wealthiest first, enrolling the new citizens *en masse* in a low census class would defuse their political influence. The tribune of the plebs Sulpicius Rufus instead proposed distributing them in geographic tribes in the popular assembly, which would give more influence to the Italians. To this proposal, Sulpicius added the rider that Marius should receive command of the Mithridatic war in Asia Minor.

Unrest broke out in the assembly between the followers of Sulpicius and Marius and their opponents. Sulla, consul in 88 and an enemy of Marius, declared an *iustitium* or suspension of public business; in the ensuing riot, Sulla fled Rome and escaped to join his army at Nola. Sulpicius’ legislation passed. Sulla then took the unprecedented measure of marching on Rome with his army, launching a short-lived civil war and thus breaching the sacred boundary of Rome. He captured the city; Marius and his supporters

fled into exile, but Sulpicius was killed. Sulla secured legislation transferring the Mithridatic command to himself, and departed with his army for the eastern Mediterranean.

The Marians then retook Rome. Marius himself, now over seventy years old, and his ally Lucius Cornelius Cinna claimed the consulship of 86, launching violent reprisals against the supporters of Sulla. Marius himself fell sick and died, but Cinna, his ally Carbo, and Marius' son continued the reprisals. When he returned with his army from Asia, Sulla marched on the city of Rome a second time, defeating the Marians at the battle of the Colline Gate (82), and made himself dictator (82–81 BCE). Sulla proceeded to proscribe his enemies, publishing lists that set prices on their heads. The Sullan proscriptions were the bloodiest period of civil conflict that the inhabitants of Rome had experienced, and permanently branded Sulla with the reputation of a tyrant. In fact, Sulla's measures as dictator "to pass laws and reform the Republic" were beneficial to the Senate, increasing its powers and discouraging the power and influence of the tribunes and the assemblies. Sulla abdicated in 81 (or 79) and died from natural causes a year or two later.

The next outbreak (or threat) of civil conflict was the Catilinarian Conspiracy of 63 BCE. It is difficult to estimate the seriousness of the Catilinarian Conspiracy, since the main sources, Cicero's *Catilinarian Orations*, exaggerate it and inflate Cicero's role (as consul in 63) in suppressing the conspiracy; Sallust's *Bellum Catilinae* is based on Cicero, though it downplays his role somewhat. Cicero persuaded the Senate to pass a *senatus consultum ultimum* against Catiline and the Catilinarians, and arrested some of the Catilinarians. The Senate voted to put the Catilinarians to death; Catiline himself escaped to Tuscany, where he joined a small army of supporters. Catiline's army was defeated in open battle near Pistoria early in the following year.

Subsequently, the tribune Publius Clodius Pulcher and his rival Titus Annius Milo gathered gangs of violent followers, recruited from the urban lower strata and organized through *collegia* (neighborhood or occupational associations). As tribune, Clodius passed a law exiling anyone who put to death Roman citizens without trial, which targeted Cicero's execution of the Catilinarians. Cicero fled into exile; the Clodians pulled down his house. Pompey's influence enabled Cicero to return from exile a short time later.

However, Milo's and Clodius' gangs so often threatened urban violence

that the consular elections for 54–53 were disturbed. The tribunes Lucilius Hirrus and Pompeius Rufus suggested that Pompey should become dictator (Appian, *Civil Wars* 2.21–3; Plutarch, *Cato Minor* 45). Instead Pompey was elected sole consul for 52. Pompey's actual alliance with the rabble-rousing tribunes, though alleged, seems unlikely. Pompey however benefited from the disturbances, for he was the most powerful figure in Roman politics, retaining his army contrary to Republican custom. Though Caesar was occupied in the years 58–50 with conquering Gaul, his successes meant that he was clearly headed for rivalry with Pompey. It can be argued that the increase in urban violence at Rome helped to kindle the late Republic's major civil wars, the Caesarian-Pompeian Civil War (49–45 BCE) and the triumviral civil war (44–31 BCE), and also a new series of proscriptions in 43 BCE.

Sara E. Phang

See also Cicero; Clodius Pulcher; Conspiracy of Catiline; Gaius Gracchus; Livius Drusus the Younger, Marcus; Marian-Sullan Conflict; Marius; Pompey; Proscriptions; *Senatus Consultum Ultimum*; Sulla, Lucius Cornelius; States of Emergency; Tiberius Gracchus; Tribune of the Plebs; Vengeance

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Civil Rights

The Roman concept of civil rights was status based, distinguishing citizens from noncitizens and free persons from slaves. Noncitizens and slaves were liable to harsher punishment. During the empire, civil rights, though still based on these distinctions, increasingly differentiated those of privileged status (*honestiores*) from those of unprivileged status (*humiliores*). The

humiliores were liable to more severe punishment and exacerbated death penalties. The Christianization of the empire did not have a great effect upon this scaling of punishment.

Roman citizens had the right of *provocatio ad populum* or appeal to the Roman people, deriving from the verb *provocare* (to cry out). *Provocatio* applied to Roman citizens who were not in military service, and granted the right to a fair trial by the people against the arbitrary judgment or use of force by a magistrate. Citizens could also appeal to the tribunes of the plebs, who could provide aid (*auxilium*) against or veto the decisions of the magistrates. Noncitizens and slaves did not have these rights.

In the Classical Republic, the civil rights of Roman citizens protected them from execution. Exile was the most severe capital punishment, involving loss of Roman status (*capitis deminutio*). Noncitizens were liable to summary judgment by Roman governors in the provinces. At all times, slaves, lacking rights, were subject to extremely harsh punishment and exacerbated death penalties, such as crucifixion, as a punishment for running away or rebellion.

Citizen rights were eroded by the civil conflicts and wars of the late Republic. The *senatus consultum ultimum* (SCU), first used against Gaius Gracchus and his followers in 121 BCE, authorized the magistrates to take any action deemed necessary for the public safety, including extrajudicial executions. As consul in 63, Cicero arrested some of the Catilinarian conspirators; though Cicero sought a measure of legality by having the Senate debate on and vote on their fate, he was authorized to execute them by the SCU. Subsequently, Cicero's enemy Clodius Pulcher, a radical tribune of the plebs, passed a law making it illegal to execute Roman citizens without a public trial, forcing Cicero into exile. The influence of Pompey set aside this law and reinstated Cicero.

The rights of citizens eroded further when they were targeted as *hostes publici* (public enemies) in the proscriptions under Sulla (82–81 BCE) and the triumvirs Octavian, Mark Antony, and Lepidus (43–42). Public enemies could be killed by anyone seeking the rewards listed in the proscription lists. The civil wars erased the former distinction between *domi* (“home,” where citizens had the right of *provocatio*) and *militiae* (where they did not); those defeated in civil war were at the victor's mercy.

During the imperial period, additional distinctions of social status developed, separating the “more honorable” (*honestiores*) from the “more

lowly” (*humiliores*). Since the surviving legal writings were redacted much later (see “Codex Justinianus”), the development and precise definitions of these categories are debated by modern scholars. The *honestiores/humiliores* distinction replaced that of Roman citizen and noncitizen after Caracalla granted the Roman citizenship to all inhabitants of the empire in 212 CE.

The *honestiores* certainly included the imperial family, senators, equestrians, and decurions (town councilors), and probably veterans. Members of these groups were usually (except in cases of treason or sedition) exempt from the death penalty, undergoing exile instead. In cases of treason or sedition, convicted *honestiores* underwent a more honorable form of execution, for example, forced suicide or decapitation by the sword. The *honestiores* were also exempt from corporal punishment such as being beaten with rods. In contrast, the *humiliores* were liable to corporal punishment, sentence to hard labor in mines or quarries, torture (used to extract evidence), and exacerbated death penalties, including crucifixion, being thrown to wild beasts in the arena, or being burned alive. As a check to these brutal punishments, emperors and provincial governors could display *clementia* (mercy), and some jurists gave opinions restraining the cruelty of owners toward slaves. However, the conversion of Constantine I (306–337) to Christianity, and the Christianization of the empire, had little effect on severe penalties and exacerbated death penalties other than the banning of crucifixion.

Sara E. Phang

See also Cicero; Codex Justinianus; Criminal Procedure; *Domi/Militiae*; Exile; Proscriptions; *Provocatio*; Public Order; Suicide; Treason; Tribune of the Plebs

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Civil War (Marius-Sulla). See Marian-Sullan Conflict

Civil War (Pertinax-Septimius Severus) (193–197 CE)

The Roman emperor Commodus (180–192) was strangled to death in his bath on New Year's Eve, 192 CE. The City Prefect, Pertinax, perhaps had a hand in the conspiracy. Late that night the Praetorian Guard reluctantly acclaimed him emperor. Pertinax' reserved and conservative demeanor was unpopular with the praetorians. His attempts to reform and discipline the Guard added to his unpopularity. Two attempted coups to replace Pertinax as emperor failed. Yet on March 28, several hundred soldiers entered his palace and killed Pertinax after a reign of less than three months.

There was no clear successor to the throne after Pertinax' assassination. The City Prefect, Sulpicianus, attempted to buy the loyalty of the praetorians, offering a 20,000 sesterces reward to each soldier. However, Didius Julianus outbid him with an amount of 25,000 sesterces per soldier. Although the Guard proclaimed Julianus emperor, he was disliked in Rome, and his power did not extend far outside of central Italy. Much as in the civil war of 69 CE, the strong Roman generals outside of Italy did not recognize the new emperor and looked to make themselves *imperator*. Septimius Severus secured the support of Clodius Albinus in Britain by declaring him his Caesar, he styled himself as the avenger of Pertinax, and he marched his army from Pannonia and pushed toward Rome. All of Julianus' attempts to avert destruction failed, and the praetorians deserted him. He was murdered after an even shorter reign than Pertinax.

Severus became emperor June 1. He replaced the soldiers in the Praetorian Guard with his own men, executed those responsible for

Pertinax' murder, and had him deified. Severus' attention quickly turned to Pescennius Niger who had been hailed emperor in Syria. Niger had gained control of most of the eastern portion of the Roman Empire. He made Byzantium his headquarters and defeated part of Severus' army at Perinthus. Yet Severus soon arrived in the east and defeated Niger's forces near Nicaea. By early 194, Niger was retreating toward Antioch, and Severus gained the loyalty of most of Asia Minor, Egypt, and the Near East. Severus' general, Anullinus, caught up with Niger near Issus, where Alexander the Great had defeated Darius III. Niger's army was outflanked, surrounded, and decimated; he lost 20,000 men. Niger escaped the battle and fled to Antioch. He then attempted to flee to Persia. However, he was captured on the outskirts of the city and killed. By May, most of the remaining supporters of Niger had surrendered, and Severus was sole Augustus.

Only one potential rival remained to Severus' rule, Albinus in Britain. An assassination attempt against Albinus failed, and he was stripped of his rank of Caesar. Albinus immediately declared himself Augustus at the end of 195, prepared for war, and crossed into Gaul. He gained the support of much of the Gallic forces and made Lugdunum his headquarters, but he failed to gain the support of the Rhine legions. Severus reached Gaul with his army early in 197, and the two forces, equaling 150,000 men, clashed outside of Lugdunum on 19 February. Albinus had some success in the battle, routing Severus' left wing. Yet the timely charge of Severus' cavalry put the Albanians to flight. Lugdunum was sacked, and Albinus committed suicide. Severus had his body mutilated as a warning to any other potential rivals. He then purged the Senate of potential threats, executing 29 men. Severus became the unquestioned ruler of the Roman Empire.

Nikolaus Leo Overtoom

See also Clodius Albinus; Pertinax; Pescennius Niger; Septimius Severus

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Civil Warfare

In Roman literary tradition, *the* civil war (*Bellum Civile*) was the Caesarian-Pompeian civil war (49–45 BCE), popularized by various literary narratives dramatizing the conflict. Other major civil wars included the Social War and Marian-Sullan conflict (91–87, 88–82 BCE), the "triumviral" wars of 44–31 BCE; the War of Four Emperors (69 CE); the civil war of the later Severans (217–222 CE); the Tetrarchic civil war (306–313); the war of the sons of Constantine (337–340); and the revolt of Eugenius (392–394). The Catilinarian Conspiracy is not usually considered a civil war, though Catiline and his supporters took the field and were defeated in battle. Various usurpations, though violent and involving the army, also should probably not be regarded as civil wars. After the triumviral period, the longest period of civil warfare was the third century crisis (by convention, 235–284) with intermittent wars between the various claimants to the purple, most notably the revolt against Gallienus (268), Aurelian's "reconquest" of the empire (270–275), and Diocletian's war against Carinus (284–285). The recurrent civil wars of the fifth century CE led eventually to the disintegration of the western empire.

A number of revolts are not regarded as civil wars: the Campanian Revolt (214 BCE); the British revolt of 60–61 CE; the Jewish War (66–70 CE); the Gallic Revolt of 70 CE; and the Bar Kochba Revolt (132–135). In these cases, the rebels were regarded by the Romans as non-Roman (native) opponents.

Victory in a civil war might or might involve reprisals against the opposing side. The Marian-Sullan conflict was marked by such reprisals, as was the first stage of the triumviral wars (43–42 BCE). The reprisals included the proscription of vanquished enemy aristocrats, who were exiled on pain of death and with a price on their heads, sought by bounty hunters. In later civil wars, some victorious emperors preferred not to exact reprisals.

In contrast with civil wars in modern nations, where the opposing sides may support differing ideological regimes, the allegiances in Roman civil

wars appear to be based on personal loyalties. After the victory of one side, the desire for vengeance might motivate the vanquished to resist. If they accepted the victors' clemency, they could be easily assimilated into the new regime. The closest to an "ideological" civil war appears to be the conflict of Octavian and Antony, where Octavian and his supporters made Antony appear to be "Greek" or even "Egyptian." Roman soldiers in civil wars were thus probably not ideologically motivated; service in civil wars resulted in the redistribution of money on a large scale as troops received pay and bounties.

Rewriting of the historical narrative after one side achieved victory in a civil war was common. The opponents in armed conflicts who belong to the same nation, people, or ethnicity tend to characterize their own faction as legitimate and the opposing side as illegitimate. Victory in civil warfare often results in renaming or recharacterization of the conflict not as a revolt but as a war of liberation or the defeat of an unjust opponent or regime.

Thus, Roman victors of civil wars tended to denigrate their opponents as unjustified. After Octavian (the future emperor Augustus) defeated Mark Antony, a tradition consolidated that depicted Mark Antony as deluded and irrational, besotted by his love for Cleopatra into betraying Rome. This narrative was based on Octavian's propaganda against Antony. In his *Res Gestae*, a biographical inscription commemorating his deeds, Augustus characterized another opponent in the civil wars, Sextus Pompeius (the son of Pompey the Great) and his followers, as "pirates."

In the civil war of 69 CE, won by Vespasian (emperor 69–79), the pro-Flavian tradition depicted especially Vitellius, Vespasian's immediate predecessor, as lazy and incompetent, preferring to feast on his country estate rather than command his army. Later, Septimius Severus (emperor 193–211) fought and defeated his opponents Pescennius Niger and his former ally Clodius Albinus in an aggressive civil war; the historical tradition, favorable to the Severans, presents Albinus as deranged.

The possibility of civil war affected Roman concepts of "grand strategy," if such a term is not an anachronism. Emperors often chose to deal with an internal threat (revolt or civil war) first, and with external threats second; if emperors became preoccupied with an external threat, they risked revolt or usurpation within the empire. Scholars have counted as many as 49 separate civil wars during the later Roman Empire, from 235 to 476 (16 during the third century crisis) (Drinkwater and Lee 2015). To deal with wars on two or

more fronts, the later Roman emperors, beginning with Gallienus (260–268) reorganized the Roman army into central field cavalry forces that could move more rapidly to face threats, and more stationary frontier troops. Another response to the threat of war on multiple fronts was multiple co-emperors, whether unrelated peers or family members. Nonetheless, the many civil wars of the later Roman Empire, when added to increased external pressure, undoubtedly contributed to the weakening of the empire and the collapse of the western empire.

Sara E. Phang

See also Army in Politics; Caesar, Gaius Julius; Civil Wars (I) (49–45 BCE); Civil Wars (II) (44–31 BCE); Civil War (Pertinax-Septimius Severus); Cleopatra; Fall of the Roman Empire (West); Marian-Sullan Conflict; Mark Antony; Octavian; Pompey; Sextus Pompeius; Tetrarchic Civil War; Third-Century CE Crisis; War of Four Emperors

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Civil Wars (I) (49–45 BCE), Causes

The immediate cause of the Caesarian-Pompeian civil war was Caesar’s crossing the Rubicon River, the boundary with Cisalpine Gaul and Italy, with his army. By crossing this boundary without laying down his *imperium* (right to command) and disbanding his army he committed an act of war. Longer term causes include the decreasing influence of the Roman Senate and the increasing willingness of Roman politicians to use popular support and military commands as bases for their power.

By the late 60s, Caesar, Pompey, and Crassus formed the First Triumvirate with the goal of controlling Roman politics. The collaboration

was successful, particularly for Caesar, who won the consulship of 59 BCE and continued to the governorship of the Gallic provinces. However, by the end of the 50s, Crassus had died at Carrhae in 53, the Triumvirate had collapsed, and Pompey's support for Caesar was wavering. In addition, political opposition to Caesar had polarized Roman politics, particularly over Caesar's intended candidacy for the consulship of 49. Caesar's opponents were eager for him return to Rome as a private citizen so that they could indict him for the actions of his consulship of 59, particularly his rejection of the religious omens declared by his consular colleague. Caesar, on the other hand, preferred to be allowed to run for office *in absentia*, although such an exception required special permission. Caesar's enemies persuaded the Senate to declare Caesar a public enemy, leaving him with no option but civil war, a gamble that he must have believed that he and his highly experienced legions (and the wealth plundered from Gaul) could win.

Rosemary Moore

See also Caesar, Assassination of; Caesar, Dictatorship of; Caesar, Gaius Julius; Civil Wars (II) (44–31 BCE); Gallic Wars; Ilerda, Battle of; Munda, Battle of; Pharsalus, Battle of; Pompey; Sextus Pompeius

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Civil Wars (I) (49–45 BCE), Course

The civil war between Caesar, Pompey, and the Pompeians, beginning with Caesar's crossing of the Rubicon in January 49 BCE and ending with the battle of Munda in spring 45, is one of Rome's most famous civil wars, and resulted in Caesar's autocratic rule as dictator, though his clemency toward his peers resulted in his assassination in 44.

While Caesar waged war in Gaul, his enemies at Rome militated against him (see Causes, below). In January 49 BCE, the Senate declared Caesar a public enemy. Caesar's allies fled to Caesar, who persuaded his army to avenge this insult, as well as illegal actions taken against his allies. In response, on January 10, 49 Caesar led his army across the Rubicon River, the boundary between Cisalpine Gaul and Italy. This was an act of war. Caesar's swift advance through Italy indicates he had planned for this possibility.

Caesar's route took him along the east coast of Italy, along a route that denied the Pompeians opportunities to recruit Pompeian veterans. Except for two legions of doubtful loyalty, the Pompeians had only inexperienced soldiers, a real disadvantage in battle against Caesar's veterans. Pompey therefore persuaded his colleagues to move southeast of Rome, leaving the route open to further recruiting while avoiding battle. Although this strategy was prudent, it struck Pompey's colleagues as cowardly.

The first major confrontation between Caesar and the Pompeians was at Corfinium, where the Pompeian Domitius was recruiting soldiers. Although Pompey, knowing that Domitius' forces could not match Caesar's, strongly encouraged him to move south with the rest of the Pompeians, Domitius chose to stay. His troops mutinied and sided with Caesar. Domitius was released and returned to Pompey, demonstrating Caesar's policy of *clementia* (clemency) toward his enemies.

Caesar and his army entered Rome with no resistance. After collecting funds from the treasury, he quickly marched north again to nearer and further Spain, provinces governed by Pompey *in absentia*. Caesar planned to deprive Pompey of access to the two veteran legions stationed there. He defeated the Pompeians, led by Gaius Afranius and Marcus Petreius, in the battle or more properly the campaign of Ilerda (August 49). By first outmaneuvering Pompey's legates and then encouraging fraternization between his and Pompey's soldiers, Caesar won control of these legions,

which he immediately disbanded. Caesar emphasizes the relative bloodlessness of this campaign.

Subsequently, both Caesar and Pompey moved their forces east, where Pompey anticipated support from his many allies there. Having landed first at Dyrrhachium, he outmaneuvered Caesar to claim the better camp for his army. Caesar's attempted circumvallation of Pompey's camp failed, with the result that his own army was cut off from resupply. Despite serious food shortages, Caesar's army managed to break through Pompey's forces. Both armies headed inland and met in early August 48 BCE near Pharsalus, a town in Thessaly. The battle of Pharsalus was the most famous battle of the civil war. Despite Pompey's superior numbers, the Pompeians were newly recruited, and their only real advantage was cavalry. Caesar's tactics and experienced soldiers won a decisive victory. Still, Caesar fought continued Pompeian resistance over the next three years.

After Pharsalus, Pompey fled to Egypt, where he was assassinated because the Ptolemaic king Ptolemy XIII had secretly decided to back Caesar instead. Caesar followed Pompey to Egypt and became embroiled in the "Alexandrine War," a local dynastic struggle. Caesar sided with Cleopatra, Ptolemy XIII's older sister and wife. Caesar brokered a short-lived agreement between the two, but due to his closeness to Cleopatra, was attacked by Ptolemy's army. Caesar was soon victorious. Installing Cleopatra VII as ruling queen, he gained control of the enormous financial resources Egypt could provide.

During this period, the surviving Pompeians regrouped and allied with Juba of Numidia. In Asia Minor, Pharnaces, son of Mithridates VI of Pontus, overran Asia Minor, taking territory held by Rome and its allies. On the way to face Pharnaces, Caesar settled matters in the Near East. After unsuccessful negotiations at Zela, a town in northern Asia Minor, Caesar fought and quickly won a decisive battle in August 47. He sent the news back to Rome with the famously short message, "I came, I saw, I conquered."

By October, Caesar returned to Rome, where he prepared for the coming campaign against the remaining Pompeians in Africa. During this period, all nine Caesarian legions garrisoned in Campania mutinied due to Caesar's failure to provide promised bonuses as well as pay and supplies. According to most sources, Caesar was able to end the mutiny by addressing his soldiers as *Quirites*, a traditional Latin term for citizens, signifying that he was discharging them from the army. The soldiers begged to be reinstated.

The truth is more complicated: promised pay and bonuses had failed to materialize. In the end, most likely four of the nine legions were disbanded, and five new legions were recruited to fill out needed numbers.

The “African War” was brief. Due to his new legions’ lack of experience, Caesar’s progress against the combined forces of Scipio and Juba was inconsistent. After retraining his troops and successfully blockading Thapsus, a fortified town held by Pompeians, Caesar was finally able to bring the other side to formal battle in April 46. Caesar’s victory was decisive, but his army’s frustration with the war manifested: his veterans attacked their own officers. These soldiers blamed the officer corps, and by extension the upper strata of Roman society, for this civil war.

While many Pompeian leaders surrendered after the defeat, several, including Labienus and two of Pompey’s sons, Gnaeus and Sextus, fled to Spain. Metellus Scipio died in a naval battle. At Utica, Cato the Younger, the moral leader of the opposition and commander of five legions, committed suicide rather than surrender to receive Caesar’s humiliating *clementia*.

Caesar returned to Rome close to the end of July 46 BCE, but soon proceeded to Spain to oversee the fighting that had arisen there between the remaining Pompeians and the few Caesarian legions. This was the so-called Spanish War. Despite successfully denying Caesar’s army winter quarters, the Pompeian commanders were soon soundly defeated in the battle of Munda (March 45), east of the modern Spanish city Cádiz. By the end of mopping-up operations, of the Pompeian commanders only Sextus Pompeius survived. He would later lead resistance against Caesar’s adopted son Octavian.

Rosemary Moore

See also Caesar, Assassination of; Caesar, Dictatorship of; Caesar, Gaius Julius; Civil Wars (II) (44–31 BCE); Gallic Wars; Ilerda, Battle of; Munda, Battle of; Pharsalus, Battle of; Pompey; Sextus Pompeius

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Civil Wars (I) (49–45 BCE), Consequences

Caesar was victorious in the Caesarian-Pompeian Civil War, and became virtually an autocrat, with increasing, unprecedented powers. His *clementia* toward his enemies resulted in a disaffected group of Roman aristocrats who eventually conspired against and assassinated him on the Ides of March, 15 March 44 BCE.

In April 45, after receiving news of the victory at Munda, the Senate granted Caesar numerous unprecedented honors, including the right to dedicate statues portraying him as a god. In October, Caesar celebrated a triumph for the Spanish war. Though technically this triumph was over a foreign enemy of Rome, it was understood as being over other Romans.

Caesar used his unparalleled influence to control that candidates could run for office, thus truncating any opportunity for advancement without his favor. His consolidation of his political power was paralleled by his monarchic and divine affectations. In a famous incident at the Lupercalia of February 44 BCE, he refused a crown offered to him by Mark Antony. While Caesar never actually claimed the title of king, in that month he became dictator for life.

By this point a definite conspiracy formed against Caesar. Its membership, drawn primarily from the Roman political elite, included several former supporters. The conspirators' major complaint was Caesar's destruction of the political freedom of their class. In their view, when Caesar made himself dictator for life, he established himself as a tyrant, thus overturning the tradition of collegial rule. Meanwhile Caesar planned for a major Roman campaign against the Arsacid Persian Empire (Iran).

The conspirators decided on the Senate meeting in Pompey's Theater on March 15 for the assassination. As Caesar entered the theater, Mark Antony was drawn away by a mutual friend. After Caesar sat, the conspirators

crowded around him as if they were going to ask him favors, and then stabbed him to death.

The news of Caesar's death incited rioting throughout Rome. This response allowed Mark Antony to broker a compromise with his enemies: Caesar's official acts would remain valid and the Liberators would not be prosecuted. For a brief time, this forced coalition would stand, but it was never meant to address the far more serious systemic problems in Roman government. As it turned out, the next decade and a half resulted in further civil war and the ascendancy to sole power of Octavian, Caesar's great-nephew and heir, the future emperor Augustus.

Caesar's actions by the end of 45 BCE strongly suggest that he was moving away from the traditional political organization of the Roman Republic. The authority Caesar was granted gradually removed limitations on Roman chief magistrates' extent and length of power, both ways that the political structure of the Republic controlled individual ambition.

Ultimately Caesar's loyal soldiers formed the base of his political support. His wealth also allowed him to dominate areas of influence outside formal politics, through patronage and popularity with the Roman public. He spent heavily on spectacles, as well as an extensive building program, both traditional methods of raising personal prestige while demonstrating respect for the state and state religion. Caesar also recruited the Italian elite into politics, promoting some of them into the Senate. The attention he gave these groups further alienated his senatorial colleagues.

Caesar can be seen as continuing a trend of the late Roman Republic toward greater power accumulated by one man. Once he had defeated his political enemies, he took steps that would outline the framework of early imperial power: the near-monopoly of military command, the redefinition of traditional Roman offices to legitimate personal power, the introduction of ruler cult, and new values, such as *clementia*. He failed for several reasons. Too many members of senatorial families opposed the changes Caesar had initiated, and the honors Caesar was willing to accept suggested there was no limit to his ambition.

This transition to single-man rule would not be simple. By late 44 BCE, when Octavian marched his legions against Rome, no participant was strong enough either to reestablish the institutions of the Roman Republic or to put in place another form of government. In late 42 BCE, those capable of commanding the largest armies, Mark Antony, Lepidus (*magister*

equitum when Caesar was assassinated), and Octavian joined together to govern the state. They defeated the Liberators decisively at Philippi and soon began to struggle among themselves for superiority. By 30 BCE, Octavian had eliminated all potential rivals. His command of the Roman army made it impossible to oppose him. Yet in his construction of power, Octavian followed the broad outlines Caesar had provided, though he would mask it far more ably with titles and forms familiar from the traditional Republic. Future emperors also found that their careers and reputations might depend on how they treated the Senate.

Ample evidence has survived for this period. Caesar's *Civil War* (*Bellum Civile*) is unfinished, and while it shares many of the same qualities of style as his *Gallic Wars*, is generally less trustworthy. It is politically motivated, at points distorts chronology, and ends shortly after his victory at Pharsalus. Other sources, such as the letters of Cicero, are often more reliable. Accounts of later portions of the war in Africa, Egypt, and Spain were written by Caesar's subordinates. They are of varying quality but unparalleled sources for these campaigns. The period of the civil war between Caesar and Pompey is also covered extensively in later sources: Appian's *Civil Wars*, Plutarch's *Lives* (*Caesar*, *Pompey*, *Cicero*, and others), and Suetonius' *Divus Iulius*. Idealization and dramatization mark these sources, in particular a poetic epic based on the civil war, Lucan's *Pharsalia*.

Rosemary Moore

See also Caesar, Assassination of; Caesar, Dictatorship of; Caesar, Gaius Julius; Civil Wars (II) (44–31 BCE); Gallic Wars; Ilerda, Battle of; Munda, Battle of; Pharsalus, Battle of; Pompey; Sextus Pompeius

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Civil Wars (II) (44–31 BCE), Causes

Although Caesar's assassins, often called the Liberators, wished to restore traditional government, long-term trends made this impossible. No other alternative was clear, as senatorial tradition was still too powerful to overcome, and no single man at that point could match Caesar's influence. In addition, the use of military force to attempt to resolve senatorial conflicts made further violence inevitable. Octavian would only be able to restore peace and stability to Rome by defeating his opponents' armies, as well as emphasizing his military control and popularity to prevent others from usurping power.

By assassinating Caesar, the Liberators hoped to restore the Republic by ridding it of a tyrant. However, they had little success in winning over the crowd to their side, making their ambitions impossible to achieve. Antony, however, as Caesar's closest ally, far more effectively won its support. A compromise was secured, that Caesar's *acta* would remain valid, and that the Liberators would not be prosecuted.

What nobody counted on was the impact of Octavian, Caesar's heir. His youth and background made him easy to underestimate. But Octavian immediately demonstrated remarkable political facility. By emphasizing his connection to Caesar, Octavian won great popular and military support. It also allowed him to exploit the desire for revenge. Throughout the triumviral wars, he emphasized his duty to avenge Caesar's death, drawing upon the loyalty of Caesar's veterans. Octavian later built a Temple of Mars Ultor (Mars the Avenger) in the name of the deified Julius Caesar.

Rosemary Moore

See also Actium, Battle of; Augustus; Brundisium, Treaty of; Brutus (Junius Brutus, Marcus); Caesar, Assassination of; Caesar, Gaius Julius; Cassius Longinus; Civil Wars (I) (49–45 BCE); Cleopatra; Divisions of the Army (Imperial); Elite Participation; Mark Antony; Mars Ultor, Temple of;

Octavian; Perugia, Siege of; *Princeps*, Principate; Proscriptions; Second Triumvirate; Tarentum, Pact of; Vengeance

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Civil Wars (II) (44–31 BCE), Course

The assassination of Caesar on March 15, 44 BCE unleashed another period of civil warfare between Caesar's heir Octavian and Caesar's assassins, then between Octavian and his former ally Mark Antony, lasting until 31 BCE. This period is known as the "triumviral wars" from the establishment of the Second Triumvirate in 43.

After Caesar's death, the inhabitants of Rome rioted, and Brutus and Cassius, far from being welcomed as "liberators," were forced to flee for their own safety. Antony, Caesar's trusted supporter, encouraged this riot, exploiting opposition to Brutus and Cassius. By the end of 44, Antony's position weakened due to growing rivalry with Octavian and growing opposition to Antony at Rome, encouraged by Cicero's invectives against Antony, the *Philippics*. However, Antony's army, influence, and his magistracy protected him.

Brutus and Cassius both remained outside Italy and were made propraetors of Crete and Cyrene, respectively. Antony claimed the governorship of Cisalpine and Transalpine Gaul, but the governor he was to succeed, Decimus Brutus, refused to yield. Antony besieged Brutus at Mutina in north Italy. To confront Antony, the Senate awarded Octavian formal command of the legions he already led. Octavian and the new consuls, Hirtius and Pansa, fought and defeated Antony at Mutina (March/April 43). Hirtius and Pansa were killed, and Antony was declared a public enemy.

During his absence, relations between the Senate and Octavian began to

sour, with Octavian ultimately claiming the consulship after a successful march on Rome (August 43). Octavian was 19 years old, in clear violation of the traditional *cursus honorum*. In addition, Octavian ensured Antony was no longer a public enemy. Though the two would always be rivals, at this point alliance benefitted them both.

Lepidus, Caesar's *magister equitum*, joined the alliance. Unlike the first so-called triumvirate, the Second Triumvirate was formally constituted. Their powers were overwhelming: they could pass laws and try citizens without due process. Top priority was dividing territory among the three. Antony, the most powerful, took Cisalpine and Transalpine Gaul, while Lepidus received Narbonese Gaul and Spain, where he already had troops stationed. Octavian received Sardinia, Sicily, and Africa. This was less than it appeared: these provinces were actually controlled by Sextus Pompeius.

The triumvirate also needed troops and money to pay them, and like Sulla, chose proscriptions. These had a dual purpose: eliminating enemies while claiming their property. Those proscribed had no legal recourse; many were forced to flee or be killed. Notably, Cicero was proscribed in retaliation for his opposition to Antony. Proscriptions, however, did not raise enough funds and so the triumvirs gave 40 Italian towns over to their armies to plunder.

In early 42, Octavian and Antony moved east to oppose Brutus and Cassius. Lepidus remained in Italy. The triumvirs and Liberators both had massive armies, 20 or so legions on each side. There were two decisive battles three weeks apart, both near the strategically located city Philippi. In the First Battle of Philippi (October 3, 42), Brutus routed Octavian, while Antony defeated Cassius, who committed suicide before the battle ended. In the Second Battle of Philippi (October 23), Antony's victory was undeniable and Brutus likewise committed suicide.

With Brutus and Cassius gone, triumviral rivalries rose to the surface. Antony remained the most influential. In addition to his earlier provinces, Antony took Spain as well as the eastern provinces. Lepidus took Sardinia, and Octavian was tasked with raising more money and troops in Italy. Antony's visit to the eastern Mediterranean of course included Rome's ally Egypt, where he began his famous romance with Cleopatra. But by the middle of 40, he returned to Italy in response to the open hostilities between his wife, brother, and Octavian.

The triumviral land confiscations in Italy caused considerable hardship,

compounded by Sextus Pompeius' naval blockade, and made Octavian very unpopular. Lucius Antonius, consul for 41, and Fulvia took advantage of this opportunity. War broke out in the middle of 41, with Octavian eventually besieging their forces in Perugia. By spring 40, the town was plundered, with many civilian casualties. But Octavian's soldiers treated Antony's mercifully, and Lucius Antonius and Fulvia departed unharmed. Lucius Antonius died soon afterward, while illness claimed Fulvia soon after she returned to Antony in Greece.

Despite victory at Perugia, Octavian had won a reputation for ruthlessness in the proscriptions, alienating potential supporters. Sextus Pompeius' growing strength made him a tempting ally. Octavian forged a marriage tie through Scribonia, the sister of Sextus Pompeius' father-in-law. Though this marriage lasted no more than a year, it produced Octavian's only child, Julia.

In the Treaty of Brundisium (September 40), Antony and Octavian renegotiated the triumvirate, significantly without Lepidus, who had become much less important after he took no side at Perugia. The new terms reassigned the Gallic provinces (which Octavian already occupied) and Illyricum to Octavian. Antony's authority in the eastern Mediterranean was strengthened and included provisions for the invasion of the Arsacid Persian Empire. Octavian and Antony strengthened this agreement by marrying the newly widowed Antony to Octavian's sister, Octavia.

Continuing difficulties from Sextus Pompeius' blockade of Italy reduced public enthusiasm for this agreement. Octavian and Antony met again at Misenum in summer 39 to grant Pompeius control of Sardinia, Sicily, and the Peloponnese, capped with the promise of a priesthood and future consulship. But the terms also undermined continued support for Sextus Pompeius: Romans who had fled to him were permitted to return to Italy, while his veterans were given benefits equivalent to those of the triumvirs' soldiers.

Relations between Octavian, Antony, and Sextus Pompeius soon grew unstable. Pirates continued to interfere with shipping traffic to Italy. Antony delayed handing over the Peloponnese. And Octavian divorced Scribonia, choosing a new wife, Livia, who had strong connections to several powerful families of the aristocracy, especially the Claudii. Antony left Italy in 39 as the most powerful of the dynasts.

In 37, Antony and Octavian negotiated the Pact of Tarentum, Antony

agreeing to loan Octavian ships to counter Sextus Pompeius, who had stepped up his “piracy” against Octavian, and Octavian agreeing to give Antony soldiers for his Persian expedition. Octavian’s and Antony’s combined naval force defeated Sextus Pompeius at the battle of Naulochus in 36, removing the last of the Pompeians.

Octavian exploited Antony’s absence, painting Antony as a man debauched by eastern luxury. This was especially persuasive in 36 after Antony fathered a third child with Cleopatra and formally recognized his paternity of their twins. Antony appeared committed to Cleopatra rather than Roman tradition.

By this point, Antony’s Persian campaign had finally begun, but soon foundered. The Persians destroyed his baggage train, and the Armenians withdrew their heavy cavalry, which was essential for Roman success. Returning from Syria, Antony’s army suffered numerous casualties from disease and hunger. Antony remained in the eastern Mediterranean to manage affairs there.

Octavia soon brought fresh troops for Antony. This was ofcourse awkward, but any perceived slight toward Octavia could weaken ties with Octavian. Soon another scandal arose, the so-called Donations of Alexandria (34) where Antony crowned Cleopatra and their children, proclaiming Cleopatra ruler of Egypt and their children kings and queens. Octavian portrayed Antony as behaving in an un-Roman manner, disavowing his Roman family and espousing Hellenistic-style monarchy.

The final conflict broke out in 33, when the triumvirate expired and after Antony’s divorce of Octavia. Octavian gained support through his publication of Antony’s alleged will, which declared Caesarion, Caesar’s son by Cleopatra, Caesar’s true heir. Octavian caused all of Italy to swear an oath of loyalty to himself, giving him an overwhelming moral advantage.

Antony wintered his forces on the west coast of Greece. Agrippa, Octavian’s admiral, chose to attack early in the fighting season of 31 and forced Antony’s forces toward Actium. By September, Antony decided that his only chance was to break through Agrippa’s forces and return east. Although Antony and Cleopatra escaped with the Egyptian fleet and returned to Alexandria, Agrippa and Octavian captured most of their fleet in a decisive victory, the battle of Actium (September 2, 31). By midsummer of 30, Octavian arrived in Egypt. Antony’s navy surrendered without a fight, and his army folded quickly. Antony and Cleopatra both committed

suicide, Antony because he thought Cleopatra already had done so, and Cleopatra to avoid being paraded as a captive in Octavian's triumph.

Rosemary Moore

See also Actium, Battle of; Augustus; Brundisium, Treaty of; Brutus (Junius Brutus, Marcus); Caesar, Assassination of; Caesar, Gaius Julius; Cassius Longinus; Civil Wars (I) (49–45 BCE); Cleopatra; Divisions of the Army (Imperial); Elite Participation; Mark Antony; Mars Ultor, Temple of; Octavian; Perugia, Siege of; *Princeps*, Principate; Proscriptions; Second Triumvirate; Tarentum, Pact of; Vengeance

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Civil Wars (II) (44–31 BCE), Consequences

The consequences of the triumviral wars were nothing less than the establishment of the empire (Principate). By Actium, it was obvious that the traditional structure of the Republic was broken. But Octavian recognized that despite his popularity, he was still vulnerable to aristocratic ill will. In the coming decades, Octavian combined and modified traditional institutions to permit him to retain overall control while permitting the aristocracy to maintain sufficient prestige. In the “First Settlement” of 27 BCE, Octavian ostensibly gave up his powers, claiming to restore the governance of the Republic. However, the Senate conferred on him extended proconsular *imperium*, enabling him to override the governors of provinces with legions. Previous commanders had had extraordinary *imperium*, giving a precedent. Octavian presented himself as the leading citizen,

primus inter pares or simply *princeps*, “first among equals” rather than a dictator or an autocrat. His resignation of his powers in 27 was answered by the Senate with a number of honors, particularly the title *Augustus*, “revered,” a term with significant religious connotations. Henceforth from 27 BCE, Octavian is conventionally termed Augustus.

In fact, Augustus’ power depended on the Roman army, which he reorganized to discourage potential future rivals among the senators. Soldiers swore their oaths to him, and he personally paid their salaries, preventing senators from using the army to follow in his footsteps. As Sulla and Caesar had before him, Augustus also incorporated many Italian *eques* in the Senate, both to replenish the Senate and to build loyalty among a long-ignored class. These new senators received traditional prestige, but owed their primary loyalty to Augustus.

However, the extensive network of connections senators possessed was too important to weaken by much. The system this fueled, patronage, was a fundamental way many state activities such as public works were funded. So Octavian positioned himself and his family as the best representative of traditional values, deploying them to support existing institutions as well as entirely new structures. His promotion and funding of numerous projects and spectacles encouraged other aristocrats to follow his example. However, no other Roman could match his wealth, which gave him considerable advantages, while also allowing him to display the traditional value of modesty by his refusal to outdo others by too much.

Augustus’ solution to the problems of late Republican government managed to incorporate the practical realities of power in that period, namely, control of the military and popular appeal, while satisfying the aristocracy’s desire to retain prestige. For this reason, therefore, elections and other aspects of Roman government continued, although without any of the traditional freedoms the Liberators had hoped to restore. Successful candidates were those Augustus indicated he supported.

Stability, however, was delicate, and required adjustment at a number of points, most notably in the “Second Settlement” of 23 BCE. To satisfy both the aristocracy, resentful due to Augustus’ monopolization of the consulship, and the people, eager to keep Augustus in a visible official role, he took for himself *tribunicia potestas*, “tribunician power,” which granted the rights though not the office of a tribune of the people. He was also granted the same rank as the two regularly elected consuls of that year, and made all

other governorships formally inferior to his.

The system Augustus created was largely continued by his successors. There were significant weaknesses to Augustus' solution, particularly the matter of succession. Preparing family members for rule was understandable in Rome's patriarchal society, but went against Roman tradition. Time would demonstrate that emperors who did not have significant experience in government were ineffective. But on the whole Augustus' solution was remarkably long-lived.

Rosemary Moore

See also Actium, Battle of; Augustus; Brundisium, Treaty of; Brutus (Junius Brutus, Marcus); Caesar, Assassination of; Caesar, Gaius Julius; Cassius Longinus; Civil Wars (I) (49–45 BCE); Cleopatra; Divisions of the Army (Imperial); Elite Participation; Mark Antony; Mars Ultor, Temple of; Octavian; Perugia, Siege of; *Princeps*, Principate; Proscriptions; Second Triumvirate; Tarentum, Pact of; Vengeance

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Civil Wars (House of Constantine) (Fourth Century CE)

Constantine the Great (306–337 CE) had three surviving sons, Constantine II (emperor 337–340), Constantius II (r. 337–361), and Constans (r. 337–350). All three had been elevated to the rank of Caesar before Constantine's death, Constantine II in 317; Constantius II in 324; and Constans in 333. Constantine also elevated a nephew, Delmatius, to Caesar in 333. Constantine designated all three sons as Augusti (co-emperors) on his

deathbed in 337, with the hope that they would rule the empire together, Constantius II being assigned to the eastern frontier, Constantine II to the western provinces (Gaul, Spain, and Britain), and Constans to the Balkans, Italy, and Africa. Delmatius may have been intended to be a fourth Augustus. However, after their father's death Constantine's sons (in particular Constantius II) took immediate action to eliminate the collateral branch of the family to which Delmatius belonged, killing him and all the other collateral relatives except Gallus and Julian.

In 340, Constantine II invaded northern Italy, hoping to seize it from Constans, but was defeated and slain by Constans near Aquileia. Constans thus claimed to rule all the western empire, but became unpopular with his subjects and was overthrown by the usurper Magnentius in 350. Constantius II was occupied with waging war against the Persians and did not take part in his brothers' civil war. He was obliged, however, to fight the usurper Magnentius and defeated Magnentius at the battle of Mursa in 351.

Constantius II thus reigned alone from 350 to 361; however, he needed a co-emperor or Caesar in the western empire and so designated first his cousin Gallus (Caesar 351–354), then Gallus' brother Julian (Caesar 355–361). Victorious in war against the Germans in Gaul, Julian was acclaimed as Augustus by his soldiers and was prepared to begin civil war with Constantius II. Fortunately for Julian, Constantius died from disease in 361.

Sara E. Phang

See also Constantine I; Constantius II; Julian; Magnentius; Revolt; Succession (Imperial); Usurpation

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Civil-Military Relations

During the early Republic, Roman society developed a strong military

tradition of the citizen-soldier who volunteered for Rome's many wars. Roman expansion in the age of the Punic Wars inflicted stress on recruitment and service patterns, as did the civil wars of the late Republic. Something of the ethos of the citizen-soldier remained, and most Italians of the first century BCE had some experience of war. After Octavian (later Augustus) ended the wars by securing victory at Actium in 31 BCE, he began fundamentally changing Roman military service as part of his efforts to restabilize Roman society as a whole. By the end of his reign in 14 CE, service in the Roman army was a fulltime, specialized career with a state salary. The army consumed at least half of the state's budget. Soldiers became seen as a separate class during the imperial period, but no one should imagine them all sequestered in legionary forts on distant frontiers far from any civilian populations. Instead, civil-military relations were a vibrant, if problematic, factor in Roman imperial society.

New military bases, whether on the frontier or in the empire's interior, tended to attract considerable civilian commercial activity in the form of shops, taverns, brothels, and other services. Often these developed into permanent towns (*canabae*) adjacent to the camp. Augustus did not allow soldiers to be married (a policy which lasted until 197 CE), but many started families with local women anyway. The documentary sources show the constant worry over supplying the army from civilian resources, and the mere presence of units of soldiers, who were regularly paid in cash, brought economic development, urbanization, and a population boost to many areas. From Britain to Egypt, the army had a major social and economic impact on areas where it was stationed.

Overall, the post-Augustan army was a peace-time force during the 200 or so years of the *pax Romana* ("Roman peace"), in which most soldiers never saw combat. Rome derived active benefit from the soldiers by putting them to work in other capacities, such as policing, administration, and construction. Soldiers were increasingly seconded from their main units to man security outposts or serve a year on a governor's staff. Some out-posted soldiers received vows of thanks from civilian communities they had served in temporary policing roles. Other soldiers found themselves building roads, carrying messages, processing prisoners (including Christians amid occasional outbreaks of persecution), overseeing civilian watchtower guards, or administering mines. The Roman government had remarkably little bureaucracy during the early empire, so the state turned to the soldiery

when it needed skilled professionals to collect certain types of taxes, or staff administrative posts (*stationes*) throughout the empire.

Many—maybe most—soldiers would at some point during their careers be detached from their military units for some kind of temporary noncombat work. Some soldiers looked forward to a change of scenery, and most apparently did this service without major problems, but spreading soldiers out in this way undermined the army's combat effectiveness. Hadrian (117–138) specifically acknowledged this problem in his speech to the troops at Lambaesis, and his predecessor Trajan (98–117) had pushed back against governor Pliny the Younger's proclivity to use his staff soldiers for tasks such as guarding prisons, supporting a grain procurement mission, and providing security among civilians in vulnerable areas in his province (Bithynia-Pontus, today northern Turkey). Despite Trajan's reluctance in these cases, it is clear that soldiers were increasingly circulating throughout the provinces in the second and third centuries, which intensified contact between soldiers and civilians—often at the expense of the latter.

The frequency of detached service by soldiers opened the way for abuse of civilians, which is thoroughly attested in every type of source. Jurists condemned the rapacity of soldiers. Papyri and third-century inscriptions document how common it was for violent soldiers to rob civilians of donkeys and other valuables, fraudulently claiming they were needed for an official requisition. Novels and other literary sources practically depict soldiers as bandits, and bandits like soldiers. Christian texts express disaffection, especially toward low-ranking soldiers, and Jewish rabbis thought the mere proximity of a military patrol rendered the area impure. People had a realistic fear that soldiers would rape civilian women and boys.

Seeking legal redress against soldiers seems to have been extremely difficult. *Satire Sixteen* of the late second-century poet Juvenal describes the terrors of meeting a soldier on the streets of Rome; if you try to press charges after he beats you up, this poem claims, you will encounter a rigged process where the jury consists of his fellow soldiers. Every class of civilian seems to have feared and loathed soldiers. Responsible emperors and governors invested energy into curbing soldiers' corruption and abuse, but the problem remained.

Late antiquity brought changes. When he took Rome in 312, Constantine disbanded the enormous military-police complement that had grown up in

Rome (previously as many as 20,000 praetorians, urban cohorts, and *vigiles* had policed the million-inhabitant metropolis). Soldiers could still be found in major cities to serve the emperors' interests, but the heyday of military policing was over. So was the classic pattern of abuse. In terms of state service and administration, the distinction between civilian and military blurred in many ways as bureaucracy grew. Whereas in the early empire all legions were notionally mobile, now frontier forces (*limitanei*) settled into permanent stations; with the marriage ban lifted in 197 and the decline of old distinctions, these soldiers could integrate more easily with surrounding civilian communities.

Christopher J. Fuhrmann

See also Gender and War; Hadrian; *Limitanei*; Military Discipline; Noncombatants; Public Order; Trajan; War Crimes

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Civis Romanus

Citizenship for the Romans consisted of a set of rights and obligations, which, unlike Greek citizenship, became divorced from physical residence, allowing Roman citizens to inhabit large areas of Italy and beyond. The basic obligations of citizenship in the Republican period were military service (*militia*) and the payment of a property tax to fund military operations (*tributum*). Citizens were liable to the census, which determined their military and tax obligations. After 167 BCE, Roman citizens no longer

had to pay this tax. They were still liable to other taxes, including the *vicesima hereditatium* introduced by Augustus (27 BCE–14 CE), which funded military pensions.

Roman citizen rights include the right to vote in elections (*suffragium*), the right to run for office (*ius honorum*), the right to engage in commercial activities under Roman law (*commercium*), and the right to marry to produce citizen offspring (*conubium*). The latter two were shared with Latins, but the right to vote in elections was confined to Roman citizens and in practice to those who lived in and near Rome. By the late Republic, due to the growing expense of canvassing for votes and providing promised amenities, running for office became the privilege of wealthy citizens.

The character of the Roman citizenship drifted with time, as seen from the change in tax obligation above. As Roman citizens settled outside Italy, their full political participation declined, since they were unlikely to travel to Rome to vote in elections. This long-term shift, as well as the promotion of Italians and provincial Roman citizens into the Senate, was a major demographic factor in the transition to the Principate. People accepted imperial rule because they no longer had a strong familial tradition of participation in traditional Republican politics.

The Republican *dilectus* (levy) also went into abeyance. The Roman army relied more and more upon volunteers, usually provincial Roman citizens, who joined the legions, and noncitizens induced to enlist in the *auxilia* by the grant of citizenship upon discharge. Recruiting became increasingly regional, near the frontiers. Citizenship thus became less and less a trait of the political participant, and more and more a reward that the Romans offered to provincials, including urban elite individuals as well as soldiers. Citizenship granted privileges in Roman law, including greater access to legal representation; noncitizens were liable to summary judgment (*cognitio extra ordinem*) by the governors. In 212 CE, the Emperor Caracalla (211–217) granted the Roman citizenship to all inhabitants of the empire except surrendered aliens (*dediticii*).

Michael J. Taylor

See also Cives Sine Suffragio; Comitia Centuriata; Recruitment of Army (Republic)

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Claudius I (Emperor) (41–54 CE)

Born in 10 BCE, Claudius I (reigned 41–54), a nephew of the emperor Tiberius (14–37) and uncle of Gaius (Caligula, 37–41), achieved the conquest of Britain and the addition of other provinces to the Roman Empire. Despite his contemporaries' poor opinion of him, Claudius contributed to the rationalization of Roman imperial administration and the promotion of provincials. His reign demonstrates the symbolic role of the emperor as commander-in-chief and displays the conflict between emperor, imperial functionaries, and Senate that persisted into the third century CE.

Claudius was a scion of the Julio-Claudian imperial house; as the son of Drusus the brother of Tiberius, he was also the brother of Germanicus (d. 19 CE), who was the father of Gaius (Caligula). For these reasons, and not for his previous public distinction, the Praetorian Guard elevated Claudius as emperor upon Caligula's murder. Claudius had held few public offices or duties because of his ill health. He was disabled, probably by cerebral palsy. Though the condition did not affect his intellect, the Roman elite prized the art of oratory, which emphasized harmony in speaking, walking, and gesturing; Claudius' limp and stammer made him inadequate in these respects. Claudius occupied his earlier years writing histories of the Carthaginians and Etruscans. After his accession, Claudius rewarded the praetorians with 15,000 sesterces per man, an unprecedented sum.



Relief of Claudius subduing Britannia. The emperor Claudius (41–54 CE) is shown in heroic guise, overpowering the female personification of Britain, conquered by Claudius' generals in 43. The Romans frequently depicted conquest in such gendered terms. From the Sebasteion (temple of the imperial cult) at Aphrodisias, Turkey. (Paul Street/Alamy Stock Photo)

Claudius needed to build up his prestige with military conquest. In 42, the governor of Dalmatia, Camillus Scribonianus, revolted; Scribonianus quickly lost the support of his army and was murdered. Nonetheless, the traditional (if symbolic) role of commander-in-chief would bolster Claudius' image as emperor.

Most important was his invasion of Britain in 43 CE. Julius Caesar had

invaded Britain twice in 55 and 54, but achieved no lasting conquest beyond the establishment of client kings. Although British chieftains had earlier visited Rome to pledge their friendship, Britain still seemed extremely remote, located beyond Ocean, the great river thought to encircle the world. Claudius hoped to surpass Julius Caesar's achievements and link himself to a founder-figure of the Julian dynasty by conquering Britain permanently. In the early Principate, emperors did not fight in combat or even often take the field in person; their roles as commanders-in-chief were symbolic. The Britain campaign was commanded by Aulus Plautius; the future emperor Vespasian commanded a legion. Claudius took a more active role than usual, even traveling to Britain himself to enter the town of Camulodunum (Colchester) as a victor. Suetonius (*Claudius* 17) minimizes the campaign, and Tacitus, *Agricola* 13 emphasizes the role of Vespasian, but Cassius Dio depicts Claudius as a commander (60.21.4). Given Claudius' physical disability, Dio (abbreviated by the Byzantine author Xiphilinus) is probably attributing to Claudius the deeds of his subordinates, though it is likely Claudius received the surrender of the Britons at Camulodunum.

After celebrating his triumph over Britain at Rome in 44 CE (the first emperor to triumph in his own right since Augustus' triple triumph in 29 BCE), Claudius commemorated his invasion of Britain with the construction of a victory arch, depicted on coin issues from 46 to 50 even before it had been completed. Another arch was constructed at Gesoriacum (Boulogne), from where the troops had embarked for Britain. Claudius' son, born in 41, took the name Britannicus ("Conqueror of Britain"), and Claudius extended Rome's *pomerium*, in recognition that he had expanded the empire. Displaying the heroic stature which Claudius claimed, one of the reliefs from the Sebasteion at Aphrodisias depicts Claudius as a heroic figure subduing a personification of the province of Britannia.



Bust of the emperor Claudius I (r. 41–54 CE). Claudius had various physical disabilities and was a poor public speaker, but an effective and intelligent ruler who also wrote scholarly histories of the ancient Etruscans and Carthaginians. Located in the Seattle Art Museum, Seattle, Washington. (De Agostini/Getty Images)

Claudius' annexation of Lycia (part of Asia Minor) in 43 CE is less well known, but a series of recently discovered inscriptions show that he was celebrated there as bringing peace to a restless region. His governor Quintus Veranius oversaw an extensive road-building program that played a crucial part in the process of pacification and reorganization. This was celebrated in an impressive monument set up by the Lycians in Claudius' honor at Patara in 45/46 CE, overlooking the quayside of the ancient harbor, whose inscription gave details of the distances between at least 50 locations across Lycia.

Claudius also annexed Thrace and Noricum in 46 CE, and military operations were ongoing in Germany. Since conflict between Jews and

Greeks had arisen in Caligula's reign, Claudius imposed peace upon the Jews of Alexandria in a surviving document. The wider conflict of the Jews of Judaea with their Roman rulers continued to grow, resulting in the outbreak of the Jewish War (66–70) late in the reign of Nero. Claudius also suppressed a revolt in Mauretania. By the end of his reign, Claudius had been acclaimed *imperator* an unprecedented 27 times, showing how his image as successful military commander remained a key component in his grip on power.

Unfortunately, Claudius' conflict with the Senate was less fortunate for his reputation. He promoted his imperial freedmen as secretaries. These men's roles, in charge of imperial correspondence and finances, were very powerful and influential. Modern scholars regard Claudius as contributing to the creation of a rationalized imperial bureaucracy. However, the Senate resented the freedmen secretaries. Aristocratic sources (such as Suetonius' biography of Claudius; Tacitus' *Annals*) depict Claudius as under the thumb of his freedmen and of his wives, successively Valeria Messalina (put to death with her lover Gaius Silius for alleged conspiracy) and Agrippina the Younger, his own niece and mother of Nero. Modern historians have made extensive efforts to rehabilitate Claudius' reputation as a capable ruler.

Alison E. Cooley

See also Acclamation; Britain, Conquest of; Britain, Roman; Caligula; Camillus Scribonianus; Coins; Emperor as Commander; *Imperator*; Jewish War; *Pomerium*; Praetorians; Sebasteion of Aphrodisias; Triumph

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Claudius II Gothicus (Emperor) (268–270 CE)

A Roman emperor (268–270 CE), Marcus Aurelius Claudius, was a tribune in

268 CE when he participated in the plot to murder the emperor Gallienus. Subsequently proclaimed emperor himself, he embarked on a campaign against the Alamanni in north Italy. When the empire was threatened by a Gothic invasion, Claudius took to the field again, winning a significant victory at Naissus in 269 CE, and earning the title Gothicus. He died of the plague in September 270 CE and was commemorated with a golden statue on the Capitoline hill and a shield in the Senate House. Constantine the Great (306–337) claimed that his father Constantius I was descended from Claudius II Gothicus, but there is probably no basis for this claim.

Claudius is mentioned briefly in the epitomes of Eutropius and Aurelius Victor (mid-fourth century CE). The Life of Claudius in the *Historia Augusta* is longer but highly idealized and unreliable.

Caillan Davenport

See also Aurelian; Constantine I; Gallienus; Third-Century CE Crisis

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Clementia

Clementia, “mercy,” became an important imperial virtue, contrasting with the Republic. In the Republic, commanders were expected to spare the enemy who formally surrendered into the power of the Romans (*deditio in fidem*). To massacre or enslave those who had surrendered *in fidem* was considered reprehensible. However, mercy or clemency became a positive virtue in the context of the late Republican civil wars and proscriptions. Julius Caesar advocated clemency toward the Catilinarian conspirators in 63 BCE and emphasized his clemency toward the Pompeians in the civil war of 49–45 BCE, not taking reprisals on his opponents. More cynically, Cicero called Caesar’s clemency “a new way of conquering” (*nova ratio vincendi*, *Letters to Atticus* 9.7C). Caesar’s opponents saw his clemency as an assertion of power over them and rejected it. Spectacularly, Cato the

Younger committed suicide rather than receive Caesar's clemency. The so-called Liberators who assassinated Caesar also repudiated the clemency he had shown toward them.

The cruelty of the triumviral proscriptions (43–42 BCE) led Augustus to emphasize his clemency, as a transformation from Octavian who had treated pleas for mercy with cold contempt. Antony and Cleopatra chose to commit suicide rather than receive *clementia*; Cleopatra allegedly said “I will not be triumphed over” (in Greek, *ou thriambeusomai*). The bad reputation of the treason trials in the early empire meant that *clementia* became one of the stock imperial virtues, best known from Seneca the Younger's *De ira* and *De clementia*, advocating *clementia* as a monarchical virtue to the young emperor Nero (54–68 CE). However, in this very period the punishments meted out to lower class subjects became more severe.

Sara E. Phang

See also Caesar, Gaius Julius; Cato the Younger; Civil Wars (I) (49–45 BCE); Civil Wars (II) (44–31 BCE); Cleopatra; Criminal Procedure; *Deditio* (Surrender); Proscriptions; Suicide; Treason; War Crimes

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Cleopatra (69–30 BCE)

Cleopatra VII (r. 51–30 BCE) was the last reigning member of the Ptolemaic dynasty of Macedonian Greeks, who ruled Egypt from 305 to 30 BCE. She is famous for her connections to Julius Caesar and Mark Antony and her attempt to preserve the independence of Egypt from the Roman Empire. Thus she played an important role in the last stage of the civil war that brought Octavian to power as ruler of the Roman world.

Born in 69 BCE, Cleopatra was the daughter of Ptolemy XII Auletes (r.

80–58, 55–51 BCE) and an unknown Greek minor noblewoman. When Ptolemy XII died, Cleopatra married her younger brother, Ptolemy XIII (sibling marriage was a traditional Pharaonic and Ptolemaic custom), but his ministers soon overthrew her and briefly imprisoned her. She escaped, probably after suffering torture. When the defeated Pompey fled to Egypt, expecting the already deceased Ptolemy XII to protect him, the Ptolemaic general Achillas persuaded Ptolemy XIII to murder Pompey, because he was too dangerous to keep alive (Caesar, *Civil War* 3.104). When Caesar arrived in Egypt in pursuit of Pompey, he learned of Pompey's murder and the civil war between Ptolemy and Cleopatra.

Caesar ordered Ptolemy XIII and Cleopatra to submit to Roman arbitration according to the alliance with Ptolemy XII. However, Pothinus, another minister of Ptolemy XIII, refused and encouraged Achillas to attack Caesar. Caesar thereupon executed Pothinus and seized Ptolemy XIII. Cleopatra's younger sister Arsinoë then joined another general, Ganymede, and proclaimed herself queen of Egypt. Ganymede killed Achillas, and later Caesar killed Ganymede.

Cleopatra won Caesar over with her charm (according to legend, she was smuggled to him in a carpet or large sack). Ptolemy XIII died in the fighting ([Caesar], *Bell. Alex.* 31), and Arsinoë was captured (later, Arsinoë was executed at Cleopatra's request). Caesar recognized Cleopatra as queen of Egypt and made her marry her younger brother Ptolemy XIV. Caesar then departed Egypt. After his departure, Cleopatra gave birth to a boy whom she claimed was the son of Caesar, Caesarion (later Ptolemy XV). Modern scholars have speculated that Caesarion was the product of rape during her brief captivity, rather than Caesar's illegitimate son.

Despite the notorious Ptolemaic dynastic conflict, Cleopatra appears to have been a highly effective monarch of Egypt, ruling for the good of her subjects. She was a highly intelligent and well-educated woman who impressed those she met with her charm and wit, rather than with her beauty, the latter being emphasized by later, more remote sources. If Cleopatra had an affair with Caesar, as the sources concur, it was calculated to establish a favorable relationship with Rome. For his part, Caesar secured Egypt as a client monarchy providing wealth and grain for the city of Rome.

In 44, Cleopatra joined Caesar in Rome, a matter of chagrin for Cicero. Cleopatra hastily departed right after Caesar's assassination and never returned. In 42, Mark Antony ordered Cleopatra to appear in Tarsus to

apologize for assisting Brutus and Cassius before Philippi. However, Cleopatra charmed Antony with her wit (and also seduced him with a display of Egypt's wealth). Antony began an affair that lasted over a decade and fathered three children with Cleopatra. However, Antony agreed to marry Octavian's sister Octavia in the Treaty of Brundisium and never formalized his relationship with Cleopatra with marriage.

Thus, Antony appears to have attempted to play both sides—Roman commander and triumvir, and Hellenistic monarch. He gained by doing so; Cleopatra helped fund his unsuccessful invasion of Persia. In the ceremony termed the “Donations of Alexandria” in 34 BCE, Antony held a quasitriumph at Alexandria and he and Cleopatra appeared on lofty thrones, garbed as “Dionysus” and the “New Isis,” respectively. Antony proclaimed Cleopatra “Queen of Kings,” and her son Caesarion “King of Kings”; their mutual children Alexander Helios, Cleopatra Selene, and Ptolemy Philadelphus were granted the eastern empire east of the Euphrates, Cyrene, and the eastern empire west of the Euphrates respectively. The “Donations” hurt Antony's reputation at Rome. The prevailing view at Rome was that Antony's conduct was arrogant and un-Roman; many of these areas were provinces governed by Romans and not his to give away.

Octavian exploited Antony's un-Roman behavior (and his slighting of Octavia) to justify a civil war against Antony; in Octavianic propaganda, the war was depicted as a foreign war against the Egyptian queen, depicting Antony as having lost his Roman identity from infatuation with Cleopatra. War was declared in 32 BCE. In August 31 BCE, Cleopatra persuaded Antony to risk a naval battle, over the advice of his more experienced commanders, who urged him to wait or fight on land. During the battle, Cleopatra and the fleet with the treasure sailed off to Egypt, but most of Antony's fleet was destroyed or surrendered to Octavian.

Octavian's forces closed in on Egypt. Unable to resist for long, Antony committed suicide on September 1, 30 BCE, and Cleopatra surrendered to Octavian, hoping to remain a client monarch. Later realizing that she would be displayed in Caesar's triumph, she committed suicide. Plutarch says there are multiple versions of her death, but the most common is that an asp (a poisonous snake) was smuggled in on a plate of figs, the snake delivering a fatal bite. Many scholars have found this implausible and have suggested that Cleopatra took poison by the normal route or that Octavian had her

assassinated, though his attempts to revive her argue against the latter. Octavian allowed Antony and Cleopatra to be buried with traditional Egyptian and Ptolemaic pomp. He had an effigy of Cleopatra paraded in his triumph in 29 BCE.

Gaius Stern

See also Actium, Battle of; Brundisium, Treaty of; Caesar, Gaius Julius; Civil Wars (II) (44–31 BCE); Civil Warfare; Donations of Alexandria; Mark Antony; Octavian. *Greek Section:* Cleopatra VII; Egypt, Egyptians; Ptolemies

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Client.* See *Patronage

Client Monarchs

Client monarchs were rulers who had become friends and allies of the Roman people (in Latin *reges socii et amici populi Romani*). As Roman power expanded throughout the Mediterranean, the Romans came into contact with many small kingdoms. These kingdoms persisted into the early empire, as a crucial, functional piece of Roman governance. Client kings maintained kingdoms on the borders of the empire, or regions that were deemed too difficult for the Romans to rule. Under the Flavian (69–96 CE) and early second century CE emperors (98–138 CE), a policy of annexation ended this governing arrangement. Client peoples reemerged as significant in the later empire.

Client peoples might have other forms of government, such as elected magistrates (the Aedui in pre-Roman Gaul) or an oligarchy of nobles. Even in such cases, the Romans preferred to deal with the client peoples' elites as "friends and allies of the Roman people."

The memory of the sixth century BCE Roman kings framed the Roman

relationship to client kings. Due to the legend of the proud, haughty Tarquins, and the overthrow of the monarchy by Lucius Junius Brutus, the Romans prided themselves on not being subjugated to a king. Therefore, Romans disdained kings and their subjects. So powerful was this ideology that Roman emperors, 500 years later, deliberately avoided the term king, *rex*, because of its implications and used *princeps*, or first citizen instead.

Actual Roman relationships with kings were inevitably driven by Roman foreign policy. During the First Punic War, Rome found an ally in King Hiero II of Syracuse. During the Second Punic War, they used the Numidian chieftain Masinissa to weaken the Numidian kings who were allied to Carthage. Masinissa's kingdom grew, at the expense of a much weakened Carthage, eventually leading to the Third Punic War and the destruction of Carthage.

In the second-century BCE Mediterranean, Rome faced off against two powerful kingdoms, the Antigonids of Macedonia and the Seleucids of the greater Near East; both Hellenistic successor states to the empire of Alexander the Great. Against these enemies, Rome led a coalition of lesser states and kingdoms, including the client monarchies of Pergamum, Judaea, Bithynia, Cappadocia, Galatia, Pontus, and Ptolemaic Egypt. These kings provided the Romans with allied troops, logistical support, naval power, and tribute. In return, Rome helped them maintain their independence and awarded them with territory acquired at the expense of the Antigonids and the Seleucids.

The Romans had certain expectations for these kings. They had to follow Roman foreign policy and not make war without Roman permission. They provided regular gifts to the Roman people, and they were clients of powerful Roman aristocrats. They were required to provide military support to Roman magistrates. For example, when Cicero was governor of Cilicia in 51–50 BCE, he called in King Deiotarus of Galatia's forces to help him.

Roman expansion in the Mediterranean, following the collapse of the Antigonids and Seleucids, led to the creation of provinces under Roman rule. Many of these provinces expanded at the expense of the client kingdoms. The kingdom of Pergamum, following the death of Attalus III in 133 BCE, was deeded to the Romans in his will, creating the province of Asia. The great eastern command of Pompey from 66 to 61 BCE brought more client kings under direct Roman supervision.

From this period on, the client kings became pawns in the Roman civil

wars. Juba I of Numidia fought with Cato the Younger and Metellus Scipio against the forces of Caesar in North Africa. The famous King Herod of Judaea acquired his power from the Roman Senate in 40 BCE. To aid her lover Mark Antony, Cleopatra provided him with troops to fight Octavian. Throughout these civil wars, the client kings served as supporters of the most immediate power.

Following the victory of Augustus at Actium in 31 BCE, the Roman Empire was reorganized. Much territory in the empire was placed under the government of client kings. In the Near East, client kingdoms were numerous, with Judaea, Nabataea, Commagene, Galatia, and Armenia under the rule of client monarchs. Egypt passed under Roman rule following Actium and was governed by an equestrian prefect who answered directly to the emperor. These client kingdoms were integrated into a broader system of Roman rule. The governors of imperial provinces (garrisoned with legions) exercised oversight over the nearby client kingdoms.

Client monarchs in the imperial period were far more integrated into the imperial system. Succession was not automatic; the heirs of a deceased client king had to travel to Rome to be confirmed by the emperor. Client kings also engaged in euergetism, providing benefactions to cities throughout the empire. Herod of Judaea was particularly notorious for this, but he also served as the patron and defender of Jewish communities throughout the Roman Empire. Kings also made their allegiance to the Roman imperial family well known. Herod founded the city of Caesarea on the coast of Judaea, with a temple of Roma and of Augustus. Many client kings ruled over sparsely settled areas, often on the periphery of the Roman Empire, that would be difficult for the Romans to govern, such as Trachonitis or Batanea, mountainous regions full of bandits in southern Syria. Kings also trained their troops in Roman style; such troops might be incorporated into the Roman army. For example, the army of King Deiotarus of Galatia persisted long after his kingdom was annexed, becoming the Legio XXII Deiotariana.

By the Flavian period, many of these kings had been removed from power. Galatia and Judaea had been absorbed into the empire and turned into normal provinces. Commagene had also been annexed by the Romans because of the intrigues of its rulers in 72. In 106, during the rule of Trajan, Nabataea was annexed. By the Antonine period, kings were far less crucial

to the Roman imperial system; emperors preferred direct governance by Roman governors. Institutionally, this led to standardized Roman rule, ending royal privileges and creating a more coherent Roman imperial structure.

The late fourth and fifth centuries CE saw a reversion to alliances with client peoples and their leaders, such as the Visigoths, Burgundians, and Huns. Rather than being kept beyond its borders, these peoples were allowed to settle within the empire, eventually leading to the fragmentation of the western empire.

Nathan Schumer

See also Alliances; *Amicitia*; Civil Wars (I) (49–45 BCE); Civil Wars (II) (44–31 BCE); Cleopatra; Persian Wars, Arsacid

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Clodius Albinus (Usurper) (d. 197 CE)

Roman emperor (195–197 CE). Decimus Clodius Septimius Albinus, governor of Britain, was one of four senators who claimed the imperial power following the murder of Pertinax in 193 CE. One of his rivals, Septimius Severus, offered Albinus the junior post of Caesar, which he accepted. But after Severus defeated another claimant, Pescennius Niger, he had Albinus declared a public enemy. Albinus' forces in Gaul were initially successful in holding back Severus' troops, though he suffered losses at the hands of a local Gallic militia. However, Severus won the day at the battle of Lugdunum (Lyons) in February 197 CE. Albinus was killed and his supporters executed.

Cassius Dio's *Roman History* and Herodian's *History of Rome* (from 180 to 238) narrate the civil war. The *Historia Augusta's* Life of Clodius Albinus is highly unreliable.

Caillan Davenport

See also Civil War (Pertinax-Septimius Severus); Pescennius Niger; Septimius Severus

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Clodius Pulcher (d. 52 BCE)

A *popularis* or “people’s man” who sought betterment for the urban plebs of Rome, Publius Clodius Pulcher is best known for his unscrupulous and violent political methods, exploiting the office of tribune of the plebs in the chaotic conditions of the late Republic. Clodius was born in 92 BCE to a notable patrician family. Clodius was rumored to have had an incestuous relationship with one of his sisters, who was married to Lucius Licinius Lucullus. Clodius served with Lucullus in the Mithridatic Wars and sparked a mutiny among Lucullus’ soldiers.

In 61 BCE, Clodius caused a scandal during the *Bona Dea* or “Good Goddess” festival. Julius Caesar’s wife, Pompeia, hosted the festival, a religious rite exclusive to women. During the ceremony Clodius dressed as a woman to gain entrance to the premises and supposedly entertain an affair with Pompeia. He was caught by an attendant and quickly placed on trial. Cicero bore witness against him, while Caesar, who had divorced his wife over the incident, chose not to testify. Clodius was acquitted of the charge, largely due to support from the people, possible bribery and threats of mob violence.

In 59 BCE, with the aid of Caesar, Clodius transferred to plebeian status to become eligible for the office of tribune of the plebs. As tribune in 58, he instituted a number of popular reforms, most notably free grain distribution and reinstitution of *collegia*, “associations.” Clodius drove Cicero out of Rome by enacting a law punishing anyone who sought to execute Roman citizens without a trial. This law targeted Cicero, who, during the Catilinarian conspiracy, had ordered the summary execution of some of the conspirators.

Clodius attacked his former ally Pompey, challenging the arrangements Pompey had made while on campaign in the eastern Mediterranean.

Pompey was assisted against Clodius by Titus Annius Milo. Both Milo and Clodius incited large gangs of followers against each other. These gangs turned violent, wounding and killing many. Clodius then attained the aedileship for 56 BCE. He continued to viciously attack Milo.

In 52 BCE, Milo's and Clodius' gangs engaged in a riot during which Clodius was killed. This caused an uproar among the people. His body was taken to the rostrum and displayed, throwing the populace into a frenzy. His body was carried to the Senate House, where it was placed on a makeshift pyre and the entire building was burned down. Milo was later prosecuted for the murder.

Clodius is sometimes regarded as a pawn of larger figures such as Caesar; however, recent historiography has seen Clodius as a far more independent agent. He seems to have genuinely sought reforms favoring the people of Rome, in addition to his own political advancement, primarily through use and threat of violence.

Michael Hankins

See also Associations; Caesar, Gaius Julius; Cicero; Civil Conflict (Late Republic); Conspiracy of Catiline; Milo, Titus Annius; Tribune of the Plebs

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Codex Justinianus

The Codex Justinianus, or Code of Justinian, is a part of the massive project undertaken by the emperor Justinian (527–565) to comprehensively publish and regularize the body of Roman law. Carried out by a team of Justinian's legal advisers, the result was what has become known as the Corpus Juris Civilis or Civil Law which consists of Justinian's Code, the Digest, the Institutes, and the later Novels.

By the sixth century an enormous body of Roman law, dating back as far as the Roman Republic, complicated Roman jurisprudence. Despite earlier codifications such as the Theodosian Code of the fifth century, problems persisted. Nearly a century of additional legislation had accreted since the earlier codes had collected imperial enactments, or constitutions, from the reign of Hadrian through Theodosius II. The first edition of the Code of Justinian appeared in 529 CE and was revised in 534 CE. The Code harmonized and updated the earlier works and included more recent legislation.

However, Justinian's project went well beyond that of his predecessors. Tribonian, the *quaestor sacri palatii*, or senior law minister, also chaired a commission which compiled and edited the writings of the earlier important jurists of Roman law from the first through the fourth centuries into the Digest. These jurisconsults had legal standing and could be cited in court, but at over 1,500 books of opinions by various authors confusion often prevailed. Tribonian and his colleagues condensed this mass of material into a mere 50 books that Justinian promulgated in 533 CE. Henceforth, the redacted opinions of the jurists in the Digest were to have the force of imperial enactments in their own right, but no new independent legal commentaries were to be permitted. The emperor himself was to be the sole maker and interpreter of the laws. Concurrent with the Digest, Justinian also promulgated a new textbook, the Institutes, which was to be the cornerstone of the first year of legal education.

Justinian had planned to promulgate his Novels, or new enactments that post dated his Code, in an official collection. This plan ultimately did not come to fruition, but they have come down to us in unofficial compilations.

Although the Code, Digest, and Institutes were written in Latin, the traditional language of the Roman administration, the Novels were generally composed in Greek, the language of the eastern empire.

Despite the seemingly traditional nature of much of the material contained in the Code and the Digest, a degree of caution is warranted. The process by which earlier legal materials were brought into conformity with one another sometimes went beyond simple excerpting and epitomizing. On occasion, Justinian's men engaged in outright alteration, known as interpolation, although the extent of such interpolation is a matter of some debate.

In addition, the degree to which the codification supported the ideology of Justinian's regime should be taken into account. Even the pagan legislation that was included now received a Christian gloss through references to the divine providence in various constitutions as well as the prologue of the Digest. Likewise the person of the emperor received special reference as the source of all legislation. First year law students were now to be known as *Justiniani novi*, "new Justinians," and in a novel of 537 the emperor could even go so far as to refer to himself as *nomos empsychos*, "incarnate law."

The influence of the Corpus Iuris Civilis on modern European civil law has been immense, especially in continental Europe.

Joseph R. Frechette

See also Codex Theodosianus

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Codex Theodosianus

The Codex Theodosianus or the Theodosian Code is a collection of over 2500 imperial constitutions from the reign of Constantine I to Theodosius II (313–437). The code is written in Latin and is arranged under 16 titles according

to topic, and the constitutions are in chronological order. This is not a complete record of all the constitutions from the empire in this time period, since the commissioners were unable to find all these constitutions. Justinian's later collection, the Digest, contains many constitutions that were not in the Theodosian Code.

The Code served as a major legal codification project, supplementing earlier collections from the time of Diocletian, the *Codex Gregorianus* and the *Codex Hermogenianus*. The three were intended to be a comprehensive guide to Roman law. This codification served an important function, since Roman law had grown extensively during the empire. Since the emperor's decisions had the force of law, there were two main ways in which laws were created, first by rescripts, imperial responses to specific requests, which sometimes served as legal precedent, but were often merely restricted to the case in question. The second source of law was imperial laws or constitutions, positive prescriptive laws issued by the emperor. A major purpose of the Theodosian Code was to resolve some of the inconsistencies between these different forms of law, though ultimately they only ended up collecting imperial constitutions. The Theodosian Code aspired to be comprehensive in its treatment of Roman law, but this was only accomplished by the fifth century legal code of the emperor Justinian, the Digest.

The Theodosian Code was begun in 429 at the behest of Emperor Theodosius II. An editorial panel of nine collected and abridged laws extensively, excluding irrelevant material. An early version was finished in 435, but it underwent several years of editing and redaction under another editorial panel of 16. The completed Theodosian Code was published in 438. Theodosius II ratified the Theodosian Code in February 438; it was carried to Rome soon after and ratified by the Roman Senate as the law of the empire. The ratification process emphasized the essential unity of the divided Roman Empire.

The Theodosian Code is an intentionally Christian work, collecting only the constitutions of Christian emperors, since it begins with Constantine and omits the constitutions of the pagan emperor Julian. Book 16, in particular, deals with transformed religious nature of the Roman Empire, declaring that the religion of the empire was Orthodox Christianity and banning heresy. It also confirmed the legal status of Jews and Judaism as a separate, noncitizen group living under Roman rule. The Theodosian Cod

had a long afterlife among the barbarian successor states to the Roman Empire. A crucial textual witness for the Code comes from fifth and sixth century barbarian and Roman jurists, who collected and abridged the law code for use in the new kingdoms.

Nathan Schumer

See also Codex Justinianus; Julian; Theodosius II

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Cohorts (Auxiliary). *See* ***Auxilia***

Cohorts (Legionary)

Introduced early in the second century BCE, the cohort became the main tactical unit of the Roman legion from the late second century BCE. The transition from maniples to cohorts is attributed to Gaius Marius (ca. 107 BCE). Legionary cohorts are distinct from praetorian cohorts and auxiliary cohorts, which were different in size and tactical function; the use of *cohors* (pl. *cohortes*) for all these units is an example of the Roman tendency to adapt the same term to different institutions. The term “cohort” may also be used without reference to a particular division of the army, referring to a group of several hundred soldiers.

Legionary cohorts were not introduced by Marius. They were used on an ad hoc basis, for example, in the Roman wars in Spain, in the early and middle second century BCE, where cohorts gave the Romans a greater advantage than maniples. Cohorts had advantages over maniples; being larger, cohorts were better able to resist shock and more able to operate independently. The cohort reform abandoned the division of the manipular legion into age classes, the youngest *hastati*, the mature *principes*, and the older *triarii*, with different equipment and tactical roles. In the cohortal

legion, all infantry soldiers were equipped and fought in the same way.



Detail from the Column of Trajan. From the late second century BCE onward, Roman legions were organized into subunits termed cohorts. In the Empire, units of the Praetorian Guard and auxiliary infantry were also termed cohorts. Located in the Forum of Trajan, Rome, Italy. (fotokris/iStockphoto.com)

One legion had 10 cohorts; each cohort was made up of six centuries of 80 men each, giving a total of 480 men per cohort. At some time in the second half of the first century CE, the first cohort was expanded to 800 men, and organized into five centuries, rather than six. The first cohort was the most prestigious of the cohorts, as were its centurions.

Adam Anders

See also Legion, Organization of; Maniples; Marius

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Coins

The Roman monetary system initially relied on bronze bullion (*aes rude*) but in the late fourth century BCE Rome began to cast heavy bronze coins (*aes grave*) and bars (*aes signatum*). By around 300 BCE the Romans had adopted Greek-style silver coinage and they soon came to use lighter and more convenient fiduciary bronze coins.



"Ides of March" silver denarius. The obverse (heads) depicts a profile of Marcus Junius Brutus, one of Julius Caesar's assassins; the reverse (tails) depicts two daggers, a cap of liberty, and the legend EID MAR, referring to Caesar's assassination on March 15, 44 BCE. Located in the British Museum, London, United Kingdom. (The Trustees of the British Museum/Art Resource, NY)

The financial strains of the Second Punic War led to the creation around 211 BCE of the *denarius* system which (with some modifications) would remain in operation from the mid-Republic to the third century CE. The system consisted of the silver *denarius*, the gold *aureus* (worth 25 *denarii*), and the bronze *as* (initially worth a 10th of a *denarius*, but a 16th after ca. 141 BCE), as well as a variety of fractions such as the silver *sestertius* (a

quarter of a *denarius*) and the bronze *triens* (a third of an *as*).

Under the Republic the *denarius* dominated production but the *aureus* became increasingly common from the latter half of the first century BCE. Production was closely related to the military payroll, likely to have been the largest item in the state budget. Even a single *denarius*, worth more than a day's wages until well into the empire, was a substantial sum of money for the average soldier. Day-to-day transactions probably involved bronze coins or credit. The *denarius*, *as*, and even the rarely minted *sestertius* might serve as a unit of account for keeping financial records.

The zone of circulation of the *denarius* system gradually spread throughout the growing empire but many communities continued to mint their own coins and the Romans themselves perpetuated some local issues in certain cases. Debasement in the first and second centuries CE eventually led to the failure of the *denarius* system in the third century. The emperors Diocletian (284–305) and Constantine (306–337) managed to establish a new monetary system in the fourth century.

In addition to its economic functions, Roman coinage played an important role in communicating political messages, since millions of coins were produced and they circulated widely in the Mediterranean basin and beyond. Under the Republic, the *tresviri monetales* or moneyers produced the bulk of the coinage. Relatively minor magistrates, they tended to advertise the accomplishments of their ancestors on the coins. During the civil wars that plagued the Republic in the first century BCE, Roman coinage came to play a prominent role in propaganda. The most famous example is the “Ides of March” *denarius* that Marcus Junius Brutus produced with Lucius Plaetorius Cestianus in 43–42 BCE. The obverse of these coins features a bust of Brutus and the names of the issuing authorities while the reverse has a dagger on either side of a *pileus* (a hat symbolizing freedom) above the legend *EID MAR* (the Ides of March). The coins, probably struck to pay Brutus' army, reminded their recipients of Brutus' leadership in the assassination of Caesar on March 15, 44 BCE, liberating Rome from Caesar's dictatorship.

Under the empire Roman coinage promoted the interests and accomplishments of the emperors. Octavian, the future emperor Augustus, issued coins in 28 BCE with a crocodile and the legend *AEGVPTO CAPTA* to advertise his conquest of Egypt. Vespasian used coinage to remind his subjects of his conquest of Judaea and establish the dynastic claims of his

sons Titus and Domitian. To reward or encourage the loyalty of their troops, emperors would sometimes distribute donatives (*donativa*), large cash gifts, on important occasions.

David Hollander

See also Army in Politics; Caesar, Assassination of; Civil Warfare; Donatives; Pay and Finances, Military (Republic); Pay and Finances, Military (Empire)

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Colline Gate, Battle of the (82 BCE)

The battle of the Colline Gate was an important battle in the Marian-Sullan Conflict. Sulla was anxious to defeat Mithridates VI of Pontus, against whom he had been campaigning since 88 BCE, so that he could return and avenge himself on the regime of Cinna and Carbo which had controlled Rome in his absence. He landed at Brundisium in 83 and marched north, joined by a number of conservative aristocrats.

In the spring of 82, while some of these aristocratic supporters campaigned in northern Italy, Sulla himself operated in central Italy. Many Italians were placated by his announcement that he would not interfere with their recent enfranchisement, but some, particularly the Samnites, remained hostile.

While Sulla was besieging the younger Marius in Praeneste, a large force of Samnites and Lucanians attacked the city of Rome. Sending cavalry ahead to harass them, Sulla made a forced march and caught up with this group at the Colline Gate, where they were besieging the city, around noon

on November 1.

Rather than wait, Sulla decided to give battle that afternoon. He commanded the center and left, while Crassus led the right. In the engagement Sulla's troops were pushed back, saved from serious losses by the onset of darkness. Crassus meanwhile not only held the right but broke the enemy's left, driving them in a rout as far as Antemnae, just north of Rome.

The turning of the enemy's flank gave Sulla the victory—and control of the city of Rome. Sulla inflicted a terrible revenge on the Samnites with a mass execution of 8,000 Samnite prisoners: their cries could be heard from outside a meeting of the Senate he had convened. "Some of the criminals are receiving correction on my orders," he ominously warned.

Bruce Marshall

See also Marian-Sullan Conflict; Samnium, Samnites; Social War (91–87 BCE); Sulla, Lucius Cornelius; War Crimes

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Column of Marcus Aurelius

The Column of Marcus Aurelius, begun during the reign of Marcus' son Commodus (180–192 CE) and finished in 193, is a victory column located in Rome which commemorates the Marcomannic Wars (166–180). Standing 40 meters (140 Roman feet, including the lost base), the column is carved with scenes from the Marcomannic Wars. Notable scenes include an early Germanic assembly and two battle miracles, as well as exceptionally brutal combat scenes between Roman and German forces. There is also an interior stairway, leading to a statue of St. Peter (presumably replacing a lost statue of Marcus Aurelius).

The narrative relief carvings are less intricate than those upon the column of Trajan. However, they are larger and in higher relief with

contrasting shadows increasing visibility. One of the most notable scenes depicts the Rain Miracle, where a bearded god stretches his arms over the drenched soldiers. In contrast with the column of Trajan, this monument shows infantry and cavalry fighting together as combined forces, possibly reflecting a shift in Roman tactics. Unfortunately, the column of Marcus has been damaged by acid rain, causing the reliefs to deteriorate.

The column of Marcus Aurelius is often confused with the lost Column of Antoninus Pius, which was located nearby. Indeed, Marcus adopted the name of his predecessor, and the Column of Marcus was also known as the Column of Antoninus. The monument is located in Rome's Piazza Colonna, along the Via del Corso (Via Lata), halfway between the Palatine and the mausoleum of Augustus. Previously, this area had been a cemetery (like the Via Appia), and Marcus was cremated here.

The column was restored by Domenico Fontana during the reign of Pope Sixtus V (1585–1590). In 1896, scholars concluded that the column can be read chronologically, spiraling from top to bottom. However, subsequent analysts have suggested that the scenes might be arranged thematically, and perhaps vertically (not spiraling).

Adam Rinkleff

See also Column of Trajan; Marcomannic Wars; Marcus Aurelius; Victory

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Column of Trajan

Located at Rome in the Forum of Trajan, Trajan's Column was dedicated in 113 CE and finished in the reign of Hadrian (117–138). The most remarkable feature of Trajan's Column is the elaborate spiral narrative relief carving wound around the column, depicting the Dacian Wars (101–106 CE). The

Column was probably designed and built by Apollodorus of Damascus, Trajan's chief architect.

The central column is about 100 Roman feet (29.6 meters) tall and 12 feet in diameter, standing atop a podium carved with images of Dacian arms and armor. Trajan's Column is hollow inside, the base containing a chamber housing Trajan's ashes after his death, and the column containing a spiral staircase of 185 steps leading to the top. The column was originally topped with a statue of Trajan.

The central column is covered with a spiral narrative relief of Trajan's Dacian Wars, 200 meters long, depicting 155 separate scenes. The scenes and figures are carved in highly detailed low relief and were originally painted in bright colors, as with most ancient statuary and relief sculpture. Small bronze ornaments, such as weapons held by soldiers, were originally attached that have since disappeared. The relief is pierced by 40 slit windows, giving light to the interior staircase.

addressing the army, the emperor presiding over sacrifices, the emperor receiving delegates from the Dacians, the emperor meeting with his advisers, the emperor refusing or granting *clementia* to captives, and the suicide of enemy leaders. These scenes were highly ideological, the sacrifice scenes stressing for instance the emperor's role as mediator with the gods on behalf of Roman victory. The goddess Victoria (Victory) appears in some scenes. Scenes of *adlocutio*, the emperor addressing his troops, stressed the emperor's close relationship with the army.

Other scenes show the Roman army on the march; building camps, roads, and bridges; and fighting battles. These scenes have been used by Roman army scholars as a rich visual source, but they also were symbolic. Scenes of the Roman army at work may emphasize Roman *disciplina militaris* (military discipline), which extolled the virtue of physical labor in displaying and maintaining obedience. Building scenes also depict the Roman mastery of their physical environment, in contrast with the more primitive Dacians.

Though important battles (the Second Battle of Tapae and the fall of Sarmizegetusa) are depicted, Trajan's Column tends to downplay battle, in contrast with the many violent combat scenes on the Column of Marcus Aurelius. On Trajan's Column, Roman auxiliaries play a fiercer role in battle scenes. One auxiliary employs his teeth to hold the severed head of a Dacian by the hair while getting ready to slay another Dacian. The suicide of King Decebalus is depicted, as is the Roman soldier who severed his head as a trophy for the emperor. Other Dacian nobles are also depicted committing suicide after the fall of Sarmizegetusa, while Dacian noblewomen are led away into exile, and Dacian captives of lower status are shown collected for transport and sale as slaves. Non-Roman women appear to symbolize "civilians," whether subjects of the empire (greeted by Trajan in an *adventus* or imperial welcome scene) or representative of the enemy.

The narrative relief is rather difficult to view due to its elevation above the ground. Ancient spectators might have viewed it from the upper stories of the two nearby libraries that were part of the Forum of Trajan. Modern scholars have studied it from photographs and from casts taken of the reliefs. The standard edition is C. Cichorius, *Die Reliefs der Trajanssäule* (1896–1900), numbering the scenes (1–155).



Detail from the Column of Trajan, ca. 106–113 CE. In this scene from the Dacian Wars (101–102, 105–106 CE), Roman and barbarian warriors are clearly distinguished. Located in the Forum of Trajan, Rome, Italy. (Vittoriano Rastelli/Corbis)

Sara E. Phang

See also *Adlocutio*; *Ara Pacis*; Arch of Titus; Column of Marcus Aurelius; Dacian Wars; Decebalus; Emperor as Commander; Forum of Trajan; Gender and War; Military Discipline; Noncombatants; Prisoners of War and Slavery; Trajan; Triumph; Victoria; Victory

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Comes

Usually translated “count,” *comes* (pl. *comites*) was a rank of the Later Roman government and military. Its origin is obscure. Earlier Roman governors and emperors were accompanied by *comites*, “companions” or members of their private councils. After the administrative reforms of Diocletian and Constantine, *comes* might also be a title of civilian administrative officials, such as the *comes sacrum largitionum* or Count of the Sacred Largesses, a major fiscal official. *Comites* as military officers, clearly attested later in the fourth century, were lower-ranking than *magistri militum*. Provinces that did not have a *magister militum* assigned to them, but which still required a military presence, were assigned a *comes*. As did the *magistri militum*, *comites* commanded field forces independent of the frontier forces commanded by *duces* (singular *dux*, leader). Like the *magister militum*, the *comes* was responsible for deploying his military units when the frontier forces failed and under these circumstances probably took control of the forces of the *dux* as well as his own forces. *Comites* were notably deployed in Britain, North Africa and Egypt.

Michael D. Blodgett

See also Dux; Magister Militum; Magister Utriusque Militiae

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Comitatenses

The *comitatenses* were the fast-moving field division of the later Roman army. In the aftermath of the various foreign incursions and civil wars of the third century and tetrarchic period, the Roman army institutionalized a number of changes by the early fourth century. Rather than an army of 33 legions, of roughly 5,000 men each, generally posted in the frontier areas, and supported by a similar total of soldiers in separate units of auxiliaries, a new system evolved in the late third and early fourth centuries. Leaving aside barbarian federates and aristocrats’ armed retainers, the Roman army now consisted rather broadly of two classes of troops organized into a greater number of units which typically numbered no more than 1,000 soldiers each. The *limitanei* or *ripenses* were those posted to the frontier areas, while the *comitatenses* were the troops of the more or less permanent central field armies, each of which was commanded by *magister militum*. These field armies might be regionally focused or praesental armies attached directly to the imperial court, the *comitatus*. The conditions of service were more favorable for the *comitatenses* and especially for the troops associated with the emperor(s).

Whether the development of the praesental armies should be seen primarily as a gradual process beginning in the third century and accelerated by Diocletian or as an initiative of Constantine has been debated for some time. Although there are clear antecedents the current consensus favors Constantine’s actions as the decisive factor in making the distinction between *limitanei* and *comitatenses* permanent.

Organizationally, the legions and other regiments of the *comitatenses* were more numerous, but dramatically smaller than the old legions of the Principate. In addition to the legions, *auxilia palatina* served as the light and medium infantry of the central armies. Despite often having ethnic names, there is no sure indication that the *auxilia* were any less Roman in composition than the legions. Cavalry in the *comitatenses* was organized

into units called *vexillationes* that might be units of mounted archers, heavily armored lancers, or light cavalry. Units might be classified as either *palatini*, *comitatenses*, or *pseudocomitatenses*, indicating a degree of status, with the *palatini* being the most prestigious, and the *pseudocomitatenses*, units promoted from the *limitanei*, being the lowest.

After Constantine's death in 337 CE his unified praesental army was divided among his sons with further subdivisions under their *magistri militum* and smaller forces under *comites rei militaris*. This practice continued to develop over the fourth century, mirroring the process by which the eastern and western halves of the empire came to be governed by separate emperors. By the early fifth century, the *Notitia* lists five armies of *comitatenses* in the eastern empire under the command of *magistri*. These were two praesental armies as well the armies of the Roman Near East, Thrace, and Illyricum. In addition, *comites* commanded forces in Egypt and Isauria. In the western empire, the *Notitia* details a different, more vertical structure. All of the western *comitatenses*, which included the western praesental army, a regional army in Gaul, and six smaller forces under *comites*, were subordinate to the praesental *magister peditum*.

Despite modern notions of corruption and decline, the *comitatenses* in western Europe are still attested in Gaul and Italy through the late fifth century even after the collapse of the central government. In the eastern empire, despite some adjustments and reorganizations, the field armies of the *comitatenses* continued to function until the Arab conquests of the seventh century when they were converted into the territorially based themes of the medieval Byzantine army.

Joseph R. Frechette

See also *Alae*; *Auxilia*; Constantine I; Diocletian; *Dux*; Frontiers; Legion, Organization of; *Limitanei*; *Notitia Dignitatum*

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Comitia Centuriata

The *comitia centuriata* or “centuriate assembly” was one of the Roman Republic’s main voting assemblies. Tradition held that King Servius Tullius founded it in the mid-500s BCE, though its operation in early centuries is now hard to discern. Notionally the *comitia centuriata* could pass laws or serve as an appellate court, but really its main function was declaring war and electing the highest magistrates (consuls, praetors, censors). Technically a military assembly, it met in the *campus Martius* (“Field of Mars”), just outside Rome’s sacred boundary (*pomerium*). Consuls and praetors were its usual conveners.

The *comitia centuriata*’s voting procedure was exceedingly elaborate and complicated. During the census, the censors ranked male Roman citizens according to the amount of property they owned. This census evaluation of their wealth traditionally determined where citizens served in the army, and it certainly fixed each voter’s place in the *comitia centuriata*, which grouped citizens from richest to poorest into 193 voting units called *centuriae*. Polling within each *centuria* decided that unit’s vote. The richest *centuriae* voted first, and when a majority of 97 centuries had voted one way, voting ceased. Only the richest 18 *centuriae*, called *equites* or “cavalry,” were true centuries, as in groups of 100 men each. The lower *centuriae* were probably progressively larger, down to the enormous 193rd *centuria* into which most poor, landless Romans were dumped. This group, the *capite censi* or *proletarii*, would only ever vote in this assembly to break a tie, and the *comitia centuriata*’s procedure had the basic effect of disenfranchising the poor.

The other important voting assembly was the *comitia tributa*, or “tribal” assembly, organized from and named for the Roman citizen tribes (*tribus*) that were geographic rather than property based. It was more populist and overlapped to some degree with the *concilium plebis*, the “plebeian” assembly of plebeian citizens that the tribunes of the plebs presided over.

See also Capite Censi; Censors and Census; Republic, Political Structure

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Commilito

Commilito (plural *commilitones*) is a form of address used by some Roman Republican commanders and emperors to their soldiers, with the meaning “fellow-soldier.” It probably developed as late Republican commanders’ attempt to bridge the social distance between themselves and common soldiers. The traditional recruitment structure of the Roman army derived its fighting men from small landowners (*assidui*), farmers with modest landed property; though commanders came from the upper strata of society, this model of military recruitment was relatively egalitarian. By the second century BCE, the economic status of some of the nobles had risen drastically; they became very wealthy, whether from conquest or from agricultural exploitation. The social and economic status of many of the soldiers fell, whether directly as a result of Rome’s overseas wars (they were unable to work their farms) or indirectly. By ca. 100 BCE, many common soldiers were now recruited from the landless poor.

The larger context of such a form of address was such commanders’ sharing the way of life of their soldiers: participating in combat training with them and enduring their hardships on field maneuvers and on campaign, including sharing their basic rations. Such conduct increased cohesion and loyalty in an army that now had a steep class divide. Many, though not all, nobles of the late Republic were quite wealthy and were accustomed to a much more lavish style of life than their soldiers. Gaius Marius, a “new man” (the first in his family to reach the consulship) from the town of Arpinum in central Italy, emphasized his common identity with his soldiers and shared their training and hardships. In Sallust’s *Jugurthine War* Marius gives a long speech that, though the historian’s invention,

represents his character, criticizing the arrogance, luxury, and military inexperience of the Roman nobility (Sallust, *Jugurthine War* 85).

However, possibly by the end of the late Republic and certainly during the Principate, *commilito* acquired a significance counter to its original meaning: the commander who used *commilito* not only leveled himself with but indulged his soldiers. For this reason, Suetonius' *Twelve Caesars* relates that Augustus is said to have refused to use the term *commilito* and enforced military discipline strictly (Suetonius, *Augustus* 25.1). Previous commanders had addressed this gulf between commander and common soldier through military discipline; for instance, Scipio Aemilianus at Numantia in Spain (133 BCE) prohibited officers from carrying luxury tableware (Frontinus, *Stratagems* 4.1.1).

In his *Histories* of the civil war of 69 CE, Tacitus depicts Piso, the emperor Galba's choice as heir, as addressing the praetorians as *commilitones* in an attempt to mollify their displeasure with Galba (Tacitus, *Histories* 1.29). Galba himself, who had initially refused the praetorians a donative, was confronted by the praetorians and demanded of the menacing soldiers, "Fellow-soldier, who gave the order?" (Tacitus, *Histories* 1.35). When the praetorians broke into a senatorial dinner party, Otho attempted to soothe them, addressing them as *commilitones* (Tacitus, *Histories* 1.83). Cassius Dio depicts Caracalla (211–217) as using *commilito* (in Greek translation) toward the soldiers, especially the praetorians, saying after his assassination of his brother Geta, "Rejoice, fellow soldiers, for now I am in a position to do you favors" (Dio 78.3.1). Dio believed that Caracalla favored the army over the Senate and other high-status civilians. When an emperor used *commilitones* toward his soldiers, reinforcing his bond with them, it also might suggest the existence of conflict between the emperor and the Senate or urban elite.

Sara E. Phang

See also Army in Politics; Emperor as Patron; Military Discipline; *Princeps*, Principate; Senate, Senators

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Commodus (Emperor) (180–192 CE)

Born in 161, Commodus (180–192) was the son of Marcus Aurelius, promoted by Marcus to the rank of Caesar before Marcus' death and thus marked as presumed successor, breaking with the pattern of adoptive succession that the emperors had followed since Nerva (96–98 CE). Commodus succeeded to his father without incident. He had accompanied Marcus to the Danube frontier to wage the Marcomannic Wars, but on his accession Commodus withdrew from the frontier and returned to Rome.

Commodus' conduct as emperor displeased the Senate and urban elite. Commodus notoriously fought in the arena as a gladiator, identifying himself with the Greek hero and demigod Hercules. He renamed the months of the Roman year after his own imperial titles. In the pattern of previous "bad emperors" such as Nero, Commodus promoted low-status persons to responsible positions. A palace conspiracy finally formed against Commodus, who was assassinated on December 31, 192.

Commodus' death without presumed dynastic heirs resulted in a short period of coups and civil wars, including the elevation of Pertinax (emperor 193), the assassination of Pertinax, the "auction of the empire" between Sulpicianus and Didius Julianus, and the rise to power of Septimius Severus (193–211). The main sources for Commodus' reign are Cassius Dio, Herodian, and the *Historia Augusta*. An eyewitness to events of the reign, Dio is the most valuable source.

Sara E. Phang

See also Civil War (Pertinax-Septimius Severus); Cassius Dio; Marcus Aurelius; Pertinax; Septimius Severus; Succession (Imperial)

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Concordia

A minor goddess in ancient Roman religion, *Concordia* represents harmony, agreement, and unity, particularly in marriage and in political affairs. In the late Roman Republic, Cicero supported the concept of the *concordia ordinum* or harmony of the orders, hoping to inspire cooperation and unity between the Senate and the *equites* in light of competing political aims. Cicero worked to extend the concept further as a *consensus omnium bonorum* of all Roman citizens in hopes of preserving the Republic. This was not to be. Imperial coins, particularly those depicting imperial wives, often featured the goddess with the legend *Concordia*. In the imperial period, *concordia* was frequently invoked to emphasize the loyalty of Roman soldiers to the regime.

Cheryl L. Golden

See also Cicero; Civil Warfare; First Triumvirate; Usurpation

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Conspiracy of Catiline (63 BCE), Causes

From an old but eclipsed patrician family, Catiline (108–62 BCE) was motivated in part by frustrated ambition. He had fought for the Sullans in the Marian-Sullan civil war, and was responsible for personally killing Marius Gratidianus, the nephew and adopted son of the famous Gaius Marius. Catiline held the praetorship in 68 and was governor of Africa in

67–66. He ran for consul without success in 65. That year he was prosecuted for extortion during his tenure as governor of Africa; though he was acquitted, the prosecution probably harmed his reputation, for he ran for consul again in 64 and lost. Cicero and Gaius Antonius Hybrida (an uncle of the famous Mark Antony) were elected for 63. Catiline ran again for consul in 63 and failed. In frustration Catiline launched the actual conspiracy against the incoming consuls and the Senate late in 63.

Catiline's own self-aggrandizement was a major cause of the Conspiracy.

Repeatedly losing in his quest for the consulship, Catiline was deeply in debt (political campaigning had become very expensive for Roman aristocrats). He and his followers hoped to enrich themselves from seizing the Roman government, possibly planning to repeat Sullan-type proscriptions. He also obviously sought personal vengeance against his political rivals. Catiline's aristocratic followers, such as Publius Cornelius Lentulus Sura (consul 71 BCE) and the woman Sempronia, are depicted as having similar motives.

However, Catiline also sought support via policies associated with the *populares*, such as cancellation of debts and land redistribution. He thus appealed to the indebted wealthy, to the poor urban population at Rome, and to poor rural citizens, including Sulla's veterans, who had received land redistributions from Sulla but, being more used to fighting than to farming, had mismanaged their farms and fallen into debt. It is not clear how much Catiline and his aristocratic followers were motivated by genuine sympathy for the impoverished masses and the desire for social justice. They may have exploited these sentiments to gain supporters.

In the surviving sources, Catiline is presented mainly from Cicero's perspective, the source of Sallust's *Bellum Catilinae*. Cicero emphasizes Catiline's villainy, stressing his role as a Sullan supporter in the vicious civil war and proscriptions of the 80s and also emphasizing his subsequent private crimes (including adultery, for which he was prosecuted). Catiline's advocacy of debt relief and property redistribution also made him more evil in Cicero's eyes, as Cicero was a major supporter of the wealthy elite at Rome, the so-called *optimates* or oligarchs. Cicero desired to make Catiline and his followers appear more formidable opponents, genuine threats to the stability of the *res publica*, justifying Cicero's summary actions as consul in December 63. Sallust's depiction of Catiline is more complex, setting him

against a background of moral decline; Catiline takes on a “paradoxical” character, exhibiting military virtues (courage, boldness, endurance) in attacking the state rather than defending it; Sallust gives archaic overtones to his death in battle, resembling heroes of the ancient Republic.

Michael Hankins and Sara E. Phang

See also Catiline; Cicero; Civil Conflict (Late Republic); Clodius Pulcher; Sallust; *Senatus Consultum Ultimum*; States of Emergency; Sulla, Lucius Cornelius

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Conspiracy of Catiline (63 BCE), Course

In the Catilinarian Conspiracy of 63 BCE, Lucius Sergius Catilina, commonly known as Catiline, led a failed attempt to overthrow the Senate and take over the government of the late Roman Republic. In Oct.–Dec. of 63, the conspiracy was exposed and foiled by Cicero, one of that year’s consuls, and the Senate, which passed the *senatus consultum ultimum*, authorizing whatever degree of force was necessary to avert the crisis. Cicero arrested the conspirators, who were summarily tried and sentenced to death by the Senate. Catiline escaped to Etruria, joining his accomplice Manlius and his army. Catiline and his army were defeated in battle near Pistoria (Pistoia) early in 62. The sources for the Catilinarian Conspiracy are Cicero’s four *Catilinarian Orations* and Sallust’s *Bellum Catilinae* or *War with Catiline*, written a generation later. The precise motivations of the conspirators are obscured by partisanship. The consequences later included Cicero’s own exile at the instigation of Publius Clodius Pulcher, a tribune of the plebs, who also exploited Catiline’s supporters.

The Catilinarian Conspiracy was first exposed in October 63 when a number of anonymous letters, warning them of an impending assassination attempt on the Senate, were delivered to prominent members of the senate, among them Crassus. Cicero had the letters read aloud in the Senate. In response, on October 21 the Senate passed the *senatus consultum ultimum* or “last decree,” a bill authorizing a “state of emergency” in which the consuls were empowered to “see to it that the state shall come to no harm.” The SCU enabled the consuls to employ whatever degree of force might be necessary to avert or resolve a crisis.

On November 7, Cicero learned of a plot to assassinate himself, revealed by Fulvia (not the same Fulvia who was wife of Clodius Pulcher and Mark Antony), the mistress of one of the conspirators, Quintus Curius. Cicero summoned a meeting of the Senate and denounced Catiline in a speech published later as the First Catilinarian Oration. In consequence, Catiline fled the city of Rome and joined the army of his accomplice Manlius in Etruria.

To round up the other conspirators, Cicero suborned the Allobroges, a Germanic people who were involved in the conspiracy, and who succeeded in causing the other conspirators to incriminate themselves. The conspirators (among them Publius Cornelius Lentulus Sura, then praetor) were arrested and imprisoned on December 3. A debate was held in the Senate over how to punish the conspirators; it is dramatized by Sallust in the *Bellum Catilinae*. Julius Caesar advocated mercy toward the Catilinarians, but Cato the Younger, followed by most of the senators, advocated putting them to death. The Senate voted for the execution of the conspirators, who were strangled to death in the Tullianum, the ancient springhouse beneath the Senate House that was used as a prison.

Catiline and Manlius were now in open revolt. Gaius Antonius Hybrida and Marcus Petreius marched against them with two armies, pinning the Catilinarians near Pistoria in Etruria, where they gave battle. Catiline and his followers fought bravely but were defeated; Catiline himself was killed in the battle.

How far back the Catilinarian Conspiracy went is obscure. Cicero tendentiously presents Catiline as his mortal enemy for years preceding the events of Oct.–Dec. 63, alleging Catiline’s “First Conspiracy” in 65. The “First Conspiracy” repeats elements of the actual conspiracy of 63 (such as planning to murder the consuls) and has been questioned by scholars. The

degree of support for Catiline by influential political leaders of the day, especially Crassus and Julius Caesar, has also been extensively debated but not resolved.

Michael Hankins and Sara E. Phang

See also Catiline; Cicero; Civil Conflict (Late Republic); Clodius Pulcher; Sallust; *Senatus Consultum Ultimum*; States of Emergency; Sulla, Lucius Cornelius

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Conspiracy of Catiline (63 BCE), Consequences

Cicero was glorified for his part in suppressing the Catilinarian Conspiracy. The Senate voted Cicero the title *parens patriae*, “Father of His Country,” setting a precedent for Augustus’ adoption of the title *pater patriae* in 2 BCE. Cicero even composed epic poetry praising his own actions as consul in 63 (quoted in Cicero, *De div.* 1.11–1.20), as well as a work *De consulatu suo* (“On His Consulship”) that was also self-glorifying.

However, Cicero’s enemies also did not forget the Catilinarian Conspiracy. Clodius Pulcher, a tribune of the plebs in 58, moved a law that exiled any politician who put citizens to death without trial. This law was retroactive and targeted Cicero for his summary execution of the Catilinarians in December 63. Cicero went into exile. Clodius’ gang of supporters tore down Cicero’s house in Rome. With Pompey’s support, another law was passed enabling Cicero to return to Rome in 57.

Catiline’s conspiracy never possessed adequate support for his objectives. Many of his followers were probably unwilling to resort to actual violence, arson, and general destruction. Thus, they shied from the conspiracy as soon as it was exposed and challenged. This was especially true of the urban *plebs*, who would be the chief victims of urban violence.

The conspiracy and its defeat had no effect on the root causes of conflict, namely, the economic issues of widespread debt and the increasingly sharp divide between rich and poor. This is possibly because Romans did not conceive of their problems in economic or social terms, but rather in moralistic frameworks that cast the conspirators as immoral enemies of the state. Romans also lacked tools and theories for examining and explaining the economic issues at work. There was likely little connection made between economic and social issues and the conspiracy itself.

Catiline's concept of *tabulae novae*, "new tablets," which would forgive some or all debts, never saw fruition. Nevertheless, lawmakers did address some grievances that the conspiracy had illuminated. In 62, Cato sponsored a bill to distribute grain at lower prices. In 58, Clodius passed the *lex frumentaria*, which supplied free grain to the urban poor. Bills in 58 and 55 allowed landowners to sell their land directly to the state, alleviating debt and encouraging investment. This aided failed farmers and allowed dispossessed landowners to return to their farms. Not all reforms aided the poor. The state enforced the repayment of debt, strengthening the creditor class. Customs dues on Italian ports were removed in 60, aiding traders and wealthy consumers. The state maintained the stability of the investor class, which undoubtedly strengthened the Roman economy as a whole.

Attributing these measures to the Catilinarian Conspiracy is likely an overstatement. Reforms would probably have passed regardless. Although Catiline's Conspiracy did fit into a general pattern of increasing violence and social and economic unrest during this period, it did not cause these patterns.

Social inequality remained a source of social and political conflict in the late Republic, exploited by Clodius the tribune and by Caesar for mostly political ends. It became associated with civil war because poor citizens were among the volunteer soldiers of the civil warlords. In the long term, the emperors supported welfare measures, such as distributions of free grain to the city population, to stabilize the existing order and reduce conflict. To deter unrest, Augustus also established a permanent military presence in the city of Rome: the Praetorian Guard, urban cohorts, and *vigiles* or fire brigade.

Michael Hankins and Sara E. Phang

See also Catiline; Cicero; Civil Conflict (Late Republic); Clodius Pulcher;

Sallust; *Senatus Consultum Ultimum*; States of Emergency; Sulla, Lucius Cornelius

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Constantine I (Emperor) (306–337 CE)

One of the most famous Roman emperors, Flavius Valerius Constantinus, better known today as Constantine I or Constantine the Great (306–337), was born on February 27, 272 CE in Naissus, Moesia Superior (Serbia) to the high-ranking Illyrian officer Constantius and Helena, who probably came from a family of moderate social standing in Bithynia. Constantius was subsequently promoted to the rank of Caesar (deputy emperor) by Diocletian (284–305), introducing his son to the imperial court and probable imperial ambitions. Although originally not designated to receive imperial power, Constantine was acclaimed as emperor in Britain following the sudden death of his father in 306. Victor of a series of civil wars, by 324 Constantine had become sole ruler of the Roman Empire. He imposed numerous changes on the Roman Empire, including reforms to the government and army, and most notably the creation of a new capital, Constantinople, and the official patronage of Christianity.

From his adolescence, Constantine's life was focused on the imperial court, as his father Constantius was an important member of the *Protectores Augusti Nostri* (Defenders of Our Augustus), an imperial bodyguard and staff college. Around 286, Constantius entered the imperial family, divorcing Helena and marrying the emperor Maximian's stepdaughter Theodora. Constantius' rise in imperial circles continued, and in 293 he was promoted by Diocletian to the rank of Caesar, active mainly in the western provinces. At some point after 293, Constantine moved to Diocletian's imperial court,

arguably as a political hostage to ensure Constantius' loyalty. Being a member of Diocletian's court meant being on the move, and between 297 and 303 it toured the eastern half of the Roman Empire, visiting Egypt, Syria, and Asia Minor. Between 303 and 304, the court journeyed to Italy and Rome, before returning to Nicomedia. During these years, Constantine observed large areas of the Roman Empire, and witnessed first hand the impact, practicalities, and limitations of imperial power.

On May 1, 305 Diocletian and Maximian abdicated as Augusti to be replaced by Constantius and Galerius in carefully choreographed ceremonies. Though courtiers may have believed that Constantine would be promoted to his father's old rank of Caesar, Diocletian declared that the two new Caesars would be Severus (in the western provinces) and Maximinus II (in the east). A few months after his appointment as Augustus, Constantius wrote to his co-emperor Galerius demanding that Constantine join him in Trier, a major imperial capital in western Europe. It is probable that Constantius did not trust Galerius with the well being of his son. Whatever the true circumstances of the request and its fulfillment, we know that by January 306 Constantine had joined his father in the western empire.

At Eboracum (modern day York, England) in 306 Constantius suddenly died, and Constantine was acclaimed as emperor by his father's troops and commanders. This news of Constantine's acclamation to the imperial purple did not go down well with the emperor Galerius. However, the nature of Constantine's military backing meant that Galerius had little choice other than to accommodate Constantine in the Tetrarchic system, and compromised by formally recognizing Constantine as Caesar. Constantine's promotion encouraged Maxentius, the son of the ex-emperor Maximian, to seize power at Rome.

Despite his successes on the battlefield, Constantine was probably aware of the fragility of his claims to imperial power. Whereas his father Constantius had acquired the rank of emperor through legitimate designation and accession, Constantine's acclamation at York was essentially a revolt. Consequently, Constantine needed to emphasize his legitimacy as emperor. He did so through his alliance with Maximian, Diocletian's co-Augustus, who had retired with Diocletian in 305. Maximian was not content with retirement and sought to regain the imperial power, especially after his son Maxentius claimed it for himself. Maximian's approach to Constantine in 307 for an alliance with Maxentius provided

Constantine with a link to legitimacy, sealed by Constantine's marriage to Maximian's daughter Fausta. However, Maximian's own position was ambiguous: his move to regain the status of Augustus was unlikely to be endorsed by the other Tetrarchs, particularly Galerius and his Caesar.



Head of Constantine I (306–337 CE), ca. 315 CE. Emerging as the victor of a vicious civil war, Constantine emphasized his own autocracy. He is best known for his conversion to Christianity and his creation of a new capital, Constantinople (also known as Byzantium). Located in the Capitoline Museums, Rome, Italy. ([iStockphoto.com](https://www.iStockphoto.com))

At the Council of Carnuntum, attended by Galerius, Diocletian (who remained in retirement), Maximian, Licinius, Maximinus, and Constantine,

Diocletian persuaded Maximian to abdicate for the second time, and Galerius promoted Licinius to the rank of Augustus; Maximinus and Constantine were confirmed as Caesars. The conference however did not settle matters among the Tetrarchs. Galerius declared Maxentius a public enemy. Maximian revolted again in 310, claiming the role of Augustus, and this time Constantine dissociated from him and apparently forced Maximian to commit suicide or executed him at Massilia.

Realizing he had to dissociate himself from Maximian and detach himself from the Tetrarchic model of imperial authority, Constantine reverted to the old concept of dynastic legitimacy. In presenting his father as a nephew of Claudius II Gothicus, Constantine not only emphasized his father's legitimacy as Augustus but also his own. Constantine, however, was careful not to entirely eradicate any connection to Diocletian, and ensured that his rule as emperor, although adopting an independent character of its own, was to some degrees recognizable as a continuation of Diocletian's. Constantine's ability to alter the public presentation of his regime demonstrates his supreme ability to adapt to changing circumstances, essential to understanding his success as emperor.

Although Constantine originally supported Maxentius against retaliation from Galerius in 307, by 311 relations between the two had soured, making war inevitable. In 312, Constantine crossed the Alps and invaded Italy. On October 28, after a series of victories, Constantine finally met Maxentius at the Milvian Bridge outside of Rome. The resultant battle was short but decisive, and in the ensuing rout Maxentius was killed. Constantine was now the undisputed ruler of the western empire.

Galerius had died from a long, painful illness in 311. In 313, with the death of Maximinus Daia in the eastern empire, Constantine's only remaining coruler was his ally Licinius. Peace between the two, however, did not last long. After a series of battles between 316 and 317, Licinius sued for peace, agreeing to hand over two of his Balkan dioceses (regions). Relations remained strained and in 324 Licinius and Constantine were at war again. After defeats at Adrianople and Chrysopolis, Licinius fled to Nicomedia, and there surrendered for the second and final time on December 16. Licinius was sent into exile in Thessalonica, where he was executed the following year. Constantine was now the sole emperor of the Roman world.

Building upon the work Diocletian had already begun in increasing the

number of Rome's fighting units, Constantine reorganized the Roman army. From the old army structure, Constantine established two armies: a frontier army, the *limitanei*, who were responsible for defending Rome's imperial frontiers, and a field army, the *palatini* and *comitatenses*, that provided a strategic reserve that could react quickly at times of military crisis. Constantine also disbanded the Praetorian Guard, since they had supported Maxentius, replacing them with the *Scholae Palatinae*, elite cavalry units.

Constantine promoted a somewhat more traditional social order than that of the third-century crisis and First Tetrarchy, emphasizing the preeminence of the senatorial order at least in Rome and Italy, which the senators were permitted to administer without interference. He returned certain civil offices to senatorial control. In 324, Constantine established a new imperial capital in the eastern Mediterranean, Constantinople, which was planned to emulate Rome in terms of architectural and cultural splendor. Furthermore, Constantinople was designed to provide a center of power in the eastern empire that could accommodate the ambitions of the eastern aristocracy. Thus, the establishment of a senate house in Constantinople designed to equal that of Rome allowed Constantine to directly involve the eastern elite in the governance of the empire, and made their incorporation into his imperial regime possible.

In the sphere of religion, Constantine acted to maintain the empire's unity by ensuring that the rapidly growing Christian religion was fully incorporated alongside Rome's pagan heritage. Constantine reversed the persecution edicts against the empire's Christian population, restoring property that had been confiscated. However, the emperor was not content simply to reverse persecutions and directly involved himself with the affairs of the Church. Concerned that internal strife could be as damaging as external persecution, Constantine summoned a council of the empire's bishops at Nicaea in 325 to reach agreement over a divisive theological question, the relationship of Christ to God. The resultant Nicene Creed partially unified the Church, though significant bodies of heretics, such as the Arians, would continue to divide it. Constantine's direct involvement in Church affairs has been argued to prove that Constantine was himself a Christian convert. However, it is arguably more likely that such involvement was a case of Constantine demonstrating that imperial authority pervaded every dimension of the Roman Empire.

Constantine was a remarkable leader of the Roman world. His rise to

power demonstrated a clear political and military capability unmatched by his rivals. He recognized the fragility of his legitimacy as emperor and was quick to rectify the situation, adapting his regime to the rapidly changing political situation. Once in power, Constantine demonstrated a great ability regarding fair governance, ensuring the wider welfare of the empire always came first. In honoring Rome's traditional religious practices, while simultaneously accommodating the emerging Christian population, Constantine promoted cohesive imperial community in which religious tolerance was to be observed. Constantine left the empire in a state of health that it had not seen since the time of Aurelian, and his successors were sadly to fail in maintaining his high standards.

Constantine has been a controversial subject for biographers and historians both in antiquity and modern times. The presentation of Constantine's character by ancient authors was strongly influenced by their religious convictions. The Christian writers Eusebius and Lactantius both present Constantine as a Christian hero, whereas the pagan historian Zosimus paints a very negative picture of Constantine. Even today, details of Constantine's life still spark heated debate among scholars, most especially regarding the true nature of his Christianity, and it is these lasting questions that serve to rank Constantine as one of the most fascinating characters of the Roman world.

Alexander G. Peck

See also Arch of Constantine; Christians, Persecution of; *Comitatenses*; Constantinople; Constantius I; Diocletian; Galerius; Licinius (Emperor); Maximian; Maximinus II Daia; Milvian Bridge, Battle of; Tetrarchic Civil War

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Constantine II (Emperor)*. See *Civil Wars (House of Constantine)

Constantine III (Usurper)*. See *Fall of the Roman Empire

Constantinople

Constantinople (Constantinopolis) was founded by Constantine the Great (306–337) in 324 on the site of Byzantium, a Greek city located at the strait between the Black Sea and the Sea of Marmara. Constantinople became a major capital of the eastern Roman Empire and the capital of the Byzantine Empire until its capture by the Turks in 1453. The modern Turkish city was renamed Istanbul.

Constantine's action was not unprecedented, as Roman emperors, especially the Tetrarchs, had previously designated provincial capitals, such as York (Eboracum) in Britain, Trier (Augusta Treverorum) in the Rhineland, and Nicomedia in Asia Minor, close to Constantinople. The strategic and political advantage of provincial capitals was proximity to the frontiers. An emperor who stayed at Rome risked losing touch with the provinces and losing control of the frontier provinces to revolts, usurpations, or barbarian incursions. The locations of Nicomedia, chosen by Diocletian (284–305), and Constantinople enabled access both to the Balkans in the north and west, and to the eastern frontier via Syria and Armenia. Constantinople was not systematically besieged in the period of the early later Roman Empire (to 476), though the Goths overran Thrace in the period preceding and after the Battle of Adrianople (378).



View of the Theodosian Walls, Constantinople. Constantinople (Byzantium) was located on the Bosphorus straits, a strategic location offering the later Roman emperors access to both Danube and Eastern frontiers. These defensive walls were built by the emperor Theodosius II (408–450 CE). ([iStockphoto.com](https://www.iStockphoto.com))

Termed a “new Rome,” Constantinople received a Roman-style senate and magistrates (quaestors, tribunes, and praetors). However, the dominant culture of the city was Greek. Constantine intended Constantinople to be a Christian city, founding churches, yet pagan temples persisted until later emperors such as Theodosius I (379–95) undertook a more systematic policy of abolishing them.

Sara E. Phang

See also Constantine I; Rome (City). *Greek Section:* Byzantium, Byzantines

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Constans (Emperor). *See* ***Civil Wars (House of***

Constantine)

Constantius I (Emperor) (305–306 CE)

Flavius Valerius Constantius, termed Constantius I (Chlorus), one of the Tetrarchs, was born ca. 240 and reigned as Caesar from 293 to 305 and as Augustus in 305–306. He was also a founder of the dynasty of Constantine the Great, his son by his first wife Helena. Constantius may have come from a minor aristocratic family in the Balkans, related to the emperor Claudius II Gothicus (268–270), though this relationship has been doubted, as it was promoted to give Constantine a more aristocratic genealogy. The details of Constantius I's early career are not known; he married Helena, a woman of relatively low status, whose son Constantine was born ca. 272. Constantius I rose as an army officer, then governor of Dalmatia, and probably praetorian prefect for the emperor Maximian after 286. In 293, Constantius I was designated Caesar, Maximian's deputy and presumed successor. To seal the alliance, or shortly earlier, Constantius divorced Helena and married Maximian's daughter Theodora.

As Caesar, Constantius I was in charge of Gaul and Britain. At this time Britain was governed by a usurper, Carausius, who also claimed northern Gaul. Constantius drove the supporters of Carausius out of northern Gaul, but Carausius and then his usurper Allectus continued to hold Britain. In 296 Constantius invaded Britain and fought a battle with Allectus' forces, defeating and killing Allectus. Constantius was merciful to Allectus' supporters and restored Tetrarchic rule in Britain.

In 303 Diocletian and Galerius began the so-called Great persecution of the Christians (303–313), which chiefly affected the eastern empire. Maximian allegedly inflicted the persecution in the western provinces, where Christians were less numerous, but according to Constantinian propaganda, Constantius tried to avoid persecuting the Christians. In contrast with the other Tetrarchs, Constantius, Constantine's father, is depicted favorably by the contemporary Christian authors Lactantius and Eusebius.

In 305, Diocletian and Maximian abdicated in favor of their respective Caesars, Galerius and Constantius I. Constantius thus became Augustus, but did not enjoy the role of senior emperor long; he died from natural causes in

306, enabling his son Constantine to claim the title of emperor at York. Constantine allegedly was hailed as emperor by his father's soldiers, unleashing a period of civil war (the Tetrarchic Civil War, 306–313). Constantius I's children included five other half-siblings of Constantine; one of these, Julius Constantius, was the father of Gallus and the future emperor Julian (361–363).

Sara E. Phang

See also Carausius; Constantine I; Diocletian; Galerius; Maximian; Succession (Imperial); Tetrarchic Civil War

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Constantius II (Emperor) (337–361 CE)

Flavius Julius Constantius, the third son of Constantine I, became Caesar ca. 324, co-Augustus in 337, and sole Augustus from 350 to 361. He spent much of his reign fighting the Sassanid Empire, Germanic tribes, and civil wars. He was responsible for the elevation of his cousin Julian to the title of Caesar. He and Julian were the last male descendants of the dynasty of Constantine. Constantius II also is noteworthy as an openly Arian Christian emperor and a strong supporter of Arianism. He died of illness on November 3, 361 at Mopsucrenae in Cilicia, while preparing to fight a civil war against Julian.

Born in 317 at Sirmium, Pannonia, Constantius II was the second son of Constantine and Fausta. He was named after his grandfather, who had been co-Augustus with Galerius from 305 to 306. At the time of his birth, Constantine was co-Augustus with Licinius. In 324, Licinius was defeated in civil war and Constantine raised Constantius to the rank of Caesar. Constantine sent the young Constantius to the eastern frontier to resist the incursions of the Sassanid Empire. He conducted a successful campaign that

was cut short by news of his father's ill health. Constantius was with his father near Constantinople when he died in 337.

On his death, Constantine divided the Roman Empire among his sons; Constantius II became co-Augustus in the eastern empire. He also ordered a purge of the imperial family, killing two uncles and six cousins and thus removing potential rivals. Constantius immediately returned to the eastern frontier to fight a new invasion by Shapur II. While Constantius waged a generally successful war against the Sassanids in the east, his brothers, Constantine II and Constans, fought a civil war. Constantine II was killed in 340 and Constans became sole Augustus in the western empire.

Constantius still was fighting Shapur II on the eastern frontier when the usurper Magnentius declared himself emperor in the west and had Constans murdered in 350. Constantius refused to recognize Magnentius and prepared for war. He elevated his cousin Gallus to Caesar in the eastern empire and moved west against Magnentius. Constantius defeated Magnentius at Mursa Major in 351 and Mons Seleucus in 353. Magnentius committed suicide, and Constantius gained control of the entire Roman Empire. He at once turned his attention to fighting Germanic incursions along the Danube and Rhine.

After Gallus' short but turbulent reign as Caesar, Constantius had Gallus executed for suspected conspiracy in 354. It was now clear to Constantius that the empire faced too many threats for just one man to handle. He turned to his last remaining cousin, Julian (the younger brother of Gallus), and in November 355 made Julian Caesar in the western empire. While Julian fought the Franks and Alamanni in Gaul, Constantius campaigned against the Sarmatians and Quadi along the Danube. However, by 359, there was a renewal of war against Shapur in the eastern frontier. For his war against the Sassanids, Constantius ordered a large portion of Julian's Gallic army to move eastward. The soldiers rebelled and hailed Julian as emperor in 360. Constantius found himself trapped between the serious threat of Shapur on the eastern frontier and Julian's rebellion in the western empire. Constantius began to move westward to face Julian, but the two never met in battle because Constantius died of fever on November 3, 361 in Cilicia. On his death bed, he was baptized an Arian and named Julian his successor.

Nikolaus Leo Overtoom

See also Civil Wars (House of Constantine); Constantine I; Julian;

Magnentius; Succession (Imperial)

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Constantius III (Emperor). See Fall of Roman Empire; Galla Placidia (Empress)

Consul

Consuls were the most powerful annually elected magistrates in the Roman Republic. According to tradition, the office was established in 509 BCE after the end of the monarchy. Modern scholarship of the early Republic has challenged this model, pointing out alternate supreme magistrates such as the early praetors and military tribunes with consular power; the primacy of the consulship took some time to evolve.

To continue with the traditional account, the position of consul somewhat resembled former monarchy—the consuls retained much of the same powers and even borrowed much of the royal insignia. However, there were notable differences between consul and king. The traditional religious role of the kings was given to the *pontifex maximus* and *rex sacrorum*. The consuls retained only *auspicium*, the right to perform public divination. To prevent the abuse of power by a single ruler, two consuls were elected annually. Initially both consuls were from the patrician class, but after the year 367 plebeians were allowed to run for the office. Consuls were elected

by the centuriate assembly and because they traditionally had to hold lower magistracies to be considered acceptable candidates, consuls were usually over the age of 40. The minimum age of 42 was set by a law of 180 BCE and reiterated by the dictator Sulla; to hold the office at this minimum age was considered particularly prestigious.

The Romans also named their years after the two consuls who were in office at the time. Traditionally, consuls entered office March 15 and remained for 12 months, thus a year such as March 15, 205–March 14, 204 BCE would be named the “year of the consulship of Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus and Publius Licinius Crassus Dives.” After 153 BCE, consuls took office on January 1, though by the late Republic the Roman calendar was out of sync with the solar year until Julius Caesar’s reform of the calendar. However, this practice of naming the year after the consuls continued into the empire.

While inside the *pomerium* (the boundary of Rome itself), the two consuls served as the heads of government. They also had the power to convene the Senate and citizen assemblies. The consuls also served as the chief diplomats for Rome, and all foreign envoys had to meet with them before appearing before the Senate. In consuls’ absence, their duties were handled by the urban praetor. In addition, though priests handled most religious functions in Rome, consuls did perform certain specific rituals related to public divination (*auspicium*). Consuls outranked virtually all other elected magistrates, though there were exceptions. Supreme offices alternative to the consulship during the Republic included military tribunes with consular power, decemvirs, and elected dictators, all much rarer; the first two were seen only in the early Republic.

The consuls’ military power was arguably even greater than their civic authority. The magistrates were trusted with full *imperium*, meaning they had ultimate authority over almost every aspect of the campaign. Given the militarism of Roman society, consuls went to war on a regular basis. The consuls called for the levy of Roman citizens and further oversaw the organization of forces from Roman allies. A consul’s army typically contained at least two legions plus an equal number of allied troops. As Rome continued to expand during and after the Punic Wars, consuls enjoyed greater authority than ever. On campaign, they had the ability to do almost whatever they wished diplomatically and militarily without much resistance from the Senate.

There were some checks on consular authority. Each could veto the other. Tribunes of the plebs were not subordinate to the authority of the consuls and could block most consular action. Within Rome itself, citizens held the right of *provocatio*, which enabled them to appeal to the people any punishment possibly levied by the consul or any other magistrate. The Senate decided where consuls would be deployed, and if a consul went against the Senate's wishes he could find himself appointed to a trivial command with no chance for military glory. An additional check was that a consul could be prosecuted for his actions after he left office. Caesar, for instance, specifically obtained deployment as proconsul to Gaul to avoid this prosecution. Sulla placed additional restrictions upon consuls, requiring them to stay in Rome during their tenure of office, so that commanders thence were promagistrates.

Under the empire, the office lost most of its former power. While still formally elected, now by the Senate, consuls were often nominated by the princeps. One of the two consular positions was often held by the emperor himself, and with imperial authority superseding that of the consuls, the office gradually dwindled to little more than a symbol of Rome's Republican heritage. However, the consulship remained a desired office and route of gaining individual prestige and influence in imperial society.

Consular authority could be prorogued if necessary. If this occurred, the consuls would become proconsuls and still be able to govern their province or command an army, albeit with certain limits on their extended powers. If a consul resigned or died in office, a suffect consul would be elected by the *comitia* or appointed by the Senate, though during the imperial period suffect consuls were chosen by the emperor and increased in number (up to 12 per year) to make the honor more available.

Michael J. Stout

See also Caesar, Gaius Julius; *Cursus Honorum* (Imperial); *Cursus Honorum* (Republic); *Dilectus*; First Triumvirate; *Imperium*; Legion, Organization of; Proconsul; Prorogation; Scipio Africanus

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Corbulo (Cn. Domitius Corbulo) (d. 67 CE)

A Roman general during Nero's eastern wars (58–63 CE), Corbulo led two successful campaigns to recover Armenia from the Persians. His victories abroad and reputation for rigid military discipline brought him great fame. But Nero worried that Corbulo's fame might eventually rival his own. He ordered the general's death in 67, although Corbulo had never given any indication of disloyalty.

Little is known of Corbulo's early life and career. He was born sometime around 4 CE to the clan of the Domitii, an old senatorial family which prided itself on upholding Roman tradition. Corbulo's father, who served as praetor, famously once chastised a younger nobleman in the Senate for not giving up his seat to an elder statesman. Corbulo followed in his father's aristocratic footsteps, becoming consul in 39. He also served as proconsul of Lower Germany (47 CE) and Asia (sometime before 54 CE) prior to his Armenian expeditions. His German command is especially noteworthy as the period when he honed his reputation as a stern disciplinarian.

But it was the Armenian crisis at the outset of Nero's reign that finally let Corbulo showcase the true extent of his martial abilities. He invaded Armenia in 58 after spending nearly four years preparing his troops. With such careful planning, Armenia's current ruler, the pro-Persian Tiridates, could do little to halt the Roman advance. After forcing Tiridates to flee, Corbulo captured the kingdom's twin capitals of Artaxata and Tigranocerta. The former surrendered after a brief siege once Corbulo catapulted the head of a local nobleman behind the city walls; the latter capitulated at the mere

sight of the approaching Roman army. By 60 CE, a pro-Roman candidate had been placed on the Armenian throne, and the kingdom was once more firmly under Roman control.

Any progress Corbulo made in Armenia was soon undone by his successor, Caesennius Paetus. Paetus had none of Corbulo's patience or resolve and, in his haste to outdo Corbulo, led his army into a Persian ambush at Rhandaia. The Rhandaian disaster convinced Nero that only a diplomatic compromise could end the Armenian crisis once and for all. Yet Roman honor demanded that Paetus' loss first be avenged. Nero thus ordered Corbulo to attack Armenia again in 63. On this occasion, though, Corbulo's invasion was largely just for show. After sufficiently demonstrating Roman power Corbulo met with Tiridates at the site of Paetus' defeat. It was agreed that Nero crowned Tiridates as Rome's client monarch, then Rome would recognize him as Armenia's king.

In Rome, Nero claimed Corbulo's victories as his own. The emperor celebrated a triumph over the Persians and commemorated Tiridates' visit with a lavish public festival. Amid all this Corbulo remained Nero's faithful servant. The Pisonian conspiracy (65 CE), nevertheless, made Nero suspicious of any potential rivals. While touring Greece in 67, Nero summoned Corbulo from the eastern frontier. Upon arriving Corbulo received word that he had fallen into disfavor. He chose to take his own life rather than let his family risk Nero's wrath.

John Poirot

See also Armenia; Nero; Persian Wars, Arsacid; Tiridates I

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Coriolanus (Active 490s BCE)

Gnaeus Marcius Coriolanus was a semi-legendary Roman general of the early Republic who defected from Rome to the Volsci, a people of central Italy. According to Roman tradition, he won his name after capturing the settlement of Corioli from the Volsci in 493 BCE. Because Coriolanus authorized distribution of grain to the hungry poor at Rome, he was charged with tyranny and was exiled by the Senate. He went into exile and defected to the Volsci. Becoming a leader of the Volsci, he besieged Rome. The intervention of his wife and mother persuaded Coriolanus to abandon the siege; the enraged Volscians then killed him. Coriolanus is poorly documented (his name does not appear in the *Fasti*, official lists of consuls, dictators and other chief magistrates of the Roman Republic) and may be a legendary figure, the subject of Roman historical dramas that were treated as history by Plutarch's *Life of Coriolanus* and Dionysius of Halicarnassus. Alternately, in the view of Timothy Cornell, his story represents a period of Roman history when competing warrior band or clan leaders, of which Coriolanus was one, struggled for the domination of Latium and central Italy.

Sara E. Phang

See also Dionysius of Halicarnassus; Latin Wars; Overthrow of the Monarchy

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Cornelius Lentulus Gaetulicus (d. 39 CE)

Publius Cornelius Lentulus Gaetulicus was a Roman noble executed for conspiracy against the emperor Gaius (Caligula) in 39 CE. Gaetulicus was consul in 26 CE and subsequently legate of Upper Germany (30–39). In 39, Gaetulicus was accused of conspiring to assassinate Gaius and was executed with his fellow conspirator Marcus Aemilius Lepidus.

Sara E. Phang

See also Caligula; Treason

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Cornelius Scipio, Publius (d. 212 BCE)

Publius Cornelius Scipio, father of Scipio Africanus, was consul in 218 BCE, at the outbreak of the Second Punic War, he was initially assigned the province of Spain. Learning that Hannibal had already entered southern Gaul, Scipio tried but failed to intercept him at the Rhône River. Bringing his army to northern Italy to await the Carthaginian invasion, he nonetheless dispatched a detachment to Spain under the command of his brother Gnaeus. Scipio first confronted Hannibal in a cavalry skirmish at the River Ticinus, which ended in his defeat. Wounded in the fighting, Scipio was rescued by his son (the future Africanus), an event which helped to launch the young man's remarkable political career. Uniting with fellow consul Tiberius Sempronius, Scipio suffered an enormous defeat at the River Trebia, although the favorable tradition recorded by Polybius reports that Scipio had advised against the engagement, and that the mistakes belonged to his consular colleague. By 217, Scipio had sufficiently recovered to join his brother in Spain, where they successfully held the Ebro River line. In 212, the two brothers split their armies for an offensive that yielded some successes, including the capture of Saguntum. The Carthaginian generals Mago and Hasdrubal Gisco, however, managed to unite their forces against Scipio's isolated army, having arranged for the defection of his Celtiberian mercenaries. Scipio fell fighting; his brother was defeated and killed shortly

afterward in a separate engagement. His son, who then had only held the aedileship, undoubtedly owed his election to the extraordinary command in Spain in 210 to the reputation of his politically prominent father.

Michael J. Taylor

See also Punic War, Second; Scipio Africanus; Spanish Wars

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Crassus (Marcus Licinius Crassus) (115–53 BCE)

Marcus Licinius Crassus was born ca. 115 to Publius Licinius Crassus, a Roman politician. Crassus may have started his military training as *contubernalis* under his father in Spain. His father and older brother were executed by the Marians when Marius' supporter Cinna took control of Rome. Crassus fled and went into hiding in Spain where he had family contacts. When Crassus learned that Sulla was heading back to Italy, he raised a small army of provincial clients and crossed first to Africa to link up with Quintus Caecilius Metellus Pius (a Sullan supporter), but he fell out with him, so crossed to Greece, joining Sulla there. He played an important role in Sulla's victory, operating in north Italy with Metellus and Pompey, and in particular was successful on his wing at the battle of the Colline Gate in November 82.

The beginnings of Crassus' large fortune came from the Sullan proscriptions, and he made astute political use of it to advance the careers of others. After his praetorship, probably in 73, Crassus offered to take over command of the war against Spartacus, when others, including the consuls of 72, had failed. Though technically a *privatus* by then, Crassus was given command of a large army, eventually defeating Spartacus (72–71) and ordering large-scale crucifixion of the defeated slaves along the Appian Way.

Though a rival of Pompey, who had also advanced under Sulla and who had even claimed credit for ending the slave war, Crassus joined with

Pompey in running for the consulships of 70. Crassus was technically qualified to run, but Pompey needed a dispensation as he was too young to be consul. Their joint program restored the powers of the tribunate that Sulla had taken away and divided the criminal courts between senators and *eques*. Neither took a provincial command after their term of office.

In the mid- to late 60s Crassus is associated in the sources with various schemes to counteract Pompey's growing military fame and influence. As censor in 65 Crassus tried to give citizenship to the Transpadani and to annex Egypt, but these attempts were foiled by his colleague, Quintus Lutatius Catulus, and they both ended up resigning. He supported the early ambitions of Catiline, until the latter proposed the cancellation of debts—hardly something which Crassus would condone. He may have supported the agrarian proposal of Publius Servilius Rullus in 63.

Crassus also promoted Caesar, enabling him to take out large debts in 62 and so freeing him to depart for his governorship in Spain. On Caesar's return, Pompeius and Crassus supported Caesar's bid for the consulship of 59, forming what is called "the first triumvirate." Caesar paid his political debt back by carrying legislation for a reduction in the price paid by *publicani* for the Asian tax-collecting rights—a request which Crassus had promoted and in which he probably had a personal involvement.

The triumvirate was inherently unstable: when Caesar left for his Gallic command, Crassus turned to supporting Clodius, who was threatening attacks on Caesar's consular legislation and on Pompey's interests. But Clodius was too ambitious to be a reliable ally. When attacks on the triumvirate increased and there were threats to replace Caesar in his Gallic command, Caesar met with Crassus at Ravenna in winter 56 and all three then met at Luca to forge a new agreement: Pompey and Crassus were to become consuls for 55, with subsequent five-year commands in Spain and in Syria, respectively and a five-year renewal of Caesar's command. Crassus probably wanted a military victory to keep up with his younger rivals, though he was now nearly 60 years old.

Before the end of 55, Crassus left for Syria. It is not clear whether the law proposing all the commands authorized Crassus to attack the Persians, but that was certainly his intention, as he needed a major victory to secure the prestige he desired. Ancient authors regard Crassus as motivated by greed, but there were valid reasons for the campaign: continual bickering between Armenia and Persia was likely to upset Roman interests in the area

following Pompey's settlements in 62. The size of Crassus' army, probably seven legions and 4,000 cavalry, suggests that the Senate contemplated war against Persia.

Crassus spent his first campaigning season in 54 crossing the Euphrates, reconnoitring the area and setting up garrisons and depots, especially along the Belikh River. He returned to winter in Syria, to train his troops and to complete financial preparations for the next campaigning season by plundering temples (such as the Temple in Jerusalem) and extorting large sums of money (attributed to his greed). In the spring of 53, Crassus crossed the Euphrates again; he moved away from the river, persuaded by Abgar, an Arabian guide, that the Persian force, led by the Surenas, was heading southeast. After a desert crossing to the Belikh River, Crassus caught up with the Persians near Carrhae on June 9, but the Romans suffered heavy losses at the hands of the enemy archers. The Roman army fled to Carrhae, then toward Sinnaca; invited to a parley, Crassus was treacherously captured and killed.

One ancient story has it that gold was poured down the dead Crassus' throat to symbolize his greed; another that a performance of Euripides' *Bacchae* at the Persian court used his severed head as a prop.

Carrhae was a disastrous loss, and the death of Crassus had repercussions for the growing rift between Pompey and Caesar. Crassus suffered from a bad press because he was ultimately a loser, but he was a master of the game of politics. He was reputedly the richest man in Rome, and that was probably true until Pompey returned from his victories in the eastern Mediterranean, when he could probably have bought Crassus out many times over.

Bruce Marshall

See also Carrhae, Battle of; Catiline; Colline Gate, Battle of; First Triumvirate; Persian Wars, Arsacid; Spartacus, Revolt of

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Criminal Procedure

In ancient Rome, not all criminal acts were regarded as public (capital) crimes; some violent or harmful acts were regarded as delicts, private wrongs that could be prosecuted as civil actions (roughly analogous to Anglo-American torts). Delicts included *iniuria*, “insult,” which might include physical assault short of murder; delicts were usually punished by the imposition of fines. Violent and harmful acts that were prosecuted as public crimes included treason, parricide, extortion, murder, poisoning, and in the Principate public disturbances and adultery. Criminal procedure evolved from ad hoc trials by the Roman people to trial in standing courts (*quaestiones perpetuae*), dominant during the late Republic, to summary judgment by the governors, the emperors, and their legal advisers (jurists). Criminal laws were established with the courts and continued to apply even when the standing courts fell into disuse. At all times, the Roman criminal legal system lacked a formal prosecutorial infrastructure (public prosecutors and police) and depended on private delation and private prosecution. Criminal prosecution was also highly susceptible to political manipulation and abuse. The scale of penalties for the convicted was determined by status (see “Civil rights”).

During the early and middle Republic (down to 149 BCE), jurisdiction over capital or public crimes was delegated by the praetor to lesser magistrates who presided over ad hoc trials by the Roman people. Public crimes included murder, arson, witchcraft, corruption, and military cowardice or incompetence. The episode of the Bacchanalia, a disorderly and allegedly seditious religious cult, resulted in a public trial (Livy 39.14), as did an episode of female poisoners (Livy 40.32.4). A citizen seeking justice brought an accusation before the praetor resident at Rome, who would delegate a lesser magistrate, a quaestor, aedile, or tribune. The magistrate would organize a date for the citizen assembly to meet. At the assembly, the plaintiff and defendant would speak on their own behalf; any evidence would be presented, and the assembly would vote on the verdict and the penalty.

In the last two centuries of the Republic, such *ad hoc* trials, which were cumbersome to organize, were replaced by standing criminal courts, the *quaestiones perpetuae*. The laws that established these courts also defined the crimes. The first, created in 149 BCE by the *lex Calpurnia de repetundis*,

was the *quaestio de repetundis* or court in charge of recovering extorted money; it tried magistrates and provincial governors who were accused of extortion. The *lex Calpurnia* established panels of equestrian jurors and specified restitution, requiring the defendant to pay back the extorted money to the victim. Many subsequent laws revised the scope of the court, the penalties, and the composition of the jury panels, replacing the equestrians with senators. Because senators were unwilling to convict their fellows, the court was only partially effective in checking extortion. Populist politicians attempting to counter the Senate passed laws empanelling equestrians. Augustus streamlined the court by appointing five senatorial *recuperatores* to supervise proceedings and limiting compensation to simple restitution.

Other *quaestiones perpetuae* are best known through their originating laws that persisted in force during the Principate. During his dictatorship (82–81 BCE), Sulla's *lex Cornelia de sicariis et veneficis* created a court for trying murderers and poisoners, and his *lex Cornelia de falsis* created a court for trying forgers and counterfeiters. Sulla's *lex Cornelia de maiestate* defined treasonous activity by provincial governors: they were required to remain within and keep their armies within their *provinciae* or risk prosecution for treason.

Augustus' *lex Iulia de vi publica* of 18 BCE made it a capital crime for a magistrate or governor to physically harm a citizen (violating the victim's right of *provocatio*). A *lex Iulia de vi privata* made it a public crime to store weapons in one's house (for seditious purposes) or to cause a public disturbance by brandishing weapons. The interpretation of the law allowed Roman travelers to carry weapons for their protection on the road and in remote areas, due to the prevalence of bandits. The most notorious of Augustus' criminal laws was the *lex Iulia de adulteriis*, which made adultery a public crime for the first time (see "Adultery"). Other Roman criminal laws and their juristic commentary are collected in Digest books 47 and 48.

However, in the late Republic and empire, provinces, governors also had summary jurisdiction over capital crimes, giving justice as they saw fit, except for the indictment of Roman citizens, who had the right to a trial at Rome. This judgment was termed *cognitio extra ordinem*. In the Principate, the criminal courts continued to exist for some time, but summary jurisdiction by the governors and by the emperors and their legal assistants

were more important, and the emperors' decisions became regarded as law. The Senate tried capital cases involving its own members. Appeal to the Roman people was replaced by appeal to the emperor, even against decisions by his own governors. Summary execution was most likely in cases of treason (*maiestas*), when the normal practices exempting high-status citizens from the death penalty did not apply.

At all times Roman criminal process, lacking a formal prosecutorial infrastructure, depended on private delation (informers) and private prosecution. Magistrates, politicians, or private persons could inform or bring charges, though private persons more often sought professional forensic orators (such as Cicero) to represent them in court. Forensic orators should not be termed "lawyers"; they were experts in oratory and political affairs as much as law, and were usually senators themselves or wealthy equestrians who were the patrons of the people they represented.

Prosecution was frequently exploited for political ends, politicians prosecuting their rivals for *repetundae* and other crimes. In 187–184 BCE, the famous Scipio Africanus and his brother Lucius Cornelius Scipio Asiagenes fell from prominence when they were prosecuted for embezzlement during Lucius' command in Asia Minor. The *repetundae* court was especially given to politically motivated prosecutions. The most famous *repetundae* prosecution was Cicero's prosecution of Gaius Verres, a corrupt governor of Sicily, in 70 BCE.

In *cognitio extra ordinem*, governors' judgments might be harsh, or influenced by popular pressure. The best known judgment is that of Pontius Pilate over Jesus Christ, when Pilate was allegedly pressured by the Jews to render a capital verdict.

Sara E. Phang

See also Augustus; Adultery; Bribery and Corruption; Cicero; Civil Rights; Constantine I; *Provocatio*; Public Order; *Senatus Consultum Ultimum*; States of Emergency; Sulla, Lucius Cornelius; Tiberius (Emperor); Treason; War Crimes

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Cult of the Emperor

The cult of the emperor, also known as the imperial cult, was both a religious and political institution of the Roman Empire. According to Duncan Fishwick, an expert on the imperial cult, political power had a religious dimension, just as religious cults might have a political dimension. In practical terms, the cult of the emperor involved the worship of the emperor's *genius* (the divine spirit associated with him) and the creation of special priesthoods (*sacerdotes* or *flamines*) to carry out the relevant rites. In general, the cult did not involve treating the emperor as divine in direct social and political interaction, although a few emperors, including Caligula and Diocletian, may have encouraged this. Although Cassius Dio, writing in the early third century CE, presents the cult as a tool of empire-wide unification, this was not always the case, and the cult itself was far from a single coherent system.

In the Hellenistic kingdoms following the death of Alexander the Great, a tradition of ruler cults became well established. Local communities established these cults in gratitude for a ruler's patronage and benefactions, demonstrating their allegiance to him or her. These cults enabled local communities to maintain a symbolic link with an often absent and distant

political authority. It was upon these pre-existing Hellenistic foundations that the Roman imperial cult was gradually established in the eastern empire, adopting and utilizing many original elements, such as the erection of statues of the emperor accompanied by dedications within temples to other deities—especially that of Roma—at which people could seek sanctuary. Since the imperial cult was founded upon its Hellenistic predecessor, it was easily disseminated in the east via statues and other images of the emperor. Although the imperial administration encouraged a uniform provincial system in the east, local communities retained their traditional autonomy to establish such cults.

Whereas the Hellenistic world offered the Romans a cultural precedent for the imperial cult, at Rome the situation was more problematic due in part to Roman attitudes toward monarchy. Consequently, Augustus, recognized as Rome's first emperor, took care to appear to preserve Roman Republican traditions. Therefore, apart from approving a divine cult for his dead adoptive father Julius Caesar, during his lifetime Augustus restricted any cult activity centered on himself at Rome to the worship of his *genius* (his divine inspiration), which was incorporated into Roman families' private religious practices. It was only after Augustus' death that the Roman Senate declared him a god and that consequently a formal cult and priesthood could be established at Rome and throughout the western provinces, a policy then followed for the deification of Augustus' successors. Thus, the imperial cult at Rome and in the western provinces became a fundamental component of Roman imperial rule, and unlike the localized cults of the east was controlled exclusively from the center. However, whether locally inspired in the east or controlled by the central imperial administration in the western provinces, the cult's purpose was identical, focusing the loyalties and concerns of the empire's population on the person of the emperor.

Conversely, the imperial cult could also become a focus of political disloyalty and disapprobation. At the height of treason trials in the reign of Nero (54–68), disrespect to the imperial image (even the emperor's image on a coin) was persecuted as disloyalty. Mutinies might focus on the imperial image; in their revolt against Galba (68–69 CE), the legionaries of the Rhine frontier stoned his images carried on military standards. The Senate had the right to decree *damnatio memoriae*, the systematic effacement of a hated ruler's inscriptions and images.

Despite unifying the attentions of the empire, and in so doing reinforcing the image of the emperor as its supreme guardian and benefactor, the cult was also a focus of religious friction, especially among the Empire's monotheistic communities. The notion of worshipping an emperor, dead or alive, ran against Jewish religious practice, which featured no images of the Jewish God. An attempt by Caligula to erect a cult image of himself in the temple in Jerusalem was met with such fierce resistance that he was forced to back down. Other emperors gave the Jewish community the special privilege of exemption from direct involvement in imperial cult. While the Jewish community did not offer sacrifices and prayer *to* the emperor, they did do so "on his behalf" or "for the emperor's well being."

The empire's Christian community also came under scrutiny regarding the imperial cult, and their refusal to worship the emperor was treated as a sign of disloyalty. We know from Pliny the Younger's letters to Trajan that one of the methods by which individuals were forced to either prove their non-Christian status, or to renounce their Christian status, was to offer a libation to the emperor, or to the traditional pagan gods on the emperor's behalf. Despite the imperial cult's involvement in the persecution and suppression of Christianity, ultimately the establishment of Christianity as the empire's sole officially recognized religion in 380 CE dealt it its deathblow. Although Theodosius I (379–395) officially outlawed the imperial cult along with all other pagan practices at this time, its end had little impact on the exalted status of the Later Roman and Byzantine emperor, which was expressed in court ceremonial and abstract honorifics such as "Your Sublimity."

Alexander G. Peck

See also Augustus; Christians, Persecution of; Jewish War; Monarchy; *Princeps*, Principate; Sebasteion at Aphrodisias; Standards, Cult of; Theodosius I

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Cults, Pagan (Illicit)

From time to time during the last two centuries of the Republic and in the early empire, the Roman authorities repressed pagan cults that were regarded as a threat to public order. The best-known instance of such repression is the suppression of the Bacchanalia in 186 BCE. Other cults that the Roman Republic suppressed or discouraged included the cults of Isis, Osiris, and Serapis, Egyptian gods seen as foreign to Rome. After conquering an enemy people, Roman destruction of the enemy's sacred sites was not uncommon. In the empire, though the overall attitude to foreign cults became more tolerant, the Roman authorities persecuted Druidism in Gaul and Britain because it may have been a focus for native resistance. Governors were expected to monitor private associations (*collegia*), many of which were religious associations venerating a pagan deity or deities. These attitudes toward illicit cults and associations also informed the Roman government's treatment of Christians.

The suppression of the Bacchanalia is best attested in Livy's *History of Rome* (39.8–19) and in a surviving decree of the Senate. The Bacchanalia were cultic associations worshipping Bacchus, the god of wine and inspiration, akin to the Greek Dionysus. According to Livy, the cult had changed its nature, holding secret and transgressive nocturnal rites, and was growing rapidly. Originating in Etruria, it had become widespread not just at Rome but in Italy. When informed of the cult by Publius Aebutius and his mistress Hispala Faecenia, the consuls Spurius Postumius Albinus and Quintus Marcius Philippus opened an extraordinary prosecution (*quaestio*), arresting and detaining cult priests and prosecuting all initiates who had committed crimes, including sexual immorality, murder, the falsification of wills, and perjury (probably connected with false witness to the wills). Over 7,000 people were implicated and many of these were put to death. Two

decrees of the Senate dissolved the current Bacchic associations, prohibiting Roman citizens to become priests and restricting the size of associations to five people or fewer; any associations had to apply to the Senate for approval. One decree survives as an inscription (*ILLRP* 511), supporting Livy's account. The brutality of the suppression of the Bacchanalia was unprecedented, since in the Republic exile was a more usual capital penalty than death. The Senate's motivations remain obscure and have been much debated (e.g., Bauman 1990, Gruen 1990, Takacs 2000). The Bacchic initiates may have represented a political conspiracy or seditious group, threatening the Roman state. Their suppression may have been intended to reinforce sex/gender roles (male initiates underwent sexual penetration, a transgressive act for Roman males) and to reinforce Roman cultural identity. The cultists' murders were perhaps intended to raise money for the cult by falsifying the wills of their murder victims. What is certain is that the Roman Senate in suppressing the cult asserted its right to control Roman religious practices and to dominate Italian affairs. Little other information is available; the circumstantial story of Aebutius and Hispala Faecenia in Livy may derive from a contemporary play.

Modern scholars have argued that foreign cults were prohibited within the *pomerium* (the sacred boundary of Rome). The Great Mother's priests (*galli*) were eunuchs, and the Senate forbade Roman citizens to become eunuchs. However, the pomerial rule has been questioned and the Roman Senate permitted the formal introduction of the cult of Cybele in 206 BCE, and of other non-Roman gods, such as Aesculapius (Greek Asklepios), the god of medicine.

The Roman authorities distrusted and periodically targeted the cults of Isis, Osiris, and Serapis, deities worshipped in Egypt. In 58 BCE, shrines of Isis and other Egyptian deities on the Capitoline hill were destroyed (Tertullian, *Ad Nationes* 1.10). Isis cult associations supported the rabble-rousing tribune Clodius, leading to their disbandment in 53 and 50 BCE. In 50, the authorities destroyed shrines of Isis and Serapis (Valerius Maximus 1.3.4). In 28, BCE Octavian prohibited Egyptian cults within the *pomerium*, and in 21 BCE Agrippa expelled them from the city (Dio 53.2.4, 54.6.6). Tiberius (emperor 14–37 CE) also expelled Egyptian cults (Suetonius, *Tiberius* 36.1). In these instances of persecution of Egyptian cults, the emperors were concerned to reinforce Roman cultural identity. Octavian's propaganda in his civil war against Mark Antony focused on Antony's un-

Roman behavior as the lover of Cleopatra, queen of Egypt. In the empire, greater tolerance prevailed as provincials from around the empire were incorporated into the Roman governing class. The emperors tolerated the cults of Cybele, Isis, Osiris and Serapis; some even patronized them as they would any other pagan cult that was not a threat to the established order.

Druidism, the system of Celtic religious and cultural lore, was suppressed by the Romans in Gaul and Britain (Suetonius, *Claudius* 25.5; Tacitus, *Annals* 14.30), because it served as a focus of resistance to Roman authority. According to Julius Caesar, the Gauls practiced human sacrifice, then regarded as barbaric by the Romans; suppressing it may have justified suppressing the Druids. The Romans frequently destroyed the enemy's sacred sites (temples, shrines, groves) alongside the destruction of enemy cities (the most famous instance is the destruction of the Temple of Jerusalem). However, classical sources speak of the Druids as philosophers, prophets, and magicians. Such (non-Druid) persons were regarded with suspicion and periodically expelled from the city of Rome; they provided an obvious focus for public unrest because they claimed special powers and might predict the death of a magistrate or emperor or a coup or revolt (cf. Tacitus, *Histories* 2.61, 4.54).

Manichaeism, a dualist cult originating in Persia, was persecuted by Diocletian (284–305), as an un-Roman cult and possibly as a political threat during a period of renewed war with the Sassanid Persians.

Sara E. Phang

See also Associations; Astrologers; Christians, Persecution of; Human Sacrifice; Jewish War; Livy; *Pomerium*; Public order

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Cursus Honorum (Imperial)

The *cursus honorum* (sequence of magistracies) for members of the senatorial aristocracy during the Principate (approximately from 18 BCE to 235 CE) consisted of the vigintivirate, laticlavian tribunate, quaestorship, optional aedileship or tribunate of the plebs, and praetorship, followed by various civil or military posts, culminating in the consulship, which was now granted as an imperial honor with little power. Provincial governors might be ex-praetors or ex-consuls. The façade of Roman tradition and continuity with the Republic was thus maintained, but in fact all magistracies were voted by the Senate or appointed by the emperor. In the imperial service, senators were eventually thrust aside by equestrians.

Augustus examined the rolls of the Senate in 28 and 18 BCE, weeding out unsuitable or superfluous members. In 18, he made membership in the Senate require a census qualification of 1,000,000 sesterces (Dio 54.17.3; Suetonius, *Augustus* 41 is in error). He also lowered the age requirement for the quaestorship from 30, which had been the policy of Sulla, to 25. As many senators could not meet the requirement of one million HS, Augustus also adlected (chose to promote) wealthy equestrians to the Senate.

At age 17 the son of a senator could wear the *latus clavus*, the broad-striped tunic. He became eligible for the vigintivirate (Board of Twenty), a group of minor magistrates, of whom three were *tresviri monetales*

(moneyers), 10 were *decemviri stlitibus iudicandis* (judges), four were *quattorviri viarum curandi* (in charge of roads), and three were *tresviri capitales* (in charge of punishment). All these offices were held for one year. Since upper-class education emphasized rhetoric and literature, it is unlikely that the moneyers, the magistrates in charge of roads, and the magistrates in charge of punishment actually managed the day-to-day work; the 10 judges presided over courts, a task for which their rhetorical training had better prepared them.

A senator's son then served as a laticlavian tribune in a legion, one of six tribunes (the other five were equestrian tribunes). He was appointed by the emperor or by the governor of the province in which he served. This *militia* also lasted one year. For many senators' sons, the laticlavian tribunate was their only military experience, in contrast with the senatorial careers of the middle Republic.

A senator's son then, at 25, was eligible to run for the quaestorship, which enabled him to enter the Senate as a senator, which he held for life. There were 20 quaestorships yearly. Quaestors in the Republic had accompanied consuls or praetors on their campaigns, managing logistics and payment for the troops. Quaestors in the empire were more likely to have minor administrative duties as assistants to the consuls and the emperor.

Having served as quaestor, the young senator was required to wait for two years before he could hold another magistracy, the aedileship or the tribunate of the plebs. The tribunate of the plebs no longer represented the interests of the lower classes; the populace regarded the emperor as their protector and appealed to him from unsatisfactory judgments by lower magistrates or provincial governors. The aedile in the Principate retained some of his earlier responsibilities caring for the markets and amenities of the city of Rome. However, the equestrian members of the imperial service had taken over many functions of the quaestors, aediles, and tribunes.

After another two years of required *otium* (inactivity) the senator could run for praetor, a magistracy that also had lost much of its power from the Republic but that was coveted because it was a prerequisite for legionary commands, provincial governorships, and other high-ranking posts in the imperial administration. The number of praetors was insufficient for the number of candidates, and the emperors were forced to increase the number of praetors from eight to 12 a year (Augustan) to 16 (mid-first century) to 18

(late first century).

After the praetorship a senator might be appointed legionary legate or governor. If governor of a public province, he received proconsular rank and was appointed by the Senate; if governor of an imperial province, one with an active military presence, he received the rank of *legatus Augusti pro praetore* and was appointed by the emperor. He might also hold other important administrative posts.

The culmination of the imperial *cursus honorum* was the consulship, now appointed by the emperor as an honor rather than voted on. To disseminate this honor more widely, the number of consuls per year expanded from two to eight or 10 by the late first century and in the Severan period to 12, each pair of consuls serving for two months. The pair of consuls who inaugurated the year were termed *consules ordinarii* or ordinary consuls; they still gave their names to the year as in the Republic, though dating by the year of the emperor's reign also became common. The other consuls were termed *consules suffecti* or supplementary consuls. The *consules ordinarii* were the most prestigious. The emperor might hold a consulship repeatedly. Since the emperor was now commander-in-chief and used provincial governors, legates, and members of the imperial family as field generals, the consuls were not given military commands. They still presided over meetings of the Senate, as well as presiding over games at Rome. They were authorized to govern the city of Rome in the emperor's name in his absence, though the Prefect of the City also took on this role. Governorships following the consulship were most prestigious, topped by the proconsulship of Africa and the proconsulship of Asia.

Senatorial careers are attested both in literary sources and in inscriptions, where the senator's offices and other honors (such as priesthoods) are usually listed in reverse chronological order, starting with his most senior and highest ranking posts and descending to his earliest posts. Both sources favor recording the most distinguished careers. Many senators did not obtain the praetorship and proceed to legionary commands and provincial governorships; some senators' sons possibly did not even enter the Senate, preferring to enter the equestrian career track or to withdraw from political affairs. Withdrawal from politics was a temptation when "bad emperors" persecuted the senatorial aristocracy for suspected sedition. At best, the emperors' patronage and favor was fickle, at worst it was bestowed on persons (equestrian and more lowly) whom senators

considered unworthy.

Sara E. Phang

See also Aedile; Augustus; Consul; *Cursus Honorum* (Republic); Elite Participation; Inscriptions; Legate; Praetor; Proconsul; Quaestor; Tribune of the Plebs

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Cursus Honorum (Republic)

When the monarchy was overthrown and the Republic was established (traditionally 509 BCE), two magistrates, called consuls, were created to take over the kings' administrative, military, and some religious functions. Collegiality was an important principle with republican magistracies: for example, there were always two consuls. Magistrates were annually elected and initially came exclusively from patrician families, for example, wealthy landowners, since there was no payment and they alone could afford the task.

As Rome grew and some plebeians became wealthy, they resented their exclusion and gradually secured admission. Further offices were added: first an urban praetorship (in 367) to supervise justice; in ca. 242 a second praetorship (called *peregrinus*) to deal with lawsuits involving noncitizens. Expansion throughout Italy and then overseas required more magistrates, since it became usual for higher magistrates to govern an overseas province after their year of office in Rome. The number of praetors increased to four in 228/7 and six in 198/7.

The quaestorship was created at the beginning of the Republic: originally two, then four, and gradually more, until Sulla increased their number to 20 (and made them automatically members of the Senate) and Caesar to 40. Earlier they had judicial powers, but later dealt mainly with finance; most were allocated to generals and provincial governors as their

assistants.

Over time an “official” career developed, called the *cursus honorum* (“ladder of office”): quaestorship, praetorship, and consulship. Due to conflicting evidence for the development of the magistracies, it is not really possible to speak of an established *cursus* before the third/second century BCE. Optional offices included the aedileship, held after the quaestorship but before the praetorship; the tribunate of the plebs, after the aedileship but before the praetorship; and censorship, after the consulship. A law, usually dated 180 BCE, set out the steps, though the law probably only re-affirmed conventional practice: the quaestorship was held no younger than 30, the praetorship no younger than 39, and the consulship no younger than 42. One could not move to the next step without having held the previous office, and there were rules about intervals between the same office. Sulla restated this law about ages, as well as increasing the number of quaestors to 20 and praetors to eight. The number of consuls never increased, creating a steeply narrowing pyramid of office, with intense competition for the top magistracies. Very few reached the consulship.

Two magistracies not required in the *cursus* were the aedileship and the tribunate of the plebs, but they were often held because of opportunities for self-advertisement. There were originally two aediles; the patricians added two more, termed curule aediles, exclusive to themselves. Aediles supervised public buildings and games and other infrastructure and amenities of the city of Rome, and in the earlier Republic their office usually brought admission to the Senate.

The tribunate of the plebs was created to protect plebeians from unjust decisions of (usually patrician) magistrates in their struggle for rights. Eventually there were 10 each year; to be eligible candidates had to come from a plebeian family. Since tribunes could initiate legislation and appear as “protectors of the people,” this magistracy was used to seek popular support

A person achieving a magistracy in the first year he was eligible was said to have secured it *suo anno* (“in his own year”). It was difficult to secure a consulship if there was no one from the family who had held that office before, and the first to do so was called a “new man” (*novus homo*).

There were exceptions to the rules, usually in military emergencies. Scipio Africanus, for example, was appointed by the people in 210 to a consular command against the Carthaginians in Spain, though he had been

only aedile, because of his family's military reputation. After his successes Scipio was directly elected consul in 205 to combat Hannibal. Another Scipio, born Aemilius but adopted by Africanus' son (becoming Scipio Aemilianus), was elected by the people direct to a consulship for 147, though he was standing only for the aedileship, to lead another war against Carthage; again the family name played a part. Against all convention, Marius, a "new man," held seven consulships in all, five in succession (104–100), while Pompey moved straight into a consulship for 70 without the previous magistracies and aged only 36. Cicero, consul in 63, achieved a double distinction: he was a "new man" and elected *suo anno*.

The *cursus* continued into the early imperial period, though the ages for office were lowered. There were a larger number of magistracies, but the emperor gained the right to nominate and even appoint candidates. The imperial family dominated the consulship, but a system of "suffect" (supplementary) consulships developed, giving the upper classes more chances at advancement. There were also more opportunities for military command, in both public and imperial provinces. Emperors could use appointment to office as an honor, though such appointments were not simply honorific. Increasingly men of equestrian rank occupied administrative positions, and a separate *cursus* developed for them.

Bruce Marshall

See also Aedile; Consul; Praetor; Proconsul; Proprætor; Quaestor; Tribune of the Plebs

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Cynoscephalae, Battle of (197 BCE)

Cynoscephalae was the decisive battle of the Second Macedonian War. In the autumn of 197 BCE, Roman consul Titus Quinctius Flamininus and a Roman army of approximately 32,000 men outflanked and decisively defeated a Macedonian force of 25,500 led by King Philip V. The victory ended Macedonian power in the eastern Mediterranean and proved the superiority of the Roman legion over the Greek phalanx.

Both armies met near the town of Pherae and skirmished without result, but the heavily wooded terrain proved unsuitable for battle. Both sides broke camp and advanced to the west toward the town of Scotusa to secure provisions for themselves. Bad weather, mist, and a range of hills—known as Cynoscephalae—shielded each army’s movement from each other.

Flamininus sent scouts to the summit of the hills to try and locate Philip’s army and met the Macedonian reserve force. Both armies sent reinforcements, and the Macedonians drove the Romans from the hilltop. Both sides then gathered their full strength and charged each other. Philip’s right wing steadily drove back the Roman left, but Flamininus and the Roman right in turn routed the Macedonian left, outflanking the remainder of the phalanx. An unnamed Roman tribune then led 20 maniples into the Macedonian rear, routing Philip’s army. Philip himself escaped, but the Romans were victorious. The Romans lost about 700 men, while killing 8,000 Macedonians and capturing about 5,000 more.

This battle is often regarded as proof of the superiority of the Roman legion over the stalwart, close-formation Greek phalanx. The legion’s flexibility proved the key: its organization into maniples allowed separate units to break off the pursuit of the fleeing Macedonian right wing, wheel around, and take the phalanx in the rear. The phalanx, armed with long spears and designed around a rigid formation, was incapable of reacting to the sudden threat to its rear and disintegrated.

Michael J. Stout

See also Macedonian War, Second; Flamininus. *Greek Section:* Macedonian War, Second; Philip V

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D

Dacia, Dacians

Occupying roughly the area of modern Romania, pre-Roman Dacia was unified in the first century BCE by the native leader Burebista, and was conquered in the late first and early second centuries CE by Domitian (81–96) and Trajan (98–117) in the Dacian Wars of 85–89 and 101–102 and 105–106. It is the latter two that are commonly termed the First and Second Dacian Wars. Dacia became Rome's only large province north of the Danube and was abandoned during the third-century crisis.

The various peoples collectively termed Dacians occupied the lower Danube basin and Carpathian Mountains (roughly modern Romania). Their cultures were influenced by the Celts. They were first united by the leader Burebista in the mid-first century BCE, who extended his realm into Illyricum, encroaching on Roman territory in Macedonia. After Burebista's death, however, the Dacians fragmented and were not reunified until the reign of King Decebalus in the late first century CE. Renewing Dacian expansion, Decebalus fought and defeated two Roman governors in 85 CE and 86. Domitian (81–96) inflicted a defeat on Decebalus at the Second Battle of Tapae in 88 and then made a peace with Decebalus in 89, establishing him as a client monarch, to free troops for a new war with a coalition of the Suebi and Sarmatians. Trajan (98–117) renewed the Dacian War, conquering Dacia in two wars between 101–102 and 105–106. The native Dacians are rendered in "barbarian" fashion as monumental statues that probably originally adorned the Forum of Trajan and in the reliefs on Trajan's Column.

Dacia was incorporated as a Roman province. Its native capital of Sarmizegetusa, destroyed in Trajan's Dacian Wars, was rebuilt as Ulpia

Traiana, a Roman colony. Many peoples from around the empire settled in Dacia, attracted to the opportunities for mining in the Carpathians and to the cities founded by the Romans. The Roman military presence also promoted urbanization near forts. The immigrants merged with the native Dacians. This makes somewhat implausible the persistence of a “barbarian” Dacian identity, attributed to the emperor Galerius (Caesar 293–305, Augustus 305–311) by Lactantius’ invective (Lactantius *De mortibus persecutorum* 9.2). Dacia itself was abandoned by the emperor Aurelian (270–275) as an indefensible salient; its inhabitants moved south across the Danube to Moesia.

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See also Aurelian; Barbarians; Burebista; Dacian Wars; Danube; Decebalus; Domitian; Frontiers; Galerius; Trajan

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Dacian Wars, Causes

The three wars fought between the Roman Empire and the kingdom of Dacia took place in the reigns of Domitian (81–96 CE) and Trajan (98–117) between 85–89, 101–102, and 105–106. (The last two are usually termed the First and Second Dacian Wars.) The Dacians had raided Roman territory since Caesar, but the sources record causes for the wars rather sketchily. They took sides with Pompey in the civil war with Caesar. Raids followed in the reigns of Augustus and Tiberius.

The Dacians caused the Domitianic War. The Gothic chronicler Jordanes asserts that there had been a long truce until the Dacians broke it by attacking Moesia, motivated by fear of the emperor Domitian’s avarice. Suetonius specifically places the blame on the Dacians for the destruction of a legion and calls the Roman War justified, contrasting it with Domitian’s

unnecessary war against the Germanic Chatti. Dio's notice is particularly brief and neutral: that a very serious war with the Dacians came to be.

Dio is the main source for the First and Second Dacian Wars. He acknowledges that Trajan began both wars, but exonerates him of guilt and favorably contrasts his character and martial abilities with Decebalus, having previously compared Domitian unfavorably to the Dacian king. Dio attributes three motives to Trajan for the First Dacian War: their previous deeds, the expensive Roman subsidies, and the growth of Dacian power and pride. The first motive, referring to the raids, clearly shifts the blame to the Dacians while the second and third directly affronted Roman honor. Dio once again firmly blames the Dacians for the Second War, asserting that King Decebalus was breaking the treaty that ended the First War in several points: collecting arms, withholding Roman deserters, repairing the fortifications of citadels, sending envoys to neighbors and annexing land from the Sarmatian Iazyges to the west.

The deeper causes for the Dacian Wars were expansionism; the desire for victory, *gloria*, or revenge; and economic motives. Rome was a very aggressive state. While the Republic was more aggressive than the empire, some emperors did fight expansionist wars. Trajan was particularly active and ambitious in his wars, fighting both the Dacians, the strongest polity in unconquered Europe, and the Arsacid Empire Rome's only real equal among her neighbors. These were the most extensive additions to the empire since the reign of Augustus and her most dangerous enemies. In addition, Trajan annexed the kingdom of the Nabataean Arabs peaceably as the province of Arabia Felix.

As an expansionist power, Rome expected its leaders to attain victory. The more ambitious emperors sought military renown (*gloria*). Dynastic insecurity quite often played a role in expansionism during the early empire. Trajan, for example, was the first provincial emperor (born in Spain of Roman descent) and was only adopted by Nerva (96–98) after the troops mutinied. He attained both dynastic security and *gloria* through his Dacian and Persian conquests. Doubtless, he sought comparison with Alexander the Great, the great paragon of military prowess in the classical world. Roman honor required revenge after the defeats by the Dacians in the Domitianic War and the disadvantageous treaty.

Lastly, the Romans did sometimes have economic motives for conquest. Dacia was in fact a prosperous kingdom with a partly monetized economy.

The gold mines of the western Carpathians were immediately exploited by the Roman state. Similarly, the Transylvanian plateau was a well-watered and fertile region that could readily support a garrison.

Stephen Chappell

See also Burebista; Column of Trajan; Dacia; Decebalus; Domitian; Emperor as Commander; Trajan; *Tropaeum Traiani*

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Dacian Wars, Course

The Dacian Wars occurred during the reigns of Domitian (81–96 CE) and Trajan (98–117 CE). While the Domitianic War (85–89 CE) was inconclusive, Trajan's First Dacian War (101–102 CE) and Second Dacian War (105–106 CE) were partial and total Roman victories, respectively. The Second Dacian War led to Roman annexation of the kingdom of Dacia as a Roman province in 106 CE. Roman conflict with Dacia reflected a broader shift in frontier policy in the late first century CE away from the Rhine and toward the Danube. As the Rhine frontier zone became more secure, emperors shifted legions to the Danube to counter the increasing threat of the Dacians and Sarmatians on the Danube.

There are few ancient sources for the Dacian Wars: Dio 67–68, Suetonius' *Life of Domitian*, and Trajan's Column. Trajan's Column is the most detailed source for the First and Second Dacian Wars, but is propagandistic and Romanocentric. No Dacian written sources survive. Archaeological evidence attests major destruction in Dacian citadels, such as Sarmizegetusa Regia, in Trajan's reign.

We know little about Domitian's war against Dacia. Dio uses his account of this war to criticize Domitian and praise Trajan. Although

Domitian took personal command thrice during his Dacian War, the Domitianic battles are mentioned only briefly. Suetonius notes the defeats of Oppius Sabinus in 85 CE and Cornelius Fuscus, commander of the Praetorian Guard, at the First Battle of Tapae in 86 and then summarizes the rest of the war in conjunction with Domitian's campaigns against the Chatti as battles of varying outcomes. This masks Domitian's victory over Decebalus in the Second Battle of Tapae (88 CE) that avenged the earlier defeats. Domitian ended his Dacian War because he needed troops for a war against the Suebi and Sarmatians, and made a treaty with Decebalus that granted payments of subsidies to Dacia and the loan of artisans and architects. The architects rebuilt parts of Dacian citadels in stone, particularly temple foundations. An altar near the *Tropaeum Traiani* lists the names of soldiers who died in the First Dacian War's disasters.

Trajan sought revenge for damaged Roman prestige in his First and Second Dacian Wars, which he conducted in person. He invaded Dacia in 101 CE (the First Dacian War), achieving a swift victory by 102. Trajan pressed forward quickly toward the Carpathian fortresses with strong forces in two columns. The Dacians retreated to higher ground. The Roman columns then reunited and defeated the Dacians. A second Roman victory allowed Trajan to besiege and capture the Dacian fortresses at Costești and Piatra Roșie, recovering the legionary eagle standards lost in Fuscus' defeat. Trajan forced a treaty on Decebalus, requiring the return of Roman deserters and removal of the defenses of the Carpathian fortresses. Decebalus also became a Roman client. Trajan then left behind garrisons.

Decebalus broke the treaty by maintaining his fortifications and large forces. Trajan declared war in winter 105 and won a final victory in 106. Decebalus fiercely attacked the Roman forces protecting the bridge over the Danube at Drobeta, but Trajan rallied his men and defeated the attackers. Once again the emperor divided the army into two and advanced rapidly on the Dacian capital at Sarmizegetusa Regia. The Romans took the citadel by assault with heavy Dacian losses. Decebalus and some warriors fled, but were pursued by Roman auxiliary cavalry. Decebalus killed himself with poison just before the moment of capture. The war ended with the capture or flight of many civilians, though few nobles (*pileati*) survived. Trajan annexed the Dacian kingdom as the province of Dacia under a consular governor in 106 CE. A monument to Trajan's Dacian Wars, the *Tropaeum Traiani*, was erected near Adamklissi.

See also Burebista; Column of Trajan; Dacia; Decebalus; Domitian; Emperor as Commander; Trajan; *Tropaeum Traiani*

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Dacian Wars, Consequences

The annexation of Dacia caused momentous effects: increased economic exploitation, large-scale colonization, major changes in settlement patterns, linguistic and cultural change, and the relative marginalization of the surviving Dacian population.

The Dacian kings had partly monetarized their economy in the first century CE and fostered commerce and mining, but the Roman economy intensified the scale and volume of economic activity. Gold mining and quarrying for stone expanded considerably. Urbanization provided markets for crops and manufactured goods, both domestic and imported. Lastly, military supply transformed agriculture and pastoralism in scale to sustain the garrison of two legions and numerous auxiliary regiments, almost 50,000 soldiers. In time, prosperous farms (*villae rusticae*) developed, especially near Apulum and Ulpia Traiana Sarmizegetusa. Material goods from the rest of the empire penetrated Dacia thoroughly.

Eutropius notes Dacia's depopulation in 106 and colonization from the whole Roman world. The final panels of Trajan's Column and continuity in settlement in many smaller Dacian sites show the survival of the Dacians. Inscriptions demonstrate significant colonization from the Greek east and Latin west. Major cities, such as Ulpia Traiana Sarmizegetusa, attracted settlers from the Mediterranean. But smaller towns, such as Ampelum and Alburnus Maior, saw immigration from peripheral areas: gold-miners from

rural Dalmatia and settlers from the caravan city of Palmyra. Merchants from Anatolia and Syria migrated for the emerging commercial and industrial expansion. Auxiliary units from Britain, Gaul, Africa, the Danube provinces, Anatolia, and the Levant arrived in the first generation of occupation. Many veterans retired in Dacia. The result was a cosmopolitan mix more diverse than in other provinces on the northern frontier.

The foundation of new cities altered the pattern of settlement in Dacia. While there was significant continuity in many rural sites in the province, most urban sites in Roman Dacia saw a significant break from the Iron Age kingdom. Ulpia Traiana Sarmizegetusa was a new site, 25 miles from the old capital of Sarmizegetusa Regia. The Roman founded cities such as Drobeta, Apulum, and Napoca because of their location on the emerging imperial communications network rather than their proximity to former Dacian villages. The entire pattern of settlement also increased in population density, largely because of the influx of colonists and garrisons.

The most important effect was linguistic and cultural change. Although the Dacian language doubtless endured in rural areas, Latin was the language of the cities and camps. The overwhelming majority of inscriptions in the province are in Latin with a tiny minority in Greek and some Palmyran wax tablets in the gold-mining towns. Only 2 percent of names in inscriptions were Dacian. Latin eventually turned into Romanian, the only major Romance language in eastern Europe. The Roman linguistic influence was thus profound and enduring.

Cultural change, or “romanization” as it was once called, introduced widespread innovations to Dacia. The result was the creation of a new culture neither Roman nor indigenous, similar to other frontier provinces in the Latin west. Many cultural influences entered from throughout the empire, carried by administrators, merchants, and soldiers. In the largest cities, Ulpia Traiana Sarmizegetusa and Apulum, the inhabitants could choose from elements of Roman and other traditions. The imperial synthesis of the Mediterranean core of the empire was strongest here. In smaller towns, there were fewer choices. The countryside engaged little with the imperial culture beyond the incorporation of its basic material goods.

Few Dacians erected Latin inscriptions. This is very atypical of the Latin west. The imperial government generally made efforts to incorporate local elites and those elites embraced the epigraphic culture. Since the Dacian aristocracy mostly fell in the Trajanic wars, the surviving peasants and

shepherds probably languished in rural obscurity with few opportunities to rise into the new imperial elite or to engage much with its emerging culture.

Stephen Chappell

See also Burebista; Column of Trajan; Dacia; Decebalus; Domitian; Emperor as Commander; Trajan; *Tropaeum Traiani*

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Dalmatia

The Roman province of Dalmatia comprised parts of modern-day Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Serbia. Geographically the province occupied almost all the Adriatic eastern coast, and stretched north as far as the Sava valley. The interior of the province was mountainous and more importantly rich in gold, silver, and iron deposits, which is probably what drew the Romans to the region in the first place. The peoples inhabiting the territory of the province were of Illyrian and Pannonian origin, and among them were the Delmatae (after whom the province was named), the Liburni, the Iapodes, the Maezaei, the Daesitiates, the Dindari, the Pirustae, the Ditiones, the Glinditiones, the Melcumani, and the Deuri, in addition to several smaller tribal units. Although this region had been visited sporadically by the Romans since 230 BCE, it was not until the end of the Pannonian revolt (around 8 or 9 CE) that the Roman province of Dalmatia officially came into existence. Dalmatia was created when the previous, larger province of Illyricum was divided into two smaller provinces, Dalmatia and Pannonia, for the purposes of easier control and administration of the region. Initially held secure by two legions in the aftermath of the Pannonian revolt, Dalmatia quickly becomes a peaceful ungarrisoned province, hosting only a small auxiliary force for policing

purposes. Dalmatia was governed by a Roman senator, who bore the official title *legatus Augusti pro praetore provinciae Dalmatiae*, the first of which was Gaius Vibius Postumus. In the later Roman Empire, Dalmatia became famous as the birthplace of several Roman emperors, most notable of which was Diocletian.

Blanka Misić

See also Illyria; Pannonian Revolt

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Damnatio Memoriae

Damnatio memoriae was the obliteration of an important Roman's public record, including his statues, portraits, inscriptions, family tree, tomb, and other forms of commemoration. It was imposed as a *post mortem* punishment on enemies of the state and on hated and despised rulers. It is most associated with the emperors, but also dates from the late Republic.

Public commemoration was central to Roman elite culture, recording for posterity the exploits of men with distinguished political and military careers. Career inscriptions are the most obvious form of record. Famous men in their lifetimes might dedicate buildings or temples. After their deaths, their relatives held elaborate funerary processions displaying the wax death masks of deceased ancestors. The emperors, belonging to this elite, carried on and expanded the tradition of public commemoration, possessing greater resources to erect monuments and buildings. Senatorial aristocrats continued to hold office in the imperial period and also perpetuated this public culture.

Conversely, the worst punishment imaginable was not death itself, but the destruction of an individual's public record, a *post mortem* punishment termed *damnatio memoriae* by modern scholars (the Romans did not use the term). *Damnatio memoriae* involved a wide range of *post mortem* sanctions, including the official condemnation of the individuals by the Senate; the annulment of their legislation; and the destruction of their public inscriptions and images (portraits and statues). Related sanctions

included the invalidation of their wills, the confiscation of their property, and the denial of a public funeral or public mourning. At worst, the condemned person's body might be desecrated, usually by severing the head and exhibiting it in public; the body might be thrown into a river or sewer. However, there was no one legal institution that combined all these features, and in many instances some but not all these features appear. It was obviously infeasible to destroy all inscriptions and images of an emperor who had reigned for many years.

Though *damnatio memoriae* is most often associated with unpopular emperors, it predates the Principate and was inflicted on Gaius Gracchus (d. 121 BCE; Plutarch, *C. Gracchus* 18) and on Lucius Appuleius Saturninus. It was also inflicted in the Marian-Sullan conflict, and in the Sullan and triumviral proscriptions of 82–81 and 43–42 BCE. In these cases, the *post mortem* condemnation of enemies was due to their status as *hostes publici*, public enemies. Their corpses were left unburied and often decapitated, since individuals who sought rewards for murdering proscribed persons had to provide proof by producing the victim's severed head.

Revulsion against this period motivated the early emperors to moderate *damnatio memoriae*-like policies. Though Mark Antony's statues were destroyed (Plutarch, *Antony* 86.4), Augustus merely refrained from mentioning Antony and other rivals by name in his *Res Gestae*, the monumental inscription recording his career and deeds. Though the Senate condemned Gnaeus Calpurnius Piso *pater*, the treasonous governor of Syria who allegedly murdered Germanicus in 19 CE, it moderated some of the features of condemnation in the surviving *Senatus Consultum de Cn. Pisone patre* (Flower 1998; cf. Tacitus, *Annals* 3.17–18). The Senate confiscated Piso's property, but gave most of it back to his descendants, including Piso's son, who was forced to change his praenomen Gnaeus to Lucius but subsequently had a distinguished career. When the Senate wanted to condemn Caligula's memory, the emperor Claudius dissuaded them (Dio 60.4.5).

As the case of Piso shows, personages other than emperors might also receive *post mortem* condemnation, as did Lucius Aelius Sejanus, Tiberius' Praetorian prefect (Dio 58.11.5). Roman women were also subjected to *damnatio memoriae*, as with Julia the granddaughter of Augustus, convicted for adultery and subversion. In most instances, the consort of a condemned emperor was likely to suffer the same fate.

Subsequently, the Senate imposed *damnatio memoriae* on the hated Domitian (81–96) (Suetonius, *Domitian* 23). In 193, the Senate called for the condemnation of Commodus (*Historia Augusta, Commodus* 18.1–19.9), chanting execrations: “let the memory of the murderer and the gladiator be abolished” (19.1) and “let him be dragged by the hook” (desecrating his corpse). The emperor Caracalla (211–217) imposed *damnatio memoriae* on his younger brother and coruler Geta, whom he assassinated. A famous painting of the Severan imperial family once displayed Septimius Severus, Julia Domna, Caracalla, and Geta; Geta has been blotted out of the painting. The latest definite imperial victim of *damnatio memoriae*-like policies is Maximian (286–305), Diocletian’s coruler, who attempted on his own to regain imperial power after 305 and was defeated and committed suicide (or was forced to do so). After his suicide, his images were destroyed; because Diocletian’s and Maximian’s images had been paired as corulers, Diocletian’s images were also destroyed (Lactantius *De mortibus persecutorum* 42). However, Diocletian’s policies were allowed to stand.

It is unlikely that the statues of deposed emperors and unsuccessful usurpers were always destroyed. Many statues of deposed emperors and usurpers were probably just removed from display; with the rapidly changing fortunes of civil wars, a successor might put them back on display to rehabilitate a previous ruler (Varner 2004; Galinsky 2008).

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See also Caligula; Caracalla; Civil Warfare; Commodus; Domitian; Elite Participation; Gaius Gracchus; Maximian; Piso, Gnaeus Calpurnius; Proscriptions; Tiberius (Emperor); Treason

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Danube (River)

With a length of 1,785 miles, the Danube River (Danuvius or Ister) formed the Roman Empire's northern border for the provinces between Raetia in the Alps through Moesia near the Black Sea. The only province north of the Danube was Dacia, added in 106 CE and abandoned in the reign of Aurelian (270–275).

The Danubian provinces, as they are often termed by modern scholars, were added in stages. Rome's conquest of Illyria, the part of the Balkans bordering on the Adriatic Sea, was achieved in the late Republic; conquests in the reign of Augustus (27 BCE–14 CE) extended Illyricum to the Danube. The Romans explored the length of the Danube, disproving the Greek belief that the upper river (Danuvius) as far as the Iron Gate gorge, and the lower river (Ister) flowing into the Black Sea were separate rivers. However, the river's gorges south of modern Belgrade, especially the dramatic gorge known as the Iron Gate, discouraged continuous navigation. Besides the conquest of Dacia, Trajan's army carried out public works at the Iron Gate, building a canal to bypass the gorge, repairing the towpath, and building a bridge across the Danube (*CIL* III 1699 = *ILS* 8267).

The Danube formed the northern boundary for the provinces of Noricum, Pannonia, and Moesia. Pannonia and Moesia were divided into Upper and Lower Pannonia and Upper and Lower Moesia. Legionary bases on the Danube developed into important provincial cities. The Danube was patrolled by two Roman fleets, based in Pannonia and Moesia. Due to the expense and slowness of land transport in antiquity, the Danube River was an important transportation route for the Roman army, for traders, and for Roman emperors and dignitaries traveling through the Danubian provinces. A Roman road bordered the south bank of the Danube from Castra Regina in Raetia to the Black Sea delta.

Sara E. Phang

See also Augustus; Dacia; Fleets; Frontiers; Pannonia; Trajan

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De Rebus Bellicis

The *de Rebus Bellicis* (“On military matters”) is a Roman military treatise written by an anonymous author in the fourth or very early fifth century. It explicitly states that the emperor Constantine I was dead, placing the date of composition after 337, and tells us that the empire was under severe external threat. Some scholars suggest the battle of Adrianople (378) as the earliest possible date of composition. The unknown author suggests a variety of mechanical weapons and other innovations (such as cattle-powered paddle wheel boats) that could be used to maximize the lethality of Roman military units. He also criticizes the performance of the contemporary Roman army, suggesting poor morale during the final crisis of the Roman Empire. A few of *de Rebus Bellicis*’ more sensible suggestions, such as a padded undergarment (*thoracomachus*) to be worn under body armor, may have already been in practice. The more extravagant weapons and vehicles do not seem to have been implemented.

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See also Military Treatises; Vegetius

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Debt

Debt was a chronic aspect of the agrarian economy of ancient peasant societies; even the most competent small farmer could lose his crops to a myriad of unforeseen circumstances, and require a subsistence loan to cover the expense feeding his family and procuring seed for the next planting. Unfortunately for the ancient peasant, credit was simultaneously a means of social control as well as an economic mechanism. Social strife rooted in debt was a driving force in the so-called Struggle of the Orders. Early law concerning debt was brutal: in the Twelve Tables (ca. 450 BCE), a creditor after 30 days of default might personally arrest his debtor and imprison

him (Aulus Gellius 20.1). After 60 days, the creditor, having announced his intent on three successive market days, could either sell the debtor into slavery across the Tiber to the Etruscans, or murder him. If there were multiple creditors, then “they shall cut into parts” (*partis secanto*) (XII Tables 3.6). Some scholars have argued that *partis secanto* involved the literal cutting up of the debtor’s body as a deterrent, exemplary punishment, or expression of cruelty; this savagery cannot be ruled out, but more likely *partis secanto* involved the division of the debtor’s property. For all of its harshness, the law of debt in the Twelve Tables may reflect some reforms, given that the law code itself was represented in the sources as a plebeian victory. Debtors were given some procedural guarantees, including the 30 and 60-day grace and probationary periods, as well as the triplicate public announcement of the debt, presumably to allow relatives and friends a chance to redeem the debtor prior to the terrible final consequences. Specific requirements were also laid out mitigating the treatment of the imprisoned debtor, so that his creditor was required to provide minimum rations of one pound of wheat a day (more if he so chose), and to fetter the debtor in no more than 15 pounds of chains (the creditor also had the option of letting the debtor live on his own to save the expense of feeding him).

The annalistic tradition reports various attempts to limit the interest rate on loans during the fourth century BCE, capping interest at first 8 1/3 in 357 and then 4 1/6 in 347, but these measures were likely temporary and ineffective (a rate of 8 1/3 had already been defined in the Twelve Tables, a rule that seems to have been ignored).

A more significant reform came in 326 (or 313) with the passage of the *lex Poetelia*, which banned a form of indentured servitude known as *nexum*, in which a debtor contracted up front to labor for the creditor for a fixed period in exchange for a loan; the indentured labor of children might also be pledged as a form of repayment. The story in Livy (8.28) about a handsome youth being imprisoned for debt and then sexually abused by his creditor is almost surely fiction, given the parallels with the Rape of Lucretia and Appius Claudius’ outrages against Verginia, but it nonetheless continues a Roman historiographical tradition of attributing political reform as a response to sexual misconduct (which in turn symbolizes and embodies broader political inequity). As a practical measure, the *lex Poetelia* was probably connected with the renewal of hostilities with the Samnites (the so-called Second Samnite War), and the anticipated need for military

manpower. Poor citizens were more useful as soldiers than as debt bondsmen. The increasing influx of chattel slaves from foreign wars may have also convinced the elite that they could do without the indentured labor of citizen *nexi*.

Debt continued to be a source of social tension, and is listed as a motive behind the final succession of the plebs in 287 BCE. While the *lex Poetelia* banned a specific form of contracted indentured servitude, private imprisonment for debt (either owing to a defaulted loan or a tort action) continued. In 215, there were roughly 6,000 adult male citizens imprisoned in chains (*addicti*), for debt who were freed by a consular edict to fight against Hannibal (Livy 23.14; Valerius Maximus 7.6.1). While we hear no more of debtors killed or sold into chattel slavery (these actions may have also been banned by the *lex Poetelia*), they still could be held a state of servitude until they either worked off the debt or produced the money. The early imperial agricultural writer Columella (*On Farming* 1.3) refers to the practice of farming land with the “bondage of citizens” (*nexu civium*; n.b. the use of the archaic term). Hadrian banned the imprisonment of free men in workhouses (*ergastula*), a measure attesting to the enduring nature of the problem of predatory lending in the ancient world, and one that was likely limited in its effectiveness.

The ultimate solution to the ongoing debt crisis in the early Republic was conquest, as the distribution of land and plunder propped up the economic fortunes of the peasant class, breaking the structural cycle of debt, default, and dispossession that chronically menaced the small-landowner. Indeed, the temporary solution created by the *lex Poetelia* and associated reforms spawned a virtuous cycle, in which citizens increasingly possessed the economic ability to serve as *assidui* (and were perhaps more willing to fight and die for the *res publica* with the mitigation of internal oppression), providing the manpower for successful conquest, which in turn provided additional resources for distribution. The end of colonization activities in Italy in the 170s BCE led to a return of the vicious cycle, exacerbated by predatory behavior of large-landowners employing chattel-slaves obtained from overseas conquest, leading to renewed social crisis centered on poverty and debt that underlay much of the political violence of the late Republic.

Michael J. Taylor

See also Patrician-Plebeian Conflict; Recruitment of Army (Republic);

Samnite Wars

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Decebalus (Reigned 80s–106 CE)

Decebalus was the last king of Dacia before the Roman conquest. He fought three wars against Rome: winning victories against the generals of Domitian (85–89 CE) and a partial and later total defeat against Trajan (101–102 and 105–106 CE). Though Decebalus' Dacia was smaller and more homogeneous than Burebista's multiethnic empire, it was the strongest and most sophisticated state north of the Danube in its day. Cassius Dio (Books 67–68) is the main source for the reign of Decebalus, focusing almost entirely on the Dacian Wars. Jordanes (76–78) describes the war against Domitian, but omits Decebalus and Trajan's Dacian Wars. Trajan's column provides a pictorial record of Trajan's Dacian Wars from a Roman perspective. There are no Dacian sources.

Decebalus ruled a sizable kingdom in eastern Europe. Its extent is unclear though in all likelihood was similar to that of the later Roman province of Dacia, encompassing most of western Romania. The capital was Sarmizegetusa Regia that boasted many limestone temples, tower dwellings, and terraced agriculture. There were several other fortified citadels in the nearby mountains that played an important role also, including the former capital of Costești. They formed a concentric ring around Sarmizegetusa.

Dio's characterization of Decebalus (67.6) reflects his own political bias as a senatorial historian as much as the king's character. He praises Decebalus strongly in comparison to Domitian, whose despotism he deplores, but emphasizes the strength and nobility of Trajan by contrast to Decebalus' fear. According to Dio, Decebalus exhibited great military

prowess. He was versatile in attack and defense, skillful both in victory and defeat and was, all in all, an enemy worthy of the Romans.

Decebalus caused the war against Domitian (85–89 CE) by raiding Roman territory. When Domitian sent armies against him, he defeated them, first the governor of Moesia, Oppius Sabinus, and then a force of picked troops led by Cornelius Fuscus, the praetorian prefect. Both died in battle. Domitian himself took command of the army and inflicted a defeat on the Dacians at Tapae (88), but made a compromise peace with a still vigorous Decebalus. At this time, Domitian faced incursions by the German tribesmen in Pannonia and unrest in Rome. It was easier to pay Decebalus off and treat him as a Roman client than to wage war on at least two fronts.

Trajan attacked Dacia in 101 CE to avenge Roman honor. He won a swift victory, recaptured Fuscus' lost standards, and forced Decebalus into submission within a year. Decebalus rearmed his forces and protected Roman deserters, causing Trajan to declare war again in 105. Decebalus held Sarmizegetusa Regia under siege for a time, but fled after its fall and committed suicide when Roman soldiers were closing in to capture him.

Stephen Chappell

See also Burebista; Client Monarchs; Dacia; Dacian Wars; Trajan

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Decemvirate

The Decemvirate was a special commission of 10 men (*decem viri*) formed to formulate a code of laws for Rome in 451 BCE, which attempted to seize power in 450 and was overthrown. Prior to the Decemvirate, the Romans (according to later tradition) lacked a formal legal code and relied on custom.

The Decemvirs formed a special college with consular powers, the other magistracies being suspended during their tenure, and were not restricted by *provocatio* (the right of a Roman citizen to appeal the action of a

magistrate). The decemvirs drew up 10 of the XII Tables (Twelve Tables), Rome's most ancient law code. The XII Tables are reconstructed from citations by later Latin authors. They represent a relatively primitive society in which the "eye for an eye" principle still prevailed: as punishment for bodily harm, similar harm could be inflicted on the offender. Debt bondage (*nexum*), in which a debtor unable to pay a creditor became the slave of the creditor, is another institution attested in the XII Tables that was later abolished. The XII Tables represent a period of superstition when witchcraft (if that is what *occentare* means, "chanting" a spell) could be a crime. Classical Roman law, from the last century BCE and reaching its height in the second and early third centuries CE, was more rationally based and more humane.

A second Board of Ten was appointed for 450 BCE to enact two more tables, completing the XII Tables. According to legend, these decemvirs became more and more arrogant, led by the decemvir patrician Appius Claudius, and refused to relinquish their powers at the end of their term. Appius Claudius intended to seduce the plebeian virgin girl Verginia, forcing one of his clients to claim her as his slave. Verginia's father and her intended husband Icilius sued, but Appius Claudius himself was the judge and decided in favor of his client. Rather than surrender Verginia to Appius Claudius, Verginia's father killed her to save her from dishonor. The injustice and tragic death inflamed the Roman *plebs* against the patrician Decemvirs.

Revolting against the decemvirs, the Roman plebs seceded, meeting on the Aventine, and overthrew the decemvirs. Normal magistracies were restored, and Appius Claudius committed suicide (Cicero, *Republic* 2.61–63; Livy 3.33–58; Dionysius *Roman History* 10.54–11.46; Juvenal *Satires* 3.44–48). The dramatic story of Appius Claudius and Verginia has been doubted by modern historians, who see it as repeating "typical" motifs about tyrants (cf. Sextus Tarquinius, Lucretia, and the fall of the monarchy). However, the conflict of patricians and plebeians reached a head in the period of the Decemvirate and would not be resolved till the next century (367 BCE).

Sara E. Phang

See also Civil Rights; Overthrow of the Monarchy; Patrician-Plebeian Conflict; *Provocatio*; Republic, Political Structure

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Decius (Emperor) (d. 251 CE)

Gaius Messius Quintus Decius reigned as Roman emperor from 249 to 251 AD, and ambitiously took the additional name “Trajan.” Hailing from an old senatorial family, he distinguished himself militarily as well. He usurped the throne from Philip Arabus following a successful campaign in the Balkans. But domestic and foreign insurrections plagued his reign, which ended with his inglorious defeat and death (along with his eldest son) at the hands of Goth invaders, led by Cniva (or Kniva). Decius’ domestic policies were aggressively conservative, and his command that all the empire’s inhabitants sacrifice to the gods prompted the first empire-wide persecution of the Christian church. Unreliable Latin sources allege that Decius vowed his death in battle to the gods in the manner of the *devotio* of Publius Decius Mus in the Samnite Wars.

Christopher J. Fuhrmann

See also Christians, Persecution of; Decius Mus, Publius; Goths; Philip Arabus; Third-Century CE Crisis

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Decius Mus, Publius

Publius Decius Mus is the name of three generations of Roman nobles, who allegedly sacrificed themselves at the hands of the enemy in battle, the

practice called *devotio*, in the Samnite Wars period.

The elder Publius Decius Mus served as a military tribune in the First Samnite War (ca. 343–341 BCE) and subsequently obtained the consulship in 340 BCE. Campaigning against the Latins, he elaborated upon the obscure Italian ritual of *devotio*, plunging into the enemy ranks, having first dedicated himself to the gods of the underworld in return for victory. The ritual of *devotio* was repeated by his son, also Publius Decius Mus, in the Third Samnite War at the battle of Sentinum in 295 BCE. His son in turn, a third Publius Decius Mus, died fighting against Pyrrhus in 279 BCE, although there is no evidence that this occurred in the specific religious context of a *devotio*.

The cognomen *Mus* means “mouse.” Many traditional Latin cognomina were belittling, tending to ridicule the owners. There was also an Aulus Sempronius Musca (“Fly”).

Michael J. Taylor

See also Devotio; Latin Wars; Pyrrhus, War with; Religion and Warfare; Samnite Wars; Sentinum, Battle of

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Decurion

A decurion (Latin *decurio*) was a low-ranking cavalry officer, originating in the Roman Republic. According to Polybius, each thirty-man *turma* of cavalrymen elected three decurions, with the first elected commanding the entire unit. The name derives from the division of the *turma* into three squads of 10 (*decem*) men, perhaps facilitating a deployment into three ranks of 10 files. Each decurion appointed an *optio* (Polybius calls these *ouragoi*, file closers) to serve as a second-in-command. In Polybius’ schema,

decurions were essentially centurions for the cavalry, although they seem to have lacked some of the prerogatives of centurions. There was, for example, neither a decurion equivalent to the *primus pilus* centurion, nor evidence that they received more pay than ordinary cavalrymen.

The title continued to describe cavalry officers during the empire, although each *turma* by then had only one decurion, who was appointed rather than elected: for example, Trajan promoted the Roman cavalryman Tiberius Claudius Maximus to decurion for his capture and decapitation of the Dacian king Decebalus. The imperial decurion was assisted by a *duplicarius* and *sesquiplicarius* (double-pay and one-and-a-half pay men), who filled the roles of the subordinate decurions of the Republic. The senior decurion of an imperial cavalry cohort was the *decurio princeps*. It was not unheard of for a man to serve as a decurion in a cavalry unit prior to promotion to centurion in the legions.

The term decurion also applied to town councilors in *coloniae* and *municipia*, another instance of the Roman tendency to use the same term for multiple institutions. However, the *ordo decurionum* or decurion order (also termed *curiales*) of the Principate and later Empire was entirely civilian, a class of local aristocrats with certain legal privileges who ran for municipal office. They were expected to pay extensive fees for office-holding and fund amenities for their towns, such as games, festivals, and baths. As a result, in the economic downturn of the late second century CE onward, many decurions abandoned office and left their cities. The later Roman emperors increasingly made decurion status and office-holding compulsory.

Michael J. Taylor

See also Cavalry (Republic); Centurion (Republic); *Turma*

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Dediticii

Dediticii (sg. *dediticius*) were captive people who had undergone unconditional surrender (*deditio in fidem*) to Rome and who were granted mercy. The emperor Caracalla's grant of Roman citizenship to all subjects of the empire did not grant the citizenship to *dediticii*. Especially in the later Roman Empire, they might be settled within the bounds of the empire and obligated to provide troops.

Sara E. Phang

See also *Deditio* (Surrender); Federates; Prisoners of War and Slavery

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Deditio (Surrender)

Deditio (and its fuller formulations, *deditio in fidem*, *deditio in potestatem*, and *deditio in dicionem* [sc. *populi Romani*]) was the term used by the Romans to describe the abject and total surrender of another state—people, infrastructure, possessions, and territory—to Rome through its representative (usually a consular or praetorian general). Livy suggests that the *deditio* ritual was very ancient; it first appears in his narrative during the reign of Tarquinius Priscus (616–579 BCE), where the precise verbal exchange between the Roman king and representatives of the surrendered state of Sabine Collatia is allegedly recorded (1.38.1–2). An inscription from Alcántara, Spain, dated to 104 BCE, recording the *deditio* of the Seanoc[enses?], indicates that the *deditio* formula had not changed much in the interim.

The different formulations the sources use to describe *deditio* (whether *in fidem*, *in potestatem*, or *in dicionem*) probably mean the same thing, and do not indicate any qualitative difference in terms of how the Romans treated the surrendered party. Indications to the contrary (e.g., Valerius Maximus 6.5.1; Livy 39.54.6–7) are contradicted by Polybius, who writes,

“among the Romans, surrendering to the good faith [i.e., *deditio in fidem*] has the same force as granting the decision about oneself to the conqueror [i.e., *deditio in potestatem*, *deditio in dicionem*]” (20.9.12). The latter passage occurs in the context of the Roman negotiations with the Aetolian League in 191 BCE (Polybius 20.9–10; Livy 36.27–29), when the League representatives alleged to be confused over the nature of Roman *deditio*, and tried to parse the different formulations to their own diplomatic advantage. The Greeks had their own indigenous version of *deditio*, and so were not as unfamiliar with it as the Aetolians alleged.

There were two circumstances under which foreign states performed *deditio* to Roman generals: either voluntarily to activate Roman protection or to avert a Roman attack, or under duress after a military defeat by Rome. Regardless of circumstances, however, the outcomes of *deditio* were the same: during the procedure, the surrendering state temporarily ceased to exist as an entity (although its representatives continued to have official standing); during and after the procedure, the state had a claim on Roman *fides* (good faith and protection); and, should the *deditio* be successful, the state would become a friend of the Roman people (*amicus populi Romani*). Occasionally, a treaty would follow.

It is controversial whether the *ius gentium* (“the law of nations”) compelled the Romans to merciful treatment of surrendered peoples (*dediticii*); after all, it was the prerogative of the general receiving the surrender to do as he wished with the *dediticii*, up to and including enslaving them and destroying their city. However, the centrality of *fides* in the *deditio* ritual, plus the facts that if a general wanted to destroy a city he could simply refuse an offer of *deditio*, and Roman betrayals of their *fides* after *deditiones* are relatively rare all indicate that the normative response to an offer and successful performance of *deditio* was mercy on the part of the Romans, regardless of the circumstances under which the *deditio* was offered (i.e., voluntarily or under duress).

Paul J. Burton

See also *Amicitia*; *Dediticii*; *Fides*; Law, International

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Deductio

Deductio was the formal foundation of a Roman citizen colony. In the Republic, the colonists were usually veterans and their families. The site was usually strategic, intended to help hold down a newly conquered area. The land was demarcated and surveyed, a process known as centuriation. The early *coloniae* had several hundred colonists each; later *coloniae*, in the late Republic, were larger. The practice of settling veterans on *coloniae* disappeared in the early empire, because veterans did not want to move away from the regions near the bases where they had served (Tacitus, *Annals* 14.27). As part of *deductio*, the new cities received charters prescribing Roman-type magistrates and by-laws. An instance from the Colonia Iulia Genetiva at Urso, Spain has survived, inscribed on bronze tablets (*CIL* II 5439, the *Tabula Ursonensis*, of Caesarian date). Such documents show that the new city had two chief magistrates (*duumviri*) and aediles, assistants for the magistrates, public priests, and decurions (city councilors). *Coloniae* were not independent city states in that they could not make war on their own behalf; the inhabitants, as Roman citizens, might be called out to defend the region if attacked.

Sara E. Phang

See also Latin Colonies; Roman Citizen Colonies; Veteran Settlement

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Demography

Demography is the study of human populations and their change over time: the size of the population; its geographical distribution; distribution over the human lifespan (known as age structure); mortality and fertility rates; the age at which men and women marry, and other metrics. Demography constrains the ability of a population to mobilize for war, contributing manpower and taxes to support government and armies.

Ancient demography is a particularly difficult discipline due to the lack of modern population statistics. Demographic reconstructions thus often use statistical models and comparative evidence. In the Republic, the Roman censors enacted a census of the citizen population, recording age, gender, and property. The census was held ideally every five years, intended to provide information for taxation and recruitment and for regulating the voting structure of the Republic, which assigned voting privileges according to property qualifications. However, much is not known about the criteria for the census. In the chaotic conditions of the last century of the Republic, the census often lapsed. Augustus revived the practice, but the census figures recorded in ancient authors are inconsistent and have generated much scholarly debate.

Censuses were taken in the empire for taxation purposes, since recruitment was now voluntary and voting was no longer relevant. The censuses varied from one province to another. From Roman Egypt many documents recording the “house-to-house census” survive on papyrus, which enable reconstruction of the demography of second- and early third-century CE Roman Egypt (mostly in the Fayûm Depression, a highly settled agricultural area). All provincial censuses fell into abeyance in the third-century crisis. The emperor Diocletian (284–305) and his successors revived the census and attempted to make it more uniform, but actual documents do not usually survive.

The Roman Empire at its height (first and second centuries CE) had a population of approximately 50 million to 60 million, unevenly distributed. The western empire was less urbanized and more sparsely settled, with about half the population of the eastern empire. Accordingly, Germanic invasions in the 160s–170s CE, the third century, and the late fourth and fifth centuries CE had a more harmful effect on the smaller western population. A long-term cause of the decline and fall of the western empire was thus that it was always more sparsely inhabited and less able to support recruitment and taxation.

Like other premodern societies, the Roman Empire had a bottom-heavy age structure, with a large proportion of children and young people, caused by a high birth rate (high fertility). Methods of contraception (various mechanical and chemical barriers) existed but were probably ineffective. There were probably not as many children and young people as in modern developing nations because of the high death rate (high mortality). The average life expectancy at birth was low, between 20 and 30. This does not mean that citizens of the empire aged twice as rapidly than modern people and were considered old at 30. The figure is an average, reflecting very high mortality in infancy and early childhood. Individuals who survived childhood might expect to live into their 50s or 60s. Mortality, however, was not uniform. The mortality rate of major urban populations was higher, especially in Rome, and the mortality of the lower strata was probably high. The mortality rates of the Roman emperors are unusually high for elites, reflecting the danger of assassination. Senators in the early empire show a similar pattern, reflecting early imperial treason trials.

The recruitment patterns of the republican army reflected this pattern of mortality. Young men were eligible at age 17 (reflecting relatively delayed puberty, a consequence of inadequate nutrition). They were liable to service until 60, but the most vigorous men (*iuniores*) were aged 17–46 and in practice only men aged 17–46 were called up. The extension of service in the Principate suggests a similar expectation of life. Legionaries served 16 to 20 years in the reigns of Augustus and Tiberius, and by the late first century CE, 25 years; auxiliaries served 25 years, fleet soldiers 26 to 28 years. A soldier who was recruited at 17–20 would thus be discharged at 40 to 45 years of age. When Tiberius extended legionary service to avoid paying veteran pensions, the soldiers resented this policy and, in the mutinies of 14 CE, indignantly displayed their gray hair and missing teeth. The Tiberian policy

suggests a rudimentary consciousness of age-related mortality: the pool of veterans of the same age who required pensions would be smaller at age 50 than at 45. However, centurions often served for many years, including years beyond the normal discharge date for common soldiers. Centurions' experience was highly valued; Roman society respected age when it correlated with status (cf. the Senate, senator meaning "elder").

A major controversy in Roman demographic studies concerns the demography of Roman Italy in the late Republic and its effects on politics and military manpower. Arnold J. Toynbee in his classic work *Hannibal's Legacy* argued that the Second Punic War devastated and depopulated many areas of Italy, resulting in poor men losing their farms and moving to the city of Rome, where they became *proletarii*, landless men dependent on work for hire. This process was exacerbated by the growth of very wealthy landowners who bought up the depopulated land and became even wealthier through plantation slavery. Ancient authors such as Plutarch and Appian depict the landless poor as a source of social conflict, exploited by tribunes of the plebs (beginning with Tiberius Gracchus) and by generals (beginning with Gaius Marius) who recruited and paid them, creating armies of loyal soldier-clients. The *populares*, Roman politicians (many of them tribunes of the plebs) who courted the support of the poor, also exploited the loyalty of landless men. Both warlords and *populares* contributed to the fall of the Republic.

This bleak demographic picture was supported by Peter Brunt's *Italian Manpower 225 B.C.–A.D. 14* (1971, rev. ed. 1987) and has been more recently supported by Luuk de Ligt (de Ligt 2012). It has the advantage of assuming our literary informants to be correct in perceiving widespread citizen poverty and a shortage of manpower, Tiberius Gracchus and his brother Gaius challenged the Senate and oligarchy (and were killed in doing so). However, the debate continues because it depends on the controversial interpretation of military strength and census figures from the late Republic, as well as more recent archaeological studies. Many areas of second century BCE Italy were not depopulated, and some areas populated by small farmers even underwent economic growth. Nathan Rosenstein (Rosenstein 2004) argues that impoverishment of poor farmers could have occurred not because of depopulation, but due to a population increase, resulting in the survival of more children and thus impoverishment due to the partition of inheritances (Roman estates were divided among all living children). Other

Roman economic historians have recently supported a “high” population hypothesis for the late Republic.

The population of the empire was severely impacted by the epidemic known as the Antonine plague (ca. 165–180 CE), brought back by the Roman army from the Near East during Lucius Verus’ campaign against the Persians. The disease (like many premodern epidemics) is unidentified but may have been measles or smallpox. The decline in population weakened the imperial economy and contributed to political instability in the late second and third centuries CE. Another plague, possibly smallpox or bubonic, also decimated the population in the 250s–270 CE. The long-term effect of these epidemics could have contributed to the fall of the western Roman Empire; however, high fertility rates meant that the population may have recovered rapidly, and archaeological evidence suggests that many areas of the empire in the fourth century were settled and prosperous. However, instability in the fifth century, as parts of the western empire were lost to the Germanic invasions, decreased the effective population of the western empire and thus the western empire’s tax revenues and manpower.

Sara E. Phang

See also Assassination; Augustus; Censors and Census; Diocletian; Egypt, Roman; Fall of the Roman Empire (West); Gracchan Land Conflict; Punic War, Second; Recruitment of Army (Republic); Tiberius Gracchus

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Deposita ad Signa

Imperial Roman soldiers' pay was deposited in a savings bank (probably a box or chest) kept in the shrine where the unit's standards (*signa*) were kept. Such funds were termed the *deposita ad signa*. The sacred nature of the shrine (located in the *principia*, the unit's headquarters) and the standards provided some protection against theft. However, after the revolt of Antonius Saturninus, who stole the *deposita ad signa* of his legions in Upper Germany to pay his supporters, the emperor Domitian set an upper limit to the *deposita ad signa*.

Sara E. Phang

See also Pay and Finances, Military (Imperial); Standards, Cult of; Usurpation

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Deprecatio

A plea for mercy expressed by enemies of Rome who confessed defeat and sought peace with the Romans. The enemies were expected to humble themselves and display submissiveness; if they did so, they might be treated with *clementia* (mercy). Unhumbled enemies were likely to be treated harshly. *Deprecatio* is distinct from formal surrender into Roman power (*deditio in fidem*).

Deprecatio is a stock motif in triumphal art (e.g., on historic monuments such as the Column of Trajan). Representatives of the enemy approach the victorious general and kneel at his feet.

Sara E. Phang

See also Column of Trajan; *Clementia*; *Deditio* (Surrender); Peace

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Desertion

Desertion has plagued armies in all ages, but in particular armies in premodern societies without effective police forces, systematic proofs of identity, and rapid transport and communications. The Roman army frequently campaigned in undeveloped regions where it was easy for deserters to escape into the wilderness. Despite the benefits of service and the moral censure and severe punishment of desertion, the Roman army found it difficult to prevent desertion.

Desertion was allegedly punished harshly during the early and middle Republic. According to the early imperial author Valerius Maximus, after the battle of Zama (202 BCE), Scipio Africanus, regarding desertion as worse in Roman soldiers, crucified Roman deserters and beheaded allied deserters (Valerius Maximus 2.7.12). Other commanders regarded allied deserters as deserving harsher punishment: Aemilius Paullus, victor of the battle of Pydna (168 BCE), had allied deserters trampled by elephants (Valerius Maximus 2.7.14); and Scipio Aemilianus, victor of the Third Punic War (149–146 BCE), had allied deserters thrown to wild beasts (Valerius Maximus 2.7.13). However, Valerius Maximus chose these anecdotes to illustrate the severity of ancient military discipline. Other anecdotes suggest that commanders of the mid-Republic might choose to shame deserters rather than kill them, for instance by forcing deserters to pitch their tents outside the walls of a military camp and feeding them on barley, regarded as animal fodder.

During the Republic, conscription may have made service unwelcome at least for some wars, such as the Spanish wars (150s–133 BCE). In the late Republic and empire, more soldiers were recruited as volunteers; when

Marius enrolled the landless, many soldiers chose service over an impoverished civilian life. Military service provided financial security and the prospects of plunder and donatives. In the Principate, the greatest inducements to prevent desertion were regular pay and donatives and the prospect of veteran benefits at the end of service—a cash pension for legionaries and the Roman citizenship for non-Roman auxiliaries. A soldier lost the prospect of these rewards if he deserted, as an emperor had to remind a soldier who returned from desertion in one legal instance.

Some degree of conscription continued in the Principate, and military service, especially for ordinary legionaries and auxiliaries on the frontiers, entailed repetitive duties, hard work, potential danger, and potential harsh punishment, all of which might motivate men to desert. The transfer of a legion or auxiliary unit might also motivate soldiers to desert, especially if their unit had been stationed in one place for a long time and the men had extensive ties with the local community. Soldiers also must have not welcomed the advent of a commander-in-chief or local commander with harsh ideas of discipline, such as Augustus and Tiberius, who both revived “ancient” punishments; Galba, who decimated a unit of fleet soldiers; or Domitius Corbulo, who executed even first-time deserters.

Nonetheless, legal sources from the late second and early third centuries CE and law codes from the fourth and fifth centuries CE show the Roman army’s attempts to cope with desertion. Desertion in wartime, to the enemy, or from the line of battle, was in theory punished very harshly (usually with death). But in peacetime, lest the fear of harsh punishment induce soldiers to desert, the emperors and jurists devised a more lenient policy toward men absent without leave (termed *emansores*). From the jurists’ opinions and rulings, absence without leave, such as overstaying furlough or returning late from detached duty, could arise due to extenuating circumstances, such as delay during travel, sickness, or even family issues. The jurists advised commanders to take into account these circumstances in judging whether a soldier was absent without leave or a deserter. The soldier absent without leave had to prove that he had permission to leave and that his return was unavoidably delayed; he might show paperwork, such as the petitions for furlough and passes that are attested. He had to prove that he did not intend to desert; his overall record was taken into account. If he was judged a deserter, in peacetime he might merely be punished with demotion in rank or service.

The Severan jurists' and emperors' rulings have been interpreted as showing leniency and favoritism toward the army. But these rulings may also have been intended to promote recruitment and discourage losses to desertion at a time with increased manpower demand due to the Marcomannic War, the Antonine plague, and the Severan civil wars.

Deserters might become bandits or brigands, or conceal themselves in a large city such as Rome or Alexandria. They might even be able to conceal their identity and enlist again elsewhere in a society in which proofs of identity, such as certificates of birth, were not widely used. Soldiers were identified by their names, units, distinguishing marks, and dates of enlistment, but it might be easy for a deserter without distinctive scars or other physical marks to claim another name and volunteer at another location.

Increasing use of conscription in the later Roman Empire (from Diocletian onward) may have made military service more unwelcome and desertion more frequent. Landowners were required to produce a certain number of recruits as a tax, the *aurum tironicum*, though it was often commuted to a monetary payment. The sons of soldiers and veterans were also required to serve in the army. Later Roman authors, especially Christian authors, suggest that military service had become unpopular. Legal sources show that recruits were tattooed (a practice previously used on slaves) to discourage desertion; the punishment of deserters became more brutal. However, the recruitment of "warlike peoples" (recently conquered or traditionally warlike) may have produced more willing recruits.

Military desertion (often motivated by fear of punishment) must be distinguished from political desertion, which occurred during the late Republic's and empire's civil wars and was not punished. Soldiers merely switched sides from one commander to another, retaking their military oaths.

Sara E. Phang

See also Army in Politics; Bandits and Brigands; Civil-Military Relations; Donatives; Emperor as Patron; Military Discipline; Military Law; Military Oaths; *Praemia Militiae*; Recruitment of Army (Imperial)

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Devotio

A rare vow taken by a Roman Republican general or soldier preceding a battle to dedicate his own and his enemies' lives to the gods in exchange for a Roman victory. This vow illustrates the Roman belief that the gods influenced military success. According to Livy, Publius Decius Mus, his son, and grandson of the same name took such vows in 340, 295, and 279 BCE, respectively. In the *devotio* of 340 BCE, Decius' prayer specified that he and the Latins, his enemies, were now sacred to the *di manes* (spirits of the dead) and to Tellus (goddess of the earth). Decius then rode into battle to meet his death willingly. According to Livy, Decius' self-sacrifice assured Roman victory.

In place of the general, any soldier could be dedicated to the infernal gods. If the soldier lived while the Romans achieved victory, then the Romans buried a seven-foot image of the man to fulfill the vow. Entire cities could also undergo *devotio*. During the Third Punic War (149–146 BCE), the Roman general Publius Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus devoted the city of Carthage to the gods of the underworld and the *di manes*, the spirits of the dead. These *devotiones* of others bear a close resemblance to human sacrifice.

Whether a commander or soldier devoted himself or *devotio* was imposed on another, these rituals were isolated, emergency measures taken in desperate military situations during the Roman Republic. Nonetheless, they illustrate that a Roman general sometimes placed victory in battle at a higher premium than his own life.

Amanda J. Coles

See also Decius Mus, Publius; Human Sacrifice; Religion and Warfare

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Dictator

In the Roman Republic, a dictator was not a military strongman, but rather an official magistrate of the republic. Although the dictator appears to have been an annual magistrate in some Latin towns, he was appointed only in times of crisis or emergency in Rome. At such times, one of the consuls, on the advice of the Senate, might appoint a dictator, also known as the Master of the People (*magister populi*), specifically to act as the sole commander of the Roman army. Dictators were almost always former consuls. In a nocturnal rite, the dictator received *maximum imperium*, to which all other magistrates of the Republic became subject. The degree to which the right of appeal and the tribunician veto were suspended under the dictator is debatable, though our sources claim it was complete, even as they show exceptions. Upon assuming office, the dictator named a deputy for himself, the Master of the Horse (*magister equitum*). The dictator was attended by 24 lictors (ritual attendants), twice the number allotted to each consul, and received several insignia of the ancient kings, all of which symbolized his supreme *imperium*. His *imperium*, however, was strictly limited in time: he was appointed for six months, or the duration of the crisis, whichever was shorter.

The dictatorship was primarily a response to a military crisis, and as such many dictators appear in the fifth century BCE, when Rome was regularly at war with one or more of its neighbors. Crises besides military defeats, though, could prompt the appointment of a dictator, particularly in the late third century. The *Fasti Capitolini* identify 81 dictators down to 202 BCE, of whom 56 were appointed to take command of the army during a military emergency (*rei gerendae causa*). Most of the remaining dictators were appointed to perform duties that the incumbent consuls were unable

to undertake, due to absence from the city or even death, usually to conduct consular elections (*comitiorum habendorum caussa*).

During the Second Punic War, the dictatorship began to decline in importance and, most likely, power. Thus, Quintus Fabius Maximus Cunctator was elected rather than appointed to the dictatorship in 217 BCE and put up with the elevation of his Master of the Horse, who had been chosen for him, to the status of codictator, as it were. The consuls appointed eight dictators in the following 15 years, but only the defeat at Cannae elicited a dictator who took charge of the army; the other seven performed civic tasks in the absence of the consuls. During this period, the citizen's right of appeal against the dictator and the tribunician veto, if they had been suspended under the dictatorship in earlier centuries, were restored. Following the Second Punic War, Rome abandoned the dictatorship for over a century.

Two reasons immediately suggest themselves for the absence of dictators after 202 BCE. Though some ancient and modern authors have claimed that there was no right of *provocatio* against a dictator (Livy 4.13–14, 8.33–35; most recently, Drogula 2015), the Livian incidents are intentionally dramatic. If there was in practice the right of appeal against the dictator and the possibility of the tribunician veto, these rendered a dictator's *imperium* little different that of the consuls. The dictator retained absolute *imperium* in military matters, but with most of Italy subject to Rome, a military defeat no longer threatened Rome with imminent danger. Moreover, as Roman armies operated further afield, a six-month dictatorship was impractical if an army were operating in, for example, Asia or even Spain, and there increasingly less need and less willingness to entrust absolute power to a single man. Prorogation was employed instead to assign provinces to governors as proconsuls or propraeors.

The dictatorship reappears in the first century BCE after a 120-year hiatus in a very different form. In 82, Sulla was appointed dictator to make laws and reform the constitution (*legibus faciendis et reipublicae constituendae caussa*); such a mandate was unique for a dictator. The citizen's appeal and the tribunician veto were again overridden by dictatorial *imperium*, which, coupled with Sulla's methods during and even before his appointment gave the office a despotic connotation. This most likely influenced Pompey's refusal of the dictatorship in 52 to suppress civic violence (*seditionis sedendae caussa*), believing that he would be less autocratic as that year's

only consul. Caesar's dictatorships between 49 and 44 BCE (that of 44 *in perpetuum*) added further opprobrium to the office, such that Augustus emotionally refused it when offered in 22 BCE.

C. Bailey

See also Consul; Caesar, Dictatorship of; Coriolanus; Fabius Maximus; Monarchy; Sulla, Dictatorship of

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Didius Julianus (Emperor) (193 CE)

A short-lived Roman emperor (193 CE), Marcus Didius Severus Julianus served as governor of Germany and Africa under Marcus Aurelius and Commodus. When the emperor Pertinax was murdered in March 193 CE, the praetorians held an auction of the imperial office, granting the empire to the highest bidder. The two bidders were Julianus and Flavius Sulpicianus, Pertinax' father-in-law. Julianus promised 25,000 sesterces to each member of the Praetorian Guard and won the purple. His reign lasted less than three months, after Septimius Severus, governor of Pannonia Superior, marched on Italy. On June 1, the Senate declared Severus emperor, condemning Julianus to death the following day.

Caillan Davenport

See also Army in Politics; Civil War (Pertinax-Septimius Severus); Donatives; Pertinax; Septimius Severus

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Dilectus

The *dilectus* was the Roman levy of soldiers, literally “selection,” best known during the traditional Republic. It depended on the census, carried out by the censors every five years. Male Roman citizens between age 17 and age 46 were liable to be called up. (Those between 17 and 60 were called up in a *levée en masse*, the *tumultus*, an emergency decree.) The consuls or other commanding magistrates decided how many men were needed for the year’s campaign, and the Senate passed a decree authorizing the levy. On a certain day, when a red flag was flown from the Capitoline, male citizens on the list were required to present themselves on the Campus Martius. The magistrates then selected the men most suitable for military service, as described by Polyb. 6.19.6–20.4. Not all citizens summoned would be selected for service; the magistrates probably selected younger men and those who were more strong and fit.

To evade the *dilectus* was traditionally a crime, but some Roman campaigns were less popular than others; the Spanish Wars of the 150s BCE were very unpopular (fighting the fierce and poor Spanish tribes offered much hardship and little plunder) and many men attempted to evade the levy. Citizens who wished not to serve could appeal to the tribunes of the plebs, who were formally empowered to provide *auxilium* (aid) to citizens who were oppressed by the magistrates. The consuls were able to resist the tribunes’ interference by declaring a *tumultus* (state of emergency) in which all citizens were required to serve.

Those selected by the *dilectus* subsequently presented themselves at specified locations to take the military oath (*sacramentum*) and be formally enlisted as soldiers. Those who had already served many campaigns might not be required to serve further. Sixteen to 20 campaigns were the upper limit for infantry in the traditional Republic, 10 campaigns for cavalry. Cavalrymen (*equites*, not to be confused with the social class termed equestrians) were aristocrats and members of the political class; they were expected to serve from age 17 to 26 or so, then run for office, seeking

election to magistracies that might feature military command. Roman nobles also served as military tribunes (not to be confused with tribunes of the plebs).

The *dilectus* of the late Republic and empire were probably conducted less formally, occurring away from Rome, in Italy and the provinces. Taking the military oath and enlistment on the rolls of a military unit (*in numeros referri*) were still solemn events, but recruitment now investigated the general status of a would-be soldier, determining that he was a Roman citizen (for legionary service) and that he was not a slave, criminal, or deserter.

Sara E. Phang

See also Military Oaths; Recruitment of Army (Republic); Republic, Political Structure; Spanish Wars; States of Emergency; Tribunes of the Plebs

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Diocletian (Emperor) (284–305 CE)

Emperor 284–305, Diocletian (Gaius Aurelius Valerius Diocletianus) was a creator of the later Roman Empire, as was his eventual successor Constantine I (306–337). Though he became notorious for initiating the last persecution of the Christians (303–311), Diocletian's major accomplishments included the reorganization of the Roman administration and tax system. His most remarkable creation was his political system, the Tetrarchy, which took adoptive succession to an extreme and collapsed in its second phase, after his abdication in 305. He and his colleague Maximian were also remarkable as the only emperors to abdicate; Maximian attempted to regain the purple.

Little is known about Diocletian's youth. He was named Diocles and is

said to have been the son of a freedman of the senator Anullinus; in another version, his father was a *scriba*, a copyist. Diocles was born in the early 240s; since he retired near Salonae in Dalmatia, he may have lived there in his youth. He became a military officer during the third-century crisis and reconquest. According to the unreliable *Historia Augusta*, he was promoted by Probus (278–282) as one of the *protectores*, the staff college of talented officers.

The accession of Diocletian was in effect a usurpation, colored by legend. Diocles was Emperor Numerian's commander of the guard (*comes domesticorum*, though this may be a later title). The Roman army and emperor were returning westward from Carus' Persian campaign. Numerian was a young man, under the thumb of his praetorian prefect, Aper. Aper allegedly murdered Numerian, concealing his death from the troops, but the emperor's corpse began to rot, exposing the crime. Aper intended to become emperor, but Diocles was acclaimed instead. Diocles immediately had Aper arrested, brought him before a tribunal of officers, and stabbed Aper to death, saying, "This is Numerian's murderer." Some modern scholars suspect that Diocles conspired with Aper to murder Numerian, then betrayed Aper to hide his guilt. The contemporary sources, even the very hostile Lactantius, do not suggest this version. Diocles changed his name to one more suitable for a Roman emperor: Diocletian.

Diocletian's first challenge was Carinus, Numerian's older brother and a more talented general. Diocletian and Carinus fought a battle near Margus in July 285; Carinus actually won the battle, but was assassinated by a follower, allowing Diocletian to claim the victory; Carinus' officers went over to him.

The empire was hardly stable. The Bagaudae, led by Aelianus and Amandus, were ravaging Gaul; depicted as a bandit leader, Amandus may have called himself emperor, minting coins. Rather than act alone, Diocletian elevated to the rank of Caesar an old comrade of his, Maximian, in 285. He in fact adopted Maximian as a son, though Maximian (born ca. 250) was close to his age, a pattern resembling the adoptions of Trajan, Hadrian, and the Antonines. Maximian successfully eliminated the Bagaudae, but then the captain of the Channel fleet, Carausius, revolted in 286, holding Britain and the Gallic coast. The revolt of Carausius probably induced Diocletian to elevate Maximian to co-Augustus (286). Past emperors had made their sons co-Augusti—such as Septimius Severus and Caracalla

or Valerian and Gallienus. Diocletian's distinctive partnership with the nonrelated Maximian resembled Marcus Aurelius and Lucius Verus, or more recently Pupienus (Maximus) and Balbinus, shortlived senatorial emperors (238). However, Marcus and Lucius were already related by adoption.



Aureus of Diocletian (284–305 CE). The emperor Diocletian, a military officer of obscure origins, formed an imperial junta or Tetrarchy of co-emperors. Though Diocletian was a highly capable ruler, reorganizing the later Roman administration and taxation system, his political system broke down after 305. Located in the Yale University Art Gallery, New Haven, Connecticut. (Yale University Art Gallery)

Not yet ready to attack Carausius, Maximian campaigned in the west against Germanic peoples. Diocletian campaigned in the eastern empire, where he established Tiridates III as king of Armenia in 287 and reorganized the eastern frontier. After Shapur died in 270, the Persian Sassanid dynasty had become less aggressive toward Rome, having its own succession crisis; three descendants of Shapur ruled briefly until Narses, a son of Shapur,

seized the throne in 293.

Maximian failed to expel Carausius from Gaul and Britain, and in 293 Diocletian took an unprecedented step, elevating two deputy emperors, the Caesars, Galerius, and Constantius I. In previous reigns, Caesars had been relatively young men or boys, typically sons of the emperor, not entrusted with great power. Galerius and Constantius were grown men (about the same age as Diocletian himself), proven military officers and administrators. The four emperors were called the Tetrarchs ("Four Rulers" in Greek). Symbolism bound them; Diocletian took the title Jovius, Maximian Herculus, forming quasi-divine dynasties. The daughters of the Augusti also married the Caesars. Diocletian's daughter Valeria (his only child) married Galerius. Constantius was assigned to the western empire, as a deputy of Maximian, and Galerius to the eastern empire, as a deputy of Diocletian; however, the Augusti and the Caesars lacked strict geographical jurisdictions as they constantly traveled. The peripatetic presence of the four emperors in the provinces, especially along the frontiers, was intended to discourage revolt and usurpation.

In Britain, Carausius was murdered by his finance minister Allectus, who claimed the purple. In 296, Constantius launched a successful campaign against Allectus, destroyed him, and was hailed as restorer of Britain.

Meanwhile Narses, the Sassanid king, ejected Tiridates III from Armenia and went to war against Rome (296). Diocletian sent Galerius to fight Narses. Galerius lost his first battle against Narses, displeasing Diocletian, who let him try again. Galerius invaded through Armenia, swept down the Tigris, and captured Ctesiphon, the Persian capital, returning up the Euphrates (297). Consolidated by a peace treaty at Nisibis that was favorable to the Romans, Galerius' victory restored Roman control in the east as far as Mesopotamia and avenged the defeat and capture of the emperor Valerian in 260.

It had been routine for emperors to use subordinates as commanders during the earlier Principate, a pattern Diocletian somewhat returned to. He chose Maximian, Constantius, and Galerius to be his generals. However, Diocletian did command more routine fighting on the Danube, and when Egypt revolted under Domitius Domitianus and Achilleus in 297, Diocletian commanded the siege of Alexandria and restored order to the province (298). He extensively strengthened and rebuilt frontier installations, most notably a road system in southern Syria, the *strata Diocletiana*.

Diocletian's major talents were as an administrator. He reorganized the provinces, dividing them into smaller provinces (a trend that had begun earlier) to make them easier to administer and shorten lines of communication and travel, and also to discourage would-be usurpers. The provinces were grouped into dioceses, each administered by a *vicarius*, who answered to the praetorian prefects, one prefect per emperor. Civil administration and military command were separated; military commanders, or *duces* (sg. *dux*) commanded armies that stretched across several provinces, but they had no access to the treasury, again to discourage revolt.

Diocletian followed the policy begun by Gallienus of excluding senators from provincial governorships and military commands, though Diocletian allowed senators to hold administrative posts in Italy and the traditional proconsulships of Africa and Asia.

Diocletian also reorganized the financial system of the empire. He reinstated a census, which had been allowed to lapse, but changed the mode of assessment of land and poll tax. His enemies claimed that he greatly increased taxes to support a vastly increased bureaucracy and army, but documentary sources show that the actual burden of taxation did not greatly increase; no doubt taxes had been unsystematic during the third-century crisis, with the army requisitioning what it needed in the frontier regions. Much taxation was still collected in kind. The debasement of the coinage continued, and Diocletian attempted to retariff the coinage, minting more bronze coins. Inflation motivated his Edict on Maximum Prices (301), which was inscribed on stone at various sites and assigned fixed prices to an exhaustive list of commodities and services. The Edict blamed the greed of merchants, threatened them with capital punishment, and was intended to benefit the army. It was a failure; some merchants died, and prices continued to increase.

Diocletian's other least successful policy was his persecution of the Christians, begun in 303 and preceded by a purge of Christians from the army. Diocletian was a devout religious traditionalist, upholding Jupiter and other state gods of traditional Rome. He issued an edict against the Manichaeans, a quasi-Persian religious sect. Yet Diocletian did not persecute the Christians till late in his reign, and tolerated their presence at Nicomedia (though Constantine, being educated at Diocletian's court, was not yet a convert). According to Lactantius, Diocletian was influenced by

Galerius, who hated Christians and who had become arrogant after his great victory over Persia. Diocletian was also superstitious, believing that a sacrifice he officiated at (a traditional role of the emperor) had been disrupted by Christians.

The so-called Great Persecution of 303–311 began with an edict requiring Christians to hand over their sacred books; destruction of churches and meeting places; elite Christians lost the legal privileges of their status; imperial freedmen were returned to slavery; and Christians lost legal rights to sue or counter-sue. Later edicts (2) imprisoned Christian clerics; (3) released clerics who sacrificed to the gods or emperors; and (4) required all Christians to sacrifice to the gods or emperors. Those Christians who defied the edicts were liable to torture and execution. The persecution was enforced very unevenly. In the eastern empire it was enforced by Diocletian, Galerius, and later Maximinus II. In the western empire, Maximian enforced the edicts vigorously, but Constantius I did not (according to later sources favorable to his son Constantine). It was also up to local officials to enforce the edicts, and many looked the other way.

In winter 303 Diocletian traveled to Rome to attend his *vicennalia* or 20-year jubilee with Maximian. There he compelled Maximian to promise to abdicate with him. On his way through the Balkans to Nicomedia Diocletian fell ill and was seriously ill all winter. He abdicated on May 1, 305 at Nicomedia, as did Maximian at Milan. At his abdication, Diocletian elevated Galerius to Augustus; Galerius' nephew Maximinus II Daia became Caesar. In Milan, Constantius I became Augustus; Severus, a friend of Galerius, became Caesar. These arrangements surprised courtiers, who allegedly had expected Constantius' son Constantine and Maximian's son Maxentius to become the Caesars. According to Lactantius, Galerius bullied Diocletian (no longer strong enough to rule) into abdication and forced his own choice of Caesars on him. Some modern scholars have seen the choice to abdicate and choice of Caesars as Diocletian's own, affirming the principle of adoptive succession over hereditary succession. However, the choice of Galerius' nephew Maximinus does not fit, appearing dynastic.

Diocletian retired to a palace at Spalato (the modern city of Split) in Dalmatia that he had begun building earlier (supporting the theory of a planned abdication). He abstained from the new period of conflict, termed in CAGR the "Tetrarchic Civil War," that began when Constantius died and Constantine revolted at York in 306. Diocletian himself died of natural

causes in 311 or 313.

The sources for Diocletian's reign are challenging, contemporary narrative being provided by the Christian authors Lactantius (*On the Deaths of the Persecutors*) and Eusebius (*History of the Church*). In particular, Lactantius condemns Diocletian's policies and glorifies Constantine. The parts of Ammianus Marcellinus and Zosimus that covered Diocletian's reign are not extant. Writing in the 350s, Eutropius and Aurelius Victor provide a more favorable pagan view of the reign. The *Historia Augusta's* *Life of Carus, Carinus and Numerian* provides a glimpse of Diocletian but invents material (the author did not know he was called Diocles before his accession). Diocletian's policies are best studied through the documentary sources, which increase in volume as stable conditions returned to the empire. Modern scholarship on Diocletian has only recently escaped the tendency to project upon him the entire history of the later Roman Empire and its fall.

Sara E. Phang

See also Carausius; Carinus; Christians, Persecution of; Constantine I; Constantius I; Documentary Sources; Emperor as Commander; Eusebius; Galerius; Lactantius; Maxentius; Maximian; Maximinus II Daia; Persian Wars, Arsacid; Succession (Imperial); Tetrarchic Civil War; Third-Century CE Crisis; Usurpation

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Diodorus Siculus (d. 30 BCE)

A Greek author of the *Bibliothēke* or “Library,” a history of the world from mythological times to 60 BCE. Its focus was Greek and Sicilian history. Books 1–5 and 11–20 survive intact, but the others survive only as fragments. Diodorus Siculus relied on earlier Hellenistic historians, Ephorus and Hieronymus of Cardia, for Hellenistic Greek history and relied on Polybius for Roman affairs. Diodorus is the best authority for Sicilian affairs, including the Sicilian Slave Wars. In general, Diodorus is a second-rate historian, derivative from other Greek authors, though his reputation has received reevaluation in recent scholarship.

Sara E. Phang

See also Polybius; Sicilian Slave War, First; Sicilian Slave War, Second

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Dionysius of Halicarnassus (ca. 60–7 BCE)

The Greek historian and rhetorician Dionysius of Halicarnassus wrote a history of early Rome. He spent the second half of his life in Rome, following the Roman civil wars, Dionysius reworked earlier texts in imitation of Herodotus, Thucydides, as well as Plato’s writing style, a method now called Dionysian *imitatio*.

As an orator Dionysius analyzed the rhythm, sounds, and arrangement of words with euphonic preferences. His works include: *The Art of Rhetoric*, *The Arrangement of Words*, *On Imitation*, *Commentary on the Attic Orators*, *On the Admirable Style of Demosthenes*, *On the Character of Thucydides*, and *Roman Antiquities*. In *On the Character of Thucydides* Dionysius rewrote Thucydides’ *Peloponnesian Wars* in a Herodotean style.

Dionysius’ history occasionally conflicts with his contemporary historians suggesting that he either confused myth with history, used different sources, or wrote with an alternate motivation. Writing in the reign of Augustus just after the civil wars possibly influenced Dionysius’ retelling of Roman history, through the lens of imperial triumphalism. This

theory also insinuates that the Roman civil wars influenced Greek writing as a whole. Dionysius' *Antiquities*, along with Livy's history, provide the primary accounts of early Roman history.

Kristan Ewin Foust

See also Etruscan Wars; Imperialism; Latin Wars; Overthrow of Monarchy; Rome (City)

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Diplomacy

The earliest evidence for Roman diplomatic relations is a treaty between Rome and Carthage, dating to 509 BCE, recorded by Polybius (3.22). In addition to treaty-making, Roman diplomacy consisted primarily of sending ambassadors to other states to establish informal (nontreatied) friendly relations, investigate matters deemed to affect Roman security interests, settle disputes, demand satisfaction for (perceived) injuries, and to declare war. The Romans also participated in interstate mediations as both a broker and a belligerent. Roman diplomacy also encompassed establishing terms of surrender, drawing up treaties of peace, and dispatching commissioners (usually in groups of ten) to oversee the implementation of the terms of peace following war.

Compared to modern diplomacy, Roman diplomacy lacked sophistication. This was due, in part, to the nature of long-distance communications and travel in the ancient world; the escalation of international incidents often outpaced Rome's ability to defuse them by dispatching ambassadors and messages abroad. But Rome also lacked a standing diplomatic corps. They had no specially trained international

relations experts, and no missions or embassies abroad. They did not even field the equivalent of Greek *proxenoi*, “public guests” resident in foreign states, whose purpose was to represent and look out for the interests of their states of origin.

Because most ancient states, including Rome, participated in what anthropologists describe as “shame” and “honor” cultures, where public insults to an individual’s or a state’s honor demanded at least equivalent (and often disproportionately higher) shaming responses, attempts to avert conflict through diplomacy lacked finesse and were rarely successful. Typically, Roman demands for satisfaction (*rerum repetitiones*) were couched in terms that the other side could not help but consider nonnegotiable infringements on its national sovereignty or honor, and were therefore bound (and perhaps designed) to fail. Modern political scientists call this “compellence diplomacy.” Part of the reason that such an aggressive diplomatic stance was considered practical in the ancient, prenuclear age was that warfare, the most common result of such negotiations, was considered a reasonable price to pay, in terms of blood and treasure, to redress slights to national honor. The meticulous diplomacy of the Cold War era stands in stark contrast since the price of failure (nuclear war) was so much higher. “Compellence diplomacy” still occurs, however. So, on September 20, 2001, US President George W. Bush issued explicitly nonnegotiable demands that if it wished to avoid war with the United States, the Taliban government of Afghanistan must turn over all al-Qaeda leaders on Afghan soil, including Osama bin Laden, and give US military forces open access to terrorist training camps there. Rome delivered a similarly nonnegotiable demand to Carthage in 218 BCE after Hannibal attacked Rome’s Spanish ally Saguntum: to avoid war with the Romans, the Senate declared, Carthage must surrender Hannibal to answer for his breach of treaty (Livy 21.6.8; cf. 21.10–11.2, 18). In both cases, the result was the same: a long, bloody, and expensive war.

Contrary to popular perception, the Romans were more willing than their system competitors to allow time and opportunity for negotiated settlements. Although individual Roman diplomats could, and frequently did, come across as officious, rude, arrogant, and tactless—in a word, undiplomatic—the Romans generally, and in contrast to their system competitors, employed significant self-imposed religiously-based restraints on their own belligerent behavior. So, for example, the apparently very

ancient native Italic fetial procedure, which allowed a rival state 30 (or 33) days to give satisfaction for (perceived) injury or slights to Rome's honor was used by the Romans well into the historical period. This same impulse is evident in Rome's repeated attempts to negotiate solutions before the outbreak of major wars. For example, during the run-up to the First Punic War, Appius Claudius Caudex (consul 264 BCE) probably attempted to negotiate a solution with Carthage three times—the second time after Carthaginian ships had already attacked Roman ships in the straits of Messina.

Paul J. Burton

See also *Fetiales*; Formal Declaration of War; Honor; *Ius Fetiale*; Treaties and Alliances

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Disbandment

The disbandment of a Roman military unit was the most severe punishment that the Roman army inflicted on a unit for military defeat or disloyalty. It was more severe than decimation, which impacted only a few members of the unit and after which the unit continued to exist.

In disbandment, the unit might be totally eliminated and never reconstituted, or the individual personnel might be dishonorably discharged without doing away with the unit which was freshly recruited.

Disbandment might be punishment for a military catastrophe, such as the Varian disaster (9 CE), in which a German ambush destroyed three legions, Legio XVII, Legio XVIII, and Legio XIX, which were never reconstituted under these names.

Disbandment might also be punishment for disloyalty, as when Septimius Severus disbanded the Praetorian Guard for its revolt against and assassination of Pertinax (193 CE) and for its support of the “auction” of the empire between Didius Julianus and Sulpicianus (193 CE). Septimius Severus forbade the future recruitment of the Guard from Italians and instead recruited a new Praetorian Guard from legionaries, mostly, according to Cassius Dio, from Pannonia and the other Danubian provinces.

Other legions were totally disbanded as a punishment for defeat or disloyalty. Following the Gallic revolt in 70 CE, Vespasian disbanded Legio I, Legio IV Macedonica, Legio XV Primigenia, and Legio XVI Gallica, which had surrendered to the Gallic rebels. Elagabalus (218–222 CE) disbanded Legio III Gallica for disloyalty; however, his successor Alexander Severus (222–235) reconstituted it. Gordian III (238–244 CE) disbanded Legio III Augusta for disloyalty; it was reconstituted by Valerian.

It is possible that the surviving soldiers of a disbanded unit were redistributed to other units, but they were probably stigmatized by the punishment and unwelcome. Dio implies that the Italian praetorians dismissed by Severus were not enrolled elsewhere; he claims that after Septimius Severus discharged them, the young men of Italy who would have joined the praetorians turned to brigandage for lack of occupation.

A number of legions disappeared for unknown reasons: the Legio V Alaudae (ca. 85–86 CE), Legio IX Hispana (ca. 108), Legio XXI Rapax (ca. 92), and Legio XXIII Deiotariana.

Sara E. Phang

See also Bandits and Brigands; *Damnatio Memoriae*; Didius Julianus; Gallic Revolt; Germans; Gordian III; Pannonia, Pannonians; Pertinax; Praetorians; Septimius Severus; Varus, Publius Quinctilius; Vespasian

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Dishonorable Discharge

Dishonorable discharge (*ignominiosa missio*) was the most severe punishment, short of death, that the Roman army of the Republic and Principate inflicted on individual personnel. A dishonorably discharged soldier lost the right to his pension, if he was a praetorian or legionary, and to the Roman citizenship and marriage to a noncitizen, if he was an auxiliary or fleet soldier. He did not receive the privileges of a veteran, which included tax immunities and immunity from corporal punishment. A dishonorably discharged soldier may even have received the legal stigma known as *infamia*, which excluded him from certain forms of legal process and assimilated him to the other *infames*, or infamous persons, including convicts, prostitutes, pimps, actors, and gladiators.

Dishonorably discharged soldiers sometimes attempted to enlist in other units of the Roman army, according to the Roman jurists writing on military affairs. The jurists state that convicts and dishonorably discharged soldiers should not be permitted to enter the army. In a society lacking reliable proofs of identity, such soldiers could not be easily identified before the authorities started tattooing recruits in the later Empire.

No particular ritual is known for the dishonorable discharge of Roman soldiers, in comparison with the “drumming-out ceremony” of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Western armies in which the victim was stripped of his uniform facings and insignia and expelled from the unit. Similar anecdotes from Roman histories describe the ritual disgrace of cowardly or incompetent Roman officers, usually in the middle and late Republic, who were forced to stand in public without their clothes or holding a pole or block of turf, alluding to fatigues which personnel of their rank normally would not perform. These shaming punishments were temporary, probably intended to substitute for corporal punishment, which was not appropriate for officers. Shaming punishments were imitated by the emperor Augustus and by Gnaeus Domitius Corbulo, a general in the reigns of Claudius (41–54) and Nero (54–68).

See also Augustus; *Auxilia*; Cassius Dio; Legion, Organization of; Military Discipline; *Praemia Militiae*; Praetorians; Veterans

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Divisions of the Army (Imperial)

The Imperial Roman army was divided into different branches of the service: legions, *auxilia*, Praetorian Guard, urban cohorts, fleets, and the *vigiles* or fire watch of Rome. To these were added the *numeri* (ethnic irregulars) and the *equites singulares Augusti* (the emperor's horse guards). Such a division into multiple branches, familiar in modern armies (e.g., US Army, Navy, Marines, Air Force, Special Forces, and Coast Guard), is a development of the imperial period. In the Republic, the legions were only distinct from the allies (*socii*) and from non-Italian troops recruited as auxiliaries. Though the Romans of the Republic developed a navy during the First Punic War, they later recruited allied naval forces, predominantly Greek. In addition to stabilizing the number of legions, Augustus is thought to have regularized the *auxilia* and created the Praetorian Guard, urban cohorts, fleets, and *vigiles*.

Augustus reduced the number of legions, which had grown to 60 during the triumviral wars, to 28. Three of these legions, Legions XVII, XVIII, and XIX, were destroyed in the Varian disaster (9 CE) and were not reconstituted, reducing the number to 25 at Augustus' death. Tacitus (*Annals* 4.5) describes the geographical disposition of the legions in 23 CE. Two new legions were created in 39 CE, one in 67, and two in the civil war of 68–69 CE. Marcus Aurelius created two new legions for the Marcomannic War, and Septimius Severus created three legions. Two legions had been lost, Legio IX Hispana at uncertain date, and another in Domitian's Dacian War, so that

the total at the end of Severus' reign (211) was 33. The disposition of the legions in the reign of Antoninus Pius (138–161) is attested in an inscription, *CIL* VI 3492 = *ILS* 2288, and the disposition of the legions can also be studied from literary and documentary sources, including inscriptions, papyri, and brick stamps (bricks produced by or for the army). Detachments of legionaries (*vexillationes*) might be deployed to other locations as needed. In the first two centuries CE, legions were commanded by legionary legates, men of senatorial rank.

Augustus is thought to have regularized the *auxilia*. Non-Italian troops had been recruited previously; for instance, Julius Caesar recruited Gallic cavalry to supplement his legions. Auxiliary units were much smaller than legions, numbering approximately 500 or 1,000 men each. *Alae* were units of cavalry; *cohortes* were infantry, and there were also *cohortes equitatae*, or mounted infantry. The auxiliaries in total numbered perhaps 180,000 in the late first century CE, and 220,000 in the mid-second century. Auxiliary units were often recruited from ethnicities with a strong fighting tradition, and were named for a particular ethnic group, though recruitment from that ethnicity might not continue but became localized where the unit was stationed. Members of the *auxilia* served 25 years, and as noncitizens were granted the citizenship and right to marry upon discharge. However, by the second century CE many auxiliaries were already Roman citizens at enlistment. Auxiliary units were commanded by equestrian prefects.

Augustus also created or regularized the Praetorian Guard. It may have developed from the *cohors praetoria*, the republican commander's personal guard. In 27 BCE, Augustus created the nine cohorts of praetorians (approximately 1,000 men per cohort), recruited from Roman Italy. Domitian increased the number of cohorts to 10. Three cohorts of praetorians were always stationed in Rome, intended to keep public order; the other cohorts might accompany the emperor on campaign. The Guard became notorious for its role in politics, supporting coups, and assassinating emperors. In 193, Septimius Severus disbanded the Italian praetorians to punish them for assassinating Pertinax, and recruited new praetorians from the Balkan legions. In 312, the Praetorian Guard was finally disbanded permanently by Constantine I (306–337) to punish them for supporting his rival Maxentius. However, similar guard corps developed in the Later Roman army, termed *scholae palatinae*. Notably, the praetorians were commanded by the praetorian prefect, created in the reign of Tiberius. The

praetorian prefect's duties expanded vastly beyond the command of the Guard to become the emperor's effective deputy in civil administration. Praetorian prefects also persisted beyond the dissolution of the Guard, as high-ranking officials in the later Empire. Also notably, service in the praetorians, which was shorter (16 years) and better paid than legionary service, was often a stepping stone to promotion for individual guardsmen. Ex-praetorians might become legionary centurions or enter the civil administration.

In Rome were stationed the *cohortes urbanae* (urban cohorts), also created by Augustus. These troops were lower ranking than the praetorians but played a similar role in maintaining public order and displaying a military presence in the city. They numbered three (later four) cohorts, originally 500 men each, later increased to 1,000. As with the praetorians, they were recruited from Italians. They were commanded by the urban prefect of Rome. The urban prefect also became an important official who probably delegated the details of administering the urban cohorts; after emperors no longer resided at Rome, the City was governed by the urban prefects.

The fleets were created probably in the early empire, beginning with the "praetorian" fleets based at Misenum and Ravenna. Other fleets patrolled the Rhine and Danube rivers, the Black Sea, and the English Channel. A fleet was based at Forum Julii in Gallia Narbonensis and another was based at Alexandria. The fleet soldiers were regarded as a lowly branch of the service, serving 26 to 28 years and recruited from noncitizens. As with the *auxilia*, they received citizenship at discharge. They combated piracy; fleet soldiers included marines trained to fight. But the fleets' essential duties were logistic, providing heavy transport for troops and supplies in a period when, despite Roman roads, land transport was slow and expensive.

The *vigiles*, Rome's fire brigade, were created by Augustus and also ranked low, originally being recruited from freedmen. Eventually seven cohorts of 1,000 men each were assigned to the wards of Rome with the task of preventing the spread of fires by destroying threatened property. They were probably not trained as combat soldiers.

Later in the first century CE, the *equites singulares Augusti*, or emperor's Horse Guards, were created, numbering 1,000. Recruited from the Batavians, they replaced the *Germani corporis custodes* or the emperor's German bodyguards, a Julio-Claudian institution. The *equites singulares*

accompanied the emperor on campaign and provided cavalry support for the Praetorian Guard. They might be promoted from the legions. Also later in the first century was the appearance of the *numeri* or ethnic irregulars, small fighting units recruited from ethnicities with particular tactical specialties, such as slingers (users of slingshots as weapons) or Syrian archers.

The emperor Gallienus' reorganization of the Roman army in the mid-third century CE produced a central cavalry force, later termed *comitatenses* or field army, which could move more rapidly than the infantry legions and was a larger, more formidable force than individual *auxilia* cavalry units. The other branches of the service continued to exist, but Constantine disbanded the Praetorian Guard in 312. The *equites singulares* also disappeared. Diocletian (284–305) enlarged the army somewhat, but shrank the size of individual legions. In the Later Empire also appeared the *limitanei* or frontier forces, lower in status than the *comitatenses* and whose role is debated by scholars.

The organization of the command structure changed more greatly, *duces* (sg. *dux*, “commander”) commanding forces across several provinces, but not having any civil jurisdiction. *Comites* (“counts”) were also regional commanders. The *magistri militum* or “marshals” (sg. *magister militum*) were superior in rank to *duces* and *comites*, topped by the *magister utriusque militiae* or “Marshal of Both Services,” infantry and cavalry, who was effectively commander-in-chief. This full structure is visible in the early fifth century in a document termed the *Notitia Dignitatum*.

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See also Augustus; *Auxilia*; *Comes*; *Comitatenses*; Constantine I; Diocletian; *Dux*; *Equites Singulares*; Fleets; Gallienus; Legate; Legions, Organization of; *Limitanei*; *Magister Militum*; *Magister Utriusque Militiae*; *Notitia Dignitatum*; *Numerus*; Praetorians; *Praefectus*; Urban Cohorts; *Vigiles*

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Documentary Sources

The main sources for the narrative history of Roman warfare are Greek and Latin historians, biographers, and other literary authors. However, the Roman army and military affairs are also extensively attested in Latin and Greek documentary sources: stone inscriptions, papyri, ostraca and tablets, metal military diplomas, and coins. These documentary sources reveal the day-to-day activities of the Roman army and the details of Roman military careers and military organizational structure. They illustrate the economics and logistics of the Roman army and attest the penetration of elite military values and of Latin and Greek literacy in the lower ranks of the Roman army. In documentary sources, much of the daily activities of the Roman army in the eastern empire were conducted in Greek, though more official and permanent documents were in Latin, the “language of power.”

Monumental inscriptions carved on stone were a relatively formal documentary source, representing what the inhabitants of the classical world wished to preserve for posterity. Typical inscriptions in the vicinity of a legionary base include lists of honorably discharged personnel; religious dedications by personnel to local gods; commemoration of victories; treaties with individual communities; and career epitaphs, listing the ranks and offices held by Roman officers and soldiers.

Career epitaphs range from the careers of senators (holding both military ranks and civilian offices) to the careers of simple soldiers, recording their rank and unit, and how many years they served. Such inscriptions attest a large variety of Roman military occupational specialties, displaying the Roman army’s range of logistic and support activities as well as its tactical functions. Modern scholars have reconstructed the promotion patterns of low-ranking officers within the imperial legion from such career epitaphs and other military inscriptions.

The Roman army also generated more ephemeral documents as part of its daily activities. These documents might be inscribed on wax-covered wooden tablets, written with ink directly on thin wooden tablets, or written with ink on papyrus, a paper-like writing material manufactured from papyrus reeds. Another type of writing material, more casual, was ostraka, or potsherds that were large and flat enough to write on with ink. Such documents survive mainly from the arid areas of the Roman Empire, where fragile writing materials are preserved in dry conditions, but wooden tablets

have also been preserved by burial in bog-like conditions, for example at Vindolanda, a fort near Hadrian's Wall in north England. Surviving documents illustrate not just Roman military bureaucracy, including personnel management and logistics, but also the private affairs of individual soldiers, including their personal letters and legal instruments such as birth certificates and wills.

Documentary sources may also be inscribed on metal, such as the military diplomas (diplomata) given to the praetorian, auxiliary, and fleet veterans at their honorable discharge. These were bronze tablets inscribed in Latin; they are collected and published in a similar manner to stone inscriptions.

Coins may also be considered a documentary source, containing (in the Principate and later Empire) the titles of emperors, which indicate the year of their reigns and various honorary titles, and propagandistic legends, words or phrases (usually highly abbreviated). Coins are also, of course, an iconographic source, depicting images, in particular thematic images related to their legends.

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See also Bureaucracy (Roman Military); Coins; Inscriptions; Military Diplomas; Praetorians; Promotion in Army (Imperial); Veterans

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In the traditional Roman Republic, Roman citizens within the boundaries of the city of Rome (and up to a mile outside it) were “at home” (*domi*), a condition affecting their civil rights. To be *domi* was to be a civilian, a status that extended beyond the city of Rome to Roman territory, but the most “civilian” location was within the *pomerium*, the ritual boundary of the city of Rome. Armies could not cross the *pomerium*, citizens could not bear weapons within it, and the temples of war gods such as Mars and Bellona stood outside the *pomerium*. Only a triumphant general was allowed to enter the *pomerium* with his army for the triumph ceremony.

Roman citizen civilians were protected by the right of *provocatio* from Roman magistrates’ abuses of power. The *leges Valeriae de provocatione* of 509, 449, and 300 BCE and the *leges Porciae de provocatione* of uncertain date (early second century BCE) forbade magistrates to execute citizens at Rome without trial; citizens had the right to appeal (*provocare*) to the people.

In contrast, in military service (*militiae*) Roman citizen soldiers lacked the right of *provocatio* (Cicero, *Laws* 3.6). They were subject to the magistrates’ unrestricted *imperium militiae*, including whatever summary justice the commanders chose to inflict as military discipline. In theory, the consuls or dictators had the right to put anyone to death for disobeying an order in the field, a breach of military discipline that was very serious. Other commanders put soldiers to death for even lesser infractions, such as not wearing arms in the field or leaving the standards (Tacitus, *Annals* 11.18, 13.35), incidents at a relatively late period that illustrate the persistence of this tradition.

The contrast of rights *domi* vs. *militiae* was blurred in the late Republic by civil war and violent civil conflict within the city of Rome and by the creation of the *senatus consultum ultimum* (Last Decree of the Senate, creating a state of emergency and in effect suspending civil rights). Many members of the Roman elite were shocked by the violence that ensued, especially during the proscriptions (purges of political enemies) inflicted by Sulla and by the triumvirs Antony, Octavian, and Lepidus.

In the imperial period, civil rights were blurred further because many inhabitants of the Empire were not Roman citizens and were subject to summary judgment (*cognitio extra ordinem*) at the provincial governor’s discretion. However, Roman citizens could claim their right to trial at Rome. Appeal to the emperor as protector of his subjects and redressor of injustice replaced appeal to the people.

See also Civil Rights; *Imperium*; Military Discipline; Papirius Cursor, Lucius; *Pomerium*; Proscriptions; *Provocatio*; *Senatus Consultum Ultimum*; States of Emergency

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Domitian (Emperor) (81–96 CE)

Titus Flavius Domitianus, the Flavian emperor Domitian, was born in 51 CE and reigned from 81 to 96, when he was assassinated by a palace conspiracy. He appears to have been a competent general, a conscientious administrator, and an upholder of Roman religious tradition, but his more autocratic conception of the imperial role and his persecution of suspected conspirators alienated the Senate, making him one of the most hated Roman emperors in the literary tradition.

Domitian was the last of the Flavian dynasty, succeeding his father Vespasian (69–79) and older brother Titus (79–81). Vespasian and Titus held military commands at the time of the Jewish War (66–70), Titus taking command of the Jewish War when Vespasian prosecuted the civil war with Vitellius. At that time (69) Domitian was still a boy and did not yet hold office or command. He resided in Rome with his uncle Flavius Sabinus, the city prefect; after the Flavian army (led by Antonius Primus) liberated Rome from the Vitellians, the Flavian soldiers hailed Domitian as Caesar. In Vespasian's and Titus' reigns Domitian was clearly designated as a successor to Titus, holding the consulship repeatedly (consul *ordinarius* in 73 and 80, suffect five other times). Domitian thus succeeded Titus without challenge.

As emperor Domitian took a more active role in military command,

campaigning in person against the Germans and Dacians. He waged a successful campaign against the Germanic Chatti in 82-83, holding a triumph and adopting the title Germanicus. In 85, the Dacians invaded the Roman province of Moesia, overrunning it and killing the Roman governor. Domitian campaigned in person against the Dacians; despite the death of another Roman commander in 86, Domitian won a victory against the Dacians in 88. He did not follow up this victory but made peace with the Dacian king Decebalus in 89. His forces were needed elsewhere, against the Marcomanni and Quadi (Germanic peoples across the Danube). In 92, Domitian then began war against the Sarmatians (a people from Central Asia) and Germanic Suebi, who had made an alliance against Rome.

Domitian's military activities are attested by the court poetry of Statius and Martial, but belittled by the senatorial tradition represented by Tacitus and Suetonius. In his biography *Agricola*, Tacitus focuses on Domitian's recall of Gnaeus Julius Agricola from Scotland, representing a probably rational policy (Domitian needed reinforcements for his other wars) as motivated by Domitian's cowardice and jealousy. Pliny the Younger also depicts the military careers of young senators as compromised by Domitian's jealousy (*Letters* 8.14). Suetonius, in his *Life of Domitian*, depicts Domitian as fond of hunting but physically lazy, and minimizes his military achievements.

Domitian was a religious traditionalist and adopted the role of *corrector morum*, "reformer of morals," and *censor perpetuus*, "perpetual censor." In these roles he put to death several Vestal Virgins (priestesses of the goddess Vesta) for unchastity. He also appears to have been a conscientious administrator. Despite the senatorial disparagement of his reign and condemnation of his memory, his administrative policies were permitted to stand.

Domitian's greatest failure was his relationship with the Senate. The Augustan concept of the Principate, largely followed by his successors (Gaius and Nero excepted), emphasized the emperor's role as *civilis princeps*, a "first among equals" with respect to the Senate. In this role, the emperor did not exalt himself in the manner of a monarch but remained modest and accessible. Domitian allegedly adopted a more autocratic role, imposing greater formality at court, wearing triumphal dress in the Senate House, and being addressed as "dominus et deus" (Lord and God). Domitian's behavior alienated the senators, some of whom conspired

against him. Antonius Saturninus, the governor of Upper Germany, revolted against Domitian in 89 and was quickly defeated. Domitian, now paranoid about conspiracies, persecuted suspected conspirators.

In 95, Domitian put to death his kinsman Flavius Clemens (the father of two sons whom Domitian had adopted). This was the last straw, and various senators joined a palace plot against Domitian. Domitian was assassinated by members of his household on September 18, 96. The Senate endorsed the elderly Marcus Cocceius Nerva as Domitian's successor, and pronounced *damnatio memoriae* upon Domitian, destroying portraits of Domitian and effacing his name from inscriptions.

Domitian's much more popular successor, Trajan (98–117, following Nerva who only reigned two years) reaped the credit for policies and careers begun under Domitian. The Dacian Wars, begun by Domitian but put on hold to fight the Sarmatians and Suebi, were resumed and won by Trajan. Many famous senatorial authors, such as the historian Tacitus, the administrator and technical author Sextus Julius Frontinus, and the administrator and man of letters Pliny the Younger, began their careers under Domitian, and thus must have been in good standing with Domitian. The future emperor Hadrian (117–138) also began his career in the reign of Domitian.

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See also Agricola; Assassination; Dacian Wars; *Damnatio Memoriae*; Monarchy; Pliny the Younger; Suetonius; Tacitus; Titus; Trajan; Vespasian; War of Four Emperors

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Donations of Alexandria

The Donations of Alexandria, in which Mark Antony bestowed regions of the Greek east on Cleopatra and their children, featured in Antony's policy as warlord in the eastern Mediterranean and, more obviously, in Octavian's

propaganda against Antony.

Antony had three children by Cleopatra, the twins Alexander Helios and Cleopatra Selene (born in 40) and Ptolemy Philadelphus (born in 36). In 34, Antony proclaimed Alexander Helios the king of Armenia, Media, and Persia; Cleopatra Selene queen of Cyrenaica and Libya; Ptolemy Philadelphus king of Syria and Cilicia. Cleopatra was proclaimed Queen of Kings and Queen of Egypt. Her son by Caesar, Caesarion, was proclaimed King of Kings and King of Egypt. At the ceremony of the Donations, held at Alexandria, Antony and Cleopatra were costumed as the gods Dionysus-Osiris and Aphrodite-Isis; Caesarion was named son of the deified Julius (Caesar).

Octavian exploited the announcement of these honors at Rome to consolidate popular feeling against Antony as having become un-Roman, Hellenistic, and “Oriental,” drawing on long-standing Roman ethnic stereotypes and dislike of monarchy.

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See also Caesar, Gaius Julius; Civil War II (44–31 BCE); Cleopatra; Mark Antony; Monarchy; Octavian

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Donatives

Donatives were monetary gifts presented to members of the Roman military by triumphant generals or emperors. Originating in the Roman republic, they supplemented plunder as a reward for military service. Donatives frequently were associated with times of celebration (such as the triumph or imperial accession) or crisis.

In the Republic, donatives were traditionally given by the triumphant general at his triumph, though solid evidence is lacking before the late third century BCE. By the late Republic, we find generals giving donatives to secure the loyalty of their armies ([Caesar], *Gallie Wars* 8.4; Caesar, *Civil War* 1.39) and soldiers mutinying because they did not receive a donative,

as happened with Caesar's soldiers in 47 BCE.

These patterns continued into the imperial era, but the emperors also sought to make donatives a more regular and routine event. Although Tacitus (*Annals* 1.2.1) claimed that Augustus "seduced the army with gifts," that emperor provided only two donatives during his lifetime: the first to his veterans in 29 BCE, the second on the occasion of his grandson Gaius' taking part in exercises with the legions in 8 BCE. In his will (Suetonius, *Augustus* 101.2; Tacitus, *Annals* 1.8) Augustus provided what often has been called a donative for all soldiers, with the amount varying according to the status of the unit: the Praetorian Guard, located in Rome and responsible for the security of the emperor and his family, were granted the largest sum, 1,000 sesterces each, urban cohort soldiers 500 sesterces, and legionaries and perhaps auxiliaries 300 sesterces each. Yet, it is clear that this is technically a bequest rather than a donative. On the other hand, Suetonius (*Tiberius* 48.2) records that Tiberius doubled Augustus' bequest: the additional sum paid can be viewed as a donative by the incoming emperor to ensure future loyalty. Such grants, then, came to be expected at the accession of a new emperor. That these were not just bequests can be seen most clearly in the case of Claudius: after the murder of his predecessor, Caligula, Claudius gave a large grant to the Praetorian Guard which had placed him in power (Suetonius, *Claudius* 10.4) and he celebrated his accession date with a donative to the unit for the next several years. Grants on accession then became the norm, though on occasion, these were overlooked to the cost of the incumbent (Galba), or the amount given was nominal (Vespasian, Trajan). It is worth expanding on the episode of Galba (69 CE). Galba's supporter Nymphidius Sabinus promised the praetorians a donative, which Galba then refused to pay, saying, "I levy my soldiers, I don't buy them." Tacitus adds that the praetorians would have been satisfied with a token gift (Tacitus, *Histories* 1.5, 18). The praetorians, supporting the coup of Marcus Salvius Otho, assassinated Galba. Otho could not count on their support and offered them a large donative to assure loyalty (Tacitus, *Histories* 1.84).

Donatives on occasions other than at accession were infrequent. Under the Julio-Claudian emperors (14–68 CE), only six nonaccession gifts are recorded, one under Tiberius, two under Gaius one under Claudius, and two under Nero. Only three of these were to all soldiers: two by Gaius and one by Claudius. Those under Gaius seem to be associated with conspiracies, though it is difficult to tell for certain given the late date of the source

(Cassius Dio, writing in the early third century CE). A donative given by Claudius to all soldiers was on the occasion of his heir Nero's coming of age in 51 CE. On the other hand, the Praetorian Guard—and only the guard—are given donatives at times of crisis during these reigns: after the removal of the Praetorian prefect, Lucius Aelius Sejanus, in 31 CE (Suetonius, *Tiberius* 48.2); after Nero murdered his mother, Agrippina the Younger, in 59 CE; and after the exposure of a conspiracy to replace Nero with Gaius Calpurnius Piso in 65 CE (Suetonius, *Nero* 10.1; Tacitus, *Annals* 15.72; Dio 62[61]14.3). In each case, the grant to the praetorians was motivated by the close association of that group to the individuals involved or, in the case of the Pisonian conspiracy, by the involvement of so many of the officers of the unit itself. It is clear that these donatives were intended to ensure the loyalty of the rank and file of the guard, who had not been directly implicated in any of these episodes.

Evidence for donatives beyond this period is sparse: the *Historia Augusta*, a late source, suggests that they were given to all soldiers by Hadrian on his adoption of Lucius Ceionius Commodus (who became Lucius Aelius Caesar) in 137 CE and by Antoninus Pius on the marriage of his daughter Faustina to Marcus Aurelius in 145 CE (*Historia Augusta*, *Hadrian* 5.7, *Marcus* 7.9). The praetorians “auctioned” the empire in 193, promising to support the man, Didius Julianus or Sulpicianus, who could give them the largest donative.

In fact, it was only when the Severans came to power in the late second century that the number of grants increased: as a usurper, Septimius Severus paid out donatives to the soldiers upon taking power in 193 CE and after the final defeat of his two challengers, Pescennius Niger and Clodius Albinus, in 197 CE. (Dio 46.46.7, 76.1.1) His son, Caracalla, fond of playing the role of fellow-soldier, was said to have rewarded them on several occasions. The praetorians were singled out in particular after Caracalla's murder of Geta, his brother, in 211 CE (Herodian 4.4.7). In these cases, the reason for the grants seems to be to ensure continued loyalty for the dynasty. In the post-Severan period, donatives became more frequent, as contenders for power seduced the army to their side with huge sums, though these are not specified in the sources, only their size being noted. Though all soldiers benefited from these grants, the last known donative to the praetorians alone was given by the emperor Tacitus upon his accession in 275 CE. Donatives to other troops continued to be distributed in a more regular

fashion at the accession of emperors and at 5- and 10-year anniversaries.

Donatives therefore were a long-standing tradition that were used in particular by emperors to ensure the loyalty of their troops. The nature of the Principate meant that this type of gift was granted most often in association with events that could be viewed as either celebratory or disruptive to the empire as a whole. But the perception of the ancient literary sources—namely that the emperors bought their troops with frequent donatives—should be modified somewhat, given the irregularity of these rewards.

Sandra Bingham

See also Army in Politics; Augustus; Claudius I; Pay and Finances, Military (Imperial); Praetorians; Septimius Severus

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Drusus (38–9 BCE)

Brother of the emperor Tiberius (14–37 CE), Drusus Claudius Nero was a Roman statesman and general and member of the Julio-Claudian imperial family, holding the consulship in 9 BCE. Often called “Drusus the Elder,” to distinguish him from his nephew “Drusus the Younger,” Drusus was the son of Tiberius Claudius Nero (praetor in 42) and Livia. Drusus is noteworthy mainly for his conquest of Lower Germany for the Roman Empire.

Drusus was born after his mother Livia divorced Tiberius Claudius Nero and married the future emperor Augustus. Scandal suggested that Drusus was actually Augustus’ adulterous son by Livia, but his resemblance to his

natural father dispelled that rumor. Drusus' father died when he was four, so Drusus was raised in the household of Augustus, who regarded him with great affection. Drusus married Augustus' niece Antonia for love; according to Valerius Maximus 4.3.3, she was his sole sexual partner.

As a prince of the imperial family, Drusus received age dispensations to hold political office early. In 15 BCE, he and Tiberius conquered Raetia, a deed commemorated on silver and gold coinage. In the next few years, Drusus repeatedly attacked the German tribes across the Rhine. As consul in 9 BCE, Drusus campaigned against the Chatti, Suebi, and Cherusci, sacking and pillaging a great number of German villages as far as the Elbe River, for which he was awarded a triumph. But Drusus did not live long enough to celebrate it. Allegedly, a woman of superhuman stature confronted Drusus at the Elbe and warned him he would soon die. According to Dio, he died from an illness; in other accounts, he fell from his horse. Tiberius rode 200 miles nonstop to reach Drusus on the day he died (Dio 55.2.1; Pliny the Elder *Natural History* 7.20.84; Valerius Maximus 5.5.3).

Drusus' death was greatly mourned, especially by Augustus, who passed the rest of the year in deep grief. A funeral was held for him in every Roman town and city from Mogontiacum (Mainz) to Rome. A 20-meter high monument called the Drususstein at Mogontiacum commemorates his death. Drusus' mother Livia was awarded the rights of a woman who had three children (giving her greater legal privileges than ordinary women) as a consolation for her great loss. Tiberius performed a eulogy for Drusus in the Forum, and Augustus performed one outside Rome at the Circus Flaminius. Although he was not a true member of the *gens* Iulia, Drusus was buried in the Mausoleum of Augustus. He left behind three children, Germanicus, Claudia Livilla, and the future emperor Claudius. The Senate posthumously gave Drusus the *agnomen* Germanicus, which his descendants inherited. Velleius, Suetonius, and Dio recount his exploits.

Many modern scholars, based on the testimony of Velleius, Suetonius, and Dio, speculate that Augustus had decided to advance Drusus as his potential heir ahead of Tiberius. The affection Augustus showed for Drusus during his lifetime and the grief he felt at his death strongly argue in favor of this, especially when one considers the lukewarm relationship between Augustus and Tiberius. Suetonius says that Augustus specified Drusus as his heir along with Gaius and Lucius in front of the Senate. However, Drusus was one of many potential heirs to Augustus, including Augustus'

grandchildren, Gaius and Lucius, who also died prematurely. Drusus was also the name of Tiberius' son, who predeceased Tiberius (23 CE) and the name of a son of Germanicus.

Gaius Stern

See also Augustus; Germanic Wars; Germans; Succession (Imperial); Tiberius (Emperor)

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Dura-Europos

Founded on the Euphrates by the Seleucid dynasty, ca. 300 BCE, this city in eastern ancient Syria was settled by the Macedonians, Persians, and Romans. Its name from the Aramaic "duru," meaning fortress, indicates the strategic value of the city. Archaeologists have unearthed a synagogue, a temple to Mithras and a Christian church, indicative of the variety in cultures occupying the site. The city was destroyed by the Sassanid Persians in the mid-third century CE when Shapur I took the city from Rome, employing chemical warfare (incendiary weapons made from sulfur and pitch) in the process. Dura-Europos is also the findspot for many documents relating to the Roman army in the early and middle third century.

Cheryl L. Golden

See also Bureaucracy (Roman Military); Euphrates; Persian Wars, Sassanid

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Dux

In its earliest form *dux* (pl. *duces*), Latin “leader,” applied to any military commander, but generally referred to commanders of ad hoc units. By the third century CE *duces* appear within the Roman army, usually commanding forces composed of detachments from standing legions and assembled for specific military operations. The position of *dux* seems to have been institutionalized at earliest during the reign of Diocletian (284–305) and at latest later in the fourth century. In the *Notitia Dignitatum*, a list of the military and bureaucratic ranks of the Roman Empire compiled soon after 395 CE and revised early in the fifth century, *duces* appear as commanders of the *limitanei*, Roman military forces stationed in the empire’s frontier regions. As such, *duces* seem to have been subordinate to the *magistri militum*, or Masters of Soldiers, in the diocese (supra-provincial division) to which they were assigned. A *dux*’ sphere of authority is termed *ducatus*.

Although the exact powers and responsibilities of *duces* are unknown, they were probably responsible for policing the border regions assigned to them, responding to localized raids and military threats and, in the event of a major incursion, assisting the field armies in repelling attacking forces. Additionally, *duces* may have been responsible for gathering intelligence about potential threats in the regions for which they were responsible. In the late fourth century, a Roman *dux* collected rumors concerning the Hun attack on the Gothic kingdom in modern Ukraine and passed these rumors on to Constantinople.

Michael D. Blodgett

See also Comes; Magister Militum; Magister Utriusque Militiae; Notitia Dignitatum

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E

Ebro, Battle of the (217 BCE)

The battle of the River Ebro (northeast Spain), fought in the spring of 217 BCE, was a naval confrontation between Carthage and Rome and formed part of the Second Punic War (218–201). The Carthaginian navy was commanded by Himilco and consisted of approximately 40 ships. Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio Calvus led the Romans at the helm of some 55 ships.

Victory over Carthage at the battle of Cissa (near mod. Tarragona) in 218 ensured Roman jurisdiction north and south of the River Ebro. While consolidating their position, the Carthaginian commander, Hasdrubal Barca, was raising a ground force and a navy to mount an expedition against the Romans north of that region. Scipio feared he would be outnumbered and therefore planned for a naval encounter.

On arrival, the Carthaginians anchored their fleet in an estuary of the Ebro. A lack of preparation, however, forced them to dispatch crews for provisions. This had left the Carthaginians exposed, and Himilco had no scouts checking for Roman ships. Meanwhile, Calvus was warned of their presence at the estuary. He manned his ships with selected soldiers and set off from Tarraco (mod. Tarragona) to attack the Carthaginian fleet. Hasdrubal attempted to warn his navy of their arrival, but by then it was too late. The Carthaginians were disorganized, inexperienced, and haphazard and it allowed a structured Roman fleet to nullify their movements. Ships were rammed and captured and the demoralized Carthaginian crews sought refuge among their army. The Romans proceeded to round up the remaining ships.

The battle of the Ebro was a decisive victory for Rome in context of the war. The Carthaginian fleet, considered superior to the Roman navy, was

left devastated. The defeat guaranteed Roman control of the Spanish Mediterranean coastline, ensuring open supply lines while, at the same time, being able to keep the Carthaginians in check.

Juan M. A. Strisino

See also Carthage (State); Hasdrubal Barca; Punic War, Second; Spanish Wars

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Egypt, Roman

Previously ruled by the Ptolemaic dynasty, Egypt became a Roman province in 30 BCE after the battle of Actium (September 2, 31) in which Octavian defeated the forces of Antony and Cleopatra VII, the last Ptolemaic queen. Due to its strategic importance as a supplier of grain to the Roman Empire, the province of Egypt was governed by an equestrian prefect (titled *praefectus Aegypti*) rather than by a senator. Egypt's other high-ranking administrators and commanders, including commanders of legions, were also equestrian, appointed by the emperor. In the early first century CE it was unthinkable that an equestrian would attempt to usurp the imperial power. Later this was not the case. A usurper, Firmus, claimed the role of emperor in the mid-third century, and the revolt of another claimant was put down by Diocletian (ca. 297–298).

Egypt was garrisoned by three, later two, legions, a fleet, and various auxiliary units. Two legions and the fleet were stationed at Alexandria. Roman soldiers' main role was policing. The fleet patrolled the Nile River, which was the main north-south route through the province. Minor garrisons occupied mines and quarries in the Eastern Desert and patrolled

the land routes through the Eastern Desert to seaports on the Red Sea coast, guarding the lucrative Red Sea trade from Arabia and India. Soldiers might be called on to suppress rioting in Alexandria or banditry in the Nile Delta. Many documents survive concerning the Roman army in Egypt, both on papyrus (including soldiers' private letters to their families) and on ostraka, shards of pottery written on in ink.

More is known about social conflicts in Egypt than in other provinces due to the interest of Jewish authors such as Josephus and Philo of Alexandria, the survival of the *Acta Alexandrinorum*, and the survival of numerous papyrus documents. For their part, Romans of Rome had a poor opinion of Egyptians, regarding them as animal-worshippers and despising Egyptian immigrants to Rome. Alexandria, however, was a major center of Greek culture and its inhabitants were sensitive to insults. The Greek-speaking elite of Alexandria and the Jews of Alexandria were hostile to one another, breaking out into violent conflict during the reign of Claudius (41–54); his edict, the “Letter to the Alexandrians,” survives, urging them to cooperate. The emperor Caracalla (211–217) also had trouble with the Alexandrians. The *Acta Alexandrinorum* or “Acts of the Pagan Martyrs” (second/third ca. CE) are an apocryphal and probably fictionalized series of court transcripts, resembling Christian martyr acts, in which brutal Roman emperors tried and condemned Alexandrian notables, who defied and mocked their overlords.

The papyri, preserved by Egypt's dry climate, provide a relatively random sample of day-to-day administration at many levels, including corruption, crime, and poor farmers' resistance to taxation. Roman Egypt was a highly hierarchical society, with Roman citizens and Greek-speaking Alexandrians at the top, followed by the Greek-speaking inhabitants of other cities and towns; at the bottom were the Egyptian peasants. Egypt was also intensively exploited by the Romans. However, whether social conflict was worse in Egypt than in other provinces is uncertain; conflict may only be better attested.

Egypt became heavily Christianized and was one of the first areas to practice monasticism. The Egyptian Church adapted a written version of the Egyptian language, Coptic, that is still used today by the Coptic Church.

Sara E. Phang

See also Bandits and Brigands; Cleopatra; *Equites*, Equestrians; *Praefectus*;

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Elagabalus (Emperor) (218–222 CE)

The young emperor Marcus Aurelius Antoninus, known as Elagabalus (older form Heliogabalus), born ca. 203, reigned from 218 to 222. A pawn of Severan dynastic strife, he became one of Rome's most unpopular emperors due to his unconventional gender presentation and sexuality and promotion of nontraditional religion, and was assassinated after only four years of rule.

Elagabalus was the son of Sextus Varius Marcellus and Julia Soaemias Bassiana, a niece of Septimius Severus' wife Julia Domna. His original name was Varius Avitus Bassianus. He grew up in Syria, where he held the priesthood of the native solar deity Elagabalus (El Gabal) of Emesa.

After the assassination of Caracalla and the usurpation of Macrinus in 217, Elagabalus' grandmother Julia Maesa, the sister of Julia Domna, induced the soldiers to proclaim him emperor, changing his name to Marcus Aurelius Antoninus. This imperial nomenclature asserted a link to Caracalla, whose imperial name was also Marcus Aurelius Antoninus, alleged to be Elagabalus' real father, and to Marcus Aurelius. Macrinus, in contrast, had no dynastic connections.

The teenage Elagabalus was not, of course, the general of his army, but it defeated Macrinus' forces. Elagabalus entered Rome unopposed. His subsequent acts baffled and alienated the Romans. In 218, he brought the deity El Gabal to Rome and attempted to make this Syrian solar cult the chief religion of the Roman state, displacing the traditional Jupiter Optimus Maximus and angering the Senate. Elagabalus then divorced his wife Julia

Paula and married the Vestal Virgin Aquilia Severa. Elagabalus also conducted homosexual affairs with various men. The sources explicitly state that in his appearance and behavior Elagabalus violated expected sexual and gender roles, appearing effeminate and being penetrated by other men, conduct which was unacceptable to Roman sexual mores. Moreover, his male sexual partners, such as Aurelius Zoticus, were of low social status, offending the senatorial elite.

As a concession, the Senate forced Elagabalus to adopt as heir his cousin Alexianus (the later emperor Alexander Severus, 222–235) and to divorce the ex-Vestal. Subsequently the army, allegedly disgusted with Elagabalus' sexual behavior, revolted in favor of Alexander and Elagabalus was assassinated. Alexander Severus became emperor, though he was also young and as much a pawn of Severan dynastic rivalry as Elagabalus.

The reign of Elagabalus is described by Cassius Dio, who was a contemporary to events, and by the slightly later Herodian; the text of Dio has been abbreviated by the Byzantine compiler Xiphilinus. The *Historia Augusta* also features a highly unreliable life of Antoninus Heliogabalus, with extensive but fantastic detail: to take only one example, Elagabalus was so devoted to luxury that he caused a tall “suicide tower” to be built, surrounded by ornamented and jeweled boards, so that even his mode of death should be extravagant (*Historia Augusta, Elagabalus* 33.6).

Sara E. Phang

See also Alexander Severus; Caracalla; Cassius Dio; Emperresses; Usurpation

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Elite Participation

The Roman military officer cadre was partly bureaucratic in modern fashion, partly a quasi-hereditary military aristocracy. During the traditional Republic, men of the political class were accustomed to extensive

military service. For members of the senatorial order, the expectations and prevalence of service began to shift in the late Republic and changed markedly in the Principate. Many Roman elite officers, especially senators in the Principate, had little military experience, though they outranked the equestrian officers and lower status personnel. Due to the structure of Roman elite commands we refer throughout to “elite” or “lower-ranking” rather than “senior” or “junior” officers, as the latter terms might imply seniority-based promotion, let alone a modern meritocratic promotion structure.

In the traditional Republic, aristocrats (at first patricians, later the patrician-plebeian nobility) were expected to serve in the army and to lead as officers. In the *cursus honorum* or ladder of magistracies, military service was a prerequisite; a citizen had to serve 10 campaigns before he could run for office. Thus, in this period Roman men of the political class had almost all served in the army from the age of 17 (when recruits first became liable to serve) to 26. To seek a political career was to continue military service, for the two consuls were commanders-in-chief, accompanied by lower ranking quaestors (responsible for logistics and pay). The praetors were able to command campaigns in their own right, though usually less extensive ones. Magistrates might obtain promagistracies that enabled them to continue their campaigns for more than a year or to hold *provinciae* (regional assignments or theaters of war, later “provinces”) in other areas. The dictator was a sole commander-in-chief, appointed in emergencies, without a colleague. A Roman noble who held his magistracies in sequence aspired to hold the consulship at the youngest possible age, about age 42, while he was still vigorous, though many Roman consuls, praetors, promagistrates, and dictators were older.

Below the magistrates, the Republic’s military tribunes were partially elected by the centuriate assembly and partially chosen by the Senate from the population of young nobles (Livy 22.53.1; Plutarch, *Flaminius* 1.4). Consuls, praetors, and other commanders could also choose men (usually fellow nobles) as their deputies, termed *legati* (“chosen men”). *Legati* might act as envoys and diplomats, command troops up to legion scale, and advise the general. Ideally *legati* were experienced, but the general might be obliged by family ties, *amicitia*, or patronage to select inexperienced *legati* (Caesar, *Gallie Wars* 1.39–40).

The traditional republican nobility prized the quest for military glory

and fame (*gloria* and *laus*) through bravery and conquest. They admired courage (*virtus*) and individual prowess, celebrating Roman generals who defeated enemy leaders in personal combat and despoiled them of their armor. A measure of the prestige of courage is the fact that many mid-republican Roman nobles died in battle, especially during the Second Punic War when Hannibal nearly defeated the Roman Republic.

Roman commanders sought to earn triumphs, traditionally granted by the Roman Senate if a campaign had yielded at least 5,000 enemy deaths. The greatest triumphs celebrated far larger victories and displayed the wealth plundered from enemy communities. Triumphant victors redistributed such wealth to the Roman community via the construction of public works, temples, and victory monuments, and by expending wealth on the public at triumphs, feasts, and games. Even after his death, a victorious general's conquests lived on: his descendants wore his death mask and those of other distinguished ancestors at the funerals of members of the family and related their glorious deeds (Polybius 6.53.1–9).

Elite military participation began to decline in the late third and second centuries BCE, probably as the shift to overseas warfare promoted a more "professional" army led by a smaller number of prominent leaders and their officers. The Roman elite themselves stereotyped such decline as due to the nobility's increasing wealth, avarice, and luxury (Sallust, *Bellum Catilinae* 10–11). In reality, the decline in elite military participation in the late Republic was due to the ever-rising stakes of warfare. By the first century BCE, the command of wars had become a project that only a few leaders undertook, by virtue of their own wealth, prestige, followers, and military talent. Such leaders furthermore relied more upon their own picked *legati* than on the traditional military tribunes.

Furthermore, military success might entail a political trade-off; unless very well connected, a general who was away from Rome for many years might lose touch with his peers at Rome. It seems that Marius came to despise the political elite to which he had never really belonged (Sallust, *Jugurthine War* 85) and as dictator, Sulla chose to restructure the state by force. Caesar, who had spent 10 years conquering Gaul, termed the Roman state "a name merely, without body or form" (Suetonius, *Iulius* 77.1) and seems to have been caught unawares by the assassination conspiracy.

In the first century BCE, the requirement of 10 campaigns for office-holding seems to have lapsed. Young aristocrats required an extensive Latin

and Greek “higher” education, including forensic and political oratory, rhetoric, and philosophy, to pursue public careers. However, the militaristic values remained prominent, now attached to the late Republic’s great commanders, such as Pompey in Cicero’s *Pro Lege Manilia* (On the Manilian Law) advocating granting command of the Mithridatic Wars to Pompey in 66 BCE.

Nonetheless, due to the turnover in republican noble families as a result of decades of civil strife, the militaristic family tradition celebrated by Polybius (above) seems to have weakened. This turnover continued through the first two centuries of the empire. The senatorial aristocracy failed to perpetuate itself and was constantly supplemented by the promotion of families from below.

In the Principate, the emperor monopolized the role of commander-in-chief, though many emperors delegated field command to imperial family members. The emperor was hailed as *imperator* (victorious general) and maintained a close relationship with the army. A senator who sought to do these things was likely to be accused of sedition and revolt. However, many senatorial officers did serve as commanders without incurring the imperial jealousy emphasized and perhaps exaggerated by literary authors. It is not clear that these men, the so-called *virī militares*, constituted a distinct faction or social group. Elite literary authors continued to support the military values, praising emperors who undertook imperialistic wars. Elite authors also disparaged emperors who did not wage wars. In the *Annals* Tacitus apologizes for the military inaction of the emperor Tiberius, contrasting the heroic wars of Rome’s past with the early empire’s sordid civilian intrigues (Tacitus, *Annals* 4.32).

Augustus (27 BCE–14 CE) rearranged the structure of provincial governorship and legionary command to discourage revolt and usurpation by senatorial commanders. “Imperial” provinces were separated administratively from “public” ones. “Public” provinces did not contain legions and were governed by proconsuls (now used as a title, even if the appointee had not been consul), appointed by lot. These provinces were peaceful and mostly interior to the empire, such as Sicily and Asia. In contrast, imperial provinces had active frontiers. Imperial provinces were governed by *legati Augusti pro praetore*, senators who had held the office of praetor (sometimes consul), appointed by the emperor. These governors commanded legionary legates, the commanders of individual legions. The

emperor had ultimate authority over command in imperial provinces, and might deputize a relative as field commander or take the field himself. To further prevent usurpations, Egypt (a major supplier of grain to Rome) was governed by an equestrian prefect, too low in status in the early empire to be a suitable candidate for the purple.

Senatorial aristocrats usually served a year as laticlavian tribune (*tribunus laticlavius*), a rank for young men (under 25) who had not yet entered the Senate. The laticlavian tribune was notionally second-in-command to the legionary legate (the legion's commander) and outranked the legion's equestrian tribunes. Many senatorial aristocrats did not serve further in the army but went on to civil posts. A few senators held repeated tribunates and later became legionary legates and subsequently governors of imperial provinces. However, the governorship of a "public" province was much more prestigious, involving wealth and influence. Whether the emperor's jealousy and suspicion discouraged senators who became governors of imperial provinces from pursuing military glory depends on generalizing some instances in Tacitus (*Annals* 11.20, *Agricola* 39–40) and Pliny the Younger (*Letters* 8.14). Surviving career inscriptions on stone show that senatorial aristocrats could hold military commands and display military competence without risking imperial wrath.

Senatorial aristocrats might also avoid active military command (beyond the year as a laticlavian tribune) because of their contempt for common soldiers (*milites gregarii*), an attitude most prominent in Tacitus and Cassius Dio, who depict common soldiers as uneducated and brutal, motivated by greed and unable to control anger. A senator with such attitudes who commanded a legion would find it hard to win the affection of his men, even if such affection did not incur imperial suspicion that he was courting usurpation. Cassius Dio, governor of Pannonia in the 220s, despised the Pannonians as semibarbarians (Dio 49.36.2–4; cf. 74[75]2.6); subsequently the praetorians, who remembered his attitude, forced him to surrender his consulship (80.4.2).

Members of the equestrian order served and were promoted in the Roman army much more consistently. They usually entered the army as prefects (commanders) of auxiliary units, as narrow-stripe (angusticlavian) legionary tribunes ranking below the laticlavian tribune, and sometimes as legionary centurions. The *militia equestris* sequence was prefect of an auxiliary cohort; angusticlavian tribune; prefect of an *ala* (cavalry unit). In

the first century CE, equestrian officers were usually Italians or provincial Roman citizens from north Italy, Spain, or southern Gaul; by the late second and third centuries CE, they were provincial citizens from the frontier provinces.

Equestrian officers dominated the army in the middle third century CE, when senators no longer sought or were chosen for military commands. By the mid-third century, the senatorial titles of *legatus Augusti pro praetore*, proconsul, and legionary legate were disused and the equestrian commander of a region or governor of a province might be termed *dux* or *praeses*. The mid-third century CE, a period of peril for the empire, was a golden age for equestrian officers, many of whom rose to the highest commands. Gallienus (260–268) may have taken the step of depriving senators altogether of military commands, though this is disputed.

In the later empire (284–476), civil and military appointments were separated. The senatorial order was renamed the clarissimate; a senator was termed *vir clarissimus* (most distinguished man) and was eligible for largely honorific civil posts. Military officers and commanders were men from equestrian-equivalent status or, increasingly after 378, the nobles of non-Romanized ethnic groups. Promotion within the army was based on seniority.

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See also Augustus; Consul; *Cursus Honorum* (Imperial); *Cursus Honorum* (Republic); Elite Participation; *Equites*, Equestrians; Praetor; Promotion in Army (Imperial); Promotion in Army (Republic); Republic, Political Structure; Senate, Senators; Third-Century CE Crisis; Triumph; *Virtus*

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Emperor as Commander

During the Republic's long centuries of conquest, Roman armies had often hailed their commander, a man from one of the ruling senatorial families, as *imperator*, or "victorious general." When the republican system, which shared such military glory among Rome's aristocrats, began to fail, it was largely because a few victorious generals had become so powerful that they subverted the loyalties of the armies from the state to themselves. After the civil wars of the first century BCE, there was only one *imperator*—the man we call the emperor. From Augustus, and regularly from Vespasian, each new ruler took *imperator* as his new *praenomen*, or first name, and with it took on the challenge of commanding the Roman army—his army. Without an effective army, his empire was in danger; without a loyal army, his reign might be short. Even if he did not command in person, and few and first- and second century CE emperors did, he promoted his public image as a commander. In the third and fourth centuries CE, however, many emperors commanded in person and several were killed or captured in combat.

This article will survey several aspects of the emperor's role as commander, although it can be difficult to generalize about a relatively informal system, a personal relationship between army and commander-in-chief that changed (sometimes drastically) with each new emperor. While this thematic treatment will focus on the first and second centuries CE, the last paragraph provides a diachronic sketch of the changes that occurred between Augustus and the late Roman Empire.

When Augustus finally brought the decades of civil war to a close, he had a unique opportunity. Rome had ruled an empire for more than two centuries, but he was the first emperor, the undisputed commander of the

armies that had won that empire. Augustus' central achievement was to create a stable army, replacing the highly personal loyalty of the soldiers to one warlord or another with an institutional loyalty to the emperor's person.

But the first problem was money. In the mid-Republic, veterans had been given land after victory or upon retirement, but in the late Republic this practice became a source of conflict when generals such as Sulla and the Second Triumvirs confiscated land from their enemies to give to the soldiers. To fund veterans' pensions without making confiscations, Augustus established the *aerarium militare*, a treasury seeded by his personal wealth and supported by a tax on inheritances. His decision to pay serving soldiers a steady and relatively low wage while using the treasury to ensure the payment of large cash bonuses at the end of a legionary's period of service (20–25 years) transformed army service from an opportunistic gamble into a decent career. As the system developed, the old practice of generals giving donatives (cash gifts) to their soldiers became routinized as well. Soon, all donatives came from the emperor, and normally they were paid only in honor of imperial events, such as imperial accessions and their anniversaries. Usurpers might also exploit the custom of accession donatives to win supporters.

This might seem to be a brilliant innovation: a pseudo-modern professional military conjured into existence to replace a chaos of competing war bands. There is some truth to this view, but Augustus built his new institution along traditional lines, namely the old Roman system of patronage. What might seem to be a corrupt system of promotion or an institutionalization of bribery was in Roman eyes an acceptable way of recognizing the personal, reciprocal bonds between a patron and his many clients. In this manner, the emperor became the sole patron of every serving soldier. While the emperor gathered all of the old sources of Roman martial glory to himself—the triumph, the taking of victory titles, the right to supreme command—he paid for it by providing financial stability to several hundred thousand soldiers.

As the empire passed into the hands of Augustus' successors, the bonds between the soldiers and their ultimate commander were emphasized in a number of ways. Soldiers now swore the military oath directly to the reigning emperor, which was probably often repeated on paydays and holidays. Just as emperors might reward outstanding individual service with

decorations and promotions, entire units were bound to an emperor or his family through gifts and honorific unit titles, and every unit carried portraits of the emperor. The remarkable military calendar known as the *Feriale Duranum* (the Festival Calendar from Dura-Europos, a third-century CE military base in Syria) testifies that first century imperial birthdays were still celebrated by an auxiliary unit serving on the banks of the Euphrates two centuries later. Even the coins that paid a soldier's salary bore the image of his commander-in-chief, and were likely to feature slogans emphasizing the closeness of emperor and army. Despite the social and geographical separation between an emperor and his soldiers, some emperors made much use of the term *commilito*, or "fellow soldier," and every emperor was expected to address his troops from time to time, an event known as an *adlocutio* in which the emperor delivered a formal speech to his men, usually praising and exhorting them to raise morale.

Just as the *adlocutio* recalled the prebattle speeches of battlefield commanders, there was pressure on the emperor to act the part of an old-fashioned Roman military leader. Claudius, a most unmilitary emperor, traveled all the way to Britain to be able to claim a personal triumph, but even emperors with previous command experience cultivated the reputation of a "fellow soldier." As a younger man Galba had run for 20 miles with his troops, carrying a shield; as emperor, though now an old man, he appeared at the head of his troops, carrying a sword. Trajan marched on foot, fording rivers alongside his infantry; Hadrian kept his head uncovered on the march, in fierce sun and snow alike. Here too there was symbiosis: soldiers appreciated an emperor who made the effort to share their hardships, and emperors without victories of their own basked in the reflected glory of their legions. Amidst the praise emperors also emphasized maintaining discipline, but this was largely a sop to the senatorial aristocracy who objected to the army's increased influence—even if the emperor blustered about keeping the army in line, it was understood that when push came to shove senators were dispensable and legions were not.

In reality, of course, the emperor could only very rarely lead his far-flung troops in person. Senators commanded legions, as they had always done, but now they were rotated through different regions, rarely spending more than a year or two with the same troops. The system worked well: soldiers were provided for without confiscations, and the senators could still compete (albeit in a much more restricted way) for military prestige without

much chance of earning the personal loyalty of the troops under their command. Those senatorial commanders who broke these customary rules, as did Gnaeus Calpurnius Piso, the alleged murderer of Germanicus, paid the price for perceived treason. Still, the rule of Rome depended only on the army—however much Augustus politely played down this fact—and a very unpopular emperor or the sudden end of a dynasty meant that either a provincial army or the Praetorian Guard (the chief troops in the city of Rome) would become kingmakers.

In the two centuries after Augustus major campaigns were relatively rare, yet the emperor did occasionally take the field at the head of his army. First- and second-century CE emperors were not expected to actually fight in the front, endangering their persons, but they might take an active part in directing the battle. Like any senatorial commander, they rode behind the battle lines, making dispositions and deciding when to commit reserves to combat. During sieges it was considered good leadership to be seen courting the (slight) danger of long-range fire from the enemy walls, and to remain close enough to the action to personally witness the heroic exploits of assault troops. Active leadership was good, but all understood that “no one demands that a general should risk his life in fighting like a common soldier,” in the words of Plutarch’s *Life of Pelopidas*, a biography of a fourth-century BCE Greek general in which Plutarch voices the attitudes of a citizen of the Roman Empire. Trajan is the exemplar of this approach, and the column commemorating his Dacian Wars shows him constantly in the presence of his army. He leads the religious rites, he rewards his soldiers, he directs siege and river-crossing operations, and he makes speeches—but when he is in range of enemy weapons he is protected by his shield bearers.

Trajan represents an ideal performance of “emperor as commander,” but the demands of the role were always changing. The Julio-Claudian emperors stayed in or near Rome, and only Claudius and Gaius (Caligula) appeared on campaign, each for unusual reasons. But the Flavian claim to rule rested largely on the military success of Vespasian and Titus, and subsequent emperors generally made a habit of visiting their armies in the provinces. Hadrian did not lead a victorious campaign but he toured constantly, and an inscription records the speeches he made while inspecting an outpost in North Africa—model *adlocutiones* in which he emphasized his connection to the army and displayed his familiarity with the individual units he addressed.

Toward the end of the second century, when barbarian pressure on the frontiers increased, emperors were increasingly on hand with an army. In 193, there was a chaotic scramble for power which featured two senators shouting to outbid each other for the support of the Praetorian Guard. The troops had acclaimed new emperors before, but this “auction of the empire” was seen as very shocking, and suggested the long corrosion of the Augustan modesty that had de-emphasized the political role of armed force. Not long after, Septimius Severus is supposed to have told his sons to “enrich the soldiers, and despise all the rest,” in the words of Cassius Dio. One of these sons, Caracalla, so fully identified with the army that he carried a standard on the march and wanted soldiers to address *him* as “fellow soldier.” The rest of the fiction was stripped away, and during the series of invasions and civil wars that marked the middle of the third century, most Roman emperors were little more than briefly supreme generals, leading their armies in person and ruling by right of conquest. The emperor Maximinus Thrax (235–238) represented the next logical step in this time of crisis: not only was he a soldier of humble birth, but, even after becoming emperor, he rode into battle with his troops, killing with his own hand. The emperor Decius (249–251) died in battle. The emperor Valerian (253–260) was captured when his army was defeated by the Persians in 260. Although Diocletian and the Tetrarchy restored order to the empire in the late third century, the pattern that emperors might fight in combat persisted in the fourth century; Constantine the Great’s rival Maxentius perished in the battle of the Milvian Bridge (312). In 363, the pagan emperor Julian, attempting to imitate Alexander and numerous Roman emperors in defeating the Persians, died from a wound received in battle. The emperor Valens died in the battle of Adrianople (378), one of Rome’s most notorious defeats. Even the most powerful of the later Roman emperors was dependent on the ever-uncertain loyalty of his soldiers and rarely far from a major field army.

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See also *Adlocutio*; *Aerarium Militare*; Army in Politics; Augustus; Cult of the Emperor; *Cursus Honorum* (Imperial); Donatives; Elite Participation; Emperor as Patron; Septimius Severus; Third-Century CE Crisis; Vespasian

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Emperor as Patron

The reality of the imperial army was that the emperor, as at least symbolic commander-in-chief, maintained a special relationship with the army, on which his power depended, a relationship resembling patron and client in Roman society. His soldiers were also dependent on him; many soldiers were poor men, though the socio-economic status of recruits may have risen slightly in the imperial period as more men were recruited from assimilated, and thus moderately well-off, provincials.

This relationship was emphasized throughout soldiers' service. The soldiers took oaths to the emperor and received their pay at least partially as coin minted in his name and depicting his likeness. The emperor might address his soldiers in person, praising them, and give them donatives (bounties of coin) or other privileges. Emperors who provided their soldiers with benefits earned the cooperation of the army, while emperors who withdrew benefits, as Galba did in 69 CE by refusing the Praetorian Guard a promised donative, risked revolt or assassination.

The relationship between emperors and soldiers was a reciprocal one resembling the traditional relationship of patron and client in Roman society: the patron provided for his dependent clients, and the clients returned the favor with loyalty and services. This patron-client relationship between commander and soldiers is thought to have developed during the late Republic when many legionaries were now recruited from the landless poor and the most prominent commanders were extremely wealthy oligarchs. Pompey the Great is an example; as a young man, he raised three legions from his family's clients in Picenum.

However, the patron-client model is not entirely satisfactory as an explanation of the imperial army's social dynamics. Traditional patrons did

not depend on their clients to maintain their social status. Furthermore, the Roman emperors had also to satisfy a third group, the Senate or, more broadly, the educated urban elite (in Rome and other cities). This aristocratic group disapproved of the emperor's too obvious indulgence of the army and of the army's threat of revolt. The emphasis on military discipline in imperial literature (including narratives and anecdotes of the traditional Republic) probably represents the imperial aristocracy's disapproval of the patronage dynamic between emperor and army. In this model of military discipline, emperors and senatorial commanders did not show the army special favor, and took a leading role in inculcating their soldiers to endure hardships in training and on campaign. In practice, however, skillful emperors adopted both roles; they provided their soldiers with benefits and they upheld traditions of military discipline.

Both emperors and senatorial commanders also had reason to provide a counterweight to the patronage model of military command because it offered too easy a route to power for usurpers. This is seen in the "War of Four Emperors" (69 CE) in which the historian Tacitus, our main source for the war, depicts Marcus Salvius Otho and Aulus Vitellius as rising to imperial power through their patronage of the army, Otho bestowing favors on the praetorians and Vitellius on the Rhine legions. That this dynamic was not merely an imperial historian's construction is seen in the document titled the *Senatus Consultum de Cn. Pisone Patre* (20 CE) in which the Senate of Tiberian Rome condemned one Gnaeus Calpurnius Piso, governor of Syria, for attempted conspiracy. The decree of the Senate depicts Piso as courting the favor of the army in Syria, and is supported by Tacitus' account of the same episode (*Annals* 2.55). If senatorial commanders wanted the emperors to trust them, they needed to avoid excessive emphasis on the role of patron with their soldiers. In practice, this line may have been narrow. Documents from Vindolanda (around 100 CE) on Hadrian's Wall in northern Britain show that when soldiers petitioned their commander, an auxiliary prefect, for leave, they adopted the subservient terminology a client might use.

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See also Donatives; Emperor as Commander; Galba; Military Discipline; Otho; Piso, Gnaeus Calpurnius; Pompey; Praetorians; Tacitus; Tiberius (Emperor); Vitellius; War of Four Emperors

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Empresses

The wife of a reigning emperor received the title *Augusta*, but lacked formal military, political, or judicial powers. Their absence was due to the political structure of the traditional Republic, in which men monopolized political office and military commands, and the development of the emperor's role, an outgrowth of the acclamation of victorious generals. The power of an empress was personal and depended on her influence with the emperor and with other powerful men in Rome. The Augusta was also wealthy and acted as a patron, able to dispense material favors as well as influence. However, her lack of formal political power meant that if she wished to wield political power, she might support male relations as puppet emperors. This article discusses empresses in a Roman cultural context, excluding Zenobia of Palmyra (sub vid).

The first empress termed *Augusta* was Livia, the wife and then widow of Augustus, mother of Tiberius (14–37 CE). She commanded vast influence and respect. Tacitus' *Annals* depict her as virtually a power behind the throne of Tiberius. She was rumored to have engineered the succession of Tiberius over Augustus' previous choices, family members who all predeceased Augustus. However, she maintained the public image of a traditional Roman matron.

Notable empresses after Livia included Agrippina the Younger, a daughter of Germanicus, sister of Gaius (37–41), and later wife of Claudius (41–54) and mother of Nero (54–68). Tacitus' memorable but biased portrait of Agrippina emphasizes her dominating personality and her influence over

and control of the elderly Claudius (whom she allegedly poisoned) and her underage son Nero. Nero eventually tired of his mother's domination and had her assassinated, killed by Roman soldiers after a botched attempt to drown her in a boating accident.

Other empresses who were prominent and influential were Julia Domna, the wife of Septimius Severus (193–211) and her nieces Julia Soaemias, mother of Elagabalus (218–222) and Julia Mamaea, mother of Alexander Severus (222–235). The hostile sources, the contemporaries Cassius Dio and Herodian, depict Soaemias and Mamaea as manipulating the army and powerful interests to support the accession of their teenage sons, and then as governing behind the scenes.

These empresses were particularly notorious because, in male-dominated Roman society, they gave offense by seeming to be more powerful than men; male historians such as Tacitus, Cassius Dio, and Herodian gave them a bad press. It is a useful check to examine the documentary sources for their reigns.

The last extremely prominent empress was Galla Placidia, the daughter of Theodosius I (379–395) and sister of Arcadius (395–408) and Honorius (395–423), the power behind the thrones of Honorius and her son Valentinian III (425–455). Galla Placidia was caught up in the turbulent events of the early 400s, being kidnapped by Alaric at the sack of Rome in 410 and, after Alaric's death, married to his brother Athaulf; then wife to Constantius III, a short-lived Roman emperor and father of her son Valentinian III. Galla Placidia ruled in the name of Valentinian III from 425 to 437. As Galla Placidia could not be a military leader, and neither Honorius nor Valentinian III (even after their minorities) were effective leaders, the western Empire depended on a series of unrelated commanders-in-chief (*magistri utriusque militiae*), most notably Flavius Aetius. In the eastern empire, Pulcheria, the sister of Theodosius II (408–450) also wielded great influence over her brother and the court.

Many empresses were able to exert influence more covertly. The mainstream role of an empress, which the women discussed above also fulfilled, was dynastic and religious. She presented the virtue of marital *concordia*, or harmony and fidelity. Her role as faithful spouse ensured a stable dynastic succession, in an imperial dynasty, or sealed adoptive successions with linkage by marriage, in cases of adoptive succession. (For instance, in the Tetrarchic designation of the Caesars Galerius and

Constantius I, these men married the daughters of the Augusti Diocletian and Maximian.) For these reasons, imperial historians and biographers exposed the infidelities of empresses such as Messalina (the previous wife of Claudius) and Faustina the Younger (wife of Marcus Aurelius). The Augusta also took part in Roman religious ceremonies appropriate to elite women; after the conversion of Constantine, some of the empresses were highly influential with Christian bishops.

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See also Acclamation; Agrippina II; Alexander Severus; Augustus; Cassius Dio; Claudius I; Galla Placidia; Gender and War; Nero; Republic, Political Structure; Succession (Imperial); Tacitus; Zenobia

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Equites, Equestrians

The *equites* (singular, *eques*) or equestrians were the second most prestigious of the Roman orders or social strata, ranking below the senatorial order. The *equites* originally were cavalry, termed *equites equo publico*, or “horsemen granted horses by the people.” By the last century of the Republic, the associations of *equites* with cavalry service had broken down due to military reorganization and the growth of the order. Equestrians now denoted a well-to-do middle social stratum, below the Senate and nobility, from which senators might be recruited. In the late Republic and empire, equestrians became the backbone of the government and officer corps; in the third century CE, equestrians dominated the government and officer corps, replacing senators as governors of provinces, before equestrians as a category faded away in the fourth and fifth centuries CE. *Equites* or equestrians are not best translated “knights,” a term with anachronistic medieval connotations.

In the Classical Mediterranean, horseback riding and cavalry service were usually aristocratic activities. The archaic Roman *equites* were a privileged Servian census class, granted horses at public expense and occupying 18 *centuriae* in the assembly. One of the duties of the censors was to regulate the composition of the equestrian order, summoning the *equites* to a parade on horseback (*transvectio equitum*) on July 15 and observing whether the men and their horses were fit for military service. At this time *equites* numbered from 300 (archaic) to 1800 men, required to serve in the army for 10 campaigns.

However, this narrow definition of the *equites* broke down by the last two centuries of the Roman Republic. The reorganization of the Roman legion from maniples into cohorts reduced the need for cavalry. By the mid-first century BCE, allied forces (*auxilia*) were used for cavalry. The *transvectio equitum* lapsed as a ritual. The equestrians developed into a much larger group of well-to-do landowners (they still were required to own property equivalent to 400,000 HS), businessmen, tax farmers, and friends and assistants to the Roman governing class which was still dominated by the senatorial order. Senators and wealthy equestrians might socialize in the same circles and intermarry. However, the ongoing struggle over whether senators or equestrians should serve in the jury panels for the criminal courts (*quaestiones perpetuae*) that tried magistrates for extortion, differentiated senatorial and equestrian interests, and brought them into conflict. The equestrians were not a unified group and cannot be viewed as opposing the Senate *en masse*, though Sulla in his proscriptions targeted wealthy equestrians and promoted the interests of the Senate.

When Sulla, Caesar, and Augustus sought to fill the ranks of the Senate, they promoted equestrians to senatorial rank (a power originally held by the censors). Such equestrians were “new men” who had not held magistracies in earlier generations. Many came from Italian towns and cities outside Rome. Augustus differentiated senators and equestrians more sharply, requiring senators to possess 1,000,000 HS in landed property, while equestrians required only 400,000; senators and equestrians were assigned to different seating in the games and theater. Augustus also restored the *transvectio equitum* parade, though obviously not all equestrians could participate (many lived outside Rome) (Dionysius *Roman History* 6.13). Through the promotion of equestrians into the senatorial order and common citizens into the equestrian order, the emperors assured a constant flow of

provincial Roman citizens into the governing class of the Roman Empire.

In the Principate, equestrians entered the imperial service both as civilians and as military officers. As civilians, they might become imperial secretaries with major responsibilities, carrying out the day-to-day central administration of the empire. These secretaries were the emperors' freedmen in the Julio-Claudian period, but soon were replaced by equestrians, a group less resented by senators. The *ab epistulis* managed the emperor's correspondence, including diplomatic relations with many communities; this prestigious post required literary polish in both Latin and Greek. The *a rationibus* managed imperial finances, taxation, and expenditures. Other secretaries assisted the emperor with the formulation of legal opinions. Subjects wrote to the emperor asking for legal advice, and the emperor (or his secretaries) issued replies (*rescripta*) which functioned somewhat like modern case law, establishing precedents.

The most important civilian post in the Principate was the praetorian prefecture. The praetorian prefect commanded the Praetorian Guard but became the emperor's deputy for civilian administration. The praetorian prefecture was held by equestrians, and the first equestrian to become emperor, Macrinus (217–218), was the emperor Caracalla's praetorian prefect (Dio 78.41). (Pertinax, emperor in 193, was born an equestrian but had been promoted into the Senate.) The risk that the prefect would usurp the emperor's place continued into the mid-third century, with usurpations by Philip (244–249), Carus (282–283) and Aper (284, a would-be emperor slain by Diocletian, emperor 284–305). In the provinces, equestrians might hold the office of *procurator* in the financial administration, but only one major province, Egypt, had an equestrian governor, the *praefectus Aegypti* (Tacitus, *Annals* 2.59; Dio 51.17). Because Egypt was a major provider of grain to the empire and to the city of Rome, a senatorial governor of Egypt would be a risk for usurpation.

Equestrians also dominated the higher ranks in the imperial legions, though senators still monopolized the highest ranks in the first two centuries CE. Proconsuls and legates were of senatorial rank, as was the *tribunus laticlavus*, the broad-striped tribune, a young man (under 25, a senator's son but not yet senator). The *tribunus laticlavus* formally outranked the equestrian *tribuni angusticlavii* (narrow-striped tribunes), who however were mature men with longer service. Centurions might also begin as equestrians, obtaining their centurionates by patronage. A minority

of centurions attained equestrian rank through long service: a centurion who was promoted through the hierarchy of centurions, attaining the rank of *primus pilus*, became an equestrian on his discharge from the army. Some *primipilares* (former *primi pili*) continued in military service, holding the rank of *praefectus castrorum* (camp prefect), an important officer in charge of logistics. Other *primipilares* might enter the civilian administration at the level of procurator. The *praefecti* of auxiliary units (infantry or cavalry), commanding these units, were also equestrians.

The “third-century crisis” (235–284) is traditionally seen as a period when the emperors excluded senators from military commands and provincial governorships, promoting equestrians as governors and legionary commanders. The promotion of equestrian commanders began earlier; Septimius Severus (193–211) created three new legions, I–III Parthica, commanded by equestrians, and appointed an equestrian governor of the new province of Mesopotamia (Dio 75.3.2). The exclusion of senators may have been informal and regarded by contemporaries as temporary. The third-century emperors stereotyped as lower class peasants by contemporary writers such as Herodian and by later fourth-century authors were probably provincial equestrians. In the fourth and fifth centuries, the status of equestrian died away as it mattered less than holding office in the enlarged government and army. Advance in civilian or military rank conferred wealth and prestige equivalent to equestrians and senatorials.

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See also Legate; Praetorian Prefect; *Princeps*, Principate; Senate, Senators; Servian Constitution; Third-Century CE Crisis; Tribune

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Equites Singulares Augusti

The *equites singulares Augusti* (singular: *eques singularis Augusti*) were an elite cavalry unit which guarded the early Roman emperors. Started by Domitian (81–96 CE) or Trajan (98–117), they replaced the earlier semimercenary “German bodyguard” (*Germani corporis custodes*) who had been tasked with keeping first-century emperors safe. Somewhat like their predecessors, the *equites singulares* were initially recruited from the Batavi and Ubii, Germanic peoples in the Rhineland who had a strong cavalry tradition. By the Severan era (ca. 200), as with the praetorians, they were largely recruited from militarized frontier zones around the western Danube River that provided much of Rome’s auxiliary *alae*. By this period they also came to number 1,000 or, more probably, 2,000, and occupied a notable camp in southeast Rome, the *Castra Nova* (new camp). The camp today lies under the St. John Lateran papal basilica complex.

There is a good deal we do not know about the *equites singulares Augusti*’s service and command structure, but they do not seem to be simply the cavalry of the Praetorian Guard, which had its own mounted units. Nor, of course, were the *equites singulares Augusti* always on their horses; especially in Rome, the nature of their service would have afforded limited opportunities to ride. Besides keeping the emperor safe and accompanying him on journeys, *equites singulares Augusti* (like praetorians) were sometimes sent out on policing missions against bandits and other problems, especially in Italy but occasionally the provinces as well. Constantine disbanded the *equites singulares Augusti* along with the praetorians when he took Rome in 312.

Cavalry guards with similar titles also served some Roman provincial governors.

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See also Alae; Auxilia; Cavalry (Imperial); Cavalry (Republic); Constantine I; Praetorians

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Etruria, Etruscans

The region of Etruria comprised the core geographical area of the Etruscan civilization, which flourished between the ninth century and fifth centuries BCE in central Italy. Etruria's geographical borders are the Arno and Tiber rivers to the north and the south, and the Tyrrhenian Sea and Apennine Mountains to the west and east. As early as the eighth century BCE Etruscans began colonizing other parts of Italy. These extensions reached northward to the Po Valley and southward into Campania. Etruscan city-states resembled Greek city-states in their development as autonomous political units containing both urban areas and the adjacent agricultural hinterland. Many archaeologists consider Etruscan civilization to have been the most advanced civilization of the western Mediterranean during its height. This cultural ascendancy is due most significantly to Etruria's mineral-rich and fertile land. The excellence of Etruscan metalworking, shipbuilding, and masonry enabled the Etruscans to dominate trade.

The Etruscans are an under-represented people in the historical record as almost no original literary sources in the Etruscan language are extant. Our main sources of information are derived from archaeological excavations of Etruscan cities and necropolises, and from the writings of later Romans. Since the Romans conquered the Etruscan city-states, these literary sources are written with a pro-Roman bias giving the superficial impression of the Etruscans as a perpetually hostile enemy to Rome.

The dearth of Etruscan literary sources causes their language to remain largely unknown to modern scholars except from brief and tantalizing inscriptions. Etruscan is not a member of the Indo-European language family and thus has traditionally been considered an isolate language, unrelated to others. The origin of the language and its people has frustrated scholars for centuries. Origin theories include the possibilities of migration from either the eastern Mediterranean, from northern Alpine regions of Europe, or that these were truly an indigenous people.

After the Roman conquest of Etruscan territory, Etruscan civilization (itself heavily influenced by Greek civilization) became submerged in Italian

and Roman culture, largely disappearing by the first century BCE. Nonetheless, Etruscan civilization had some important influences upon Roman civilization, providing loan words and religious practices such as haruspicy, the ritual inspection of the livers of sacrificed animals to reveal portents.

Amanda Grace Self

See also Etruscan Wars; Livy

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Etruscan Wars

Early Roman engagement in war with the Etruscans was a major undertaking that would have significant repercussions on Roman expansion. The Romans had no notion of a planned, unified war against the Etruscan people. Rather, the military endeavors against the city-states of Etruria were discrete reactions to an array of individual factors and events.

The Etruscans themselves never united in a large-scale war against the growing strength of Rome. The legendary league of 12 Etruscan peoples evidenced no desire to unite militarily. Aware of their impotence against the might of a confederated Etruria, Romans exhibited anxiety at this prospect that never came to fruition. The only evidence of cooperation was city-states that would form occasional alliances with each other to face the threat of Rome. Early Romans were at a distinct disadvantage compared to their adversarial neighbors. The thoroughly developed Etruscan city-states had military experience and ample resources to contend with the blossoming threat of Rome.

The Etruscan Wars fought by Rome began as a clash of neighbors who

inhabited opposite banks of the Tiber River. This proximity was a motivating factor for both parties to engage in warfare. The closeness and shared geographical resources of these two peoples drove them to conflict. The Tiber, which served as the boundary between these two civilizations, was crucial for interior access to the peninsula and the salt beds at the river's mouth were highly valuable. The Etruscan cities of Caere, Fidenae, and Veii all relied on access to these resources as well as on trade routes to Campania and thus were keen to defend their position from the new Latin city.

Throughout Rome's infancy it was the Etruscan cities, particularly those closest to the Tiber River, which incited war. The Etruscans, having been the dominant culture in Italy for centuries, were not complacent to the looming threat of Rome's unrestrained expansion. As such, it was the city-states of southern Etruria that engaged in the earliest confrontations. The inhabitants of northern Etruria did not challenge the Romans until the southern stronghold of Veii was conclusively defeated.

The Etruscans were inclined to avoid the battlefield and seek less traditional tactics to inflict damage. Raids on Roman lands became a frequent method of instigating hostilities. Etruscans showed willingness to capitalize on Roman preoccupation. Whether distracted by wars with other Italian tribes or crippled by pestilence and famine, Etruscan cities, like Veii in 436 BCE and Tarquinii in 397 BCE, sought these opportunities to initiate conflicts with Rome.

The most significant conflict in these wars happened between Veii and Rome. It began slowly with sporadic raids on the Roman countryside. This conflict culminated in the final episode between Veii and Rome with the besiegement of Veii for 10 years, from 406 BCE and 396 BCE. According to legend, the Roman dictator Marcus Furius Camillus ordered a tunnel built to sack the city from inside its own gates. Though the Etruscan cities of Capena and Falerii offered their aid to Veii, it was not enough to contend with the tenacious Romans.

After the fall of Veii, other southern Etruscan cities engaged in war with Romans and one by one were defeated in conflict. The remaining Etruscan cities, most of which inhabited northern Etruria, were increasingly vulnerable after the fall of southern Etruria. Throughout the fourth and third centuries BCE Roman commanders such as Camillus and Quintus Fabius Maximus made forays into the heart of Etruria. Once powerful

strongholds such as Arretium, Perugia, Rusellae, Tarquinii, and Volsinii were defeated and their autonomy lost. In 295 BCE, the Etruscans threw in their lot with the Samnites in a famous alliance of Samnites, Etruscans, Umbrians, and Gauls. This coalition was defeated by the Romans in the battle of Sentinum.

Rome's Etruscan Wars were not a simple process of expansion into barbarian-inhabited lands. Etruria was home to a thriving civilization that did not willingly forfeit their independence. Throughout centuries of conflict, Etruscans dealt the Romans frequent defeats, but eventually they succumbed along with the rest of Italy into the hands of the Romans.

The Etruscan Wars played a significant part in expanding Rome's sovereignty throughout the Italian peninsula. The incorporation of Etruscan city-states into Rome's dominion represented the end of political autonomy for the once dominant Italian people. In the aftermath of an Etruscan defeat there were immediate consequences as to the city's relationship with Rome and its place as an Italian ally. Rome had no prescribed formula for how it dealt with a conquered Etruscan city. The outcome was particularized according to the initial cause for war, the past relations with that city, and the result of the actual military engagement.

Among all the pacified Etruscan cities, the incorporation of Veii in 396 BCE was most significant to the rise of Rome. The expansion of Rome by the additions of Veii can be measured by numerous means. Roman territory more than doubled in size with the addition of Veian lands and the auctioning of the population was Rome's first attempt at large-scale enslavement.

Rome's interactions with the Etruscans did not cease once they were conquered. An interest in Etruscan culture and identity persisted in Roman society centuries after the conflicts were fought and the cities subdued. A uniquely Etruscan culture continued to thrive in central Italy in spite of the loss of political autonomy. Etruria benefited overall from the stability offered by Rome. Much of the famous Etruscan art known today, including sculptures and tomb paintings, was produced from the fourth century BCE and onward into Roman times. Though Etruscan culture never fully vanished in the Roman period, its language did disappear from use. Etruscan eventually succumbed to Latin sometime near the end of the Republic; bilingual tomb inscriptions in both Latin and Etruscan are used to track the decline of the Etruscan language.

See also Etruria, Etruscans; Livy; Overthrow of the Monarchy; Samnite Wars; Sentinum, Battle of; Veii, Siege of

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Eugenius (Usurper) (d. 394 CE)

Flavius Eugenius was a usurper who ruled the western half of the Roman Empire from August 22, 392 to September 6, 394 CE. His reign is often thought to represent the last significant pagan challenge to the dominance of Christianity in the Roman Empire. Reconstructing the detail of Eugenius' reign is difficult due to a paucity of ancient sources for the period. With the history of Ammianus ending with the year 378 we are forced to rely on brief epitomes, the history of Zosimus and the work of church historians. Both Zosimus and the church writers are highly biased regarding Eugenius' usurpation and must be used with care.

Eugenius came to power in 392 after Valentinian II, who had been given responsibility for the west by his brother-in-law the eastern emperor Theodosius I, was either murdered or driven to suicide by his Frankish *magister militum* Arbogast. Knowing he would not be accepted as co-Augustus by Theodosius, Arbogast instead raised Eugenius to power (Zosimus 4.54.2; Socrates 5.25). Prior to his accession Eugenius was a teacher of rhetoric who had also served as chief secretary to Valentinian II. Needing support among the western aristocracy, Eugenius appointed leading pagan senators to senior positions in his regime. Despite the claims of Christian writers, there was no widespread pagan revival under Eugenius. Instead Eugenius (himself a Christian) offered pagan senators support as they

publicly patronized pagan causes, a decision which brought him into conflict with Ambrose of Milan (Ambrose, *Letters* 57).

Eugenius was Augustus in name only and was most likely directed by Arbogast in all his actions. Initially Eugenius attempted to coexist with Theodosius. He sent emissaries seeking approval for his appointment and minted coinage in the names of both Theodosius and his son Arcadius. Although Theodosius did not immediately denounce the usurper, he quickly began to prepare for war (Zosimus 4.55, 57). In January 393, Theodosius raised his second son Honorius to the rank of Augustus, signaling his intent to keep the empire in his dynasty's hands. In mid-394, Theodosius finally moved west with a large army, defeating Arbogast and Eugenius at the Battle of the Frigidus River on September 5 and 6, 394. Following Theodosius' victory, Eugenius was captured and executed (Zosimus 4. 58.2–5; Sozomenus 6.24).

Mark Hebblewhite

See also Arbogast; Arcadius; Frigidus, Battle of the; Honorius; Theodosius I; Valentinian II

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Euphrates (River)

The Euphrates River is one of the two great rivers of Mesopotamia, west of the River Tigris, and in Roman times was sometimes a frontier of the Roman Empire in the east. The Euphrates originates in the mountains of Armenia and first flows in a southwest direction toward the Taurus Mountains before it flows southward.

The Euphrates formed an unofficial boundary between the Roman and Persian Empires. Individual Roman emperors sought to extend the area of Roman control eastward to the Tigris River, establishing client kingdoms in

Mesopotamia as buffer states between the Roman and Persian Empires. Septimius Severus established Mesopotamia as a Roman province (197). The Persian Sassanid Empire, the Arsacids' successor, overran this territory and captured Dura-Europos, a Hellenistic city and Roman frontier outpost on the Euphrates, in 257 CE. Major Roman victories in 297–298 and a treaty of 299 extended Roman control eastward to the Tigris, but the region of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers was contested through the later empire, in a cold war of diplomacy that occasionally heated up into active warfare.

Sara E. Phang

See also Galerius; Julian; Persia, Arsacid; Persian Wars, Arsacid; Persian Wars, Sassanid; Tigris

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Eusebius (ca. 260–339 CE)

Eusebius of Caesarea, bishop of Caesarea, was a major early Christian historian, apologist, and scholar, writing in Greek. His *Church History* (finished ca. 324–325) broke new ground in presenting a history of the Roman Empire from a Christian point of view, and documents the persecutions of the early Christians. He included contemporary events, such as the so-called Great Persecution of 303–311 and the victory of Constantine the Great (306–337). Eusebius also innovates as a historian by quoting documentary sources in full, a practice usually avoided by classical authors who prefer to summarize or paraphrase such documents. The *Church History* thus is a valuable source of documents pertaining to the early Church and the persecutions. Eusebius sees pagan-Christian conflict as a major historical force, in contrast with non-Christian authors who probably viewed the persecutions of Christians as incidental (probably as a matter of public order).

Eusebius also wrote an encomiastic biography of Constantine, the *Vita Constantini*, and a lost *Chronicle* (replaced by Jerome's Latin *Chronicle*) that covered biblical and classical history from earliest times to the present. Eusebius thus is a useful source for the Tetrarchy and reign of Constantine.

See also Christians, Persecution of; Constantine I; Documentary Sources; Lactantius

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Exile

Latin *exilium*, which in the imperial period employed the technical terms *deportatio* (deportation) and *relegatio* (relegation), was the most common capital penalty applied to Roman citizens during the Republic. During the Principate and later empire, exile applied to elite Roman citizens (i.e., senators and equestrians). The death penalty was not usually applied to citizens of the Republic or to elite citizens during the Principate.

During the Republic, citizens not on military service were protected from the arbitrary judgment of magistrates by the right of *provocatio ad populum*, appeal to the Roman people. They could request a fair trial. In exemplary narratives from the early Republic, *provocatio* saved citizens from the death penalty. In practice, during the Classical Republic, exile was the most severe penalty applied to citizens. Those exiled beyond the boundaries of Roman territory might take refuge in the Greek Eastern Mediterranean, hardly a severe punishment. Nonetheless the exile suffered *aquae et ignis interdictio* (interdiction from fire and water, i.e., no citizens or allies might lend him or her aid). He or she may have lost Roman citizenship, though this is debated by scholars.

The civil wars and civil conflicts of the late Republic caused the death penalty to be applied to citizens who threatened the public safety or committed treason. In some cases, the death penalty was extrajudicial, a result of the *senatus consultum ultimum* (SCU) that empowered the consuls or other executive magistrates to “see to it that the state suffered no harm,” authorizing them to inflict whatever violence they deemed necessary. In the late Republic’s civil wars and conflicts, those presently in power might

declare their opponents *hostes publici*, public enemies, liable to summary execution if caught. In the proscriptions of 82–81 and 43–42 BCE, the victims were *hostes publici*, exiled on pain of death and with a price on their heads; if caught, they could be summarily killed and their killers could claim rewards. A few of the victims escaped beyond the boundaries of the empire. However, outside of emergency situations such as these, the Republic still regarded exile as the most severe capital penalty.

The expansion of the empire decreased the geographic space available for exiles to flee to. Accordingly, in the Principate exile to islands became the favored mode of exile. Such exile could be relatively comfortable, or could be a severe hardship if the island in question was small, barren, uninhabited, and far from shipping routes. The Roman Mediterranean boasts hundreds of islands, from Sicily, Sardinia, and Corsica to tiny rocks; Britain was also counted. However, the symbolic nature of the islands as remote from society mattered more than their actual desolation.

Those exiled to islands underwent *deportatio*, the most severe form of exile, in which they lost their citizenship and civil rights; their property was confiscated, and their familial relationships were dissolved. A less severe form of exile was *relegatio* (relegation), in which the convicted person did not lose his or her civil rights but might suffer loss of property. A relegated person might undergo temporary exile or be forbidden to enter the city of Rome or other defined areas of the empire, but was not necessarily restricted to an island. Female adulterers and their lovers were exiled to different islands.

In the imperial age, deportation and relegation applied to the upper orders, who normally were not executed. The exception was execution for sedition or treason; even in these cases, aristocrats might be offered the opportunity to commit suicide, sparing them the humiliation of execution. In contrast, members of the lower orders, even if Roman citizens, were subject to the death penalty and, increasingly, to exacerbated death penalties (such as being thrown to wild beasts in the arena) formerly reserved for slaves.

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See also Civil Rights; Proscriptions; *Senatus Consultum Ultimum*; States of Emergency; Suicide; Treason

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Extraordinary Levies

In emergencies, the Romans recruited groups or classes of persons who were normally ineligible for service in the legions, including *capite censi* (in the pre-Marian Republic), and slaves and freedmen. Such recruitment is distinct from the *tumultus* (*levée en masse*, call-up of all male citizens of military age) that marked a state of emergency.

The traditional Republic's military recruitment excluded men without property, termed *proletarii* or *capite censi*. In 280 BCE, *capite censi* were called up to campaign against Tarentum in South Italy. Marius made it routine to recruit *capite censi* into the legions, and the barrier to service thenceforth was slave status. Slaves and freedmen traditionally did not serve in the legions. They might be recruited into Rome's navy, as occurred in 217, 214, 181, and 171 BCE (Livy 24.11.7–9, 22.11.8, 40.18.7, 42.27.3). After the battle of Cannae (216 BCE), due to the mass casualties, the Senate authorized the recruitment of freedmen (Livy 22.57.12, 23.35.7). The loyalties of many of these freedmen was to their former master Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus (an ancestor of the tribune of the plebs), according to Livy (25.20.4).

After the Pannonian revolt in 6 CE and the Varian disaster of 9 CE in which three legions were lost, Augustus authorized the recruitment of freedmen. The owners of suitable slaves were required to free them (described in Velleius 2.111). The measure is alluded to in Tacitus, *Annals* 1.8 and 1.16. These units of freedmen were organized as cohorts, not legions,

and termed *cohortes voluntariorum civium Romanorum*, “cohorts of Roman citizen volunteers” distinguishing them from regular auxiliary cohorts of noncitizen soldiers. The freedmen cohort soldiers received a donative as Augustus’ bequest, as did other Roman citizen troops (Tacitus, *Annals* 1.8). The *cohortes voluntariorum* are also attested in inscriptions. Freeborn civilian volunteers, the *cohortes ingenuorum*, were also recruited for the emergency (*ingenus* means freeborn).

Under normal conditions, slaves were not enlisted and were not permitted to enter the army. As governor of Bithynia, Pliny the Younger wrote to Trajan about the disposal of two recruits who had proven to be runaway slaves; Trajan reiterated the rule that slaves were prohibited to enter the army (Pliny, *Letters* 10.29–30). The only division of the army routinely open to freedmen was the *vigiles*, Rome’s fire brigade.

If there was a sudden need for manpower, it was also possible to promote soldiers from one branch of the service into another. During the civil wars of 68–69 CE, fleet soldiers were recruited *en masse* to make up two legions, Legio I Adiutrix and II Adiutrix (“Helper”), which then sought permanent status (Tacitus, *Histories* 1.6, 3.55; Suetonius, *Galba* 12; Dio 55.24.2). In 193, Septimius Severus sacked the praetorians who had supported Pertinax’ assassination and replaced them with men promoted from the Danubian legions.

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See also Cannae, Battle of; Marius; Recruitment of Army (Imperial); Recruitment of Army (Republic); States of Emergency; Varian Disaster

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F

Fabius Maximus (275–203 BCE)

Quintus Fabius Maximus Cunctator was a Republican Roman statesman and war hero mostly remembered for the delaying tactics he employed against Hannibal during the Second Punic War. Though Fabius was an established general and politician by the time of Hannibal's invasion, the Second Punic War thrust him into a commanding and controversial role as dictator.

Fabius was born into one of the Republic's oldest patrician families, the Fabii, and was known for upholding traditional Roman values. His long career consisted of five consulships (233, 228, 215, 214, and 209 BCE) and the dictatorship; he was also chief augur and *pontifex maximus*, and he celebrated two triumphs. Fabius had at least one son, Quintus, who became consul in 213 BCE.

Fabius' traditionalist reputation and influence brought him into conflict with other Punic War era Roman heroes such as Marcus Claudius Marcellus and Scipio Africanus who espoused more aggressive policies. The rivalry between Fabius and Marcellus was well known; they had opposing personalities and used every bit of influence at their disposal to compete for political, martial, and religious honors. Fabius also resented Scipio's nontraditional rise to fame and did what he could to counter the young man's aggressive plans.

Fabius' long career climaxed when he became dictator in 217 BCE, directly following the Romans' defeat at the battle of Lake Trasimene. Though known for his conventional ways, Fabius as dictator was anything but conventional. Acknowledging that the Romans could not defeat Hannibal and his cunning tactics in battle, Fabius avoided pitched battles

and from high ground continually harassed Hannibal's foraging troops. This method of warfare would eventually weaken the Carthaginians by keeping them constantly vigilant and depriving them of food. These tactics became known as "Fabian tactics" or "delaying tactics" and earned the dictator the nickname Cunctator, "the Delayer." Though Fabius—and Hannibal—understood the power behind this plan, its evasive nature was antithetical to the bellicosity traditionally inherent in Roman warfare.

Consequently, Fabius' troops and his second in command, Minucius Rufus, criticized him for "cowardice." Fabius' lack of a definitive victory also attracted negative attention at Rome and Minucius was elevated to the unprecedented status of codictator in the hopes that he could defeat Hannibal since Fabius could not. It was not until Fabius rescued Minucius from one of Hannibal's ambushes that Minucius realized that he had wrongly judged the senior dictator and resigned his office. While Fabius' tactics remained contrary to Roman warfare, they nevertheless were employed again after the battle of Cannae (216 BCE) when the Romans at last understood that facing Hannibal in pitched battles was not feasible at that time.

Fabius' reputation was unaffected by his dictatorship; though nearly 70 years old, he continued to be an active and influential member of the Senate and went on to win a triumph for his sack of the Greek city of Tarentum in southern Italy. Sadly, he did not live long enough to see the conclusion of the war and died of natural causes in 203 BCE just as Scipio Africanus was moving toward Carthage. Fabius was affectionately remembered as the "Shield of Rome." Cicero once said of Fabius, "Though quite old, he waged war like a young man."

Annamarie Vallis

See also Dictator; Marcellus; Punic War, Second; Scipio Africanus

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Fabius Valens (d. 69 CE)

Fabius Valens was a legionary commander in Lower Germany at the time of Vitellius' revolt in 69 CE, and may have encouraged it. After the troops in Germany refused to take oath to Galba, Valens led his troops in proclaiming Vitellius as emperor. Vitellius split his army into two forces, with one headed by Aulus Caecina Alienus, and the other commanded by Valens; Caecina and Valens advanced through Gaul and into north Italy. Their combined force defeated the army of Otho at the First Battle of Bedriacum (April 14, 69). When the army supporting Vespasian reached Italy, Valens fell ill, leaving command of the Vitellian forces to Caecina. After the Vitellian army lost at the Second Battle of Bedriacum, Valens fled Italy, only to be captured and beheaded.

J. Michael Ferguson

See also Aulus Caecina; Galba; Vespasian; Vitellius; War of Four Emperors

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Factions

Factions (sg. *factio*, pl. *factiones*) were groups or alliances in the politics of the Roman Republic. They might coalesce around a particular politician or family, connected by bonds of kinship and friendship (*amicitia*); members might be connected by mutual obligation or patronage. The Scipionic faction in the late third and early second centuries BCE is an example of a faction centered around a powerful family. These factions were personal in nature rather than ideologically oriented.

Other factions were broader and reflect common material interests. The optimates or “best men” of the late Republic identified with the Roman aristocracy and often were nobles, wealthy landowners, and businessmen.

Optimates favored the Senate and disapproved of more populist institutions such as the tribunate of the plebs. The *populares* or “people’s politicians” appealed to the *plebs*, in particular the urban populace. Tribunes of the plebs were by tradition *populares*. However, a wealthy aristocrat might be a *popularis*, exploiting his appeal to the public. The optimates and populares were not political parties or class identities in the modern sense; they had a disposition to support policy and vote a certain way in the assemblies and the Senate, but no formal ideologies or codified platforms. The impact of such factions still depended on personal influence and alliances. Thus interpreting republican political relations as “factional” has often been a matter of controversy.

Individual popular leaders encouraged popular followers who could become a source of mob violence in the late Republic. The most notorious such leader was Publius Clodius Pulcher, tribune of the plebs, who encouraged his followers to tear down Cicero’s house; the followers of Titus Annius Milo later lynched Clodius (52 BCE).

“Faction” itself became a term of abuse. A politician might describe his opponent’s party as a faction but would not do so for his own supporters. Thus Augustus, in his autobiographical *Res Gestae*, famously stated that “I liberated the state from the domination of a faction” (*rem publicam a dominatione factionis oppressam in libertatem vindicavi*, RGDA 1), alluding to his opponents, Caesar’s assassins.

Faction in republican politics is distinct from the “circus factions” best known at Constantinople in late antiquity, but found in many large cities. These were the fans of chariot racing teams, for example, the Blues and the Greens at Constantinople. They were prone to rioting.

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See also Amicitia; Cicero; Civil Conflict (Late Republic); Clodius Pulcher; Patronage; Republic, Political Structure; *Res Gestae Divi Augusti*; Tribune of the Plebs

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Fall of the Roman Empire (West), Causes

Both internal weaknesses and external pressures came to a head in this rolling series of problems and disasters. The external factor is the most dramatic and obvious: the Germanic and Hunnic invasions. It is difficult to claim that the external threat was much more formidable than in earlier periods, although a case can be made that the invaders were more numerous. The fall of the western empire is thus not a story of major battles and defeats, but rather of inability to keep enemies out and to recover territory lost. The loss of Africa, its grain supply and revenues, was most damaging; laws from the 440s indicate a desperate financial situation. The empire's forces seemed unable both to maintain a solid extended frontier and to preserve internal political unity; as in the third-century crisis, an internal crisis, such as civil war or a coup, invited external invasion and vice versa. Despite Rome's long history of incorporating outsiders, the fifth-century empire did not effectively control or co-opt new and potential barbarian clients. The problem may have been one of scale as much as opinion (e.g., prejudices against barbarians and Arians). Furthermore, too many of the new groups had forced their way in, being neither defeated nor received as suppliants. Rome was no longer in a position to always dictate terms, and allied tribal groups kept their own leaders and hierarchy. Barbarian incursion and settlement caused a vicious cycle: each province lost meant a diminished capacity to recover and to withstand future invasions.

Not all barbarian movement into the empire was hostile, and recent scholarship has tended to downplay the scale and effects of the barbarian migrations. One of the important things barbarian settlement did was to expose already-existing fault lines beneath the imperial surface. The willingness of the Gallo-Roman aristocracy to accommodate Visigothic kings, for example, suggests a growing gap between the imperial center and regional aristocracies. Weaknesses at the center meant the provinces increasingly looked to self-help or accommodation.

The major weakness at the center was one of leadership. Ineffectual

rulers were dominated by powerful generals, often of barbarian stock, from Stilicho to Gundobad, and it is notable that powerful warlords often chose to rule from behind the throne. The public role of the emperor had become extremely formal and ceremonial, and while this had not hindered powerful third- and fourth-century emperors (e.g., Diocletian, Constantine I, Valentinian I, Theodosius I), it seems to have stultified less dominating personalities. These weak emperors, furthermore, tended to provoke usurpers, and emperors had a marked tendency to confront rivals rather than external enemies. Attention and resources devoted to civil wars further hampered Roman recovery from existing problems.

Economic and social factors also had a role. The western empire was generally less prosperous than the eastern empire, but archaeological studies suggest no universal economic decline, and some regions, like Africa, flourished. Vast amounts of land were concentrated into huge and far-flung aristocratic estates owned by a very few families and farmed increasingly by *coloni*, tenant farmers tied to the land. Other land is described as abandoned. These patterns of land tenure are hard to verify, as is demographic change in a period without available population statistics. Nonetheless, disruption of resources and manpower may have contributed to the collapse of the western empire. There were difficulties in large-scale military recruitment from the provinces, and landlords preferred to provide coin rather than conscripts. This increased Roman reliance on allied barbarian troops (*foederati*), effectively mercenary bands setting their own price.

We may connect this to the tendency of Rome's elites, other than the emperors themselves, not to participate in warfare. After Constantine, senatorial status was an *honor* deriving from high-ranking service in civilian government posts. As such, the military officer cadre was socially distinct from the civilian elite, further fragmenting the unity of the empire.

We must also recognize the long-term survival of the eastern empire, which shared many of the western empire's weaknesses. Two major distinctions are the much lower occurrence of armed invaders in the eastern empire, before the Arab conquest, and a civilian-dominated government that resisted the takeover of power by supreme generals. The eastern empire was also significantly richer; indeed, part of the weakness of the western empire lay in the division into two empires: the western regime could not draw on the resources of the eastern Mediterranean to make up its

shortfalls.

Christopher Malone

See also Aetius; Alaric; Arcadius; Attila; *Auxilia*; Burgundians; Catalaunian Plains, Battle of; Client Monarchs; Demography; Elite Participation; Federates; Franks; Galla Placidia; Goths; Honorius; Huns; *Magister Utriusque Militiae*; Ricimer; Valentinian III; Vandals

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Fall of the Roman Empire (West), Course

The fall of the western Roman Empire was not a single moment in 476 CE, but rather a process of slow erosion of imperial control. The fourth-century rejuvenation of the Roman Empire faltered early in the fifth. The empire was divided in 395 between the young sons of Theodosius I (379–395), Arcadius (395–408), and Honorius (395–423), who both became weak rulers controlled by powerful advisors. In the western empire, the power behind the throne until 408 was Stilicho, the first in a series of commanders, often of Germanic origin, usually holding the ranks of *magister utriusque militiae* (commander-in-chief) and patrician, effectively governing the western empire through ineffectual emperors. Much of Honorius' reign was characterized by military crises involving Germanic incursions and rival usurpers. A Gothic invasion of Italy in 402 led the court to move from Milan to the more defensible Ravenna, which remained the capital until the end of

the western empire. Stilicho's regime managed several emergencies, but not the wandering army of Alaric's Visigoths, and in 408 rival factions at court convinced Honorius to execute Stilicho. This left Honorius to deal with Alaric, a task to which he was unequal. His inability to choose conciliation or resistance led finally to the sack of Rome in 410.

Numerous enemies took advantage of the power vacuum generated by the weak, indecisive emperor. At the end of 406, bands of Vandals, Alans, Suebi, and Burgundians crossed the frozen Rhine and campaigned through Gaul for three years. Revolts and usurpers were frequent. In Britain, several arose in succession; the most successful, Constantine III (407–411) established himself in Gaul in 407, helping to secure the region. The year 409 saw usurpers in Spain, Gaul, and even Rome: Priscus Attalus (409–410; 414–415), a compromise candidate between Alaric and the Senate. Britain was formally abandoned (ca. 410), while the Vandals, Alans, and Suebi overran Spain and divided it between themselves.

The shock of Rome's sacking was much greater than its material or military effects. Recovery was possible into the 420s, thanks partly to Constantius III (421), briefly co-emperor with Honorius after having served him as a highly successful general, who established alliance with the Visigoths in 418, at the cost of Aquitaine.

The deaths of Constantius III in 421 and Honorius in 423 left a power vacuum, briefly occupied by Johannes (423–425), but Galla Placidia, Honorius' half-sister and Constantius' widow, persuaded the eastern emperor Theodosius II (408–450) to reassert dynastic and imperial unity by placing her son Valentinian III (425–455) on the throne. Galla Placidia ruled as regent for Valentinian until 437, balancing the competing great generals Aetius, Boniface, and Felix.

Aetius was successful in reasserting Roman control in the north. Preferring to be sole commander-in-chief, Aetius eliminated his rivals in the early 430s, and wrested control from Galla Placidia, but did not attempt to become emperor. Aetius' regime was strong, and achieved stability through force, diplomacy, and gold subsidies paid to the tribes. Barbarian settlement within the empire nonetheless expanded. In 429, the Vandals left Spain to conquer North Africa, severing much of the richest part of the western empire and disrupting maritime trade. Aetius assembled an invasion force in 440 in response to the capture of Carthage, but abandoned the plan due to the Hunnish threat. A treaty recognised the Vandal king Geiseric as

essentially independent in 442.

The great invasion force of Attila the Hun was met and defeated by Aetius and his Visigothic allies near Châlons in 451. Attila himself died after an abortive Italian campaign, dissolving the Hunnish empire. Aetius' power seemed assured, but Valentinian III, wanting to rule in his own right, personally killed him in 454. Valentinian was assassinated the next year, and Petronius Maximus acclaimed (455). Rome was that year sacked again, much more brutally, by a Vandal raiding force; Petronius Maximus was assassinated.

Subsequent emperors faced expanding barbarian kingdoms in Africa, Spain, and Gaul. Avitus (455–456) was next acclaimed by the Visigothic king Theoderic and the Gallo-Roman aristocracy. On a visit to Rome, the Italian army revolted under Majorian and Ricimer, who deposed Avitus and forced him into clerical orders. Ricimer, as *magister utriusque militiae*, put Majorian (457–461) in power, beginning Ricimer's 15-year tenure as kingmaker in the western empire. Majorian was one of the last emperors to attempt imperial recovery, against the trend of central power devolving into separate kingdoms. He recaptured parts of Gaul, and campaigned through Spain, but failed to invade Africa because of problems with his fleet. On return to Italy, Majorian was killed by Ricimer, who after a few months raised Libius Severus (461–465) to power. Geiseric had suggested Olybrius, who would be emperor briefly in 472. Notably, these nominees were all Romans, not Germans. In the meantime, the eastern emperor Leo (457–474) and Ricimer agreed to invest the eastern aristocrat Anthemius (467–472) as western emperor, with full eastern backing to launch a campaign to retake Africa. It was not to be. After initial success, treachery and adverse winds allowed the Vandals to destroy the Roman fleet, ending hopes of western recovery. Gaul too was abandoned. Ricimer declared war on Anthemius, and both, along with Olybrius, died in 472.

The Burgundian prince Gundobad installed Glycerius (473–474), but gave up on *de facto* control of the empire in favor of ruling his own small kingdom, a very telling decision. In 474, Julius Nepos (474–480) was raised by the Illyrian army, with Leo's blessing, to replace Glycerius. In 475, Nepos was ousted by the patrician Orestes, and left for Illyricum, where he ruled until 480. Orestes installed his aptly-named son Romulus (Augustulus, 475–476). In 476, Odoacer, a Scirian commander, removed the boy from office, sent the imperial insignia to Constantinople, and began to rule in Italy as

patrician and king.

Christopher Malone

See also Aetius; Alaric; Arcadius; Attila; *Auxilia*; Burgundians; Catalaunian Plains, Battle of; Client Monarchs; Demography; Elite Participation; Federates; Franks; Galla Placidia; Goths; Honorius; Huns; *Magister Utriusque Militiae*; Ricimer; Valentinian III; Vandals

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Fall of the Roman Empire (West), Consequences

The end of the western empire gradually led to the dawn of medieval Europe. However, the year 476 is no longer seen as a sharp cataclysmic division between ancient and medieval, but rather a time of transformation; late antiquity was a vibrant and innovative period in its own right.

Nonetheless, the late fifth century did see the end of an era and of an empire, and in particular, the end of any attempt to maintain an imperial regime in the west as an overarching structure. Centralization disappeared, both in administration and culture, enabling the new barbarian kingdoms to coexist within the old imperial borders: Vandal Africa, Visigothic Spain and Aquitaine, Frankish and Burgundian Gaul, and Ostrogothic Italy all became more or less stable, if not peaceful, kingdoms. Common Roman culture eroded at different rates in different regions: rapidly in Britain, whereas Ostrogothic Italy remained fundamentally Latin.

Despite archaeological continuity between fifth century and post-Roman cultures, economic consequences are clear. Sophistication and quality of

ordinary artifacts drops, particularly in the pottery record. The empire had made large amounts of high-quality goods available to the average provincial, and had provided a coherent, safe network of long-range trade. While trade continued, imperial infrastructure and easy communication and transport over long distances disappeared. The empire-wide culture of traveling noblewomen and landowners with far-flung properties likewise dissolved. The post-Roman west had narrower horizons. The scale of building, even for new churches, was much reduced, and cities shrank—across post-Roman western Europe is seen a strong trend toward increased civic fortification, but very often on smaller footprints. Land surveys also indicate fewer rural sites in the fifth to seventh centuries. These all points to a shrinking economy and population.

The normative elite literacy and highly educated culture of the empire did not endure in the west; it was retained in Constantinople, but there lost its Latin character, preserving Greek classicism. By around 600, Latin literacy was mostly confined to clergy. This meant that the intellectual world became solidly clerical; knowledge of the pagan Roman past dimmed.

The most notable beneficiary of the end of the empire was the Church. The power vacuum left behind by imperial administration meant that bishops, already major power brokers in many cities, were representatives of the only surviving interregional body, tied together and to the emerging papacy in Rome. The head of such a system could only gain in prestige and authority. A number of formerly imperial roles were adopted by the popes, and the emergence of a strong papacy seems inconceivable without the Empire's collapse.

An additional consequence was the persistence of the enduring ideal of Rome, and the desire of some ambitious individuals to recapture it. Just over 50 years after Romulus Augustulus, Justinian (527–565) launched his campaign to retake the western empire, ideologically charged but fundamentally doomed. The Byzantines nonetheless persisted in calling themselves Romans (*Rhomaioi*), and the concept of the western empire would overshadow Europe, with Charlemagne's attempt to revive the Roman Empire in 800 CE.

Christopher Malone

See also Aetius; Alaric; Arcadius; Attila; *Auxilia*; Burgundians; Catalaunian Plains, Battle of; Client Monarchs; Demography; Elite Participation;

Federates; Franks; Galla Placidia; Goths; Honorius; Huns; *Magister Utriusque Militiae*; Ricimer; Valentinian III; Vandals

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Fall of the Roman Republic

The causes of the collapse of the late Republic lay in the new extremes of wealth among the elite and the breakdown of cohesion and cooperation within that elite starting with the Gracchan conflicts in 133 and 123–121 BCE. Vast military successes in the second century BCE had brought Rome political and economic control over huge territories throughout the Mediterranean and thus wealth in the form of indemnities, tribute, taxation, and spoils, as witnessed by displays such as the Pydna triumph of Aemilius Paullus in 168 (Plutarch, *Aemilius Paullus* 32–35). The cultural emphasis the older Roman elite placed on fair competition for offices and honors had been useful when harnessed to public service; however, when the possession of resources and power among the elite became extremely uneven, this sense of competition became harmful to the principle of fair cooperation. This change dampened leveling impulses among Roman elites and instead fostered the taste for conspicuous consumption noticed and decried by the likes of Cato the Censor (Plutarch, *Cato Maior*). Offices and war brought wealth and glory, and competition for these goods became more extreme throughout the late Republic, with glory-seeking individuals setting precedents alien to republican norms.

Three major ingredients of future civil conflict began in the late second century BCE. In 133, Tiberius Gracchus' forcing of a land-reform bill brought

about his assassination. Tiberius' refusal to follow elite power-sharing norms created an example, as did his lynching. Such events repeated at intervals for the remainder of the Republic. Gaius Marius' removal of property requirements for legionary service in 107 BCE, intended to give work and money to landless men targeted in the Gracchan reforms, instead paradoxically contributed to civil conflict. It created armies of landless individuals, their weapons now supplied to them, their loyalty attached to their general in a personal patron-client relationship rather than to the Roman state as a superpersonal entity.

Political competition between Marius and Sulla became deadly, setting another pattern for the century. Rivalry between Marius and Sulla erupted into civil war in 88 and 82, resulting in Sulla's march on Rome, proscriptions, and conservative reforms. Loyal to Sulla were both his armies and the equestrians he promoted to the Senate, providing more precedents for future dynasts. However, Sulla's increase in magistracies created more competitors for office, hence harsher competition to reach higher offices. Moreover, the civil war normalized massacre, such as the Sulla's slaying of the Samnites as a warning to the Senate.

After Sulla's abdication, legal channels for ambition now seemed constricted or breakable in the era of the dominance of Pompey and Crassus. Pompey was too young to receive proconsular *imperium* necessary to campaign against Sertorius' Spanish empire in 77, but exceptions were made in his case (Plutarch, *Pompey*). This set new patterns for breaking republican rules. After defeating Sertorius, Pompey took over the Roman offensive in the Third Mithridatic War from Lucullus, winning the war effectively. Spartacus' revolt of 73–71 BCE united landless poor citizens and slaves against Roman civil authority. Upon escaping from captivity, the Thracian slave Spartacus led an insurrection. Marcus Licinius Crassus' use of private funds to raise additional troops against this threat created another precedent for future dynasts. The display of Spartacus' army's corpses crucified on the Appian Way after the crushing of the revolt was a grotesque warning against would-be insurgents, but did not change the important fact that not only slaves but impoverished free persons had joined the revolt, signaling extreme civil discontent among the poor *plebs*. The elites were also destined for discontent: In 70 BCE, Pompey and Crassus marched to Rome and left their troops camped outside its gates. Both anticipated high honors and consulship. The Senate feared Pompey's troops,

but he was too young to be consul and had not held the prerequisite magistracies. Crassus and Pompey joined forces. The Senate permitted Pompey to run for office and he and Crassus won consulships for 70 BCE. After this year of cooperation, the two dynasts began rivalry again.

Some examples of civil conflict in the late Republic employed traditional channels, such as Cicero's prosecution of Verres for extortion in Sicily in 70 BCE. In addition, attempts to curb some abuses of power occurred in 67 under the tribunes Gaius Cornelius and Aulus Gabinus. They punished bribery and curbed the Senate's ability to grant exemption from laws. However, piracy had become intolerable in Mediterranean waters, prompting Gabinus to present voters with a bill to create a command against piracy with consular rank, immense resources, ships, and staff for three years. Most senators opposed this bill, fearing it would empower one individual dangerously, but the Roman populace made the bill pass. The command went to Pompey. His clearing the seas of piracy demonstrated the effectiveness of an individual given sufficient power, and led to his success in the Third Mithridatic War and to further campaigns in the eastern Mediterranean, creating a loyal army of followers for himself and Rome. His splendid triumph in 61 raised the stakes for other Roman elites' pursuit of glory.

Elite competition for office required increasing displays of power such as public festivals, games, and monuments, leading naturally to debt. Lucius Sergius Catilina exploited this, running for consul for 63 on a platform of debt cancellation, and again for 62 using more extreme rhetoric, attracting debtors both from both elite and the masses, including Sullans, farmers, and victims of Sulla's proscriptions (Cicero, *Against Catiline*; Sallust, *Bellum Catilinae*). Winning neither election, Catiline resorted to planning revolution. Allying with him, the former centurion Gaius Manlius began forming an army of impoverished peasants and former Sullans to march on Rome. Cicero arrested and executed the conspirators. Although the Senate disdained Cicero, he believed that maintaining the Senate's prestige was essential to the Republic's survival and concord between the orders, a concord all the more necessary in the face of Catiline's threat.

The penultimate years of the Republic matched Pompey and Julius Caesar against each other. In 62, Pompey returned from the eastern Mediterranean. Italy feared a new Sulla. He released his army before arriving at Rome, desiring recognition more than tyrannical power.

However, the Senate short-shrifted Pompey's great accomplishments, and in 60, refused Pompey's request for farmland for his veterans and ratification for his disposition of the eastern Mediterranean. Concord between Pompey and the optimates seemed hopeless. The younger Cato opposed both Pompey's wishes and a bill sponsored by Crassus to relieve *publicani* (tax farmers) who had bid too high. He moreover irritated the equestrians with another bill and frustrated Caesar by blocking his petition to run for consul *in absentia*. Then for 59 BCE, he offered Caesar as consular provinces Italy's cattle-tracks and forests, a trivial appointment that Caesar obviously did not want. This antagonism aggravated elite civil conflict, thwarting Pompey, Crassus, and Caesar to the point that they formed an alliance (the so-called First Triumvirate) to pursue their goals. The First Triumvirate granted Caesar his desire, the proconsulship of Gaul and scope to conquer Gaul.

Caesar's successes in Gaul in the 50s BCE spurred resentment in the Senate, which blocked his policies. In 49, Pompey and the Senate declared Caesar a public enemy. Invading Italy, Caesar defeated Pompey at Pharsalus in Thessaly. After Pompey fled to Egypt and was assassinated there, the Senate, pressed, made Caesar dictator (in 44 for life), consul, and *pontifex maximus*. Caesar's reforms were intended to reduce conflict, including a rationalization of government in Italy and the provinces. However, all this was too much for the Senate. His assassins in 44 called him a tyrant.

The Republic's final years saw more civil war following Sulla's template. Caesar's will, snubbing Mark Antony, declared as his primary heir Octavian, who exploited Caesar's memory to his advantage. The Senate's disinclination to give Octavian a triumph or reward his troops led Octavian to march on Rome, a Sullan tactic. Though he was too young for the office, Octavian received a suffect consulship in 43 at age 19, and created with Antony and Lepidus a "three-man board for the restoration of the Republic" the so-called Second Triumvirate, which seized most consular powers and in Sullan style effected proscriptions and packed the Senate with clients. In 42, the triumvirs defeated Caesar's assassins and then made an uneasy peace with different spheres of influence. Civil war resumed in 32: Octavian presented it as a war of Rome against Egypt, where Antony was living with Cleopatra VII. Octavian won, becoming sole ruler of the entire Mediterranean. Civil conflict was transformed by the poet Horace's pen into Rome's victory over Egypt's raving queen.

The ultimate fruit of the breakdown of the Roman Republic was

acceptance among both elites and nonelites of a new form of monarchy in the person of Octavian. His reception of the title Augustus in 27 BCE normally marks the year that ended the Republic and began the empire. The terrors of civil war made his subjects inclined to accept any alternative, even one offending republican power-sharing sensibilities. Augustus enacted many reforms but did not become dictator, and retained the Senate and the offices of the Republic: his control of government was subtler. In any case, his reign ended a period of severe civil conflict, “winning over the soldiers with gifts, the populace with cheap grain, and all men with the attractions of peace” (Tacitus, *Annals* 1.2).

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See also Caesar, Gaius Julius; Civil Wars (I) (49–45 BCE); Civil Wars (II) (44–31 BCE); Conspiracy of Catiline; Marian-Sullan Conflict; Marius; Octavian; Pompey; Social War (91–87 BCE); Sulla, Lucius Cornelius

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Families of Imperial Soldiers

Legionary and auxiliary soldiers in the Roman army were not legally allowed to marry during their period of military service for at least the first

two centuries of the Principate (ca. 13 BCE–197 CE and possibly longer). At the same time soldiers formed *de facto* relationships that were not technically legal but occurred frequently, with the result of offspring that until 140 CE were legalized with the right of citizenship conferred by the Roman government when the soldier retired (recorded in Roman military diplomas). High level officers, such as the prefect of an auxiliary unit (cohort or *ala*) and probably also the centurions, were allowed legal marriage and their families often lived within the fort itself. The *praetorium* (residence of the commanding officer) was located in the central area of an auxiliary fort and the centurions' quarters were located in a larger unit at the end of standard barrack blocks. Most likely the families of the rank and file lived outside the fort itself in the extramural settlements that adjoin most military sites. Some evidence suggests that families of soldiers may have traveled with the unit either on campaign or when changing locations (e.g., Cassius Dio 56.20.2), but it is unclear whether this practice was typical. Equally uncertain is the location of soldiers' families during volatile periods or while the unit was on active campaign. It is doubtful that dependents of soldiers accompanied the unit on active campaigns, and we should expect that the extramural settlements remained occupied during times of conflict to house soldiers' families and other noncombatants associated with the unit.

Elizabeth M. Greene

See also Civil-Military Relations; Marriage of Soldiers

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Federates

Federates (Latin *foederatus*, plural *foederati*), also translated "allies," were non-Roman communities who had entered into a *foedus*, a treaty or perpetual agreement, to provide military service to Rome for land or other considerations from the Roman government. The practice is best known and most debated in the later empire (from the 380s onward). The debate over the *foederati* in the later Roman army concerns their novelty, their extent and their alleged "barbarization" of the Roman army. It is colored by the increasingly opportunistic behavior of some of the allied Germanic peoples and their leaders, such as Alaric, king of the Visigoths.

There was nothing new about the empire's use of non-Roman contingents to flesh out Roman armies. As early as the Polybian legion non-Roman manpower, as the Italian allies, seems to have provided up to half the strength of Roman armies. Client monarchs also supplied contingents to Roman wars. The imperial *auxilia* were originally recruited from non-Roman peoples, as were the *numeri*, smaller fighting units that maintained native weapons skills such as archery and slingshots. Many units of the late third-century Roman army took their titles from the native peoples they were originally recruited from. The titles persisted, though the regiments were probably filled with local recruits and lost their ethnic character. These units are not considered federates.

The increased use of federates is usually attributed to Theodosius I (379–395) in a treaty that he concluded with the Goths in 382, obliging them to fight for Rome. Theodosius faced a manpower problem due to massive Roman losses in the battle of Adrianople (378). However, his action should

not be regarded as unprecedented (above) or desperate. From the Roman perspective using non-Roman manpower in Roman armies was pragmatic. First, fewer Roman citizens had to be inducted every year. The evidence suggests that, during the fourth- and fifth-centuries Rome was having increasing difficulty recruiting citizens to serve in the army, and was having difficulties paying those Roman citizens who were serving. *Foederati*, on the other hand, were usually recruited from large groups, even whole peoples, who were willing to serve in the Roman army in exchange for land to settle on. Their equipment and training were up to their leaders, whom the Roman authorities paid. Many of the federate peoples were so-called warlike peoples, a major component of the Germanic “barbarian” stereotype, and did not need special training.

Barbarians might assume the status of *foederati* in several ways. The most common was by treaty or arrangement with a barbarian community outside the empire, committing warrior bands to Roman service. The Huns were particularly known for this method of service, as Hunnic auxiliaries served under Aetius in support of the usurper Johannes (423–425) and later in Gaul. Barbarians also came to be *foederati* by being admitted into the empire. In this case whole communities rather than just warriors were involved, and they were usually given land in exchange for military service. Such communities could be disruptive, however, and sometimes became military threats. For example, the Burgundians were initially allowed into the empire as *foederati* in the 420s, but later began raiding Roman territory and were attacked and decimated by the Huns, at the direction of Aetius, in the 430s. A third way barbarians became *foederati* was through the collapse of barbarian kingdoms, in which case some splinter groups were taken into Roman service. The advantages from the Roman perspective were surely securing fighting men for the Roman army and keeping those same splinter groups from raiding Roman territory.

This raises two inter-related questions: to what extent did the use of *foederati* lead to the “barbarization” of the Roman army, and to what extent were *foederati* loyal to Rome? As for the question of “barbarization,” the evidence seems to indicate that *foederati* as a percentage of the Roman army remained relatively steady throughout the third and fourth centuries. Furthermore, *foederati* units, as they suffered losses and retirement, were supplemented with whatever recruits the Romans could find, meaning that ethnic units would, over the course of a generation, lose their ethnic

character. Finally, the evidence is that *foederati* were, generally speaking, loyal to Rome. *Foederati* units did support usurpers, but then so did Roman regiments. As long as Rome was providing pay and land, there was no incentive for *foederati* to conspire against Roman rule.

The Franks provide a good case study. The Franks became *foederati* in 358 after being defeated by the emperor Julian (361–363), who had crossed the Rhine and invaded Frankish territory. Entering into a *foedus* with Julian, the Salian Franks were allowed to migrate west of the Rhine, taking over territory that was underpopulated, in return for military support. The Salian Franks provided a bulwark against other peoples east of the Rhine, while simultaneously bringing into cultivation land that had apparently been abandoned by Roman farmers.

The example of the Gothic migration of 376 offers an example of a *foedus* that failed. The Goths, fleeing the depredations of Huns who were themselves migrating from Central Asia, arrived on the Danube and requested the emperor Valens (364–378) grant them the status of *foederati*. Under this arrangement, the Goths were to provide military service in return for land to settle their families on. Valens saw an opportunity in this arrangement both to reinforce his army and to repopulate agricultural land that had been abandoned in previous decades. However, the Roman logistical system was unable to support such a large body of immigrants. Facing starvation, the Goths seized the supplies they needed from the surrounding territory. In response, the emperor Valens led the eastern Roman army out to attack the Goths, but was defeated at the battle of Adrianople. It was only a generation later, in 415, that the Goths were finally allowed to settle in Aquitaine.

Michael D. Blodgett

See also Burgundians; Client Monarchs; Goths; Franks; Vandals

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Female Warriors

In discussing women as warriors, it is necessary to distinguish between women with influence in military affairs, women as commanders, and women as combat fighters. The political structure of the Roman Republic meant that women did not serve in the army or hold political office or military commands. Roman women of noble families might, however, exert indirect influence over political affairs. Fulvia, Mark Antony's wife before 40 BCE, wielded considerable political influence, supporting her husbands' dangerous political careers (she was married to Clodius and Curio before Antony). After Fulvia's death, Octavia, the sister of Octavian, helped to arrange the Treaty of Brundisium (40 BCE) between Octavian and Antony; she married Antony at this time, and later brought him troops for his Persian invasion. However, extrainstitutional political influence was distinct from office or military command.

In the civil conflicts of the late Republic, elite women faced danger alongside their husbands and a few women took up military command in special situations. In the *Laudatio Turiae*, an inscription from the late Republic, the husband of Turia commends her bravery in defending him when his life was threatened during the triumviral proscriptions. Other women helped their proscribed husbands escape to safety. It was not uncommon for women to take part in the defense of besieged cities. Fulvia and Antony's brother Lucius Antonius commanded the defense of the city of Perugia in north Italy when it was besieged by Octavian. Agrippina the Elder, wife of Germanicus, accompanied him on his mission to suppress the Rhine mutiny (14 CE) and played a leadership role in stemming a rout of Roman soldiers by greeting them at the Rhine bridge. Female leadership might be regarded hostilely; according to Tacitus, Tiberius resented Agrippina's action as a usurpation of power.

However, the sources most often depict female military leaders as non-Romans, such as Boudicca, queen of the Iceni and leader of the British revolt of 60/61 CE, or Zenobia of Palmyra. In such cases, ethnic difference and gender difference were conflated, making the female enemy leader doubly alien to Roman male eyes.

In these cases, it is probably correct to speak of female military commanders rather than fighters. Women warriors such as the Amazons or the Latin warrior woman Camilla appear in legend. Female gladiators

appeared in the arena. Despite these instances, and despite stories of small Roman (male) fighters defeating tall Gauls in single combat, in ancient warfare success in hand-to-hand combat depended greatly on height and physical strength, giving the average male greater advantage as a combatant when compared to the average female. This does not rule out exceptions (particularly tall, strong women from peoples with female leadership, who infiltrated the Roman army in disguise), though none are known. Women who infiltrated early modern armies found firearms to be an equalizing factor.

Courage (*virtus*, a quality pertaining to men, *virī*) was displayed by Roman women in other situations, such as resisting torture or committing politicized suicide, sometimes by violent means paralleling death in battle. Such courage was displayed by the legendary Lucretia and in historical times by Arria, wife of Caecina Paetus, a senator who was accused of conspiracy by Claudius (41–54). Arria set an example for her husband Paetus by stabbing herself first, telling him, “Paetus, it does not hurt” (Martial 1.13; Plin. *Ep.* 3.16). Courage was also displayed by female martyrs in the persecutions of the Christians.

Sara E. Phang

See also Agrippina I; Boudicca; Gender and War; Overthrow of the Monarchy; Suicide; Tacitus; Tiberius (Emperor); Zenobia

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Fetiales

The *fetiales* were 20 priests, who ritually ensured that Rome waged just wars and who monitored religious aspects of treaties. This priesthood, which was held for life, demonstrates the importance the Romans placed on ensuring divine approval in all military matters. Though fetial priests were an Italian custom, King Numa Pompilius (715–673 BCE) introduced fetiales into Rome. The priests acted as ambassadors to neighboring towns to

request redress for grievances before declaring war. The treaty ritual was still used in the 50s CE and the war declaration in the fourth century CE.

Amanda J. Coles

See also *Bellum Iustum*; Formal Declaration of War; *Ius Fetiale*; Religion and Warfare; Treaties and Alliances

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Fides

Fides, "loyalty," was an important Roman virtue with respect to military and political affairs. The communities which formally surrendered to Rome entered the *fides* of the Romans; granted protection, they owed submission and loyalty in return. The Romans thus could be extremely harsh toward subjects and allies who betrayed *fides* and defected or revolted. Such violators of *fides* were considered to deserve vengeance. A commander or governor who was cruel toward surrendered peoples or subjects also breached *fides*. However, such a commander or governor risked prosecution for misgovernance (usually, extortion) by his political rivals at Rome, rather than the vengeance of the Roman state.

Fides was personified as a goddess, with a temple on the Capitoline, in association with the state cult of Jupiter. *Fides* became a political catchword, frequently used on imperial coins to invoke the loyalty of various groups, such as the army.

Sara E. Phang

See also Alliances; Army in Politics; Bribery and Corruption; Diplomacy; Military Oaths; Religion and Warfare; Vengeance; War Crimes

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Fimbria, Gaius Flavius (d. 85 BCE)

Gaius Flavius Fimbria was a Roman commander in the Marian-Sullan conflict, fighting for the Marian-Cinnan alliance. He first became involved in the Marian-Sullan conflict when he was sent to negotiate a treaty of alliance with the Samnites, who were still fighting Rome in the Social War. During the subsequent siege of Rome Fimbria killed a number of prominent opposition figures. In 86 BCE, Fimbria was appointed deputy to Lucius Valerius Flaccus, who commanded the army sent to fight Mithridates VI in Asia. While in Asia, Fimbria either organized the mutiny and murder of Flaccus, or acquiesced in it, and took over command of his army.

Fimbria campaigned extensively in Asia in 85 BCE against Mithridates' forces, defeating one of his sons at the battle of Miletopolis and driving Mithridates himself from Pergamum, winning back much of Asia for Rome. Fimbria's campaign is also noted for the sacking of Ilium, the supposed site of ancient Troy, from which Rome claimed descent. He came close to capturing Mithridates himself, besieging him in Pitane, but Lucius Licinius Lucullus' refusal to send naval forces enabled Mithridates to escape by sea. The Marian-Sullan conflict interrupted the campaign when the opposing commander Sulla crossed into Asia. Full blown military conflict was only averted when Fimbria's army deserted him and defected en masse to Sulla. This was their second betrayal of a commander in two years. Fimbria himself fled to the city of Pergamum where he committed suicide later that year, allegedly at the orders of Sulla.

Gareth C. Sampson

See also Marian-Sullan Conflict; Marius; Mithridatic Wars; Sulla, Lucius Cornelius

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First Triumvirate

The First Triumvirate (founded 60 BCE) was a political alliance between Pompey, Crassus, and Caesar. It had no official status, but was simply a combining of their political resources aimed at achieving particular individual goals.

Pompey and Crassus had been rivals since first appearing in Roman affairs helping Sulla gain control in 83–82. Following Pompey's victory in Spain against Sertorius and Crassus' defeat of Spartacus, they put aside their differences and secured a joint consulship in 70. At the time of the formation of the triumvirate toward the end of 60, the two men's requests were being blocked by conservatives in the Senate. Pompey had conducted major rearrangements of Rome's eastern possessions after his defeat of Mithridates. The Senate refused to endorse them in a single vote, but wanted to debate them individually. Pompey was also having difficulty getting a law passed to provide land allotments for his army veterans. Crassus had promoted a request by businessmen for a reduction in the price they had paid for the right to collect Asian taxes, but the Senate rejected it. Caesar, recently returned from a governorship in Spain, asked for a triumph and permission to run for the consulship *in absentia* rather than in person, as the law required, but the Senate refused him that permission; he abandoned his request for a triumph and entered the city.

The three thwarted men decided to combine their political resources to secure Caesar's election as consul for 59, so that he could push through their requests. It is usually thought that Caesar took the initiative and reconciled Pompey and Crassus, but it is more probable that these two, wealthy and far more influential and experienced, chose to cooperate again and give Caesar their support. At first the coalition was kept secret, but it became apparent with Pompey's marriage on May 59 to Caesar's daughter Julia, which cemented the alliance.

As consul Caesar pushed through legislation to satisfy his partners' requests, but he had to use force to do so. Before the end of the year he left for a five-year command in Gaul, while Crassus began sniping at his rival Pompey through the volatile Publius Clodius Pulcher. Tensions developed, showing that the coalition was inherently unstable. When threats emerged to Caesar's tenure of the Gallic command, he summoned Crassus to Ravenna in winter 56, and then they both met with Pompey at Luca to

reorganize their coalition: Pompey and Crassus planned to become consuls again for 55 and receive five-year commands in Spain and Syria, respectively, to equal the extension of Caesar's command in Gaul.

All went to plan, but when Julia died in childbirth in late summer 54 and Crassus was killed in the disastrous battle of Carrhae in June 53, the bonds were broken. Pompey drifted away from Caesar to the side of the conservatives, being made sole consul in 52 with their approval and marrying a daughter of the Metellan and Scipionic families. Pompey acquiesced in the intrigue which forced Caesar to cross the Rubicon and invade Italy, marking finally the end of their coalition.

Bruce Marshall

See also Caesar, Gaius Julius; Carrhae, Battle of; Clodius Pulcher; Crassus; Pompey

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Flamininus (228–174 BCE)

Titus Quinctius Flamininus was a patrician consul and general of the Roman Republic who defeated Philip V in the Second Macedonian War (200–197 BCE), but later fell afoul of Cato the Elder for his philhellenism and his alleged luxuries.

Flamininus hailed from the same patrician family as the legendary Cincinnatus, and his *cognomen* indicates that an ancestor(s) were high priests or *flamines*, in particular priests of Jupiter, Mars, and Quirinus. During the Second Punic War, Flamininus served with distinction under Claudius Marcellus. Flamininus was one of a few wunderkind military geniuses elected to the consulship an before the legal age, in his case at 29

for 198 BCE, just as Scipio Africanus had been so elected in the election for 205. Flaminius' candidacy was opposed by two tribunes because he had not yet served as aedile or praetor (Plutarch, *Flaminius* 2.1 mistakenly includes tribune, for which Flaminius was ineligible as a patrician), however, the Senate allowed the people to decide by permitting him to run. Flaminius was elected to the consulship with Sextus Aelius Paetus. Flaminius received the command of the Second Macedonian War against Philip V. Among Romans, Flaminius had a special advantage, for he spoke Greek excellently and understood Hellenistic culture. He was a true philhellene.

When Flaminius came to Macedon, he found the war at a stalemate. His predecessor, Publius Villius, was unable to force a successful outcome, so Flaminius assumed the command and pressured or enticed the Greek leagues and cities to join the Romans against Philip (or defect). After more diplomatic than military successes, Flaminius' command against Philip was renewed for 197, and the two fought a decisive battle at Cynoscephalae (Dogs' Heads) in Thessaly, in which Philip was completely defeated, and his army cut to ribbons. The most reliable historians agree that Macedonian casualties numbered 8,000 killed and 5,000 captured (Polybius 18.27; Livy 33.10.7; Plutarch, *Flaminius* 8.5) while Roman casualties numbered 700. It was a stunning victory that demonstrated the superiority of the flexible legion over the rigid phalanx. Philip soon sued for peace, and Flaminius imposed what was to become a Roman standard of victory. The defeated would pay an indemnity, cede territory, lose their elephants, reduce their fleet to 10 warships, give hostages, surrender any Roman captives and deserters, reduce the army, ally with the Romans, and not make war without Roman permission. When news reached Rome of Flaminius' victory and the proposed peace terms, his command was extended for a third year.

In the following year, 196, Flaminius negotiated borders and the return of prisoners. He then shocked and delighted the Greeks by announcing at the Isthmian Games that henceforth the Greeks were to be free. After a moment of disbelief, the Greeks asked for the message to be repeated. Thereupon, according to Valerius Maximus, a shout so loud arose from the gathering that it allegedly stunned birds flying overhead who fell to the ground (Valerius Maximus 4.8.5, not supported by Polybius 18.46; Livy 33.32.9; Plutarch, *Flaminius* 10.5).

Soon after, Flaminius went to a war with the tyrant Nabis of Sparta. As a Roman ally, Philopoemen of Arcadia fought bravely and according to Plutarch aroused Flaminius' jealousy. The Romans could easily have destroyed Sparta, but Flaminius chose to come to terms with Nabis, rather than destroy Sparta and allow Philopoemen equal credit for the victory. When Flaminius was challenged over this decision later, he claimed that the price of destroying Sparta was not worth the life of Nabis, but in fact Flaminius may have been concerned that a new Roman general would have replaced him and won the glory, had the war lasted much longer. In this case, he might be exonerated of jealousy of Philopoemen.

For his victory Cynoscephalae, Flaminius was awarded a triumph. On top of the gold and silver and captured weapons and prisoners, the finest adornment of the triumph was the 1,200 Roman captives from the Hannibalic War marched behind his chariot as freedmen with the *pilleus* (freedman's hat) on their heads. For as a gesture of gratitude, the Achaeans and some other Greek allies rounded up their Roman slaves and presented them, unrequested, to, who hardly knew the number of Romans Hannibal had sold into slavery to the Greeks.

Flaminius was elected censor in 189 with Claudius Marcellus, the son of his old commander, over Cato the Elder. In the long ongoing feud between Cato and Scipio Africanus, Flaminius sided with Scipio by renewing him as *princeps senatus*. Cato later retaliated after his election as censor in 184 by expelling from the Senate the younger brother of Flaminius, Lucius. Flaminius' philhellene sympathies also conflicted with Cato.

In his final act of public service, Flaminius pursued Hannibal, now a refugee from the Romans. Many of the Romans continued to fear Hannibal, for after the defeat of Carthage in the Second Punic War, Hannibal had stirred Antiochus III against the Romans in the Syrian War (191–189). These Romans felt insecure as long as Hannibal was alive. Therefore, Flaminius took the assignment to see to the death of Hannibal. Learning that Hannibal had joined the court of King Prusias of Bithynia, Flaminius demanded his surrender. Unable to escape, Hannibal took poison. However, this mother did nothing to increase Flaminius' glory, but to the contrary diminished, for it was thought that Flaminius had driven to death an old, sick man, rather than a dangerous enemy of Rome.

After retiring from public service, Flaminius died peacefully. Polybius,

who often refers to Flamininus as Titus, is a major source for this period. Flamininus is also the subject of a biography by Plutarch.

Gaius Stern

See also Cato the Elder; Cynoscephalae, Battle of; Isthmian Declaration; Macedonian War, Second

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Fleets

Although never as large or critical to Rome's strength as its legions, the fleets played a vital role in Rome's military history. Despite occupying a peninsula in the middle of the Mediterranean Sea, the Romans were not originally a naval people. The First Punic War forced the Romans to learn to build and crew ships. After victory in the First Punic War, the Roman fleet proceeded to defeat the Carthaginians at the battle of the Ebro River in the Second Punic War. As Rome expanded into the eastern Mediterranean, the Roman fleet protected trade, including the essential Egyptian grain shipments, from pirates and the depredations of hostile kingdoms such as Macedonia. The fleet also played a critical role in the final defeat of Mithridates of Pontus in 73 BCE.

Equipped and structured differently from its opponents, Roman fleets used lighter vessels and emphasized boarding over the ramming and maneuver tactics that had dominated Mediterranean naval warfare since the Greco-Persian Wars. These fleets served Rome well against the Carthaginians and later opponents. Augustus equipped his fleet with light agile *liburnae*, a bireme design optimized for boarding, which by defeating Mark Anthony's and Cleopatra's more traditionally equipped fleet at Actium, ensured the demise of the trireme, quinquereme and larger banked-oar ships. Such massive ships, funded by Hellenistic monarchs, had expanded beyond easy maneuverability. All later Roman warships were founded on the bireme *liburna* design. Although ships were still equipped

with rams, boarding remained the navy's primary tactic throughout its existence.

After Actium, Augustus organized his 800-ship fleet into three, later two permanent "praetorian" fleets, each stationed at key ports near major trade routes. The Misene fleet was stationed at Misenum near Naples, while the Ravenna fleet, also created by Augustus, guarded the Adriatic Sea and naval routes eastward. In the third and fourth centuries CE, the advent of barbarian invasions, resurgent piracy and Gothic naval raids forced later emperors to shift resources to the Ravenna fleet. The fleets' primary duties during the imperial period were convoy escort, maritime policing, and troop and heavy transport, essential to logistics. The navy also maintained provincial squadrons (fleets) in key areas along the frontier. The Rhine fleet was one of the first and most active but provincial fleets were also stationed in Alexandria, Britain, on the Danube, and in Syria. Roman naval units also operated in the Red Sea, on the Tigris and Euphrates rivers and the Indian Ocean. Gothic raids led to the stationing of an imperial fleet at Constantinople in 330 CE.

As the least prestigious branch of the service, the fleets tended to recruit non-Romans from the late Republic onwards, particularly from the Greek and Dalmatian coasts. Fleet service was longest (26 to 28 years) but offered the Roman citizenship at discharge.

Unfortunately, the fleet's importance to the army's supply system and strategic mobility drew it into imperial Rome's many civil wars. These diversions from the navy's primary role depleted its ranks, and created vacuums in areas the fleet normally patrolled, inspiring piracy and raiding. Still, the fleet won more battles than it lost in its last century of existence, defeating three Gothic, two Vandal and one Cilician fleets. Never as numerous, well paid or important as the legions, the fleet nonetheless played a vital role in Rome's expansion and defense.

Carl O. Schuster

See also Actium, Battle of; Carthage (State); Danube; Divisions of the Army (Imperial); Ebro, Battle of; Egypt, Roman; Punic War, First

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Formal Declaration of War

Despite the indisputable aggression that Rome displayed in the wars throughout Italy and the Mediterranean, the Romans were never able simply to march toward their enemies on a whim. On the contrary, the Roman state religion stipulated an intricate process for declaring war on an enemy to gain justification for the conflict and to ensure the approval of the gods. The fetial priests, who supervised Roman foreign policy, originally controlled the procedure for declaring war, known as the *ius fetiale* (fetial law). Over time, however, the processes required by the fetial law became impractical as Roman control spread farther into Italy, and eventually throughout the Mediterranean. In response, the fetial procedure began to change, losing much of its ethical significance and becoming much more of a formality.

The sources disagree on exactly when the fetial priests were introduced, but all point to sometime during the Roman monarchy (traditionally 753–509 BCE). According to Dionysius of Halicarnassus,

It is their (the fetial priests') duty to take care that the Romans do not enter upon an unjust war against any city in alliance with them, and if others begin the violation of treaties against them, to go as ambassadors and first make formal demand for justice, and then, if the others refuse to comply with their demands, to sanction war.

(Dionysius, *Roman History* 2.72.5)

As the excerpt shows, the fetial priests' original mission was to facilitate communication and relations with other Latin cities near to and in alliance with Rome, and thus not solely for bellicose purposes. Livy goes into great

detail regarding the specific process by which a fetial priest would facilitate a declaration of war. First, the leader of the fetial college, the *pater patratus*, traveled to the border of the accused neighbor, identified himself as the representative of Rome, recited the Roman demands, and called upon Jupiter as the witness and judge for the veracity of his claim. The priest then proceeded into the accused neighbor's territory and city, repeating his claims two more times. After the demands for restitution were delivered, the priest returned and a period of 33 days was allotted for the offender to supply recompense. If restitution was not given during this time, the *pater patratus* returned to the enemy city and announced before Jupiter that the accused had not offered redress for their transgression, and that the Roman Senate and people would now decide their fate. Having returned to Rome, the king (or, after 510, the consuls) and Senate debated on the offenses suffered by their neighbor, and accordingly, with the consent of the Roman people, voted for war. The *pater patratus* then returned to the enemy's boundary a final time and cast a blood-stained spear into their territory, thus officially delivering the declaration of war (Livy 1.32.5–14).

This procedure was feasible so long as it involved Rome's immediate neighbors in Latium or Etruria, but became impractical once Rome began to expand throughout the Italian peninsula. A key aspect to the *ius fetiale* is that the Romans were willing to adapt the tradition to accommodate for the circumstances brought on by their expanding frontiers. The first change was that senatorial *legati* (envoys) began to replace the fetial priests when delivering the demands. While Rome's other Latin neighbors had their own fetial customs and *patres patrati*, allowing for a common ground of communication, other cultures in Italy, specifically the Greeks of South Italy, did not have a fetial custom. In many ways, this religious disparity strengthened the Romans' justification for wars. Since Italian cities outside of Latium did not have a fetial tradition there was no manner for those cities to effectively contend with Rome's demands, thereby strengthening the Romans' own claims to possess the approval of the gods.

The war against Pyrrhus of Epirus (280–275 BCE) brought on a notable change, as the Romans were fighting a power originating from outside of Italy for the first time. Specifically, the Roman fetial priest or senatorial *legati* could not reasonably lead three journeys to Epirus to deliver demands, nor could they realistically throw a bloodstained spear from Roman territory into Epirote territory. According to the Roman grammarian

Servius (late fourth century CE), the Romans accommodated for the distance from Epirus by capturing an Epirote soldier, selling him Roman land, and then throwing the spear into the captive's small plot, thus satisfying the final requirement for the fetial custom (Serv. *Aeneid*. 9.52). This emphasis on technicalities illustrates the legal aspect of the *ius fetiale*, and shows that the Romans were insistent on demonstrating their justification for war to the gods.

As Rome became involved in conflicts throughout the Mediterranean, the *ius fetiale* changed further. Some scholars have argued that the tradition had completely faded away by the late second century BCE, but a close inspection of the literary evidence shows that the fetial custom survived albeit in a reduced and evolved manner. There was no longer any question of the feasibility for multiple trips to an enemy's city, and the formalities for declaring war were now entirely in the hands of senatorial envoys. In fact, the innovations made in the fetial custom demonstrate the power of tradition. By the late second century, ambitious aristocrats often manipulated circumstances to create the pretexts for wars. In this context the fetial custom did remain as a true expression of religious piety, but evolved also into a ritual observance that facilitated the necessary formalities for declaring war (Watson 1993, 64–65). Vestiges of the fetial custom can be seen in the multiple embassies to the Carthaginians prior to the Second Punic War (218–201 BCE), the strategically placed envoys sent through Greece leading up to the Second Macedonian War (200–197 BCE), and the demands given to Perseus before the Third Macedonian War (171–168 BCE).

Many aspects of the *ius fetiale* resemble private law suits, where the fetial priests would announce their grievances to the accused neighbor before the gods as judges. If the fetial priests (or senators) failed to gain reparation for the enemy's transgressions, the Romans could go to war knowing that the gods had ruled in their favor. One result of the evolution of the fetial procedure was that the opportunity for peaceful resolution became impossible. Demands began to be set so high that the Romans seem to have expected an enemy to reject them, thus supplying a pretext to declare war with a clear conscience (see the prelude to the declaration of the Third Punic War in 149 BCE, document 10). In all instances of Roman demands leading to a declaration of war, only in 238, when Rome threatened Carthage over the affair at Sardinia, did an enemy capitulate to a

Roman ultimatum. In such a manner, the *ius fetiale* evolved into a way to obtain a desired war, rather than a way to determine the necessity and justification of war.

Dustin Cranford

See also Alliances; Allies; *Amicitia*; *Bellum Iustum*; Dionysius of Halicarnassus; *Fetiales*; Imperialism; *Ius Fetiale*; Latin Wars; Livy; Macedonian War, Second; Punic War, First; Punic War, Second; Punic War, Third

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Formula Togatorum

In the mid-Republic, the *formula togatorum* was a document which stipulated the number of men that each allied community was required to provide for Rome’s wars. Polybius states that allied communities were required to keep lists of their men of military age (2.23–24, ca. 225 BCE). An agrarian law of 111 BCE describes Rome’s allies as “from whom the Romans demand soldiers in the land of Italy according to the *formula togatorum*.” The term *togatorum*, from *togati*, “men who wear the toga,” indicates Rome’s most immediate allies in Latium and Italy, with a similar culture as opposed to overseas allies; it also suggests adult males (Roman boys ritually became men when they donned the toga at age 16).

It is possible that the number of men each allied community had to contribute was established at the time of its treaty with Rome. At a later date, in 177 BCE, the Samnites and Paeligni could not meet their numbers because thousands of their people had migrated (Livy 41.8). However, the *formula togatorum* may have been more flexible than this and the number that each community provided changed with Rome’s requirements. The *formula togatorum* itself is not extant and has been a topic of scholarly

debate.

The allies specified by the *formula togatorum* were grouped together into *alae* (wings) that might comprise both cavalry and infantry. They were commanded by Roman *praefecti sociorum*.

Sara E. Phang

See also Alae Sociorum; Allies; Dilectus; Recruitment of Army (Republic)

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Forum (Republic)

The Roman Forum was of great antiquity, being constructed upon a swampy area between the Palatine, Quirinal, and Capitoline hills that was drained and infilled in the late seventh century BCE. It became a market place, meeting place, and the political and religious center of Rome. Important political structures included the Senate House and Comitium (assembly place), and Rostra (speaker's platform, adorned with the beaks or *rostra* of ships). Important temples included the Temple of Saturn, the Temple of Vesta, and the Regia. Though Sulla and Caesar began adding more impressive public buildings to the Forum, the emperors built the Forum that is extant today, with the Temple of Divus Iulius (built by Augustus) and other restored and elaborated temples.

Sara E. Phang

See also Forum of Augustus; Forum of Trajan; Rome (City)

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Forum of Augustus

The Forum of Augustus, built at Augustus' expense, was dedicated in 2 BCE, the year when Augustus was hailed as father of the fatherland. It comprised a large rectangular piazza flanked by porticoes on its long sides, which acted as venues for courts of justice. It was dominated by the Temple of Mars Ultor (the Avenger). The Forum was decorated on one side by marble statues of Rome's seven kings and of great men of the Republic who had expanded Rome's empire, and on the other by statues of Augustus' Julian ancestors and the kings of Alba Longa. Inscriptions accompanying these statues summarized each general's career and could be interpreted as justifying Augustus' anomalous powers. Augustus showed personal interest in the Forum's design, and wanted his achievements to be measured against those of Rome's famous generals of the past. Further bronze statues of triumphal generals were added over the next hundred years or so. Statues of Rome's mythical founders, Aeneas and Romulus, were complemented by a statue of Augustus in a chariot, as father of the fatherland. Paintings of the deities Castor and Pollux with Victory and of Alexander the Great further enhanced the Forum's martial flavor. The Forum played a central role in military ceremonies, becoming the venue where the Senate would meet to vote on awarding triumphs and waging wars; from where commanders set out to the provinces on their military campaigns; and where boys celebrated their coming-of-age (and, by extension, potential entry into military service).

Alison E. Cooley

See also Augustus; Mars Ultor, Temple of; Rome (City); Triumph; Victory

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Forum of Trajan

The Forum of Trajan was built ca. 104–112 by the emperor Trajan (98–117) as an addition to the Roman Forum and Forum of Augustus. It occupied the lower ground between the Capitoline and Quirinal hills. Two large semicircular exedrae (recesses) ascended these hills. The south was bounded by a portico facing onto the Forum of Augustus. The north side was bounded by the Basilica Ulpia, built by Trajan. To either side of a colonnaded court were two Greek and Latin libraries. Trajan's Column stood in the center. The Column's elaborate reliefs depicting the Dacian Wars may have been visible from the upper floors of the libraries. The Forum of Trajan, celebrating Trajan's victories, was probably adorned with relevant statuary such as the images of two Dacians that now stand in the courtyard of the Musei Capitolini in Rome.

Sara E. Phang

See also Column of Trajan; Dacian Wars; Rome (City); Trajan; Victory

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Franks

The Franks were a Germanic people originally located east of the Rhine River. In 358 CE, the Salian Franks were defeated by the Caesar Julian (later emperor, 361–363). Given the status of *foederati*, the Salian Franks were

settled in Roman territory near the mouth of the Rhine. During the late fourth century, several Franks rose to prominence in the Roman army and played key roles in Roman politics. Flavius Richomer, more commonly referred to as Richomer (not to be confused with the mid-fifth century general Ricimer), was a Frank who took service in the Roman army during this period. He eventually held the positions of *comes*, *magister militum*, and consul. His son Theudemeres became a king among the Franks while his nephew Arbogast took service with Rome. In 388, Theodosius I sent Richomer to suppress the rebellion of Magnus Maximus. Richomer then served Theodosius as *comes et magister utriusque militiae* until his death in 393.

After the capture and execution of Magnus Maximus, Theodosius I elevated Valentinian II, the son of Valentinian I, as western emperor. Richomer's nephew Arbogast, as *magister peditum* in the western empire, was ordered to consolidate Valentinian's rule in the west, which he did by eliminating Victor, the son of Maximus and a potential rival to Valentinian II. Subsequently Arbogast was promoted to *magister militum*. Arbogast, however, overthrew the young Valentinian II, who either committed suicide or was murdered in 392. Arbogast then promoted the civilian Eugenius as emperor in the west. Theodosius I refused to recognize Eugenius as emperor and moved his army into Italy. At the battle of the Frigidus River (394), Arbogast and Eugenius were defeated. Eugenius was captured and executed, while Arbogast committed suicide.

In 451, the Salian community was divided in support of two claimants to the Salian throne, one backed by Aetius and the Romans, the other backed by Attila, king of the Huns. This conflict was one of the reasons Attila chose to invade Gaul in 451. Attila entered Salian territory and presumably placed his ally on the throne, then advanced on Orleans. Driven away from Orleans, Attila met the combined Roman and Visigothic army at the battle of Châlons. In this battle, Franks appear to have fought on both sides.

A generation later the Salian Franks seem to have provided the core of the newly emergent kingdom of Tournai ruled by Childeric I. Historians refer to this period in Frankish history as the Merovingian dynasty, beginning from the accession of Childeric I to the Frankish throne in 481 and continuing down to 751. During this period the Franks, having converted to Roman Catholicism and having adopted Latin as an elite language, began to develop Old French, the ancestor of the modern French

language.

Michael D. Blodgett

See also Burgundians; Fall of the Roman Empire (West); Federates; Gaul, Gauls; Suicide; Usurpation

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Frīgīdus, Battle of the (394 CE)

The battle of the Frīgīdus (394 CE) was fought between Theodosius I (379–395) and the western usurper Eugenius near the Frīgīdus River (modern Isonzo), bordering north-western Italy, on September 5–6, 394. The *magister militum* Arbogast had proclaimed Eugenius emperor in the west after the suicide or suspicious death of Valentinian II in 392. Theodosius rejected Eugenius’ legitimacy and assembled his armies to defeat Eugenius in May 394, to secure his son Honorius as western emperor. Theodosius’ army was reinforced with 20,000 Gothic warriors, previously settled in Moesia, while Eugenius’ army was reinforced by several thousand Frankish and Alamanni auxiliaries. Arbogast commanded Eugenius’ forces, making a defensive camp in the mountain valley near the Frīgīdus. During the first day of battle, Theodosius’ forces suffered heavy casualties. Theodosius also allegedly stationed the Gothic auxiliaries deliberately in the front line to kill them off, where they suffered 10,000 casualties.

On the second day, some cavalry of Arbogast defected to Theodosius’ army but both sides were still evenly matched in battle. Christian sources state, however, that Theodosius received the aid of the Bora wind, a katabatic wind blowing downslope from a mountain range, carrying dust with it that threw the forces of Arbogast and Eugenius into disarray, allowing the eastern army to break through and defeat them. In the aftermath of the battle, Eugenius was executed and Arbogast committed suicide. Theodosius I emerged briefly as senior ruler over the entire empire until his death in January 395. Together with the defeat of Magnus Maximus, the battle of the Frīgīdus imposed a massive strain on the western

Roman army from which scholars have argued that it was never able to fully recover during the fifth century. Theodosius' mistreatment of Gothic soldiers also sowed the seeds of Alaric's mutiny, leading to the sack of the city of Rome in 410 CE.

Jeroen W. P. Wijnendaele

See also Alaric; Arbogast; Magnus Maximus; Rome, Siege of; Theodosius I

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Frontiers

In *The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire: From the First Century A.D. to the Third* (1976, rev. ed. 2002), modern strategic studies expert Edward Luttwak argued that in the early Roman empire, the Romans projected force beyond their borders, shifting to a more defensive and linear concept of frontiers in the middle empire when linear *limes* works (walls and ditch and road systems) were constructed in north Britain, Germany, Africa, and elsewhere.

Scholars within classical studies and archaeology challenged Luttwak's account by emphasizing cultural aspects of Roman frontier policy (see in particular Whittaker 1994; Mann 1979; Mattern 1999). Within the literary tradition, Romans do not appear to be very conscious of linear frontiers, let alone the need to geographically project force beyond them or maintain rigid defensive barriers. These are modern concepts dependent on the possession and use of accurate two-dimensional maps. Map-making was very inadequate in the ancient world; the Romans calculated distances along roads, but otherwise viewed their domination in terms of control or influence over peoples. Furthermore, frontier works such as Hadrian's Wall and the ditch system in North Africa (*fossatum Africae*) were intended to be permeable and let local peoples move back and forth. The army kept watch

over their movements rather than maintaining a rigid barrier. The Romans viewed the political submission of frontier peoples and of external peoples as more important; in imperial ideology peoples far beyond the frontiers did homage to Rome.

According to Luttwak, in the later Roman Empire, inferior frontier forces (*limitanei*) served to detain any enemy who broke into the empire, until the central field force arrived to combat the enemy. The frontier troops were dispersed in the frontier provinces, thus “defense in depth.” Luttwak attributes this strategic policy to the emperor Diocletian (284–305) and Constantine I (306–337). The strategy contrasts with that of the earlier Principate in which the Romans sought to contain enemy forces beyond their borders, defending their borders with linear frontier installations (*limes* works) and projecting force beyond them. In the later Roman Empire, since the Romans no longer projected force beyond their borders, the empire was inevitably eroded, leading to its collapse in the west.

The theory of “defense in depth” has been challenged particularly by Benjamin Isaac, a Roman frontier archaeologist and historian, who argued in *The Limits of Empire* (1988, rev. ed. 1992) that Roman soldiers were dispersed in the countryside not to combat external enemies but to maintain internal security, suppressing revolt, and policing potentially rebellious subjects. Isaac focuses on Roman Judaea, where low-intensity internal conflict involving resistant Jews was common. Many other provinces, particularly in mountainous areas, had such low-intensity conflict, usually termed “banditry.” Because the emperor’s power rested upon the army, the army’s maintenance of internal control was as strategically important as its use against external threats.

Furthermore, the Roman army, being the largest body of trained and disciplined personnel at the Roman state’s disposal, was employed for many other purposes besides defense (Fuhrmann 2012). Soldiers’ additional duties included policing and guard duties; attending and assisting provincial governors and other officials; collecting taxes, customs duties and other imposts. In modern nations, civilian officials perform most of these functions. Military installations within Roman provinces may have had a variety of purposes, including defense, internal policing, and other activities. Hence, it is difficult to prove that the purpose of later Roman military installations was “defense in depth.” Furthermore, even in the later Roman Empire there is substantial evidence that Roman emperors and

armies continued to carry out military offensives and expeditions beyond the frontiers.

Sara E. Phang

See also Bandits and Brigands; Diocletian; Hadrian's Wall; Judaea; Low-Intensity Conflict; Public Order; Strategy

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Frontinus (ca. 30–after 100 CE)

Sextus Julius Frontinus was a notable Roman senator, administrator, military officer, provincial governor, and author of two surviving technical treatises, the *Stratagems* and the *Aqueducts*. He held a praetorship in 70, the consulship in 72 or 73, and was governor of Britain in 73/74–77, conquering Wales for the Roman Empire. He may have commanded in Domitian's war against the Germans in 82/83. Frontinus was proconsul of Asia in 86, a highly distinguished post; he was then *curator aquarum* (in charge of the water supply of Rome) in 97, and held two more consulships in 98 and 100.

Frontinus' *Stratagems* is a collection of military anecdotes from Greek and Roman history and biography, arranged topically to illustrate various

tactical and strategic concepts, such as “on hiding one’s decisions” from the enemy. The Greek term *stratagemata* connoted “tricks” or deceptive tactics rather than modern formal or grand strategy. Frontinus also displays a moralistic approach, idealizing Rome’s great leaders of the past, such as Scipio Africanus, Fabius Maximus, and Cato the Elder.

Frontinus’ *De aquis urbis Romae* (*Aqueducts*) concerns the water supply of Rome, a city of over a million inhabitants in the first century CE for which the provision of fresh water was a vital necessity. He describes the construction of aqueducts and thus is a major source on Roman engineering techniques.

Sara E. Phang

See also Stratagems

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Fulvia (d. 40 BCE)

A Roman noblewoman of the late first century BCE, Fulvia was actively involved in the politics of the last decades of the Republic. She was married to Publius Clodius Pulcher (92–52 BCE), the populist tribune who became a major enemy of Marcus Tullius Cicero. After Clodius was assassinated by Milo’s followers in 52, Fulvia sought justice for Clodius, exhibiting his body to the Roman crowd and provoking a riot. Milo was prosecuted for the death of Clodius and was defended by Cicero. Fulvia next married Gaius Scribonius Curio, a tribune of the plebs in 50 BCE and a Caesarian officer. Curio was killed in Caesar’s African campaign. Since Curio had been a patron and friend of Mark Antony’s, the widowed Fulvia married Mark Antony, whose interests she proceeded to defend passionately.

Fulvia played an active role during the triumviral proscriptions in 43–42 BCE, in which the triumvirs Octavian, Antony, and Lepidus targeted political and personal enemies, putting prices on their heads and confiscating their property. Fulvia is said to have particularly sought the death of Cicero, whose *Philippics*, orations targeting Mark Antony, also targeted her. After Cicero’s execution, Fulvia allegedly mistreated his severed head, pulling out

his tongue and sticking it with her hairpins.

Fulvia is noted also for her command of the siege of Perusia. Fulvia and her husband's brother Lucius Antonius roused the Italians against Octavian and were besieged by Octavian at Perusia (41–40 BCE; Appian, *Civil Wars* 5.32–49). Though Roman women were normally excluded from military affairs, their participation in the defense of a besieged city was more acceptable (cf. Caesar, *Civil War* 3.9, the Roman colony of Saloniae during the Caesarian civil war). The soldiers of Octavian and of Lucius Antonius inscribed insults on sling bullets, some of which were sexual in nature and intended to embarrass Fulvia and Octavian. Perusia eventually fell to Octavian, who spared Lucius Antonius; Fulvia fled to Greece, where she died of an illness a short time later. After Fulvia's death, Mark Antony then married Octavian's sister Octavia as part of the Treaty of Brundisium alliance (40 BCE).

Nonetheless Fulvia's personality became part of Mark Antony's bad reputation, elaborated by Cicero and embellished by Octavian's propaganda: she was said to dominate Antony, preparing him for his defection to Cleopatra. Fulvia's reputation has been analyzed in terms of Roman stereotypes of male/female behavior. A woman with masculine traits such as Fulvia possessed was contrary to Roman social norms and to represent her thus was a strategy of insult.

A different Fulvia played a minor part in the suppression of the Catilinarian Conspiracy in 63, exposing the conspirators to Cicero.

Sara E. Phang

See also Brundisium, Treaty of; Cicero; Clodius Pulcher; Female Warriors; Gender and War; Mark Antony; Octavian; Perusia, Siege of; Proscriptions

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Gaius Gracchus (ca. 154–121 BCE)

Gaius Sempronius Gracchus, the younger brother of the *tribunus plebis* Tiberius Gracchus, himself held the tribunate of the plebs in 123 and 122 BCE. During his tribunate, Gaius Gracchus promoted land redistribution and the extension of the Roman citizenship in Italy, and other sweeping reforms, but was killed by the Senate in an extrajudicial purge.

As a young man, Gaius Gracchus served on his brother's land commission and served as quaestor in Sardinia, where he was known for his probity. Following the murder of Tiberius Gracchus at the hands of a senatorial lynch mob, Gaius Gracchus was widely expected to take up his brother's cause. He did so, being elected as tribune in both 123 and again in 122 BCE. During his two years of office, Gaius Gracchus produced a legislative program with far wider aims than his brother's. The chronology of these measures is controversial, as are some of the measures themselves.

In terms of the land issue, Gaius Gracchus reissued his brother's law of 133, which resumed the distribution of *ager publicus* to Roman citizens. The redistribution of public land was intended to promote military recruitment by enlarging the pool of eligible citizens. Gaius Gracchus went further by proposing distribution of land outside Italy by founding new city colonies, including one on the site of Carthage itself. Gaius Gracchus also provided for the army with legislation that required legionary clothing and equipment to be funded at public expense and that barred the recruitment of youths under the age of 17.

Gaius Gracchus also targeted corruption and misgovernment. One of his laws required that the Senate, which assigned provinces to governors, must designate all provinces before the election to discourage favoritism. He also

assigned tax collection in Asia to merchants termed *publicani*, who bidded for the right to collect taxes. This policy, administered by the censors, later became unpopular with the provincials, but Gaius Gracchus hoped to discourage corruption by taking tax collection away from governors and their staff. Another notable Gracchan measure was the state issue of grain, the staple diet of an average Roman citizen, to the inhabitants of Rome, at a subsidized rate.

Following his re-election for 122, which in contrast to Tiberius Gracchus' campaign was without notable incident, Gaius Gracchus introduced more sweeping governmental reforms. Hitherto the juries in the *quaestiones perpetuae*, the criminal courts for trying corruption and misgovernment, had been mostly senatorial and the trials had been used by nobles to attack political rivals with little effect on corruption. Gaius Gracchus assigned the juries to equestrians, reducing senatorial influence over the outcomes and ensuring fairer trial of senators. Gaius Gracchus' most drastic measure proposed to extend the Roman citizenship throughout Italy, making Latins Roman citizens and allies Latins. This measure had actually been proposed earlier, in 125 BCE, by the consul Marcus Fulvius Flaccus, an ally of the Gracchi. Both the jury and the Italian proposals would have extended Gaius Gracchus' power base. Gaius Gracchus clearly favored the equestrian order, themselves not an altogether separate class from the senatorial elite, by his measures for the *publicani* and equestrian juries. Perhaps his most important proposal was the extension of the Roman citizenship throughout Italy (albeit in a controlled manner), an issue not resolved until the Social War.

Thus Gaius Gracchus went far beyond his brother's scope in terms of legislation. His motives were debated by ancient and modern authors, but the scope of these laws and proposals shows a desire to rapidly alter the shape of the Roman political landscape. Such reform also benefited Gaius Gracchus' supporters, *plebs* and Italians. The more traditional nobility regarded sweeping, rapid political reform and popular measures with horror, but Tiberius Gracchus and his supporters' violent deaths had also shocked the political class.

In response to Gaius Gracchus, the Senate initially adopted a more measured approach than they had used against his brother and set about undermining his support, certainly within Rome itself. One of Gaius Gracchus' fellow tribunes of 122, Marcus Livius Drusus, proposed his own

program of colony foundation on a reduced scale and vetoed the measures on extending the citizenship throughout Italy. On this occasion there was no resultant deposition of Drusus, perhaps because the urban populace of Rome was unwilling to share citizenship rights with the inhabitants of Italy. Thus Drusus presented a more subtle opposition to Gaius and not one that could easily be ignored. Furthermore, Gaius Gracchus spent some time outside Rome, organizing the foundation of the colony on the site of Carthage. His absence did not help his popularity. As a result of Drusus' efforts and his own absence, Gaius Gracchus failed to be elected for a third consecutive tribunate, for 121 BCE.

The following year, with Gaius no longer a tribune, the Senate made its move, via a compliant tribune, to annul some of his previous legislation. When the day came for the measure to be passed, Gaius Gracchus and his supporters protested at the assembly, during which a servant of Lucius Opimius was killed. Opimius, one of that year's consuls, was a noted opponent of Gracchus and used this death to argue that Gaius Gracchus was attempting armed sedition, a charge leveled against his brother Tiberius Gracchus. On this occasion, rather than resort to a religiously sanctioned lynching, Opimius urged and the Senate passed a unique decree known as the *senatus consultum ultimum* (the ultimate or final decree of the Senate), equivalent to martial law: it suspended the usual laws and the civil rights of citizens. Gaius Gracchus and his supporters retreated to the Temple of Diana on the Aventine, but were then hunted down and killed; when his capture was imminent, Gaius himself committed suicide, ordering his slave to kill him (Appian, *Civil Wars* 1.26; Plutarch, *Gaius Gracchus* 17).

Thus Gaius Gracchus met the same fate as his brother, murdered at the hands of the Senate, but left an even more divisive legacy. In particular, his promotion of equestrian and Italian interests raised issues that were not resolved with his death, but contributed to the instability which plagued the late Republic and in particular the Social War of 91–87 BCE.

Gareth C. Sampson

See also Civil Conflict (Late Republic); Gracchan Land Conflict; *Senatus Consultum Ultimum*; Social War (91–87 BCE); States of Emergency; Tiberius Gracchus; Tribune of the Plebs

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Galba (Emperor) (68–69 CE)

Servius Sulpicius Galba, a Roman senator from a distinguished patrician family, revolted from the emperor Nero and claimed the imperial power in 68 CE. His personality and policies alienated the Praetorian Guard, whom Marcus Salvius Otho persuaded to assassinate Galba on January 15, 69. Galba’s adopted heir, Lucius Calpurnius Piso Frugi Licinianus, was also assassinated.

Galba represented the last of the old aristocracy at Rome and lived through the reigns of Tiberius, Gaius, Claudius, and Nero. He was appointed governor of Aquitania, governor of Upper Germany during the reign of Gaius, and governor of Africa (ca. 44–51). He was governor of Hispania Tarraconensis from 60 to 68. In 68, Galba was solicited by Gaius Julius Vindex to support his revolt. Galba himself was hailed as emperor by his troops, and upon Nero’s death proceeded to Rome and was accepted by the Senate.

Galba alienated the armies through the harshness of his policies toward them. Already known for severe discipline during his governorship of Upper Germany, he inflicted decimation on the legion constituted from fleet soldiers who requested that he formally recognize them as a legion. Galba also alienated the praetorians. Though Nymphidius Sabinus, then praetorian prefect, had promised the praetorians that Galba would give them a large donative, Galba as emperor refused to give this donative, saying, “I levy my soldiers, I don’t buy them” (Tacitus, *Histories* 1.5). Tacitus relates that the praetorians regarded this refusal as a personal insult; they would have been satisfied with a small gift, a token of the emperor’s respect for them

(Tacitus, *Histories* 1.18). Galba was believed to be very wealthy in his own right, adding to the odium of his parsimony. At age 72, he seemed both harsh and inflexible, and weak, excessively dependent on three subordinates, Titus Vinius, Laco, and his former slave Icelus.

Galba had no sons and adopted as heir a young man, Calpurnius Piso Frugi Licinianus, who had a similar old-fashioned, severe reputation. Otho, who had hoped to be adopted by Galba, was displeased. Accordingly, Otho subverted the praetorians with bribes and personal favors. On January 15, the praetorians carried Otho off to their camp in Rome and hailed him as emperor. Galba was seized and assassinated by the praetorians, who also assassinated Piso. Otho was recognized and accepted as emperor in Rome and Italy, though his reign would be short, lasting only until April 69 when he was defeated in battle by the Vitellians.

The main sources for Galba's life and reign are Tacitus' *Histories*, Suetonius' *Galba*, Plutarch's *Galba*, and Cassius Dio's *Roman History*. Tacitus emphasizes Galba's incompetence; Suetonius adds uncritical biographical information. Plutarch's *Galba*, much more favorable to Galba than Tacitus' *Histories*, provides some additional information about the first months of Galba's reign. Dio's *Roman History*, surviving in epitome for this period, probably followed Plutarch. Scholars have examined Galba's coin issues as evidence of his actual policies and political stance; however, the extent to which emperors controlled the images and legends on their coinage as a mode of propaganda is uncertain.

Sara E. Phang

See also Army in Politics; Assassination; Donatives; Emperor as Patron; Military Discipline; Otho; Praetorians; Tacitus; Usurpation; War of Four Emperors

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Galerius (Emperor) (305–311 CE)

Galerius (Caesar 293–305, Augustus 305–311) was one of the Tetrarchs. His full name was Gaius Galerius Valerius Maximianus, and he is often termed Maximian in the ancient sources, but usually termed Galerius by modern scholarship to avoid confusion. A vigorous general, Galerius was notable for winning great victories over the Sassanid Persians in 297–8. He is also best known as the instigator of the “Great” Persecution of the Christians (303–311). Accordingly, Christian authors disparaged his character, depicting him as barbarous and cruel. However, Galerius remained loyal to Diocletian and attempted to salvage the Tetrarchic system after it began to break up into civil warfare.

Little or nothing is known of Galerius’ youth. He was probably born in the 250s in eastern Illyricum. Lactantius claims that he was Dacian, in which case his family will have evacuated Dacia ca. 270–275 to settle elsewhere. Lactantius also claims that his mother, Romula, was a pagan priestess (a position of some local prestige), influencing him to hate the Christians. Galerius entered the army and advanced rapidly in the army and administration. He probably held high office before he was raised to the rank of Caesar in 293.

As Caesar, Galerius took command of the Roman war with Persia, which had broken out afresh in 296 due to the accession of a new ruler, Narses. Galerius lost his first battle with Narses’ forces between Callinicum and Carrhae, angering Diocletian, who let him try again. Galerius first invaded through Armenia with great success (297). The next year, he advanced down the Tigris and captured Ctesiphon, the Persian capital; he then returned up the Euphrates (298). In 299, the Romans negotiated a peace with the Persians at Nisibis on very favorable terms to the Romans. Galerius had restored Roman control of the eastern frontier up to the River Tigris and avenged the defeat and capture of the emperor Valerian in 260. When not fighting the Persians, Galerius assisted Diocletian with campaigning against Germanic peoples and Sarmatians on the Danube.

According to Lactantius, Diocletian was allegedly influenced by Galerius to persecute the Christians in 303, based on Galerius’ personal hatred of Christians and Diocletian’s fear of Galerius, who had become arrogant after his Persian victory. This story inverts the official relationship of Augustus and Caesar, and denies Diocletian sound Roman traditionalist

reasons to attempt to suppress the new religion. It also emphasizes Galerius' personal cruelty and barbarity.

At Diocletian's abdication in 305, Galerius was promoted to the rank of Augustus, together with Constantius I. Courtiers may have expected that Constantius' son Constantine and Maximian's son Maxentius would become Caesars. Instead, according to Lactantius, Galerius influenced Diocletian to name his own friend Severus and nephew Maximinus II Daia as Caesars. The truth is not known; Diocletian may have intended to favor adoptive (nonhereditary) succession, yet the choice of Maximinus appears dynastic.

On the death of Constantius I in July 306, Galerius automatically became senior Augustus, and Constantine I revolted at York. The revolts of Maxentius and the ex-Augustus Maximian followed. For his part, Galerius attempted to hold the Second Tetrarchy together. Severus, now Augustus in the western empire, lost to Maxentius and was captured and executed. Galerius invaded Italy, but did not save the situation. He called a conference of all the emperors (including Diocletian, living in peaceful retirement at Spalato) at Carnuntum in November 308. Here Maximian was induced to retire, and Licinius (a friend of Galerius) was promoted to Augustus; Constantine and Maximinus only received the rank of Caesar, and Maxentius did not get even that. Subsequently, Galerius recognized Constantine and Maxentius as having the status of Augustus. Galerius became very ill in 311, and died after a long, painful illness, described in detail in Lactantius' *On the Deaths of the Persecutors*. On his deathbed, Galerius rescinded the persecution. His wife, Diocletian's daughter Valeria, attended by her mother Prisca, were forced to flee from Maximinus (whom the widowed Valeria refused to marry) and Licinius, and were eventually killed by Licinius' men.

Sara E. Phang

See also Christians, Persecution of; Constantine I; Constantius I; Diocletian; Lactantius; Maxentius; Maximian; Maximinus II Daia; Persian Wars, Arsacid; Succession (Imperial); Tetrarchic Civil War

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Galla Placidia (Empress) (ca. 390–450 CE)

Aelia Galla Placidia, daughter of Theodosius I, was a Roman empress and briefly Visigothic queen, and perhaps the greatest example of the strong political women of the Theodosian dynasty.

Captured by Alaric in the sack of Rome in 410, Galla wed Alaric's successor Athaulf in 414. Intelligent, pious, and charismatic, Galla briefly became central to Roman diplomacy with the Visigoths; Athaulf and Constantius III (Honorius' *magister utriusque militiae*) bargained over her while the Visigoths jostled for position in Gaul. Athaulf was overthrown in 415, and after public humiliations Galla was rescued and returned by King Vallia to Ravenna in exchange for alliance with Rome. In 417, Galla (reluctantly) married Constantius; their children were Valentinian III and Honoria. Constantius was briefly elevated to co-emperor with Honorius in 421, but did not rule long.

Galla involved herself in episcopal politics, and after Constantius' death from illness in 421, she promoted Valentinian's claim to succeed as emperor after Honorius, who had no sons of his own. Galla's attempts to persuade her half-brother were undercut by intrigue and factions at court, resulting in her exile to Constantinople. After Honorius' death in 423 and the usurpation of Johannes (423–425), Galla inspired her nephew Theodosius II (408–450) to impose dynastic succession on the western empire: in 425, six-year-old Valentinian III (425–455) was installed as western emperor, and Galla began her regency at Ravenna. She genuinely ruled from behind the scenes, but there was no precedent nor institutional framework for female rule, and one of her major concerns was balancing the competing generals Boniface, Felix, and Aetius, against the backdrop of the barbarian takeover

of Spain and Africa, and the advance of the Huns. By 437, Aetius had wrested control for himself from Galla, and Valentinian ruled in his own right. Afterward, the empress continued to play a role in familial and papal politics, becoming a vital link holding the Theodosian dynasty—and thus the two empires—together, until her death in November 450.

Christopher Malone

See also Aetius; Alaric; Empresses; Fall of the Roman Empire (West); Honorius; Theodosius II; Valentinian III

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Gallic Empire

The Gallic empire was a separatist state, which existed independently of the Roman Empire between 260 and 274 CE. It was established when the governor of Germania Inferior, Marcus Cassianius Latinus Postumus, staged a revolt in Cologne that resulted in the murder of Saloninus, a son of the emperor Gallienus. Postumus declared himself emperor and was recognized throughout most of Gaul, Britain, and Spain. The Gallic realm was established on the model of the Roman Empire itself, with its own senate, consuls, and coinage.

Gallienus invaded Gaul in 265 CE and achieved some success against Postumus, but the campaign was soon abandoned after he was wounded in battle. Then, in 268 CE, Gallienus' cavalry commander Aureolus was to launch a second invasion; this too ended in failure after Aureolus mutinied against Gallienus instead. But the Gallic empire was soon destabilized by its own internal problems. Postumus himself was killed in 269 CE by his own

troops, when he prevented them from sacking the city of Mainz. He was replaced in rapid succession by Marcus Aurelius Marius and Marcus Piavonius Victorinus. In response to this upheaval, the Spanish provinces rejoined the central Roman Empire, and the new emperor Claudius II Gothicus sent an expeditionary force into Gaul to increase the pressure. Victorinus was himself murdered in 271 CE, and succeeded by Gaius Esuvius Tetricus, the governor of Aquitania. He reigned until 274 CE, when the emperor Aurelian invaded Gaul, and Tetricus surrendered himself. As a reward, he was given the governorship of the Lucanian region of Italy.

Caillan Davenport

See also Aurelian; Claudius II; Gallienus; Third-Century CE Crisis

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Gallic Revolt (69–70 CE)

The Gallic Revolt of 69–70 CE was a major revolt that involved the Rhine frontier of the Roman Empire and the provinces of northern Gaul (modern France). It was triggered by the civil war of 69 CE (the War of Four Emperors), in which Aulus Vitellius was proclaimed emperor by the Rhine legions in January 69. Most of the legions followed his two generals, Aulus Caecina and Fabius Valens, south to Italy, leaving the northern frontier under strength. The Vitellians quickly defeated the emperor Otho, but were soon challenged by a new usurper, Vespasian. Native leaders of the Batavians, a Germanic people occupying the Rhine delta area, took advantage of the Roman imperial power's distraction, assaulting Roman legionary bases. Two Roman legions were defeated, and some Roman legionaries defected to the enemy. The native Gauls soon joined the revolt. The revolt was only suppressed in 70 when Petilius Cerialis brought more legions north to fight the Batavians and Gauls.

An immediate cause of the revolt was Roman recruiting officials' mistreatment of the Batavians, who instead of paying tribute furnished

recruits to the Roman army. In particular, Roman recruiting officers are depicted as practicing extortion and sexually molesting Batavian youths (Tacitus, *Histories* 4.14). Longer term causes include native religion and the probable disaffection of Romanized auxiliary soldiers and veterans who faced inferior conditions of service and a glass ceiling to promotion. The main source, although incomplete, is Tacitus' *Histories*.

Notably, the named leaders of the revolt, the Batavian leader Julius Civilis and the Gallic leaders Julius Classicus and Julius Tutor, were auxiliary veterans and Roman citizens. Their names suggest that their immediate ancestors in the male line received the Roman citizenship from Julius Caesar or Augustus. Their fathers or grandfathers had probably also served as auxiliaries, receiving the citizenship as a reward. Civilis and his peers probably benefited from family connections, as they became auxiliary officers, but were unable, due to the structure of the Julio-Claudian Roman army, to rise further. Auxiliary prefects (commanders of cohorts or cavalry units) might be promoted to tribune in a legion or into the civil administration, but at this time such promoted officers were more likely to be Italian. Tacitus depicts the auxiliaries as revolting against legionaries, who had more privileged terms of service and discharge benefits; this degree of hostility, rather than mere rivalry, is not apparent elsewhere. Civilis, furthermore, had personal grudges against the Roman administration, as he had been detained twice on suspicion of treason.

Another possible cause of Gallic disaffection was native religion, particularly Druidism. The Roman emperors took a dim view of Druidism due to its associations with potentially seditious prophecy. Druids as native "wise men" resembled astrologers, a group that the Roman authorities periodically expelled from the city of Rome; Tiberius and Claudius had banned the practice of Druidism. Tacitus relates that a Germanic prophetess, Veleda, supported Civilis' revolt, and that the Gauls and Germans were elated by the news of the burning of the Capitoline Temple of Jupiter in Rome in December 69, because they claimed that it portended the fall of the Roman Empire.

The Gallic Revolt displays the pattern in which peripheral areas of the Roman Empire tended to revolt and even to elevate local rulers (who claimed the title of emperor) at times of crisis elsewhere. Gaul elevated its own emperors, Postumus and Tetricus, during the crisis period of the mid-third century CE, and elevated another emperor, Avitus, during the period

preceding the fall of the western empire in the fifth century CE. These “Gallic empires” did not mean that Gaul was regarded as a separate nation. It is notable, though, that in the Gallic Revolt none of the Batavian or Gallic leaders claimed the title of emperor.

The main literary source for the Gallic Revolt of 69–70 is Tacitus’ *Histories*, particularly Books Four and Five, though Book Five is only partially preserved. Tacitus presents the views of Civilis and the rebels and of Petilius Cerialis in set speeches which, as often in ancient historiography, represent the author’s opinions, dramatize conflicts, and are probably not based on factual speeches. Tacitus’ presentation of the Batavian and Gallic Revolt is, as usual with Tacitus, layered with ambiguity and ideology.

21 CE saw the lesser revolt of the Treveri Florus and Sacrovir.

Sara E. Phang

See also Gaul, Gauls; Tacitus; War of Four Emperors

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Gallic Wars, Causes

The immediate causes of the Gallic Wars were the alleged threat of the Helvetii, an Alpine people relatively close to Roman territory, and Julius Caesar’s own desire for the prestige and plunder of conquest. Broader factors include migration and cultural shifts in the late Iron Age societies of this region, and the Roman Republic’s political structure based upon aristocratic competition and military values.

Caesar depicts the Helvetii as a severe threat to Roman interests, suggesting in his commentaries that they might cross the Alps into Roman territory. To combat the Helvetii, Caesar and his advisers were drawn into

the political world of the peoples of southern Gaul. It was common Roman practice to actively foster and exploit such relationships, particularly by granting favored groups privileges and influence in return for access to resources.

Victory against the Helvetii could provide plunder Caesar needed to pay back the massive debts he had accrued in political campaigns at Rome, in addition to providing funds to pay and provision his army. Though the state guaranteed these funds, their transport from Rome to Gaul was slow and risky. If he did not treat his troops well, he could expect mutinies.

Military victory would not only increase Caesar's political influence, but would justify extension of his command in Gaul (initially limited to five years), enabling him to avoid prosecution by his opponents. Magistrates in office could not be prosecuted. Once Caesar became a private citizen, he would become vulnerable.

A major long-term cause of the Gallic Wars was the orientation of Roman elite society and government toward warfare. For Roman aristocratic males, a successful political career was closely interwoven with military responsibilities. Aristocrats competed strenuously for military glory, exemplified by the awarding of a triumph, the victory procession through the streets of Rome.

Rosemary Moore

See also Alesia, Siege of; *Amicitia*; *Auxilia*; Britain, Conquest of; Britain, Roman; Caesar, Gaius Julius; Diplomacy; Elite Participation; Gaul, Gauls; Imperialism; Plunder; Vercingetorix; War Crimes; Warlike Peoples

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Gallic Wars, Course

Between 58 and 50 BCE, Julius Caesar and his army conquered Gaul, a region covering what is now modern France, Belgium, and the Netherlands. Caesar also attempted an invasion of Britain across the English Channel. The main source for the Gallic Wars is Caesar's *Gallic Wars*, supplemented by Caesar's officer Aulus Hirtius. For the most part, independent sources are lacking; Caesar's representations dominate the narrative of the Gallic Wars.

The Gallic Wars began soon after Caesar arrived in his provinces (Cisalpine Gaul and "Transalpine" Gaul, that is, Narbonne) in 58 BCE. Gaul proper, or Gallia Comata, northward to the English Channel and eastward to the Rhine, was unconquered territory. The Helvetii, an Alpine people forced to migrate due to pressure from Germanic peoples, requested his permission to cross Roman territory to relocate further west. On hearing the news, Caesar quick-marched his troops to the Rhône, the border of the province, and destroyed the bridge to prevent their crossing. He later formally refused their request, justifying the future Roman use of force. After unsuccessful attempts to cross the Rhône and the Saône rivers, the Helvetians were defeated in the battle of Bibracte and surrendered. They became Roman allies and returned to their original lands.

Caesar then encountered Ariovistus, leader of the Suebi, a Germanic people. By this point Caesar had allied with the Gallic Aedui, who earlier had been defeated by Ariovistus. The Sequani and a number of other peoples joined them to ask for Roman support. This campaign would be more difficult, as the Suebi had been too powerful for a coalition of Gallic peoples to expel. Just as troublesome was Ariovistus' status as a Friend of the Roman People, a title given to client monarchs obligated to Rome. Regardless, Caesar attacked Ariovistus and the Suebi and drove them back across the Rhine.

The following spring, Caesar campaigned in northern Gaul. These peoples, especially the Nervii, responded with guerrilla tactics, where Rome

was at a disadvantage. The Romans responded quickly with battle at the River Sambre. Caesar then besieged and defeated the Belgic Aduatuci, rejecting their deceptive attempts at negotiation.

Matters in Gaul remained unsettled. Several peoples, including the Veneti of northwest Gaul and the Aquitani of southwest Gaul, revolted in 56. Unrest began in spring 55 among the Usipetes and the Tencteri, both Germanic peoples who had migrated to Gaul. Here again Caesar represents the Germans as not to be trusted; despite their diplomacy, they attacked treacherously, resulting in a humiliating defeat of his auxiliary cavalry. He refused the apology of the Germanic leaders and attacked their camp, massacring as many as 400,000 Germans. At Rome, Caesar's enemies used this incident to argue that Caesar should be recalled for the Roman equivalent of war crimes—a betrayal of *fides* (loyalty) toward allies. The proposed trial was politically motivated, as the Romans normally showed little compunction toward killing and enslaving enemy peoples.

The next month Caesar led his army across the Rhine over a bridge built for this purpose, a direct response to the German peoples, who had asserted that Roman power did not extend east of the river. Caesar had his soldiers destroy the bridge after crossing back to Gaul, to impress these peoples further as well as hinder any possible advance.

Caesar then directed the first Roman invasion of Britain in 55 to counter those who allegedly had given assistance to the Belgae. As significant was Caesar's desire to explore a region new to Rome. However, the campaign was a great disappointment. Inadequate intelligence left the Roman army unprepared to land safely; in addition a hostile British army awaited Roman soldiers approaching the shore. However, the Romans forced the Britons to accept terms. In the second invasion of Britain in 54, despite greater success, the Romans still achieved no permanent occupation. During this period, there were signs that several Gallic peoples planned to revolt during Caesar's absence. Therefore, Caesar left behind Labienus, his most trusted legate, in command of half the Roman forces. Caesar soon defeated Cassivellaunus, the Britons' most powerful leader, and claimed victory. However, Caesar decided to withdraw to Gaul for the winter. While bad harvests made it necessary to garrison the legions separately, Caesar did not reduce the amount of grain requisitioned. The pressure this caused in addition to already existing resentment of Roman control strengthened Gallic resistance.

The Eburones, of northeastern Gaul, were first to revolt in winter 54–53, attacking a detachment of soldiers from the force commanded by Sabinus and Cotta. During later negotiations, the leader of the Eburones, Ambiorix, informed them of plans for coordinated attacks on all the Roman winter camps and suggested that Sabinus and Cotta withdraw, swearing to protect them on the march. Despite sharp disagreement, Sabinus persuaded Cotta, who supported staying and fortifying camp, to march out. The Roman army left the next morning, and was soon ambushed and massacred by the Eburones.

Ambiorix' victory inspired further revolts. The Nervii attacked the winter camp of the legion led by Quintus Cicero (the brother of Marcus Tullius Cicero the orator). Cicero fortified his camp, and managed to get a message to Caesar, who personally led a Roman contingent to relieve the siege. This news caused the Treveri to forestall their attack on Labienus' camp. Caesar decided to consolidate Roman forces into three camps instead of five for the remainder of the winter.

For the campaigns of 53 BCE, Caesar correctly suspected that the previous year's unrest would continue. His immediate goal was the capture of Ambiorix, who had formed an alliance with a number of Gallic and German peoples. Unable to accomplish this, he placed greater pressure on Gallic resources.

Consequently, many Gallic peoples united, led by Vercingetorix, a prince of the Arverni, a people in southern Gaul. Vercingetorix used Roman-style discipline and diplomacy to keep his supporters in line, and was a talented strategist. But realizing that the Gauls were too weak to oppose the Romans in open battle, Vercingetorix focused on a strategy of attrition.

The first major encounter in this campaign was the siege of Avaricum, a Gallic stronghold. Despite strong initial resistance, the Gauls yielded, and were slaughtered as they attempted to flee. Caesar then proceeded to Gergovia, the well-fortified primary town of the Arverni. The Romans managed by stratagem to take Gallic camps surrounding the town. However, the army advanced into Gergovia too eagerly and was driven back.

The defeat inspired the Aedui and other Gallic peoples to join Vercingetorix, who began to fortify the hill town Alesia. Caesar began a circumvallation, which Vercingetorix' cavalry attacked before its

completion. Caesar therefore constructed a second wall with defenses designed to slow advancing enemies. The Romans drove back several coordinated assaults, with a final rout that left few Gallic survivors. Vercingetorix was forced to surrender. This was the last serious resistance of the war.

The remaining narrative of the Gallic Wars is authored by Aulus Hirtius, one of Caesar's officers. Caesar remained in Gaul for another two campaigning seasons. The last significant actions of this war were the siege of Uxellodunum and the subduing of Commius, leader of the Atrebates. But during this period, Caesar's opponents gained political momentum and finally were able to declare him a public enemy. In response, soon after January 1, 49, Caesar crossed the Rubicon and marched on Rome, beginning the Caesarian-Pompeian civil war (49–45 BCE).

Rosemary Moore

See also Alesia, Siege of; *Amicitia*; *Auxilia*; Britain, Conquest of; Britain, Roman; Caesar, Gaius Julius; Diplomacy; Elite Participation; Gaul, Gauls; Imperialism; Plunder; Vercingetorix; War Crimes; Warlike Peoples

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Gallic Wars, Consequences

Caesar's *Gallic Wars* provides a lucid and fast-moving narrative. It is extremely valuable for study of Roman diplomacy, the Roman army, and engineering. It is also an important source for the classical ethnography (description of peoples) of preconquest Gaul, Germany, and Britain. However, recent scholarship has drawn attention to distortions in his work. For example, Caesar presents the Gauls and Germans as unreliable and treacherous, continuing an old tradition of Roman hostility to the Gauls. He also omits any less than creditable motives he might have for the conquest of Gaul.

After the Gallic Wars, Caesar's legions were loyal and highly experienced. The bond Caesar developed with his troops was significant and served as a model for many subsequent Roman military commanders. Though the nature of Caesar's authorship casts doubt on the enthusiasm of his army's response, there is plenty of confirmatory evidence that soldiers in this period were more loyal to their personal leaders than to the formal institutions of the Republic.

Other factors contributed to Caesar's army's loyalty, such as generous rewards and pay. Army size and campaign length may have weakened the common identity that Caesar's leadership methods were intended to foster. His armies mutinied in 49 and 47 due to supply shortages and dissatisfaction with pay and rewards. His soldiers recognized their own interests, as well as the political value of their support, and were willing to use these to their own benefit.

This pattern continued after Caesar's death: as Caesar's heir, Octavian was able to call up Caesarian veterans. Antony, as one of Caesar's former legates, used this connection to recruit his veterans. The oligarchic opposition did not have this advantage and had to rely on new recruits from the eastern Mediterranean, as did Antony after his break with Octavian.

The immediate consequences of the Gallic Wars for many of the Gallic peoples were undoubtedly disastrous. Even if the Romans had not inflicted massacre outright (as at Alesia), they enslaved many Gauls, reducing the native labor supply. Roman logistic demands likely also reduced food and supplies for the native population.

Some Gauls did benefit from the Roman conquest. These Gauls were recruited into the Roman army as non-Roman troops; Caesar was the first

to do this on a large scale, creating Legio V Alaudae (“Larks”) from Gauls and numerous cavalry cohorts from Gauls and Germans. Such recruitment led the way for the permanent establishment of the *auxilia*, military units recruited from noncitizens. These units were smaller, more flexible, and less expensive (auxiliary soldiers were paid slightly less) than legions.

Gaul eventually prospered from Roman colonization and especially from the trade promoted by Roman presence along the Rhine frontier. Local aristocrats who assimilated to Roman ways might receive positions in local government, which both promoted stability and provided needed support for Roman rule. Some reached high status, and Gauls became members of the Roman Senate by the mid-first century CE. Gallo-Roman aristocrats reached their high point in the fourth and fifth centuries CE, as the center of gravity of the western empire shifted northward to Milan and Trier.

Rosemary Moore

See also Alesia, Siege of; *Amicitia*; *Auxilia*; Britain, Conquest of; Britain, Roman; Caesar, Gaius Julius; Diplomacy; Elite Participation; Gaul, Gauls; Imperialism; Plunder; Vercingetorix; War Crimes; Warlike Peoples

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Gallienus (Emperor) (260–268 CE)

A Roman emperor (260–268 CE), Publius Licinius Egnatius Gallienus was born ca. 213 CE, the son of the senator Publius Licinius Valerianus (Valerian) and his wife Egnatia Mariniana. They were a traditional senatorial family, with links to the central Italian region of Etruria. When Valerian became emperor in 253 CE, he promoted Gallienus to the rank of Augustus, effectively making him coruler. Between 254 and 256 CE, Gallienus campaigned in the Danubian and Balkan regions before moving to the

Rhine frontier between 257 and 259 CE. His father Valerian was based in the east, preparing for a war against the Persians. Although there was no formal territorial division, the system of co-emperorship allowed Valerian to deal effectively with threats on several different fronts.

Gallienus married Cornelia Salonina prior to his accession, and she bore him three sons, Valerian II, Saloninus, and Marinianus. This enabled the further division of responsibility between members of the imperial family. Valerian II was given the title of Caesar in 255 CE, and replaced his father on the Danube in 256 CE. When Valerian II died in 258 CE, Saloninus was elevated to Caesar in his place, and joined Gallienus on the Rhine frontier. Disaster struck in 260 CE, however, when Valerian was captured by the Persian king Shapur. This sparked a series of revolts by governors and commanders throughout the empire, including Ingenuus and Regalianus on the Danube, and Postumus in Germany. Saloninus was murdered in the latter uprising, which resulted in the defection of the provinces of Gaul, Spain, and Britain from the empire.

As a result of these events, Gallienus was left as sole ruler of the central provinces of the empire, as his conventional reign dates (260–268) show. The Palmyrene king Odenathus appears to have exercised some authority in Gallienus' name over the eastern regions, but the extent of his powers is debated. The revolts continued in the east until 262 CE, with insurrections by the financial official Fulvius Macrianus and the governor of Egypt, Aemilianus. In response to this dire situation, Gallienus reformed the military hierarchy. He ceased appointing senators to the post of legionary commander, instead replacing them with officers who had worked their way up from the ranks. Many of these commanders had begun their career as protectors, a new officer corps established by Valerian and Gallienus in the 250s CE. Gallienus' new nonsenatorial generals played pivotal roles in defending the Balkan provinces from incursions by the Goths and Heruli in 267–268 CE. Attempts to reclaim the Gallic provinces from Postumus were, however, unsuccessful.

Gallienus was murdered at Milan in 268 CE as a result of a conspiracy by several of his leading officers, which included the future emperors Aurelian and Claudius II Gothicus. He was unpopular with the Senate as a result of his military reforms, and the senators wanted to condemn his memory and put his brother and youngest son, Marinianus, to death.

Gallienus did not fare well in the Latin and Greek historical record. The

epitomators Eutropius and Aurelius Victor, the emperor Julian (361–363) in his *Caesars*, and the *Historia Augusta* blame Gallienus for the crisis and depict him as frivolous and unreliable. All that can be said is that Gallienus failed to retain the loyalty of his generals. Despite the hostility of the ancient sources toward his regime, Gallienus' overhaul of the army command structure marked a pivotal turning point in Roman history.

Caillan Davenport

See also Aurelian; Cavalry (Imperial); Cavalry (Republic); Claudius II; *Comitatenses*; Gallic Empire; Third-Century CE Crisis; Valerian

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Gaul, Gauls

Roman interaction with the Gauls began in the early Republic with the Senones' invasion of Roman territory and sack of Rome; as the Roman conquest of Italy progressed, the Romans subdued and colonized the northern part of Italy known as Cisalpine Gaul. Continental Gaul, occupying roughly the area of modern France and Belgium, was added to Roman territory in the late Republic. The Romans first acquired the region of modern southern France (called at first the Province or Transalpine Gaul, later *Narbonensis*). Northern Gaul, which Julius Caesar describes as divided into three parts, Aquitania, *Lugdunensis*, and *Belgica*, was conquered by Caesar in 58–50 BCE. During the Republic, the Gauls remained an alien people, embodying the stereotype of the hated and feared “barbarian,” but as Gauls became assimilated Roman citizens, this role was filled by the Germans.

The Gallic peoples who settled in North Italy in the fifth/fourth centuries BCE were the Boii, Cenomani, Insubres, Lingones, and Senones. The similar Veneti and Raeti also settled in north Italy. They migrated from

continental Gaul across the Alps into the Po valley, which became termed Cisalpine Gaul.

The Senones proceeded as far as the Allia River, where they inflicted a serious defeat on the Romans. The Gauls advanced to Rome and sacked it in 390 BCE. According to Roman legend, the Gallic leader (the) Brennus demanded 1,000 pounds of gold but was forced to abandon his demands and flee when the Roman general Marcus Furius Camillus arrived with an army and drove off the Gauls. In fact, the Gallic sack was probably more humiliating for the Romans. The Romans developed a fear of the Gauls (*metus Gallicus*), and the prospect of a Gallic invasion justified a *tumultus* (a *levée en masse* or mass conscription, including propertyless citizens).

Nonetheless, as the Roman conquest of Italy advanced, some Cisalpine Gauls served as Roman allies; the Senones, however, allied with the Etruscans, Umbrians, and Samnites against Rome at the battle of Sentinum (295 BCE) and were defeated. The Romans thence advanced into Cisalpine Gaul and planted colonies to establish a Roman presence and intimidate the Gauls. The early colonies of Cremona and Placentia were overrun by the Gauls, but over time the Roman presence grew. In the decades just before the Second Punic War (218–201 BCE) the Romans defeated a coalition of the Senones and Etruscans and another union of the Boii and Insubres; Marcus Claudius Marcellus was among the Roman commanders victorious over the Gauls. In the Second Punic War, the Boii and Insubres allied with Hannibal.

In the early 120s, the Romans acquired Transalpine Gaul as a province, termed “The Province,” to protect the land route to Spain. Now the threat consisted of the German Cimbri and Teutones, who first invaded Transalpine Gaul in the late second century BCE, defeating a Roman army of 80,000 men at Arausio in 105. The Germans became the feared and hated barbarian.

After the Social War of 91–87 BCE Cisalpine Gaul became a Roman province; noncitizen settlers in colonies were enfranchised, and the other inhabitants of the province were granted Latin rights. After 42 BCE Cisalpine Gaul was merged with Italy, adding four new districts. Cisalpine Gaul was rapidly Romanized, but remained a strong recruiting ground for the legions in the late first century BCE and the early first century CE.

Continental Gallic society is described in Caesar’s *Gallic Wars* and (with more local color) by Greek ethnographers. Caesar depicts an agricultural, male-dominated society with many tribes (*civitates*) with aristocratic elites;

a few *civitates* elected magistrates in more Mediterranean fashion. The Gauls also had a priestly elite, the Druids, who monopolized learning and religious lore. The Gauls' Late Iron Age culture is known to archaeologists as La Tène from its style. In the 50s, the Gauls were already influenced by Mediterranean trade and culture, as Caesar notes. Each *civitas* (sg.) had a central settlement (termed *oppida*, "forts," by Caesar) but was otherwise dispersed in the countryside rather than urban.

Roman Gaul was marked by two major revolts, one in 21 CE, the more significant one in 69–70 CE, triggered by the partial withdrawal of Roman legions from the Rhineland as the legions supporting the emperor Vitellius marched south to civil war. The Gallic leaders of the revolt were auxiliary veterans, Julius Classicus and Julius Tutor, allying with the Batavian leader Julius Civilis. Their names suggest that their ancestors acquired Roman citizenship in the period of Julius Caesar or Augustus. Our main account of the revolt, Tacitus' *Histories*, depicts the persistence of native identity and resistance to Rome. However, Rome soon quelled the revolt.

The Gauls of the imperial period became partially assimilated to Roman culture. This happened quickly in Cisalpine Gaul, which became indistinguishable from the rest of Italy and was a major recruiting ground for the early imperial legions, and in Gallia Narbonensis, where the local elites were granted Roman citizenship and advanced in the imperial administration. Northern Gaul took longer to be fully assimilated. In a famous speech (preserved also in an inscription), the emperor Claudius I (41–54 CE) defended the promotion of Gallic elites into the Senate. A fusion of cultures took place, often termed Gallo-Roman. Many Gallo-Roman aristocrats became highly proficient in Latin literature and rhetoric, especially in late antiquity. Many Latin place-names have persisted into modern times in French form; the French language evolved from Vulgar Latin (as spoken in Gaul) but was not standardized until the seventeenth century.

In the mid-third century, as the central power was weakened by invasions, coups, and revolts, Roman Gaul became practically a separate empire, with its own emperor Postumus (and shortlived successors). The "Gallic Empire" was reconquered by Claudius II Gothicus (268–270) and Aurelian (270–275). After that time unrest took the form chiefly of brigandage, the Bagaudae of the late third and fourth centuries. Diocletian (284–305) elevated Maximian to co-emperor to fight the Bagaudae.

The First and Second Tetrarchy and Constantine the Great (306–337) maintained provincial capitals throughout the empire to maintain an imperial presence and discourage separatism. The provincial capitals in the western empire were at York in Britain, at Trier in northeast Gaul, and at Milan. Trier (Augusta Treverorum) was one of Constantine’s favorite capitals before his founding of Constantinople and was adorned with impressive buildings.

Fourth-century Roman Gaul was prosperous, but the fortunes of fifth-century Gaul went sharply downhill due to the invasions of the Burgundians, Visigoths, and Franks. The loss of Gaul to the western empire seriously weakened its finances, contributing to the collapse of the western Roman Empire (476). The Visigoths dominated Gaul until the late fifth century CE, when they were displaced by the Franks.

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See also Aurelian; Augustus; Bandits and Brigands; Burgundians; Caesar, Gaius Julius; Constantine I; Franks; Fall of the Roman Empire (West); Gallic Empire; Gallic Revolt; Gallic Wars; Goths; Maximian

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Gender and War

The term “gender” encompasses both the actual social roles of men and women and the cultural or ideological construction of masculinity and femininity in a given society. Both actual roles and cultural constructs influence one another and may change considerably over time. “War” for the purposes of this article includes active war, low-intensity conflict, and military organizations. War and gender interact because across nearly all primitive and historical cultures, warfare was considered a masculine activity; warriors and soldiers were male, and manhood was associated with fighting. Though individual female fighters existed in some of these societies, they were exceptional until very recently, when the professional

militaries of Western nations accepted women as soldiers; even then, women have often been excluded from the front lines.

In the Roman world, warfare was a male prerogative, closely associated with masculinity. Women did not serve as soldiers in the Roman army. As will be seen, the presence of women in military society was symbolic or marginal before the imperial period. A few legendary exceptions exist, such as Cloelia, who saved early Rome by escaping from captivity and swimming a river to warn the Romans (Livy 2.13). Cloelia received an equestrian statue in her honor, which Livy depicts as altogether exceptional, as is the equally legendary Camilla, a Volscian female warrior who aided Turnus in his war against Aeneas and the Trojans (Virgil *Aeneid* 11.1121–1210).

Historical exception was made for siege warfare, where women often aided the defense of their cities. Women were motivated to defend their besieged cities because the enemy, sacking the city, would rape and enslave the women. During the civil war of Caesar and Pompey, Caesar (*Civil War* 3.9) relates that at Salona, a city on the coast of Dalmatia (modern Croatia), the female citizens appeared on the walls disguised as male fighters so their menfolk could make a sortie from the walls and drive off the besieging Pompeians. In a less reliable anecdote (repeated elsewhere, for example, Appian, *Punic Wars* 93), the women of Salona cut off their hair (a feminine attribute in classical culture) to make catapult torsion ropes. In the triumviral civil wars (ca. 44–31 BCE), the Roman noblewoman Fulvia and her brother-in-law Lucius Antonius commanded the defense of Perugia, an Italian city besieged by Octavian. In Plutarch's view, Fulvia was a particularly strong personality. Found at the site of Perugia, lead sling bullets were inscribed with soldiers' Latin words instructing the bullets to "rape" Fulvia, Octavian, and Antonius.

The Romans associated warfare and military service with *virtus* (courage, the quality of being a *vir*, "a [true] man"). Military training, military discipline, and a rigorous lifestyle on campaign all maintained *virtus*. The life of pleasure was thought to make men effeminate. Accordingly, exemplary commanders expelled luxuries (including lavish food and drink and dinnerware, personal servants, and prostitutes and entertainers) from military camps.

A darker side to military *virtus* concerns the ideological place of women in Roman military culture, as represented in classical literature and art. The personification of Victory (Victoria) eroticized victory, being depicted as a

winged female deity influenced by representations of Aphrodite (Venus), the goddess of love (Dillon and Welch 2006). In contrast, defeat was also gendered: on Roman historical reliefs, from imperial monuments to provincial art, defeated non-Roman peoples are often depicted as female captives, grieving and in chains. Male barbarians are in a similar state, often depicted as captive or as being killed. Defeat meant enslavement and the reduction of the enemy to “female” status through subjection and rape (Phang 2004).

Triumphal art could even depict Roman military conquest as the rape of female personifications or representative captives. In a famous relief from the Sebasteion (temple of the imperial cult) at Aphrodisias in Asia Minor, the emperor Claudius (41–54 CE) is depicted as a heroic male nude overpowering a female personification of Britannia (Britain). The Column of Marcus Aurelius (completed by Commodus) depicts both a Venus-like Victory and Roman soldiers dragging away captive German women by the hair or even killing them. The enslavement of German women and their children symbolizes the destruction of German society and thus the complete victory of the Romans in the Marcomannic Wars (Ferris 2009).

That soldiers, like tyrants, are unable to restrain their desires was a stock theme in late republican and imperial literary authors. It was used by rebels against the Roman Empire to justify revolt. The British revolt of 60/61 CE was motivated by Roman soldiers’ beating and rape of native British noblewomen (the queen Boudicca and her daughters). Jewish rabbinical sources also assume that Roman soldiers who entered a Jewish settlement would sexually molest the women.

In contrast, the Romans regarded the female leaders and warriors of non-Roman peoples with fear and hostility. Octavian’s propaganda against Mark Antony and Cleopatra depicted Antony as enslaved by love of Cleopatra and Cleopatra as an alien “Oriental” queen who would dominate and subjugate all Roman men. A similar scare figure is Boudicca, the British tribal queen in Cassius Dio’s account of the British revolt of 60/61 CE. In this ideology, warrior queens were particularly un-Roman; they represented monarchy, to which the traditional Republic was antithetical. The representation of barbarian peoples’ individual female fighters belong to the same discourse (Iberians, Appian, *Spanish Wars* 12; Germans, Plutarch, *Marius* 19.7, 27.2).

The actual place of women in Roman military society is harder to study;

due to the masculine gendering of warfare, women merit only brief mentions, if at all. During the Republic, the legions were often on the move. During the Italian Wars, Roman commanders and soldiers left their families behind in Rome and Italy. Women and children probably tended the farms owned by legionary smallholders (*assidui*). These practices were strained by the longer term overseas campaigns of the Punic and Macedonian Wars onward. Some farming families may have lost their land. Meanwhile, soldiers on campaign resorted to the prostitutes and other camp followers (including personal slaves) whom martinets ejected. The Roman legions fleeing the Varian disaster (9 CE) were hampered by excessive baggage and the presence of women and children.

The stabilization of the frontiers after 14 CE enabled substantial civilian settlements to develop around military bases. The camps themselves were no longer tents, as in the traditional Republic, but solid buildings. Archaeological evidence suggests the presence of women and children within military camps, depending on the association of “female” gendered objects (dress brooches, combs, and perfume bottles) with the presence of women.

Within camps, officers were allotted dwelling space according to their rank. Such space offered room for servants or families. Elite officers could bring families to their posts, though in the early first century CE it was still unusual. Agrippina the Elder, her children, and female friends and servants accompanied Germanicus to his post quelling the Rhine mutiny in 14 CE. Tacitus provides more context by relating a debate in the Senate (Tacitus, *Annals* 3.33–4) over whether the wives of provincial governors should accompany them to their provinces.

In Tacitus’ *Annals*, this passage is closely tied to political events. Agrippina greeted the troops in Germanicus’ name when they returned from an advance across the Rhine into barbarian territory. Agrippina’s behavior scandalized Tiberius and excited his paranoid fears that she (as well as her husband) was an imperial rival (Tacitus, *Annals* 1.69). When Germanicus died of alleged poisoning, Tiberius implicated the governor of Syria, Gnaeus Piso, and his wife Plancina, whom he also depicts as interfering with the army (Tacitus, *Annals* 2.55).

Though Tacitus depicts empresses and aristocratic women as subverting political stability, the emperors might promote their wives’ images on coins (which the army received as donatives and pay). The wives of Antoninus

Pius and Marcus Aurelius, Faustina the Elder and her daughter Faustina the Younger, appear on these reigns' coins. Faustina the Younger, furthermore, received the title *mater castrorum* or "mother of the camps," a title that the Severan empresses also used. The image of the empress suggested the stability of the regime. The slogan "mother of the camps" was probably intended to reinforce soldiers' loyalty to the imperial house. Another symbolic role for imperial women in a military context was the birthdays of empresses and other members of the imperial family, celebrated by the army at least at Dura-Europos in Syria, attested in the military calendar termed the *Feriale Duranum*.

Outside the pages of Tacitus, it became usual for governors and elite officers to bring their wives and families to their posts, attested in inscriptions and even documents such as the letter from one officer's wife to another, surviving from Vindolanda near Hadrian's wall. This letter, a birthday party invitation, suggests the role of officers' wives in maintaining social ties. At provincial bases, officers' families tended to intermarry. Common soldiers were denied legal marriage between ca. 13 BCE and 197 CE, when Septimius Severus permitted them to marry, but many soldiers formed stable de facto marriages with women and raised children (who were technically illegitimate). The legal position of soldiers' families was precarious, illustrating the impact of gender ideology on social practice.

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See also Coins; Column of Marcus Aurelius; Elite Participation; Emperor as Commander; Empresses; Families of Soldiers; Perusia, Siege of; Prisoners of War and Slavery; Sebasteion; Septimius Severus; Siege Warfare; Tacitus; Varian Disaster; Victory; Vindolanda; *Virtus*

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Germanic Wars, Causes

Migration, nascent state formation, and perceptions of insult sparked these conflicts. The initial invasion of Cimbri, Teutones, and Ambrones resulted from a population increase and/or a shift in climate in northern Europe decreasing usable land. If we allow for Roman exaggeration, Plutarch (*Marius* 11) depicts some 300,000 armed warriors and huge numbers of their wives and children outnumbering the men, seeking land and towns for habitation: their entry was a population migration, not simply a raid.

Over the first century BCE, the Celtic inhabitants of Southern Germany as well as Germanic groups such as the Tencteri, Usipetes, and Ubii began to suffer displacement by the Suebi migrating from the east, who soon dominated Germany east of the Rhine (Strabo 4.3.4). The Suebi's political organization made them attractive allies: Celtic tribes invited them into Gaul to fight the Aedui, who were allies with Julius Caesar and the Romans (Caesar, *Gallic Wars* books 4 and 6; Tacitus, *Germania* 8).

Exact causes of the German provocation in 16 BCE involving the Tencteri, Usipetes, and Sicambri are unknown. Cassius Dio (54.20.4) states that their seizure and crucifixion of an unspecified number of Romans led to the attempt of Marcus Lollius to avenge this slight. After Lollius was defeated and his standards stolen, the Romans embarked on campaigns against the Germans led for four years by Drusus the Elder (Velleius 2.97), followed by Tiberius' campaign against Germania in 8 BCE. These were incursions, not long-term subjugations or conquests. Campaigning in Germany was crucial vis-à-vis the pacification of Gaul, unruly in response to a census (Dio 54.32.1, [Livy] *Periochae* 139).

Germanic state formation and Roman response to it also illuminates the causation of the near-war against the Marcomannic king Maroboduus. By 5 CE, the Marcomanni possessed a palace, a fortress, and a huge, welltrained multiethnic army. Maroboduus attracted and gave refuge to both "races and individuals who revolted" from Roman rule (Velleius 2.109), suggesting widespread anti-Roman sentiment and an ability to integrate non-Marcomanni into his nascent Germanic state.

A theme of Roman abuse occurs through several outbreaks of Romano-Germanic conflict of the following period. Sources trace the disaster at Teutoburg Forest in 9 CE to Varus mistreating Germanic peoples (Dio 56.18.3–4). Arminius' coalition there resembled those of Vercingetorix,

Ariovistus, and Maroboduus. The briefness of Arminius' Teutoburg success, his failure to follow up on it, and his assassination in 21 CE by his tribal brethren explain the difficulties of organizing a state from tribes reluctant to discard older freedoms. In the case of the Germanic Frisii in the Netherlands in 28/29 CE, sources show the revolt responding to harsh Roman taxation including seizures of Frisian livestock, land, wives, and children (Tacitus, *Annals* 4.72). The final significant Romano-German conflict of this period stemmed from the Batavian leader Gaius Julius Civilis' irritation at being arrested for treason twice, grew when Batavi were required to provide a disproportionate number of soldiers for Rome's auxiliary armies and when Galba dismissed his German bodyguard further insulted the Batavian nation (Tacitus, *Histories* 4.13ff).

The "Empire of the Gauls," a coalition of Germanic and Gallic tribes, combined causative themes from previous conflicts: Germanic perceptions of Roman insult, as was the case with the Frisians in 28 CE and the Varian Disaster, and a Germanic chieftain with Roman citizenship who seemingly sought his own power-base, as with Arminius. A new factor, however, is deep friction between Roman legionaries and Germanic auxiliaries. This would prove a precedent for future discord in the coming centuries.

Timothy Doran

See also Arminius; Augustus; Drusus; Gallic Revolt; Germanicus; Germans; Logistics; Varian Disaster

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Germanic Wars, Course

Violent conflicts occurred intermittently between the Romans and several Germanic peoples from the late second century BCE to the first century CE, beginning with the invasion of the Cimbri, Ambrones, and Teutones in the late second century BCE. They attacked Roman territory in Transalpine Gaul repeatedly between 113 and 105, defeating a Roman army of some 80,000 men in 105 at Arausio (Orange), the worst Roman disaster since Cannae. In 102–101 BC, Marius' army defeated the Cimbri and Teutones in two battles, Aquae Sextiae (Aix-en-Provence) and Vercellae (Plutarch, *Marius* 27).

After a gap, in 58 Julius Caesar's six legions defeated the Suebi led by King Ariovistus at Vosges in Alsace (Caesar, *Gallie Wars* 1.43). The Suebi then turned back across the Rhine to Germania. However, German groups inhabiting both sides of the Rhine frequently assisted Gauls against Rome in the 30s and 20s BCE.

Conflicts resumed in 16 BCE with the crucifixion of several Romans by Tencteri, Usipetes, and Sicambri, leading to Roman raids on Germania and Gaul, a defeat of the Roman consul Lollius, and the capture of the Fifth Legion's eagle (Dio 54.20.4–5; Velleius 2.97.1). Drusus the Elder then attacked the Chauci, Usipetes, and Cherusci, and then the Sicambri and Suebi at the River Lupia (Lippe) in 11 BCE (Dio 54.32–33), then defeated the Marcomanni in 9 BCE. The future emperor Tiberius subsequently began a thorough campaign in parts of Germania starting in 8 BCE. In 5 CE, Tiberius campaigned in Germania (Velleius 2.106) and planned to attack the Marcomannic chief Maroboduus and his huge army trained in the Roman style (Velleius 2.109.2), but the Romans allied with Maroboduus for the duration of Rome's war against Pannonia. In Germania beyond the Rhine, the Romans succeeded in pushing the frontier up to the Elbe, its furthest extent.

Around this point, Dio (56.18.1–3) claims that the Germans' partial Romanization and urbanization might have led to Germania becoming a Roman province. However, in 9 CE occurred the Varian disaster in the Teutoburg Forest. Germans led by Arminius, a Cheruscan noble, auxiliary veteran, and Roman citizen, lulled the legate Varus into trusting them, and ambushed and destroyed three Roman legions and auxiliaries—some 20,000 men (Dio 56.19–22; Velleius 2.117–119). As a result of this terrible defeat, in 14 CE Augustus issued a posthumous directive to Tiberius not to extend

further the boundaries of the empire.

Vengeance was still necessary. Tiberius, and subsequently Germanicus in 14–16 CE, mounted punitive expeditions into Germania. Germanicus defeated Arminius at the battle of Idistaviso in 16. This partly avenged the Teutoburg and Lollian disasters, but did little to extend Roman rule. The Romans abandoned the territory between the Rhine and the Elbe.

From this point, “Germania” must be divided into Roman territory (the Rhineland, organized by the time of Vespasian into two small provinces, Germania Superior and Germania Inferior) and “free” Germany beyond the Rhine. In the first century CE, the Romans built many forts along the Rhine and promoted urbanization. Claudius elevated Trier and perhaps Cologne to *colonia* status. Although local elites received Roman citizenship, nonelite acculturation to Roman values and culture was limited. The most important revolt occurred in 69–70 CE. The Batavi, a Germanic people dwelling at the mouth of the Rhine, joined by several other Germanic groups and by the Gauls, revolted under their chief Gaius Julius Civilis, an auxiliary veteran and Roman citizen, resulting in a brief Gallic Empire before defeat in spring 70.

In the Flavian period and early second century, the Romans advanced the German frontier from Germania Superior (the southern province) beyond the Rhine. Domitian (81–96) inflicted defeats on the Chatti and may have begun the construction of frontier works, but was distracted by the Dacian invasion. Trajan and Hadrian constructed a *limes* or frontier installation, consisting of a road and line of forts (later a palisade) eastward of the Rhine that modern archaeologists term the Odenwald-Neckar *limes*. It encloses the western part of Baden-Württemberg, covering the Black Forest and Jura. The region enclosed by the *limes* was termed the *Agri Decumates* (Tacitus, *Germania* 29.4). Its purpose was to shorten the Roman frontier between Germania Superior and Raetia by enclosing a salient. But the *Agri Decumates* were overrun by the Germans in the mid-third century.

In the fourth century CE, from the 350s onward, the emperors constantly fought incursions of Germanic peoples across the Rhine, especially the Alamanni, Suebi, and Juthungi. Constantius II (337–361) raised his cousin Julian to Caesar to combat the Alamanni. Julian inflicted a major defeat on the Alamanni at Strasbourg in 357; because of his victory, he was acclaimed as emperor by his troops, and though he then refused, he did not refuse when they did the same at Paris in 361. Valentinian I (364–375) also fought

the Germans. However, civil war distracted the Romans in the 380s–390s, and after 400 the Germanic peoples poured across the Rhine, taking advantage of the river’s freezing in 407. This time the Romans were unable to expel them.

Timothy Doran

See also Arminius; Augustus; Drusus; Gallic Revolt; Germanicus; Germans; Logistics; Varian Disaster

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Germanic Wars, Consequences

Several significant short- and long-term consequences resulted from these wars. Marius’ campaigns against the Cimbri and Teutones in the late second century BCE resulted in changes in Roman military organization and produced key political aftereffects. Rome’s victories over the Germans made them fear the Germans less despite their perception of German alienness. Many German peoples themselves, through trade relations with urbanized peoples, increasingly adopted elements of Mediterranean material culture. The Roman borders stabilized as a defensible line along the Rhine. However, the failure to conquer Germany east of the Rhine allowed the German population outside of Roman control to increase. This development would ultimately be fatal to the western empire.

The invasion of Cimbri and Teutones in the late second century BCE panicked Romans so severely that after the disaster at Arausio in 105 BCE, the Roman people illegally gave Gaius Marius command against these groups. This strengthened a precedent for the popular bestowal of commands outside of republican norms, and surely encouraged elite expectations for

extraordinary commands in the final century of the Republic. Another direct response to this invasion was a reorganization of the Roman legions. Before the battle of Arausio, Marius had already abolished the property qualification for military service. After Arausio, Publius Rutilius Rufus reformed some aspects of Roman legionary training and organization to better fight the Germans. Marius' victories using this formation in 102–101 BC against the Germans caused him to be regarded as Rome's "third founder," enjoying offerings of food and wine alongside those given to the gods at family gatherings (Plutarch, *Marius* 27), a significant precedent in the evolution of emperor worship. Cimbrian invasion fostered sharp contention between Marius and Sulla, bringing on Rome's first civil war and setting a precedent for future marches on Rome and Rome's bloody proscriptions by the likes of Octavian. Finally, Marius made his Italian troops into Roman citizens, encouraging Italians to desire more input into Roman foreign policy, which would bring on the Social War (91–87 BCE).

This series of victories, along with further victories in the first centuries BCE and CE, allowed the Romans overcome some of their fear of the Germans as described by Plutarch (*Marius* 16) and in Tacitus' ethnography *Germania*. Roman soldiers of the Augustan period became accustomed to the Germans' fierce battle cries, huge physiques, nakedness, and other fearsome features. Subsequently, it is likely that the Germans that Romans most often encountered were assimilated Germans serving in the *auxilia*, where they were organized, dressed, equipped, and trained in Roman fashion.

Consequences for the Germans deserve examination. Germans in areas near Roman borders adopted Roman ways and economic practices (Tacitus, *Germania* 5). Romans introduced not only garrisons and forts along the Rhine but also villas and towns, which undoubtedly modeled forms of resource-extraction technology more efficient than those the Germans practiced. The primitive economy that characterized many Germanic tribes, reliant on spoils from raiding and which featured little banking, interest, finance, or private ownership of land (Tacitus, *Germania* 26) grew into more complex systems featuring trade with people influenced by Mediterranean economies and cultures. Roman trade goods and coins have been found deep within "barbarian" Germany. A cosmopolitan Roman influence is visible in local architectural forms, such as the change in a villa at Megina from wattle-and-daub construction to stone foundations and walls supported by posts, and finally even a colonnade. However, the adoption of

Roman architectural features was never total, and pre-Roman regional styles still prevailed in Germania.

Another consequence for the Romans was a more realistic limit to Roman control over Germania east of the Rhine resulting from Germania's impenetrability, the numerousness of German tribes, their lack of interest in being governed by Rome, and a general lack of benefits compared to the costs of occupation. For even the most privileged of the Germans who received Roman citizenship led revolts against Roman rule. The Rhine came to seem a sensible border, as Rhine shipping made supply easy. Between the Varian debacle of 9 CE and the Trajanic era, the Rhine held more Roman forts and garrisons than any other similarly-sized place along the Roman frontier. Romans were thus able to retain control of the west bank of the Rhine until the early fifth century CE, and even controlled a segment of the east bank (the *Agri Decumates*) until the mid-third century. Cities of the Rhineland, such as Augusta Treverorum, enjoyed economic success stemming probably from production of agricultural products and other goods sold to the army. These cities began to transform from *civitates* into *municipia* in the Flavian period. After giving up the ambition of direct rule over the area east of the Rhine, the Romans could sponsor indirect rule via client kings in Germania, using deterrence, Roman education, gifts, and imperial honors.

Although prudent from the perspective of Roman administration in the considerations of the first century CE, relinquishing Germania east of the Rhine held a grievous demographic consequence for the future. It meant that Germanic societies there were able to retain more or less their own cultural forms and political arrangements, but with the advantage of using Roman resource-extraction technology without supervision, admonition, or frequent checks or controls by Roman administrators. This allowed Germanic groups outside of Roman territory to increase without observation, providing a constant threat in the Antonine Period and beyond, and eventually contributing to the fall of the western Roman Empire.

Timothy Doran

See also Arminius; Augustus; Drusus; Gallic Revolt; Germanicus; Germans; Logistics; Varian Disaster

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Germanicus (16/15 BCE–19 CE)

Germanicus was the nephew of the emperor Tiberius (14–37 CE), the father of the future emperor Gaius (37–41) and empress Agrippina the Younger, and the brother of the future emperor Claudius (41–54). A potential heir of Tiberius, he was promoted rapidly as a general and was assigned to suppress the 14 CE Rhine mutiny and commanded the campaign against Arminius. However, Germanicus’ subsequent conduct in the eastern empire aroused the jealousy both of a rival governor and of Tiberius, and he perished under mysterious circumstances resulting in a major political trial, recorded both in Tacitus’ *Annals* and in a surviving decree of the Senate.

Germanicus was the son of Drusus the Elder, the younger brother of Tiberius, and Antonia. He was adopted in 4 CE by Tiberius (not yet emperor) and renamed Germanicus Iulius Caesar. As a prince of the imperial family, Germanicus was promoted rapidly to military commands and held the consulship in 13 CE. Though Tiberius had a son, Drusus the Younger, the more popular Germanicus appeared to be his probable successor.

In 14, after the death of Augustus, the Rhine and Danube legions mutinied over their conditions of service, which included relatively low pay (reduced by deductions for arms and armor and other necessities: Tacitus, *Annals* 1.17) and lengthy service. Germanicus was sent to the Rhineland to suppress the mutiny. Still a young man, not yet 30, he faced hard-bitten soldiers and at first was unable to quell their demands. He was accompanied by his wife Agrippina the Elder, her attendants, and his children, whom he

now sent away for safety. Among his children was Gaius, a little boy termed Caligula ("Little Boots") because he wore a miniature soldier's costume. According to Tacitus' account of the mutiny, the soldiers repented at losing Agrippina and their mascot "Little Boots." Tacitus tends to stress the irrationality of crowds, depicting the repentant soldiers as joining in punishing the ringleaders of the mutiny. Tiberius made only slight concessions to the soldiers' demands.

Germanicus followed up with an aggressive campaign into Germany, intended to avenge the defeat of Quinctilius Varus and destruction of three legions in 9 CE. He reached the site of the Varian disaster in the Teutoburg Forest (near Kalkriese) and recovered the lost Roman standards. He campaigned against Arminius, defeating him in the battle of Idistaviso (16). According to Tacitus, these successes incurred the suspicion of the jealous Tiberius.

Tiberius then transferred Germanicus to the eastern empire on a tour of inspection. After visiting Asia Minor, Cappadocia, and Commagene, Germanicus entered Egypt. As the main source of grain for the empire, to discourage senatorial revolt, the province of Egypt was governed by an equestrian prefect; senators were not permitted to enter Egypt without imperial permission. By visiting Egypt, Germanicus further incurred Tiberius' anger and suspicion. Germanicus also made an enemy of Gnaeus Calpurnius Piso, the governor of Syria; allegedly, Tiberius and Livia encouraged Piso and his wife Plancina to be rude to Germanicus. On his return from Egypt, Germanicus fell ill at Antioch, issuing a directive to his subordinate to remove Piso from his governorship. Germanicus became worse and died (19 CE), allegedly from witchcraft (Tacitus, *Annals* 2.68–71). Piso attempted to recover control of Syria by suborning the army, an apparent revolt (Tacitus, *Annals* 2.76–81). Tacitus depicts Piso as previously currying the favor of the legions with donatives and favors (Tacitus, *Annals* 2.55). Piso was summoned to Rome for trial for sedition and murder. Agrippina the Elder brought home Germanicus' ashes to Rome from Brundisium, to great popular mourning for Germanicus, who had been highly popular in contrast with the grim Tiberius.

Gnaeus Calpurnius Piso was charged by the Senate with sedition and with conspiracy in the murder of Germanicus by poison or witchcraft. Plancina was exonerated, but Piso committed suicide before the trial commenced and was condemned *post mortem*. The verdict of the Senate is

recorded in the surviving *Senatus Consultum de Cn. Pisone Patre* (Piso was termed “pater” to distinguish himself from relatives with the same name). The *SC de Cn. Pisone* execrates Piso and condemns his memory; his portrait images and name in inscriptions were destroyed and his son Gnaeus Calpurnius Piso was required to change his name to Lucius.

Besides the *SC de Cn. Pisone patre* and other contemporary inscriptions, the main source for Germanicus’ life is Tacitus’ *Annals*. Tacitus uses Germanicus as a foil to the uncongenial Tiberius. Modern historians have sometimes viewed Germanicus less favorably, as a young man lacking in the political acumen that might have made him a true rival to Tiberius.

Sara E. Phang

See also Arminius; Assassination; Caligula; Donatives; Egypt, Roman; Germanic Wars; Idistaviso, Battle of; Piso, Gnaeus Calpurnius; Rhine and Pannonian Mutinies; Tiberius (Emperor); Varian Disaster; Varus, Publius Quinctilius

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Germans

The Germans were among Rome’s most persistent enemies and as such, most persistently mythologized by ancient authors and modern nationalists. There was no such entity as modern Germany, but many different tribal peoples sharing cultural characteristics and thus characterized as “Germans.”

The Greeks did not differentiate strongly between Gauls and Germans, terming both groups “Celts” (*Keltoi*). In the *Gallic Wars* Julius Caesar distinguishes between Gauls and Germans, characterizing the Gauls as more exposed to Mediterranean civilization and as possessing more traits of civilization, such as permanent settlements. In contrast, Caesar’s Germans are nomadic and lack most of the traits of civilization. Tacitus’ treatise *Germania* provides a fuller description of the Germans, but one that is still

subject to generalization and idealization. The *Germania* is a literary text in which Tacitus gives the primitive Germans the virtues that present-day Romans lack. As such, the *Germania* has appealed to modern German nationalists. However, Caesar and Tacitus, and other ancient authors describe individual tribes: the Chatti, Suebi, and others. The Romans dealt with individual tribes rather than with the Germans as a whole. The invasion of the Cimbri and Teutones, who inflicted a major defeat on the Romans at Arausio and were routed by Gaius Marius, characterized the Germans as enemies of Rome.

Roman imperialism thrust into Germany as far as the Elbe and halted there after the Varian disaster (9 CE) when three legions, commanded by Publius Quinctilius Varus, were ambushed and destroyed by the German leader Arminius and his followers. Germanicus, the nephew of Tiberius, inflicted punitive raids in 15 and defeated Arminius in the battle of Idistaviso (16 CE), but Roman expansion into Germany did not resume. The region's large forests were impassable, and the Germans had the reputation of being relatively poor, not affording great plunder. Individual emperors carried out intermittent campaigns against the Germans, such as Domitian's against the Chatti in 82–83 and war against the Sarmatian-Suebi alliance. The Romans established a stable frontier by closing the frontier boundary between the Neckar and the Danube, a region termed the *Agri Decumates*, by creating *limes* works (not a permanent stone wall but a palisade).

The Germans became a greater threat to the Roman Empire from the mid-second century CE onward, when the Marcomanni and Quadi invaded the Danubian provinces in the 160s and were repelled by Marcus Aurelius, who campaigned in person against them. The Goths invaded the empire in the mid-third century, raiding through the Balkans and along the coast of Asia Minor, but were defeated or expelled. Low-intensity conflict against Germanic peoples on the Rhine and Danube became endemic. Germanic invasions became a major threat in the late fourth century, culminating in the battle of Adrianople (378), a major defeat for the Romans. In the early fifth century, Germanic peoples migrated into the empire on a large scale, their warriors serving as mercenary bands ("allies" or *foederati*) to which the emperors paid large subsidies. Eventually these bands and their leaders displaced the weakening central authority. Even before this time, many officers with Germanic names served in the Roman army; their allegiance appears to be entirely Roman.

During the first five centuries CE, the Germans themselves underwent cultural change from their contact with the Roman Empire. Defeated Germanic peoples who were allowed to settle in the Roman Empire (such as the Batavi and Ubii in the Rhineland) served in Rome's auxiliary forces, obtaining the Roman citizenship on discharge; service in the army was thus a strong force for Romanization. Trade also promoted cultural change. Roman coins, pottery, and arms and armor are found deep within Germany, indicating that traders penetrated into Germany and that the Germans sought both Mediterranean food and drink (such as wine, not produced in northern Europe) and Roman-style arms and armor. Within the empire, men's fashions changed, perhaps from Celtic or German influence or the influence of the Roman army (in modern times, the military inspired men's fashions such as the cravat, the Victorian frock coat, the trench coat, and other items). By the mid-third century CE, Roman men often wore tunics and trousers instead of togas; in earlier times, trousers had been considered a "barbarian" garment, worn by Persians, Gauls, and Germans. The most drastic cultural change among the Germans was their adoption of Christianity, often Arianism (a variant considered heretical by Roman Catholicism). Such assimilation of Roman cultural traits has caused modern scholars to refer to the fifth- to eighth-century Germanic kingdoms (Franks, Visigoths, Vandals, Lombards, et cetera) as "post-Roman" rather than "barbarian."

The study of the ancient Germans has historically been conditioned by modern German nationalism, which anachronistically presented the ancient Germans and in particular leaders such as Arminius as founders of the modern nation.

Sara E. Phang

See also Adrianople, Battle of; Arminius; *Auxilia*; Caesar, Gaius Julius; Domitian; Fall of the Roman Empire (West); Federates; Frontiers; Gallic Wars; Germanicus; Goths; Marcomannic Wars; Marius; Tacitus; Varian Disaster

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Geta (Emperor)*. See *Caracalla

Glycerius (Emperor)*. See *Fall of Roman Empire

Gordian I (Emperor) (238 CE)

A Roman emperor (238 CE), Marcus Antonius Gordianus Sempronianus Romanus Africanus served as proconsul of Africa in 237/238 CE at the age of 80. In January 238 CE, he was hailed as emperor by provincials protesting against the harsh taxes being exacted by Maximinus I Thrax. Gordian sent an embassy to Rome to murder Maximinus' praetorian prefect, and his rule was officially recognized by the Senate. However, the governor of Numidia, Capelianus, remained loyal to Maximinus, and invaded the province of Africa. Gordian committed suicide by hanging himself, having reigned for only three weeks. These events are depicted in Herodian's *History of Rome*; the *Historia Augusta*'s life of the Three Gordians is unreliable.

Caillan Davenport

See also Gordian II; Maximinus I; Third-Century CE Crisis

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Gordian II (Emperor) (238 CE)

A Roman emperor (238 CE), Marcus Antonius Gordianus Sempronianus Romanus Africanus was the son of the old Roman senator of the same

name, Gordian I. In 238 CE, the younger Gordian was serving as his father's legate in the province of Africa when a rebellion broke out against the emperor Maximinus. The rebels proclaimed the elder Gordian I emperor, and he subsequently made his son joint Augustus. However, the governor of Numidia, Capelianus, led an army into Africa in support of Maximinus' regime. After the suicide of his father, Gordian II took command of the resistance forces, but died in battle.

Caillan Davenport

See also Gordian I; Maximinus I; Third-Century CE Crisis

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Herodian 7.5–9, 8.8; Aurelius Victor 27; Eutropius 9.2; *Historia Augusta, Gordiani Tres*.

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Gordian III (Emperor) (238–244 CE)

A Roman emperor (238–244 CE) and the grandson of Gordian I, Marcus Antonius Gordianus was aged thirteen when he became emperor in 238 CE. In 241 CE, Gordian III married Furia Tranquillina, the daughter of his Praetorian Prefect Timesitheus. The following year Gordian III and Timesitheus embarked on a campaign against the Persians, who had invaded the Roman province of Mesopotamia, and captured several cities including Nisibis and Hatra. However, the Roman forces were defeated in battle by the Persian king Shapur in early 244 CE, and Gordian was murdered by his own soldiers or assassinated by his new praetorian prefect, Philip Arabus, who became the emperor Philip (244–249). Gordian III was buried in a tumulus at Zaitha. The short reign of Gordian III is illustrative of the precarious position of boy emperors in the later Roman Empire, when emperors needed to be competent military leaders and were surrounded by ambitious generals.



Bust of Gordian III (238–244 CE). Thirteen years old when elevated, and faced with civil war and renewed Persian aggression, Gordian had to play the role of commander-in-chief. Gordian III wears a military cloak and the soldierly scowl introduced by Caracalla's portraits. Located in the Louvre Museum, Paris, France. (Vanni Archive/Art Resource, NY)

Caillan Davenport

See also Gordian I; Persian Wars, Sassanid; Succession (Imperial); Third-Century CE Crisis

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Goths

The Goths were a Germanic people who played a central role in the fall of the western Roman Empire in the late fourth and fifth centuries CE. Two Gothic states eventually emerged in western Europe in the fifth century: the Ostrogoths in Italy and the Visigoths in the Iberian peninsula and southern Gaul.

Originating in southern Scandinavia, the Goths first invaded the Roman Empire in the mid-third century CE, launching raids in the Balkans and Aegean by land and by sea. The emperor Decius (249–251) died in battle with the Goths, but the emperors Gallienus (260–268) or Claudius Gothicus (268–270) (who should have credit is uncertain) defeated the Goths in a major battle at Naissus (Nish in modern Serbia) and drove them back across the Danube. Rome maintained normal diplomatic relations with the Goths during the early fourth century, and Christian missionaries, most famously Ulfilas (Wulfila), made headway among the Goths. Ulfilas converted many of the Goths to Arianism, a branch of Christianity deviating from the Nicene Creed.

By the mid-fourth century CE, it becomes possible to differentiate two branches of the Goths, the Thervingi (later termed Visigoths) and the Greuthungi (later Ostrogoths). Both were pressured by the migration of the Huns into central Europe. The Ostrogoths, led by their king or chieftain Fritigern, sought sanctuary on the Roman side of the Danube, negotiating with the officers of the emperor Valens (364–378). Tens of thousands of Goths crossed the Danube. Ammianus Marcellinus relates how Valens' officers abused the Gothic refugees, enslaving them and selling them dogs' meat. The angered Goths overran the Balkans, raiding and destroying Roman settlements. Valens decided not to wait for his younger colleague Gratian to send reinforcements from the west, and encountered the Goths in battle at Adrianople in Thrace (August 9, 378). The Roman army was surrounded and cut to pieces. Valens died in the battle, along with two-thirds of the eastern empire's army.

The Thervingi (Visigoths) made peace with the Roman Empire in 391, being permitted to settle along the eastern Adriatic coast in return for

providing client military forces. The recruitment of such client peoples was emperor Theodosius I (379–395)’s stopgap solution to the loss of manpower at Adrianople. The leader or king of the Visigoths, Alaric, a former Roman officer, provided Gothic troops to Theodosius in his civil war against Arbogast and Eugenius. In the battle of the Frigidus (394) Theodosius allegedly stationed many of the Goths in the front lines of the battle so that more of them would be killed, reducing the barbarian population. In any case, Alaric regarded himself as insufficiently rewarded after Theodosius’ victory.

Taking advantage of Theodosius’ death in January 395, Alaric sacked the Peiraeus (the port of Athens) and destroyed many Greek cities before invading Italy in 401. The western Roman commander-in-chief, Stilicho, repulsed Alaric’s invasion at the battles of Pollentia and Verona in 402. When Stilicho was executed for suspected treason in 408 and the Roman populace assaulted the families of its Gothic garrison in revenge, many of Stilicho’s Gothic federates defected to Alaric. With his army augmented, Alaric invaded Italy again. Alaric went on to besiege Rome three times, 408, 409 and 410, accepting tribute the first time, installing an emperor and accepting a Roman title the second; and sacking it the third time. He planned to establish a Visigoth-ruled Roman province in Africa but his death in 410 precluded that dream. The Visigoths settled as *foederati* in southern France, where they assisted the Roman commander-in-chief Aetius to defeat the Huns at the battle of Châlons in 451. Driven out of Aquitania by the Franks, the Visigoths established a kingdom in Spain in the sixth century, converting to Catholicism. The Spanish Visigothic kingdom fell to the Muslim invasions of the early eighth century.

The eastern Ostrogoths occupied Roman Pannonia, becoming endemic raiders in the Balkans. Little is known of them until they allied with the Huns in the 450s. The Ostrogoths remained with the Huns into the mid-fifth century, but broke from them and established their own kingdom in northern Italy under Theoderic the Great, who became king of the Ostrogoths in 471. Theoderic was commissioned by the eastern Roman emperor Zeno to recover Italy from Odoacer, the Germanic king who had supplanted the last Roman emperor in 476. Theoderic conquered almost the whole of Italy, taking Ravenna as his capital in 493. He also allied with the Visigothic king Alaric II, who married one of his daughters. Upon Alaric II’s death, Theoderic became regent for the Visigothic kingdom in Spain, giving

him power of almost imperial reach. Theoderic's post-Roman kingdom was peaceful and prosperous, but did not long survive his death in 526.

In the early sixth century, the Byzantine emperor Justinian (527–565) attempted to reconquer Italy from the Ostrogoths, an ultimately unsuccessful venture. Many surviving Goths were taken into Byzantine military service. However, the Ostrogoths were then absorbed by the invasion of the Lombards (Langobardi). The Visigothic kingdom lasted into the eighth century, when an Arab army from North Africa landed at Gibraltar in 711 and defeated a Visigoth army. The Arabs then advanced across Spain and entered southern France, extinguishing the Visigothic kingdom in 716.

Carl O. Schuster

See also Alaric; Fall of the Roman Empire (West); Federates; Rome, Siege of; Stilicho; Theoderic; Theodosius I

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Gracchan Land Conflict (Second Century BCE)

The second century BCE was a period of crucial transformation in Roman economy and society. The sources present a bleak picture: small farmers driven off the land by the rich, who created large slave-staffed estates to supply the market in Rome. Some elements of this picture are correct: more commercial farms appeared, although this development was mostly limited

to central Italy, catering to the growing city of Rome. It is probable that in this area some small farmers sold their land, because land prices were high. Others may have been forced to leave the land, because population growth caused chronic underemployment in the countryside. In other areas of Italy changes were not so radical, but accumulation of land in the hands of the rich occurred there too. For most small or landless farmers there were other economic opportunities, for example, (seasonal) wage labor, manufacturing, or trade. Furthermore, military service was an attractive option: the wars of the early second century brought in large amounts of wealth. Veterans could also expect land distributions.

However, as the second century progressed, these options became less attractive. The wars fought in the later second century, particularly the Spanish Wars, were less successful, leading to a decline in the willingness of men to enlist. There were also fewer job opportunities in the city of Rome, since after the mid-second century there was a considerable decline in the number of public works. Furthermore, colonization had stopped after the 170s, so that discharged veterans who had lost their land had no means to survive. All this led to an increase in the number of citizens unable to support themselves. Some people moved to the cities, especially Rome, creating an urban proletariat. A situation in which both the rural and the urban poor experienced problems of subsistence presented an ideal opportunity for a social reformer to gain support: now Tiberius Gracchus (163–133 BCE) saw his chance.

The sources state that Tiberius Gracchus identified a lack of access to land as the main problem: since the poor had no land, the people were reluctant to have children, which led to a decline of the number of free citizens and thus a decline in the number of available soldiers. These perceptions were based on a reasonable analysis of available data: the census figures had been falling for 30 years. In the census of 136/135 the number of citizens was lower by 25,000 than in 164/163. There is no evidence that the population actually was declining; the problems described in the sources also fit a situation of overpopulation, though there is extensive scholarly debate over both the interpretation of the census figures and the archaeological evidence. Possibly the declining census figure was caused by a lower willingness of people to register themselves, since those who were not registered could not be called upon to serve in the army. The Spanish Wars were extremely unpopular. However, Gracchus assumed the

population was actually declining.

In the sources, the cause of the problem is described as the occupation of land owned by the Roman state, *ager publicus*, by the rich, although most large estates near Rome were located on private land. However, in the early Republic the struggle for access to land had been presented as a struggle for *ager publicus*. Furthermore, the only land available for distribution was state-owned land. Therefore, Gracchan rhetoric focused on the occupation of *ager publicus* by the rich.

As tribune of the plebs for 133 Tiberius Gracchus proposed a law, the *lex Sempronia agraria*. This limited the possession of *ager publicus* by existing users to a maximum of 500 *iugera*, plus an additional amount for children. All public land above the limit would be distributed to the poor. A three-man commission was installed to execute the proposal.

Many elements of the Gracchan land law are still unclear. A first problem is the limit set on the possession of *ager publicus*. Many scholars assume that the amount was 500 *iugera* (125 hectares) for the occupant and 250 for each of a maximum of two children. However, one of the objectives of the Gracchan reform was to stimulate population growth, which would have been more effective if land had been granted to all children. The limit was imposed on Roman citizens and Latin and Italian allies; legally allies had no right to hold land owned by the Roman state, but it would be dangerous to antagonize Rome's allies. However, allied poor did not receive land from the Gracchan commission. It is often suggested that each settler received thirty *iugera* of land, but there is no evidence for this.

Another issue is whether the distributed land remained *ager publicus* or became private. Sale of the distributed land was forbidden; the plots were also subject to taxation. However, because the main aim of the reform was to increase the number of citizens and soldiers, the plots must have counted in the census as private property, to create new *assidui*.

Obviously the law was opposed by those holding more than 500 *iugera* of public land. The Licinian Law of 367, which had imposed a maximum on holdings of *ager publicus*, had never been enforced; Tiberius was the first who actually proposed to take excess land away from the wealthy. Because Tiberius feared that the senators, many of whom were large landholders themselves, would block him, he took unprecedented steps to ensure his law was passed. Firstly, he sidestepped the Senate and went straight to the *concilium plebis*; normal practice was to ask the Senate's permission before

proposing a law. Another tribune, Octavius, vetoed Tiberius' law. Tiberius then took another unprecedented step: he proposed that Octavius should be deposed. When the people started voting to depose him, Octavius vetoed them; Tiberius had him removed from the meeting and his law was passed.

The Senate tried to hinder the execution of Tiberius' law by giving him insufficient funds to do the job. Tiberius proposed to use the legacy of King Attalus of Pergamum, another unprecedented step. Managing the legacies of client monarchs to Rome was the traditional prerogative of the Senate. Tiberius' opponents declared their intention to prosecute him at the end of his term as tribune. To protect himself, Tiberius attempted to be re-elected as tribune. During the elections, Scipio Nasica and other senators attacked Tiberius and his followers. Tiberius was beaten to death; hundreds of his followers were killed in the riot.

Although Tiberius was dead, the land distributions continued; actually a large amount of land was distributed until 130. In 129, Italian allies complained that lands were taken from them; the jurisdiction to settle claims about which land was state-owned was transferred by the Senate to the consul. However, he ignored his duties, and since most undisputed land had already been distributed, the commission ceased to function.

In 123, Gaius Gracchus (ca. 154–121 BCE), brother of Tiberius, became tribune. Apart from many other measures, he reintroduced his brother's land law, but also proposed to found colonies outside Italy to relieve the pressure on Italian land. Gaius managed to be re-elected as tribune for 122, but the Senate tried to stop him by enlisting tribune Livius Drusus to make even more popular proposals to the people. One of the consuls for 121, Opimius, moved to repeal many of Gaius' measures; violence then broke out. The Senate passed the first *senatus consultum ultimum*, authorizing whatever force was necessary to end the crisis, and besieged Gaius and his followers on the Aventine Hill. The Gracchans were defeated; Gaius committed suicide and 3,000 of his supporters were executed.

The immediate results of the Gracchan reforms were impressive: the land commissioners achieved a great deal within a short time. There are several grids of land distribution (centuriation) from the Gracchan period still visible in the Italian landscape. The total number of new settlers must have been between 15,000 and 50,000. The results of the land distribution of Tiberius Gracchus are visible in the census figure, which in 125/124 was higher by 75,000 compared to 10 years earlier. Firstly, people were more

willing to register, since those registered were eligible for land distributions. Secondly, there was an actual increase in the number of small landholders; now that these people qualified for military service, the state was more eager to register them. Thus, the goals of the Gracchan land reform had been met: the apparent decline of the free population had been halted and the number of available soldiers had increased.

The Gracchan land distributions clearly had a large impact on the Roman state's assets of *ager publicus*. Much land had become private, while previous users of public land had been granted security of tenure on a maximum of 500 *iugera*, plus an amount for children. After the death of Gaius Gracchus, various laws were introduced to change the arrangements. The first allowed recipients of public land to sell the land they had been granted. The second stopped all distributions of state-owned land; those who still held public land were to pay a rent on it to benefit the poor. It also fully privatized all land that had been assigned. The third post-Gracchan law, to be identified with the epigraphic *lex agraria* of 111 BCE, abolished the rent placed on assigned land, so that both new settlers and previous holders of state-owned land held their land as fully private. Thus, these laws were further steps in the privatization process of *ager publicus*.

Despite the increase in the number of citizens, the invasion of the Cimbri and Teutones, and particularly the disaster at Arausio (105 BCE), where (allowing for exaggeration) as many as 80,000 Roman soldiers died, created an immediate demand for recruits that motivated Marius to enlist the *capite censi* (landless poor). The citizen population continued to grow, so that demand for land remained high. This was especially the case after *capite censi* became regular army recruits; these men expected to be provided for after discharge, so that grants of land to veterans became standard practice in the first century. However, there was not enough state-owned land available. In the Marian-Sullan conflict, Sulla therefore resorted to punishing communities that had supported the Marians by taking away their land. The only land still owned by the Roman state was public pasture and some very fertile land in Campania; Caesar finally distributed this in 59 BCE. However, there was simply not enough land available in Italy; from Caesar onward it became standard practice to establish colonies in the provinces.

A further consequence of the Gracchan land reform was growing resentment among the Italian allies. After the Roman conquest of Italy, they

had been allowed to continue to work their land, even if it had been turned into *ager publicus*. The Gracchan laws had treated Italians generously: they were granted private ownership on holdings up to 500 *iugera*, plus an amount for children. However, the surveys carried out by the Gracchan commission were often done incorrectly, which endangered the allies' private property. The land problem came to be connected to the issue of citizenship: in 125 it was proposed for the first time to give the allies citizenship, hoping that they would be more willing to give up their land. In 91, a new attempt was made; the allies hoped that Roman citizenship would protect them against the kind of confiscations they had experienced in the Gracchan period. However, when the proposal to give them citizenship failed, they feared that their land would be taken away and rose in rebellion against the Romans. Thus, the land conflict was one of the main causes of the Social War.

A further long-term consequence of the Gracchan reform was the increasing polarization between *optimates* and *populares*. The Gracchi were the first politicians in recent centuries to use the poor for their own political ends. Later politicians also drew their support especially from the urban plebs. The events of the Gracchan period had shown how *tribuni plebis*, and their unique powers of veto, could be used in politics; politicians increasingly resorted to using tribunes as their agents. The Gracchan conflict also showed how the threat to prosecute a politician after his term of office could be used as a weapon. Finally, the Gracchan conflict was the first time that violence had been used within the city of Rome in recent centuries to settle political differences. Eventually civic violence would become an established part of politics in the first century.

Saskia T. Roselaar

See also Caesar, Gaius Julius; Civil Conflict (Late Republic); *Dilectus*; Demography; Gaius Gracchus; Germanic Wars; Marian-Sullan Conflict; Marius; Republic, Political Structure; Senate, Senators; *Senatus Consultum Ultimum*; Spanish Wars; Sulla, Lucius Cornelius; States of Emergency; Tiberius Gracchus; Tribune of the Plebs; Veterans

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Gratian (Emperor) (367–383 CE)

Flavius Gratianus was a Roman emperor (co-Augustus with Valentinian I and Valens, 367–375; co-emperor with Valens and Valentinian II, 375–378; co-emperor with Valentinian II and Theodosius I, 379–383). Born in 359 at Sirmium, Gratian was the eldest son of Flavius Valentinianus, the future emperor Valentinian I (364–375). When Gratian was eight his father suffered a serious illness and upon recovering presented Gratian to the army as his co-Augustus (Ammianus 27.6.1–16). That Valentinian was forced to

prematurely raise a child to power so soon after making his unpopular brother Valens co-Augustus, demonstrates Valentinian's limited options available in his efforts to stabilize the authority of his dynasty. The designation of sons as co-Augusti (presumed successors) in their minority was not unprecedented, and had been employed by Septimius Severus with Caracalla and Geta.

Following Valentinian's death from a stroke in 375, Gratian was forced to share power in the western empire when a segment of the army raised his even younger half-brother Valentinian II as Augustus (375–392). During his reign Gratian came into conflict with Rome's pagan aristocracy by ending subsidies for pagan ceremonies and priesthoods, refusing the position of *pontifex maximus* (chief pagan priest), and removing the Altar of Victory from the Senate House (Symmachus, *Relationes* 3.15; *Codex Theodosianus* 16.10, 20). In early 379, Gratian appointed Theodosius to replace his uncle Valens as eastern emperor after the latter died at the battle of Adrianople in 378. Throughout his reign Gratian had to contend with a number of ambitious senior commanders who had served under Valentinian I. In 383 a leading general, Magnus Maximus, launched a rebellion in Britain and crossed into Gaul to confront Gratian. After some preliminary skirmishes Gratian's army quickly abandoned him. Compared to the vigorous Magnus Maximus, the young Gratian was considered militarily ineffective by his troops, who also resented him for the favoritism he had shown toward a group of Alan auxiliaries. Gratian subsequently fled and was captured and killed at Lugdunum (Zosimus 4.35–36).

Mark Hebblewhite

See also Civil Warfare; Magnus Maximus; Succession (Imperial); Usurpation; Valens; Valentinian I; Valentinian II

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Great Trajanic Frieze

The Great Trajanic Frieze is a historical relief commemorating the Dacian Wars (101–106 CE), probably originally exhibited in the Forum of Trajan, now part of the Arch of Constantine. The original extent and location of the Great Trajanic Frieze is debated by scholars; it may have featured as the entablature of a colonnade in the library court of the Forum of Trajan. The Great Trajanic Frieze is unusually large and of fine workmanship, depicting not separate scenes as on the Column of Trajan, but a continuous scene. The frieze features the emperor Trajan as mounted warrior in heroic fashion; Roman soldiers with Dacian captives; and the emperor's triumphal entrance into the city of Rome, attended by the goddesses Victoria and Roma.

Constantine the Great (306–337) created the Arch of Constantine to commemorate his defeat of his rival Maxentius in 312 CE, decorating it with reliefs removed from older monuments, including the Great Trajanic Frieze. Such “recycling” of architectural elements was common in late antiquity and was not regarded as inappropriate.

Sara E. Phang

See also Arch of Constantine; Column of Trajan; Constantine I; Dacian Wars; Trajan; Triumph

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Conflict in Ancient Greece and Rome

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THE DEFINITIVE POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND
MILITARY ENCYCLOPEDIA

Volume 3: H–Z, Roman Section

IAIN SPENCE, DOUGLAS KELLY, AND
PETER LONDEY,
Editors, Greek Section

SARA E. PHANG,
Editor, Roman Section



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H

Hadrian (Emperor) (117–138 CE)

One of the “Five Good Emperors,” Hadrian (Publius Aelius Hadrianus, 117–138 CE) was notable for his promotion of a “peacetime” army, his apparent conflict with the Senate, his extensive travels, his brutal crushing of the Bar Kochba Revolt of 132–135, and his securing the succession of Antoninus Pius (138–161) and Marcus Aurelius (161–180).

Landowners in Italica, Spain, Hadrian’s forefathers were provincial Roman citizens who had entered the Roman Senate a few generations ago. Hadrian was born in 76. In 95 and 96, Hadrian served as laticlavian tribune, a typical officership for a young man of senatorial status. It was unusual, however, of Hadrian to hold this rank twice.

In 96, the emperor Domitian (81–96) was overthrown and assassinated by a palace conspiracy, destabilizing the empire. The Senate supported their own choice, the elderly Marcus Cocceius Nerva. The praetorians were angry because they had been loyal to Domitian, who had raised military pay across the board. In October 97, the praetorians mutinied against Nerva, who conceded to them by handing over Domitian’s assassins. Nerva was clearly unable to control the situation. Nerva declared that he was adopting Trajan (Marcus Ulpius Traianus), at that time governor of Pannonia (or, as some argue, Upper Germany), who had won a decisive victory over the Germans. No one knew for sure whether Trajan had forced Nerva’s hand. Nerva died on January 27, 98 and Trajan was declared emperor on January 28. Hadrian, who was serving a third tribuneship in Upper Germany, brought the news to Trajan at Cologne.

Hadrian was marked out as a recipient of Trajan’s favor, a potential successor, though Trajan was still relatively young and did not then declare

a successor. Hadrian married Trajan's grand-niece Sabina. Hadrian was admitted to the Senate and held the junior magistracy of imperial quaestor, with fiscal responsibilities. When Trajan waged his First Dacian War (101–102), Hadrian accompanied him. Hadrian's next offices were tribune of the plebs (104) and praetor (105), but he also served in the Second Dacian War (105–106) and was promoted to legate of Legio I Minervia. According to the *Historia Augusta*, Hadrian received military decorations for distinction in the Dacian Wars, but again little detail is known. Hadrian was also rewarded with a consulship in 108.

Hadrian next became an officer in Trajan's Parthian War, in which the Romans captured the Persian capital of Ctesiphon and acquired three new provinces, Assyria, Greater Armenia, and Mesopotamia. The new conquests left instability in their wake. Revolts broke out in Mesopotamia; in reprisal, Trajan's generals destroyed Seleucia on the Tigris and Edessa in Syria. Jewish revolts occurred in Cyrenaica and Egypt and were likewise suppressed harshly. Birley (1997) emphasizes that though Hadrian is considered a "peacetime" emperor, he was trained in war and became acquainted with Roman mercilessness toward provincial unrest.

In 117, Trajan fell ill, possibly from a stroke, and died at Selinus on August 10. Hadrian was acclaimed emperor on August 11, 117. His designation as Trajan's heir was probably unsurprising, but according to rumor, Trajan had been incapacitated and Trajan's wife the empress Plotina had designated Hadrian. The Senate had not been consulted. Hadrian's position as emperor was secure neither at Rome nor in the provinces, especially in the precarious eastern empire.

As emperor, Hadrian acted immediately, abandoning Trajan's new provinces of Assyria, Mesopotamia, and Greater Armenia. He returned to the middle Empire through the Balkans, also relinquishing part of Moesia around the Danube delta, turning these areas over to the Sarmatian Roxolani. Hadrian's other decisive action was apparently to order the deaths of four senior senators, acting through his praetorian prefect Attianus to save his own reputation. Whether these four men were actually guilty of any conspiracies is uncertain; one of them, Avidius Nigrinus, allegedly planned to assassinate Hadrian (Dio 69.2.5; *Historia Augusta, Hadrian* 7.1). Hadrian then dismissed Attianus and swore to the Senate that he would not execute another senator without their vote (Dio 69.2.6; *Historia Augusta, Hadrian* 7.4). However, the damage had been done. The Senate regarded

Hadrian with suspicion, and for his part, Hadrian frequently spent long periods away from Rome.

Hadrian undertook no new campaigns, but maintained and improved the Roman army, apparently developing the concept of a “peacetime” army along the Roman saying “if you wish peace, prepare for war” (cf. *Historia Augusta, Hadrian* 10.2). The frontier bases were stationary by this time. Hadrian visited them on his travels, addressing his soldiers and examining all aspects of military administration and discipline. He enjoyed camaraderie with his men, dressing and eating in the manner of a common soldier. He expelled officers’ civilian luxuries from camps. He repressed corruption, and he regulated the conditions of service to exclude men who were too young or too old for military service. A Latin inscription at Lambaesis in Numidia preserves a speech of Hadrian’s to the troops, given in 128 (*ILS* 2487; 9133–9135). Hadrian praises and criticizes the troops’ performance of military exercises, including cavalry formations, displaying the notable knowledge of military affairs that literary authors credit him with. Legal sources also show that Hadrian administered the legal affairs of soldiers, who, as stationary personnel, amassed both property and relationships with civilians (including their *de facto* wives, mothers of their children).

Hadrian’s most notable military policy was the building of linear frontier works, Hadrian’s Wall in north Britain being only the most famous. In the early 120s, he supported construction of a palisade between the River Main and the River Neckar on the eastern border of Upper Germany and Raetia. A line of forts had been begun by Domitian. In north Britain in 122, Hadrian initiated the building of a frontier wall from the mouth of the Solway in the west to the mouth of the Tyne in the east. This isthmus was a practical dividing line. In 122, probably only a bridge at the mouth of the Tyne, termed the Pons Aelius after Hadrian, and a dedicatory inscription (*Roman Inscriptions of Britain* 1051) were finished; the entirety of Hadrian’s Wall would take many years to finish. Contemporaries believed that the walls were intended to “keep out” the barbarians, but in practice the Roman army allowed traders and herding peoples to pass across the frontiers in both directions and exacted customs duties.

Though he paid great attention to the army, Hadrian’s travels around the empire had a wider aim: to make the emperor more visible to the empire. Such travels were not unprecedented. Provincial governors were

expected to tour their provinces, visiting major cities and holding assizes. But Hadrian ensured that his provincial subjects knew who he was and in theory found him accessible. This discouraged usurpation by local would-be emperors. A story is told of Hadrian, though it is attributed to Hellenistic rulers too. An old woman accosted Hadrian with a petition, asking him to resolve a legal problem. "I don't have time," Hadrian said. The old woman retorted, "Then cease to rule!" (Dio 69.6.3; cf. Plutarch, *Demetrius* 42).

A highly cultivated man, Hadrian was passionate about Greek culture and, in his travels, spent time in Athens and the Greek cities of Asia Minor. This philhellenism led to two episodes that overshadowed the later years of his reign. In Asia Minor in the 120s, Hadrian brought into his entourage a Bithynian youth named Antinous. Hadrian and Antinous were probably lovers in the classical Greek manner in which an older man loved a younger man (in his late teens) for a short time. To prolong the relationship into the younger partner's adulthood was considered disgraceful. In 130, Hadrian traveled to Egypt, accompanied by Antinous. Antinous drowned in the River Nile, apparently a suicide. Antinous' motivation is unknown; A. R. Birley (1997) has suggested possibly shame that he was becoming too old for an appropriate relationship, or a *devotio*, a self-sacrifice to obtain the favor of a god, perhaps for Hadrian's health. In any case, Hadrian was grief-stricken and had Antinous deified, naming a new Egyptian city Antinoöpolis in his honor. Though the Romans were not hostile to same-sex sexual practices *per se*, imitating the Greek model of homosexual love was considered un-Roman.

The second episode was the Jewish revolt of 132–135, called the Bar Kochba Revolt after its leader, Simon Bar Kochba. Though the Jews already had good cause to hate the Romans, Hadrian's policies triggered the revolt: Hadrian decided to found a new Roman city, Aelia Capitolina, on the site of Jerusalem, and allegedly to ban circumcision (Dio 69.12.1–2). The new city was named for Capitoline Jupiter, the chief Roman god, fundamentally offending the Jews. Hadrian came to Judaea briefly to oversee the suppression of the revolt, but otherwise left the task to his generals. The Romans slew, according to Dio, 585,000 Jews (Dio 69.13.3) and sold many more into slavery. No further significant Jewish revolts occurred down to the end of the empire, but whenever they recorded it, Jewish rabbis execrated Hadrian's name.

Hadrian's marriage to Sabina was allegedly hostile and produced no

children. By the mid-130s Hadrian was in ill health and faced the need to choose an adoptive successor, continuing the adoptive succession policy begun by Nerva and Trajan. Hadrian's first choice was Lucius Ceionius Commodus, who was adopted as Lucius Aelius Caesar in 136. The sickly Aelius died early in 138, and Hadrian chose another adoptive successor, Aurelius Antoninus (the future emperor Antoninus Pius), a man in his 50s, and required Antoninus to adopt the teenage Marcus Annianus Verus, the future emperor Marcus Aurelius. Such a double adoption ensured the succession of the imperial power for many years.

Unfortunately, Hadrian's bad relationship with the Senate re-emerged when he allegedly forced his elderly relative Servianus and Servianus' grandson Fuscus to commit suicide. The implication of Servianus and Fuscus in a conspiracy is unclear, and the suicides added to Hadrian's reputation for cruelty to senators. The claims that Hadrian died "hated by everyone" (*Historia Augusta, Hadrian* 25.6–7; Dio 69.23.2) reflect the senatorial perspective. Nonetheless, Hadrian had secured the succession. When Hadrian himself died, probably of heart disease, in 138, he was succeeded smoothly by Antoninus Pius.

The main historical sources for Hadrian's life and reign are Cassius Dio's *Roman History*, book 69 (surviving as Byzantine-era summaries) and the *Historia Augusta's Vita Hadriani*. Extensive documentary sources help fill out the life of one of the most remarkable Roman emperors.

Sara E. Phang

See also Antoninus Pius; Bar Kochba Revolt; Dacian Wars; Frontiers; Hadrian's Wall; Marcus Aurelius; Military Discipline; Nerva; Persian Wars, Arsacid; Succession (Imperial); Trajan; Tribune

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Hadrian's Wall

Hadrian's Wall was built in the 120s CE across the Tyne-Solway isthmus in northern Britain (between modern Newcastle and Carlisle and extending to each coast). The wall was ca. 15 feet high, 6–10 feet thick at its foundation, and stretched for 80 Roman miles. It was complemented with 17 forts, 81 milecastles (small fortlet structures), and 158 turrets (watch towers). Every Roman mile along the entire length of the wall stood the milecastles with gates to the north and south as well as the forts with at least one entry point on every side. To the north of the wall stood a defensive ditch, with a single v-notch profile and to the south the so-called *vallum*, a large earthwork ditch with mounds on either side. The presence of the *vallum* suggests that there were security concerns on both sides of the Wall, not only with unconquered tribes to the north.

The Wall was originally of stone construction from Newcastle-upon-Tyne (soon extended east to Wallsend) to the River Irthing, with turf construction on the western end to the coast. The project was part of Hadrian's policy to halt expansion of the empire and give permanent boundaries to the frontiers. Fronto (*De Bello Parthico* 2) refers to the death of soldiers in Britain under Hadrian, and the *Historia Augusta* (*Hadrian* 5.1–2) reports troubles in Britain around the beginning of Hadrian's reign (117 CE), a situation which may explain the undertaking of this massive project. A coin issue of between 119 and 125 CE portraying *Britannia* suggests some form of military victory in Britain. The single surviving reference to Hadrian's Wall in Roman literature reports that the wall was built to separate the Romans from the barbarians (*Historia Augusta, Hadrian* 11.2). The wall was not intended to be an entirely closed boundary and should not be envisioned as a barrier to keep northern peoples out of the Roman Empire. The wall should be seen more as an imperial control point for asserting hegemony over the area and for controlling movement around the frontier zone. Various units of auxiliary soldiers (nonlegionary units) garrisoned the forts, milecastles and, turrets, allowing the Roman army to monitor the movements of natives, control small attacks and raiding, and quickly alert larger units to any more serious threats.

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Hannibal Barca (247–183 BCE)

Hannibal Barca was the Carthaginian general who launched the Second Punic War (218–201 BCE) against the Roman Republic. His brilliantly executed tactics on the battlefield won him resounding victories and earned him a reputation, both during the ancient world and the present, as one of history's best commanders and tacticians.

Hannibal, born in Carthage in 247 BCE, was the eldest son of the First Punic War commander, Hamilcar Barca (Barca, the family nickname, meaning "lightning"). Before leaving for Carthaginian Spain with Hamilcar, nine-year old Hannibal swore eternal hatred for the Romans in a religious ritual performed at the insistence of his father.

During his time in Spain (237–218 BCE), Hannibal studied with tutors and received martial training. He married Imilce, a Spanish princess from Castulo, and had a son around the year 220 BCE. It is generally accepted that Imilce did not join her husband on his invasion of Italy and their son either died young or lived in obscurity.

In 221 BCE, Hamilcar died and was succeeded by his son-in-law, Hasdrubal, who then founded New Carthage in Spain. Later that year, Hasdrubal was assassinated by a Gaul who may have been aided by Hannibal himself. Hannibal became the commander of the Carthaginian army in Spain; his close physical resemblance to his father made the transition of leadership a relatively smooth one.

Hannibal must have been a charismatic and impressive figure. His multiethnic, multilingual army—made up of Carthaginians, Libyans, Iberians, Celtiberians, Lusitanians, Gauls, Ligurians, Greeks, Numidians, Balearic slingers, and Italians—never mutinied regardless of the hardships they endured for the 15 years they fought in Italy. Hannibal led by example,

which no doubt endeared him to his soldiers; his firm control over such an army and the superior maneuvers they achieved bespoke of exceptional leadership.

Hannibal aimed to humble the Roman Republic by dismantling its network of alliances with peoples throughout Italy, the core of Roman supplies and reinforcements. After capturing the Roman-allied Spanish town of Saguntum in 218 BCE, Hannibal left his younger brother, Hasdrubal Barca, in charge of Spain, and led his army north. In the meantime, the Romans declared war on Carthage after the Punic Senate refused to curtail Hannibal's ambitions.

Hannibal's land invasion of Roman Italy became a thing of legend. In November of 218 BCE, the Carthaginians crossed the Pyrenees, overcame the Romans in a small skirmish at the Rhône River, and then pressed onward to the snow-covered Alps. The epic 15-day excursion across the Alpine crags was a risky one; the steep, icy climbs and hostile native tribes cost Hannibal thousands of men, many supplies, and most of his war elephants.

The overconfident Romans awaited Hannibal at the foot of the Alps but were soundly defeated at their first major engagement at the Trebia River. Familiar with Roman military tactics, Hannibal took advantage of his army's flexibility and the Roman legions' inflexibility, outflanking and killing 15,000–20,000 Romans. Hannibal moved south, initiating a "scorched earth" policy that illustrated Roman powerlessness and drew Italian peoples to his side. He assured them that their farms would be spared if they deserted Rome. To prove his good intentions, Hannibal regularly released his non-Roman prisoners of war.

It is said that Hannibal contracted ophthalmia and became blind in his right eye as the Carthaginians passed through the marshes of Etruria, yet he and his men successfully ambushed the next Roman army sent against them despite his disability. Harnessing their tactical superiority again, the Carthaginian army routed the Roman legions at the battle of Lake Trasimene (June 217 BCE), killing 15,000 Romans and capturing 10,000 more.

The Romans appreciated the danger they were in and revived the emergency office of dictator. Dictator Quintus Fabius Maximus acknowledged that the legions did not fare well in pitched battles against Hannibal and so he initiated a delaying strategy where his army shadowed the enemy from high ground, periodically ambush them to prevent them from foraging, and refuse to fight battles. Fabius' plan would starve

Hannibal into submission.

The Romans, however, criticized the dictator for what they considered cowardly tactics, but what they did not know was that Hannibal recognized the danger he was in; his army could not survive without local supplies and reinforcements. The Carthaginians ravaged the Italian countryside, hoping to anger the Romans enough to abandon their war of attrition and fight a pitched battle.

The plan worked. In 216 BCE, the Romans mustered the largest army in the Republic's history and in August met Hannibal outside the town of Cannae. It was here that Hannibal illustrated his tactical brilliance and won his most famous battle.

The Romans lined up in standard formation, light and heavy infantries in the center and cavalries on the flanks. Hannibal's light infantry was placed in the center, the heavier infantry on the flanks, and the entire army was positioned in a concave shape pointing toward the Roman legions. As Hannibal anticipated, the Carthaginian light infantry, made up of undisciplined Gallic and Spanish troops, fell back under the onslaught of the powerful Roman charge, transforming the concave Punic line into a convex one. As the Roman infantry pushed forward, the Carthaginian heavy infantry, made up of more professionalized soldiers, slowly closed in on the legions' sides. Rome's cavalries, more suited for pursuit or scouting missions, were quickly chased away by Hannibal's experienced horsemen. When the Carthaginian cavalry returned, they took up position in the Roman rear. The Roman legions were completely surrounded and a massacre ensued. Though 10,000 Romans survived—the heavy infantry in the center managed to break through the Carthaginian line—approximately 50,000 Romans and allies were killed, including a Roman general.

Such a conclusive victory usually ended wars in the ancient world. Indeed, Hannibal sent envoys with his prisoners to Rome to discuss terms and Philip V of Macedon struck up an alliance with Hannibal in 215 BCE as a preventative measure to maintain the weakened state of the Roman Republic. Hannibal's plan of breaking Rome's hegemony was working; news spread of Cannae's outcome and many territories loyal to Rome defected. By 212 BCE, most of Campania and 40 percent of Rome's allies abandoned the Republic, with Etruria and Umbria deliberating to do so.

Hannibal traveled virtually unopposed through central and southern Italy, foraging supplies, persuading and besieging Italian peoples to abandon

Rome, and engaging in small encounters with the Romans. Though Hannibal remained undefeated on the field, he could not counter all of the Republic's persistent comebacks. Rome's determination to fight until the very end allowed them to gradually regain all previous territories and alliances, thereby providing them with seemingly inexhaustible reinforcements. By 205 BCE, the tides had turned in favor of Rome: Carthaginian Spain had been subdued; Campania and Syracuse were back under Roman control; Hasdrubal Barca was killed at the battle of the Metaurus River in 207 BCE before he could join Hannibal; and the potential threat of Philip V of Macedon was neutralized. The Romans' comeback was so successful that they launched an invasion of Africa in 205 BCE.

Spearheading the invasion was Scipio Africanus. Having learned from his experiences at the battle of Cannae, Scipio created a semiprofessional army worthy of the hardened Carthaginians. As the Romans successfully fought their way toward Carthage, the Carthaginian Senate recalled Hannibal in 203 BCE. Fully equipped with a fresh army and 80 elephants, Hannibal faced Scipio at the battle of Zama in 202 BCE. Hannibal was defeated and the Second Punic War was over.

Hannibal survived Zama and advocated peace with Rome. His time in Italy, however, left a deep scar on the Roman psyche. By 196 BCE, there were rumors that Hannibal was advising the Republic's enemies. The Romans believed they were not safe as long as Hannibal lived and from then on, the Carthaginian was a hunted man, fleeing to Syria, Crete, Armenia, Tyre, and lastly to Libyssa in Bithynia. Before the Romans secured his capture, Hannibal committed suicide in 183 BCE. According to Plutarch, he lamented: "Let us now put an end to the great anxiety of the Romans, who have thought it too long and hard a task to wait for the death of a hated old man..."

Hannibal Barca may have lost to the Romans in the end but his brilliant tactics and generalship have inspired later generals to create their own Cannaes. None have come close. A charming anecdote tells of Scipio and Hannibal meeting in Ephesus later in life. Scipio asked his old foe who he thought were history's three greatest generals. Hannibal, listing them in order of importance, replied, "Alexander, Pyrrhus, and myself." Scipio, surprised, inquired who the three greatest generals would be if Scipio did *not* defeat him. Hannibal answered the same three men but his own name would be at the top of the list.

See also Cannae, Battle of; Carthage (State); Elite Participation; Fabius Maximus; Lake Trasimene, Battle of; Marcellus; Metaurus, Battle of; Punic War, Second; Scipio Africanus; Zama, Battle of

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Hasdrubal (Active 150s–140s BCE)

Hasdrubal was the commander of the Carthaginians during the Third Punic War (149–146 BCE); he was also the Carthaginian general who campaigned in 151 BCE against the Numidians, who had been raiding Carthaginian territory for several years. Since Rome had forbidden Carthage to go to war, this gave the Romans a pretext to punish the Carthaginians, declaring the Third Punic War. The Carthaginians disciplined Hasdrubal for causing Roman interference but reinstated him upon realizing that a Roman attack was imminent. The Third Punic War lasted three years until Publius

Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus in 146 took and destroyed Carthage. Polybius 38.7–8's depiction of Hasdrubal treats him harshly. The longest narrative is in Appian's *Punic Wars*, most importantly at 70–118.

Timothy Doran

See also Carthage (State); Carthage, Siege of; Punic War, Third

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Hasdrubal Barca (245–207 BCE)

Hasdrubal Barca was a Carthaginian commander who spent most of his military career campaigning in Spain in Second Punic War (218–201). He belonged to the aristocratic Barcid family and was the son of Hamilcar Barca and younger brother to the more illustrious Hannibal Barca.

When Hannibal made preparations to depart from Spain to Italy (218) he left Hasdrubal in charge of a sizeable army and navy there. Hannibal's intention was to probably use Hasdrubal as back up for his invasion of Italy. However, the Romans had different ideas and Hasdrubal was to be involved in several major confrontations particularly against Gnaeus and Publius Cornelius Scipio. At Cissa (near mod. Tarragona) in 218 he failed to arrive in time to help the Carthaginian army, under Hanno, thus allowing the Romans to secure their hold north and south of the River Ebro. In 217, he was defeated by Gnaeus and forced to retreat after the battle of the River Ebro. He lost again at Dertosa (mod. Tortosa) in 215. However, Hasdrubal showed his mettle as a commander when he defeated both Scipio brothers, who were killed, in 211 near the River Baetis (mod. Guadalquivir). In 209/208, Hasdrubal met his match in Scipio Africanus at the battle of Baecula (mod. Bailén). The defeat forced Hasdrubal and his depleted army to retreat across the Pyrenees with the aim of joining Hannibal in Italy. However, in 207, Hasdrubal was beheaded by the Romans at the battle of Metaurus (mod. River Metauro, north Italy).

Hasdrubal will always be remembered in the shadow of his older

brother, Hannibal. But he was a capable commander having evaded the Romans for several years. He played a major, if ultimately unsuccessful, role in the Second Punic War.

Juan M. A. Strisino

See also Carthaginians; Ebro, Battle of; Hannibal Barca; Metaurus, Battle of; Punic War, Second; Scipio Africanus; Spanish Wars

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Hastati

The *hastati* were a rank in the manipular army of the classical Roman Republic (ca. 340–170 BCE). They were the youngest group of men alongside the other infantry ranks, the *principes*, and the *triarii*. There were 10 maniples of 120 *hastati* in a legion, totaling 1,200 at full strength. In battle, the *hastati* deployed as the front line of the three fold battle line or *triplex acies*, the middle rank being the *principes* and the third rank the *triarii*. The *velites* (skirmishers) ranged ahead of the army.

The name of the *hastati* is derived from the *hasta* or spear, though they were probably armed with two *pila*, or heavy javelins rather than a thrusting spear. They were also armed with a large oval shield (the *scutum*), helmet, greaves, breastplate, and a sword. They disappeared with the reorganization of the manipular legion into cohorts, in which all soldiers were equipped the same way.

Adam Anders

See also Legion, Organization of; Maniples; *Principes*; Recruitment of Army (Republic); *Triarii*; *Triplex Acies*

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Helvidius Priscus (d. ca. 75 CE)

Helvidius Priscus was a senator whose philosophically based opposition to the Flavian emperors led to his exile and execution. He was the son-in-law of Thrasea Paetus, a senator and philosophical opponent of the Principate who committed political suicide in the reign of Nero. Priscus was tribune of the plebs in 56 and praetor in 70. He was exiled after Paetus' death. Vespasian (69–79) permitted Priscus to return from exile, but Priscus became critical of the emperor and was eventually exiled (ca. 75) and executed.

Sara E. Phang

See also Nero; Senate, Senators; Suicide; Thrasea Paetus; Treason; Vespasian

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Heretics and Polytheists, Persecution of

Christian persecution of variant forms of Christianity has been a major force in shaping western civilization since the beginning of the early Church. The Christian movement was never fully unified, and it took over three centuries to develop the dominant catholic (“universal”) or orthodox (“right-thinking”) form of Christianity. Heresy is a chosen belief that deviates from what would become established orthodoxy. Modern scholarship appreciates plurality in ancient Christianity (or “Christianities”)

without privileging proto-orthodox belief, thus many scholars eschew the term “heresy” in favor of less loaded terms like “heterodoxy.” Heterodox beliefs were not necessarily inauthentic or biblically incorrect, and they were not necessarily minority movements: The greatest heresy of the fourth century was the Arian interpretation of the Trinity, and it may have been a majority opinion with years of enthusiastic support from emperors and bishops until the anti-Arian side ultimately won. The complicated *theological* debate on such matters will not be discussed in this article. However, one must realize that even though some of these doctrinal disputes seem hopelessly subtle to us today, they were of real interest to a truly broad range of people who thought getting these questions right was absolutely vital. The following material focuses on the Christian state’s involvement in religious conflicts, including (by way of brief conclusion) the repression of Jews and pagans.

The persecution of schismatic Christian groups is a related concern. Whereas heresy is deviation in belief, a schism is an institutional fracture. Like heresy, schism was a threat to the Church from its beginning (note, for example, Paul’s competitive hostility toward his rivals). Persecution of Christianity aggravated institutional divides, especially the “Great” persecution undertaken by Diocletian and the Tetrarchs in the early 300s. These persecutions were severe enough to cause a later crisis over how to bring back into the fold Christians who had been weak under persecution. Two rigorist sects emerged, the Donatists in North Africa and the Melitians in Egypt, which tenaciously rejected anything done by weak Christians (or their associates) who had handed over the scriptures to Roman persecutors, or otherwise compromised the faith. Donatism proved to be the more difficult schism, claiming legitimacy as the “true church of the martyrs” and gaining a large following in what is today Algeria and Tunisia.

Constantine’s conversion to Christianity, and his unrivaled grasp on the western Roman Empire, in 312 utterly changed how heresy and schism were handled. Before, Christian communities addressed schisms and heresies themselves internally, by means of regional conferences of local Christian leaders (bishops), the exchange of letters between communities, and the early development of creeds (public declarations of faith). But after 312, Christianity now gained an imperial-triumphalist aspect it had hitherto lacked, and the possibility of state persecution was realized. Constantine seemed convinced that division within Christendom would undermine his

rule. He heard appeals from Donatists and Catholics alike and sided with the latter. Initially, Constantine followed the recent example of the pagan Tetrarchs and persecuted and killed recalcitrant Donatists. If anything, this type of martyrdom strengthened the Donatist cause, and Constantine soon ceased the executions of unyielding Donatists. Henceforth, exile of leaders became the emperors' main tool for dealing with schismatic and heretical leaders. Constantine and his successors also built churches for Christians and gave valuable privileges and exemptions to Catholic clergy only, denying heretics and schismatics such gifts.

Constantine took over the whole empire in 324, and in the next year convened the first empire-wide "ecumenical" church council at Nicaea. The convened bishops had to determine when all Christians would celebrate Easter, as a concern of institutional unity. More pressing was the Arian debate on the Trinity. A key anti-Arian theologian was Athanasius of Alexandria, and while he was victorious at Nicaea, his later fortunes show the vicissitudes of the emperors' whim. Shortly after Nicaea, Constantine started wavering after listening to pro-Arian advisors. Some of his fourth-century successors were Arian, favoring councils that mitigated the attempted unity of Nicaea. Athanasius was exiled from Alexandria several times. The Arian emperor Valens' stunning defeat at the battle of Adrianople in 378 was probably seen as divine repudiation of Arianism, which thenceforth faded within the Roman Empire. The problem of back-and-forth councils and imperial whim continued though. The Christological controversies of the fifth century featured "robber" councils and counter-councils which sometimes became violent. Intercity rivalry among the empire's metropolises (especially Rome, Carthage, Constantinople, Alexandria) was a background factor behind the religious disputes of the era as well.

Regionalism, changing imperial policy, and continued institutional disputes also inflamed tensions over schism. In 347, under Constantine's sons, North Africa saw a brutal imperial repression of Donatism, called the Macarian Persecution; not only was there renewed violence against prominent Donatists, there was at least one wholesale slaughter of a Donatist congregation. Catholics authorities confiscated Donatist churches, and may have been on the verge of stamping out Donatism. Then, in 361, Constantine's pagan nephew Julian "the Apostate" took the throne. Julian barred Christians from the teaching profession and canceled privileges that

had accrued to Christian bishops, such as free use of the imperial transport system (*cursus publicus*). But the main way Julian hurt the Church was by refusing to referee Christians' endless disputes, reasoning that "no savage beasts are so menacing as most Christians are to one another" (Ammianus 22.5.4). Julian allowed all exiled bishops to return home, which led to tumult and violence with Donatists retaking their churches and congregations. Catholic gains in North Africa vanished and the Donatist schism entered a more violent phase with fanatics called circumcellions pressing the Donatist cause. Donatism continued losing favor, though, at the imperial level and in church councils, which gave Catholicism decisive practical advantages. Information is scarce after Augustine's death and the Vandal conquest of Africa in 430, but Donatism may have limped on in some form till the Arab conquest of the mid-seventh century.

The Christianization of the Roman Empire was a tangible misfortune to Jews and pagans alike. Constantine ended pagan blood sacrifice, and by the end of the fourth century Christianity was the official state religion. Theodosius I (379–395) and other Christian emperors commanded their praetorian prefects to confiscate non-Catholic altars and coerced practitioners of pagan rites with threats of torture and death; Christians who apostatized to paganism were stripped of the right to make a legal will or testify in court. Judaism was not outlawed or persecuted as a religion, yet imperial legislation of the fourth through sixth centuries made economic and social life harder for Jews. Heretics, pagans, and Jews were sometimes lumped together in being denied privileges and protection, and these disfavored populations became the targets of mob violence. State persecution of these groups was more passive than active: when mobs lynched pagans or heretics, or burned synagogues, the imperial authorities generally did nothing to stop or punish the violence. Such attacks were sometimes led by clergy. Even if an emperor wanted to stem such disorder, popular opposition and the growing strength of bishops like Ambrose of Milan (d. 397) might prevent him.

Christian persecution of heretics, schismatics, and non-Christians forms a dark chapter in history that continued to play out well into modern times. Conflicts in late antiquity shaped church-state relations for centuries to come, and generated creeds still recited by millions of Christians at weekly services. Despite the lamentable oppression of this legacy, rightly rejected by free societies today, the basic unity of Christendom for a thousand years

is a signal achievement that should not go unrecognized.

Christopher J. Fuhrmann

See also Christians, Persecution of; Constantine I; Diocletian; Julian the Apostate; New Testament; Public Order; Tetrarchic Civil War

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Herodian (d. 240 CE)

Herodian was a Greek historian of the early third century CE, who wrote a *History of the Empire after Marcus* in eight books, covering the period from Commodus (180–192) to the Gordians (ending in 238). Herodian sometimes provides a more detailed account of events than Cassius Dio's abridgement by the Byzantine Xiphilinus. Though rhetorical, Herodian is also more reliable than the *Historia Augusta*, a collection of Latin biographies of emperors from Hadrian (117–138) through Numerian (283–284) that declines sharply in quality after the Life of Macrinus (217–218).

Herodian provides an unflattering account of the reign of Alexander Severus (222–235), a young emperor who was a pawn of the Severans' dynastic strife and who was eventually murdered by his mutinous soldiers. With little basis in fact, the *Historia Augusta's* *Life of Alexander* presents Alexander Severus as the ideal emperor.

Herodian also provides some insight into conflict in the beginning of the third century crisis (235–284), though he blames the indiscipline and greed

of the Roman army. He describes the events of 235–238, marked by the revolts of Maximinus, a soldier-emperor, and the Gordians, senatorial aristocrats.

Sara E. Phang

See also Alexander Severus; Cassius Dio; *Historia Augusta*; Septimius Severus; Third-Century CE Crisis

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Historia Augusta

The *Historia Augusta*, also known as *Scriptores Historiae Augustae* (e.g., in the three-volume Loeb Classical Library edition), is a collection of imperial biographies from the Emperor Hadrian (117–138 CE) to Carinus and Numerian (283–284), including unsuccessful usurpers. The authorship and date of the *Historia Augusta* (abbreviated HA) are uncertain, and the work is unreliable particularly for usurpers and for the third-century emperors after Macrinus (217–218). Nonetheless the *Historia Augusta* is an important historiographic source.

The alleged authors are supposedly writing in the reigns of Diocletian (284–305) and Constantine (306–337), occasionally addressing these emperors in asides. However, the purported authors are otherwise unknown and modern scholars have proposed that the real author(s) wrote nearly a century later, in the late fourth or early fifth centuries CE, based on various anachronisms and possible allusions. Nothing is known of this author or authors except that they were clearly familiar with the conventions of Latin historiography and biography, sometimes parodying these conventions.

The earlier lives of the *Historia Augusta*, from Hadrian to Macrinus, are relatively substantial and probably derive from the no longer extant work of

Marius Maximus; they can be compared with Cassius Dio and Herodian. For the period conventionally termed the third-century crisis (235–284), other literary sources, such as the epitomes by Eutropius and Aurelius Victor and later chronicles, are very abbreviated, and the *Historia Augusta* gives the fullest though unreliable source. Where possible, the *Historia Augusta* can be compared with these sources and with the fragments of the contemporary Greek author Dexippus (preserved in later sources) and with contemporary coins and documents.

The real author(s) of the *Historia Augusta* include fantastic or absurd elements, especially in the so-called *Secondary Vitae* or biographers of pretenders or usurpers, such as Avidius Cassius (in the reign of Marcus Aurelius, 161–180 CE) and Pescennius Niger (early in the reign of Septimius Severus, 193–211 CE) and the so-called *Thirty Tyrants* of the mid-third century. The elements of the absurd are also frequent in the biographies of Heliogabalus (218–222) and Alexander Severus (222–235) and all subsequent biographies (Loeb *SHA* vol. III). The *Secondary Vitae* and later *Lives* also contains extensive incidental and probably invented detail.

Nonetheless, even comical or digressive anecdotes in the *Historia Augusta* are of use because they reveal Roman social and cultural attitudes. Military discipline was a favorite theme of the author(s), for instance appearing in the biography of Hadrian and dominating the biographies of Avidius Cassius and Pescennius Niger. The *Historia Augusta* is also a valuable source of imperial ideology, presenting models of good and bad rulers. The *Historia Augusta*'s Commodus, Caracalla, and Heliogabalus are extremely bad emperors and (with very little historical basis) the *Historia Augusta*'s Alexander Severus is the ideal emperor. With the exception of Gallienus, a bad emperor, the military emperors of the third-century crisis period (Claudius II Gothicus through Probus) are given heroic virtues.

Sara E. Phang

See also Cassius Dio; Herodian; Third-Century CE Crisis

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Honorius (Emperor) (395–423 CE)

Honorius, son of Theodosius I, ruled the western Roman Empire from 395 to 423 CE. Born in 384, Honorius became emperor at the age of 11. He was at first dominated by his guardian, the *magister utriusque militiae* (commander-in-chief) Stilicho. Honorius was married to Maria, Stilicho's daughter. Stilicho balanced an array of threats, including Alaric and his marauding Visigoths, new barbarian movements across the frontier, and intrigues in Milan and in Constantinople. After Alaric's failed invasion of Italy in 402, Honorius and Stilicho moved the western Roman capital to Ravenna, a more defensible location than Milan.

In 407, the Rhine froze over, and a barbarian alliance swept into northern Gaul. In the same year, the usurper Constantine III crossed the Channel into Gaul. At the same time, in 408, the eastern emperor, Arcadius, had died and Stilicho traveled to Constantinople, allegedly hoping to influence the court of Theodosius II, Arcadius' young heir (born 402). With Stilicho away, Honorius came under the influence of Olympius, who led Roman troops in a revolt against Stilicho and his barbarian troops. Honorius executed Stilicho in 408. Stilicho's death allowed a resurgent Alaric to sack Rome in 410. The sack of Rome was traumatic for the Roman world.

As several new usurpers emerged in Hispania and Gaul, Honorius found a new general in Constantius (Emperor Constantius III, 421). Constantius defeated the usurper Constantine in 411. Constantius allied with the Visigoths, settling them in Aquitaine and used them to defeat the other barbarian foes. He also fought off a usurper on the Rhine and one in Africa. Constantius married Honorius' sister, Galla Placidia, and fathered Honorius' heir, Valentinian III (born 421). Constantius III reigned briefly, but Galla Placidia became the power behind the throne for both Honorius and Valentinian III, Honorius dying in 423 and Valentinian reigning from 425 to 455.

Nathan Schumer

See also Alaric; Arcadius; Galla Placidia; Goths; Rome, Siege of; Stilicho;

Theodosius I; Valentinian III

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Horace (65–8 BCE)

Quintus Horatius Flaccus was one of the most famous Latin poets closely associated with the Augustan period. He is not a direct literary source for the civil wars, but some of his works reflect Augustan ideology.

Horace's father was of low birth (a freedman) but provided his son with an elite education at Rome. Horace himself served in Marcus Junius Brutus' army as a tribune. After the battles of Philippi, Horace relinquished military life and worked as a scribe (a civilian assistant to the magistrates). He began a literary career around this time, finding a patron in Maecenas, Augustus' ally. Though his work depicts the Augustan peace favorably, Horace did not seek Augustus as a direct patron and retired to private life.

In Horace's body of work, *Epodes* 1 and 9 and *Odes* 1.37 allude to the battle of Actium. *Odes* 3.1–6 and 3.24 allude to the Augustan moral legislation. Horace's *Carmen Saeculare* is Horace's most overtly "Augustan" work.

Sara E. Phang

See also Augustus; Civil Wars (II) (44–31 BCE); Octavian; Virgil

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Hostages

Modern hostage-taking is a violent practice, in which armies, terrorists, or criminal gangs or pirates usually extort ransom for their victims or merely kill them to inflict terror. As such, hostage taking is now condemned in international law. In antiquity, the exchange of hostages was a routine element of diplomacy. Hostage exchange could be presented as hospitality, overlapping with the Mediterranean-wide practice of guest-friendship, in which the host and guest had mutual obligations of good conduct. Mistreatment of guest-friends and hostages was traditionally regarded as sacrilegious, and the assassination of hostages might be a pretext for war.

In early Rome, the Romans exchanged hostages with their Italian allies. However, by the second century BCE it was already apparent that Rome had the upper hand in her relationships with other peoples and states. Even as the Romans employed the language of guest-friendship to remonstrate with Greek and Hellenistic states, this language veiled coercion (e.g., Livy 42.39–41). The Greek historian Polybius of Megalopolis was effectively a hostage for the Achaean League, even though he also became a friend of Lucius Aemilius Paullus (the victor of the Third Macedonian War) and his son Scipio Aemilianus.

The inequality in hostage-taking was sharper when the hostages were neither Italian nor Greek but “barbarian” peoples. Typically, the Romans would accept native leaders’ children as hostages and give them a classical education at Rome. Such a practice underlined the power difference in the relationship, the children being dependent on their hosts. A classical education instilled Greco-Roman culture and values, and the children would also develop personal ties with their hosts, making the children, when they grew up, more likely to cooperate with Rome. Rome thus adopted the role of a “parent” to barbarian peoples, illustrated on the reliefs of the *Ara Pacis* where barbarian children accompany the procession of members of the Julio-Claudian house. However, the adult hostages could not always be relied on for loyalty.

Hostage exchange also occurred during civil conflicts and wars. Less formal exchanges might be used to confirm alliances. In the Tetrarchy, the

sons of Constantius I and Maximian, Constantine and Maxentius, were educated at the court of Diocletian (284–305) where they were in effect hostages for their fathers' loyalty. Marriages might play the same role as hostage exchange. In the Treaty of Brundisium (40 BCE), Octavia, the sister of Octavian, was married to Mark Antony and thus became in effect a hostage. In the Tetrarchy, Diocletian's daughter Valeria was married to his Caesar Galerius.

Hostage-taking as a violent mode of extortion was practiced by pirates and brigands. During his early post in Asia Minor, the young Julius Caesar was captured by pirates and held for ransom. Promising them ransom, he persuaded them to release him, then returned with Roman soldiers and arrested them.

Sara E. Phang

See also Alliances; *Ara Pacis*; Bandits and Brigands; Barbarians; Brundisium, Treaty of; Jugurtha; Jugurthine War; Piracy

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Hostes Publici*. See *Proscriptions

Human Sacrifice

Human sacrifice appears in Greek and Roman mythology, and may have occurred in the prehistoric era. By the historical period it was considered mostly a past practice, and some rituals have been suspected of being symbolic replacements of an earlier practice of human sacrifice. The *pontifices*, Vestal Virgins and others tossed straw effigies called *Argei* into the Tiber from the *Pons Sublicius* (Livy 1.21.5), an act which some ancient authors suspected of substituting for an earlier human sacrifice. In relation to war, human sacrifice is attested in two major ways; self-sacrifice, in Latin the practice called *devotio*; and the sacrifice of humans to the gods in times of extreme crisis. In the former, a willing participant gave up his life to ensure victory for his side, most famously in the stories of the Decii clan, whose father, son, and grandson each dedicated their lives to the gods of the

underworld in exchange for victory (see article “Decius Mus, Publius”).

The second category of human sacrifices during war is those recorded to have happened on occasions of great emergency. During the Persian Wars, the Athenian general Themistocles is said to have allowed three Persian noblemen, nephews of King Xerxes, to be sacrificed to Dionysus Omestes (“the flesh eater”). During the third and second centuries BCE, on three separate occasions (228, 216, and 114/113 BCE) the Romans sacrificed two Gauls, male and female, and two Greeks, male and female, by burying them alive in the *Forum Boarium* (Plutarch, *Marcellus* 3.3–4, *Moralia* 284a–284c; Livy 22.57.3–6). Livy calls such acts “repellent to Roman sentiment.” These sacrifices are not fully understood, particularly the choice of nationalities, which represent nations with which the Romans were not at war. In each case the sacrifice seems connected to a scandal involving the Vestal Virgins. According to Pliny the Elder, human sacrifice was officially banned outright in 97 BCE (Pliny *Natural History* 30.3.12).

The practice of human sacrifice came to be shorthand for moral depravity, symbolizing the barbarity of Rome’s enemies—the Carthaginians were thought to sacrifice infants, and Caesar wrote of the Celtic practice of human sacrifice, including a ritual in which victims were burned alive inside the effigy of a man made of wicker (Caesar, *Gallic Wars* 6.16). Roman soldiers were made victims to the practice when German tribes sacrificed military tribunes on their altars in 9 CE during the devastating Roman loss at the Teutoburg forest (Tacitus, *Annals* 1.61). The trope of human sacrifice was also used to characterize Rome’s internal enemies, such as in the likely embellished accounts of the conspirator and enemy of the state Catiline (Lucius Sergius Catilina), which assert that he executed Marcus Marius Gratidianus (Marius’ nephew) at the tomb of the Lutatii, an action evocative of human sacrifice (Valerius Maximus 9.2.1). Similarly, Christian apologists of the second century CE recorded accusations of sacrifices and cannibalism, and in particular the story that neophytes were initiated into the religion by means of rite in which they struck a baby concealed in flour, whose blood and limbs were then consumed by those present (Minucius Felix *Octavius* 9.5). This so-called blood libel had the longest history of the use of human sacrifice as a dehumanizing trope.

Kathryn H. Milne

See also Decius Mus, Publius; *Devotio*; Religion and Warfare; Samnite Linen

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Huns

The Huns were a confederation of mounted warrior bands that alternately threatened the later Roman Empire as well as defended it from other barbarian invaders in the fourth and fifth centuries CE. The Huns originated in Central Eurasia, possibly to the north of China prior to the second century. They first appear in Mediterranean historical sources in the late fourth century, when they defeated Gothic kingdoms located north of the Black Sea and the Danube River—generating waves of Gothic refugees who fled south and threatened the Roman Empire.

The Huns initially served as Roman clients, providing auxiliary forces to serve Rome. Hunnic forces consisted of cavalry primarily armed with a powerful composite bow; their secondary weapons consisted of swords and lassoes. The Huns developed proficiency in siege warfare, and their armies evolved to incorporate subordinate allies, including infantry, using their own traditional weapons. Hun warriors were supplied with spare horses that allowed them to rapidly cover great distances.

Although bands of Huns may have attacked the Roman Empire as early as 378, their first major assault on Roman territory occurred in 395, when raiding bands crossed the Danube into Thrace. Simultaneously, to the east of the Black Sea, Huns crossed the Caucasus Mountains and, due to an absence of many Roman military units which had been deployed elsewhere, rapidly advanced through Armenia to Syria and Cilicia, seizing cattle and enslaving Romans, before retreating across the Caucasus Mountains. When the Romans went to war with the Persians in the 420s, the Romans stripped their northern frontier of resources, allowing the Huns to once again attack Thrace.

In 445, Attila became the sole king of the Huns and inaugurated the period of the Huns' greatest political and military prowess. Attila's policy toward Rome alternated raids with peace treaties, during which he acquired huge amounts of gold as well as Roman territory to incorporate in his burgeoning, though short-lived Hunnic Empire. Attila launched two major assaults on the western Roman Empire: a march into Gaul which was thwarted in 451 at the battle of Châlons by an alliance between Rome, the Goths, and other barbarians; and an attack on Italy in 452, which failed due to disease and logistical difficulties. Following Attila's death in 453, his empire was divided among his sons and Hunnic power began to rapidly unravel. This was hastened by the revolt of Germanic peoples against the Huns, culminating in a series of battles that broke Hunnic hegemony in about 455. In subsequent years, the Huns progressively declined as a credible threat to Rome, though bands of Huns continued to serve as mercenaries in Roman service in Italy in 457 and Sicily in 461.

Glenn E. Helm

See also Aetius; Attila; Catalaunian Plains, Battle of; Fall of the Roman Empire (West); Federates

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I

Idistaviso, Battle of (16 CE)

In the battle of Idistaviso, also termed the battle of the Weser River, Germanicus defeated the German leader Arminius and destroyed his army. A former Roman auxiliary, Arminius had defected to the Germans and become a native leader. To expedite invasion, Germanicus employed naval transport, assembling his forces at the island of the Batavi. He commanded auxiliary troops (themselves Gauls and Rhinelanders), four legions, two cohorts of praetorians, and units of archers and slingers. The Roman invasion penetrated the area between the rivers Amisia (Ems) and Visurgis (Weser).

The Romans first deployed Batavian cavalry against the Germans; the Batavian cavalry were expert at swimming and fording waterways, but were beaten back by the Germans. The battle took place on the Weser (Visurgis) in a plain termed Idistaviso, where the Germans occupied the plain and kept a reserve force in the forest. To deter the German assault, the Romans built earthworks to force the enemy to attack uphill. The Romans overwhelmed the Germans, but many escaped, including Arminius.

Subsequently, the Germans attempted to ambush the Romans on the march. This time neither side had an escape route, the Germans being hemmed in by a wood, the Romans by the river and hills. The Germans were too closely crowded to wield their weapons effectively or sustain a charge, favoring Roman tactics. The Romans slaughtered all of the Germans (though Arminius escaped a second time) and Germanicus erected a trophy in honor of the emperor Tiberius. The return of his army was hindered by a storm that wrecked many ships. Germanicus was recalled by Tiberius and permitted to celebrate a triumph. The battle of Idistaviso was considered to

have avenged the Varian disaster of 9 CE. The episode of Idistaviso is narrated by Tacitus, *Annals* 2.5–26.

Sara E. Phang

See also Arminius; Germanicus; Germans; Tiberius (Emperor); Varian Disaster

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Ilerda, Battle of (49 BCE)

The battle of Ilerda took place in 49 BCE between the forces of Gaius Julius Caesar and those of the Pompeian politicians Lucius Afranius and Marcus Petreius, near the town of Ilerda in Spain. It was one of the earlier conflicts in Caesar's civil war against the Pompeians, who were led by Gnaeus Pompey. Unlike other many other battles of the time, this battle served more as a campaign maneuver rather than an attempt to weaken the enemy's military strength.

Near the town of Ilerda, there was a plain, in the middle of which there was a hill. This hill controlled communication to and from the town, and it also had a weapons store. Capturing the hill was Caesar's main objective; if the Caesareans were to hold it, they could effectively cut off supplies and communication to the Pompeians. The opposing forces secured the hill first. Nevertheless, Caesar's soldiers engaged their enemies in an attempt to take the hill from them. This contest led to a longer and larger battle.

The first engagement was unique for Roman warfare at the time because of the style of fighting that the Pompeian soldiers had adopted in their fight against the Caesareans. According to Caesar, who is our primary source for the battle, the Pompeian legionaries were fighting with skirmish-like tactics, presumably appropriated from the local Spanish style of fighting. This means that the Pompeian soldiers were approaching the Caesareans and then running away from them in what seemed like disorder. The Caesareans were surprised by this approach because they had expected the Pompeians,

being Romans, to fight in the same manner as they did, that is with disciplined maneuvering and a strict adherence to their positioning—dictated by the ensigns or battle standards.

Because of the unexpected method of the Pompeian attack, the Caesarean soldiers were driven back, but after retreating to safety, they renewed their attack with reinforcements. Caesar then claims that in an effort to compensate for retreating, the reinforced legions charged the Pompeians with particular vigor and enthusiasm, managing to push them back a significant distance, very near to the town of Ilerda itself; this, in turn, found them fighting on the hill leading to Ilerda.

Once on the hill, the Caesareans were chasing the Pompeian forces uphill, and upon realizing that they were in an advantageous position, the latter army turned and attacked the Caesareans. Because of the steepness of the sides of the hill, the forces engaged in combat could not be reinforced from the flanks, and so their respective commanders sent reinforcements to their rear—the Pompeian soldiers having to go through the town to join their comrades.

Caesar claims that the battle lasted five hours in such circumstances, until his forces finally made a powerful push against the enemy, forcing them to retreat to the town. He further claims that his losses were significantly fewer than those of his enemies. If this is true, the victory is especially notable because of the adverse combat conditions that his soldiers were faced with (first, facing skirmishing tactics, then fighting a literal uphill battle).

The victory did not immediately lead to consequential gains in Spain for Caesar's forces. Ilerda should be considered as part of Caesar's overall campaign, in which he outmaneuvered the forces of Afranius and Petreius, forcing the latter into a waterless area where they ran short of provisions. He was able to negotiate their surrender to the Caesarian side, thus achieving a "bloodless" victory (emphasized in Caesar's *Civil War*) and seven additional legions.

Adam Anders

See also Caesar, Gaius Julius; Civil Wars (I) (49–45 BCE); Pompey; Spanish Wars

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Illyria

Ancient Illyria comprised parts of modern-day Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Albania. The territory was inhabited by several peoples of Illyrian or Pannonian origin, most notably the coastal Liburni and Delmatae, who were renowned for their seafaring abilities. Although the Illyrians had been engaged in trade with the Greeks since the seventh century BCE, their first contact with the Romans occurred in 230 BCE, when a group of Illyrian pirates attacked Italian merchants. This event initiated the First Illyrian War, fought between Rome and the Illyrian kingdom (229–228 BCE). After the First Illyrian War, Illyria became a Roman client state. The Illyrian kingdom finally fell in 168 BCE, at which point Illyria came under the jurisdiction of the Romans. This was not, however, the end of Roman-Illyrian conflict. The Delmatae's protest about encroachment on their territory set in motion a series of further Roman campaigns between the years 158–135 BCE. In general, the Romans considered Illyria to be of little threat, and these campaigns were conducted mainly for the purposes of training an army or seeking glory. Definitive Roman control over Illyria, however, was established following the Augustan campaigns of 35–33 BCE and 13–9 BCE (*Pannonian Wars*); and 6–9 CE (Pannonian revolt), after which the Roman provinces of Dalmatia and Pannonia came into existence.

Blanka Misić

See also Dalmatia; Pannonian Revolt; Pannonian Wars

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Imperator

Throughout the Roman period, the title *imperator* denoted military authority and evidenced martial expertise. With the advent of the Principate, *imperator* became one of the emperor's titles and closely bound up with imperial power.

During the republican era, victorious troops would bestow the title *imperator* upon a successful general through public acclamation. Tradition indicates that this may have taken place on the battlefield itself (Pliny the Younger, *Panegyricus* 12.1). Though Scipio Africanus was allegedly hailed as *imperator*, the first attested general to be hailed as *imperator* was Lucius Aemilius Paullus in 189 BCE. Generals were permitted to retain the title of *imperator* until they re-entered the city of Rome for their triumph, although on occasion the Senate could also permit a general to utilize the title on the day of his triumph.

The title of *imperator* took on a more significant meaning during the violence of the late Republic and establishment of the Principate. Augustus recognized the value of the title for emphasizing his preeminent military authority. In a radical shift in tradition, Augustus utilized *Imperator* as a *praenomen*, ensuring that his name (*Imperator Caesar Augustus*) was permanently linked to military command. While the title of *imperator* continued to be bestowed upon members of the imperial family, it persisted in a permanent form in the name of the emperor himself. Augustus' successors did not necessarily follow Augustus' model. Both Tiberius and Claudius publicly refused to take the *praenomen imperatoris* (Suetonius, *Tiberius* 26.2, *Claudius* 12.1). The chaos of the civil wars of 69 CE prompted subsequent emperors, starting with Vespasian (69–79 CE), to adopt the *praenomen imperatoris* on a regular basis, thus distinguishing themselves as supreme military commanders.

Under the early Principate, acclamations as *imperator* increasingly became the preserve of the imperial family. The final acclamation of an individual outside of the imperial family was that of Junius Blaesus in 22 CE. Emperors came to accept the title of *imperator* on behalf of the successful generals who fought under their command. The title was charged with political meaning, to the extent that Augustus could deprive Drusus of an acclamation by the troops (Dio 54.33.5).

It is likely that most emperors dated their first acclamation as *imperator*

to their accession, so that number of time an emperor was acclaimed as *imperator* was often abbreviated in his titles and coins to signify the year of his reign. It has been conjectured that imperial acclamations were also used to designate potential heirs, particularly during the Julio-Claudian period (Tacitus *Annals* 1.3). The number of acclamations accepted by particular emperors varied according to the nature of their reigns. It is noteworthy that, of the Julio-Claudian emperors, Claudius received the most acclamations (Campbell 1984: 124). This may reflect his lack of military credibility and his desire to demonstrate that he held the political allegiance of the praetorians and provincial armies.

The title of *imperator* was thus imbued with significant political power as a symbol of victory and of imperial rule. Its significance in terms of battlefield exploits became increasingly irrelevant. Yet this did not detract from its symbolic currency as evidence of the close relationship between the emperor and his soldiers. This latter function demonstrates why the title of *imperator* was jealously monopolized by the emperor and his close male relatives. If you were a nonimperial general or even private citizen who was saluted as *imperator*, you had revolted from the incumbent emperor, which is why some emperors elevated by their soldiers attempted at first to refuse the title.

Jonathan Eaton

See also Acclamation; Army in Politics; Emperor as Commander; Imperial Titles

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Imperial Titles

The titles of the Roman emperors are attested in inscriptions, edicts, and other documentary sources, and tended to grow longer and longer over the centuries. The core element was *Imperator Caesar Augustus*, adopted by Augustus (27 BCE–14 CE), to which filiation, numerous offices, and honorifics

could be added. The imperial titles packed a great deal of ideology into a relatively short space, as especially on coins, and also on inscriptions, imperial titles received standard abbreviations. After Augustus, the Julio-Claudian emperors did not take the *praenomen Imperator*, but it is a standard element of imperial titulature from Vespasian onward.

Filiation indicated the relationship of the present emperor to his immediate predecessor. Augustus was *divi filius*, son of the deified (Julius Caesar), and many subsequent emperors were also deified after their deaths. Though adopted by Nerva, Trajan was officially *divi Nervae filius*, “son of the deified Nerva.”

The emperor’s formal titles included *pontifex maximus*, chief priest of the state religion; holder of the tribunician power (for the *n*th time); and *imperator* (for the *n*th time), distinct from the praenomen *Imperator*. The consulship (for the *n*th time) might also be included. These formal titles indicated the offices and powers held by the emperor, dating from the Augustan settlements.

Honorific titles included *pater patriae* (“Father of the Fatherland,” adopted by Augustus), *pius* (“faithful”), and *felix* (“fortunate”). Other honorific titles alluded to the emperor’s conquests, which were attributed to him even if he did not campaign in person. *Britannicus* or “Conqueror of Britain,” *Germanicus* or “Conqueror of Germany,” and *Parthicus* or “Conqueror of Persia” were possible triumphal titles, to which *maximus* was often added, particularly by the late second century CE onward. Thus Caracalla was *Parthicus Maximus* and *Britannicus Maximus*, associating himself with his father’s conquests. In Severus’ reign, Caracalla had been nominal Augustus (co-emperor with Severus). The later emperor might also be termed *invictus* (“unconquerable”). The military role of the emperor as symbolic conqueror was thus stressed.

In the later Empire, *Dominus noster* (“Our Lord”) tended to supplant *Imperator* as the first element, usually abbreviated to *D(ominus) N(oster)* in inscriptions. Abstract titles such as *Aeternitas* (“Your Eternity”) or *Serenitas* (“Your Serenity”) also became frequently used, especially in noninscriptionary documentary sources such as imperial edicts and communications.

Sara E. Phang

See also Acclamation; Augustus; Caracalla; Emperor as Commander;

Imperator; Septimius Severus; Succession (Imperial)

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Imperialism

Like most English words ending in “-ism,” imperialism is a modern term, although it has broad conceptual parallels across the span of human civilization. Its semantic root is the Latin term *imperium*, “the power to command.” Imperialism can be simply defined as the behavior by which a powerful state exerts control over less powerful states.

Modern political theorists use the term imperialism to cover a wide range of state activities and behaviors. If “empire,” as Michael Doyle defines it, is “a system of interaction between two political entities, one of which, the dominant metropole, exerts political control over the internal and external policy—the effective sovereignty—of the other, the subordinate periphery” (Doyle 1986: 12), then imperialism is the pursuit by a metropole of this type of control. Empire may be informal (that is, sustained by collaborators on the periphery rather than by a resident metropolitan military and bureaucracy), but must be distinguished from hegemony (when a metropole seeks to control, by formal or informal means, another state’s foreign policy only).

Most structural theories of imperialism can be categorized as either metrocentric, pericentric, or systemic. Metrocentric theory regards imperialism exclusively as a function of “dispositional” factors within metropolitan society (a particularly warlike aristocracy, the need for excess capital at home to find new outlets for investment abroad). Pericentric theory argues that troubles on the periphery, such as disputes between imperial collaborators and resisters, and consequent threats to metropolitan investments, draw imperial powers reluctantly into expensive and potentially bloody armed interventions to protect those investments (the

flag, as it were, follows trade, not the other way round). Systemic theory (also called Realist theory) posits a transcendent international system generated by the limitations of human reactions to security threats. In the absence of a credible international referee (a state of anarchy, literally “leaderlessness”), this system compels all states to behave in broadly similar ways, resulting in a ruthless global environment in which “the state among states ... conducts its affairs in the brooding shadow of violence. Because some states may at any time use force, all states must be prepared to do so—or live at the mercy of their militarily more vigorous neighbors” (Waltz 1979: 102). All states, therefore, engage in security-seeking behavior, resulting, over time, in only one or a few metropolitan imperial powers controlling the destiny of a host of lesser states.

Although scholars of Roman international relations have only recently begun applying imperialism theory to their subject matter, it has never been in serious doubt that the Romans practiced—for good or ill—some form or forms of imperialism at different points in their history. The discussion began in antiquity itself, specifically in the work of the second-century BCE Greek politician and historian Polybius of Megalopolis, whose 40-book *Histories* charted the rise of Rome to world power during the late third and early second centuries BCE. In his work, Polybius credited the Romans with a “plan of universal aggression” (1.3.6, 3.2.6), an appetite for power that escalated as Roman victories over the Italians, the Carthaginians, the Celts, the Greeks, and the Hellenistic kingdoms mounted up. On the other hand, Polybius also identifies crises on Rome’s periphery as responsible for Roman expansion. So, for example, a request for Roman intervention against Hiero II of Syracuse by the Mamertines of Messana in 264 BCE led to war with Carthage and, eventually, a Roman province of Sicily. Moreover, despite Polybius’ thesis that the Romans had a “plan of universal aggression,” in terms of the specific causes of major wars, throughout his narrative Rome’s rivals are usually the aggressors. Thus, famously, “the wrath of the Barcids”—the anger of the father and brother-in-law of Hannibal over the Roman defeat of Carthage in the First Punic War, followed by the Roman seizure of Carthaginian Sardinia—was passed on to Hannibal, which, together with the success of the Carthaginian empire in Spain, drove the Carthaginians to provoke a major war with Rome in 218 BCE (Polybius 3.9.6–12.7). (It is unclear, however, whether the Roman seizure of Sardinia or the Carthaginian *reaction* to it was a major cause in Polybius’ mind; if the

former, then the Romans were at least partly responsible and rather aggressive, but the text is ambiguous: compare Polybius 3.10.1–5 and 13.1 with 3.30.4.)

The ancient analysis of Polybius set the terms of the modern discussion of Roman imperialism. For decades, this discussion revolved around the issue of “defensive” vs. “aggressive” imperialism. The defensive imperialism hypothesis filtered the Roman acquisition of an empire through the lens of a particular thesis about the British Empire—that it was acquired in “a fit of absence of mind,” to quote historian and classicist Sir John Robert Seeley. The aggressive imperialism thesis appeared in its extreme form in *War and Imperialism in Republican Rome, 327–70 BC* (1979) by William Harris, where the author argued that the internal characteristics and pathologies unique to Roman society (a fetishization of victory, a cult dedicated to the goddess Victoria, an aristocratic moral code based on *virtus*, a political economy based on success in war) made the Romans exceptionally aggressive and bellicose compared to their system competitors. Although the Harris thesis remains influential, it has been successfully challenged by scholars who adopt a pericentric perspective (emphasizing the passive and reactive nature of Roman Republican imperialism), or an international systems approach (emphasizing the brutality of the Mediterranean interstate system as the driving force behind Roman behavior).

No unified theory of Roman imperialism can possibly begin to explain Rome’s every (re)action in the international sphere, much less the evolution of the nature of Roman imperialism over the long term. The early republican period (509–264 BCE) is dominated by the story of the gradual (and not uncontested) expansion of Roman power (by diplomatic as well as military means) throughout the Italian peninsula. The era of the middle Republic (264–133 BCE) is marked by a sudden projection of Roman power overseas during the relatively short time-span of 53 years between 220 and 167 BCE, which was identified by Polybius as an unprecedented achievement in human history. There followed long periods of contestation of Roman power throughout the Mediterranean (in Spain, Greece, Asia Minor, and North Africa), and, in the Late Republic, the rise of the military dynasts, who pursued opportunities for war as a personal rather than a state endeavor. The classic example of this latter phenomenon is Julius Caesar’s self-assigned 10-year command in Gaul during the 50s BCE.

Under the emperors, Rome’s foreign policy focus shifted from imperial

expansion to consolidation. The process of “provincialization,” the regularization of Roman administration in the formally annexed portions of the empire (the provinces), accelerated, and “Romanization,” the urbanization and acculturation to Roman ways of Rome’s provincial subjects, began in earnest. Territorial expansion did not cease altogether, however, the emperor Augustus and several of his successors continued to pursue opportunities for aggressive expansion, particularly against the Germanic tribes (Augustus, Domitian) and on the eastern frontier (the Flavian emperors, Trajan). Roman wars of expansion were effectively over by the mid-second century CE, and imperial priorities would soon shift toward self-preservation as competition between rival claimants to the throne intensified, and the empire began the slow process of disintegration and reformation into distinct eastern and western halves.

Paul J. Burton

See also Acclamation; Augustus; *Imperator*; *Imperium*; Polybius; Victoria; Victory; *Virtus*

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Imperium

Imperium was the power to command vested in a Roman magistrate or governor, and during the Principate, in the emperor and his provincial governors. In the traditional Republic, dictators, consuls, and praetors held

imperium. Proconsuls and propraetors, as governors of *provinciae*, held *imperium* only within the bounds of their *provinciae* and laid it down as soon as they crossed the borders. Lesser magistrates, such as tribunes of the plebs, quaestors, and aediles, did not have *imperium*. *Imperium* was conferred by the Senate on magistrates and promagistrates, originally for only the year of office.

The conventional view is that as legitimate political authority, *imperium* was distinct from purely military command; it was exercised both at home (*imperium domi*) and in the field (*imperium militiae*). Commanders-in-chief (dictators, consuls, or praetors) had *imperium*. Their senior officers, even legates and tribunes, did not have *imperium*; nor did low-ranking officers such as centurions. (For the view that *imperium* applied only *militiae*, in war, Drogula 2015.)

In the conventional view, *imperium* conferred on a magistrate *coercitio*, the right to compel citizens and punish disobedient citizens. However, at Rome citizens were protected from magistrates' unjust use of *imperium* by the right of *provocatio*, appeal to the Roman people. Citizens who faced summary judgment from a magistrate could appeal to the Roman people for a fair trial. They could also appeal to the tribunes of the plebs. In contrast, a commander's *imperium militiae* was unrestricted, according to Cicero; soldiers in the field ideally did not have the right of *provocatio* against their commanders (Cicero, *Laws* 3.3.6). Cicero may have been mistaken. In some instances of military indiscipline in the middle Republic, the cases were referred to the Roman people for trial (for example, Valerius Maximus 6.1.11). During Rome's Italian Wars, this was still practical. By Cicero's day, Roman armies often served for long periods outside Italy; cases could not easily be referred to Rome, and military discipline became harsher, exacerbated by the drop in common soldiers' social status. Commanders might be prosecuted at Rome for abuses of *imperium* on their return, when they laid down their *imperium*.

Imperium ceased to apply within the Roman private household (*domus*) where the *paterfamilias*, the oldest living male ascendant who headed the household, had summary judgment over his descendants. In theory, the *paterfamilias* had power of life and death (*vitae necisque potestas*) over his descendants, though the power to inflict death was almost never used. The *paterfamilias* and other respected adults in the family formed a *consilium* for judgment. In the Republic, women who committed crimes were typically

handed over to their *paterfamilias* for judgment.

A trend in the late Republic was for grants of *imperium*, by the Senate or by public law, to have a wider geographic or temporal scope for particular purposes. An example is Pompey's special *imperium* to combat Mediterranean piracy, extending over many traditional *provinciae* (covering their coastlines as well as the Mediterranean Sea) and granted for three years. *Imperium* also came to be granted to promagistrates for more than one year at a time. Caesar received *imperium* for the Gallic Wars for five years at a time. These prefigured the emperor's greater *imperium*.

Augustus was granted proconsular *imperium*, enabling him to override his governors (*legati Augusti pro praetore*) in imperial provinces. His *imperium* extended over all the imperial provinces (provinces with an active military presence) and was granted for 10 years at a time. His *imperium* was then made *maius* (qualitatively greater), enabling him also to command within the city of Rome and intervene in public (termed "senatorial" in earlier scholarship) provinces governed by proconsuls.

From Augustus onward, the emperor's *imperium maius* enabled him to campaign in person in the provinces (though before Domitian and Trajan, with the exception of the civil war of 69 CE, emperors very rarely campaigned in person). More importantly, the emperor's *imperium* enabled him to intervene with or overrule his governors, and to hear legal cases on appeal, as well as to delegate authority to important administrators such as the praetorian prefect. The emperors' *imperium* was conferred by the Senate on accession and renewed automatically, though fragments of a law, the *lex de imperio Vespasiani*, survive, conferring the imperial powers on Vespasian (emperor 69–79), who as the victor of the war of 69 CE was a successful usurper in need of legitimacy. *Imperium maius* might also be granted to members of the imperial family who served as commanders-in-chief (e.g., Germanicus' tour of inspection in the eastern empire in 17–19 CE).

The use of *imperium Romanum* to mean "Roman empire" is not entirely historical. *Imperium* connotes political authority, rather than the geographical extent of such authority, so that terms such as *imperium Romanum* were abstract, suggesting "Roman dominion" rather than geographical "empire."

Sara E. Phang

See also Augustus; *Cursus Honorum* (Republic); *Domi/Militiae*; *Imperator*;

Military Discipline; Pompey; *Provocatio*; Republic, Political Structure; Senate, Senators; Vespasian; War Crimes

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Inscriptions

Greek and Latin epigraphy, or inscriptions cut into stone, is a major source for the documentary history of the Roman army and its personnel, as well as Roman elite careers and treaties between communities. Epigraphy is also the study of such inscriptions, including their reconstruction, transcription, and publication in academic collections. Many thousands of inscriptions have been transcribed and published. They must be reconstructed by scholars because the ancient stone cutters used many conventional abbreviations and because many stones have weathered away or are otherwise damaged.

Stone inscriptions are a formal documentary source, representing the statements that relatively privileged inhabitants of the Roman Empire wished to preserve for posterity. As such, they tend not to depict conflict, or only its triumphant resolution (for instance, commemoration of a victory). Less formal types of inscriptions, such as graffiti scratched on walls, are also studied by epigraphers.

The early Roman inscriptions from the last two or three centuries of the Republic include the Scipionic funerary epitaphs from the family of the Cornelii Scipiones, whose descendants included Scipio Africanus and Scipio Aemilianus. These epitaphs are from earlier generations of the Cornelii Scipiones and attest the military virtues that motivated the Roman elite during the mid-Republic. Other inscriptions from the Republic commemorate the victories of generals. However, inscriptions from the

Republic are relatively thin on the ground compared with inscriptions of the imperial era.

Latin inscriptions sometimes document the civil wars of the late Republic. One of the most famous, the *Laudatio Turiae*, dates from the period of the triumviral wars (44–31 BCE) and records how the dedicator's wife, Turia, exerted herself to save her husband when he was exiled during the proscriptions. Another very famous inscription, the *Res Gestae Divi Augusti*, "The Deeds of the Deified Augustus," survives from various locations and in Greek translation; it was erected in many cities around the empire at Augustus' posthumous order. In the first person, Augustus narrates his rise to power and his deeds as Rome's first emperor.

The epigraphic habit, or practice of erecting inscriptions, underwent a boom in the early Empire, displaying great sophistication in Rome and Italy itself and filtering to the provinces. A wider social range of individuals erected inscriptions. In the vicinity of military bases, typical inscriptions include victory monuments, career inscriptions of commanders (legates) and high-ranking officers, epitaphs of ordinary soldiers, inscriptions recording voluntary associations of military personnel, and religious dedications by personnel. Career inscriptions (often, not always, epitaphs) list the ranks and occupational specialties held by individual Roman military personnel. Such inscriptions have enabled scholars to reconstruct promotion patterns in the imperial Roman army. For examples of epitaphs of officers, see *Illustrations*: tombstones of centurion Marcus Caelius and of tribune Sextus Adgennius Macrinus.

A modestly well-off individual according to the economic baseline of the empire, such as a legionary common soldier (*miles gregarius*), veteran, or his heirs could afford a gravestone with an epitaph. Common soldiers are approximately the lowest social stratum commemorated in Latin epitaphs in the frontier provinces along the Rhine and Danube and in North Africa. This practice reflects acculturation to Roman ways and the diffusion of Latin-speaking culture. The soldiers probably spoke Latin and if they were not literate in Latin, they and their heirs knew people who were literate who could draft an epitaph. In Italy, the epigraphic habit has a different pattern: slaves and former slaves erected large numbers of epitaphs, though the military units based in Italy, the praetorians, urban cohorts, and fleets, also produced epitaphs. Many praetorians, recruited from more rural areas of Italy, seem to have died young in the city of Rome's crowded, unhealthy

conditions, where malaria and other infectious diseases often felled newcomers.

Soldiers formed voluntary associations (*collegia*, clubs or guilds), often grouped by rank or military occupational specialty. *Collegia* collected and pooled donations from members to fund feasts and funerary arrangements. Many civilians belonged to similar associations.

Religious dedications are another common type of inscription at military sites. These inscriptions record vows to gods, often erected when the vow had been fulfilled; in the inscription, the dedicator expressed his gratitude to the deity. Religious inscriptions show that soldiers worshipped both local gods and deities that were popular throughout the empire. Some gods, such as Mithras and Jupiter Dolichenus, were particularly popular with military personnel.

Some instances of corruption and abuses in the imperial army are known to us from inscriptions from the second and third centuries CE. Soldiers traveling on duty in the Balkans and Asia Minor abused the requisition of transport and lodging, seizing provincials' animals, and failing to compensate home owners for food and board. The victimized local communities petitioned the emperor in the hope that he would check the abuses. When the communities received a favorable answer from the emperor, they commemorated it by inscribing the petition and response on stone.

The epigraphic habit began to fall off in the third century CE, probably due to economic hardship. It was revived somewhat in the later Empire (284–476), but not on so large a scale. The disappearance of inscriptions does not necessarily mean that the social practices they represent ceased or that illiteracy increased on a large scale. Texts formerly inscribed on stone could have been painted on walls (examples are preserved at Pompeii and Herculaneum, buried by the Vesuvian eruption in 79 CE) or on less expensive and more perishable materials such as wooden boards.

Sara E. Phang

See also Documentary Sources; Elite Participation; Promotion in Army (Imperial); Religion and Warfare

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Isthmian Declaration (196 BCE)

As a result of the Roman victory over Philip V of Macedon at the battle of Cynoscephalae (197 BCE) in the Second Macedonian War (200–197 BCE), Titus Quinctius Flamininus made a statement at the Isthmian Games in 196 announcing “the freedom of the Greeks” (Polybius 18.46). He did so without the permission of the Roman Senate and needed to persuade the Senate to accept his statement. Flamininus was idolized in Greece for supporting the freedom of the Greeks from Macedon, but it is possible the Romans were willing to support Greek freedom as a partial rationale for aggressive imperialism against the Hellenistic monarchies.

Sara E. Phang

See also Cynoscephalae, Battle of; Flamininus; Macedonian War, Second.
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Ius Fetiale

Ius fetiale, or fetial law, was a code by which the fetial priests ritually guaranteed that the Romans waged just wars. This code demonstrates the importance the Romans placed on divine approval of military matters. The code developed under the Roman kings Tullus Hostilius and Ancus Marcius in the seventh century BCE. A pair of fetial priests traveled to enemy territory, where they announced Rome's grievances and demands, repeating them a ritual number of times. The repetition both ensured that the demands were heard by a large number of people and also compelled the enemy to offer redress on the threat of war. If the enemy did not meet the demands within a month, the fetiales called upon Jupiter, the god who guarantees laws, and Janus, the god of beginnings, and all other gods to witness the injustice. Then the Roman state made a formal declaration of war, which the fetiales announced to the enemy by casting a bloody spear across the border between Roman and enemy territory.

When Rome's enemies were across the sea and no longer shared contiguous borders with Rome, a captive was forced to purchase a symbolic piece of land near the Temple of Bellona in Rome into which the fetiales cast the spear. Fetiales also investigated allies' claims of abuse by Romans; if substantiated, the fetiales delivered the men accused to the injured parties. Dionysius of Halicarnassus (2.72) attributes the Romans' military success to their following the *ius fetiale* and to their only engaging in divinely sanctioned wars.

Amanda J. Coles

See also Bellum Iustum; Fetiales; Formal Declaration of War; Janus, Temple of; Religion and Warfare; Treaties

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J

Janus, Temple of

A small shrine to Janus Geminus (Twin) was located near the Basilica Aemilia in the Roman Forum. The Romans closed the Temple of Janus on the rare occasions when they were completely at peace, thus ritually marking the lack of military activity. Janus was depicted in this shrine as a god with two bearded faces looking in opposite directions. In addition to protecting entrances, Janus was the god of beginnings and endings. As such, he lent his name to January, the first month of the Roman calendar (after 153 BCE). He was also invoked first in Roman prayers, for example, when Decius Mus dedicated himself to the gods before battle in 340 BCE. Janus' oldest shrine was a bridge (*ianua*) along the *sacra via*, the sacred road through the forum. Construction of this shrine is attributed to King Numa Pompilius (715–673 BCE). The shrine boasted two sets of doors that were kept open during war and closed when Rome was completely at peace. The Roman poet Ovid (43 BCE–17 CE) writes that the doors were closed to keep the goddess Peace within the city. Due to the high level of military activity during the Roman monarchy and Republic, the doors were closed only once during the reign of King Numa and once again in 235 BCE after the consul Titus Manlius Torquatus celebrated a triumph over the Sardinians. Augustus, Rome's first emperor, boasted that he closed the doors three times in his reign. The exact location of the Temple of Janus Geminus in the Roman forum is unknown, but a coin dating to ca. 65 CE (under the emperor Nero) shows the imperial reconstruction of the arch and bronze-decorated doors.

A second Temple of Janus stood in the Forum Holitorium (the vegetable market between the Capitoline Hill and the Tiber River) in Rome. The

general Gaius Duilius vowed this temple during the First Punic War (264–241 BCE) after the Romans defeated the Carthaginians at Mylae in Sicily in 260 BCE. There were three small victory temples in the Forum Holitorium, the northernmost of which is most likely the Temple to Janus. These victory temples served as political propaganda to advertise the generals' success in battle and assist them in their next political campaign. Augustus restored the Forum Holitorium temple when he renovated the city; Tiberius rededicated it in 17 CE. Janus' two temples represent two ways military men might interact with the gods. The arched temple in the main forum was opened and closed in accordance with a customary public ritual, while the Forum Holitorium temple advertised an individual general's military success and piety.



Sestertius of Nero, depicting the temple of Janus (ca. 66 CE). The temple of Janus was closed only during times of peace—a rare event. Ironically, this coin was issued

during the year of the outbreak of the Jewish War (Judaea's revolt against Rome). Located in the Museo Bottacini, Padua, Italy. (DeAgostini/Getty Images)

Amanda J. Coles

See also Augustus; Peace; Manlius Torquatus, Titus

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Jerusalem, Siege of (70 CE)

The siege of Jerusalem began in the spring of 70 CE and ended in September, effectively finishing the Jewish War. Following his victory in the War of Four Emperors in 69, Vespasian ordered his son Titus, the Roman commander in Judaea, to take Jerusalem, providing the Flavian dynasty with the victory over foreign enemies needed for legitimacy. Jerusalem was held by three competing factions led by Eleazar ben Simon, John of Gischala, and Simon bar Giora, respectively.

Titus surrounded Jerusalem with four legions in the spring of 70. Jerusalem was divided among three factions, which were sometimes able to cooperate against the Romans. The food supply was under great pressure. By the beginning of summer, Titus breached the third and second walls, and then turned to take the Antonia Fortress, overlooking the Jerusalem Temple and the Temple Mount. In surprise sallies, the Jews were able to hinder the Romans and destroy their siege equipment. Tightened security and a wooden wall placed around Jerusalem stopped these assaults. By the summer, the Jews were running very low on food. By August, the Romans had captured the Antonia Fortress and broken into the Temple, burning it down on the ninth day of Av, the Jewish day of mourning for the

destruction of the First Temple. From there, the Romans moved into the rest of the city. In a month, they had subjugated it and destroyed all resistance. Most of the inhabitants of Jerusalem were killed or enslaved. Titus returned to Rome in 71 for a triumph, bringing with him huge amounts of slaves and treasure.

Nathan Schumer

See also Jewish War; Josephus; Siege Warfare; Titus; War of Four Emperors

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Jewish War (66–70 CE), Causes

The Jewish War took place between 66 and 70 CE, in Roman Judaea. It began as a small-scale rebellion, but the defeat of a Roman army transformed it into a larger war. It was interrupted by an empire-wide civil war, following the death of the emperor Nero in 68 CE. After 69 CE, Vespasian was emperor. His son Titus, now the Roman commander in Judaea, renewed the war, destroying Jerusalem in 70 CE and crushing the remaining pockets of Jewish resistance by 73 CE.

Though nominally under Roman rule from 63 BCE on, Judaea was integrated into the empire under the rule of the client monarch Herod the Great. Herod had allied with Mark Antony and Octavian, and was declared king of the Jews in 40/39 BCE. Herod conquered Judaea in 37 BCE, repressing dissent, and establishing a kingdom that lasted in various manifestations to the early second century. Herod's son Archelaus was deposed in 6 CE and a Roman governor was put into place. This governor was at first called the prefect of the Jews, and later a procurator. The Roman governor had a small military force at his disposal, five cohorts of infantry and one of cavalry, recruited from Greek cities in the province. He was based in the capital city of Caesarea, and was responsible for taxation, building projects, and maintaining order. The governor inherited the machinery of government

from the Herodian state. The governor coexisted with the Jewish Herodian kings, who had managerial power over the Temple in Jerusalem. The Roman governor of Syria was the final administrative piece in this system. He had authority over the local Roman governor and the Herodian client king.

The province of Judaea was managed on a day-to-day level through the Jewish priestly elites of Jerusalem. The High Priest managed the Temple; he was appointed at first by the governor, but eventually by the Herodian king. Following Herod's renovation of the Temple and creation of larger ports, Jerusalem had been enriched by a pilgrimage economy. This benefited the Jewish elites, making Temple service quite lucrative. Such riches led to increasing aristocratic competition for positions in the Temple during the first century. These overlapping areas of jurisdiction and the failure of these shared sovereigns and groups to collaborate in putting down the rebellion played an important role in the revolt's outbreak.

Economic anxieties may have been an important cause of rebellion. Archaeological evidence suggests that the population increased in this period, as did the urbanization of Palestine. Increased population pressure put a strain on the system. Cities were home to urban elites who owned estates in the countryside, who displaced or acquired the lands of traditional middling and poor rural farmers.

The cultural clash between Rome and Jerusalem was also an important cause of rebellion. Jewish culture in this time period was focused on the Temple; it framed most of its cultural production and institutions through this Temple and Jewish allegiance to an aniconic, monotheistic God. It is hard to convey how bizarre Judaism seemed to the rest of the ancient world. Romans regularly ridiculed the Jews, joining their contempt to a long-standing Greek tradition of anti-Judaism. Jews, because of their singular and exclusive religion were unable to take part in the traditional governing systems of the Roman world. They could not acknowledge the divinity of the emperor or Rome, nor could they display loyalty to the symbols of Rome, because their religion preached a strict aniconism. Furthermore, they misconstrued the traditional Roman practices of euergetism and patronage. Roman governors were probably deeply confused, when Jews reacted to Roman benevolence with riots, as during the governorship of Pontius Pilate, when he sought to build an aqueduct using the Temple's money and in return for his benefaction, reaped a harvest of riots.

Nathan Schumer

See also Josephus; Judaea; Titus; Vespasian

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Jewish War (66–70 CE), Course

During the procuratorship of Gessius Florus (64–66 CE), tensions built up. Florus had little respect for the Jewish elites. Florus also favored the Greeks of Caesarea, in their struggles with the Jews. This led to an incident in Caesarea which is considered the cause of the war. In Caesarea, a Greek sacrificed a bird outside of a synagogue, setting off a riot. This incident incited the Jews of Jerusalem. When Florus entered the city, a group of young priests paraded around, asking for money to give the governor as if he were a beggar. In a rage, Florus ordered his troops to attack the city. However, the Jews drove him and his troops out of the city. Then, Eleazar ben Anaias suspended the sacrificial service for the emperor, openly declaring rebellion.

At this point, two anti-Roman parties existed in Jerusalem, the Zealots, led by Eleazar ben Simon, and the Sicarii, led by Menahem ben Yair. In Jerusalem, they slaughtered the Roman troops. The Zealots turned on the Sicarii, slaying Menahem and driving his followers out of the city. Throughout Syria, Jews attacked Greek cities. In response, many Greek cities slaughtered their Jewish inhabitants. All of this disorder impelled the governor of Syria, Cestius Gallus, to march on Jerusalem. He reached Jerusalem, but for an unknown reason turned back and was ambushed by

the Jewish forces. His army was routed at the battle of Beth Horon. The emperor Nero directed Vespasian to suppress the revolt.

On a political level, the Roman regime had failed remarkably. A tense relationship between the elites and the Roman procurator led to increased violence. The Syrian governor had failed to effectively intervene. Meanwhile, the Herodian king Agrippa II had the means to intervene in elite competition based on the Temple, but no formal jurisdiction. He and the procurator Florus were also at odds. The entire machinery of Roman governance failed to prevent revolt.

Jerusalem was controlled by Ananus ben Ananus, the leader of the faction that had come to power following the defeat of Cestius Gallus. Ananus and his allies dispatched generals to various regions of Palestine. One general led a failed attack on the port city of Ashkelon. Another, the historian Josephus, attempted to organize Galilee to resist the Roman assault. Josephus ran afoul of a local magnate, John of Gischala. When the Romans arrived in 67, Galilee was divided between Josephus, John, and Roman loyalists, such as the city of Sepphoris.

In the spring of 67 CE, Vespasian landed at Ptolemais and led his army into Galilee. Many Jewish cities capitulated on his arrival; he besieged others, putting the inhabitants to the sword. At the siege of Jotapata, a minor fortified town, the historian Josephus went over to the Roman side. Josephus' rival, John of Gischala, fled with a band of followers to Jerusalem. By 68, Vespasian and Titus had subdued the north and moved down the coast, setting up a base in Caesarea.

In Jerusalem, John of Gischala joined Eleazar ben Simon's faction. They butchered Ananus ben Ananus and his allies. John of Gischala emerged as a faction leader, after defecting from Eleazar. While this civil war in Jerusalem was taking place in 68–69 CE, Vespasian conquered the district of Judaea, subjugating everything but Jerusalem. Vespasian's movements forced Simon bar Giora and his army into Jerusalem. Jerusalem was divided among Eleazar ben Simon and the Zealots, John of Gischala, and Simon bar Giora.

Meanwhile, the Roman Empire had fallen into chaos. In the middle of 68 CE, Nero was deposed. Galba, Otho, and Vitellius came to power successively during 68–69 CE. In the spring of 69 CE, the legions of the Danube, followed by those of Egypt and Syria declared Vespasian emperor. In the winter of 69 CE, Vespasian's forces defeated and killed Vitellius. Vespasian left for Rome in the summer of 70, but instructed his son Titus to

destroy Jerusalem and suppress the Jewish Revolt.

In March of 70, Titus arrived at Jerusalem. The defenders, weakened by internal strife, had some initial success in hindering the Roman siege equipment. In response, the Romans encircled Jerusalem with parapets. Food ran out in Jerusalem and the people starved. In August, after many attempts, the Romans captured the Antonia fortress above the Temple. By mid-August they had broken in to the Temple, and burned it. By September, they had destroyed the city of Jerusalem, captured and killed thousands of Jews and effectively ended the war. Roman casualties were unusually heavy, because Titus was under pressure to capture Jerusalem as soon as possible, to shore up the legitimacy of his father's reign by triumphing over a foreign enemy.

Mopping up operations continued in 71. The last pocket of Jewish resistance was crushed during the siege of Masada in 73, when the leader of the Sicarii rebels in the fortress, Eleazar ben Yair, convinced his followers to commit suicide, an act that has since become heroic and iconic. This was the end of the First Jewish War.

Nathan Schumer

See also Josephus; Judaea; Titus; Vespasian

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Jewish War (66–70 CE), Consequences

In scale, the Jewish War was a minor revolt in an obscure corner of the Roman Empire. Resistance was never particularly serious and its conclusion was inevitable. However, it occurred during a period of dramatic instability for the Roman Empire. Following Vespasian's triumph in his war with his competitors for the empire, he needed a way of reframing the civil war to

legitimize his seizure of power. The Flavians cloaked their seizure of power in the language of legitimate war against an outside enemy. Thus, they sought to magnify the level of Jewish resistance, connecting their rise to their victory in a foreign war. The Flavians imposed a tax on the Jews, in lieu of the two shekel tax that was traditionally paid to the Jerusalem Temple. This tax went to the Capitoline Temple of Jupiter Optimus Maximus, which was damaged during the Flavian capture of Rome. This tax symbolized the punitive subjugation of the Jewish people. The Flavians also rebuilt Rome, using the spoils of the Jewish War to adorn Rome with monuments such as the Arch of Titus and the new Coliseum.

The Jewish War also had important consequences for the nascent Christian community in the province of Judaea. By 70 CE, Christians were spread throughout the Mediterranean. A Christian community persisted in Jerusalem until the outbreak of the revolt in 66. It is in this period after 70 CE that Christianity seems to have separated from Judaism. Romans such as Pliny the Younger were able to recognize Christianity as something distinct from Judaism. Christians also believed that the Jewish War validated their theology, considering the destruction of the Temple punished Jews for their rejection of Jesus.

The province of Judaea changed in fundamental ways following the war. In 70, Judaea was annexed directly to the Roman Empire. The Roman annexation meant the province was governed by Roman law, meaning that traditional Jewish laws were no longer enforced. This probably led to the decline of Jewish practice. Jews had to make an effort to practice Judaism, but the evidence from cities suggests that much of the province chose to practice Greco-Roman civic paganism.

For the Jews, the Jewish War created a profound dislocation in their society. Much of the Jewish economy of the Second Temple period was focused on the Jerusalem Temple. The pilgrimage economy, which brought a massive influx of wealth into the city, ceased to exist. The lands of the Jerusalem priestly elite were confiscated and with their connection to the Temple severed, their main claim to preeminence was destroyed. For the Jewish religion, the destruction of the Temple was catastrophic. The apocalyptic writers from this period, 2 Baruch and 4 Ezra, counsel hope and preach the eternity of the Jewish covenant, despite the loss of the Temple. Both argue that the Torah, the written body of Jewish law, remained valid. The destruction of the Temple also was the beginning of the rabbinic

movement, the form of Judaism that is practiced today. The rabbis root their foundational moment in 70. The Jews in the postdestruction period had to formulate ways of practicing Judaism without the Temple.

Nathan Schumer

See also Josephus; Judaea; Titus; Vespasian

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Johannes (Emperor). See Fall of Roman Empire; Galla Placidia; Honorius

Josephus (37–ca. 100 CE)

Titus Flavius Josephus, born Yosef ben Mattiyahu, was a member of the priestly elite of Jerusalem and served as a commander of the Jewish resistance in Galilee during the Jewish War of 66–70. In 67, after the siege of Jotapata, Josephus defected to the Romans and served as a translator and aide to the Roman generals Vespasian and Titus, who later became emperors and founded the Flavian dynasty. Josephus was particularly close to Titus. After the war, Josephus went with the Flavians to Rome and witnessed their triumph. While in Rome, Josephus wrote a history of the Jewish War and several other works, including the *Jewish Antiquities*, making him the primary source for Jewish history in the Roman period. As a writer, Josephus is biased and clumsy, he adapts sources poorly, and he provides inconsistent versions of the same events, especially those that involve himself.

Josephus was born in 37 CE in the city of Jerusalem. His father was

Mattathias, a member of the priestly elite. Through his mother, Josephus was descended from the old Jewish ruling family, the Hasmoneans. Josephus had a traditional Jewish education in Jerusalem and studied with the different sectarian movements centered on the Jerusalem Temple. From 64–66 CE, Josephus came to Rome as part of an embassy that sought to free several priests who were on trial before the emperor Nero for causing disturbances in Judaea. Josephus' embassy was successful, because of the Jewish sympathies of the empress Poppaea Sabina.

Josephus returned to Judaea in 66 CE, at the outbreak of the Jewish Revolt. After defeating the Roman governor Cestius Gallus in 66 CE, the Jews formed a revolutionary government in Jerusalem. They dispatched Josephus to organize Jewish resistance in Galilee, the northern region of the province of Judaea. It is difficult to interpret Josephus' report of his actions in Galilee. His autobiography, the *Vita*, and his history, the *Jewish War*, contain different versions of the same events. In the *Jewish War*, Josephus portrays himself as a general, with formal institutional military powers and support from the population. In the *Vita*, Josephus appears to be one of several military adventurers based in Galilee, attempting to consolidate his own power.

Josephus' mission to Galilee, if its success is to be judged on the basis of Galilee's readiness for war with the Romans, must be considered a complete failure. He hurried back and forth from village to village, barely able to hold onto his life and command. Josephus also ran afoul of John of Gischala, a local warlord, who later emerged as a major leader of the revolt. The local power struggle between Josephus and John of Gischala was unresolved at the time of the Roman invasion in 67 CE.

The Roman army, under the command of Vespasian, gathered in Ptolemais (present-day Akko) and met little resistance in Galilee. They besieged several small fortified towns, butchered the inhabitants, and suppressed rebellion in the major city of Galilee, Tiberias. The other major city, Sepphoris, had already allied with the Romans. The Romans then besieged the city of Jotapata, trapping Josephus inside. When they captured the city, Josephus and 40 comrades hid in a cave under the city, where they decided to commit suicide. Josephus avoided this fate by being the last one to survive the successive drawing of lots for the mass suicide (Josephus, *Jewish War* 3.8.7). This episode has inspired a mathematical problem, the "Josephus Problem." Afterward, Josephus defected to the Romans.

Announcing that he was a messenger from the Jewish God, he predicted that Vespasian would become emperor.

When Vespasian was proclaimed emperor in 69, Josephus was freed from captivity. When Vespasian left for Italy in 70, his son Titus took over command of the Roman army in Judaea. Josephus attained relatively high status as a Roman collaborator. As the Roman campaign progressed and culminated in the siege of Jerusalem, Josephus had a variety of roles, translator, spokesman, and advisor to the Roman general Titus. Josephus, because of his role as a collaborator, was able to provide some benefits to his friends, rescue captured holy books, and free captives. He also received some land in Judaea. At the end of the war, Josephus came to Rome with the Flavians, receiving Vespasian's old house as a gift. There, Josephus began his history of the war. As a client of the Flavian dynasty and a new Roman citizen, Josephus changed his name to Titus Flavius Josephus.

Josephus was tasked with writing an official history of the Jewish War. His first effort was in Aramaic, which he then translated into Greek. This was the *Jewish War*, which was considered the official history of the Jewish War by both the Flavian emperors and their local ally, the Jewish king Agrippa II. Later in life, Josephus also wrote a long history of the Jews, called the *Jewish Antiquities*, which was dedicated to a patron named Epaphroditus. In it, Josephus treats Jewish history from the Creation to the Jewish Revolt. Appended to this work is the *Vita*, a description of Josephus' early life and activities in Galilee before the Roman invasion. This work is apologetic and polemical, refuting the accounts of Justus of Tiberias, who had become the secretary of King Agrippa II. Josephus believes that Justus of Tiberias has vilified him. Unfortunately, Justus of Tiberias' history has not survived. Finally, Josephus composed *Contra Apion*, which refuted a well-known attack on the Jews and the Jewish religion written by Apion, a first-century Greek intellectual in Alexandria. Josephus probably died around the year 100.

The Christian textual tradition preserved Josephus' works. Josephus argued that the tragic outcomes of the Jewish War were a result of God's abandonment of the Jewish people and the sins of the Jews. These explanations played an important role in shaping Christian theological understandings of the supersession of the Jewish faith by Christianity. Christians saw the Roman destruction of the Jerusalem Temple as God's repudiation of the Jewish people in response to their murder of Christ.

Josephus' works were also preserved among the Jews, but in a medieval Hebrew adaptation called *Sefer Yosippon*.

Nathan Schumer

See also Jewish War; Suicide; Titus; Vespasian

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Jovian (Emperor) (363–364 CE)

Jovian was a Roman emperor who ruled between June 27, 363 and February 17, 364 CE. Born at Singidunum (Belgrade), Jovian was the son of the senior imperial commander Varronianus. Prior to his accession, Jovian served as commander of the palace guard. When Julian died during the Persian campaign without nominating a successor, Jovian was proclaimed emperor by the army. Jovian was either forced upon the army by a small group of officers, or was a compromise candidate acceptable to both the eastern and western factions of the army and imperial hierarchy (Ammianus 25.5.4; Zosimus 3.30.1). Jovian subsequently negotiated a humiliating peace treaty with Sassanid Persia before returning to Roman territory, ceding to them the areas west of the River Tigris that had been won by the emperor Galerius. Jovian died in his sleep at Dadastana the following year (364) without naming an heir. The cause of his death was not known; he may have died of natural causes, or suffocated from the fumes of a charcoal brazier. (Ammianus 25.10.13–16; Eutropius 10.18.32). He was succeeded by Valentinian I (364–375), also the choice of the officers' council.

Mark Hebblewhite

See also Ammianus Marcellinus; Assassination; Julian; Succession (Imperial); Valentinian I

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Judaea

The term “Judaea” signifies two distinct geographic regions. Judaea primarily indicates the district surrounding the city of Jerusalem, now east central Israel and a large part of the West Bank. The geographical designation Judaea also came to signify the Roman province that consisted of most of present day Israel, the West Bank, and the East Bank of the Jordan River. This Roman province was formed from the domains of the Jewish client king Herod, who ruled from 39 BCE to 4 BCE. In 6 CE, after the banishment of Herod’s heir, Archelaus, the kingdom became a Roman province with an equestrian governor. Judaea, however, retained its association with the region around Jerusalem.

The ancient boundaries of the district of Judaea are described by the historian Josephus. It stretches from the Jordan River to the port city of Jaffa on the Mediterranean coast. The northwestern boundary is the port of Akko and the southern boundary is the Negev Desert. Much of Judaea is in the hill country. It has little rainfall and the land is relatively arid.

In the Biblical period, the district of Judaea was the home of the Israelite tribe of Judah, who presumably settled there during the Israelite conquest. A consistent Israelite presence was maintained until 586 BCE, when the Babylonian Empire overran the province and deported the inhabitants. In the Persian period, a renewed Jewish presence was established around the temple-city of Jerusalem.

The Hellenistic period of Judaeon history began with the conquest of

Alexander the Great. In 301 BCE, Judaea was incorporated into the Ptolemaic province of Coele-Syria. Then in 200 BCE, the Seleucids conquered Coele-Syria. An internal Jewish civil war of 167 BCE, drew in the Seleucid king Antiochus IV. A local priestly family, named the Hasmoneans, came to power. Following the implosion of the Seleucid Empire, Judaea emerged as a regional power and an ally of the Romans. The Hasmonean dynasty conquered the neighboring peoples, especially during the reigns of John Hyrcanus (134–104 BCE) and Alexander Yannai (103–76 BCE). They ruled modern day Israel and its territories, as well as the East Bank of the Jordan River.

Civil war broke out in 67 BCE between Aristobulus and Hyrcanus, the two heirs to the Hasmonean throne. Hyrcanus was supported by the Idumean Antipater, the father of the future king Herod. The arrival of Pompey Magnus in Judaea in 63 BCE led to the resolution of the civil war in Hyrcanus' favor, but the Mediterranean coast was detached from the kingdom of Judaea. Hyrcanus and Antipater supported the Caesarians during the Caesarian-Pompeian civil war. After the murder of Caesar in 44 BCE, they first supported the "Liberators," then Mark Antony. In 40 BCE, the Parthians invaded, restoring Aristobulus' son, Antigonus to the throne. At the same time, the Roman Senate, at the recommendation of Mark Antony and Octavian, made Herod, the son of Antipater, king of Judaea. From 39–37 BCE, Herod fought Antigonus and the Parthians, driving them out of Judaea. After the battle of Actium in 31 BCE, Octavian confirmed Herod as king of Judaea once more. After Octavian became emperor, he attached the mountainous regions of Southern Syria, Trachonitis, Batanea, and Auranitis to Herod's kingdom. Herod settled veteran soldiers and mercenaries in these areas to repress banditry and stabilize the regions.

Herod ruled both Greek and Jewish subjects, maintaining peace and stability in a multiethnic kingdom. He rebuilt the Second Temple, making it into a massive pilgrimage center for the Jewish Diaspora. He also sponsored building projects in Greek cities throughout the Mediterranean, as well as creating the city of Caesarea, which became the new capital of Judaea.

Herod's rule lasted from 39 BCE to 4 BCE. After his death, the peace imposed by Herod unraveled, as rebellions spread throughout the province. These rebellions were crushed by the governor of Syria, Publius Quinctilius Varus. Herod's son Archelaus was made ethnarch of a reduced kingdom, while two of Herod's other sons ruled in Galilee and Southern Syria.

Augustus stripped Archelaus of his throne in 6 CE and Judaea became a Roman province, governed by an equestrian prefect and under the jurisdiction of the proconsular governor in Syria. The prefect was supported by a small military force, recruited from the surrounding Greek cities.

Judaea briefly returned to Herodian rule at the beginning of the reign of the emperor Claudius in 41 CE. The grandson of Herod, Agrippa I, ruled southern Syria. A close friend of Claudius, he helped raise Claudius to the throne in the aftermath of Gaius' assassination. In recompense, Claudius added Judaea to Agrippa's kingdom. Upon Agrippa's death in 44 CE, Judaea reverted to Roman rule. During Roman imperial rule from 6 to 66 CE, Judaea had an anomalous provincial status, since much of the ruling machinery of the Herodian state was left in place. The governor was based in Caesarea, the old Herodian capital, and the military force at his disposal was originally the nucleus of the Herodian army.

After the revolt of 66–70 CE, Judaea was annexed as an imperial province. Its governor was a former praetor and the Tenth Legion was stationed at Jerusalem. In the 130s, another legion, the VI Ferrata, was settled in Palestine, in Southern Galilee at Legio. The outbreak of the Bar Kochba revolt in 132, and its quelling in 135, led to the effective extinction of the Jewish inhabitants of Judaea. The emperor Hadrian in 136 renamed the province of Judaea, Syria Palaestina after its ancient Philistine inhabitants. Palestine has been the term employed for the region until the founding of the modern nation of Israel in 1948.

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See also Bar Kochba Revolt; Client Monarchs; Jewish War; Josephus

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Jugurtha (ca. 160–104 BCE)

The main source for the life and career of the Numidian king Jugurtha (reigned 118–105) is Sallust's (ca. 86–35 BCE) *Jugurthine War*, written a little more than 50 years after the end of the war of the same name (112–105 BCE). Plutarch's *Lives* of Marius and Sulla also provide some indirect information. Livy and Cassius Dio survive only in epitomes for this period. Appian's *Numidian Affairs* has been largely lost, though a few fragments referring to Jugurtha do survive. Among the lost sources for the life of Jugurtha should be counted Sulla's *Memoirs* and the writings of Juba of Mauretania.

Jugurtha was the illegitimate son of Mastanabal, and grandson of Masinissa, king of Numidia and *amicus* of Rome from the end of the Second Punic War almost to the beginning of the Third. Though excluded from Masinissa's will on account of his birth, Jugurtha was adopted and raised upon his father's death by his uncle, Micipsa, on a level with Micipsa's two sons, Adherbal and Hiempsal.

His popularity, appearance and athletic successes, according to Sallust, roused the envy of Micipsa, who feared the development of rivalry between Jugurtha and his younger cousins that might lead to a civil war. Micipsa therefore sent Jugurtha with a Numidian force of infantry and cavalry to Spain to assist Scipio Aemilianus in the Numantine War, hoping that Jugurtha would be killed in battle (133 BCE). Sallust may be exaggerating Micipsa's concerns, but a rivalry certainly did exist between the cousins by ca. 118 BCE. At any rate, Jugurtha earned the praise and respect of Scipio Aemilianus for his conduct during the war, and that of other members of the Roman aristocracy, whose support and corruption would later enable Jugurtha to persist in his war against Rome.

When Jugurtha returned to Numidia after the war, he was warmly received by Micipsa, who perhaps now recognized the value of Jugurtha and his Roman contacts. Sallust claims to quote a letter from Scipio Aemilianus to Micipsa praising Jugurtha, which has suggested to some scholars that Jugurtha was becoming Rome's preferred "candidate" for the Numidian throne upon Micipsa's death.

When Jugurtha became one of Micipsa's official heirs is unclear; Sallust reports that it occurred just after the Numantine War (late 130s), and just before Micipsa's death (early 110s). Sallust's uncertainty is likely due to disputes over the throne and territory which followed Micipsa's death. In

the ensuing struggles for dominance in Numidia, Jugurtha and his cousins must each have had to justify his claims to primacy during arbitration by the somewhat disinterested Senate. Initially, the Senate supported a tripartite division of the kingdom, but when Jugurtha assassinated Hiempsal in 116, a senatorial commission led by Lucius Opimius simply split the kingdom of Numidia between Adherbal and Jugurtha.

Dissatisfied with this settlement and motivated by his own ambitions, Jugurtha abandoned the long-standing cooperative mien that Masinissa and Micipsa had maintained with Rome, ignoring Opimius' decision as well as a second minatory delegation. When confronted by this second delegation, Jugurtha emphasized his friendly disposal toward the Senate, claiming that Adherbal had prompted the renewal of hostilities by an attempted assassination. The Senate as a whole appears to have taken little interest in the ensuing civil war until 112. Until that year, it could be argued that Jugurtha maintained Numidia's status as an *amicus* of Rome, but in 112 even his contacts with the Roman aristocracy could not maintain that status. Jugurtha had by this point driven Adherbal out of most of his half of the kingdom and besieged him in the city of Cirta. A number of Roman businessmen in the city prevailed upon Adherbal to surrender himself to Jugurtha on the strength of the Numidian *amicitia* with Rome. Jugurtha, however, executed his cousin, and in the confusion of the captured city, a number of Roman citizens were killed. Jugurtha's deception of Adherbal at this point forced a break with Rome, since he had infringed upon Roman *maiestas* and *fides*: he had ignored Adherbal's appeal to the name of Rome, and he had killed Roman citizens. The latter action was exaggerated in Rome by one of the tribunes of 112 BCE, until the Senate named Numidia as one of the consular *provinciae* for 111 BCE, and war was declared.

In the course of the resulting war (112–105 BCE), termed the Jugurthine War, Jugurtha proved himself to be an active and energetic commander, displaying a talent for strategy and guerrilla-type tactics, as well as cleverness and deception, to maintain his position against the consular armies sent against him. Sallust's Jugurtha is not unlike Rome's later enemy, Mithridates VI of Pontus, in his charisma, duplicity, and resiliency after serious defeats, but he was never the threat that the Pontic king was. Jugurtha availed himself of Roman susceptibility to bribery and corruption, rivalries within the Senate and Rome, and, perhaps, incompetence and ambition among the aristocracy to maintain his position in Numidia.

Jugurtha was thus able to defy consular armies longer than he should have been able to in later Roman eyes, repeatedly violating truces in the first two years of the conflict. The Roman effort intensified under Caecilius Metellus Numidicus (consul 109) and Marius (consul 107). Metellus conducted the war for two years, during which period he won a number of successes, even driving Jugurtha out of his kingdom. Nonetheless, Marius secured the command of the war for himself by emphasizing Metellus' failure to end the war and capture Jugurtha. Marius' campaigns, beginning in 107, culminated in the capture of Jugurtha by Marius' quaestor, Sulla.

At any rate, Jugurtha was betrayed by Bocchus, the king of Mauretania, in 105 to Sulla, Marius' quaestor. Numidia was divided between Bocchus and the new province of Africa Nova, while Jugurtha himself was taken to Rome to appear in Marius' triumph at the beginning of 104 BCE. He was forced to die of starvation in a dungeon in Rome.

Jugurtha himself is often overshadowed by the aftermath of his war on Rome: the rise of Marius and his growing rivalry with Sulla. At the same time, the subsequent careers of these two men enhance Jugurtha's own status. Sallust contributes to this distortion of the Numidian king, largely because he wished to depict the low-born Marius triumphing over an incompetent, arrogant, and corrupt aristocracy that was no longer able to rule its empire or effectively wage wars. He presents us with a Jugurtha who is almost more Roman than the aristocracy (he is handsome, intelligent, popular, modest, and averse to luxury and idleness), and so a greater enemy for Marius to suppress. At the same time, contending groups in Rome itself at the time emphasized the danger posed by Jugurtha as a way of advancing their own political interests and rivalries, perhaps none more so than Marius.

C. Bailey

See also Caecilius Metellus Numidicus, Quintus; Client Monarchs; Jugurthine War; Marius; Masinissa; Sulla, Lucius Cornelius

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Jugurthine War (112–105 BCE), Causes

The causes of the Jugurthine War lay in a complex series of events surrounding the usurpation of power by Jugurtha of Numidia. This conflict arguably originated a century earlier, when the king of the African kingdom of Numidia was Masinissa. The whole kingdom of Numidia did not belong to Jugurtha by right, and so the history of how it came into his hands begins with Masinissa. As king of Numidia, Masinissa was a friend of Scipio Africanus and a close Roman ally.

When Masinissa died, he left his son Micipsa as sole heir, since his other sons Gulussa and Mastanabal had died from illness. Micipsa had two sons, Adherbal and Hiempsal, who were brought up in the palace, along with their cousin, Jugurtha, who was the son of Mastanabal. Jugurtha turned out to be a prodigious hunter and warrior, and won the hearts of the Numidian people with his exploits of bravery and his humble nature. His uncle Micipsa even sent him to fight for Rome against the Numantines, where, due to his display of skill, he was heavily relied upon by the Roman commander, Scipio Aemilianus for difficult operations. Having come out of this war a hero of Rome, Jugurtha was adopted by Micipsa, much to the disappointment of Adherbal and Hiempsal.

When Micipsa died in 118 BCE, the three brothers could not agree on how to divide the kingdom among themselves, which in turn led to scheming on Jugurtha's part. Hiempsal was the first to be killed by Jugurtha's agents, which gave Adherbal advance warning to prepare troops for a battle and send word to Rome regarding the turn of events. Though Adherbal had a superior force in terms of numbers, Jugurtha rallied several cities to his cause and defeated his adoptive brother in their one and only engagement. Thereafter, Adherbal fled to Rome for protection.

Jugurtha had thus, through treachery and force, become ruler of Numidia. At this time, according to Sallust—the main historian of the Jugurthine War—Jugurtha made sure to secure the loyalty of Rome by sending envoys with gold and silver to the Senate. Adherbal, however,

having fled to Rome, appeared before the Senate at this time and begged them to see Jugurtha as a cruel man, having unjustly seized the throne, and further beseeched them to take action against him. However, because half the Senate had been bribed by Jugurtha, the Senate decided simply to split the kingdom between Jugurtha and Adherbal.

In 112 BCE, Jugurtha, unhappy with the Senate's decision, plundered and raided Adherbal's territory, and then retreated to entice him into retaliating and starting a war. Adherbal, knowing he was not capable of defeating Jugurtha in war, fruitlessly attempted negotiation with him and eventually surrendered. Jugurtha had Adherbal tortured to death.

When the Senate had heard of these unjust actions, they declared war on Jugurtha and sent an army to Africa. Due to the usurpation of power on Jugurtha's behalf, and his ruthless methods of maintaining that power, including the bribery of Roman officials and the murder of their allies, he brought war with the Romans to his kingdom.

Adam Anders

See also Caecilius Metellus Numidicus, Quintus; Jugurtha; Marian-Sullan Conflict; Marius; Sallust; Sulla, Lucius Cornelius

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Jugurthine War (112–105 BCE), Course

The Jugurthine War was a conflict involving the Roman Republic and the Numidian kingdom, taking place between 112 and 105 BCE. It began with the usurpation of power by Jugurtha, and the killing of Roman allies and Italian citizens on his orders. It took several Roman commanders and seven years of campaigning and negotiations to ensure peace in Numidia.

Though the Roman Senate declared war on Jugurtha in 112 BCE, the

army they subsequently sent to Africa in 111 made little impact before Jugurtha surrendered to the consul Lucius Calpurnius Bestia and his legate Marcus Aemilius Scaurus. It was not until Jugurtha had his cousin Massiva, another claimant to the Numidian throne, killed in Rome, that the Senate declared war once again in 110 BCE. This war would last until Jugurtha's final defeat and capture.

The consul of 110 BCE was Spurius Postumius Albinus, and he led this second invasion into Numidia. This invasion, however, was late in the season, and Albinus was forced to return to Rome for the elections, leaving his brother, the praetor Aulus Postumius Albinus, in charge of the military affairs in Africa. The historian Sallust tells us that in January of 109 BCE, Aulus took it upon himself to try to finish the war quickly, though he failed and Jugurtha was able to negotiate harsh terms of peace, forcing Aulus out of Numidia.

Responsibility for Numidia then fell to one of the consuls for 109 BCE, Quintus Caecilius Metellus (who later received the agnomen Numidicus from his command in Numidia). Metellus invaded Numidia marching in battle-ready formation with his legate Gaius Marius holding the rear of the column. When they reached the merchant town of Vaga Jugurtha sent envoys suing for peace, but Metellus turned his envoys against him, and sent them home without a reply for the king.

Though Metellus never openly refused peace, Jugurtha also realized that the Numidian people favored the Romans at Vaga, and that the Roman army was not only becoming dangerously more familiar with the territory of Numidia, but also that they were prepared for war, rather than peace. As a result, Jugurtha decided to engage the consul's forces in battle.

At the River Muthul, the Romans won a close and costly victory. After this, Metellus decided to conduct a campaign of raiding in Numidia, rather than one of pitched battles. Jugurtha responded by attacking Roman stragglers when they least expected it, thus countering Metellus' "guerilla"-type warfare with his own.

Though the Romans gained some territory over the course of a year, Metellus' forces soon found themselves disadvantaged by Jugurtha's greater knowledge of the terrain. By 108 BCE, Metellus, seeing that further war with Jugurtha would be a costly and protracted affair, decided to use negotiation as his main weapon. With the promise of recompense from Rome, Metellus then convinced Jugurtha's closest confidant and general, Bomilcar, to

encourage Jugurtha to surrender. Bomilcar did so successfully, but Jugurtha reneged on his promise when the time came to face up to his crimes, and so he renewed the war. By this time, Metellus had already returned to Rome's province of Africa, and had left several garrisons behind in Numidia to hold the territory gained. Jugurtha reignited hostilities by ambushing a Roman garrison at Vaga in Numidia. Metellus managed to defeat him at Vaga within two days.

At this time, things did not bode well for Jugurtha, he faced internal treachery (i.e., namely from Bomilcar), and when he found out, he quickly dealt with those who plotted against him. This nevertheless caused him great anxiety. He engaged in sporadic marches and indefinite attacks, occasionally skirmishing with Metellus' forces, then disappearing again. Metellus faced a change of fate, however, as Marius pursued the consulship in Rome and won it, taking over command in Numidia for 107 BCE.

When the campaign season began in 107 BCE, Marius had won the consulship as a "new man"—a politician with no ancestors who had ever held the consulship. This lack of consular lineage aided Marius' rise to power, since the nobility and their oligarchic grip on political power had become associated with corruption and oppression of the masses. As consul, Marius took over Metellus' army and began raiding Numidian territory.

Marius captured many towns in Numidia, as well as Jugurtha's fortress at the River Muluccha, which held much of his gold. He then approached Cirta, where Jugurtha and Bocchus fell upon his marching army from all sides. The battle was hard-fought, and a near loss for the Romans, who prevailed in the end.

At this time, Marius sent his legate Sulla (quaestor under Marius) to negotiate peace. Sulla persuaded Bocchus to accept terms on his own behalf and to surrender Jugurtha later. Marius then settled his army in winter quarters until 106 BCE, and later that year, the Senate officially pardoned Bocchus, who then formally joined forces with Marius and Sulla, the latter escorting Bocchus back from Rome through Numidia.

In the course of their travels, they ran into Jugurtha's forces, who then sent envoys to negotiate peace. Bocchus betrayed Jugurtha's trust, as per the negotiations with Sulla, and had him captured by the Romans at the peace meeting. This took place in 105 BCE, and at the beginning of 104, Marius returned to Rome to celebrate a triumph over Jugurtha, who was eventually killed in Rome.

See also Caecilius Metellus Numidicus, Quintus; Jugurtha; Marian-Sullan Conflict; Marius; Sallust; Sulla, Lucius Cornelius

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Jugurthine War (112–105 BCE), Consequences

The beginning of the Jugurthine War revealed the ethical and moral corruption of many Roman politicians of that time. The fact that Jugurtha was able to buy his way out of warfare in 112 BCE highlights the issue of individual greed in Rome over the welfare of the Roman state and their allies. This decline in political ethics arguably caused the Roman people to seek to change the traditions that put such corrupt noblemen in power. This desire culminated in the election of Gaius Marius to the consulship.

The rise of Gaius Marius is perhaps the most important consequence of the Jugurthine War. During the war, he acted as legate to the consul Metellus, and proved himself a highly skilled and trustworthy commander. As a result, he managed to win the consulship in 107 BCE. His ascension to the consulship was unprecedented due to his nonnoble lineage and his status as a “new man.” His rise also came at a time in Roman history where the common people were seeking to advance such men from the “popular” class, perhaps with the hope that these politicians would support their interests. Indeed, Marius was part of the populist political alliance known as the *populares* within the Roman Senate. Populist politicians might have found greater public support over the wealthy politicians known as the *optimates*, who had, up until that time, had the greatest influence and power in Roman politics. Thus, Marius aided in furthering the cause of both populist politicians and of “new men.” Famous politicians from the late

Republic such as Cicero (also a “new man”) and Caesar (a leading member of the *populares*, though not a “new man”) arguably owed some debt to Marius’ political accomplishments.

When Marius replaced Metellus as commander of the war in Numidia, he successfully ended the war with the capture of Jugurtha. This marked the beginning of a meteoric, high-profile political career, including a totally unparalleled (until the imperial period) seven consulships. He is also well known for the military reforms of the Roman army that are termed “post-Marian.” This includes the elimination of the tripartite division of the infantry (i.e., *hastati*, *principes*, *triarii*), and making the cohort the primary organizational and tactical unit of the legion. Perhaps most significantly, these reforms also included Marius’ recruitment of the *capite censi* into the army. These men owned no property and as a result were previously exempt from military service. Marius’ change in the recruitment policy transformed the nature of the army, and the nature of the relationship that generals had with their armies. These reforms led to the emergence of career soldiers and this, in turn, led to the recruitment of large armies funded by wealthy politicians in the late Republic, such as Pompey, Crassus, Lucullus, and Caesar. The long-standing nature of these essentially private armies had a significant influence on the power struggles that would lead to the fall of the Roman Republic.

Another consequence of the Jugurthine War was the subsequent rise of another politician, Lucius Cornelius Sulla. The capture of Jugurtha was negotiated by Sulla, who was quaestor under Marius, and he accompanied him on campaign. Sulla’s skill in negotiation and his performance under Marius brought him to the forefront of Roman politics, which would culminate in his consulship in 88 BCE, his unprecedented march on Rome in the same year, and his dictatorship in 82–81 BCE. Sulla’s leadership saw great public unrest and eventual civil war with Marius that came within the gates of Rome and intensified a period of extra-legal violence, the proscriptions (or political purges), which undermined the Republic’s political stability and credibility.

Thus, the Jugurthine War was the catalyst for major change in Roman politics and Roman military history, and it could be argued that the immediate consequences of the war were the first steps on the path that led to the eventual decline of the Roman Republic and transformed it into the Roman Empire.

See also Caecilius Metellus Numidicus, Quintus; Jugurtha; Marian-Sullan Conflict; Marius; Sallust; Sulla, Lucius Cornelius

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Julian (Emperor) (361–363 CE)

Flavius Claudius Julianus (331–363 CE), who is best known as the last pagan emperor of Rome, became Caesar in 355 and sole Augustus from 361–363. Heavily influenced by Greek culture and philosophy, Julian was also a talented general. He met his death at a young age attempting, like many Roman leaders before him, to subdue the Sassanid Persian Empire.

Born in 331 at Constantinople to Julius Constantius, half brother of Constantine I, and Basilina, Julian became the last male descendant of the dynasty of Constantine. His grandfather was Constantius I. He had an older half brother, Gallus, and several cousins, including Constantius II. When Constantine died in 337 and Constantius II became co-Augustus in the east, he ordered the purge of Julian's family. All of Julian's direct relatives, except Gallus, were murdered. Julian and Gallus became Constantius' prisoners and lived secluded lives for many years. Julian was raised as an Arian Christian in the care of Eusebius of Nicomedia, and it was during his exile in Cappadocia that he was first introduced to the Greek classics. In 351, Julian began his study of Neoplatonism and soon after secretly converted to paganism. His brother, Gallus, became Caesar in 351 only to be executed in 354.



Aureus of the emperor Julian, ca. 361–363 CE. Brought up as a Christian, Julian converted to pagan polytheism, influenced by Greek philosophy. Distinguishing himself from his clean-shaven Christian predecessors, Julian affected a philosopher's beard. Campaigning against the Persian Empire, Julian died from a battle wound. Located in the Yale University Art Gallery, New Haven, Connecticut. (Yale University Art Gallery)

In November 355, Constantius named Julian his Caesar, married him to his sister, and sent him to face the growing Germanic threat in Gaul. Julian's campaigns in Gaul proved highly successful and made him a popular general. He retook Cologne in 356 and crushed the German confederation under King Chnodomarius at the battle of Strasbourg in 357. After the battle, Julian's soldiers attempted to acclaim him Augustus, which Julian immediately refused (Ammianus 16.12.64). Julian spent the next few years reestablishing Roman control of the Rhine frontier.

In 359, Shapur II renewed war against Rome in the east. In February 360, Constantius ordered a large portion of Julian's Gallic army to move east in support of his campaign. The soldiers rebelled and at Paris again proclaimed Julian Augustus; this time he could not refuse (Ammianus 20.4.14). Once he had settled matters in the western empire, Julian marched east against Constantius in early 361. Yet the empire was spared another civil war when on November 3 Constantius died of illness in Cilicia.

Julian openly declared his paganism and turned his thoughts to a campaign against the Sassanid Persian Empire. After a tumultuous stay in Antioch, where Julian clashed with the city's Christian population, he moved his army against Shapur in March 363. With 65,000 Roman troops, plus additional auxiliaries, and a fleet of 1,100 ships, Julian's campaign experienced initial success. By May, the Romans had reached the Sassanid capital of Ctesiphon and defeated a Sassanid army. However, Shapur's arrival with a sizable force made a siege of the city impractical. In a fateful decision, Julian burned his fleet. The Romans soon found themselves isolated and outmaneuvered. The Sassanids then harassed the Roman withdrawal. In one of the engagements, Julian was fatally wounded in the liver with a spear thrust; he died on June 26, 363.

Much of Julian's youth was spent studying Greek classics and philosophy. Julian was a bright student with a facility for rhetoric and writing. He wrote several works on a variety of subjects, including panegyrics, philosophical treatises, satires, and religious discourses. He became highly influenced by Neoplatonism. As an adolescent, Julian rejected Christianity and returned to traditional pagan beliefs. As emperor, Julian attempted with little success to reestablish traditional Greco-Roman polytheism. He advanced the interests of Hellenism, and followed a policy of pagan activism. Julian did not persecute Christians. However, he removed many of the Church's privileges and subsidies, while heavily favoring pagan interests. He attempted to restore and rebuild the ancestral cults and temples of Roman traditional religion. The brevity of his reign meant that nearly all his religious measures were short-lived. Ammianus Marcellinus is our main source on the life and reign of Julian, as are Julian's own writings.

Nikolaus Leo Overtoom

See also Ammianus; Constantine I; Constantius II; Persian Wars, Sassanid

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Julius Civilis (Gallic Leader). See Gallic Revolt

Julius Nepos (Emperor). See Fall of Roman Empire

Julius Vindex (d. 68 CE)

Julius Vindex was a Gallic nobleman and Roman senator who rebelled against Nero in the spring of 68 CE. Vindex came from a family that received Roman citizenship under Julius Caesar or Augustus and senatorial status under Claudius. As governor of Gaul, Vindex raised an army of over 20,000 men against Nero. Though the ancient accounts conflict, Vindex apparently sought the aid of Servius Sulpicius Galba, governor of Hispania Tarraconensis, but Galba himself was acclaimed as emperor by his own army (Plutarch, *Galba* 4–5; Suetonius, *Galba* 9–11; Dio 63.23.1). Vindex himself was not a credible imperial candidate in this period, in contrast with Galba, a patrician Roman senator of ancient family. According to Suetonius, Nero 40–42, Nero ignored the rebellion of Vindex as insignificant until he heard that Galba had joined the rebellion.

However, the governor of Germany, Verginius Rufus, marched against Vindex, perhaps interpreting Vindex's rebellion as a Gallic uprising against Rome, rather than a revolt against Nero. His army laid siege to Vesontio (modern Besançon), whereupon Vindex marched to relieve Vesontio. Dio

says that while the two commanders were reaching an agreement to act in concert against Nero, the Rhine legions massacred Vindex's army. The loss of his army so distressed Vindex that he committed suicide.

Gaius Stern

See also Galba; Nero; Suicide; War of Four Emperors

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Lactantius (ca. 240–320 CE)

Lucius Caecilius Firmianus Lactantius was a Christian apologist and rhetorician whose most important historical work is *On the Deaths of the Persecutors* (*De mortibus persecutorum* [DMP]), a narrative of the “Great” Persecution (303–311) and of the Tetrarchic civil war and rise of Constantine I (306–337).

Born in Roman North Africa, Lactantius distinguished himself as a Latin rhetorician. Though later termed the “Christian Cicero,” Lactantius may not have been a convert at the time when he accepted the position of teacher of rhetoric at Nicomedia, the capital of the emperor Diocletian (284–305). During the “Great” Persecution, Lactantius lost his position and was forced to flee into exile. He was later reinstated as teacher of rhetoric at Constantinople.

DMP was composed ca. 317–318. Despite a brief rundown of the previous emperors, focusing on those who previously persecuted the Christians, Lactantius emphasizes contemporary affairs. He describes Diocletian’s secular policies, though in the tradition of Latin invective he presents them in the worst possible light. Lactantius starts his main narrative with the Persian War of 296–299, of which Diocletian’s Caesar Galerius was the victor, to vilify Galerius, whom Lactantius regards as the main author of the “Great” Persecution. In Lactantius’ view, Galerius became arrogant from his victory and gained undue influence over Diocletian. Lactantius describes the course of the persecution, which began with relative moderation (Christian meeting places were disbanded and sacred books were confiscated) in early 303 and proceeded to harsher edicts through the course of the year.

Lactantius describes the dissolution of the First Tetrarchy in May 305, when Diocletian and Maximian abdicated in favor of Galerius (Augustus in the eastern empire) and Constantius I (Augustus in the western empire). Modern scholars often regard the Tetrarchic succession as a planned system, but Lactantius depicts the abdication as unplanned, motivated by Diocletian's severe illness in 304–305 and by Galerius' pressure. According to Lactantius, Galerius pressured Diocletian into agreeing to the elevation of Galerius' nephew Maximinus II Daia and friend Severus as Caesars, instead of Maximian's son Maxentius and Constantius' son Constantine.

Constantius died in 306, resulting in the elevation of Constantine to emperor by his father's soldiers at York. This revolt began the Tetrarchic civil war and the ultimate victory of Constantine over his rivals, for which *DMP* is an important narrative source. Lactantius describes Constantine's victory over Maxentius in the battle of the Milvian Bridge (312) and the downfalls of the other emperors. Galerius expired in 311 from an unpleasant, painful illness. The treacherous Maximian was captured by Constantine and either hanged or forced to commit suicide in 310; going to war against Licinius, Maximinus died of another unpleasant disease in 313. Licinius became co-Augustus with Constantine for some years, downplayed by Lactantius; he and Constantine would eventually go to war, Licinius being defeated in 324.

Due to the polemical nature of the *DMP*, Lactantius should be compared with Eusebius' *Church History* (part of which covers the same period) and *Life of Constantine*, with the surviving Latin panegyrics to Maximian and Constantine, and with the nonsectarian Latin epitomes, as well as surviving official documents.

Sara E. Phang

See also Christians, Persecution of; Constantine I; Constantius I; Diocletian; Eusebius; Galerius; Licinius (Emperor); Maxentius; Maximian; Maximinus II Daia; Severus (Emperor); Succession (Imperial); Tetrarchic Civil War

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Lake Regillus, Battle of (499 or 496 BCE)

The battle of Lake Regillus took place in 499 or 496 BCE. The ousted Tarquinius Superbus had gained the support of the other Latin communities, which joined against Rome. The Romans met the Latins in battle and defeated them. Tarquinius Superbus fled south, taking refuge with Aristodemus, the tyrant of Cumae. As a result of the battle, Rome and the Latins made a treaty, the so-called *foedus Cassianum*.

This period is dimly illuminated and even the date of the battle is uncertain: 499 according to Livy 2.19–20; 496 according to Dionysius, *Roman History* 6.2. The description of the battle in Livy 2.21.3–4 and Dionysius 6.17 is legendary, representing the continuing struggle of the newborn Republic against tyranny. In Livy the account is also anachronistic, since at this early time the Roman army employed the hoplite phalanx.

Sara E. Phang

See also Latin, Latins; Latin Wars; Overthrow of the Monarchy; Treaties and Alliances

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Lake Trasimene, Battle of (217 BCE)

The battle of Lake Trasimene was fought on June 21, 217 BCE, between a Roman army led by the consul Gaius Flaminius and a Carthaginian army commanded by Hannibal. It was an important battle of the Second Punic War and one of a sequence of defeats suffered by the Romans in the years 218–216 BCE. Hannibal was attempting to further his strategy of destroying Roman ties with her allies in Italy, and was thus making for the south of the Italian peninsula. Polybius' account of the battle credits Hannibal with superior skills as a general, able to anticipate Flaminius' actions and provoke him into pursuit by marching his army past the Roman camp and laying waste to the countryside. Hannibal marched south through Etruria burning crops, while Flaminius and his army followed. The road Hannibal

chose took him around the side of Lake Trasimene, and there he found that the mountains came down almost as far as the lake, leaving a narrow path in between, beyond which the path led out into a wider plain flanked by extremely steep hills. It was here that Hannibal set up his ambush, building his camp in the open on the far side of the plain protected by his Spanish and African infantry, and concealing other cavalry units behind some hillocks at the plain's entrance. Hannibal planned to trap the Roman army in the pass between these two forces, while other contingents of Celtic and Numidian light and heavy cavalry he placed on the hilltops where they would be able to descend upon the legions as they were spread out on the march.

When Flaminius arrived at Lake Trasimene he ordered the army to proceed, and, led by the *extraordinarii*, men hand-picked from the allies and representing about a third of the allied cavalry and about a fifth of its infantry, the Roman army entered the pass. They were completely surprised by the ambush, suddenly finding cavalry in their rear, infantry in front, and both cavalry and infantry descending from the hills above them. Of the Roman soldiers, 15,000 lost their lives in the ensuing slaughter, among them Flaminius himself, and 10,000 were taken prisoner. Flaminius, alleged to have ignored advice from his senior officers, is blamed for the defeat by both Polybius and Livy. The classical historical tradition, however, is clearly hostile to Flaminius, who was a popular plebeian consul who had championed the people's rights. His decision to follow Hannibal's army into the plain was probably not the result of imprudence caused by anger over the destruction of crops, as alleged, but part of a plan of cooperation with the other consular army led by Gnaeus Servilius Geminus. This army lay on the other side of the Carthaginians, and the plan had most likely been to trap Hannibal between them. Hannibal, however, must have anticipated the move, and determined to destroy Flaminius' army before help could reach him.

Kathryn H. Milne

See also Hannibal Barca; Livy; Polybius; Punic War, Second

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Lanciarii

The *lanciarii* were soldiers in the later Roman army who were predominantly armed with light javelins, or the *lancea*. We have evidence for soldiers using the title on their tombstones from the early third century CE. This evidence comes from tombstones of the soldiers from Legio II Parthica, stationed in Apamea, Syria. There are three tombstones depicting *lanciarii*, although only two use the title in the inscription. All three monuments date from between 215 and 218 CE, and as such are some of our earliest evidence for *lanciarii*. The iconography on the monuments depicts each man holding a handful of spears in his right hand, with a round shield in his left. On the tombstone of Aurelius Mucianus (*L'Année Épigraphique* 1993, 1575) we can also make out a cloak, *cingulum*, and sword belt, worn over the right shoulder. The number of javelins each man carried (between four and five) suggests that these were missile weapons, rather than stabbing spears. Mucianus' tombstone inscription also notes that he was a *lanciarus* in training or an "instructor" (*discens*). This suggests that the position of *lanciarus* was a specialized one which required additional training.

Lanciarus appears more frequently on tombstones from the early fourth century CE. Thus, this type of soldier seemed to have evolved beginning in the third century, finally becoming more regular by the beginning of the fourth century CE. By this time, we have epigraphic evidence of vexillations of *lanciarii* in the provinces. Funerary inscriptions also make note of *lanciarii* being promoted to the Praetorian Guard in the late third and early fourth centuries.

In the second half of the third century, we also hear of a special guard unit that included *lanciarii* known as the "sacred retinue" (*sacer comitatus*). This was the personal field army of one of the emperors of this time, probably Diocletian.

By the time of the late Roman army, *lanciarii* formed the core of one of the elite palatine legions, indicating a gradual rise in their status from the early third century.

See also Comitatus; Recruitment of Army (Later Empire)

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Latin, Latins

Latinus refers to both the ethnic group *Latini* (sg. *Latinus*) or the inhabitants of Latium, and to the status “Latin,” which became differentiated from ethnic Latin identity and refers to an intermediate status between full Roman citizen and ally.

In the early Republic, down to 338 BCE, the Latins (*Latini*) were the inhabitants of Latium, a region of central Italy south of Rome, bounded by the Tyrrhenian Sea to the west, the Apennines to the north, and Campania to the south. The Latins had a similar culture and shared Latin rights: *conubium*, the right to intermarry; *commercium*, the right to trade among each other and recognize contracts; and *ius migrationis*, the right to change residence among each other’s communities. At the start of the fifth century BCE, as Rome’s closest neighbors, the Latins formed a Latin League in response to the threat posed by the new and aggressive Roman Republic. The League backed Tarquinius Superbus, who had escaped the overthrow of the monarchy, and was defeated in the battle of Lake Regillus (496 or 499 BCE). As a result of this defeat, the Latin League was forced to ally with Rome, providing troops.

Due to the growth of Roman territory in central Italy, the Latin League communities revolted from Rome in 341 BCE, allying with the Volsci. The Romans crushed the revolt in the so-called Latin War (341–338), dissolving the Latin League.

After the dissolution of the Latin League, the status “Latin” became

differentiated from ethnic Latins. “Latinus” might denote a juridical status inferior to a Roman citizen (*civis Romanus*) but with privileges that mere allies (*socii*) lacked. Individuals of Latin status could not vote as Roman citizens, but possessed *conubium*, *commercium*, and *ius migrationis* with Romans. If they settled permanently at Rome, they could receive the Roman citizenship. These collective rights were termed “Latin rights” or *ius Latii*. However, many Latin colonies were quite far from Rome, so these rights were difficult to use. Though Latin cities were internally self-governing, the citizens were also liable to Roman taxation and military service. Though these communities typically enjoyed strong ties with Rome, the rebellion of the town Fregellae in 125 BCE presaged a fuller revolt a generation later.

The grievances of the Latins and allies motivated the Social War (91–87 BCE), as a result of which Latins were granted the Roman citizenship. After this period, Latin status became obsolete, except as a juridical status for informally manumitted freed persons (Junian Latins).

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See also Allies; *Civis Romanus*; Latin Colonies; Latin Wars; Social War (91–87 BCE)

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Latin Colonies

Colonization is attested from the very early history of Rome. Settlers were sent from their home town, sometimes to a new city built for the purpose; in other cases a captured city was colonized by Roman citizens. The practical aspects of the settlement of a colony were organized by a committee, usually consisting of three men: they selected the colonists, measured and allotted the land, established boundaries, and so on. Each settler received a piece of land as their private property; colonies also

received some land as common land belonging to the colony, to be used by all inhabitants. If the distributed land covered a large area, villages were established away from the town, so that not every colonist lived in the city. The foundation of a colony was celebrated with religious rituals, and its foundation was a source of pride for the town; the date was still commemorated centuries after the event.

Between 510 and 383, 13 “Latin colonies” were founded, most of them in Latium itself. These colonies most likely included both Romans and inhabitants of the Latin cities. The practice was established to enable the Romans and their allies to receive an equal share of any land that was taken as booty acquired in wars fought together. These older colonies were usually settled in already existing towns, rather than *ex novo*; often the local inhabitants were also accepted as settlers. After the foundation of Sutrium and Nepes in 383 colonization ceased, perhaps because of growing tension between Rome and the Latin allies, culminating in the Latin War of 341–338 BCE.

From the Latin War in 338 onward two kinds of colonies existed: Roman and Latin. Latin colonies were so named because they enjoyed the so-called Latin rights. They were independent of the city of Rome and had their own government; their only obligation to Rome was furnishing soldiers for the Roman army. The colonists were both Roman citizens and Latins, that is, people from the old Latin towns, or people who had received Latin rights earlier; Roman citizens who moved to Latin colonies lost their Roman citizenship. In exchange, these colonies received certain privileges in their contacts with Rome, which were not available to other allies: *commercium*, the right to acquire property in Roman territory and make business contracts protected by Roman law; *conubium*, the right to marry Roman citizens; and the *ius migrationis*, the right to move to Rome and receive Roman citizenship there, as long as they left a son behind to keep up the colony’s strength. They had limited voting rights in the Roman assemblies: all Latins were gathered in one *tribus*, so their actual influence was negligible.

The number of settlers, when attested, was 2,500, 4,000, or 6,000; this most likely included only the adult male settlers sent out to the colonies, to which women and children should be added. Between 338 and 241, 23 colonies were founded, which accommodated a total of about 85,000 male settlers. The colonists received considerable plots of land; amounts between

15 and 50 *iugera* (3.75 to 12.5 hectares) are attested, at least after the Second Punic War. It may be that these large plots were a reflection of the large amount of land available in this period, and that earlier settlers received smaller plots.

After the Second Punic War a new wave of colonization occurred; new colonies were founded and old ones received new settlers. This was necessary to emphasize the Roman presence in the whole of Italy to prevent new defections such as those that had taken place in the war, and to secure the newly conquered territory in Gaul. However, the Romans now preferred to found colonies with Roman citizenship rights, rather than Latin ones; the last four Latin colonies were founded between 192 and 181, and catered for about 15,000 men.

Several considerations were important in the foundation of colonies. The most important was the stabilization of newly conquered territory to discourage defeated enemies from revolting against Rome, and to serve as bridgeheads for further conquests. They were often located in very strategic locations, from where it was possible to supervise large amounts of territory and to control the most important communication routes through Italy. The settlers in Latin colonies were veterans of the Roman armies; these colonies were often located in areas close to enemy territory, and therefore needed experienced soldiers to fulfill their military function.

An additional purpose of colonization was to reduce the pressure on Roman land by providing additional territory for Rome's growing population. When colonization ceased in the second century, population pressure led to economic and social problems only a few decades later, leading to the Gracchan land reform in the 130s BCE.

It is clear that due to their sheer size, the changes to the landscape, and their strategic functions of watching potential enemies, the colonies had a great impact on many areas in Italy. Almost all regions in Italy received colonies, so that a Roman presence was never far away. It is often argued that colonies were one of the most important instruments of the "Romanization" of Italy. Of course, it is important to emphasize that this process was not straightforward, and that the Italian peoples were not simple recipients of a "Roman culture" spread by the colonists; the Italians were active agents in creating a new identity in changed circumstances. Nevertheless, there was much contact between the colonists and the inhabitants of the surrounding territory. They were often the largest

population centers in the area, and thus served important economic and administrative functions. Italians were free to migrate to a colony, to visit colonies for trade and other purposes, and to live in the surrounding countryside; the close contacts between them and the colonists made them familiar with Roman culture and the Latin language, so that the colonies played an important role in the spread of urbanization, a “Roman” lifestyle, and the integration of Italy into the Roman political and cultural framework.

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See also *Civis Romanus*; Gracchan Land Conflict; Latin, Latins; Roman Citizen Colonies; Social War (91–87 BCE)

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Latin Wars

Rome’s wars against the Latins stretch back into her mythical past and form the backdrop for most of early Roman history. Beginning with Aeneas’ clash with Turnus and continuing on through Rome’s conflicts with Alba Longa under the *reges* and later the wars between the Latin League and the emergent Republic, Rome was regularly at war with some, or all, of the

Latins until her final conquest of the region in the fourth century BCE. The nature of the conflicts, however, changed over time as Rome's social, economic and military institutions changed.

The earliest conflicts with the Latins were not wars of conquest. Instead, local elites led small-scale raids. Warfare during this period was largely conducted by the mobile, warlike, aristocratic clans that dominated the region (led by so-called *condottieri*) and the style of warfare represented an extension of their very personal clan-based politics. Communities, when they did engage in warfare, seem to have either been led by a clan leader (for instance the *rex* of Rome) or waged defensive conflicts, protecting their land and wealth from raiding tribes and warbands.

The Latin wars of the early Republic continued this trend, although changes were occurring. The main battle between Rome and "the Latins" during this period, the battle of Lake Regillus c. 499 BCE, supposedly formed part of the conflict with Tarquinius Superbus as he attempted to regain his property and throne. This battle, however, also marked the beginning of Rome's ascendancy in Latium and precipitated the signing of the *foedus Cassianum*. This treaty between Rome and the Latins represented a general peace that also included mutual defense and commercial clauses, laying the groundwork for a more direct alliance system in later years.

The *foedus Cassianum* did not prohibit warfare by Rome against individual Latin communities, and *vice versa*, as Rome fought regular wars against various Latin communities (Fidenae, Ardea, and others) in the fifth century BCE. Toward the end of the fifth century BCE changes in Latium's economy, most notably a decline in trade and advances in agriculture, led to an increased focus on land as an objective in war, although this did not seriously change Rome's attitude toward warfare with the Latins. During the fifth century BCE, with a few notable exceptions (the problematic acquisition of land from the Hernici in 486 BCE being the most prominent, Livy 2.42), land was only taken as a second choice, in instances where no movable plunder was available, and was generally distributed to soldiers.

A key problem of the "Latin Wars" is the identification of "the Latins" in each instance. The *nomen Latinum*, representing the totality of the Latin people, was a cultural designation associated with a shared language and culture, and was likely based ultimately on notions of kinship. But within this large cultural group were countless smaller units, including both tribes and communities. The *prisci Latini*, or "ancient Latin peoples," would meet

together at the festival of Jupiter Latiaris on the Alban Mount (later at the *Lucus Ferentinae*) each spring to arrange marriages, seal bargains, and make military alliances. This meeting of the *prisci Latini*, supposedly always 30 in number, formed the basis for the Latin League: a confederation of Latin communities which is recorded during the regal period and persisted until their ultimate conquest by Rome in the second half of the fourth century BCE. At the yearly festival the League would elect magistrates and decide on any joint military ventures. Although each member of the *nomen Latinum* was supposedly present at the meetings of the League, attendance and membership probably varied significantly each year. As a result, it is likely that “the Latins,” as embodied by the army led by the *dictator Latinus*, usually represented a much smaller subset of the *nomen Latinum*. This would explain how Rome was able to defeat “the Latins” at the battle of Lake Regillus in the early fifth century BCE. Indeed, the myth of archaic Roman superiority in Latium has rightly been discarded in recent years. Instead, during the fifth century BCE, Rome still represented merely one of many burgeoning communities in Latium—although her key location on the Tiber, along with access to a range of natural resources, did mean that her growth soon outstripped that of her peers.

The situation in the fourth century BCE, however, was different. The Gallic sack of Rome at the start of the century (ca. 390 BCE) created a phobia of the Gauls (*metus Gallicus*) that the Romans would not fully dispel until Julius Caesar’s conquest of Gaul in the first century BCE. It is clear that this threat did not affect all the Latin communities equally, but the existence of a military force which could conquer even the most powerful Latin city created an impetus toward unification for defensive purposes which had not existed previously. The economics of warfare in the fourth century BCE were also changing. Warfare in Latium during the sixth and fifth centuries BCE had been focused on raiding, and so the long term impact of military “conquest” on a defeated community was usually minimal. This changed during the late fifth and fourth centuries BCE as land became increasing valuable—a development driven by a combination of economic changes, migration, and agricultural developments. By taking land the victors changed the underlying economic and political framework of warfare by imposing long term conditions on the vanquished. This shift in economy and military practice also increased the Roman impetus toward control and unification of the geographic region of Latium and seems to have fueled

Rome's early push toward empire. The conquest of Latium by Rome can therefore be seen as the culmination of a series of military, political, and economic developments in central Italian society which dramatically changed Rome's approach to warfare and captured communities.

The means by which Rome unified the region of Latium, as detailed by Livy in Book Eight of his history, are also revealing. Instead of using the preexisting structure of the Latin League as a model, Rome instead dealt with each conquered community individually. Many captured communities were simply integrated into the Roman state by becoming *municipia*. The inhabitants of these communities acquired Roman citizenship and were therefore subject to conscription into the Roman army. Other communities seem to have been incorporated but granted a limited form of citizenship, *civitas sine suffragio*, which made them eligible for military service but without the power to vote. Still others, most notably Velitrae, were virtually destroyed and their land given over to Roman settlers. Overall, however, the approach of Rome to the Latin communities in 338 BCE supports the idea that Rome was primarily concerned with increasing her military manpower and removing any possible threats to military unity and cohesion. This shift in the power balance in Latium, coupled with Rome's increasing unilateral approach to wielding it, eventually led to war. In 341 BCE, while the Romans were also engaged with the Samnites, "the Latins" revolted against Rome in an attempt to stop her inexorable rise and reaffirm the old status quo among the Latin peoples. The Latins failed. In 338 BCE Rome defeated the Latins and established a new system of alliances which would become the pattern for future Roman expansion in Italy. Instead of dealing with the Latins as a League, Rome dealt with the defeated communities individually, dissolving all previous unions and directing foreign policy through the Roman state.

The Latin wars also left an indelible mark on the Roman army. Rome had allied herself with various Latin communities off and on for centuries through the mechanism of the Latin League, and the equality of Roman and Latin units in joint military ventures (at least in terms of access to spoils and booty) had been established as early as 493 BCE with the *foedus Cassianum*. But early allied armies seem to have been largely *ad hoc*. With the settlement of 338 BCE Rome became the master of a regularized Latin army. This massively expanded her manpower reserves and gave all subsequent Roman armies a characteristic Roman/allied composition. Rome's Latin allies (*socii*), unsurprisingly, seem to have been equipped and

fought in the same manner as the Romans, although they were raised and deployed in their own units and had their own commanders under the aegis of a Roman general. This situation represents a standardized version of the ad hoc model deployed by the army of the Latin League. The most important consequence of Latin wars, however, was the precedent set in how Rome approached conquered communities. During the course of the fourth century BCE, Rome had experimented with a number of different approaches to vanquished communities in an effort to find one which allowed her to extract key resources: military manpower and long-term military security. The settlement of 338 BCE represented the culmination of this period of experimentation and set the model for Rome's later conquest of Italy in the subsequent century.

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See also Lake Regillus, Battle of; Latin, Latins; Latin Colonies; Livy; Patrician-Plebeian Conflict; Samnite Wars

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Law, International

Although there were no international institutions (equivalent to the modern International Criminal Court or the United Nations) to police state behavior in the ancient world, there did exist a set of almost universally recognized, divinely sanctioned norms of international conduct that were regarded as binding. As early as Homer, for example, the sanctity of ambassadors and the right to give the war dead a proper burial were considered to have the force of divine sanction, if not of the law as such.

At Rome, at the latest by the mid-first century BCE, there had developed

the concept of *ius gentium*, “the law of nations” (as opposed to *ius civile*, “civil law,” which only applied to Roman citizens). According to Cicero, *ius gentium* had greater moral obligations attached to it than did *ius civile* (*On Duties* 3.17.69). By the second century CE, the jurist Gaius established the principle that civil law is the law that individual peoples establish for themselves while the law of nations is the law that derives from natural reason (*naturalis ratio*) and is observed by all mankind (*Institutes* 1.1.1). The Digest of Justinian (sixth century CE) indicates that Roman jurists at some earlier point established the principle that a state that is not in a state of friendship and alliance with Rome is not automatically considered an enemy (Digest 49.15.5.2), which is a considerable advance from the more ancient principle that whoever is not a friend is a (potential) enemy.

The Romans participated in a pan-Mediterranean customary framework that today would be categorized as “international law,” but that Mediterranean peoples regarded as overseen and enforced by the gods themselves. This collection of ground rules, customs, and taboos (mostly governing conduct during wartime) mandated the sanctity of oaths to the gods, conducting negotiations of disputes in good faith, and respect for the inviolability of diplomats, priests, suppliants of the gods, sacred places and structures, and neutral states (though the same cannot be said for noncombatants and civilians). Any and all of these could be (and often were) violated according to the criteria of state self-interest and security, but the general principles were widely understood and respected.

In addition to these, the Romans (or perhaps the Italians more generally) had developed additional divinely sanctioned constraints on their own international conduct. The most important of these—the fetial and *deditio* (surrender) rituals—had exclusively wartime applications. The college of fetial priests was initially responsible for all aspects of beginning and ending wars. When a perceived violation against Rome had taken place, they sought satisfaction from the offending state (*rerum repetitio*); consulted the gods as to the justice of Rome’s intention to declare war (to ensure a “just war,” *iustum bellum*); declared war after a 30- or 33-day “cooling off” period had passed, and a formal vote by the Roman people had taken place; and ritually declared the gods’ judgment in favor of Rome to the offending state, and cast a spear into its territory (*indictio belli*). After the enemy state surrendered (performed *deditio* to a Roman commander in the field), and a battlefield truce (*sponsio*) was made and ratified by the Roman people, the

fetials would assist in drawing up and overseeing the popular ratification of the formal treaty of peace. It is not known when the fetial ritual and priesthood declined in importance, but they probably did so when Rome's international relations expanded beyond Italy into the wider Mediterranean, encompassing peoples who had no comparable ritual traditions. The *deditio* ritual, on the other hand, persisted well into the historical period (to the first century CE at least). The ritual involved the Roman commander extending to the surrendering party the Roman state's *fides*, which probably implied a pledge of mercy.

The Romans were also unique in their institution, in 242 BCE, of a special annually elected magistrate, called the *praetor peregrinus*, whose sole function was to manage disputes between non-Romans (resident aliens) and between them and Roman citizens. It was probably from the edicts (declarations of legal beliefs and intentions) of successive praetors that the concept of *ius gentium* developed, at the heart of which was the uniquely Roman concept of *fides* ("good faith").

It is unknown how the Roman version of the main instrument of international law—the formal treaty (*foedus*)—developed. The earliest example we possess—the treaty between Rome and Carthage, dated to 509 BCE and recorded by Polybius (3.22)—is mainly concerned with commerce, and so may reflect Carthaginian rather than Roman treaty forms. The evidence of later treaties inclines most scholars to believe that the fully developed Roman international treaty was based primarily on Greek models. Most Roman peace treaties and treaties of alliance, for example, contain versions of the Hellenic treaty formulae concerning the pledging of friendship and mutual assistance in wartime (if possible); the promise to have the same friends and enemies, and to not make separate (and secret) peace treaties with common enemies; and the sanctifying of the treaty by mutually sworn oaths. A Roman innovation, however, was the *maiestas* clause, according to which the treaty partner promised to respect "the majesty of the Roman people," thus indicating some form of subordination to Roman will and power in perpetuity. The most famous example of this is contained in the Roman-Aetolian treaty of 189 BCE (Polybius 21.32, 22.13; Livy 38.11). This does not mean, as is sometimes argued (but on very weak evidentiary grounds), that Roman treaties were formally and legally divided into *foedera iniqua* and *aequa*, "unequal and equal treaties."

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See also Alliances; *Deditio* (Surrender); Diplomacy; *Fetiales*; *Fides*; Formal Declaration of War; *Ius Fetiale*; Religion and Warfare; Treaties and Alliances; War Crimes

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Legate

A legate (Latin singular *legatus*, pl. *legati*, lit. “chosen”) was a senior military officer in the Republic, but a provincial governor or a commander of a legion in the Principate. Legates first appear in the period of the Second Punic War, when the consuls needed to delegate command of legions; the six military tribunes per legion apparently had insufficient authority. Republican legates were appointed by the Senate at the time of the Second Punic War; by the late Republic, they were appointed by the general. The republican legate ranked above the military tribunes but was still the subordinate of the commanding magistrate (consul, praetor, or promagistrate). At this time (from the early second century BCE) there was no fixed number of *legati*. As the general’s picked men, *legati* began to dominate elite command in the late Republic.

Legati were typically the commander’s social peers, often wealthy equestrians, sometimes senators, but who might lack military experience. Caesar depicts some of his *legati* early in the Gallic Wars as panicking at the prospect of fighting the German Ariovistus (Romans had had a phobia of Germans since Arausio). Caesar emphasizes that it was the role of the commander to plan for the whole army, but the role of *legati* to obey orders (Caesar, *Gallic Wars* 1.39–40, *Civil War* 3.51). Some of Caesar’s *legati* distinguished themselves, such as Quintus Tullius Cicero, the brother of Cicero the orator, who commanded the resistance to a Gallic ambush, or Titus Labienus, Caesar’s most trusted legate, who eventually defected to Pompey. However, *legati*, as part of the commander’s *consilium* or advisory

council, brought other useful administrative or legal talents to the task of governing a province. *Legati* were also deputized as envoys.

In the Principate *legatus* acquired new meanings, displaying the tendency of Romans to adapt old titles to new institutions. Most governors were now termed *legati Augusti pro praetore*, despite the fact that many governors had already held the consulship as well as the praetorship when they were appointed. The *legati Augusti pro praetore* governed imperial provinces with active military fronts. The governors of public provinces, which did not have active fronts or (with the exception of Africa), legions, were termed proconsuls. In the rare instance that there was only one legion in a province, the governor also commanded the legion. There were some exceptions to senatorial governors: the governor of Egypt, the *praefectus Aegypti*, was an equestrian, and the commanders of the two legions in Egypt were also equestrian prefects so as not to outrank the *praefectus Aegypti*. In Africa, the commander of the one legion (legio III Augusta) was an equestrian. When Septimius Severus created the three *Parthica* legions, he gave them equestrian commanders, and he appointed an equestrian to govern the new province of Mesopotamia. Some small or recently formed provinces also had equestrian governors.

A younger man of senatorial status who had only held the praetorship was more likely to be a *legatus legionis*, commander of a single legion. Legionary legates held their commands for a short time, no more than three years; governors held their posts for a year. These short tenures of office prevented any one senator from building a center of power in any one province and thus discouraged usurpation. Some senators, however, built up careers with numerous military commands in multiple provinces; they tended to be “new men,” municipal Italians or provincials without consular ancestors, again to discourage usurpation.

The inexperienced (first-time) legionary legate may have depended for assistance on the narrow-stripe tribunes, equestrians with more military experience, and on the *praefectus castrorum*, a long-serving former legionary chief centurion who was responsible for logistics. The lack of experience reflects the decreasing military participation of the Roman senatorial order in the Principate.

In the mid-third-century CE equestrian military men took over legionary commands and provincial governorships. The term *legatus* was superseded in the later Roman Empire due to Diocletian’s reorganization of the

provinces and Constantine's reorganization of the army. Terms such as *comes* and *dux* were used instead.

Sara E. Phang

See also Augustus; Caesar, Gaius Julius; *Comes*; Consul; *Cursus Honorum* (Imperial); *Dux*; Elite Participation; *Equites*, Equestrians; Legion, Organization of; *Praefectus*; Praetor; Senate, Senators; Tribune

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Legion, Organization of

In the early Republic, the legion was originally organized according to the Servian census classes: the upper two classes provided heavy-armed hoplite troops and cavalry. The strict relation of the census classes to military recruitment is debated due to inconsistent evidence; the upper three classes may have provided heavy-armed hoplite troops and cavalry, or all five propertied classes, termed collectively *classis*, may have provided troops, the unpropertied *capite censi* or *infra classem* providing none. In any case the direct relationship of the Servian constitution to recruitment was later superseded, and the *dilectus* (levy) was conducted according to the tribes that citizens belonged to. Down to the late second century BCE, soldiers had to meet a minimum property qualification for service: 11,000 *asses*, lowered in the second century BCE to 4,000 and then to 1,500 *asses*. Though the *as* coin was retariffed in the late third century BCE and its value is debated,

these minimum figures probably corresponded to a small amount of property, five *iugera* or less, meaning that ordinary legionaries were recruited from subsistence farmers. The lowering of the requirement reflects difficulties with recruitment; its exact relationship to Italian demography is also debated.

In the middle Republic, before the Punic Wars, each consul commanded two legions, meaning that Rome normally fielded four legions of citizens, plus at least that many allies. At this time legions were not commanded by legates. Each legion had six military tribunes, meaning that at the *dilectus* 24 military tribunes were selected. Sixteen of these tribunes were elected by the *comitia tributa*, and eight were appointed by the consuls. Fourteen of the military tribunes were required to have at least five years' military experience, and 10 were required to have at least 10 years' experience. Below the tribunes, the centurions (60 per legion) commanded field operations.

In the middle Republic (ca. 264–133 BCE) legions were organized into maniples, the basic tactical unit of the legion. Livy's evidence (8.8.5–8) reflects a somewhat earlier stage than Polybius. According to Livy, the legion consisted of 15 maniples of *hastati*, the front line of battle; 15 maniples of *principes*, the second line of battle; and 15 *ordines*, the third line, comprised of *triarii*, *rorarii*, and *accensi*. Livy (59 BCE–17 CE) wrote centuries after the period which he describes and approximately a century after maniples became obsolete, so it is likely he did not fully understand what he describes. The *rorarii* were skirmishers and should have been deployed ahead of the *hastati*; *accensi* are military servants. Livy 8.8.5–8 describes a deployment of the maniples termed by modern scholars *quincunx*, resembling a checkerboard, in which as front line maniples tired, they retired and ones to the rear moved up to replace them.

Polybius describes the manipular legion ca. 220–170 BCE, as he was a contemporary of the manipular legion, and sets greater store by accuracy. According to Polybius (for example, 6.21.7–23.6), there were 30 maniples per legion: 10 maniples of *hastati* in the front line, young soldiers armed with *pila* (javelins); 10 maniples of *principes*, the middle line, consisting of mature and more heavily armed men; and 10 maniples of *triarii*, the rear line, consisting of older men (relatively speaking) who were expected to fight most doggedly: "it has come to the *triarii*" was a proverb for being in desperate straits. These three lines formed the *triplex acies*. Individual

maniples could maneuver more readily than the phalanx on an uneven battlefield. Ahead of the legion ranged the *velites*, lightly armed skirmishers.

The Second Punic War, which nearly annihilated the Roman Republic, caused many changes in military organization. The mass mobilization of citizens and allies meant that as many as 22 legions were fielded. Consuls needed to delegate the command of individual legions so they created the rank of legate, a commander of a legion, at this time appointed by the Senate. The first use of cohorts also appeared during this time, in Spain (probably adapted from local practice).

In the last two centuries of the Republic, the manipular organization was superseded in favor of cohorts, and was discarded entirely with the Marian reforms of 107 BCE. The distinction of *hastati*, *principes*, and *triarii* by age and equipment was abolished. Lighter troops such as the *velites* were likewise superseded in favor of additional allied units that provided the same function. The structure of the old levy process (*dilectus*) was largely ended, and legions became a volunteer force that developed into a paid, professional long term fighting force, rather than a citizen army called to arms for relatively short periods. The most important change was to the command structure of the imperial legion, which placed senatorial aristocrats in short-term officer posts, preventing them from developing bonds with their armies that might threaten the emperor's power.

Replacing the earlier republic's manipular system, the late republican and imperial legion was organized into 10 cohorts. Each cohort comprised six units of 60 to 80 men known as centuries. Each century was composed of 10 *contubernia* ("tent squads") of six to eight men apiece. This organization may have persisted when legionaries were housed in permanent barracks, as was increasingly the case during the Principate. Each squad was led by a *decanus*. A centurion commanded each century, assisted by a handpicked second known as an *optio*. Six centuries made up a cohort of 360 to 480 men, and 10 cohorts formed the legion itself. Centurions of senior rank commanded the cohorts. The most senior centurion, the *primus pilus* (first spear) normally commanded the first century of the first cohort, and led the entire first cohort when in battle. Ranking below the *primus pilus* were 10 *pilus prior* (first file), who commanded the first centuries of each of the 10 cohorts and likewise each of the other cohorts in battle.

Compared to the manipular system, cohorts provided the legion with much greater tactical flexibility. Maniples had given the republican legion

excellent maneuverability in combat, shown by the flanking move against the Macedonians at Cynoscephalae in 197 BCE, but cohorts provided a more tightly focused use of force. They could maneuver more effectively and efficiently. Cohorts, being larger than maniples, could also operate independently with greater efficiency. Separate cohorts could secure strategic points ahead of the main legion or be used to counter an enemy's flanking movement.

The most significant change to the legion's organization in the Principate was the command structure. Augustus appointed senators as legionary legates or provincial governors for short periods (usually a year), preventing them from developing a deep relationship with any one army that might encourage them to revolt. A *legatus legionis* (legionary legate) commanded a single legion, while a *legatus Augusti pro praetore* (governor of a province) commanded two or more. In provinces where only one legion was stationed, the legionary legate might also serve as governor.

Below the legates were military tribunes, six per legion. These officers were distinct from the military tribunes of the classical Republic, who had been elected by the *comitia tributa* and who often had many years of military experience. The highest-ranking tribune was the *tribunus laticlavus* or broad-stripe tribune, named for the broad stripe of a senatorial tunic, who served as the second in command. The laticlavian tribune was a young man, from a senatorial family but under age 25 so not yet a senator. His position was a high honor but involved little real responsibility. A legion also had five *tribuni augusticlavii* or narrow-striped tribunes, who were normally from the equestrian order and served in an administrative capacity. All these military tribunes also were posted for a short time (six months to a year). Individuals who showed military talent were promoted to different legions to avoid the risk of revolt.

A legion was also assigned a *praefectus castrorum* or camp prefect, who was a former *primus pilus* (chief centurion) who had completed his 25 years of service. He served as third in command of the legion and oversaw its logistics and internal operations. As an officer with long experience, the camp prefect was probably the expert consulted by the relatively inexperienced legates and tribunes, though they formally outranked him.

In addition to the 3,600 to 4,800 combat troops, imperial legions were assigned 120 cavalrymen, though they were lightly equipped and used more for scouting, carrying dispatches, and pursuit rather than full-scale combat.

In addition, legions contained a unit of about 60 engineers, who employed various supporting weapons such as ballistae and the heavy “scorpion” crossbows. Along with the cavalry and engineers, each legion also contained a sizeable number of slaves, used as baggage handlers, so the actual number of men in an imperial legion averaged between 5,000 and 6,000 men. The legion employed many of its men as artisans and other specialists, attested in numerous inscriptions and producing whatever the unit needed. However, it is likely that these specialists were also expected to fight; there were no noncombatant support personnel. A legion was normally supported by an equal number of allied *auxilia*. The most important function of these units was to provide cavalry and skirmishers to support the heavy infantry.

Legions remained the mainstay of the Roman army throughout the empire, though *auxilia* largely outnumbered them in the field. As Roman territory expanded, legions became increasingly stationary, though detachments (*vexillationes*) and entire legions might still be transferred to different regions during wartime, though raising new legions was an alternative. In the later empire, this led to a split between the empire’s mobile and stationary forces, with the best troops being detached from their legions as *vexillationes* to be sent where they were needed, while the remainder stayed in place as a defense force. However, the persistence of legions, much reduced in size, is attested in the *Notitia Dignitatum*, a list of civil and military offices from the early fifth century.

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See also *Auxilia*; Centurion (Imperial); Cohorts; *Lanciarrii*; Legate; *Praefectus*; *Principales*; Tactics; Tribune

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Libius Severus (Emperor). See Fall of the Roman Empire

Licinius (Emperor) (308–324 CE)

Licinius (emperor 308–324) was originally one of the Tetrarchs, recruited to fill the gap left by Severus (305–308), and later co-emperor with Constantine the Great (306–337). A friend of Galerius, Licinius was elevated to the rank of Augustus at the conference of Carnuntum, held in November 308 to resolve the conflicts among the Second Tetrarchy's emperors. Licinius was loyal to Galerius and did not overstep his sphere of influence in the Balkans until after Galerius died in 311.

Licinius then allied with Constantine and married Constantine's half-sister Constantia in 313. Maximinus II, who controlled Syria and Egypt, now invaded Asia Minor and Thrace, challenging Licinius, who defeated him in a battle near Adrianople. After Maximinus' death, Constantine and Licinius established an uneasy partnership, lapsing into civil war (316–317) as a result of which Licinius agreed to occupy the eastern empire and Constantine the European part of the empire. Having previously agreed with Constantine to tolerate Christianity, Licinius began persecuting the Christians in Asia. Constantine declared war on Licinius in 324 and defeated him in another battle at Adrianople. Licinius fled to Byzantium; when Constantine besieged it, Licinius fled again to Nicomedia and surrendered to Constantine. Licinius was exiled to Thessalonica, where he was put to death in 325.

Sara E. Phang

See also Christians, Persecution of; Constantine I; Galerius; Maximinus II Daia; Tetrarchic Civil War

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Licinius Mucianus (ca. 19–74/7 CE)

Gaius Licinius Mucianus was a Roman general, statesman and scholar who served as the right-hand man of Vespasian during the civil war termed the War of the Four Emperors. During Nero's reign, Licinius Mucianus served as *legatus legionis* under Domitius Corbulo, suffect consul ca. 64 and was twice granted a propraetorian governorship—once in Lycia-Pamphylia ca. 58–60 and once in Syria ca. 67.

In 69, Mucianus conspired with Titus to support Vespasian's bid for power. In August, having declared his allegiance to Vespasian, Mucianus led a Flavian force through Asia Minor with the objective of capturing Rome from Vitellius. However, the Flavian general Antonius Primus and his Danubian legions arrived first in Italy. Primus defeated the Vitellians at the second battle of Bedriacum and captured Rome, concluding with Vitellius' downfall and lynching in December of 69.

Mucianus arrived at Rome in January of 70. As Vespasian and Titus were still occupied in the eastern half of the empire, Mucianus took personal charge of the capital as well as the responsibility for the behavior of Vespasian's younger son, Domitian. In his capacity as de facto head of state, Mucianus appointed officials, signed decrees and resolved disputes in the Senate. His authority over the capital ceased upon Vespasian's arrival in late 70.

Tacitus accords Mucianus an ambiguous portrayal in the *Histories*. He admires Mucianus' capabilities as an administrator, orator, diplomat, and a scholar. However, he is critical of Mucianus' greed and penchant for luxury (Tacitus, *Histories* 1.10).

Thomas Caldwell

See also Antonius Primus; Corbulo; Galba; Nero; Otho; Vespasian; Vitellius; War of Four Emperors

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Limitanei

In the aftermath of the various foreign incursions and civil wars of the third century and Tetrarchic period, the Roman army institutionalized a number of changes by the early fourth century. Rather than an army of 33 legions, of roughly 5,000 men each, generally posted in the frontier areas, and supported by a similar total of soldiers in separate units of auxiliaries, a new system evolved in the late third and early fourth centuries. Leaving aside barbarian federates and aristocrats' armed retainers, the Roman army now consisted rather broadly of two classes of troops organized into a greater number of units which typically numbered no more than 1,000 soldiers each. The *limitanei* were territorial forces usually posted to the frontier areas, while the *comitatenses* were the more or less permanent central mobile field armies.

By the early fourth century, frontier forces began to be organized under the command of officers known as *duces* whose authority was purely military and whose zones of control might extend across several civil provincial boundaries. Organizationally, the *limitanei* included new types of formations in addition to earlier ones organized in new ways. Forty-two, presumably smaller, legions are attested among the *limitanei* of the early fifth century, of which 17 garrisoned more than one location. Such a

dispersal of forces indicates something other than a purely offensive posture. Additional infantry might be organized into old-style cohorts or units termed variously, *numeri*, *milites*, and *auxilia*. Despite often having ethnic names, there is no sure indication that the *auxilia* were any less Roman in composition than the other units. Cavalry in the *limitanei* was organized into *alae*, *cunei equitum*, and units simply referred to as *equites*. Much of this terminology appears to have been rather imprecise, especially in the major literary sources for the period which were not particularly interested in the often mundane operations of the *limitanei*. Fortunately, the *Notitia Dignitatum* gives a good idea of the ducal commands' order of battle in the early fifth century.

Although there is evidence that at least some of the *limitanei* received land to farm and modern scholars have sometimes regarded them as an ineffective hereditary peasant militia, there is evidence to the contrary. It should be noted that all service was generally hereditary, and the government's provision of salaries, rations, and retirement allotments is incongruous with the notion of an entirely landed, self-sustaining militia.

Operationally, in addition to policing the frontier regions and providing the first line of defense against barbarian incursions, the *limitanei* were effective enough to operate in cooperation with the field armies and might even absorbed into them as "*pseudocomitatenses*." Even as late as the sixth century, Justinian considered them useful enough to order new units of *limitanei* organized in the reconquered provinces of Africa. There is no reason to suppose that they did not persist as an important feature of the Roman army into the seventh century.

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See also Alae; Auxilia; Comitatus; Dux; Frontiers; Notitia Dignitatum

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Livius Drusus the Younger, Marcus (ca. 124–91 BCE)

Marcus Livius Drusus the Younger was a Roman politician from a plebeian family, known for his radical activity as tribune of the plebs. Accounts of his life are vague and inconsistent but his father, of the same name, was a consul, his mother belonged to the patrician family of the Cornelii, and he was uncle to Marcus Porcius Cato Minor (Cato the Younger). With such associations, it was predictable that Livius Drusus would enter politics. Although never achieving the rank of consul, he started up the ladder of office (*cursus honorum*) becoming a military tribune in 105, quaestor in 102, and aedile in 94. He also became tribune of the plebs before his death in 91.

In the turbulent world of late Roman Republican politics, Livius Drusus is remembered for his populist legislative proposals, which came to nothing but which triggered civil conflict. He wanted to benefit the poor citizens of Rome by distributing free land to them, renewing the Gracchan land program. He also proposed reforms to the juries of the criminal courts. Finally, Livius Drusus proposed to offer Roman citizenship to all Italians. However, his propositions were disqualified on a technicality; they contained too many provisions per law, since legislative procedure allowed for one bill per law. The consul Lucius Marcus Philippus led the opposition against Livius Drusus and his Italian supporters. His laws were thus declared invalid and in the ensuing violence, Livius Drusus was killed in his own home in 91.

Livius Drusus was an ambitious politician who drew on his powerful connections and popular legislation to further his own political advancement. In the world he lived in, influential individuals frequently played this game and risked success or failure in the increasingly turbulent world of Roman politics. Drusus' proposal to enfranchise the Italians and his murder kindled the Social War (91–87).

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See also Aedile; Cato the Younger; Criminal Procedure *Cursus Honorum* (Republic); Gaius Gracchus; Plebeians; Social War (91–87 BCE); Tribune of

the Plebs

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Livy (59 BCE–17 CE)

Titus Livius is the most famous Latin historian of the Roman Republic, author of the *Ab urbe condita* or “From the Founding of the City,” usually called in English the *History of Rome*. Livy was from Patavium (modern Padua) in northern Italy; his life may be recorded in *ILS* 2919, a Latin epitaph. Livy’s life spanned the civil wars of the end of the Republic and the reign of Augustus. Allusions show that Books 1–5 were written ca. 27–25 BCE.

As sources, Livy employed Polybius for the Punic Wars and Greek affairs in that period, and otherwise employed Latin annalists, early Roman historians who followed a strict year-by-year arrangement, listing magistracies, major events, and religious events (including expiation of portents). He also appears to have employed documentary sources, such as treaties and decrees of the Senate. However, Livy is also a highly dramatic and rhetorical author who imaginatively expands his accounts of remote periods, such as the early Republic, for which there can have been little or no contemporary information. Livy’s level of detail may thus be unreliable or anachronistic, requiring literary as well as historical analysis. He particularly dramatizes the overthrow of the monarchy and establishment of the early Republic, and conflicts between the patricians and plebeians in the early Republic.

The *Ab urbe condita* is by convention divided by modern critics into

“decades” of 10 books. This division is based on medieval manuscript conventions and may not reflect Livy’s own arrangement.

Though the *Ab urbe condita* followed the Republic down to 9 BCE, the *Ab urbe condita* is not extant in full after ca. 167 BCE. Originally with 142 books, the surviving *Ab urbe condita* contains Books 1–10 (from earliest Rome to the Samnite Wars) and 21–45 (the Punic Wars period through the Third Macedonian War).

Livy’s *History of Rome* is also preserved in epitome form. An epitome is an abbreviated and condensed work, which may keep the arrangement of the original but summarizes it. The *Oxyrhynchus Epitome* (ca. early third century CE) abbreviates books 37–40 and 48–55. The *Periochae* (“Summaries”) from the fourth century CE summarize all of Livy except books 136–137. Their content may not accurately reflect Livy’s. Livy was also used as a source by the minor historians Florus and Eutropius, and the chronicler Julius Obsequens.

Sara E. Phang

See also Augustus; Etruscan Wars; Latin Wars; Overthrow of the Monarchy; Patrician-Plebeian Conflict; Polybius; Punic War, Second; Samnite Wars

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Logistics

The Romans had a highly developed system of logistics, within the constraints of ancient technology, employing human and animal power, roads, and water transport to move men, food supplies, and other military supplies with relative efficiency. Vegetius wrote that “hunger is more deadly to armies than the sword” (*Military Affairs* 3.3.1), but famines were relatively infrequent in the Roman army. The Roman army suffered from famine in the Spanish Wars of 154–153 BCE because the campaign was too

far inland and could not be supplied by water (Appian, *Spanish Wars* 54). In the Caesarian-Pompeian civil war, the Pompeian army depleted the Thessalian countryside of supplies, leaving the Caesarian army short of grain (Caesar, *Civil War* 3.47–8). In these cases, the army was able to rely on meat, but Antony's army, returning through the desert from his failed Persian expedition, starved, desperately ate poisonous plants, and ran short of water (Plutarch, *Antony* 47–9).

Securing logistics could be essential to victory, as could damaging the enemy's supply lines. For campaigns, the Romans established supply depots that were reachable by water, and maintained supply lines from these locations to the main body of the army. Strategy might feature cutting off the enemy's access to food and water, as Caesar did to the Gauls at Uxellodunum and to the Pompeians in the campaign of Ilerda (Caesar, *Gallic Wars* 8.40, *Civil War* 1.66–8). Where possible, transportation was expedited by using water routes, including the Mediterranean Sea, the Rhine and Danube rivers, the Euphrates River, and other rivers. Barges could transport troops and supplies more efficiently than land transport, as a baggage train itself needs additional food and fodder for its human handlers and animals. The Roman naval fleets assisted with military transport, as did private shippers.

In the earlier Republic, supply was probably less organized because the Roman army did not campaign far from home. The allies were also required to supply their own troops, at least for the first part of the campaign. Nevertheless, by the mid-Republic Roman generals built roads, beginning with the Via Appia of Appius Claudius. The roads expedited the conquest of Italy, where rivers are often intermittent in the summer months. The traditional rations of the Roman soldier consisted of unground grain (wheat), which is less inclined to spoil than ground flour or bread. The soldiers could cook this wheat as a kind of porridge or grind it to make bread. Supplementary items such as meat, legumes, cheese, olive oil, and sour wine or vinegar (mixed with water to make a drink) were subject to more ad hoc supply.

It was possible for soldiers to supply themselves in the field by pillaging, but pillaging and foraging are not very reliable means of logistics, dependent on the time of year, the extent of agriculture, and the reaction of the inhabitants. Living off the land is not feasible in mountainous, desert, or uncultivated areas. Foraging soldiers are liable to being attacked by the

enemy and even by subjects/allies. An oath from the mid-Republic prohibited pillaging (presumably of Romans and allies), restricting the items that a soldier was permitted to take to a spear, spear shaft, wood, fruit, fodder, a bladder (for water), a bag, or a torch (Gellius 16.4.24).

By the period of Rome's overseas wars, a large contingent of merchants and other service providers, including bakers, prostitutes, and entertainers, followed the army. Roman generals and modern scholars often despised this "tail" of "camp followers," but the merchants must have provided many of the supplementary items needed for a balanced and palatable diet. The disposal of booty added to the challenge of logistics. Roman commanders sold captives, often on a vast scale, to the merchants who followed the army, and also sold material plunder.

Nonetheless, because unnecessary baggage added to the logistic costs of moving the army, Roman commanders from time to time ejected the camp followers, soldiers' servants, and excess baggage (for example, Appian, *Spanish Wars* 85; Sallust, *Jugurthine War* 45). Marius emphasized that his soldiers should carry all their baggage, devising a wooden fork that his soldiers carried on their shoulders to balance the load; in return his soldiers called themselves "Marius' mules."

In the Principate, the logistics of the Roman army comprised a major responsibility of Roman administration. It may not be an overstatement to say that the financial system of the Roman Empire was organized to supply the army. Logistics were organized chiefly at the level of provincial governors, who authorized the collection of taxes and their redistribution to the army as supplies. Logistics were often simplified by collecting taxes in kind, especially from the third century CE onward.

The logistic needs of the imperial army were enormous. Assuming an army of about 450,000 (all forces, including legions and *auxilia*), Peter Kehne (2007) estimates that about 154,395 tons of wheat and 108,770 tons of supplementary food were needed a year for the human personnel, while 244,550 tons of barley and 401,500 tons of hay, and other fodder were needed for animals (cavalry mounts and transport animals). To this must be added the pay for the soldiers.

As in the Republic, civilian merchants supplemented the official provision of rations and other supplies. These merchants now set up shop in the *canabae* or *vici*, civilian settlements that grew up in the vicinity of military forts. These merchants, and soldiers' game hunting, were probably

the suppliers of the far wider range of foodstuffs attested in the archaeological excavation of military sites, including relative “luxury” foods. The merchants are also attested in documentary sources such as ostraka (potsherds, used as writing material) and wooden tablets at Vindolanda.

Logistics could be a source of civil-military conflict. The army might acquire supplies below market price or even without payment, but the requisitioning of food does not seem to have produced as much provincial resentment as the requisitioning of transport, that is, individual animals or vehicles, from provincial subjects. From the viewpoint of military personnel in charge of transport, if an animal died or a cart broke down, a new animal or vehicle was needed immediately. Provincial subjects who felt that their animals or vehicles had been unjustly seized petitioned governors and emperors; the emperors repeatedly issued edicts against the abuse of requisitioned transport. Another practice that simplified logistics was billeting, in which soldiers were lodged in civilian homes and their hosts were responsible for providing food and drink. This practice, more common in the eastern empire than in the west, was also abused and much resented.

Sara E. Phang

See also Civil-Military Relations; Documentary Sources; Fleets; Military Discipline; Pay and Finances, Military (Imperial); Pay and Finances, Military (Republic); Plunder; Strategy

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Low-Intensity Conflict

Low-intensity conflict may be defined as combat that lacks extended duration and consistency of intense effort, as commonly found in pitched

battles, for example. Modern low-intensity conflict has frequently been characterized as “guerrilla warfare” or “asymmetric warfare,” typically waged by relatively weak forces against an invasion or occupation, often ideologically opposed to the aforesaid invasion or occupation. Asymmetric warriors may be characterized as “terrorists” and make use of decentralized economic instruments and propaganda to make up for their lack of overwhelming force.

Some modern scholars have attempted to identify a similar model of low-intensity conflict in the Roman world, which appears anachronistic because many of its peoples (particularly in northern and western Europe) were traditional warrior societies that practiced low-intensity raiding as a way of life. For these peoples to continue similar military practices, now inflicting them on the Roman invaders, did not require ideological motivation. Raiding and “guerrilla” tactics were a pragmatic way of fighting the Romans, since these peoples from less organized societies had little chance of sustaining a pitched battle with the Romans’ professional armies.

Furthermore, even Roman warfare with other professional armies involved some degree of low-intensity conflict, between and leading up to pitched battles. Our sources focus on pitched battles because the Greeks and Romans regarded pitched battles as producing the most decisive and honorable outcomes in warfare. However, our sources tell us of many skirmishes and small-scale engagements that took place during continuous campaigning (that is, low-intensity conflict). Pitched battles usually occurred when neither side felt at a disadvantage, and so this dependence on a degree of mutual consent might require extended periods of campaigning to reach such a state.

The Roman political elite also favored pitched battles with decisive victories and mass enemy casualties as most likely to win the highly prestigious triumph. As a result, Republican Roman generals were motivated to represent low-intensity conflict as greater than it actually was to qualify for a triumph. A conclusive victory was more prestigious than low-intensity conflict that sputtered on. Nevertheless, during the Republic, there were significant periods, such as 167–91 BCE, with a relatively low level of military activity. The first and second century CE also saw significantly fewer pitched battles than the two preceding centuries. Nevertheless, Roman military forces were consistently maintained and constantly trained for combat, which was likely expected to occur at any given time. This combat

may have included ambushes, skirmishes, small-scale operations, and street fighting in siege warfare, particularly in provinces with persistent hostility to the Romans, such as Spain in the 150s–130s BCE, imperial Roman Britain (ca. 40s–80s CE), or Judaea. The nature of this combat often precluded traditional heavy infantry tactics, favoring more mobile light infantry or cavalry, especially auxiliary units. Combat may have been more fluid and involved missile weapons rather than hand-to-hand combat.

Low-intensity conflict also gave individual Roman soldiers the chance to display *virtus* (“courage, bravery”). One way of displaying the soldierly quality of *virtus* may have been through leadership. In a skirmish, a soldier might choose to lead a small group of comrades against one or two opposing skirmishers so that they might concentrate their missile shots and thus increase the probability of a hit. This would not only result in the increased combat effectiveness of a skirmish, but also provide the leading soldier with the opportunity to prove his leadership qualities to his officers. Polybius tells us that *velites* commonly wore some sort of animal skin on their helmets so that their commanders might recognize such efforts and displays of *virtus*. He also goes on to say that, rewards for combat were only distributed during skirmishes, rather than during pitched battle combat. Though Polybius is probably wrong about the decorations, his account of the *velites* highlights the importance of low-intensity conflict for the Romans. By the time of Marius, the *velites* were superseded, but soon replaced by the light cavalry *auxilia*.

Low-intensity conflict continued in the empire, often represented as banditry or brigandage. The persistence of low-intensity conflict (demonstrating the continued resistance of hostile conquered peoples to Roman rule) challenged the image of the emperor as the guarantor of peace. Therefore, low-intensity conflict might be either minimized as banditry, or inflated (as in some republican triumphs) into larger victories over the enemy. This makes it difficult to estimate the scale of emperors’ military activities from panegyric sources when a more objective historical account is lacking.

Adam Anders

See also Auxilia; Bandits and Brigands; Cavalry (Imperial); Cavalry (Republic); Emperor as Commander; Tactics; Velites

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Loyalty (Republic)

In the early and middle Republic, the Romans ensured the loyalty of their soldiers and allies both through reward and through coercion and severe punishment. Legionaries took an oath, the *sacramentum*, upon enlistment, and also swore other oaths as needed. They were subject to severe military discipline, though the anecdotes or legends that emphasize this may be overstating the severity. Titus Manlius Torquatus, consul in 340 BCE, put to death his own son for disobeying orders and leaving the line of battle to fight a duel with the enemy. The context was the Latin War (341–340), in which the Romans put down a revolt of their Latin and Italian allies, so Torquatus' discipline was intended to speak to the allies as well as to the Roman army. Otherwise, discipline often varied with the commander.

Severe punishment of disloyal allies was a consequence of the practice of *deditio in fidem*, unconditional surrender, in which the surrendering community became totally subject to Rome. Those undergoing *deditio* to a Roman commander were at his mercy; their treatment was up to his discretion.

The outcome of the Latin War, however, did not punish the Latin communities harshly. The Latin League was dissolved, and Rome made alliances with individual Latin communities, affirming their status. Latium was closest geographically and culturally to Rome, as the "Latin rights" of intermarriage and trade with Roman citizens showed.

More usually, Rome punished harshly those allies who revolted, sending a message about loyalty to the rest of her allies. In the Second Punic War (218–201 BCE), Hannibal's invasion of Italy sought to detach Campanian and south Italian communities from alliance with Rome. Capua and other

Campanian and south Italian cities revolted. Despite Rome's recent severe losses at the battle of Cannae (216) and the danger of the Carthaginian army, Roman commanders prioritized suppressing the Campanian and south Italian revolts.

At the time of the Third Punic War (149–146 BCE), the Achaean Revolt (146–145) broke out in Greece, led by Corinth and the Achaean League. Again, because Rome was waging a separate war, this revolt was put down brutally. The Achaean League was dissolved, and the Roman consul Lucius Mummius destroyed the city of Corinth, taking the title Achaicus. The destruction of a major Greek city shocked the Greek world as much as the destruction of Carthage.

The Roman repression of the Sicilian Slave Wars and the revolt of Spartacus (73–71 BCE) were particularly brutal because the rebels in these instances were slaves. Marcus Crassus destroyed the army of Spartacus and crucified many of the slave fighters.

In the Social War (91–87 BCE), Rome's Latin and Italian allies in central Italy revolted. They had long borne the burden of military service in Rome's wars with relatively little reward. The immediate consequence of the Social War was favorable for the Latins and allies, who received the Roman citizenship. However, in the subsequent conflict of the followers of Marius and Sulla, the Marians had strong support in central Italy, particularly Samnium. As a result after his victory over the Marians, Sulla took reprisals on the Samnites, slaughtering 8,000 Samnite prisoners (Appian, *Civil Wars* 1.82.375; Plutarch, *Sulla* 28) and sending his army into Samnium to extirpate the survivors.

The revolt of Asia of 88 BCE allegedly killed 80,000 Romans and Italians in Asia Minor (Appian, *Mithridatic Wars* 22). The Romans sought vengeance thereafter in the Mithridatic Wars, which took many years.

In the civil wars of the late Republic, however, loyalty acquired a different significance. Soldiers and officers might change sides, taking the *sacramentum* to a different commander, and escaping punishment for disloyalty. Commanders in the triumviral wars even tried to persuade each other's soldiers to defect to the other side; such defection was no longer viewed with contempt.

In 32 BCE, as his victory over Mark Antony drew near, Octavian sought to reinforce loyalty to his own cause. He imposed a loyalty oath on the entire population of Italy, claiming that they swore to him of their own free

will (*Res Gestae* 25, *iuravit in mea verba tota Italia sponte sua*). The precise form of the oath is no longer known, but it was probably based on the military oath. From that time onward, loyalty to the emperor became an unconditional requirement.

Sara E. Phang

See also Achaean Revolt; *Deditio* (Surrender); Manlius Torquatus, Titus; Marian-Sullan Conflict; Marius; Military Discipline; Military Oaths; Mithridatic Revolt; Octavian; Punic War, Second; Punic War, Third; Revolt; Samnium, Samnites; Sicilian Slave War, First; Sicilian Slave War, Second; Spartacus, Revolt of; Sulla, Lucius Cornelius; Vengeance

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Loyalty to Empire (Civilian)

Modern features of national identity and civic participation include legal status, language and education, material culture, participation in the political process, political symbolism, and consent to the state's monopoly of violence, including obedience to and recourse to law. Most modern nations make an effort to promote these features across the board. This was not the case with the ancient Roman Empire, even at its height (first through early third centuries CE). It is probable that soldiers' loyalty was far more actively promoted than civilian citizens' loyalty to the empire.

First of all, many subjects of the empire were not Roman citizens. Before the early third century CE, the franchise was not given to Italians until after the Social War (91–87 BCE). The citizenship was not given to all subjects of the empire until 212 CE, with the passage of the *Constitutio Antoniniana*,

which still excepted *dediticii* (surrendered enemies). Local identities remained strong due to the many small urban or tribal communities throughout the empire.

Participation in the Republic's political process was limited even by the late Republic, when the growing number of Roman citizens in Italy and abroad could not easily travel to Rome to vote. In the Principate, the withering away of the republican political system (the Senate now voted magistrates into office, and the emperors assigned the consulship as an honor) meant that only elites or very talented individuals who rose from poor origins participated in imperial government as its functionaries. The most numerous and lowest status participants in politics were soldiers (300,000 to 400,000 men) (see: *Army in Politics*). The masses, even in the city of Rome, were reduced to chanted acclamations to express political opinions.

Perhaps the most essential feature of national loyalty is consent to the state's use of force, taxation, and the rule of law. A modern state empowers law enforcement organizations (and if necessary the military) to impose coercion on disobedient subjects. Its military defends its subjects from external aggression. It also imposes obligatory taxation to fund its activities. In the Roman Empire, civilian police forces were sporadic (some Greek cities had them) and most policing was done by the Roman army. Subjects who resisted the "Roman order" would encounter repression by the army; texts from these groups, such as the Jews in Judaea, show fear and dislike of Roman soldiers. Subjects were also forced to pay taxes, or face coercion.

Laws of Julius Caesar and Augustus emphasized the rule of law by prohibiting private citizens to hoard weapons or carry them in public for offensive use. The literary elite supported and praised the "Roman peace." But the *Pax Romana*'s extent was patchy, especially in rural and remote areas of the empire, where travelers might need to carry weapons to defend themselves from bandits. When the empire's regressive taxation imposed too heavy a burden on the poor, or when soldiers and other imperial functionaries abused civilians, provincials were liable to resist or revolt, rejecting the legitimacy of at least the local authorities of the empire.

Citizens of the empire also endorsed the rule of Roman law through the use of legal process. Roman law applied wherever Roman citizens resided, though before the third century CE, a defendant who sought trial as a Roman citizen needed to travel to the city of Rome. Subjects might even affirm the

imperial system's legitimacy by appealing to higher authorities, such as provincial governors or emperors, against abuse by lower authorities such as soldiers or tax collectors. The Roman government promoted a consciousness of the benefits of law by publishing its edicts.

Roman political symbolism was more diffuse than modern nations' focused political symbols (such as flag or anthem). Modern Hollywood symbols of "Rome," such as lictors, fasces, purple, or eagle standards, were more closely associated with the consulship, the triumph, or the army. However, visual representations of Roman leaders and of Rome's historical achievements were widespread at least in large cities such as Rome and the provincial capitals. The most widespread symbol was the image of the emperor, in statues, stone reliefs or paintings, and coins. The imperial cult promoted veneration of the emperor. Such veneration persisted even after the conversion of Constantine and the Christianization of the empire. Though the later Roman emperor was not worshipped as a god, he was still regarded as a sacred being. However, compulsory tests of loyalty to the emperor or worship of the emperor were rare. They occurred in the Christian persecutions under Decius and Valerian and under Diocletian and the Second Tetrarchy (303–311).

Loyalty to the idea of the empire might prevail over loyalty to an existing emperor in times of crisis. Tacitus says of the civil wars of 69 CE (the "War of Four Emperors") that citizens learned for the first time that "emperors could be made elsewhere than at Rome" (*Histories* 1.4). In times of crisis, whether due to foreign invasions or civil warfare, peripheral regions of the empire showed a tendency to devolve, elevating their own emperors, who from the viewpoint of the center were usurpers. A successful usurper, such as Vespasian (69–79) might defeat his rivals and become legitimate ruler of the entire empire. However, in 69 and other civil wars (193–197 CE and especially in 235–284) the regional rulers or usurpers were still regarded as Roman emperors; the idea of the empire persisted.

The conclusive test of subjects' loyalty to the Roman Empire came in the mid-fifth century CE, as the western empire broke up. In 476 Odoacer, usurping the last Roman emperor (Romulus Augustulus), chose to become king of Italy rather than another Roman emperor. Other parts of the western empire had reached the same decision earlier in the fifth century. The western empire had shown itself unable to defend its subjects from invasion; the invaders, now "barbarian" kingdoms, were better able to do so.

See also Army in Politics; British Revolt; Christians, Persecution of; Civil-Military Relations; *Civis Romanus*; Cult of the Emperor; Fall of the Roman Empire (West); Jewish War; Public Order; Usurpation; War of Four Emperors

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Lucan (39–65 CE)

Marcus Annaeus Lucanus (Lucan) was a notably young poet of Neronian Rome who is best known for the *Pharsalia*, a lurid epic of the Caesarian-Pompeian Civil War (covering 49–48 BCE). Lucan was a kinsman of Seneca, one of Nero's mentors, and began to publish the *Pharsalia* in 62–63. However, Lucan turned against Nero and was punished by being forbidden to present his work in public or speak on his own behalf. Lucan then joined the Pisonian conspiracy in 65. When the conspiracy was exposed, Lucan accepted the option of suicide. The *Pharsalia* dramatizes the Caesarian-Pompeian Civil War in epic fashion, and dwells upon the horrors of civil warfare.

Sara E. Phang

See also Caesar, Gaius Julius; Civil Warfare; Civil Wars (I) (49–45 BCE); Nero; Pompey

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Lucius Verus (161–169 CE)

Co-emperor (161–169 CE) with Marcus Aurelius (161–180), Lucius Verus, born in 130, was the son of Hadrian's heir Lucius Aelius Caesar, who died prematurely in 138 CE. Lucius Verus was then adopted by Hadrian's second heir and eventual successor, Antoninus Pius, along with Marcus Aurelius. Verus and Marcus were brought up in the imperial household, tutored by the famous orator Cornelius Fronto. When Antoninus Pius died in 161 CE, Marcus Aurelius and Lucius Verus succeeded to the throne, although only Marcus held the office of *pontifex maximus* or chief priest. The emperors were jointly awarded the title of *patres patriae* ("fathers of the fatherland") in 166 CE. Verus married Marcus' daughter Lucilla in 164 CE.

The most pressing concern for the new emperors was the situation on the eastern frontier. War had broken out with the Arsacid Persian Empire over the client kingdom of Armenia, and Lucius Verus set out for the east in 162 CE. Verus preferred to remain in Antioch, so most of the actual fighting was done by his officers, who reclaimed Armenia in 163 CE. In 165–166 CE, the general Avidius Cassius captured Seleucia and Ctesiphon, bringing the war to a successful conclusion. Verus and Marcus Aurelius celebrated a joint triumph upon his return to Rome in 166 CE. The emperors embarked on a second campaign against the northern tribes in 168 CE, and spent the following winter at Aquileia. However, the camp was assailed by the plague that the soldiers had brought back from Persia. As the imperial retinue returned to Rome, Verus had a stroke and died.

Sources for Lucius Verus' life are Cassius Dio and the unreliable *Historia Augusta*, which contrasts the playboy Lucius with the philosophical Marcus.

Caillan Davenport

See also Avidius Cassius; *Historia Augusta*; Marcus Aurelius; Persian Wars, Arsacid

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Lucullus (117–57/56 BCE)

Lucius Licinius Lucullus, born ca. 117 BCE, was a prominent politician and

general of the late Republic who distinguished himself in Rome's wars against Mithridates, but who was eventually betrayed by his soldiers. Lucullus first served in the Social War (91–87 BCE) under Sulla, holding a quaestorship in 88; he was aedile in 79, praetor in 78, then governor of Africa, and consul in 74. In 74 he received command of the Mithridatic War in the eastern Mediterranean and attacked corruption in Roman government in Asia. Aggressively pursuing the campaign against Mithridates, he forced Mithridates to take refuge in Armenia. When Mithridates allied with King Tigranes of Armenia, Lucullus invaded Armenia and defeated Tigranes, capturing his capital of Tigranocerta. However, due to his severe discipline and arrogant behavior, Lucullus did not command the loyalty of his troops. His troops abandoned him, and his command was whittled away by his detractors at Rome. The command of the Mithridatic Wars was eventually given to Pompey. Lucullus returned to Rome to live in a degree of luxury that became proverbial at Rome. He died in 57/56 BCE.

Sara E. Phang

See also Armenia; Mithridatic Wars; Mutiny; Persian Wars, Arsacid; Pompey; Social War (91–87 BCE)

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M

Macedonian War, First (214–206 BCE), Causes

The First Macedonian War was fought between the Roman Republic and Philip V, king of Macedon, and ended inconclusively at the Peace of Phoenice. While Roman involvement in Illyria was an underlying basis of the conflict, the alliance between Philip V (b. 238, r. 221–179) and Hannibal Barca was the immediate cause of the war. As will be shown below, Philip's concerns over Illyria motivated him to ally with Hannibal to secure the Macedonian frontier there. Rome, on the other hand, perceived Philip's overture to Hannibal as aggressive and as proof of Philip's intent to join Hannibal in Italy. In response, the Romans launched a small-scale campaign (drawing largely on Greek allies) to contain Philip within Macedon. At all times, however, Rome's effort in Macedon was overshadowed by the more pressing demands of the Second Punic War. Thus, the First Macedonian War largely resulted in a stalemate, but Rome's enmity toward Philip V marked the two states' relations for the remainder of the Macedonian kingdom's existence.

After defeating Queen Teuta in the First Illyrian War (229–228), the Romans recognized Demetrius of Pharos as their client-ruler in Illyria. While Demetrius dominated Illyria for a time, he also eventually lost Roman support and was expelled in the Second Illyrian War of 219, but took refuge at the court of Philip V (Polybius 3.16, 18–19). After Philip learned of the Roman defeat at Lake Trasimene in 217, Demetrius immediately encouraged Philip to end his current war with the Aetolians, the Social War of 220–217 (not to be confused with the Roman-Italian war of 91–87 BCE), and turn his attention to Italy while the Romans were vulnerable (Polybius 5.101–102). Although Polybius believed that Philip truly desired world

domination, an end to the Social War (which Philip was already winning) also enabled him to retaliate against recent Illyrian raids upon Macedon, which were led by Scerdilaidas, Demetrius' former ally. Philip constructed a fleet of 100 *lemboi*, small ships intended to transport troops quickly, and prepared to attack several Illyrian coastal cities. Meanwhile, Scerdilaidas sent a desperate appeal to Rome, no doubt exaggerating Philip's threat. Hearing a rumor that the Romans had sent a squadron of ships to Apollonia to investigate Philip's actions, the king feared that this was the vanguard for an entire Roman fleet and retreated in a panic (Polybius 5.108–110).

Seeing the Roman response to Illyrian appeals may have finally convinced Philip to ally with Hannibal in 215. According to Polybius, the treaty between Philip and Hannibal (Polybius 7.9) included promises of mutual aid and the establishment of Carthaginian and Macedonian spheres of influence. The Romans intercepted Philip's delegation as it returned to Macedon, however, and discovered the treaty along with several Punic ambassadors. Livy reports that the prospect of an alliance between Philip and Hannibal panicked the Romans, leading them immediately to dispatch forces under the command of Marcus Valerius Laevinus to guard the southern coast of Italy and contain Philip in Macedon (Livy 23.38.5–11).

Dustin Cranford

See also Alliances; Allies; *Amicitia*; Livy; Macedonian War, Second; Polybius; Punic War, Second; Treaties and Alliances

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Macedonian War, First (214–206 BCE), Course

Meanwhile, Philip resumed his Illyrian campaign in 214, captured the city of Oricum, and began to threaten Apollonia. In response, Laevinus easily recaptured Oricum, then reinforced Apollonia and launched a surprise attack on Philip's camp. Philip was forced to flee, while nearly 3,000 Macedonian troops were killed or taken prisoner (Livy 24.40). For nearly three years after the victory at Apollonia, the Romans left Philip unchecked. By 211, Laevinus enlisted the aid of the Aetolian League (Livy 26.24.1–14), stipulating that the Aetolians receive the land of any conquered territories, while the Romans claimed any movable plunder (such as slaves). While the terms of the alliance favored the Aetolians more than the Romans, the treaty required the Aetolians to carry out the more difficult land campaign, while Laevinus pledged the support of the Roman navy. Although the initial Roman and Aetolian advance was successful, Laevinus retired to Corcyra after capturing several cities, feeling that this effort tied down Philip enough to keep him out of Italy. This further demonstrates that the Roman goals in the war were limited to the containment of Philip, and not imperialistic expansion. Philip, on the other hand, also campaigned energetically and secured his frontiers in Illyria, Thrace, and Thessaly (Livy 26.24.15–16).

By 210, Laevinus was elected consul in Rome, and Publius Sulpicius Galba was sent to take over the command of the war in Macedon (Livy 26.26.1–4). Although Laevinus ordered Galba to disband the legion stationed in Macedon, some Roman land forces remained, since Livy records that Philip faced a combined Roman, Aetolian, and Pergamene army at Lamia in 209. Philip's army defeated the allied forces twice, killing over 1,000 men in each engagement. Philip then moved to Phalara, where he met envoys from Ptolemaic Egypt, Rhodes, Athens, Chios, and King Amyntander of Athamania (representing the Aetolians), who appealed to Philip to end the war for the general welfare of Greece. The rumor of approaching Roman reinforcements, however, led the Aetolians to make irrational and arrogant demands to Philip, causing hostilities to continue (Livy 27.30).

The years 209 and 208 proved difficult for Philip, attacked by his enemies and effectively trapped in Macedon. The Romans and Pergamenes advanced in Euboea, the Aetolians ravaged Macedon, the Achaeans were hard pressed by the Spartans, and the Illyrians raided Macedon from the north. Philip calmly promised aid to all of his allies, focused on defense, and sent

detachments to various regions (Polybius 10.41–42). Galba captured Oreus in Euboea through treachery and tried to take Chalcis, but the city's defenses held out until Philip could arrive. The city of Opus marked the turning point of the war, despite changing hands several times between Philip and the Pergamenes. After first capturing, then losing the city to Philip, Attalus was compelled to withdraw from the war and return to Pergamum to defend his kingdom against Prusias of Bithynia, which in turn prompted Galba to remove his fleet to Aegina. With the Roman and Pergamene threats alleviated, Philip promptly set out to recover lost cities and answer appeals from Greek allies (Livy 28.5–7).

After two further failed attempts at mediation in 208 and 207, the Aetolians finally agreed to a cessation of hostilities in 206. The Aetolian League felt abandoned by their Roman allies and had effectively fought on their own for five years, failing to drive away Philip (Livy 29.12.1–2). Perhaps hearing of this, the Romans finally sent 11,000 troops to Greece under the new commander, Publius Sempronius Tuditanus. The Romans were angry with the Aetolians for making a separate peace with Philip, in violation of their treaty in 211, but could not persuade their former allies to return to the war. After a brief standoff at Apollonia, envoys from Epirus approached Sempronius and Philip with offers of mediation (Livy 29.12.3–9).

The treaty that ended the war in 205, the Peace of Phoenice, largely restored Greek affairs to the *status quo* before the war (Livy 29.12.10–15). A two-month armistice was declared, during which time the Senate ratified the terms of the peace. The Romans specified cities in Illyria and Greece under their protection, as did Philip in regards to his Greek allies. While the treaty only slightly benefited either side, a consideration of both Rome and Macedon's original purposes in the war makes the treaty seem more significant. From the beginning, Philip's activity west of Macedon retaliated against Illyrian aggression. Although Philip did not gain much territory in the Peace of Phoenice, the Roman presence in Illyria simultaneously secured the Macedonian frontier, thus alleviating Philip's concerns there. The Romans, on the other hand, never sought to gain territory from the First Macedonian War, but only to keep Philip from joining Hannibal in Italy. The organization and Macedonian recognition of an informal Roman protectorate in Illyria provided the buffer between Macedon and Italy that the Romans wanted. Most importantly, the theater of the Second Punic War was shifting to Africa, and the Romans needed all available troops

(including the legions in Macedon) for the coming assault on Carthage (Livy 29.12.16).

Dustin Cranford

See also Alliances; Allies; *Amicitia*; Livy; Macedonian War, Second; Polybius; Punic War, Second; Treaties and Alliances

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Macedonian War, First (214–206 BCE), Consequences

Since the Romans agreed to the Peace of Phoenice largely out of necessity, it did not mean that they had absolved Philip, and many historians believe that the Romans never desired peace with Philip and had fully intended to return. As a result, the Romans continued to suspect Philip, and certain aristocrats wanted to continue the conflict when it became possible. Rome used its Greek allies as a way to monitor Philip's activities, and many of these allies eagerly brought accusations against him. This hostile stance toward Macedon is apparent in the Roman tradition, as seen in Livy in a dubious anecdote: envoys from Greece complained of Philip's aggression and alleged that the king had actually sent money and 4,000 troops to Hannibal in 202. In response to this, Livy says that the Romans immediately dispatched a delegation to reprove Philip for violating the terms of the treaty (Livy 30.26.3–4).

In 201, envoys from Carthage and Macedon supposedly arrived in Rome

requesting an audience with the Senate. The Macedonian envoys refuted the accusations from Rome's Greek allies and further accused one of the Roman representatives sent to Macedon, Marcus Aurelius, of raising native levies of Greeks to fight against Macedonian troops. Aurelius sent his own delegate back to Rome to counter the Macedonians' claims, asserting in turn that he was only defending Roman friends against Philip's aggression. Moreover, the Macedonians demanded the release of the 4,000 troops and their commander, Sopater, who were suspected of fighting alongside Hannibal at Zama. The Senate responded to the Macedonian envoys that "the king [i.e., Philip]... was looking for war, and if he kept on doing so, he would find it all too soon" (Livy 30.42.1–8). It is unlikely that Philip sent these troops to Hannibal, probably not having the manpower to do so. The story nevertheless shows that the Romans did not trust Philip, and that relations between Rome and Macedon were far from amiable.

An undetermined number of Greek and Illyrian cities allied with Rome, despite many being listed explicitly in the Peace of Phoenice. With the Peace, however, the Romans became more involved in diplomacy with Greek cities and also maintained a firm presence in Illyria. The Romans also formed a permanent amicable relationship with Attalus in Asia Minor, as the diplomatic mission to Pergamum led by Laevinus in 206 demonstrates (Livy 29.11.1–9). On the other hand, the Aetolian League's relationship with Rome was far less harmonious, and the Romans never forgave what they saw as a betrayal by the Aetolians' separate peace with Philip. Roman and Aetolian tension and distrust deepened in the coming years. Lastly, Rome's willingness to answer appeals in Greece and Illyria set a powerful precedent and subsequently encouraged an endless stream of petitions from Greek states for over 50 years.

And so, as a direct result of Philip's decision to seek an alliance with Hannibal, the Romans had permanently turned part of their attention to the east. For the remainder of its existence as an independent kingdom, Macedon was a potential enemy in Rome's eyes. Beyond this, Rome was now permanently involved in Greek affairs, even if indirectly so. While the Romans previously had few contacts in the Greek world, their diplomatic reach now stretched from Italy into Asia Minor. Indeed, the First Macedonian War was the first time that affairs in Italy, Africa, and Greece were intertwined, what Polybius called a *sympleke* (Polybius 5.105.4). Many of Rome's future wars, annexations, and diplomatic stances had their roots

in the relationships formed during the First Macedonian War.

Dustin Cranford

See also Alliances; Allies; *Amicitia*; Livy; Macedonian War, Second; Polybius; Punic War, Second; Treaties and Alliances

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Macedonian War, Second (200–197 BCE), Causes

The Second Macedonian War was fought between the Roman Republic and Philip V, king of Macedon, and ended as a decisive Roman victory after Philip's defeat at the battle of Cynoscephalae. The war began with Rome's overt suspicion and hostility toward Philip (b. 238, r. 221–179). Though Philip complied with the Peace of Phoenice, which ended the First Macedonian War (214–206), the king turned east and began a new ruthless campaign in the Aegean. Under Macedonian pressure, the Rhodians, Pergamenes, and Athenians sent several delegations to the Romans requesting aid against Philip. The Romans, freed from the Second Punic War and still resenting Philip for his aggressive alliance with Hannibal in 215, demanded that Philip stop expanding in the Aegean or else fight a war with Rome. Philip, choosing war with the Romans, at first fought vigorously but was eventually crushed at the battle of Cynoscephalae in 197. Subsequently, the Romans faced the burdensome task of restoring order to Greece, while the Seleucid king Antiochus III's ambitions posed a new threat.

After the end of the First Macedonian War in 206, Philip did not wish to

antagonize Rome and turned his attention eastward in 204–202, focusing on strengthening Macedon's position in the Aegean Sea. Exploiting current Ptolemaic weakness, Philip and Antiochus formed an alliance to divide the Ptolemies' possessions in the Mediterranean and Egypt (Polybius 15.20.1–8). Philip would operate against Ptolemaic possessions in Thrace, the Cycladic islands, and Asia Minor, while Antiochus would invade Palestine. Neither the Rhodians nor the kingdom of Pergamum wanted to risk a joint Seleucid-Macedonian force forming in the eastern Mediterranean, leading both states (traditional rivals) to join together and attack Macedon in defense of their Aegean allies (Polybius 15.23, 16.1–10).

After defeating King Attalus of Pergamum and the Rhodians twice at sea, Philip began to campaign in Caria (in Asia Minor). In late 201, envoys from Attalus, Rhodes, and Ptolemaic Egypt came to Rome officially to protest Philip's activities. The Senate listened to their complaints and immediately deputized three senators to journey through Greece and to Ptolemaic Egypt to convey Roman disapproval of Philip's aggression (Polybius 16.24.3; Livy 31.2.1–4). Even before the Roman delegation departed, however, much of the Senate had already decided upon war with Philip and put the decision to the centuriate assembly (*comitia centuriata*). The assembly voted down the war declaration, forcing the prospective consul, Publius Sulpicius Galba, to convince them of the necessity for the war (Livy 31.6.3–8.7).

By 200, the Roman envoys arrived in Athens shortly after both Attalus and forces from Rhodes defended the Athenian seaport, the Piraeus, from a Macedonian attack. With diplomatic help from Attalus, the Roman ambassadors established an alliance between Rome and Athens and offered aid against Philip's aggression (Polybius 16.25–27; Livy 31.14–15). The Aetolian League also appealed to Rome for aid, but was rejected because they had abandoned the Roman cause during the First Macedonian War. Upon intercepting Philip's general Nicanor, who was then approaching Athens with an army, the Romans instructed him to deliver an ultimatum to Philip, that he ceases attacking all Greek cities and compensate Attalus for the damages his kingdom had suffered. If Philip failed to comply, he would risk war with Rome. Shortly afterward, Marcus Aemilius Lepidus, one of the Roman senators on the way to Egypt, met Philip at Abydos, which the king was then besieging. Lepidus announced to Philip the same demands as at Athens, also ordering Philip to cease from attacking both Ptolemaic and

Rhodian possessions. Philip rejected the Roman ultimatum, demanded that the Romans themselves respect the Peace of Phoenice, but pledged to defend Macedonian interests by force if necessary (Polybius 16.34.1–7; Livy 31.18). Philip then returned to Macedon, where he learned that Galba had crossed over from Italy with his legions and was wintering near Apollonia.

Dustin Cranford

See also Alliances; *Amicitia*; *Bellum Iustum*; *Comitia Centuriata*; *Cynoscephalae*; *Flamininus*; *Imperialism*; *Isthmian Declaration*; *Livy*; *Macedonian War, First*; *Polybius*; *Treaties and Alliances*

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Macedonian War, Second (200–197 BCE), Course

The Second Macedonian War began with the Romans capturing and destroying Chalcis in Euboea. After unsuccessfully attacking Athens, Philip proceeded to Argos where he tried to maintain his alliance with the Achaean League. In the meantime, Galba gained the allegiance of the Illyrians and King Amyntander of Athamania, and attended a conference of the Aetolian League, enlisting their aid against Philip after a lengthy debate (Livy 31.28–32). Although the Romans pushed forward into Macedon, Philip aggressively checked invasions from both the Illyrian Dardanians and the Aetolians. Galba campaigned continuously, capturing several cities, but by the end of his consular year he failed to win a decisive victory, resulting in a stalemate. The consul for 199/198, Publius Villius, was even less successful during his term.

The new consul for 198/197, Titus Quinctius Flamininus, felt that the key

to winning the war was in detaching Philip from his Greek allies (Livy 32.7.13; Plutarch, *Flamininus* 2.3–4). Philip tried to offer terms of peace to Flamininus because of the long period of inactivity, but was unsuccessful. Subsequently, Philip's severity and Flamininus' simultaneous moderation won many Greek and Macedonian communities to the Roman cause, including many Epirotes, several Thessalian cities, and most importantly the Achaean League. In early 197, Philip again attempted and failed to make peace with the Romans, even though he sent envoys directly to Rome. With his attempt at diplomacy rejected, Philip realized that the war could only be decided in battle and began an intense period of recruitment and training, conscripting men from the age of 16 to 60.

Once their armies were fielded, the Romans and the Macedonians maneuvered for a time until both armies finally met at the hills of Cynoscephalae (the "Dogs' Heads"), near Scotusa. Initially, the Macedonian phalanx held its ground well and drove back the Roman advance, but Flamininus' troops exploited a gap in the Macedonian line, quickly routing Philip's entire army, while the king himself fled north to collect survivors. Polybius reports that 8,000 Macedonians were killed in the battle with 5,000 captured, while the Romans lost only 700 men (Polybius 18.19–27; Livy 33.3–10).

At the subsequent negotiations in Thessaly, Philip agreed to all of the Roman demands and offered to submit completely to the will of the Senate (Polybius 18.38–39; Livy 33.13). The Senate agreed to the proposal for peace and granted Flamininus the power to facilitate the terms, also organizing a commission of ten men, known as the *legati*, to aid Flamininus. Philip was required to abandon all of his garrisons in Greece and turn the cities that he held over to Rome. The king was forbidden to make war outside of Macedon, was ordered to disband the majority of his navy, and was allowed to maintain an army of no more than 5,000 men. Lastly, Philip was instructed to pay an indemnity of 1,000 talents and to turn over several hostages to Rome, including his younger son, Demetrius (Polybius 18.44; Livy 33.30).

Dustin Cranford

See also Alliances; *Amicitia*; *Bellum Iustum*; *Comitia Centuriata*; Cynoscephalae; Flamininus; Imperialism; Isthmian Declaration; Livy; Macedonian War, First; Polybius; Treaties and Alliances

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Macedonian War, Second (200–197 BCE), Consequences

Flamininus' chief responsibility, even before the Second Macedonian War ended, was the settlement of Greece. A quarrel immediately broke out between the Romans and the Aetolians when Philip surrendered at Thessaly, undermining claims of Greek "freedom" and Rome's intentions. The Aetolians urged Flamininus not only to drive Philip from Greece, but either to kill the king or depose him. Flamininus realized, however, that the death or removal of Philip would only create an even more dangerous power vacuum north of Greece, subject to barbarian invasion and Aetolian expansion. Therefore, Flamininus replied to the Aetolian League that it was not Roman custom to kill the defeated, but rather to spare the conquered (Polybius 18.36.5–37.12). The tension between Flamininus and the Aetolians continued after the Senate's ratification of Philip's surrender. The Aetolians remarked that Rome's promises of freedom were empty words and that Flamininus clearly intended to maintain garrisons in many Greek cities previously held by Philip, particularly the "fetters of Greece," Demetrias, Chalcis, and Corinth (Polybius 18.45; Livy 33.31). Despite the looming threat of invasion from Antiochus III, Flamininus compromised, resolving to evacuate all of Greece, but to maintain garrisons in Demetrias, Chalcis, and the citadel of Corinth, as Roman outposts against the Seleucid threat.

In July 196, Flamininus addressed the Isthmian Games in Corinth. He

officially announced his resolution to evacuate Greece, leaving cities free and under the governance of their own laws (Polybius 18.46.4; Livy 33.32.5–6). The crowd roared with praise and approval for Flamininus, almost rioting in celebration. Immediately after the Isthmian Games, the *legati* confronted ambassadors from Antiochus III, whom the Romans instructed not to make war on any Greek city, nor to attack any of the possessions of Philip or the Ptolemies. Beyond restricting Antiochus' activity, the Romans also addressed disturbances arising from within Greece, including defeating the king of Sparta, Nabis, in 195 for his attempts to expand Spartan authority in the Peloponnese. In the public evacuation of the Roman army from Greece, Flamininus' troops were cheered as they marched out of the Acrocorinth, while Chalcis and Demetrias were evacuated days later (Livy 34.49–51). In their settlement of the Greek communities and intimidation of Antiochus, Flamininus and the *legati* demonstrated that, while Greece was free and autonomous, it was under the protection and guidance of Rome.

Philip, on the other hand, was completely humbled at the end of the war and became a dutiful client of Rome for a time. When the *legati* dispersed throughout Greece in 196 to implement the Roman treaty with Philip, the king was advised to follow Rome's commands, seek out an alliance, and clear himself of any suspicion of colluding with Antiochus (Polybius 18.48.3–4; Livy 33.35.2–7). Philip even attempted on his own to cultivate good relations with Rome and sent troops to Flamininus without request before the siege of Sparta in 195. Years later, when Antiochus III was preparing for his war against Rome, Philip made sure to absolve himself of any suspicion by rejecting Antiochus and pledging his allegiance to Rome (Polybius 21.3; Livy 36.4.1–3, 10.10, 37.7.16).

Rome's suspicion of Philip and the king's own aggressive resolve had led to the Second Macedonian War. The Romans had then rallied their Greek allies under the slogan of liberation from Macedonian hegemony, though historians continue to debate Rome's true intention in Greece after the war. On the one hand, the Roman slogan of "freedom" for the Greeks was not mere propaganda. At the Isthmian Games in 196, and following Nabis' defeat in 195, Flamininus demonstrated that the Romans fully intended to evacuate Greece as promised. On the other hand, the Romans clearly illustrated on several occasions that the liberation of Greece was dictated by Rome on Roman terms, and that Rome would not tolerate any disruption from within or outside Greece. In any case, with the reduction of

Macedon and the victory of Rome, the first stage of the power transition in the eastern Mediterranean was complete. Although Flamininus had evacuated Greece in 195, the subsequent war against the Aetolian League and the Seleucids (192–188 BCE) would once again bring Roman legions into the east for the next contest over Mediterranean hegemony.

In the end, the Second Macedonian War was a major turning point in both Roman and Greek history. The Romans had decisively defeated a full Macedonian army for the first time, liberated the cities of Greece from Macedonian domination (though this issue is hotly debated even today), while the flood of Greek appeals to Rome confirmed Rome's role as the new arbiter in Greece and the Mediterranean, with only the Seleucids as an apparent rival.

Dustin Cranford

See also Alliances; *Amicitia*; *Bellum Iustum*; *Comitia Centuriata*; *Cynoscephalae*; Flamininus; Imperialism; Isthmian Declaration; Livy; Macedonian War, First; Polybius; Treaties and Alliances

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Macedonian War, Third (171–168 BCE), Causes

The Third Macedonian War was fought between the Roman Republic and Perseus, king of Macedon, and ended shortly after Perseus' defeat at the battle of Pydna. While Polybius claimed that the war resulted from the long standing hatred of Rome on the part of Philip V and his son, Perseus (b. 212,

r. 179–168), the truest cause was Rome's own continued suspicion of Macedon (Polybius 22.18.10–11). Despite accusations from his enemies, Perseus did not seek a war with Rome, but in fact did all that he could to avoid it. His greatest mistake was his ambition and success in restoring Macedonian strength and influence in Hellenistic politics, coupled with his refusal to accede to Roman demands. Though, like his father, Perseus campaigned energetically against Rome, he was decisively defeated at the battle of Pydna in 168. The aftermath was more extreme than Philip's wars with Rome, however, as Perseus' surrender to Rome resulted in the dissolution of the Antigonid dynasty and the partition of Macedon. The most lasting consequence, however, was that the victory over Macedon confirmed Rome as the sole arbiter of eastern Mediterranean affairs.

The final years of Philip V's reign revived tension between Rome and Macedon, but also intrigue between the king's sons, Demetrius and Perseus. Though Perseus was the eldest of the two, rumors abounded that he was the son of a prostitute and therefore an illegitimate heir to the Macedonian throne, while his younger brother Demetrius' influence grew through both popular acclaim and support from Rome, which in turn aroused Philip's suspicions (Livy 39.53.1–9). Subsequently, Perseus was anxious to secure his ascension to the throne and accused Demetrius of treason, culminating in Philip's reluctant order to execute Demetrius in 180 (Polybius 23.3.9; Livy 40.24). Perseus seized the throne after Philip's death in 179 and, though he asked the Senate to renew the treaty made with Philip, Perseus' problems with Rome began almost immediately. By 176, Dardanian and Thessalian envoys in Rome accused Perseus of using Bastarnae mercenaries to expand his authority in Illyria and Greece. Although Perseus sent his own ambassadors to answer the accusations, the Senate only sternly reminded the king to adhere to his treaty with Rome. After increasing his influence in Greece and inviting exiles to return to Macedon, Perseus roused serious Roman suspicion when he reportedly opened communications with Carthage and began attacking Greek cities near Thessaly. When Perseus then reopened relations with the Achaean League in 173, a Roman delegation investigated the king's actions in Greece and reported that Perseus was preparing for a war with Rome.

King Eumenes of Pergamum, a traditional enemy of Macedon, soon arrived at Rome to confirm the Senate's fears, warning the Romans of Perseus' talent as a general and Macedon's renewed strength (Livy 42.11–

13). Eumenes further alleged that Perseus had already allied with several of his stronger neighbors, confirmed old alliances with Bithynia, married the daughter of Seleucus IV, and gave lavish gifts to the Rhodians. When Perseus' own ambassadors arrived at Rome to speak in their king's defense, the Romans were already convinced by Eumenes' account, ignoring the Macedonian envoys' retorts. In the same year, a final Roman envoy delivered an ultimatum to Perseus, which he angrily rejected. The Romans then returned and announced Perseus' response to the Senate, but also reported that the king was preparing for war in Macedon. Thus, the Romans had found sufficient justification for marching against Macedon and began their own preparations for war. Perseus did make another attempt at peace, but the Senate only replied that the king should answer for the charges made against him. When the Macedonian ambassadors could not answer, the Roman Senate cut off negotiations abruptly and ordered the ambassadors to leave Italy, while around the same time an advance force of over 5,000 Roman troops occupied forts in Epirus and Illyria (Livy 42.36).

Dustin Cranford

See also Aemilius Paullus, Lucius; Diplomacy; Imperialism; Livy; Plutarch; Polybius; Pydna, Battle of; Treaties and Alliances; Triumph

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Macedonian War, Third (171–168 BCE), Course

In 171, the consul Publius Licinius Crassus was given command of the Macedonian war with an army of 16,000 infantry and 800 cavalry (Livy 42.31.2). A Roman delegation crossed into Greece and Asia to gather allies for the coming war, while Quintus Marcius Philippus opened diplomatic

talks with Perseus under the pretense of negotiating a peaceful settlement. In reality, the negotiations provided Marcius with a plausible opportunity to declare an armistice and allow the Roman army time to assemble. Perseus himself sent representatives to several Greek and Asian cities, as well as to Rome, to announce his desire for peace with Rome, though the Senate quickly rejected his Roman envoys. Initial operations then commenced on both sides, as the Romans gathered their fleet at Cephallenia, while Perseus assembled an army of 43,000 men (Polybius 27.7.1; Livy 42.46–51).

After a minor victory at the battle of Callinicus (Livy 42.58–62), Perseus again offered peace, but the Romans replied that they would only accept his complete surrender. Crassus in turn won a costly battle near Phalanna, but failed to advance the war further during his consulship, nor did the following consul in Macedon for 170/169, Aulus Hostilius Mancinus. In 169, Philippus was elected as consul and given Macedon as his province with a fresh levy of 5,000 troops. Near the end of his term as consul, envoys from Bithynia and Rhodes went to Rome to mediate an end to the war with Macedon. Livy reports that the Rhodian delegation spoke indignantly and disrespectfully to the Senate and that the Romans began to question the loyalty of Rhodes. In 168, two new consuls were elected, and Lucius Aemilius Paullus was granted command of the Macedonian War (Livy 44.17.4–9). During this year, Perseus aggressively sought further support in Greece, Illyria, and Asia, starting with the Illyrian king, Genthius, who was quickly defeated, captured, and sent to Rome. Perseus also capitalized on the tension within the kingdom of Pergamum and negotiated with its king, Eumenes, asking the king to mediate an end to the war on behalf of Macedon.

By the spring of 168, Paullus had reached Macedon, and Perseus began to fortify his positions in anticipation of the Roman advance. The two armies met at the small village of Pydna, and, following a brief standoff, a skirmish culminated in a full battle (Polybius 29.15–16; Livy 44.36–41). Livy reports that the Macedonian infantry was forced to enter the battle hastily, was not able to deploy their phalanx formation, and was significantly outflanked by the more maneuverable Roman troops. Perseus panicked and fled shortly after the battle's inception, and the majority of his cavalry followed him unscathed. The Romans were so preoccupied with annihilating Perseus' infantry that they did not pursue the fleeing cavalry. The battle was a devastating defeat for the Macedonians, with 20,000 dead

and 11,000 more captured (Livy 44.42.7).

After hiding for a brief period, Perseus proceeded to the royal capital of Pella and then to Amphipolis to rally support, before finally seeking asylum on the island of Samothrace. A Roman delegation went to Samothrace to capture Perseus, and, after a failed attempt at escape, the king surrendered himself to the Roman delegation. Perseus was thereafter sent to Paullus' camp, where Paullus reproved him for entering into such a disastrous war with Rome, but nevertheless assured him of his safety. Although Perseus' fate was yet to be decided, Polybius and Livy state that, with the conclusion of the war with Rome, the Macedonian kingdom had been destroyed (Polybius 29.22.4; Livy 45.9.2).

Dustin Cranford

See also Aemilius Paullus, Lucius; Diplomacy; Imperialism; Livy; Plutarch; Polybius; Pydna, Battle of; Treaties and Alliances; Triumph

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Macedonian War, Third (171–168 BCE), Consequences

The aftermath of Rome's war with Perseus permanently changed the Macedonian and Greek political landscape, leaving Rome as the indisputable hegemon. After Perseus' capture, Paullus met with 10 commissioners, the *decem legati*, sent from Rome to aid him in the settlement of Greece and Macedon (Polybius 30.13.1–6; Livy 45.17–18). Paullus and the *decem legati* then announced the Roman settlement: the

cities and inhabitants of Macedon were to be considered free and independent from the Antigonid monarchy, the Macedonians would pay to Rome half the tribute previously paid to Perseus, and, most importantly, Macedon would be partitioned into four independent republics, each with its own government. The new republics were forbidden intermarriage, gold and silver mining, and cutting timber to build ships; only those states adjacent to barbarian territories could maintain armed forces (Livy 45.29; Plutarch, *Aemilius Paullus* 28.6). After similarly settling affairs in Illyria, Paullus and a colleague, Lucius Anicius, moved south, where they conquered and plundered the cities of Epirus which had supported Perseus, looting 70 cities and carrying away 150,000 captives (Polybius 30.15; Livy 45.34.1–9).

Regarding Greece, the Romans viewed states that attempted to maintain even a stance of neutrality with suspicion, while pro-Roman factions gained influence. Two Roman legates were sent with the Achaean statesman, Callicrates, to visit the Achaean assembly, where they accused several leading men of colluding with Perseus. After a lengthy debate, the Romans decided to send 1,000 Achaeans to Rome as hostages, including the historian Polybius, where they remained for 16 years (Polybius 30.13.9–11; Livy 45.31.6–10; Pausanias 7.10.7–12). Eumenes, king of Pergamum, had aided the Romans so little that rumors of his complicity with Perseus began to spread. In reaction to this, the Roman government officially shifted their political support to Attalus, Eumenes' younger brother, and launched an investigation of Eumenes.

The relationship between Rome and Rhodes also deteriorated significantly. A Rhodian envoy arrived at Rome in 168 in an attempt to mediate a peace between Rome and Macedon, but had not yet heard of Perseus' ultimate defeat at Pydna. Upon hearing of Rome's victory, the embarrassed Rhodian envoy tried to convince the Senate that Rhodes had always supported Rome and had desired to mediate an end to the war in favor of the Romans. The Romans refused to believe this claim, however, and instead alleged that the Rhodians had always supported Perseus, leaving the Rhodians fearful of a war with Rome. Although the Rhodians later begged forgiveness for their perceived transgressions, the envoys received a worse reply than before, with one praetor actually proposing a declaration of war against Rhodes. After a short debate, the Rhodians were spared from war only by the intercession of Cato the Elder, and the Senate

opted instead to strip the Rhodians of key territories in Asia Minor and to terminate their alliance with Rome (Polybius 30.19, 31; Livy 45.3, 25.1–7).

Some states, however, benefited from Perseus' defeat, or at least avoided Roman retribution. The Senate forgave the Thracian king Cotys, an ally of Macedon, and restored his son, formerly a hostage at the court of Perseus. The Romans awarded to the Athenians control over the islands of Delos and Lemnos, an act that economically weakened Rhodes, since the ports at Delos deprived the Rhodians of their tax revenue (Polybius 30.20.7–9).

Paullus' victory was celebrated in an elaborate triumph upon his return to Rome in late 167. Perseus himself was led in chains in front of Paullus' chariot, while his children and friends proceeded before him (Livy 45.40–41; Plutarch, *Aemilius Paullus* 32–34). Anicius, the conqueror of Illyria, also triumphed in the following days, during which the Illyrian king Genthius was similarly led before Anicius' chariot. The plunder from the Third Macedonian war was such that Romans of Italy were liberated from the *tributum* tax for a very long time (Livy 45.40.1–3; Plutarch, *Aemilius Paullus* 38.1), perhaps even until the early fourth century CE.

While the collective fates of Macedon, Illyria, and the Greek states differed, they all became subject to the authority and arbitration of Rome. The Romans attempted to permanently neutralize Illyria and Macedon by the partition of their kingdoms. The inhabitants of Macedon and Illyria were declared free, but the stipulations of this liberty were explicitly defined by Rome. In Greece, the Romans laid low all political dissidents and elevated pro-Roman factions. Despite future (and unsuccessful) resistance at the hands of Achaean revolutionaries and the Macedonian pretender, Andriscus, the dissolution of the Macedonian kingdom marked Rome's ascension as the indisputable leading power in the eastern Mediterranean.

Dustin Cranford

See also Aemilius Paullus, Lucius; Diplomacy; Imperialism; Livy; Plutarch; Polybius; Plutarch; Pydna, Battle of; Treaties and Alliances; Triumph

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Macrinus (Emperor) (217–218 CE)

A Roman emperor (217–218 CE), Marcus Opellius Macrinus, an equestrian from Mauretania, became Caracalla's praetorian prefect in 212 CE. He accompanied Caracalla on his travels throughout the empire, including the Parthian campaign. In 217 CE, Macrinus formed a conspiracy to murder Caracalla, and was subsequently proclaimed emperor in his place, the first equestrian to hold the office. Macrinus concluded peace with the Parthians in 218 CE, but his regime came to an end when relatives of the Severan dynasty fomented a revolt in Syria. He was killed in June 218 CE while trying to evade capture in Asia Minor.

Caillan Davenport

See also Caracalla

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Maelius, Spurius (d. 439 BCE)

Spurius Maelius was a wealthy Roman equestrian who tried to make himself king in 439 BCE and was executed for treason. In 440 Maelius purchased large amounts of grain from Etruria, which, when a famine devastated Latium, he sold at a low price and as a result gained much popularity. The sources claim that he tried to use this support to become king and sought the backing of the grain merchants.

In the most common account, this scheme was discovered by Lucius Minucius, *praefectus annonae*, and in response the Senate appointed a dictator, Lucius Quinctius Cincinnatus. He selected Gaius Servilius Ahala as

magister equitum, ordering him to summon Maelius to answer charges. According to Livy, Ahala then executed Maelius for refusing to accompany him. In an alternative tradition, Ahala was a private citizen who murdered Maelius on his own initiative with senatorial approval.

The story as reported is clearly not accurate, since the *praefectus annonae* did not exist during the early Republic. The account is also used to explain the existence and etymologies of several elements of subsequent Roman topography. Finally, the story closely mimics the actions of the Gracchi and Lucius Appuleius Saturninus from the late second century BCE. That said, the execution of Maelius was considered by the elite of the late Republic as an important precedent and moral justification for the use of violence against popular demagogues.

Bradley Jordan

See also Civil Conflict (Late Republic); Gaius Gracchus; Livy; Monarchy; Tiberius Gracchus

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Magister Equitum

The *magister equitum*, in English “master of cavalry,” was a magistrate who assisted the dictator, whose duties could be military or civil in nature. According to tradition, the title derives from the office’s role as commander of the cavalry in early republican armies, when a dictator was appointed; the dictator controlled the infantry and was commander-in-chief. In most cases, the first action taken by the dictator was to appoint his *magister equitum*.

According to tradition, the first *magister equitum*, Spurius Cassius Vecellinus, was appointed in 501 BCE by the first dictator, Titus Larcus Flavus. While in some instances the *magister equitum* commanded the

cavalry personally, his military role was more extensive. Most often, a *magister equitum* served as second-in-command of a dictatorial army, placed in temporary charge of the military camp when the dictator was absent. This meant that *magistri equitum* could occasionally engage in battle, though in many instances, dictators explicitly commanded their subordinates not to fight during their absence. The most famous example is Quintus Fabius Maximus Rullianus, who in 325 BCE ignored the dictator's orders and defeated the Samnites. Despite his success, his superior, Lucius Papirius Cursor, sought his execution for insubordination and Rullianus was only saved by the combined appeals of the Senate, people, and tribunes of the plebs (Livy 8.30.1–35.9). As the office existed as an assistant to the dictator, *magistri equitum* rarely fought independently and none qualified for a triumph.

In 217 BCE, in the aftermath of Lake Trasimene, the Senate took the unprecedented step of having dictator and *magister equitum* elected, with Marcus Minucius Rufus selected as assistant to his political opponent Fabius Maximus (later termed Cunctator). After winning a victory in Fabius' absence, Minucius had his *imperium* elevated by a tribunician law to equal status with the dictator. After becoming trapped by Hannibal and rescued by Fabius Maximus, Minucius voluntarily renounced this status and returned to his former rank.

The *magister equitum* was able to summon the Senate and the assemblies. The official rank of the office is still debated: current orthodoxy claims that *magistri equitum* ranked as praetors, though Livy states that they equated military tribunes with consular power. Whether the position had *imperium* is also disputed, though this seems to be the case, as they were preceded by six lictors. By the late third century, the office had some prestige: between 216 and 202 BCE, six out of eight *magistri equitum* were elected to the consulship in the following year.

The office fell into disuse alongside the dictatorship after 202 BCE but was revived with the dictatorship in the late Republic, first by Sulla in 81 BCE, then by Caesar from 48 onward. These late *magistri equitum* had more obvious power than their predecessors. After the assassination of Caesar, his *magister equitum*, Marcus Aemilius Lepidus, played a leading role, and according to the sources, had the right to take charge of the state, though in fact he ceded this to the consul, Mark Antony. After Caesar's assassination, the office of dictator was abolished, having fallen into opprobrium, and with

it the *magister equitum*.

In the imperial period, the title of *magister equitum* was reintroduced by Constantius II (337–361 CE), alongside that of *magister peditum*, to undertake the duties of the praetorian prefect, commanding the relevant body of troops. Later these were recombined into the office of *magister militum*.

Bradley Jordan

See also Cavalry (Imperial); Cavalry (Republic); Dictator; *Magister Peditum*

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Magister Militum

Generally translated as Master of Soldiers, the *magister militum* (pl. *magistri militum*) was a senior commander of Roman field armies. The position of *magister militum* dates from the reorganization of the Roman military and civilian administration by Constantine (306–337). In this reorganization, the emperor remained the theoretical commander-in-chief. Emperors in the fourth century (before 395) usually took the field in person. However, the emperor could not be everywhere, so some devolution of authority was necessary. Furthermore, Diocletian's and Constantine's administrative reforms separated military and civil authority. The praetorian prefects, once commanders of the Praetorian Guard, were divested of their military duties and became civil administrators of large areas, the prefectures. The military rank of *magister militum* was created to command regional forces on a similar scale. *Magistri militum* were responsible for Gaul, Italy, Illyria, and the eastern frontier. Under each *magister militum* were two subordinate commands, the *magister peditum*, or master of the infantry, and the *magister equitum*, the commander of the cavalry.

Generally *magistri militum* answered to the emperor, but on some occasions emperors created a supreme command, usually titled *magister utriusque militiae* (literally “Master of Both Services”) or *magister militum praesentalis* (“Master of Soldiers in the [Imperial] Presence”).

The *magistri militum* commanded field armies, the *comitatenses*. These armies were mobile striking forces and took their name from association with the court (*comitatus*). Roman border forces (*limitanei*) were commanded by *duces* (singular *dux*, leader), and were expected to maintain a Roman presence on the borders and contain local raids. When the forces of a *dux* were not strong enough to contain foreign incursions, a regional *magister militum* would deploy his forces. Under these circumstances, a regional *magister militum* may have had command not only of his own forces but also those of the *dux*.

Michael D. Blodgett

See also *Comes*; *Comitatenses*; *Dux*; *Limitanei*; *Magister Utriusque Militiae*; *Notitia Dignitatum*

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Magister Peditum

The *magister peditum* or “commander of infantry” was a commander of the later Roman field army (*comitatenses*). His peer was the *magister equitum* (commander of cavalry). Both are termed more generally *magistri militum*. These commands and titles originated with Constantine I (306–337). The *magister militum* who had precedence and attended the emperor was termed *magister militum praesentalis*, and might be the same as the *magister utriusque militiae*, “commander of both forces,” or commander-in-chief. However, these titles were not always used consistently.

Sara E. Phang

See also *Comitatenses*; *Magister Militum*; *Magister Utriusque Militiae*

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Magister Utriusque Militiae

Magister utriusque militiae is generally translated as “Master of Both Services.” As the *magister militum* held command over both infantry and cavalry, the *magister utriusque militiae* presumably commanded both the field armies—the *comitatenses*—and the *limitanei*. This effectively made the *magister utriusque militiae* the supreme commander of forces, subordinate only to the emperor. Because of the close relationship of the *magister utriusque militiae* to the emperor, the position is frequently referred to as *magister militum praesentalis* or *magister utriusque militiae in praesenti*, the “Master of Both Services in the Presence [of the Emperor].”

The *magister utriusque militiae* was a position largely restricted to the western Roman Empire. In the eastern Roman Empire, a large and well-organized civilian bureaucracy tended to limit the influence of the *magister utriusque militiae*. In the western empire, however, powerful generals were able to use the position of *magister utriusque militiae* to dominate weak or underage emperors. The *magister militum* Arbogast, for instance, in effect ruled the western Roman Empire during the minority of Valentinian II (375–392), born in 371. On Valentinian’s death Arbogast promoted his friend Eugenius as emperor, an act that led Theodosius I (379–395) to invade Italy, leading to Arbogast’s defeat at the battle of the Frigidus River (394) and subsequent suicide. In the wake of the death of Theodosius I his most trusted general Stilicho emerged as *magister utriusque militiae* and guardian of Theodosius’ underage son Honorius (395–423). A subsequent *magister utriusque militiae*, Aetius, dominated the western empire during much of the reign of Valentinian III (425–455).

Michael D. Blodgett

See also Aetius; Arbogast; Comes; Comitatus; Dux; Limitanei; Magister Militum; Notitia Dignitatum; Stilicho; Theodosius I; Valentinian II

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Magnentius (ca. 305–353 CE)

Flavius Magnus Magnentius, born ca. 305, was a usurper who ruled the western half of the Roman Empire from January 18, 350 to August 353. Either of Frankish or Gallic origins Magnentius rose to great prominence as a military commander serving the House of Constantine. Despite this link he rebelled against and executed the emperor Constans, who had become deeply unpopular with both the army and civil hierarchy (Aurelius Victor 42; Zosimus 2.42.1–2, 47.3). After his usurpation Magnentius controlled most of Constans' former territory, with the exception of the Danubian region, which was under the control of the usurper Vetranio. The eastern Augustus, Constantius II, refused to recognize Magnentius but was unable to move against him immediately because he was campaigning on the eastern frontier against Persia.

After deposing Vetranio, Constantius II finally moved against Magnentius in 351, defeating him at the battle of Mursa. Constantius II attained a second victory in 353 at Mons Seleucus, after which Magnentius committed suicide (Socrates 2.32; Sozomenus, *Church History*. 4.7; Zonaras 13.9).

Mark Hebblewhite

See also Civil Warfare; Civil Wars (House of Constantine); Constantius II; Usurpation

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Magnesia, Battle of (190 BCE)

Magnesia was the decisive battle of the Roman-Syrian War (192–188 BCE). Antiochus III of the Seleucid Empire had unsuccessfully invaded Greece and had lost to a Roman force at Thermopylae in 191. The two sides met again at Magnesia-ad-Sipyllum in December, 190. Lucius Cornelius Scipio and Scipio Africanus were the Roman generals. Eumenes of Pergamum fought alongside the Roman forces. In Livy's account of the battle (Livy 37.37–43), the vastly outnumbered yet elite Roman army destroys the immense, eclectic eastern army of Antiochus.

Antiochus' army numbered around 60,000 infantry and more than 12,000 cavalry. The Roman army, with its Greek allies, numbered about 27,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry. Antiochus' army was a force of many different ethnicities with a wide range of equipment, including both elephants and scythe chariots. In the course of the battle, a gap opened in the left center of Antiochus' line due to miscalculations involving the attack of his scythe chariots. The Roman army exploited this gap with a cavalry charge, creating mass confusion and the general rout of the Antiochus' left flank. Antiochus' personal leadership of his right wing achieved some success and threatened the Roman camp. However, the Roman left flank held long enough to allow reinforcements and cavalry from the successful right wing to arrive in relief. Antiochus fled the battlefield, and his army was slaughtered.

Antiochus' decisive defeat at Magnesia brought an end to the war. In the Treaty of Apamea, the Romans forced Antiochus to abandon all his lands west of the Taurus Mountains and to pay an indemnity of 15,000 talents. The victory established the Romans as the new, undisputed hegemon of the Mediterranean world.

Nikolaus Leo Overtoom

See also Scipio Africanus. *Greek Section:* Antiochus III; Syria

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Magnus Maximus (d. 388 CE)

A western Roman usurper (383–388), Magnus Maximus was a Spanish career soldier of humble background. He rose in prominence during the campaigns of Theodosius I's father. Magnus Maximus was stationed in Britain as regional commander when he was acclaimed Augustus by his soldiers and revolted against Gratian in 383. Gratian, the son of Valentinian I (364–375), was nominally emperor in the west from 375 onward, but (born ca. 359) was in his early 20s and unequal to the threat of Maximus. Maximus landed in Gaul and confronted Gratian at Paris, where the greater part of Gratian's army defected to Maximus. Subsequently, Maximus assassinated Gratian and established his rule over Britain, Gaul and Spain. Theodosius initially tolerated Maximus as emperor in the west, but when Maximus invaded Italy in 387, expelling Valentinian II, Theodosius defeated Maximus in battle at Siscia and Poetovio in 388 and beheaded him in 388. The most extensive source for Magnus Maximus, Pacatus' panegyric to Theodosius, disparages him, but in the views of some scholars, Magnus Maximus was the last strong emperor to rule from Trier and his downfall was detrimental to the western Roman army.

Jeroen W. P. Wijnendaele

See also Arbogast; Gratian; Theodosius I; Usurpation

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Maiestas* (Treason). See *Treason

Majorian (Emperor) (457–461 CE)

Flavius Julius Valerius Majorianus, one of the last western Roman emperors (457–461), served in Aetius' forces during the 440s and distinguished himself against the Franks. Majorian was sent into early retirement by Aetius, the chief general of all Roman forces (*magister utriusque militiae*) and most powerful man in the western empire between 433 and 454, who feared that Valentinian III (425–455) planned to marry Majorian to his daughter and designate him as his successor. After Valentinian III himself assassinated Aetius, Majorian was appointed *comes domesticorum*. After Valentinian's death, Majorian was considered a likely candidate for the western throne. Supported by Ricimer, Majorian revolted against the emperor Avitus and was proclaimed emperor by the army after the latter's defeat in 456. Majorian sought legitimacy, seeking recognition from the eastern emperor Leo and from the Roman Senate, before formally accepting the title of Augustus in 457.

While Ricimer remained in Italy as *magister militum*, Majorian embarked on an ambitious campaign to reconquer and reunite the western Roman Empire. His forces defeated the Alamanni in northern Italy in April 457 and Vandal raiders in Campania during the summer of 458. He campaigned in western Illyricum where he defeated and incorporated Huns into his army. In 458, Majorian arrived in Gaul, the base of the former emperor Avitus' power, which had not accepted his rule. Majorian ousted a Burgundian garrison from Lyons and defeated the Visigoths, who afterward renewed their allegiance. In 460, Majorian entered Spain with a large army to begin the reconquest of Vandal Africa. However, the Vandals managed to sabotage his fleet near Alicante, which forced Majorian to abort the campaign. Ricimer, the maker of emperors, was displeased with his failure. On his arrival in Italy, Ricimer deposed and executed Majorian near Tortona

on August 7, 461. Majorian was the last western Roman emperor who managed to unite imperial territory in Italy, Gaul, Dalmatia, and Spain. Subsequently, Ricimer elevated less strong and ambitious emperors (Libius Severus, 461–465; Olybrius, 472).

Jeroen W. P. Wijnendaele

See also Aetius; Fall of the Roman Empire (West); Ricimer; Valentinian III; Vandals

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Maniples

Maniples were the basic military subunit of the army of the middle Roman Republic (ca. 264–146 BCE). The manipular legion replaced the Greek-influenced Roman phalanx army of the early Republic. The manipular system gave the Roman legion more flexibility in battle. The sources anachronistically attribute this change to the Roman commander Marcus Furius Camillus. Yet the transformation of Roman military organization, tactics, and equipment likely was a slow process of trial and error. The manipular legion eventually was modified and incorporated into the cohort legion in the late Republic.

The republican legion was divided into three distinct ranks: the *hastati*, the *principes*, and the *triarii*. Each rank had 10 maniples, giving the Roman legion the fighting strength of 30 maniples. Each manipule consisted of 120–160 men, except the *triarii* maniples which had 60 to 80 men. A force of skirmishers (*velites*) and cavalry (*equites*) augmented the infantry.

A manipule was made up of two centuries, each commanded by a centurion (the *prior* and *posterior*). The most senior centurion in the legion was the *primus pilus* (first spear). Other positions of note are the *optio* (centurion’s second-in-command), the *tesserarius* (orderly-sergeant), the *cornicen* (trumpeter), and the *signifer* (standard bearer).

The manipular legion was suited best for straightforward, persistent attacks. The three infantry ranks increased in fighting skill, experience, and equipment. According to Livy 8.8.5–8, each legion formed a three-tiered checkerboard formation, where the three lines of maniples masked each other's gaps. The *velites* served to harass the enemy and then fell back through the gaps of the legion. Then the youthful *hastati* would approach the enemy line, hurl their *pila* (throwing spears), close up their ranks, and attack. If the *hastati* were unsuccessful, they retired through the gaps of the *principes* who then formed up and attacked. The *triarii* were the last line of defense for the Roman manipular legion. However, the checkerboard deployment and maneuver (termed *quincunx* by modern authors) was difficult, and a simpler solid three-line battle formation was also possible.

Nikolaus Leo Overtoom

See also Cohorts; *Hastati*; Legion, Organization of; *Principes*; *Quincunx*; Tactics; *Triarii*; *Triplex Acies*

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Manius Curius (d. ca. 270 BCE)

Manius Curius Dentatus was a general of the third-century BCE Republic who distinguished himself in the Third Samnite War (298–290) and Pyrrhic War (280–275). He was consul three times (290, 275, and 274 BCE) and censor in 272. His leadership in the Pyrrhic War (278) was notable for reversing the course of the war, which had gone against the Romans (defeat at Asculum, 278). Dentatus carried out the *dilectus* and sold into slavery a man who refused the summons; apparently the war had become unpopular. The Romans had not encountered war elephants, used by Pyrrhus, before the

Pyrrhic War and found them terrifying. Roman skirmishers, however, learned how to attack the elephants, which when panicked were as much a danger to their own ranks as to the Romans.

In later decades, Manius Curius was idealized as living in rustic poverty and refusing all bribes. The Romans of the late Republic idealized the poverty of their ancestors, probably inaccurately. Though the wealth of Rome's later eastern conquests was off the scale, Rome's conquests of the Samnite Wars period brought in considerable wealth; in 293 BCE Papirius Cursor's triumph displayed 1,830 pounds of silver and 2,533,000 pounds of bronze (probably uncoined *aes rude*) from the sale of slaves.

Sara E. Phang

See also Dilectus; Papirius Cursor; Pyrrhus; Samnite Wars. *Greek Section*: Pyrrhus

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Manlius Capitolinus, Marcus (d. ca. 384 BCE)

Marcus Manlius Capitolinus (consul 392 BCE) was a politician and general of the early Republic. According to Roman legend, when an invasion of Gauls, having inflicted a defeat on the Romans at the Allia River (390), marched on Rome, Manlius saved the Capitoline citadel from assault by the Gauls when the sacred geese of Juno, kept on the Capitoline, became alarmed in the night. Manlius threw the Gauls off the Capitoline, earning the surname Capitolinus for himself.

Manlius was later put to death ca. 384 for aspiring to tyranny. According to legend, at this time the plebeians were oppressed by the patricians. Though a patrician, Manlius took the part of the plebeians and paid off some of their debts (Livy 6.11.7). He was accused, tried, and convicted for popular agitation. The story repeats some of the elements of Spurius Cassius and Spurius Maelius, and, in the form related by Livy, may reflect the concerns and conflicts of the late republican oligarchy about popular leadership.

Sara E. Phang

See also Allia River, Battle of the; Cassius, Spurius; Civil Conflict (Late Republic); Gaul, Gauls; Gracchan Land Conflict; Patrician-Plebeian Conflict; Maelius, Spurius

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Manlius Torquatus, Titus (Active 360s–340s BCE)

Titus Manlius Torquatus Imperiosus was a Roman general of the Samnite Wars period (mid-fourth century BCE). He was consul in 347 BCE, 344 and 340; he held the dictatorship three times, in 353, 349 and 320. In 342 BCE the Latins revolted, joined by the Campanians. The Romans suppressed the revolt harshly. Manlius Torquatus and Publius Decius Mus commanded the battle of Veseris in 340 which broke the resistance of the Latins and Campanians.

In his youth Manlius Torquatus had fought a duel (monomachy) with a Gaul, taking the Gaul's gold necklace (*torques*) as booty, from which Manlius was called Torquatus. Before the battle of Veseris, according to legend, Manlius executed his own son for disobeying orders and leaving the line of battle to fight a duel with one of the enemy. This example of severe military discipline was extolled by later authors such as Livy and Valerius Maximus, but it cannot be considered routine, nor can it be connected to the Roman father's civilian "power of life and death" over his children. Torquatus' execution of his son was probably conditioned by the Romans' need to terrify their allies into submission.

Sara E. Phang

See also Campania; Latin, Latins; Livy; Military Discipline; Monomachy; Samnite Wars; Veseris, Battle of

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Manlius Vulso, Gnaeus (Active 190s–180s BCE)

Little is known of the life and career of Gnaeus Manlius Vulso. He was a praetor in 195 BCE and then appears on the scene in 189 as consul and successor to Lucius Cornelius Scipio Asiagenes (Asiaticus) in the Asian campaigns, most notably against the Celts of Galatia (region of mod. Turkey).

Rome had been at war with Antiochus III in Greece, until Antiochus' defeat at Thermopylae in 191, forcing him to retreat to Asia Minor where he continued his cause against Rome, employing Galatian forces. The Romans allied themselves with Pergamum (mod. Bergama) and finally defeated Antiochus and the Galatians at Magnesia in 190/89. Vulso took over the Roman command and began to systematically eradicate the Galatians. He pacified neighboring areas such as Sagalassus (near mod. Ağlasun, Turkey) by striking deals with the local peoples, accepting subsidies for peace. But he pillaged the Galatian territories, leaving many of the inhabitants dead or captive, much to the chagrin of the Senate. Vulso defended himself, claiming that victory over Antiochus alone would have been worthless. Whether Vulso's real motive was to acquire booty or not at the expense of the Galatians is a matter for discussion. Vulso did conclude a peace treaty in Asia Minor in 188. He returned to Rome in 187 with notoriously large amounts of plunder, and was granted a Roman triumph by the reluctant Senate.

Vulso is an obscure character, but he certainly left his mark in Asia Minor. The debate as to whether his campaigns were just or amounted to personal thuggery, will continue. Posterity, perhaps wrongly, remembered him as the man who brought lavish goods into Italy with dire moral consequences for the Roman state.

Juan M. A. Strisino

See also Macedonian War, First; Macedonian War, Second; Magnesia, Battle

of; Triumph

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Marcellus (ca. 268/5–208 BCE)

Marcus Claudius Marcellus was a republican Roman statesman and war hero mostly remembered for his controversial and successful military exploits during the Second Punic War. He was one of the few Romans during the war to naturally excel at martial combat and was considered a true match for Hannibal.

Marcellus, born into the plebeian branch of the Claudian clan, was a five-time consul (222, 215, 214, 210, and 208 BCE), first showing talent for military heroism when he saved his brother's life during the First Punic War. In 222 BCE, he defeated a Gallic king in single combat and won the *spolia opima*, the coveted military achievement of looting an enemy leader's armor. Marcellus was the third and last Roman to win such an honor, following in the footsteps of Romulus, the legendary founder of Rome, who was the first.

Marcellus received more notoriety during the Second Punic War (218–201 BCE). In the 210s BCE, he successfully defended the southern Italian city of Nola from Hannibal on more than one occasion and starting in 214 BCE, spent two years besieging the Greek city of Syracuse that had recently fallen under Carthaginian control. Though the ancient engineer Archimedes harassed Marcellus' forces with impressive war machines, the city fell to the Romans in 212 BCE. Marcellus ordered the civilians to be spared, but Syracuse was extensively looted and large amounts of spoils, including Greek art objects, entered Rome. Later Romans considered this moment a turning point when Hellenic culture greatly began to infiltrate Rome and

corrupt old-fashioned Roman values. While such corruption was probably a rhetorical exaggeration, the influx of wealth and slaves that entered Rome did indeed come to destabilize the late Republic by contributing to civil conflict. In 208 BCE, while on a scouting mission near Venusia, Marcellus was ambushed and killed by Hannibal's Numidian cavalry. It is said that Hannibal either allowed Marcellus' body to be honorably cremated and buried or he returned the body to Marcellus' son, Marcus, for proper rites.

Remembered as the "Sword of Rome," Marcellus and his victories earned him praise and also enemies. His most famous rival was the traditional statesman, Quintus Fabius Maximus. The two were at odds throughout their careers: Marcellus' temple to *Honos et Virtus* (Honor and Prowess) was meant to compete with Fabius' temple to *Honos*; Fabius advertised his superiority in not plundering the images of Tarentine gods when he took Tarentum in 209 BCE unlike Marcellus who did just that when he sacked Syracuse; and it is likely that Fabius was responsible for Marcellus' resignation from the consulship in 215 BCE after bad omens were acknowledged at Marcellus' swearing in. A most striking example of political enmity occurred when the Senate denied Marcellus a triumph for his sack of Syracuse, a much deserved reward, and instead allowed him an ovation, a lesser celebration and an insult to the general's grand achievement. Never one to endure a slight without a fight, Marcellus went ahead and celebrated a triumph outside of Rome on the Alban Mount.

Annamarie Vallis

See also Cannae, Battle of; Carthage (State); Cavalry (Imperial); Cavalry (Republic); Elite Participation; Fabius Maximus; Hannibal Barca; Plunder; Punic War, Second; Scipio Africanus; Triumph; Victory; *Virtus*. *Greek Section*: Syracuse

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Marcomannic Wars (166–180 CE)

The Marcomannic Wars marked a new phase in the conflict of the Roman Empire with the Germans, with origins preceding the reign of Augustus. The Romans referred to the Marcomannic War as the “War of Many Nations” (*bellum plurimarum gentium*), during which they fought against a loose alliance of northern tribes. Although the war has been named after the Marcomanni, the Romans found the Quadi and the Sarmatians to be more persistent enemies.

The Marcomanni (“mark men,” or frontier people) were a Suebic tribe which had previously been forced east by Roman expansion across the Rhine. Since 100 BCE, they had been settled along the River Main. In 58, they supported Ariovistus in Gaul, and were defeated by Julius Caesar. In 13 BCE, Nero Claudius Drusus became governor of Gaul, invading Germania and reaching the North Sea. The Roman advance forced the Marcomanni east (along with other Suebi), settling them north of the Danube (Ister). Here, the Marcomanni created a new kingdom, defeating the Celtic Boii (“owners of cattle”). Subsequently, during the reign of Tiberius, the Marcomanni fought the Cherusci of northwest Germany. Afterward, Domitian fought the Marcomanni, when they refused to support the Roman conquest of Dacia.

The Marcomannic Wars were fought against a number of tribes within the Danube basin, which flows southeast for 200 kilometers, from Vindobona (Vienna) to Aquincum (Budapest), and then south to Singidunum (Belgrade). The Marcomanni settled between the Morava and the Elbe. Further south, the Boii were replaced by the Suebic Eravisci. East of the Morava, the Quadi settled along the north bank of the Danube, between Carnuntum (Petronell) and Aquincum. Further east, the Sarmatian Jazyges were an Iranian tribe which had migrated west from the Azov, settling within the Pannonian plain (east of Aquincum). Finally, the Buri were another Suebic tribe, between the Jazyges and the mountains of Dacia.

According to Tacitus (writing 50 years before the Marcomannic war),

the Romans began subsidizing the Marcomanni and various other tribes, purchasing their loyalty. Consequently, the Romans were able to control a line of Germanic client-states along the north bank of the Danube, defending Noricum and Pannonia. However, the strategic situation shifted during the reign of Marcus Aurelius and his co-emperor, Lucius Verus. In 161, the Tiber flooded, causing famine in Rome. Meanwhile, the Arsacid Persians invaded Armenia, and Lucius allegedly embezzled millions of sesterces from the imperial treasury. Facing bankruptcy, the Senate halted subsidies for the northern tribes.

According to the *Historia Augusta*, Marcus feared that the empire would collapse. Meanwhile, the legions along the Danube had been sent to Persia. Although the Marcomanni and Quadi were temporarily persuaded to not cross the Danube, lesser Germanic peoples began raiding across the river in 162. During the winter of 166, 6,000 “barbarians” invaded Upper and Lower Pannonia and were defeated by Roman cavalry (with infantry) under Marcus Vindex. Subsequently, the Germans sent envoys, presumably demanding the renewal of subsidy (or tribute). Meanwhile, Celts from the Rhine region invaded northern Italy, and Marcus defeated them during 167 (with assistance from the future emperor, Helvius Pertinax). Gender historians should note that this Celtic army included women clad in armor.

During the spring of 167, the Marcomannic king Bellomarius negotiated a truce along the Danube, between 11 tribes and Marcus Bassus, the governor of Upper Pannonia. However, that summer, the Vandals and Sarmatians occupied the goldmines of Dacia. Meanwhile, troops returning from Persia brought an unidentified plague to Rome, resulting in severe casualties. Subsequently, both the Marcomanni and the Quadi crossed the Danube. According to Ammianus Marcellinus, Aquileia was besieged and Opitergium was destroyed (although this may have occurred in 170).

In 168, the emperors led an army north, across the Alps. The *Historia Augusta* states that Marcus wanted to march sooner, but was delayed by concern for the distraught populace of Rome. For example, Marcus oversaw the trial of a false prophet who attempted to incite a religious panic, hoping to subsequently plunder the capital. Afterward, there was heavy fighting in the Pannonias and Marcus Vindex was killed. However, the Marcomanni withdrew north, across the Danube. After the king of the Quadi died and his people surrendered to the Romans, the Quadi were allowed to settle along the south bank of the Danube, in return for defending it against the

Marcomanni. Another Germanic people was allowed to settle at Ravenna, which they subsequently pillaged (infuriating Marcus).

That autumn, Marcus and Lucius oversaw the construction of fortifications and began to disagree. Their expedition had been expensive, and Lucius insisted upon returning to Rome, although Marcus wanted to pursue the Marcomanni. In January of 169, Lucius died, perhaps from natural causes but allegedly poisoned by Marcus (according to Cassius Dio, Marcus feared that Lucius would attempt a coup). After Lucius' death, Marcus returned to Rome; meanwhile, there were revolts in Egypt, and the Berber Mauri (Moors) invaded Mauretania and Hispania.

In 170, there was a general uprising along the periphery, from Illyricum to Gaul, and barbarians overran the Balkans and Greece. To raise funds for a second expedition, Marcus auctioned imperial valuables from the palace. He returned north (with the empress Faustina) and defeated the Marcomanni, who were fleeing with pillage across the Danube. In 172, Marcus crossed the river, once again defeating the Marcomanni and claiming the title of Germanicus. Subsequently, the Marcomanni were forced to withdraw 10 miles (80 stades) north of the river.

In 173, Marcus moved east and attacked the Quadi to punish them for raiding the Marcomanni. During this campaign, a Roman legion from Anatolia (Legio XII Fulminata, from Melitene on the Euphrates) was surrounded in a waterless valley. According to Paulus Orosius, a Christian author of the early fifth century CE, this legion had converted to Christianity. However, according to Dio, a senatorial author of late second and early third century date, the Twelfth legion remained faithful to Mars. Regardless of the deity, the soldiers apparently prayed for rain. Subsequently, there was a thunderstorm, and chain lightning struck the Quadi, exposed upon the heights. Afterward, the horrified Romans were compassionate toward their wounded enemy. This storm is known as the Miracle of the Rain, and the event is depicted upon the Column of Marcus Aurelius. A similar event was also recorded, during which lightning miraculously set fire to a barbarian catapult.

After defeating the Quadi in 174, Marcus engaged the Jazyges led by Zanticus, along the Hungarian Tisza. At some point (presumably that winter), the Romans and Jazyges fought a battle upon the frozen Danube, during which Roman soldiers stood upon their shields, using friction to maintain their footing. Meanwhile, the Jazyges received assistance from the

Quadi, and Marcus vowed to annihilate both tribes. In contrast, Marcus rewarded the Marcomanni for their obedience, permitting trade and allowing villages within 5 miles of the Danube.

In 175, Zanticus surrendered, agreeing to return a hundred thousand prisoners. As Dio notes, this indicated the strength of the Sarmatians, who had done “great harm.” Although Marcus wanted to “exterminate” the Jazyges, he accepted the return of prisoners, and forced the Sarmatians to withdraw 20 miles from the Danube. Meanwhile, swearing fealty, Zanticus provided 8,000 cavalry as hostages (most were sent to Britannia).

Marcus chose to accept this peace, because of a rebellion in Egypt. Apparently, the emperor had fallen ill and was widely believed to be dead, with the result that Avidius Cassius’ legions hailed him as emperor. Afterward, although Cassius was a personal friend of Marcus, Cassius denounced the authority of the Senate and refused to surrender. Consequently, Marcus and Faustina departed for Syria, and Avidius was assassinated in July. Meanwhile, en route via Cappadocia, the empress died near Tiana.

In 176 Marcus celebrated a double triumph in Rome. Afterward, in January of 177, he appointed his teenage son Commodus as the youngest consul in Roman history. That summer, Commodus succeeded Lucius as co-emperor. In 177, the northerners once again rebelled, including the Marcomanni and the Quadi. In 178, the emperors reached the Danube, defeating the Marcomanni. In 179, the Quadi were defeated near Laugaricio, in modern Slovakia. After defeating these tribes, 20,000 Romans occupied their territory, establishing fortifications, capturing slaves, and deliberately disrupting agriculture and trade. One of the new forts has been excavated along the Morava, near Pasohlavky (south of modern Brno).

Eventually, the Quadi began to flee northwest, toward the Elbe and the Oder. According to Tacitus, the Suevus was the origin of the Suebi, controlled by the ancient Semnones. After more than a century of exile, the defeated Quadi were thus fleeing toward their ancestral homeland. Presumably, as they moved west, they would have been joined by the Marcomanni. Were they hoping to conquer the Semnones, just as they had subdued the Boians? Regardless, the Romans blocked their escape. As Dio wrote, “This showed that [the Romans] desired, not to acquire their territory, but to punish the men themselves.”

Marcus became ill and died on March 17, 180, at Vindobona (Vienna).

During his final days, the emperor expressed concern about his son's morality. Perhaps, it was Commodus who was most responsible for the brutal occupation. However, Commodus agreed to a surprisingly generous peace, abandoning the occupation and renewing the annual subsidies. Was this the dying wish of his father? Regardless, the Roman soldiers were infuriated, because they had hoped to enslave their enemies. Instead, the exhausted legions were sent against the Jazyges, Buri, and Dacians. In 184, there was rebellion in Britannia (followed by Gaul) and famine in 190. Meanwhile, Commodus showed little interest in the Danube.

Although the Romans never subjugated Marcomannia, this region remained relatively peaceful for centuries, excepting the reigns of Aurelian and Valentinian. During the fourth century, the Marcomanni apparently converted to Christianity, after their queen Fritigil was inspired by Saint Ambrose of Milan. However, the Huns began moving west from the Caucasus, pressuring other tribes to cross the Danube. Consequently, in October of 409, Suebic peoples (including Marcomanni, Quadi, and Buri) were among the Vandals of Gunderic and the Alani of Respendial. Together, they defeated the Franks, crossed the Pyrenees, and occupied Hispania. Subsequently, the Marcomanni were also among the Huns of Attila.

Ultimately, the Marcomannic War was marked by extreme hostility toward the Germans, as reflected by Marcus' alleged views and the depiction of combat on the Column of Marcus Aurelius. The occupation of Quadi territory was arguably genocidal, impressing Dio who observed that Marcus wished to exterminate the local populace. Unfortunately, after more than a decade of savage conflict, the Romans gained little from this Pyrrhic victory.

Adam Rinkleff

See also Avidius Cassius; Column of Marcus Aurelius; Commodus; Germanic Wars; Germans; Marcus Aurelius; Pannonia, Pannonians; Persian Wars, Arsacid

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Marcus Aurelius (Emperor) (161–180 CE)

Marcus Aurelius Antoninus Augustus (161–180 CE) was the last of whom Machiavelli described as the “Five Good Emperors.” Born on April 26, 121, Marcus’ reign lasted from March 8, 161, until his death on March 17, 180, overlapping with two co-emperors: Lucius Verus and Marcus’ son Commodus. Unfortunately, throughout this period, Rome fought several wars, accompanied by revolts, plague, and famine. Consequently, Marcus’ troubled reign foreshadowed the crisis of the third century CE.

Originally named Marcus Catilius Severus, Marcus Aurelius was the son of a praetor, Marcus Annii Verus, and the wealthy heiress Domitia Lucilla. He was named after his maternal great-grandfather, consul Lucius Catilius Severus. He was also the nephew of consul Marcus Annii Libo, and empress Annia Faustina Major (wife of Antoninus Pius). When Marcus was an infant, his father died and he was adopted by his paternal grandfather, a former senator who shared the name Marcus Annii Verus.

As a child, Marcus was educated by the philosopher Diognetus, the Homeric grammarian Alexander of Cotiaeum, and the Libyan orator Marcus Fronto. A primary source for his early life is the correspondence of Fronto, who warned Marcus about hypocrisy and tyranny. In February 138, the emperor Hadrian adopted Antoninus Pius as his successor, insisting that Antoninus adopt both Marcus Aurelius and Hadrian’s adopted grandson, Lucius Verus.

The *Historia Augusta* states that Marcus was studious, and his adopted brother was carefree. During his youth, Marcus served as a priest of Mars, and prefect during the Latin Festival. In contrast, at the age of 23, Lucius had never held public office. In 145, Marcus married Annia Faustina Minor,

who was his biological cousin and adopted sister. Subsequently, Faustina would accompany him during campaigns, adopting the title *Mater Castrorum* (Mother of the Camp) to promote the army's loyalty to the dynasty. They eventually had 13 children, and she died in 175.

In 140, at the age of 19, Marcus received the consulship, followed six years later by *tribunicia potestas* and proconsular *imperium*, powers of the emperor traditionally given to designated successors. Subsequently, in March 161, Antoninus Pius appointed Marcus as his sole successor. However, Marcus refused to serve as emperor, unless Verus was appointed as co-emperor. Following the death of Antoninus, the two new emperors were popular with the Senate. Unfortunately, the Tiber flooded, causing famine. Several months later, the Arsacid Persians invaded Armenia, and there were revolts in Britannia and Germania.

In 162, Marcus sent Lucius east, to direct the Persian war. Unfortunately, according to the *Historia Augusta*, Lucius was a notorious playboy who wasted public funds upon erotic parties and spent most of his time in taverns and brothels. However, under the command of Avidius Cassius, the legions occupied Ctesiphon in 165 and crossed the Tigris in 166.

During the winter of 166–167, 6,000 Germanic warriors crossed the Danube into Pannonia, while Rhine Celts crossed the Alps and entered northern Italy. This sparked an increasingly genocidal conflict, known as the Marcomannic Wars. Meanwhile, according to Cassius Dio, Lucius began plotting a coup, and Marcus had him poisoned in 169. However, the *Historia Augusta* insists that Marcus would never have murdered his brother. Since rumors of assassination were frequent, and the medical knowledge of the period was rudimentary, Lucius probably died of natural causes.

When the legions returned from Persia (ca. 166–167), they brought an epidemic to Europe. Based upon the writings of Galen, scholars have suggested that this was the first known European outbreak of smallpox, though the disease is not certainly identified. The epidemic killed as much as 25 percent of the population and caused revolts across the empire. In 175, despite his friendship with Marcus, Avidius Cassius led an unsuccessful rebellion in the east. Three years later, the North African Mauri (Moors) invaded Hispania.

In 177, Marcus appointed his son Commodus as co-emperor. Together, they fought against the northerners, until Marcus died on March 17, 180. Some sources suggest that the emperor was killed by plague, but Dio insists

that he was murdered by a physician loyal to Commodus. Shortly thereafter, the northern conflict ended, because Commodus agreed to an unpopular armistice.

After his death, Marcus Aurelius became the model of a strong emperor, merciful to his enemies and relentless toward his enemies. According to Dio, Marcus lowered taxes, was generous with the imperial treasury, and forgave decades of debt. According to the *Historia Augusta*, Marcus was an excellent administrator, who paid careful attention to seemingly minor details. The Digest shows that Marcus and Lucius (called the *divi fratres*, the deified brothers, by later jurists) paid careful attention to law. During Marcus' reign, probably due to the effect of plague and war, equestrian and civilian administrators were promoted, expanding the traditional social hierarchy. For example, allegedly the son of a freed slave, Pertinax was an equestrian promoted into the Senate, who became consul in 175, then City Prefect of Rome, and was elevated to emperor in 193.

Marcus is best known for his *Meditations*, "He who follows reason in all things is both tranquil and active at the same time, and also cheerful and collected ... Think of thy last hour. Let the wrong which is done [to you] stay there where the wrong was done." Both Dio and the *Historia Augusta* agree that Marcus was objective and reasonable, "He did not readily accept the version of those who were partisans ... but always searched long and carefully for the truth." According to Machiavelli, modern leaders should learn from the "modest life" of Marcus, "that one should avoid being despised and hated." However, despite the emperor's Stoic philosophy, his military policy was brutal and merciless. This paradox suggests the intense pressure upon Marcus, as the empire endured a growing crisis. Unfortunately, as Dio wrote, the golden era was followed by "an age of iron and rust."

Adam Rinkleff

See also Antoninus Pius; Column of Marcus Aurelius; Commodus; Hadrian; Lucius Verus; Marcomannic Wars; Persian Wars, Arsacid

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Marian-Sullan Conflict (80s BCE), Causes

The conflict of Marius and Sulla and their followers was intermittent and did not always involve armies, so we have not termed it a civil war. Nevertheless, the first civil war (here termed the Marian-Sullan Conflict) of the late Republic began in 88 BCE when Sulla led his troops against Rome. Although personal competition and the ambitions of Marius and Sulla contributed to the conflict, longer-term trends, especially the growth of the tribunate of the plebs and the evolution of the armies, and immediate crises such as the Social War and emerging divisions between populists and oligarchs, played a role as well. This conflict was not the first instance of violence in late republican politics, but it did have a number of important consequences for Rome in the decades following Sulla's death.

Marius, a "new man" from Arpinum, took advantage of the popular political movements initiated by the Gracchi, using tribunician legislation in 107 BCE to transfer the Jugurthine command from his former commander (Quintus Caecilius Metellus Numidicus, consul 109) to himself. His readiness to use popular politics became a hallmark of his career. Sulla, on the other hand, came from an ancient (now impoverished) patrician family and was typically more conservative in his outlook and his politics, ultimately revealing a reactionary standpoint. Ideological differences between the two men, then, were also involved in the build up to this civil war.

Seeds of the rivalry may have been sown during the Jugurthine war, when both men gave signs of their ambition. Marius, as proconsul, received the credit for the victory over Numidia, but Sulla was instrumental in the capture of Jugurtha in 105. He commemorated this capture on a signet ring which he famously wore thereafter, a reminder which Marius may not have enjoyed. Nonetheless, their military careers continued in parallel, as Sulla initially served under Marius in the latter's campaigns against the Germans, whose migrations had disrupted Roman allies from about 113. By the time the Germans finally invaded Italy in 102, Sulla had transferred his service from Marius to the other (patrician) consul of that year, Lutatius Catulus. Although Marius, as consul again, and Catulus, as proconsul, cooperated to

defeat the Cimbri in Cisalpine Gaul in 101, Marius was seen as the real savior of Rome, securing immense popularity, confirming popular dissatisfaction with the failure of senatorial commanders, and receiving a sixth consulship in 100 as a reward.

Ideological differences were revealed again this year. Marius' military reforms, which may have begun in 107 or 104, involved the recruitment of legionaries from the large numbers of landless citizens filling Rome (the *capite censi*). As a result, soldiers increasingly looked to their generals to reward them after a campaign or upon discharge, which encouraged greater loyalty to the general himself. In 100, Lucius Appuleius Saturninus (tribune 103, 100) promoted a popular program, including a bill to provide land allotments for Marius' veterans, to keep him on his side. Political violence arose, and the conservatives persuaded the Senate to pass the so-called final decree, calling on the magistrates, including Marius, "to see to it that the state suffered no harm." Wishing to reaffirm himself as the defender of the state, Marius turned on his former political associates and helped to restore order, using military force to suppress political disturbances. In the process, Saturninus and a number of his followers were killed.

The events of the following decade are unclear due to a lack of sources, but Marius appears to have been discredited by the Saturninus affair and is not visible in politics for some years. What Sulla was doing during these conflicts, we do not know, but one suspects he would have taken the side of the conservative senators who wished to see the continuing popular movement suppressed. At some point in this decade, Bocchus, the king of Mauretania, erected a statue in Rome depicting Sulla's capture of Jugurtha. Ancient and modern observers have taken this dedication as a snub to Marius, and a sign of a final break between the two men.

Nonetheless, when the *socii* rebelled in 91 to demand the citizenship which had long been denied them by conservative Roman attitudes, both Marius and Sulla received commands and cooperated on at least one occasion. Marius retired early due to ill health, but Sulla played a major part in the final suppression of the Social War, invading Samnium. This success helped Sulla to acquire the consulship for 88, with Quintus Pompeius Rufus as his colleague. The war, however, left a political legacy, namely how to integrate the newly enfranchised Italians into the Roman voting system. This was, perhaps, the most important political question in recent years, and one which again shows the opposition of Marius' and Sulla's attitudes.

See also Aquae Sextiae and Vercellae, Battles of; Army in Politics; *Capite Censi*; Cinna; Civil Conflict; Colline Gate, Battle of; Dictator; Jugurthine War; Marius; Mithridatic Wars; Pompey; Recruitment of Army (Republic); Social War; Sulla, Dictatorship of; Sulla, Lucius Cornelius

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Marian-Sullan Conflict (80s BCE), Course

The conflict of Marius and Sulla soon became entangled with the First Mithridatic War, the proximate cause of hostilities between Marius and Sulla. Leadership of the campaign against Mithridates VI, provoked by his invasion of Asia in 88, may well have been the most sought-after command of a generation. As consul and given both his military record and his praetorship in Cilicia (in the mid-90s), it was no surprise that Sulla received the command. Marius, though, understandably coveted the command for himself: after a decade of relative inactivity, it is likely that he wanted one final glorious campaign on which to end his career. The populist Sulpicius Rufus (tribune of the plebs 88) associated himself with Marius, secretly undertaking to reassign the Mithridatic campaign to Marius to secure support for the equal distribution of the newly enfranchised Italian peoples through the Roman voting tribes. When the consuls suspended public business to relieve tensions over the question of the Italians, Sulpicius confronted the consuls with an armed mob to force them to rescind the

suspension. The consuls then fled for their lives: Pompeius Rufus went into hiding, while Sulla sought safety in Marius' house, just off the forum. Commentators, both ancient and modern, have long speculated over this choice of refuge, but Sulla himself suggested that he sought advice from Marius. In the end, Sulla returned to the forum and rescinded the suspension, allowing Sulpicius to call an assembly to vote on his proposal for the tribal distribution. Sulla then retired from Rome and joined his army at Nola, prior to embarking for Greece to face Mithridates.

Before Sulla could depart for Greece, though, Sulpicius secured the transfer of the command to Marius. Given the bloodshed and intimidation involved, the legality of this legislation is questionable. Sulla, as consul, may have been in a legal position to overturn the transfer. Personal ambition, however, and his reactionary tendencies contributed to his momentous decision: the march on Rome by a Roman army. At the head of six legions and accompanied by his consular colleague, Sulla easily seized control of the city and drove Marius and his supporters into exile, recovering his command. The first Roman civil war had been fought by a commander pursuing his own interest with troops loyal to him rather than the state—ironically as a result of Marius' army reforms.

Sulla made some hasty arrangements for the continued operation of the state, including the annulment of Sulpicius' legislation regarding the tribal distribution of the Italians. He then departed to prepare the campaign against Mithridates, on which he was engaged for the next four years. No sooner had Sulla left than Marius, who along with others had been declared a public enemy (*hostis*), returned, collected an army, and marched on Rome, seizing control with the help of Cornelius Cinna. He unleashed a savage reprisal against his political enemies, and many optimates were killed, setting the precedent for Sulla's proscriptions later. Marius had Sulla's arrangements overturned and in turn had him declared a *hostis*: Sulla simply ignored this and continued his campaign against Mithridates. Marius and Cinna were elected as consuls for 86, but Marius died shortly after entering office, leaving Cinna in control.

Nonetheless, the Marian party dominated, executing opponents among the optimates, many of whom fled for safety elsewhere. Cinna was elected to continuous consulships, like Marius earlier, until his death in a mutiny in 84; on occasion he was joined by Papirius Carbo (consul 85, 84, 82). Marius' son joined Carbo in the consulship of 82, to prepare for the anticipated

return of Sulla as political differences and violence continued. In the east, to return to Rome to deal with his political enemies, Sulla imposed generous terms on Mithridates. He landed at Brundisium in spring 83 with his loyal, experienced army and began his second march on Rome. He was joined by aristocrats who held similar political views—or thought that he would be the winner—including Metellus Pius from Africa, Crassus from Spain, and a young Pompey (the latter two with private armies).

Sulla gained control of Rome, though pockets of resistance remained and had to be dealt with. He was created dictator, undertaking a series of reforms designed to restore conservative control and break populist forces; he also instituted a ruthless removal of political opponents by proscriptions. Some sources estimate that around 70 senators and 1600 *equites* were executed by this method. Sulla resigned the dictatorship and, after a second consulship in 80, retired from politics in 79 and died in 78.

C. Bailey, Bruce Marshall, and Gareth C. Sampson

See also Aquae Sextiae and Vercellae, Battles of; Army in Politics; *Capite Censi*; Cinna; Civil Conflict; Colline Gate, Battle of; Dictator; Jugurthine War; Marius; Mithridatic Wars; Pompey; Recruitment of Army; Social War; Sulla, Dictatorship of; Sulla, Lucius Cornelius

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Marian-Sullan Conflict (80s BCE), Consequences

The conflict between Marius and Sulla helped entrench the basic differences between conservatives and populists, and led to increasingly violent debate about “proper” political conduct and forms which would not be resolved until the time of Augustus. The Sullans tried to hang on to the control which Sulla had restored, but his own example proved too strong: commanders at the head of loyal armies were increasingly prepared to use the threat of armed force to pressure the Senate into giving them what they wanted. This threat of force undermined traditional methods of achieving political goals and resolving differences within the Senate.

During his rise to power, Marius emphasized and exaggerated “aristocratic incompetence.” He thereby undermined solidarity within the Senate, privileging his own advancement over the traditional unity and cooperation of the aristocracy. Similarly, Sulla established himself as greater than the Senate after the Mithridatic War, presenting himself, as Marius had done, as the only man who could protect and defend Rome. The Senate became increasingly ready not only to accept such military strongmen as “saviors,” but also to encourage their creation, most obviously with Pompey the Great.

The attitude of consensus and cooperation which had flourished throughout most of the second century BCE became increasingly difficult to achieve. Following Marius and Sulla, though, consensus and cooperation were no longer necessary. Marius circumvented the Senate in 107 and 88 with tribunician laws, seizing command for himself. The violence of Sulla’s response to the latter circumvention similarly avoided the need for consensus and eliminated any chance of reconciliation between the two men or their supporters. Personal ambition, pursued to any length, was privileged over public unity and would be again with Pompey, Crassus, and Caesar, among others.

Adding to the political confusion and violence in Rome, soldiers and former soldiers increasingly became arbiters of political disputes. As armies grew more reliant on and loyal to their generals, rather than to the higher magistrates, the Senate or even Rome, the distinction between *miles* and *privatus* blurred. Marius, and later Sulla, had used soldiers for intimidation and pacification in the forum, but Sulla in many ways formalized this greater political role for *milites*. Following Marius’ seizure of the

Mithridatic command, Sulla addressed his soldiers as a political *contio*, rather than as a military *contio*. He thereby invited the soldiers to choose sides in a political debate and to overturn a decision of citizens in a *comitia*—that is, a formal decision of the *populus Romanus*—making the *contio* of soldiers a *comitia*. Sulla encouraged the soldiers to defend the *dignitas* of magistrates against other magistrates, a role in which Caesar, too, would cast his soldiers.

The conflict also saw the revival of the dictatorship and the institutionalization of violence in a way that had not previously been seen in Rome. Caesar's march on Rome in 49, his dictatorship, and the proscriptions of the Second Triumvirate all had Sulla as a precedent. The disenfranchisement of the children of the proscribed left a significant population of politically ambitious men in forced political retirement, prime candidates for the social and political unrest of figures like Catiline.

The conflict between Marius and Sulla played an important role in the demise of republican politics, but it would be incorrect to identify it as the cause of the fall of the Republic. Their attitudes developed from events in the second century (preceding even the careers of the Gracchi brothers). Nonetheless, this rivalry saw more physical and constitutional violence than any other until the Second Triumvirate, and in the process intensified a number of trends in Roman politics and revealed the efficacy of soldiers in advancing the careers of generals. It may be argued that, despite the continuation of republican politics in the following generation, the rivalry demonstrated the inability of the Republic to continue to function on the same premises of aristocratic competence and cooperation that enabled the Roman conquest of the Mediterranean.

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See also Aquae Sextiae and Vercellae, Battles of; Army in Politics; *Capite Censi*; Cinna; Civil Conflict; Colline Gate, Battle of; Dictator; Jugurthine War; Marius; Mithridatic Wars; Pompey; Recruitment of Army; Social War; Sulla, Dictatorship of; Sulla, Lucius Cornelius

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Marius (ca. 157–86 BCE)

The late republican Roman general and politician Gaius Marius was born in Arpinum, a small town about 60 miles southeast of Rome. Not a member of the core consular aristocracy, Marius became one of Rome's most successful military commanders, holding an unprecedented number of consulships and inflicting two major defeats on the invading Germanic Cimbri and Teutones. Marius is credited with many important military reforms, initiating or strengthening many of the trends that eventually promoted the downfall of the Republic. Marius enlisted soldiers from the *capite censi* or propertyless class, and relied on his fame to bypass the normal mechanisms of aristocratic consensus and competition. Marius deliberately emphasized his non-aristocratic background, using it to create a persona of the archetypal Roman farmer-general, displaying the associated values of frugality and discipline.

Little is known about Marius' early life. Contrary to Plutarch's insistence on his humble origins, he was probably from the equestrian order, which enabled him to hold military offices and run for magistracies, though he was a "new man," whose ancestors had not held elected office in Rome. Marius appears on the Roman political and military scene as an officer in the Numantine War (134–133 BCE) commanded by Scipio Aemilianus. Though his outstanding courage impressed Scipio, he did not form an alliance with Aemilianus, but with the Metelli, one of whom successfully backed Marius for his first two magistracies, a quaestorship held in the late 120s BCE and tribune of the plebs in 119 BCE.

Marius' ambition became clear during his tribunate of the plebs, when he opposed the consul Cotta's proposal, even when his patron Caecilius Metellus Numidicus supported him. Although tribunes had this power,

Marius' opposition was egregious because, as Metellus' client, he should have followed his patron's lead. Passed over for the aedileship, Marius' next magistracy was the praetorship of 115 BCE.

Though Marius was capable, compared to his peers, his background and relative poverty were obstacles. Marius' propraetorial command in Spain not only provided him with money and fame, but also allowed him to demonstrate his real strength, military command. He also made a marriage alliance with the patrician Julii Caesares, thereby freeing him somewhat from his reliance on the Metelli. His next post, in 109, was legate for Metellus in the African campaign against Jugurtha.

The war against Jugurtha was controversial and difficult for the Romans. Jugurtha was the nephew of Micipsa, the ruler of Numidia and a strong Roman ally. On his death in 118, Micipsa left Numidia to his own two sons as well as Jugurtha. Jugurtha had one of the brothers killed and forced the other, Adherbal, out of Numidia. Though initially accepting Roman arbitration, Jugurtha soon attacked Adherbal, claiming his half of Numidia. By 112 Jugurtha's execution of Roman *equites* forced the Romans to retaliate. Rome's military response was unsuccessful, and followed by accusations of incompetence and corruption. According to Sallust, Jugurtha's friends warned him that "at Rome everything is for sale" (Sallust, *Jugurthine War* 8).

Metellus' command in Numidia was successful, restoring discipline to the demoralized Roman army. Marius and another legate, Rutilius Rufus, later a bitter rival, introduced new military innovations, Rufus with gladiatorial methods of training for soldiers, but Marius winning his soldiers' loyalty. Exploiting his new fame, Marius won the consulship in 107, replacing Metellus as commander in Numidia.

As consul in 107, Marius chose to enlist only volunteers, and took the unusual step of allowing men of the lowest property class, the *capite censi*, normally excluded from service, to join. Marius may have taken this step for his immediate advantage, not foreseeing the long-term effects of creating an army dependent on their commander for pay and post-discharge benefits. Such armies became more loyal to their commanders than to the Republic, and the grants of land to discharged soldiers proved even more divisive. Commanders, in their turn, supported by extremely loyal soldiers, gained great political leverage. The traditional nobility, lacking such support, lost influence.

In the war against Jugurtha, Marius made progress primarily through low-intensity conflict. Finally, Bocchus, Jugurtha's father-in-law, surrendered Jugurtha to Sulla, Marius' trusted quaestor. Sulla publicized his role and so appeared to diminish Marius' glory, and more importantly, credit for the victory. This was the first instance of the rivalry between Marius and Sulla.

Marius was then assigned the command of the war against the Germans. Beginning in 113, the Cimbri and Teutones invaded the Roman province of Transalpine Gaul and inflicted successive humiliating defeats on the Romans, most seriously at Arausio in 105. Although the Cimbri and Teutones halted, news of the defeat induced panic at Rome, and made Marius the overwhelming choice for the consulship of 104 and in the following four years.

During these years in command, Marius may have implemented the military reforms for which he is credited. In some cases, he consolidated long-term trends, such as the shift from the manipular legion to the uniformly equipped and flexible cohort legion, often called the "Marian legion." However, Marius did not introduce cohorts, which date back to the Spanish wars in the earlier second century BCE.

Other reforms are attributed to Marius, such as the modification of the *pilum* (javelin) to prevent its reuse by enemies in battle, or the replacement of four different legionary standards with the eagle. According to Plutarch, Marius won the loyalty of his soldiers by sharing their labors and hardships. They consequently not only accepted Marius' stricter regulations, but also called themselves "Marius' mules." Earlier Roman generals imposed similarly severe discipline. Such hardships only underline Marius' appeal to the general population. The label also emphasizes a larger point: Marius was the first of many late republican commanders who used personal bonds to override state authority.

Marius' outsider status both benefited and disadvantaged him. By emphasizing his lack of aristocratic culture, he won voter sympathy. Whatever his personal leanings, such a background made him a better fit for *popularis*-style politics, and in combination with Rome's military needs enabled him to win an unprecedented five consecutive consulships. He would hold seven consulships in his lifetime. But his time in the field away from Rome gave his political enemies many opportunities to work against him. He could not call on the extensive network of connections that the

nobility possessed. He therefore allied with the *popularis* politician Lucius Appuleius Saturninus, who as tribune in 103 combined a benefit package for Marius' veterans with an extension of grain donations passed by Gaius Gracchus in 122.

Saturninus also used Marius to win greater influence. In 100, Saturninus as tribune, with his ally Gaius Servilius Glaucia as praetor, promoted a land bill that gave special privileges to Marius (then consul for the sixth time). The bill extended Roman citizenship to some Italians, and required all magistrates and senators to swear to uphold it. This was deeply insulting to the aristocracy. Marius took the oath, but undercut it by adding the phrase, "insofar as the law is valid." Except for Metellus, who had already gone into exile, all senators and magistrates followed Marius' example. The bill of Saturninus and Glaucia alienated Marius from the Roman nobility, while making Saturninus a new enemy of Marius.

Italians continued to demand the Roman citizenship through the 90s, revolting against Rome when their Roman champion, the tribune Marcus Livius Drusus, was assassinated in 91. The Social War, as this conflict would be called, derives its name from the Latin name for ally, *socius*. This was a difficult war for Rome. The Italian allies had long fought besides Roman soldiers, and so were just as experienced and skilled as their opponents. Ironically, the Social War was ended by Rome granting citizenship, first to loyal allies, then to their opponents as well.

In the Social War, Marius, by this point almost 70, was given a command. His service was short, and though he was victorious, he was not reappointed. However, once Marius returned to the spotlight, he became determined to stay there. At this point, Sulla, also a commander in the Social War, was reaching the pinnacle of a traditional political career, having been elected consul in 88. Sulla had also received the command against a new enemy, Mithridates VI of Pontus, who genuinely threatened Roman interests and, if defeated, would greatly enrich a Roman commander and army.

Sulla also had to attend to domestic concerns. Though the Social War was largely over, pockets of serious resistance remained. New Roman citizens also required incorporation into Rome's popular assemblies. The old Roman population resented this enfranchisement of the allies. Furthermore, the nobility wanted to limit the influence of these new citizens. The tribune Publius Sulpicius Rufus distributed them equally in the units of the *comitia*

tributa, rather than packing them into a small number of units and thus decreasing their power. This displeased many Romans. Sulpicius, needing aid, collaborated with Marius and his new ally, Lucius Cornelius Cinna, who would trade their support in return for the consulship. Marius' additional condition was the command against Mithridates.

Sulla attempted to block Sulpicius' bill by *iustitium*, a temporary suspension of public business. A widespread riot resulted. Sulla hid out, ironically, at the house of his old enemy Marius. In return for lifting the *iustitium*, Marius helped Sulla out of the city, where Sulla joined his army as they besieged Nola, the last major Italian stronghold. Sulpicius used this opportunity to pass his bill and transfer the Mithridatic command to Marius. Exploiting their popularity and the sovereignty of the popular vote, Marius and Sulpicius used a *plebiscitum* to pass these measures, bypassing normal Senate approval for any bill.

Sulla's reaction was swift, severe, and completely unexpected. By telling his army that Marius planned to enlist other soldiers for the Mithridatic war, Sulla persuaded his soldiers to unify behind him. Then Sulla took the unprecedented step of marching with this army against Rome. He easily took the city, which had no effective resistance to him, and declared Marius, Sulpicius, and their allies public enemies. He canceled Sulpicius' legislation and took back Marius' command against Mithridates. While Marius and Cinna both escaped, Sulpicius was killed in the attempt. Sulla then departed with his army to the war against Mithridates, and was gone for some years.

Marius returned from exile in 87 and joined Cinna in marching on Rome. They were made consuls for 86, Marius' final magistracy. Already old, his physical decline was likely accelerated by the events of the last years of his life. He fell ill and died 17 days after taking office. His son, Marius the younger, and his adopted nephew, Marius Gratidianus, together with Cinna and Carbo, attempted to carry on the Marian cause; Marius the younger and Marius Gratidianus both perished in the Sullans' recapture of Rome in 82.

Plutarch's narration of one account of Marius' death depicts his feverish delusion that he was fighting in battle against Mithridates. While this passage is embellished, it showcases two Marius' ambition and fierce military temperament. Although ambition and militarism characterize the Roman aristocracy, the period in which Marius lived allowed him to exploit them to reach unprecedented heights. The structural weaknesses of Roman

Republican government, notably the growing willingness of politicians to oppose the Senate, gave Marius multiple opportunities to contrast his real military accomplishments with the relative ineffectiveness of the Roman aristocracy. This, combined with the new dynamic Marius established between commander and army, became important factors in the end of the Roman Republic.

Sulla, Marius' archrival, learned these lessons from Marius, though his formulation of policy was different. When Sulla returned from Asia and inflicted even bloodier reprisals on the surviving supporters of Marius, he made himself dictator and installed reforms that were intended to increase the power of the Senate and counter populist tendencies. The lesson Sulla's successors learned, however, was the one Sulla had learned from Marius: that political power could derive from the army.

Rosemary Moore

See also Consul; Jugurtha; Jugurthine War; Livius Drusus the Younger, Marcus; Marian-Sullan Conflict; Mithridatic Wars; Recruitment of Army; Republic, Political Structure; Senate, Senators; Social War; States of Emergency; Sulla, Lucius Cornelius; Tribune of the Plebs

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Mark Antony (83–30 BCE)

Marcus Antonius was a member of the Second Triumvirate and thus a leading figure in the fall of the Roman Republic as well as the ally and lover of the famous Cleopatra, with whom he waged an unsuccessful war against

Octavian (Augustus) and Agrippa for control of the Roman Empire.

Antony was born January 14, 83 BCE to a family very active in late republican politics. His grandfather, Antonius the Orator was put to death by Marius in 87 BCE. Antony's father as praetor in 74 BCE unsuccessfully fought the pirates based in Crete, for which he earned the mocking *cognomen* Creticus, as if he had conquered them. He died soon after.

Antony had personal reasons to ally with Caesar and to hate Cicero. Antony's mother Julia (of the Caesar branch) married the patrician Publius Cornelius Lentulus Sura (cos. 71), who was implicated in the Catilinarian conspiracy and executed by Cicero without a trial, motivating Antony to hate Cicero. Antony entered Roman politics as a follower of Curio the Younger (tribune 50) and Clodius Pulcher (tribune 57), the latter a notable enemy of Cicero.



Denarius of Mark Antony, ca. 41 BCE. After the assassination of Caesar, Antony, Octavian, and Lepidus formed the Second Triumvirate, an alliance that enabled

them to defeat and persecute their enemies. This coin, which gives Mark Antony the titles *imperator* and *Illvir (triumvir)*, depicts Octavian on the reverse. (CM Dixon/Print Collector/Getty Images)

Antony then pursued a military career, for which his bold character was suited. Antony served under Gabinius in Syria and helped defeat first the Jewish revolt of Aristobulus and later Archelaus and Berenice IV of Egypt in restoring Ptolemy XII Auletes. Antony's magnanimous burial of Archelaus won him admiration (as with the burial of Brutus after Philippi). His mother recommended him to her kinsman Julius Caesar, under whom he served in Gaul as a quaestor.

Returning to Rome from Gaul in 50, Antony was elected augur and then tribune (49), playing a crucial role defending Caesar's interests before and during the Civil War (Plutarch, *Antony* 5, *Pompey* 58–59; Appian, *Civil Wars* 2.33). But Antony abused his power governing Rome during Caesar's first Spanish campaign and started a bitter rivalry with Cornelius Dolabella. He regained favor by bringing much needed reinforcements to Caesar prior to Pharsalus and commanded the left wing at that decisive battle. However, his ongoing feud with Dolabella caused Caesar to pass over Antony for the consulship of 46 (which went to Lepidus). For this perceived slight Antony abstained from the African War against Cato and Juba, but later received the consulship of 44. His second wife Fulvia was the widow successively of his friends Clodius and Curio.

In February 44, Antony thrice offered Caesar a wreath tied with a diadem (insignia of kingship) during the Lupercalia festivities. This may have been a devoted partisan's attempt to promote Caesar's autocracy, but Antony misjudged the opinion of the crowd and Senate. However, Arthur Eckstein and others have suggested that Antony deliberately placed Caesar in a compromising position owing to his lingering discontent regarding Dolabella's impending promotion to consul. Unable to defeat Dolabella by legal means, Antony claimed as an augur that an ill omen prevented Dolabella's election (Plutarch, *Antony* 11.2–4).

Cassius and other conspirators wanted to assassinate both Caesar and Antony, but Marcus Brutus insisted Antony be spared, a favor Antony only partly later returned. For the results of the assassination were worse for the conspirators than the domination of Caesar. Although he had made a pact with Brutus and Cassius, in a speech to the people in which he exhibited

Caesar's wounded corpse, Antony whipped his audience into such a frenzy that the mob tried to burn down the houses of the lead assassins. Brutus and Cassius were forced to flee Italy and assemble an army abroad.

In a single year, Antony made enemies of Dolabella, Cicero, the assassins, the Senate, and Octavian (whose adoption he tried to block). At the end of the year, Antony illegally claimed the governorship of Cisalpine Gaul and left Rome for this province, where he made war on Decimus Brutus, one of Caesar's assassins and true governor of Cisalpine Gaul. The Senate declared Antony a public enemy and sent the consuls of 43 (Hirtius and Pansa) and Octavian against him. They defeated Antony at the battle of Mutina (April 21), but both consuls perished. Some months later Octavian decided to cast his lot with Lepidus and Antony and formed the Second Triumvirate with them.

Their plans for domination included the proscription of real and perceived enemies. Octavian agreed to resign the consulship and was engaged to Antony's underage stepdaughter Clodia. The outlawry of Antony and Lepidus was lifted, and the assassins were declared *hostes*. A blood bath in Rome followed among whose victims were Cicero and 3,000 others, whose property was confiscated (Plutarch, *Antony* 19–21; Suetonius, *Augustus* 13; Appian, *Civil Wars* 5.10–30, 36–51; Dio 47.3–15). Having raised the funds needed to make war on Brutus and Cassius, Antony and Octavian invaded Greece and defeated the assassins in the two battles of Philippi (October 3 and 23, 42); Brutus and Cassius committed suicide. Although Octavian wished to desecrate Brutus' body, Antony insisted it be given a proper burial.

The triumvirs now divided the empire. Antony presided over the eastern Mediterranean to punish those who had helped the assassins. He summoned Cleopatra to Cilicia, where she made her famous arrival on the River Cydnus as Aphrodite to his Bacchus. The two immediately became lovers and allies. Meanwhile, Octavian had to satisfy his veterans' demands for discharge benefits, causing the Italians to revolt in the Perusine War (41–40). Lucius Antonius and Fulvia were besieged by Octavian at Perugia and defeated. Antony returned to Italy in 40, but arrived too late to save to defend his wife and brother. Yet another civil war almost broke out, but in the Treaty of Brundisium (40), Octavian, Antony, and Lepidus renewed the Second Triumvirate. Antony, now a widower, married Octavia, the newly widowed sister of Octavian. The Second Triumvirate next made peace with

Sextus Pompeius in the Pact of Misenum, after which Antony and Octavia sailed east to Greece.

Antony was slow to send ships to help Octavian, who had begun a new war against Sextus Pompeius. When Antony and Octavia did come west, Octavian initially rebuffed them, but agreed at Octavia's entreaties to accept their help and promised two legions to Antony for the upcoming war against Persia. Antony returned east, leaving Octavia in Rome, but himself rejoined Cleopatra while he prepared to invade Persia.

However, Antony's invasion of Persia was a disaster (Velleius 2.82.1-4; Plutarch, *Antony* 36-50), and it lowered his reputation as a general and as a leader. He returned to Egypt where he celebrated a spectacular pseudo-triumph for his treacherous capture of the shah of Armenia. At the infamous "Donations of Alexandria" (34), Antony further inflamed Roman opinion by giving Roman provinces to his young children, the children of Cleopatra, whom Antony had married by this time. Furthermore, by divorcing Octavia, Antony turned public opinion in Italy against him as the likelihood of war loomed in 33 and 32. Probably orchestrated by Octavian, xenophobic accusations flew that he had been corrupted by "Eastern ways," and rumors claimed he had succumbed to Cleopatra's spells or drugs.

When Octavian declared war against Cleopatra in 33 (Sosius was consul when war was declared), Antony responded in kind, but he failed to seize the initiative and move quickly to take the war west. Instead, Octavian and Agrippa raised troops and funds and brought the war to Greece, where a final battle was fought at Actium on September 2, 31 BCE. Although Antony should have trusted his superior land forces, he was persuaded by Cleopatra to fight at sea. Plutarch says she was hedging her bets so that she could escape quickly by sea to Egypt if the battle turned against them, but by his own report, her fleet abandoned his fleet while the outcome was still very much in doubt, carrying off the treasury. When Antony saw her depart, he too abandoned his fleet, and followed her in a small sloop, although many of his ships continued to fight all day, unaware that he had deserted them.

Agrippa and Octavian won a total victory at Actium, and Antony's army immediately surrendered to Octavian's general Statilius Taurus. In a few short months every city and province surrendered to the armies of Octavian's coalition until the dragnet closed upon Egypt. Antony's haphazard efforts to resist were completely futile. Cleopatra let him believe she had killed herself, expecting him to kill himself, but hoping for better

terms from Octavian once Antony was dead. Antony mortally wounded himself, but did not succeed in killing himself. Cleopatra found him, and he died in her arms. She arranged for his burial. She did not long survive him. Learning that she was to be displayed in Octavian's triumph over Egypt, she too killed herself rather than suffer this humiliation.

Antony's reputation suffered at the hands of Octavian and later Greek and Roman historians and biographers. His judgment in the matter of Cleopatra was depicted as "madness," and this poor judgment was extrapolated throughout his life, rendering it problematic why Octavian, a very young but already shrewd politician, chose Antony for the Second Triumvirate. Antony was a bold military leader and warrior (as Octavian was not) and closely tied to Julius Caesar, as well as the enemy of Caesar's and Octavian's enemies. However, after a certain point Antony and his uncertain judgment became no longer useful to Octavian, who preferred to have no rivals. Nonetheless, the outcome of the contest won at Actium may not have seemed inevitable to contemporaries. After the battle of Actium, a man brought a talking crow to Octavian; it had been trained to say "Hail, emperor Caesar!" Octavian bought it for 20,000 sesterces, but a rival of the man told Octavian that the man had another crow, trained to say "Hail, emperor Antony!" (Macrobius, *Saturnalia* 2.4.29–30).

Gaius Stern

See also Actium, Battle of; Augustus; Brundisium, Treaty of; Caesar, Gaius Julius; Cicero; Civil Wars (I) (49–45 BCE); Civil Wars (II) (44–31 BCE); Cleopatra; Clodius Pulcher; Plutarch; Second Triumvirate; Tarentum, Pact of

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Marriage of Soldiers

For the first two centuries of the Principate (ca. 13 BCE–197 CE) Roman soldiers, both legionary and auxiliary as well as members of the fleet, were not legally allowed to marry during their period of service. The ban on marriage was instituted by the emperor Augustus, probably in 13 BCE with a series of other military reforms. The legal ban may have been lifted by Septimius Severus in 197 CE. At the least he allowed soldiers to cohabit with women while serving in the Roman army (Herodian 3.8.4–5). There is some evidence that in 205 CE the ban was still in effect, specifically a military diploma that still gives the right of *conubium* (legal marriage) to the retiring soldier. Various emperors made allowances to offer the same rights of civilian men to soldiers, in evidence by edicts that gave special rights of inheritance and other allowances to soldiers. Any relationship that existed before a man entered service was voided. Such an outcome would have been unusual for Roman citizen men who typically married later in life, but may not have been uncommon for the non-citizen auxiliary soldiers entering the ranks, who would have followed their native law and custom.

Officers were allowed to be married during service, but a man could not take a wife who originated from the province in which he served (Digest 23.2.63). There is ample evidence for the accompaniment of wives into the military environment with their husbands. The most famous instance of a general's wife living within the military settlement is reported by Tacitus. Agrippina the Elder accompanied her husband Germanicus, general of the German armies in the beginning of the first century CE, to the northern frontier and resided within the military camp with other wives and children. Famously, the emperor Gaius was born here and given the name "Caligula" (Little Boots) by the soldiers. It is somewhat unclear what rank of officer was allowed the privilege of marriage, but enough evidence indicates that wives of auxiliary centurions and decurions resided in military settlements, found most famously in the Vindolanda tablets from the northern frontier in Britain.

The existence of a legal ban on marriage for common soldiers and members of the fleet did not mean that soldiers refrained from starting and maintaining relationships during service. Ample evidence from inscriptions, military diplomas, and archaeological material indicates that soldiers still took *de facto* wives, even when they were not recognized by the Roman

legal system. Military diplomas of auxiliary veterans often name the wife of a soldier with which he will share the right of *conubium*, an important privilege given together with Roman citizenship after 25 years of service. Diplomas also name the children of these unions, who were granted citizenship at the same time. Several diplomas name four or more children on the document suggesting that some soldiers started families and had several children during military service.

Elizabeth M. Greene

See also Civil-Military Relations; Families of Imperial Soldiers; Gender and War; Vindolanda

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Mars

The Roman war god Mars, often identified with the Greek god Ares, played a major role in the religious aspects of Roman warfare. In early Rome, Mars, Jupiter, and Quirinus protected the city and were each honored by priests

called *flamines*. The Capitoline triad of Jupiter, Juno, and Minerva later became Rome's patron gods. Originally, Mars protected agriculture. In his work *On Agriculture*, Cato the Elder names Mars Pater (Mars the Father) in a prayer said during the ritual purification ceremony called the *lustratio*, used on fields. Mars lent his name to March, which was the first month of the Roman calendar until 153 BCE. In March, the Romans both set out for battles and bred cattle, linking the agricultural and military functions of Mars.

The Salian priests served Mars by dancing, singing, and carrying the *ancilia* (sacred shields). The festivals of Mars also included horse races held in the Campus Martius (Field of Mars) on March 14 and the *Tubilustrium*, a purification of the sacred war trumpets, on March 23. On October 15, the Romans held a chariot race, from which the right-hand horse of the winning pair was sacrificed to Mars (October Horse). On October 19, the *Salii* performed another ceremony, the *Armilustrium*, to purify the weapons in preparation for storage until the next campaign season.

Mars' main altar stood in the Campus Martius in Rome, where citizens serving in the legions trained and met to vote in the *comitia centuriata* (the main citizen assembly). In the *Aeneid* Vergil, among others, named Mars the father of the legendary founders of Rome, Romulus, and Remus. Mars' temples stood outside the Porta Capena (388 BCE), in the Circus Flaminius (133 BCE), and in the Forum of Augustus, dedicated in 2 BCE. Augustus built the Forum's temple to Mars Ultor, Mars the Avenger, after the death of his adoptive father, Julius Caesar, in 44 BCE.

Mars as god of war also served as a point of communication with other communities in and near Italy. Mars' sacred animals, the wolf and woodpecker, showed Sabine colonists the way to their new homes during the *ver sacrum* (sacred spring). The Samnites sprung from these colonies, and thus were related to the Romans, who also had married with the Sabines. The Celtic peoples in Gaul identified a large number of their military or protective gods with Mars (a process called syncretism) as the Romans gained more control over Europe. Among the many gods resulting from this syncretism were Mars Caturix (Mars king of combat) and Mars Mullo (Mars the mule), who was popular in northwestern Gaul.

Amanda J. Coles

See also Campus Martius; Comitia Centuriata; Mars Ultor, Temple of;

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Mars Ultor, Temple of

The Temple of Mars Ultor was a temple built to Mars the Avenger as the centerpiece of the Emperor Augustus' forum in Rome. This temple reinforces the connection between Mars, the god of war, and Augustus' victory over his family's enemies. The temple commemorated the defeat of the assassins of Caesar (d. 44 BCE), the adoptive father of Octavian and last great dictator of the Republic. Octavian (given the name of Augustus in 27 BCE) vowed this temple in 42 BCE during the battles of Philippi in Greece in which Brutus and Cassius, the assassins of Caesar, were defeated. The temple was dedicated on May 12, 2 BCE.



View of the Temple of Mars Ultor. Built by Augustus (27 BCE–14 CE) in fulfillment of his vow to avenge the assassination of his adoptive father Julius Caesar, the temple

literary papyri.

When Judaea came under Roman rule in 6 CE, Roman soldiers garrisoned the site. In 66 CE, a Jewish rebel group, the Sicarii (Latin for assassins), under the command of Menahem ben Judas, captured Masada, slew the Roman garrison, and pillaged the armory. Menahem returned to Jerusalem to participate in the opening stages of the rebellion. There, he was killed by his political rivals. His kinsman Eleazar ben Yair led the remainders of this group, some 960 men, women, and children back to Masada. Throughout the Jewish War, they raided the surrounding countryside.

After reducing the remaining Jewish fortresses of Herodium and Machaerus, in 72, the procurator Silva led his legion to Masada. The Roman army built a wall around Masada and then constructed an earthen ramp leading up the western side of the plateau. The fortifications of the Roman army camps are still visible from the summit of Masada. The Romans brought a battering ram up the ramp, breaching and burning the secondary wooden wall that the Jews had constructed. Knowing that the Romans would soon storm the fortress, the leader of the group Eleazar ben Yair argued that it was better for the defenders to die by their own hands than to be slaves. Persuaded, the Jewish defenders committed mass suicide. Ten men were assigned to carry out the massacre, and then killed each other, suggesting a strong aversion to the actual act of suicide.

The fall of Masada ended organized Jewish resistance to the Romans. The first-century historian Josephus (*Jewish War* 7.389–397) is the only narrative source for the siege of Masada. According to him, two women and several children survived by hiding in a cistern. These women reported what had transpired to the Romans, from whom Josephus transcribed this story.

Masada has served as an important symbol for the state of Israel. The poem *Masada* (1927) written by the Ukrainian immigrant Yitzhak (Isaac) Lamdan, elevated this obscure story and archaeological site to preeminence in the Zionist movement. Masada also became the site where the Israeli military swore in its recruits, after basic training was finished. Yigael Yadin's excavation of Masada was a national event. Even to this day, Masada is still an important symbol for the Zionist movement.

Nathan Schumer

See also Jewish War; Josephus; Siege Warfare; Suicide; Titus

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Masinissa (ca. 238–148 BCE)

Masinissa was a Numidian king who fought on both sides of the Second Punic War. As a client of Rome, he created a unified and powerful Numidian state in North Africa, acting as a Roman counterweight to Carthage. The son of a Numidian tribal chieftain, Masinissa first appears in 213 BCE fighting in North Africa for the Carthaginians. He defeated another Numidian tribe, led by Syphax, a rival chieftain who had allied with the Romans. He then fought in Spain against the Romans. After his father's death, Masinissa was forced out by Syphax, who had changed alliance to the Carthaginians and used their support to unify the Numidian tribes into one powerful kingdom. After several defeats, Masinissa sought alliance with Rome and Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus, whom he befriended.

Following Scipio's invasion of North Africa in 203 BCE, Masinissa and a Roman commander Gaius Laelius led a combined Roman-Numidian army which defeated Syphax. Masinissa recovered not only his kingdom but Syphax' as well, leaving him sole ruler of a unified Numidian kingdom. The peace treaty which followed Carthage's defeat confirmed Masinissa's gains, creating a Roman client kingdom which dwarfed the rump Carthaginian state. Masinissa ruled Numidia for over 50 years until his death in ca. 148, increasing the prosperity of his own kingdom and, with Roman support, chipping away at Carthage's remaining territory. This antagonistic policy eventually led to the Third Punic War and ultimately the Jugurthine War for control of North Africa.

Gareth C. Sampson

See also Client Monarchs; Punic War, Second; Punic War, Third; Scipio Africanus

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Maxentius (Emperor) (306–312 CE)

Maxentius, born ca. 283, was emperor from 306 to 312 CE, based in the city of Rome and Italy and laying claim to rule in the west. He was the son of Maximian, Diocletian's colleague in the First Tetrarchy, but was passed over for the choice of Caesar in 305, probably due to his youth. In 306, after Constantine's revolt at York, the praetorians and Roman populace acclaimed Maxentius as emperor. The revolt was also triggered by the Caesar Severus' imposition of a census on Italy (which had not been taxed since 167 BCE).

As emperor, Maxentius adopted a more traditional mode of imperial self-presentation, independent of the Tetrarchy, at first calling himself *princeps* and then Augustus. He sought the aid of Maximian, now in retirement. Maximian needed little encouragement to resume the imperial role in his own right. When the Caesar Severus invaded Italy to suppress Maxentius' revolt, Maximian's and Maxentius' army defeated Severus, whose army contained many of Maximian's veterans who refused to fight their old commander. Maxentius confined Severus to Ravenna and later executed him. For his part, Constantine made a tenuous alliance with Maxentius through Maximian.

In 308, Maximian quarreled with Maxentius, attempting to depose him and failing; Maximian fled to Constantine. At the Council of Carnuntum Maxentius was not included and Galerius declared him a public enemy. After Maximian's death in 310, Constantine broke entirely with Maxentius, invaded Italy, and defeated Maxentius at Verona and Saxa Rubra. Maxentius was killed in the famous battle of the Milvian Bridge (October 28, 312).

Sara E. Phang

See also Constantine I; Maximian; Milvian Bridge, Battle of; Severus (Emperor); Tetrarchic Civil War

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Maximian (Emperor) (286–305 CE)

Marcus Aurelius Valerius Maximianus (Augustus 286–305, 306–308, 310 CE) was Diocletian's coruler and one of the Tetrarchs. He campaigned and governed chiefly in the western empire, including Italy, Gaul, Spain, and Africa. His deputy Constantius I was responsible for the recovery of Britain. Maximian remained loyal to Diocletian, but after their mutual abdication in 305 Maximian was unwilling to remain inactive and disrupted the so-called Second Tetrarchy by resuming the purple. In the Tetrarchic Civil War, he backed Constantine, but eventually perished.

No more is known of Maximian's youth than of Diocletian's. Maximian, born ca. 250, is said to have been the son of shopkeepers at Sirmium; he entered the army and advanced as an army officer. He and Diocletian (then called Diocles) were presumably friends, but there are no details of the bond between them. In the Roman army, many soldiers formed close friendships and termed each other "brothers."

In 285, Diocletian elevated Maximian to the rank of Caesar to combat the Bagaudae, a group or groups of bandits ravaging Gaul who were led by Aelianus and Amandus. Maximian defeated the Bagaudae and also campaigned throughout his reign against Germanic invaders. He was elevated to Augustus in 286 probably to combat Carausius (286–293), the captain of the English Channel fleet who revolted and took over Britain and North Gaul. Carausius even claimed to be co-Augustus with Diocletian and Maximian. Maximian prepared a fleet for the invasion of Britain, but the fleet was shipwrecked.



Silver antoninianus of Maximian (286–305, 307–308, 310 CE). Maximian was Diocletian's co-emperor, elevated to Augustus in 286. Maximian retired in 305 with Diocletian, but when civil war broke out, Maximian resumed the role of emperor until he was persuaded to abdicate in 308. His revolt in 310 led to his downfall and death. Located in the Yale University Art Gallery, New Haven, Connecticut. (Yale University Art Gallery)

In 293, Diocletian elevated Constantius I and Galerius to the rank of Caesars. Constantius was assigned to Maximian as his deputy, and expelled Carausius from northern Gaul. Constantius then went to war against Carausius' successor Allectus, who had murdered Carausius. Constantius successfully crossed the channel and retook Britain (296). In the 290s, Maximian campaigned against various tribes in Spain and North Africa.

As Diocletian's fellow Augustus, Maximian was not merely a general. He had his own court, officials, and bureaucrats and was expected to give justice and perform the other administrative duties of emperors as he

traveled around the western empire. He established a preferred capital at Milan. When Diocletian began the persecution of the Christians (303), Maximian enforced the edicts in Italy, Spain, and Africa.

Maximian had a son, Maxentius (born ca. 283). He may have intended Maxentius to succeed him. However, in 303 Diocletian forced Maximian to agree to abdicate with him (and probably to accept his choice of Caesars). It is not known when Diocletian planned to abdicate at this time. He was very ill in 304–305, forcing his decision to abdicate on May 1, 305. At the same time, Maximian also abdicated. Constantius I and Galerius became the two Augusti, and Severus and Maximinus II Daia (Galerius' nephew) the two Caesars. Maximian's son Maxentius and Constantius I's son Constantine were passed over.

However, after Constantius' death and Constantine's revolt at York in 306, and the revolt of his son Maxentius at Rome, Maximian came out of retirement and claimed the purple for himself (306–308). Maximian allied with Constantine against Galerius and gave his daughter Fausta in marriage to Constantine. He tried to depose Maxentius, but failed and took refuge with Constantine. When Galerius called a conference of all the emperors at Carnuntum in November 308 to try to salvage the Tetrarchy, Maximian agreed to abdicate again, probably persuaded by Diocletian. However, Maximian revolted again against Constantine in 310 and was captured at Massilia. Maximian was executed or perhaps forced to commit suicide by Constantine.

The sources for Maximian (including Lactantius and Aurelius Victor) contrast him unfavorably with Diocletian. Maximian appeared harsher than Diocletian, carrying out unpopular policies for him (Eutropius 9.27). Maximian allegedly molested the daughters of noble families (as did many other “bad emperors”) (Lactantius *DMP* 8.5). In the Tetrarchic conflict, Maximian proved a rogue emperor and faithless to Constantine. These characterizations contradict the Tetrarchic ideology of harmony and stem from the pro-Constantinian tradition in which Constantine had to justify the execution of his father-in-law. Contemporary Latin panegyrics provide a corrective view.

Sara E. Phang

See also Bandits and Brigands; Britain, Roman; Carausius; Christians, Persecution of; Constantine I; Constantius I; Diocletian; Lactantius;

Maxentius; Panegyric; Succession (Imperial); Tetrarchic Civil War; Usurpation

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Maximinus I Thrax (Emperor) (235–238 CE)

A Roman emperor (235–238 CE), Gaius Iulius Verus Maximinus was the first man to become emperor from the ranks of the army. Although he was given the name Thrax (“the Thracian”) in late Antiquity, he was probably from the province of Moesia. The ancient sources also record that he was a shepherd; regardless of the truth of this story, Maximinus was certainly of more humble origin than most previous emperors, given his military background. He married Caecilia Paulina, a woman of unknown background, who bore him a son, Gaius Iulius Verus Maximus. Maximus was still a boy when his father elevated him to Caesar and perished besides his father in 238.

Maximinus’ early career is uncertain prior to the reign of Alexander Severus. He served in the emperor’s army during the Persian wars of 231–233 CE, and later participated in the German campaigns in 234–235 CE, with the special responsibility of training recruits. This career path strongly suggests that Maximinus had reached equestrian status by the 230s CE, making him a junior officer. In March 235 CE, Alexander Severus was murdered by his troops in the camp at Mainz, and Maximinus was proclaimed emperor in his stead. Unlike the majority of previous emperors, Maximinus decided not to journey to Rome to meet the Senate, but continued to campaign in Germany. The Senate confirmed his elevation in

his absence, but resented the lack of respect shown by their new ruler. Paintings of Maximinus' victories in Germany that were sent back to Rome did little to soothe their anger. His financial policies aroused further resentment, notably his order to melt down statues, ornaments and religious offerings to raise funds for the treasury. This was necessary to bankroll Maximinus' decision to double army pay, which had been increased only a generation earlier by Caracalla. The campaigns in Germany were followed by further wars against the Sarmatians and Dacians between 236 and 238 CE.

In January 238 CE, a revolt broke out in the province of Africa, sparked by protests against Maximinus' harsh taxes. The rebels proclaimed the governor Marcus Antonius Gordianus emperor (Gordian I), and his position was soon recognized by the Senate. Capelianus, the governor of Numidia, remained loyal to Maximinus, and suppressed the revolt, but his regime had already begun to collapse. The Senate chose a board of 20 senators to protect the state, headed by two new co-emperors, Decimus Caelius Calvinus Balbinus and Marcus Clodius Pupienus Maximus. When the senatorial resistance marshaled their forces, Maximinus was finally compelled to return to Rome. In April 238 CE, he laid siege to the key strategic city of Aquileia in north Italy. When victory eluded Maximinus, his troops grew restless and murdered the emperor and his son. Maximinus' rise and fall illustrates the tension developing between different groups within the Senate, army, and administration over the course of the third century CE.

Latin and Greek historians, traditionally pro- senatorial, are hostile to Maximinus and depict him as semi-barbarian and brutal; the *Historia Augusta's Maximini Duo* (Maximinus Thrax and his son) is particularly unreliable and fanciful. The portrayal of Maximinus as impressively tall and strong but uncultivated, angry, and brutal draws on elite stereotypes of imperial soldiers.

Caillan Davenport

See also Alexander Severus; Gordian I; Pupienus and Balbinus; Third-Century CE Crisis

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Maximinus II Daia (Emperor) (309–313 CE)

Maximinus II Daia (Gaius Galerius Valerius Maximinus) was one of the Second Tetrarchic emperors (Caesar 305–308, Augustus 309–313). A nephew of Galerius, he was elevated to the rank of Caesar in 305. His region of activity was Syria and Egypt. As Caesar (deputy emperor), Maximinus became restless when other claimants to the purple (among them Constantine I, Maxentius, and Maximian) revolted. Maximinus did not accept the settlement at Carnuntum in 308 where Licinius, a friend of Galerius, was promoted to Augustus instead of himself and where he himself and Constantine were confirmed as Caesars with the title *fili Augustorum*. Maximinus revolted in 309, claiming the title of Augustus. He did not challenge the other emperors until after Galerius' death in 311 and the defeat of Maxentius in 312. After these events, Maximinus challenged Licinius over Asia Minor and invaded Licinius' domain of Thrace. Maximinus was defeated near Adrianople in 313, fled the scene, and committed suicide (or died from a disease) at Tarsus. He is known for persecuting the Christians actively in 306–308, and for doing so even after the persecution was formally ended.

Sara E. Phang

See also Christians, Persecution of; Constantine I; Galerius; Licinius (Emperor); Maxentius; Maximian; Tetrarchic Civil War

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Mesopotamia. *See Euphrates; Persian Wars, Arsacid;*

Metaurus, Battle of the (207 BCE)

The battle of the Metaurus River was fought in 207 BCE, and as a Roman victory marked a turning point of the Second Punic War. A Punic army from Spain under the command of Hasdrubal was marching toward Italy with the intention of joining his army to that of his brother Hannibal. The Romans, however, had learned this plan through the capture of two Carthaginian couriers and were able to intercept the Carthaginians. The consul Livius Salinator was already in the region with an army, while the other consular army of four legions under Gaius Claudius Nero was further south in Italy, shadowing the army of Hannibal. These four legions left a small force to watch Hannibal while the rest marched swiftly north, meeting Hasdrubal's army near the Metaurus River. Hasdrubal was forced to deploy his troops hastily: Gauls on the left, Ligurians in the center, and Spanish on the right. Nero, commanding from the right wing of the Romans, found his way obstructed by a ravine, and, leaving enough troops to keep the Gauls occupied, marched the rest behind the Roman lines to emerge in a surprise attack behind the Spanish troops.

With the battle clearly lost, Hasdrubal threw himself into the fray and was killed fighting. Livy called the battle a disaster for the Carthaginians equal to that suffered by Rome at Cannae, and cites 56,000 enemy dead, an exaggerated claim contrasting with Polybius' more conservative 10,000. The battle at Metaurus marks the first Carthaginian loss on Italian soil during the Second Punic War and the turning point of the war for the Roman side.

Kathryn H. Milne

See also Hasdrubal Barca; Livy; Punic War, Second

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Military Decorations

The Roman army awarded decorations (*dona militaria*) to individual soldiers to honor various feats of valor. In order of increasing prominence, *armillae* (arm bands), *phalerae* (discs), *torques* (necklets), and *hastae purae* (spear shafts) were less distinctive than *coronae* (wreaths), which were divided into the *corona aurea*, the *corona muralis* or *vallis*, the *corona civica*, and the *corona obsidionalis* or *corona graminea*.

In the Republic, *armillae*, *phalerae*, and *torques* were given to ordinary soldiers to honor brave deeds. They were customarily made from silver or gold, as was the *hasta pura* (probably miniature size) and the *corona aurea* and *corona muralis*. The *corona aurea* might honor some particularly heroic action but was not specific, in contrast with the other three *coronae* which were awarded for particular actions. The *corona muralis* or *vallis*, the “wall crown,” was awarded for being the first attacker to mount the wall of a besieged city. The *corona civica*, the “civic crown,” was awarded for saving the life of a fellow citizen in combat and required attacking and slaying the enemy. The *corona graminea* or *corona obsidionalis*, the “grass crown” or “siege crown,” was awarded (to a commander) for relieving a besieged army or city, thus saving the lives of the besieged. Pliny the Elder (22.4.6–8) emphasizes that the most prestigious honors, the *corona civica* and the *corona obsidionalis*, were made from worthless materials: oak leaves and grass, respectively. Aulus Gellius also describes the crowns (5.6.1–20).

The siege crown was awarded to very few Romans during the Republic (Pliny the Elder *Natural History* 22.5.9–6.12). It was won by Lucius Siccus Dentatus (below) and by Publius Decius Mus, and it was awarded to Quintus Fabius Maximus “Cunctator,” who defeated Hannibal by attrition in Italy. In the Third Punic War, Scipio Aemilianus won the *corona obsidionalis* for relieving cohorts surrounded by the enemy; on the strength of this and other brave deeds, he was elected consul and given command of the war. Sulla was awarded the siege crown for relieving the siege of Nola.

According to legend, the *dona militaria* were given at least in the fifth century BCE, as shown by the heroic warrior Lucius Siccus Dentatus

(*tribunus plebis* in 454 BCE), who amassed over 300 military decorations (the numbers vary: Valerius Maximus 3.2.24; Pliny *Natural History* 7.28.101–2; Gellius 2.11.2). The fabled Dentatus won eight single combats and boasted 45 scars on the front of his body and none on his back.



Detail from monument of Marcus Caelius, a high-ranking centurion who died in the Varian disaster (9 CE). Caelius wears military decorations, in particular torques and *phalerae*, flat disks strapped to his armor. *CIL* XIII 8648 = *ILS* 2244, located in the Rheinisches-Landesmuseum, Bonn, Germany. (Alfredo Dagli Orti/The Art Archive/Corbis)

Polybius (6.39) describes Roman military decorations in less detail, emphasizing the social context in which the general honored his soldiers

and reinforced a military culture in which all personnel competed for distinction. As with donatives, military decorations enabled ordinary soldiers (Roman citizens of low social status) to receive recognition and participate in the Republic's culture that glorified victory. Soldiers wore their decorations on "full dress" occasions, though armor (properly maintained and worn) bore most of the cultural significance of uniform in modern armies. Funerary monuments show that the *phalerae* were worn strapped to the cuirass. Military decorations, displayed in Roman homes according to Polybius, were probably handed down in families. Precious-metal decorations must have represented considerable wealth, but are distinct from plunder or from donatives.

In the Principate, statistical studies have shown that military decorations became more restricted by rank. In sociological terms, the early emperors rationalized and routinized military decorations by awarding them less frequently and associating them with specific ranks. Frequent awards of *dona militaria* (and to a greater extent cash donatives) to common soldiers were associated with the civil warfare of the late Republic, in which ambitious generals rewarded their followers to excess. As part of his political strategy of reducing the influence of the army, Augustus (27 BCE–14 CE) maintained military discipline strictly and awarded decorations sparingly (Suetonius, *Augustus* 24–25). This policy was continued by the subsequent early emperors.

In the Principate, ordinary soldiers below the rank of centurion were eligible for *armillae*, *phalerae*, and *torques*. They did not usually receive the higher decorations. Centurions and above might receive *coronae*, including the plain *corona aurea* and the *corona muralis* or *vallis*. Chief centurions (*primi pili*) might receive the *hasta pura*, and equestrian officers were also eligible for the *hasta pura* and a miniature *vexillum* (standard). Senatorial officers might receive all decorations except the *corona civica* and *corona obsidionalis*. The civic crown became an honorific attribute of the emperors, worn by their statues. The siege crown appears to have disappeared; the authors of the imperial era, such as Pliny the Elder, take an antiquarian interest in it.

The emperor might still single out and reward individual soldiers' exploits, as Hadrian (117–138 CE) honored legionaries and riders in an address at Lambaesis in North Africa, preserved in an inscription (*ILS* 2487, 9133–9135). The military diplomas, awarded to honorably discharged

auxiliary and fleet soldiers, praetorians, urban cohort soldiers, and *equites singulares*, were not decorations as such, nor (probably) were the golden rings that Septimius Severus (193–211) permitted soldiers to wear, an ornament previously marking members of the equestrian order (Herodian 3.8.5).

Despite the rationalization of decorations and their stratification by rank, there is much evidence (some of it documentary, including Latin inscriptions) that Roman military culture's emphasis on honor and victory persisted in the imperial period. In awarding decorations to their soldiers, the emperors affirmed their personal bond with their soldiers, on whom the imperial regime depended. The award of traditional decorations also maintained continuity with Rome's past, on which the emperors also depended for their legitimacy.

Traditional *dona militaria* seem to have passed out of use in the later Roman army, in which officers might receive cash payments and elaborate clothing and equipment as rewards for valor or promotion.

Sara E. Phang

See also Donatives; Elite Participation; Fabius Maximus; Polybius; Scipio Aemilianus; Siege Warfare; Sulla, Lucius Cornelius; Victory; *Virtus*

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Military Diplomas

Military diplomas (a modern term) are documents inscribed upon portable bronze tablets, recording the privileges awarded to long-serving soldiers and veterans of the praetorian and urban cohorts, *equites singulares* (emperor's bodyguard), sailors in the Italian fleet, and auxiliaries in the provinces. The earliest known diplomas date from the time of the emperor Claudius (41–54 CE) and reflect his decision to open up Roman citizenship to provincials who had proved their value and loyalty to Rome by serving for 20 years or more.

Diplomas were issued to auxiliaries until the early third century and to other units until the mid-third century. The privileges awarded consisted of Roman citizenship for the individuals concerned, and for their children and descendants, and of the right of legal marriage with non-Roman wives. From 140 CE, children of auxiliaries were no longer regularly included as beneficiaries of Roman citizenship, only those born and officially acknowledged in front of a governor after their father had ceased military service. The emperor himself made the awards, maintaining the sense of close connection between military personnel and the emperor.

Each diploma was an official extract copied from the imperial constitutions which were displayed as inscriptions upon large bronze tablets on the Capitol at Rome, none of which otherwise survive. These constitutions could relate to several hundred soldiers in different units, but the diploma was a personalized version issued to an individual and was kept by him as proof of his status and legal rights. It is unclear whether or not bronze diplomas were routinely issued, or whether individuals had to request and pay for their diplomas. If the former, then only a tiny fraction of the originals has survived, but this would come as no surprise given the likelihood that the bronze was melted down and reused.

The physical format of the tablets indicated the status of these texts as legal documents. A diploma consisted of two rectangular bronze tablets, tied together with copper wire, and sealed by seven witnesses, who verified that the text was an authentic and accurate copy of the original constitution, via the formula "copied and checked." A diploma contained two texts, on its interior and exterior faces, with the interior text usually written in a different hand from the exterior, and with scant use of abbreviations. The interior text was intended to be consulted only in case of dispute, and was not read in ordinary circumstances: it acted simply as a legal safeguard. The relative value of the two texts shifted over time, however, with the accuracy of the exterior text becoming regarded as the more important. Over 650 diplomas have been found in different parts of the empire. Many were collected in *Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum* vol. XVI (1936), with Supplement (1955). Since then, many new examples have been published in recent years, particularly from the Balkans. New diplomas are found regularly and represent an exciting area in which we are still gaining new knowledge of recruitment, command, and deployment within the Roman army.

See also Army in Politics; *Auxilia*; Claudius I; Emperor as Commander; Emperor as Patron; *Equites Singulares Augusti*; Fleets; Inscriptions; Marriage of Soldiers; Praetorians; Recruitment of Army (Imperial); Urban Cohorts; Veterans

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Military Discipline

The Roman army is stereotyped in modern Western culture as having particularly strict discipline. From a structural standpoint, an organized state army (as opposed to bands of pre-state or tribal warriors) requires discipline to accustom its soldiers to obey orders, physically and emotionally prepare them for combat, and punish crimes and infractions. However, “primitive” or ritual aspects of discipline probably dominated in the early Republic. Discipline became more rationalized and subject to the individual commander’s judgment in the middle and late Republic, though a drop in soldiers’ status also made discipline harsher. In the late Republic and Principate, discipline conflicted with the warlord’s or emperor’s role as patron of his soldiers. Discipline became more bureaucratic, employing military law and documentation. It is not certain that discipline deteriorated in the later Roman army proper, as contrasted with the behavior of later Roman allied troops (*federates*) under their native commanders.

Many aspects of Roman warfare in the early Republic (ca. 509–264 BCE) were probably governed by religious ritual. The opening and the closing of the war season, from March to October, were marked by rites purifying the army, its weapons, and its trumpets. A ritual boundary, the *pomerium*, demarcated the city of Rome (the *urbs*) and in general *domi* (“at home”) from *militiae* (the “war zone”). Citizens might not bear arms within the

pomerium; troops were mustered outside it, on the Campus Martius. During military service, citizens were polluted by shedding the blood of the enemy; when they returned to the City, they needed to undergo purification before they could reenter it and become citizens again. Furthermore, within the city and Roman territory, citizens had the right of appeal (*provocatio*) to the people from the magistrates' use of force. *Provocatio* was waived *militiae* (in the war zone). Roman soldiers in the field thus were subject to unrestricted power of punishment.

By the fourth and third centuries BCE this ritual- governed approach to warfare appears to be waning, as the Roman army served for longer and longer periods away from Rome and campaigns no longer fit into the religious year. Accounts of discipline during the Second Punic War (218–201 BCE) show that commanders were now adopting a rational approach to discipline, based on their own leadership and personal judgment of what the situation demanded and what their men would tolerate. Scipio Africanus, who encountered a mutiny of his soldiers at Sucro (206 BCE) in Spain during the Second Punic War, was one such leader. At the time of the Punic Wars, soldiers, usually conscripted, took an oath (the *sacramentum*) to their commander not to flee or leave the line of battle except to save a comrade or strike down the foe. They also took an additional oath not to steal or pillage, with certain exceptions permitting foraging for food and fodder.

In the late Republic, from the second century BCE onward, the decline in recruits' social status of origin created a greater gulf between the officer corps (drawn from the Roman nobility) and the soldiers. Soldiers were more vulnerable to their officers, illustrated by sexual scandals within the army, in which officers were accused and tried for raping young soldiers (Valerius Maximus 6.1.10–11). Roman men's homosexual behavior was accepted, but being subjected to homosexual rape was effeminizing and socially unacceptable. In Marius' army, a young soldier named Trebonius killed a superior officer who made homosexual advances toward him. Instead of punishing Trebonius, Marius rewarded him for defending his manhood. *Virtus* (manliness) prevailed over discipline in this instance (Valerius Maximus 6.1.12; Plutarch, *Marius* 14).

Discipline may have become harsher in the late republican army as a result of the recruitment of the *capite censi*. It is in this period, rather than earlier, that most instances of decimation are recorded (despite Polybius

6.39). However, some commanders, most famously Marius, made a greater personal effort to bridge the social gulf by bonding with their soldiers.

Concern over materialistic aspects of discipline—soldiers’ pay, benefits, and expenditures—increased in the late Republic and in the imperial era. Soldiers recruited from the landless *capite censi* were dependent on the army’s pay and benefits, provided by their generals; when those generals waged civil wars, as did Marius and Sulla, Caesar and Pompey, and the triumvirs, their soldiers profited at the expense of citizens. Sulla and the Second Triumvirs confiscated land from their enemies to distribute to their veterans. As a result, civilians disapproved of soldiers’ display of wealth and conspicuous consumption. The historian Sallust depicts Sulla’s veterans as unsuccessful farmers, accustomed to living beyond their means and soon indebted; out of greed they supported the conspiracy of Catiline (63 BCE) (Sallust, *Bellum Catilinae* 16, 28). Popular anecdotes of military discipline emphasized austerity.

The emperors placed even greater emphasis on discipline as a message to the army and populace that the age of civil warfare had ended. Augustus enforced discipline with great severity, and did not allow personnel, even senatorial officers, many privileges (Suetonius, *Augustus* 24–5). In contrast with the armies of the Republic, the imperial army also faced the problem of long-term service and, over time, stationary or near-stationary bases and the interactions of soldiers and civilians. In the last years of his reign, Augustus also retained legionaries in service past their time of discharge (20 years) to avoid paying additional pensions.

By the death of Augustus in 14 CE, the legionaries on the Rhine and Danube were unhappy with their continued service and mutinied. Tacitus depicts elderly soldiers pointing out their gray hair and missing teeth to Germanicus, Tiberius’ probable successor and the imperial commander sent to put down the Rhine mutiny (Tacitus, *Annals* 1.34). The mutinies died down without extreme reprisals by Germanicus and Drusus, Tiberius’ son. During the mutinies the soldiers, expelling their aristocratic officers and centurions, continued to organize and perform routine activities; when they repented of the mutiny, they took the initiative of punishing the ringleaders themselves. Tiberius made minor concessions to the mutinous soldiers.

The next phase of serious unrest was the “War of Four Emperors” (68–69 CE) which displays the tension between the ideal of discipline and the reality of imperial patronage of the army. The emperor Galba, a rigid and old-

fashioned patrician, sought to impose ideal discipline, decimating a new legion of former fleet soldiers for impertinence and refusing the praetorians a donative (Tacitus, *Histories* 1.5). The praetorians assassinated Galba and installed Otho as emperor, who had won them over with donatives and patronage (Tacitus, *Histories* 1.23). Partly through the intrigue of his legates Aulus Caecina and Fabius Valens, Vitellius was acclaimed emperor by his soldiers in Lower Germany. Tacitus claims that Vitellius' excessively profuse indulgence of his soldiers earned their contempt (Tacitus, *Histories* 2.93–4).

Later mutinies and assassinations also had a similar motivation: the troops (usually the praetorians) were displeased with emperors who sought to impose strict discipline. The praetorians murdered Pertinax for doing so in 193 CE. Coups also had a similar structure: a usurper appealed to the material interests of the soldiers, exemplified by the praetorians' "auction of the empire" in 193 CE, in which the imperial candidates Didius Julianus and Sulpicianus competed in offering larger donatives. Septimius Severus took steps to defuse the Praetorian Guard as a source of political instability, disbanding the Italian guardsmen and replacing them with Danubians (Cassius Dio 74[75].2.4–6). Nonetheless, similar revolts and coups continued through most of the third century CE.

Despite these sensational crises, most emperors and senatorial commanders tried to strike some balance between ideal strict discipline and patronage of the army: they might compensate for strictness with personal leadership, setting an example in enduring hardship on campaign. Emperors might provide patronage not through donatives, which they sought to routinize as gifts marking imperial accessions and other holidays, but through legal privileges or access to the emperor's and his experts' legal advice (not always in soldiers' favor).

In the second and early third centuries CE, some aspects of discipline became formalized as military law, including imperial edicts, emperors' and jurists' legal advice, and handbooks on military law, excerpted in Justinian's Digest (part of the Codex Justinianus). In keeping with elite tradition, the jurists prescribed severe military discipline; many offenses, especially in the field and before the enemy, were punished with death, especially desertion to the enemy, flight from battle, causing a mutiny, or striking a superior officer. In this respect the Roman army was similar to other ancient and early modern armies: European and Anglo-American militaries did not abolish capital punishments until the twentieth century. In the Roman army,

short of capital punishment, individual punishments might entail corporal punishment, fatigues, demotion in rank, transfer to an inferior branch of the service (from legion to *auxilia* or from *auxilia* to fleet), or dishonorable discharge, forfeiting veteran benefits and privileges. As an ultimate group punishment, entire units might be disbanded, to punish them for mutiny or a disgraceful defeat. However, the jurists are also more lenient concerning the definition of desertion, distinguishing it from absence without leave due to circumstances such as travel difficulties or family emergencies.

Bureaucratic documents from Roman Egypt, Dura-Europos (a third-century military base on the Euphrates), and Roman Britain attest the army's management of soldiers' pay, equipment and provisions, assignment of tasks, furlough, and records of troop numbers. These documents helped the army enforce military discipline in a rational way by distributing soldiers' benefits and responsibilities fairly and creating an objective record. Some documents recorded military personnel's daily departures and returns on assigned tasks; others are petitions for furlough, in which soldiers requested permission for leave from their commanding officer. A soldier granted furlough might be given a pass that he could display on his journey. These reflect the army's concern to discourage absence without leave and desertion.

A particularly fraught aspect of discipline was military-civilian relations. With permanent military bases and the development of the surrounding regions, soldiers interacted more with civilian subjects. Civilians complained of military abuses, particularly forced requisition or extortion of lodging and transport animals. In satirical sources such as Juvenal's *Sixteenth Satire*, soldiers are depicted as casually violent toward civilians. Some emperors attempted to redress these injustices, answering petitions from victimized civilian communities. However, the basic reality was that a Roman soldier (especially the more prestigious praetorian or legionary) was an agent of the imperial power and was empowered to wield force. The army was probably more resented in some provinces, such as Britain and Judaea, with a history of revolt.

In the later Roman Empire military discipline's punishments became harsher, probably reflecting increased conscription to fill the ranks of an army enlarged by Diocletian (284–305). Fourth- and fifth-century CE legal sources show that recruits were tattooed to discourage desertion and that deserters might be burned alive. However, Theodosius I's recruitment of

federate troops on a large scale meant that these troops, organized and commanded by their native leaders, were not subject to Roman discipline.

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See also Army in Politics; Civil-Military Relations; Civil Wars I (49–45 BCE); Civil Wars (II) (44–31 BCE); Documentary Sources; Emperor as Patron; Marius; Military Law; Military Oaths; Mutiny; Praetorians; Religion and Warfare; Rhine and Pannonian Mutinies; Training; *Virtus*; War of Four Emperors

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Military Intelligence

Modern military intelligence separates strategic intelligence, which is long-range and features general knowledge of enemy nations, their material and human resources, and their political and military goals, from tactical intelligence, which concerns the disposition and movements of the enemy in the field. A modern nation is also likely to maintain numerous intelligence agencies, civil and military, staffed by knowledgeable professionals. In contrast, the literature available to Greek and Roman elites on foreign peoples often offered little useful information. In the Republic, there appears to have been no professional intelligence service. The Roman Republic's military intelligence was collected on an ad hoc basis, dependent largely on the talents of individual generals and on their personal connections. With

the proliferation of military occupational specialties in the Principate, some low-ranking officers, termed *exploratores* or scouts, as well as the all-purpose staff or *beneficiarii* associated with provincial governors, may have specialized in intelligence. Spying within the empire to maintain internal security, repress dissent, and prevent or detect revolt is better attested. The spies, termed *frumentarii* or *agentes in rebus*, were much feared in the later empire.

Ethnography, the description of foreign peoples, was a distinct genre in Greek and Latin literature. It tended toward the sensational, especially when the peoples were too remote to be easily visited. Even when interaction with these peoples was relatively common, ethnography tended to stereotype them: the Germans were fundamentally uncivilized, not wearing clothing, practicing agriculture, or living in urban settlements; other northern barbarians lived on milk and raw meat. Greek ethnographic tradition stereotyped the Persians as effeminate and decadent. The education of Greco-Roman elites was literary, emphasizing classics; for senators, oratory was emphasized. This education could not be very useful for military intelligence, growing out of date as cultures changed. By the time of the Marcomannic Wars (166–180 CE), the Germanic Quadi had to be forbidden to cross the Danube and enter Roman markets because they might be spies for other Germanic peoples, implying that the Quadi wore clothes and resembled the local Roman citizens (Dio 71.11.3). In the mid-third century CE, the Persian Empire was reinvigorated by a new, aggressive dynasty, the Sassanids.

Somewhat more useful literature was available to the Roman elite, including *commentarii* (reports) written by Roman governors and generals. The records of the Senate were another source of information. However, even the most conscientious of Roman commanders probably faced a language barrier with peoples who did not speak Greek or Latin, and relied on translators.

In the Republic, and into the empire, strategic and tactical military intelligence collection had an ad hoc quality, depending on the initiative of individual generals. Scipio Africanus, on his arrival in Spain, collected all available information about the Carthaginians in Spain and decided that the best site to assault was New Carthage, where his examination of local geography enabled the Romans to take the city unexpectedly. Julius Caesar investigated sources of information for his invasion of Britain (Caesar,

Gallic Wars 4.20.2–4; Suetonius, *Iulius* 58.1), though he was not able to discover much and his expedition was exploratory in nature. The Senate sent out Roman embassies that collected information and probably also spied on Roman clients and foreign monarchies and peoples. Hostages were also useful sources of information. However, Roman “ambassadors” were usually distinguished senators and not specialists in any one foreign nation or people.

In the field, generals sent scouts, termed *exploratores*, ahead of the main force to investigate the location and numbers of the enemy. In the Republic, these may have been *velites* or light-armed skirmishers. Scouts and foragers might be able to capture enemy messengers. In the Second Punic War, the Romans captured messages from Hasdrubal to his brother Hannibal, enabling the Romans to surprise and defeat Hasdrubal at the battle of the Metaurus (Polybius 11.1.3–6; Livy 27.43–61). Cavalry scouts, now termed *procursatores*, continued to be used in the later empire. Deserters and refugees might be useful sources of information in the field.

In the Principate, documentary evidence suggests that some occupational specialties within the Roman army collected intelligence. The *beneficiarii consularis*, as their name suggests, were attached to the staff of provincial governors, where they assisted with bureaucracy. *Beneficiarii* were also outposted to stations near the frontiers, where they were better placed to collect information about the enemy and send it back to the provincial governor’s staff.

However, more is known about internal intelligence gathering, focused on maintaining political stability by unearthing and repressing conspiracies and revolts. In the early Principate, when both emperor and senators were based at Rome, conspiracy detection relied on delation (reporting by private individuals, usually for reward). It was probably also the task of *beneficiarii* to collect information on provincial unrest. In the middle empire, the *frumentarii*, whose official tasks included overseeing the grain supply and carrying messages, were also notorious spies, and became so unpopular that in the early fourth century CE they were replaced by the *agentes in rebus*, or “Special Agents,” who became equally unpopular.

If soldiers reported to provincial governors, it was up to the provincial governors to report to the emperor. The emperor campaigning on the frontiers, from the Dacian and Marcomannic Wars period onward, was better placed to gather and evaluate intelligence. In the later empire, the use

of imperial provincial capitals may have increased the efficiency of intelligence collection by shortening the chain of transmission. However, there were now more layers of bureaucracy.

However, Susan Mattern reminds us that in imperial strategic decision-making, deciding to go to war, value factors tended to override rational intelligence. As did the consuls in the Republic, the emperors desired the prestige of warfare (peace being considered *otium*, idleness) and the glory of victory, not to mention the possibility of wealth from plunder. The satisfaction of vengeance was another motive, if an external enemy had inflicted defeat on the Romans. The collection of intelligence was only a means to such value-determined ends.

Sara E. Phang

See also Caesar, Gaius Julius; Civil Warfare; *Princeps*, *Principales*; Principate; Scipio Africanus; Senate, Senators; Strategy; Usurpation; Victory

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Military Law

Roman military law is attested in the emperors' legal advice to soldiers and in Roman juristic treatises composed in the second and third centuries CE. Legal codes from the later Roman Empire also contain legislation that pertains to the army. However, large aspects of military discipline were customary practices or administrative rather than legal.

In the Republic and most of the first century CE, Roman military discipline, including administration and punishment, was based on custom and the commander's discretion. Consuls and promagistrate commanders (proconsul or proprætor) had *imperium militiæ*, which gave them unlimited power to command, judge, or punish their subordinates. Roman citizens in military service waived the right of appeal (*provocatio*) from the magistrate's decisions that Roman citizens possessed in civilian life. Soldiers

took an oath (*sacramentum*) to obey the commander and not desert or flee from the field of battle; other oaths, including an oath against stealing from the camp, might be administered as needed. Though Roman civil law received written form as the “Twelve Tables” in the early Republic, there may have been no written military law. Military treatises from the second century BCE onward are attested; Cato the Elder wrote one. These treatises may have contained precepts on discipline. Polybius composed a famous description of the Roman army in his *Histories*, briefly describing Roman military punishments.

Conquest brought plunder; soldiers also received pay and donatives after victories, creating a need to protect soldiers’ rights to property. Julius Caesar is said to have allowed his soldiers to make wills (though little weight can be placed on his remark in the *Gallic Wars* that his officers started making their wills when they were frightened of a German offensive). However, it is in the very late first and in the second centuries CE, when military bases had become stable and after soldiers’ pay was raised by Domitian (81–96 CE), that legal sources on military law appear.

Nerva (96–98 CE), Trajan (98–117), and Hadrian (117–138) took a new approach in providing benefits for their soldiers; instead of giving them money, which might be wasted, they provided legal privileges. (It cannot be assumed that these privileges existed earlier.) One legal privilege was the soldier’s will (*testamentum militis*). Roman citizens placed great importance on wills, in which they provided for heirs and family members and made bequests to friends. The making of a legal Roman will required many formalities, effectively excluding common soldiers, whom the Roman elite assumed to be illiterate and uneducated. The emperors passed laws enabling soldiers to make informal wills, “in any way they wish and in any way they can,” without observing the legal formalities required of civilians. In fact, many soldiers were literate, sent and received letters, and employed legal documents that have survived from Roman Egypt. Nonetheless, soldiers were unlikely to find experts in Roman law on the frontiers, other than their own legates or governors.

The second-century emperors also devised other legal privileges for soldiers, probably as an inducement to recruitment. In Roman law, the legitimate children of a male Roman citizen were “in his power” (subordinate to his legal authority) and could not own property in their own right. This was undoubtedly irksome to adult children. It was more

burdensome to Roman citizen soldiers who might serve far from their fathers' homes. The emperors allowed soldiers under paternal authority to possess a fund that they could dispose of independently of their fathers; this fund was termed *peculium castrense*. In practice, many soldiers had probably lost their fathers by the time they were in their thirties.

Soldiers were also granted other legal privileges to protect their interests while they were away from their civilian homes. They had the status of *absentes rei publicae causa*, "absent in service of the state," and were entitled to restitution of property should they suffer any losses while they were serving in the army. Citizens owed taxes to their home towns, termed *munera* (duties), including corvée labor for lower-status citizens. Soldiers were exempted from corvée labor at home while in service. Soldiers also had the right to bring criminal charges, and were protected by their status of *absentes rei publicae causa* from being summoned to appear as defendants in civilian courts.

Roman lawyers or jurists, educated men who specialized in knowledge of law, provide the surviving information about these privileges. Their analysis of these privileges is preserved in the Digest and Code of Justinian, a massive compendium of Roman law compiled in the early sixth century CE. The jurists engaged in theoretical debate and analysis, but also responded to real cases, mainly in connection with the imperial petition system in which citizens with legal problems submitted them to provincial governors and to the emperors and their juristic advisers. The governors or emperors might judge the cases themselves. Though such judgments are not identical with modern (Anglo-American) case law, the emperors' judgments (rescripts) were a source of law and were cited as such and debated by the jurists. The jurists also issued responses to legal real and theoretical problems that became a source of law.

Emperors from Trajan and Hadrian down to Caracalla, Alexander Severus, and the Gordians issued rescripts to soldiers; after that, during the crisis of the third century, emperors had little time to judge legal cases. With the restoral of stability, Diocletian (284–305) and Constantine (306–337) began to judge legal cases again and issued edicts concerning soldiers and veterans. Though the emperors acted as patrons of the army in the sense of giving their soldiers access to legal advice, they did not always judge in the favor of military personnel and might reprove individual soldiers sternly in their rescripts. For example, the emperors stated that deserters from the

army were not entitled to the privileges of veterans. In less obvious instances, the emperors did tend to judge in favor of soldiers and their comrades and against those “not known to [them] from military service,” such as family members or spouses.

Jurists from the late second and early third century CE also wrote theoretical treatises on military law and military affairs that have been excerpted in the Digest. These works were prescriptive rather than responses or judgments in real instances. They reflect the view of the Roman elite that the army should be subject to severe discipline. However, especially on desertion and prisoners of war, the excerpts from these treatises show an awareness of the complexity of real-life situations. Roman prisoners of war (that is, Roman citizens captured by the enemy) were presumed to be enslaved and lost their citizen status, with numerous legal consequences; if they escaped and reentered Roman territory, they had to apply for the restoral of their citizenship.

The legal codes pertaining to the fourth century CE and later, the Codex Theodosianus and parts of the Code of Justinian, attest to military law and discipline. They show the standards of discipline had become harsher, mainly to discourage desertion, and also show a tendency to micro-management, including regulations for watering horses downstream from military camps.

Sara E. Phang

See also Caesar, Gaius Julius; Cato the Elder; Desertion; Emperor as Patron; Hadrian; Military Discipline; Military Oaths; Military Treatises; Nerva; Trajan

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Military Oaths

To help maintain the loyalty of soldiers and their obedience to their field commanders and officers and ultimately to the state, the Romans imposed various oaths on the army. The most prominent oath was the *sacramentum militiae*, or military oath of loyalty. The origins of the *sacramentum* remain obscure although it may have originally developed out of religious law.

Ancient writers provide important clues to its content. First and foremost, the *sacramentum* required soldiers to follow orders and not desert their posts (Dionysius, *Roman History* 10.18.2; Servius *ad Aeneidem* 1.257, 8.1). Second, the *sacramentum* compelled the loyalty of the soldiers. In doing this it mirrored Rome's political development. During the Republic the *sacramentum* was a public expression of fidelity to the Republic and its representatives on campaign, the consuls (Polybius 6.21.1–4). In the late Republic ambitious generals such as Sulla, Cinna, and Caesar required their soldiers to swear the *sacramentum* to them personally as opposed to the Republic (Plutarch, *Sulla* 27.3; Appian, *Civil Wars* 1.66). This practice continued during the imperial period when the *sacramentum* demanded that soldiers be loyal to the emperor alone, follow all orders given in his name, never desert his service, and be prepared to die for Rome (Vegetius, *Military Affairs* 2.5).

It is clear that the *sacramentum* was taken very seriously. The *sacramentum* was honored above all other oaths and punishments for breaking it, whether through disobeying orders or deserting, were very serious and could include execution (Dionysius, *Roman History* 11.43; Ammianus 26.7.9). Herodian goes as far as to call the *sacramentum* the “sacred secret” of the empire (Herodian 8.7.4).

Originally the *sacramentum* was taken by the levied troops at the beginning of the individual campaign and most probably expired when the campaign was completed. Later in the republican period the *sacramentum* was sworn at the beginning of each New Year. In the imperial period the *sacramentum* was administered on three distinct occasions. First, all soldiers swore the *sacramentum* immediately upon enlisting in the army (Vegetius,

Military Affairs 2.5). This oath covered their entire period of service, after which a soldier would be formally released from the *sacramentum* (*PSI* 1026 l.5–11; *Codex Theodosianus* 7.1.4). Second, the *sacramentum* was administered at the beginning of each new emperor's reign (*Herodian* 8.7.4–7; *Ammianus* 21.5.10). Third, the *sacramentum* was renewed yearly, either on the third of January or on a date important to the reigning emperor—most likely the anniversary of his accession (*dies imperii*) (*Pliny the Younger, Letters* 10.52, 100–101).

In the imperial period the *sacramentum* was sworn by all Roman soldiers, irrespective of the type of unit they served in (*Vegetius, Military Affairs* 2.3, 5). It was also sworn by all officers, including those of the highest rank (*Ammianus* 21.5.1, 26.7.4; *Orosius* 7.34).

Other oaths bound the loyalty of Roman soldiers in the republican period. When on campaign soldiers also swore a range of other oaths—individually each of these oaths is usually referred to as an *ius iurandum*. *Livy* says that before the battle of Cannae in 216 BCE the soldiers swore an *ius iurandum* designed to guarantee their conduct in the upcoming battle. This oath, which previously was only a voluntary agreement among the men, demanded that the troops “not run away in flight or out of fear, and not leave their ranks except to pick up their weapons or to look for them, or to attack an enemy or defend a citizen” (*Livy* 22.38.2–5). Pompeian troops are also recorded as swearing additional *iura iuranda* relating to loyalty during the civil war with Caesar (*Caesar, Civil War* 1.76.2–3, 3.13.2). However, the exigencies of civil war and usurpation meant that the *sacramentum* or *ius iurandum* were not permanently binding. In civil war, it was not uncommon for soldiers from one side to go over to the other side, especially when defeated, and swear oaths to their new commanders or rulers.

More generally, oath taking was an important part of Roman military culture and helped to regulate the behavior of Roman soldiers on a day-to-day basis. Roman soldiers swore oaths governing their conduct in relation to theft and pillage on campaign (*Polybius* 6.33.1; *Gellius* 16.4.2–4). Even the mundane routine of camp life was governed by oaths. For example, one oath taken by the troops forbade the theft of property within a camp while another oath, sworn at the beginning of each day saw the troops recite that “we will do what has been ordered and are ready for all orders” (*Dura Papyri* 47).

Ancient evidence for military oaths sworn by Roman soldiers is sporadic and incomplete and consequently there is much to discover regarding their development, content and significance.

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See also Army in Politics; *Dilectus*; Military Discipline; Mutiny

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Military Treatises

Although the Romans lacked a formal method of military education, like the Greeks before them, they did produce a body of didactic literature on the topic. Their earliest texts on military science were by experienced soldiers. Cato the Elder and Polybius both authored military manuals in the second century BCE. Unfortunately they are lost. Among extant works by such men we have Frontinus' late first century CE *Stratagems* (*Strategemata*) that is a collection of anecdotes of successful ploys organized by topic. In the mid-second century the historian and Roman governor Arrian composed both a *Tactica* and his *Ectaxis contra Alanos*. The *Tactica* is an account of the Hellenistic phalanx as well as contemporary cavalry tactics and training. Despite its apparent antiquarianism, the *Tactica* includes references to contemporary opponents noted for their use of heavy cavalry, such as the Alans, against whom such massed infantry formations would be effective. Likewise, the *Ectaxis contra Alanos* describes phalanx formations against the Alans, with whom Arrian had to deal as governor of Cappadocia ca. 135

CE.

Philosophers, antiquarians, and rhetoricians added to the body of this literature that would have been available to Roman soldiers and statesmen. In the first century BCE, Asclepiodotus wrote a *Tactics* on the phalanx and Onasander dealt with a commander's responsibilities in his first-century CE *The General*. Aelian's early second-century CE work on the Hellenistic phalanx appears to have either inspired or shared a source with Arrian's *Tactica*, and Polyaeus composed a late second-century *Strategems*, which includes exploits by gods and heroes as well as historical anecdotes. Although these authors were lacking in practical experience, their works may preserve practical details gleaned from earlier writers and they seem to have assumed that their works would be taken seriously.

More technically oriented authors also treated the fields of military engineering and artillery. In the Augustan period Vitruvius, who had been a military engineer, included a section in *On Architecture* that dealt with siegecraft and engines. The *On Siege Engines* of Vitruvius' contemporary, the philosopher Athenaeus Mechanicus, has certain similarities and they may have shared a source. In the first century CE, Hero of Alexandria composed his *On the Construction of Artillery*. Although somewhat antiquarian in character, it is a clear discussion of the development and construction of Hellenistic siege engines. His fragmentary *Cheiroballistra* provides the technical design of a more modern, metal framed artillery piece. In the early second century CE, Apollodorus of Damascus, a military engineer and architect of Trajan, composed his *Siegecraft* which treats the tactics and techniques of assaulting fortifications.

This genre of literature remained vital through the later empire. The fourth-century CE anonymous treatise, *De Rebus Bellicis*, includes a number of military reforms and designs for new weapons, some of which are oddly impractical. Vegetius, a member of the imperial bureaucracy, composed an *Epitome of Military Science* (titled *Military Affairs* in this work) in the late fourth or early fifth century CE. The work is a prescriptive amalgam of previous writers intended to guide improvements in current practice. Even after the fall of the western empire in 476 CE, writers in the Byzantine east continued to produce such works for centuries.

Joseph R. Frechette

See also Cato the Elder; *De Rebus Bellicis*; Frontinus; Polybius; Strategy;

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Milo, Titus Annius (d. 48 BCE)

Titus Annius Milo (Papianus), the son of Gaius Papius Celsus, but adopted by his maternal grandfather, Titus Annius Luscus, first appeared in Roman politics in the 50s. He supported Pompey and thus opposed Publius Clodius, a disruptive politician with links to Julius Caesar. As tribune in 57, Milo worked for the recall of Cicero, whom Clodius had had exiled. Each organized street gangs to combat the other, and laid prosecutions against the other. Milo was praetor in 55 and a candidate for the consulship of 52, hoping for support from Pompey, which he did not receive; Clodius was seeking a praetorship at the same time. In January 52, the two confronted each other with their gangs near Bovillae, and in the melee Clodius was killed.

Because of political disruption, the year 52 had begun without consuls, till eventually Pompey was made sole consul. Under a law of Pompey against public violence, Milo was prosecuted for Clodius' murder. Cicero defended him, but because the supporters of Clodius heckled the trial and threatened violence, Cicero did not speak with his usual skill. With his guilt evident, Milo was condemned and went into exile at Massilia. Cicero composed an expanded version of the defense he would have delivered—the speech known as the *Pro Milone*. When Milo read his copy, he said that if Cicero had delivered that version, he would not now be enjoying the fine fish of Massilia.

When Caesar took control of Rome, Milo was the only person excluded from his general amnesty. He joined Caelius Rufus in an uprising against Caesar in Italy in 48, but was killed in fighting near Thurii.

Bruce Marshall

See also Cicero; Civil Conflict; Clodius Pulcher

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Milvian Bridge, Battle of the (312 CE)

On October 28, 312 CE, Constantine I (306–337) defeated his rival Maxentius (306–312) near the Milvian Bridge over the Tiber, north of Rome's walls. Constantine led perhaps 35–40,000 veterans, primarily infantry, including Germanic *cornuti*. The 313 *Panegyric of Constantine Augustus* reports 100,000 under Maxentius, but this seems an exaggeration, or perhaps a total for all forces available to him. Maxentius had more heavy cavalry, but the armies were probably numerically matched on the day of the battle.

Both Constantine and Maxentius were sons of Tetrarchs and had usurped the purple, helping to destroy the Tetrarchy, Diocletian's partnership of four emperors. Constantine's imperial ambitions had little room for rivals, and in 312 he invaded Italy. He cut through Maxentius' praetorian forces in the Po Valley and at the hard-fought siege of Verona. As Constantine approached Rome, Maxentius destroyed the Milvian bridge, intending to withstand a siege (as he had done twice before), but then—perhaps because of unrest in Rome—decided to cross the river on a temporary pontoon bridge. The battle was a decisive victory for Constantine. Though contemporary and later accounts differ in detail, Maxentius' army was quickly routed and was chased to the river. The pontoon bridge collapsed and many drowned, including Maxentius himself. Victory gave Constantine the city of Rome and complete control over the western half of the empire.

The battle's real fame comes from Constantine's vision, around which legends quickly developed. Contemporary reports differ, and modern attempts to synthesize them have never been fully successful. Lactantius (*DMP* 44) says a dream instructed Constantine to emblazon a *Chi-Rho* on his soldiers' shields; Eusebius (*VC* 1.28–9) describes a cross of light in the

sky with the famous instruction “by this conquer,” followed by an explanatory dream. The victory, apparently divinely-inspired, won Constantine’s allegiance to Christianity, and the *Chi-Rho* was quickly adopted for the army. The battle’s importance as a turning point for Constantine was thus much greater than its military importance.

Christopher Malone

See also Christianity in the Later Roman Army; Constantine I; Eusebius; Lactantius; Maxentius; Tetrarchic Civil War

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Mithridates VI of Pontus (152–65 BCE)

Mithridates VI (alternatively spelled Mithradates), one of Rome’s most determined and dangerous foes, was born in 152 BCE and assumed the throne of the small kingdom of Pontus upon his father’s death 12 years later. An ambitious, brutal, and intelligent young man, he spent his first five years on the throne subject to his mother, who was acting as regent. When he reached his seventeenth year, Mithridates imprisoned her and poisoned his brothers to consolidate his position as king. Not satisfied with ruling a small kingdom on Asia Minor’s northern coast, Mithridates embarked on a series of conquests to expand Pontic power and territory. His early campaigns in modern day Georgia and north along the eastern Black Sea drew little notice. He subdued the Scythians by 100 BCE. Then, with his northern border secure and with the help of Scythian cavalry, he marched his army south, conquering Bithynia, one of Rome’s client kingdoms. The acquisition of

Bithynia doubled Mithridates' territory but triggered the first of his three wars with Rome that ultimately cost him his throne and his life.

His first drive across Asia Minor went smoothly and quickly. The Greek city states there accepted his suzerainty and those in Greece sought his aid in overthrowing Roman dominance. Crossing the Aegean, he faced the Roman general Sulla, who defeated him at Chaeronea in 86 BCE and drove him out of Greece. Sulla then recaptured Asia Minor's coastal cities and forced Mithridates to sign a peace treaty. Mithridates broke the treaty within months of Sulla's departure for Rome. Mithridates forced the Romans to withdraw from Bithynia and unsuccessfully tried to enlist allies to drive Rome completely out of Asia Minor. Rome did not send another army against Mithridates until Lucius Licinius Lucullus took the war into Pontus. Lucullus easily defeated Mithridates, driving him into the mountains where the Pontic king conducted a 10-year guerrilla war against Roman garrisons and isolated units.

The Romans recognized that the command of the war against Mithridates required special *imperium*. Pompey had enjoyed recent success in the war against the pirates, for which he received an *imperium* that extended across provincial boundaries and for three years, though he defeated the pirates in only three months. By popular vote (the *lex Manilia*) Pompey received another extended *imperium* for the war against Mithridates in 66.

Pompey replaced Lucullus in 65 BCE and, with a larger army, drove Mithridates out of Asia Minor and up the eastern coast of the Black Sea. With his kingdom all but destroyed and his sons unwilling to continue the war, Mithridates VI, the last commander of a major Hellenistic army, fled to modern-day Kerch, where he committed suicide in late 65 BCE. Rome annexed his kingdom and all its territories.

By all accounts, Mithridates VI was a brilliant military commander who wielded his Hellenistic-style army effectively on the battlefield, using his phalanx and missile troops to fix the enemy in place while his cavalry attacked the enemy's flanks. However, tactics that worked against inflexible Hellenistic armies or cavalry-dominant opponents did not fare well against Rome's agile, flexible legions. More importantly, Mithridates lacked the diplomatic skills to draw Rome's other enemies into the fight and his practice of slaughtering resistant populations convinced his neighbors that Rome was the lesser evil. In the end, Pontus lacked the resources to defeat

Rome on its own and Mithridates' character flaws prevented him from gaining the assistance he required to win.

The Mithridatic wars were also notable on the Roman side for giving extended powers to Roman commanders, prefiguring the extended *imperium* given to Julius Caesar for the Gallic Wars, the powers of the Second Triumvirs, and the *imperium maius* of Augustus.

Mithridates was perhaps most notorious in classical antiquity and later ages for his alleged immunity to poisoning, acquired via taking small doses of poisons over a long period of time. Legendary antidotes to deadly poisons were ascribed to Mithridates by later classical, medieval, and Renaissance authors.

Carl O. Schuster

See also Asia Minor; Client Monarchs; Legion, Organization of; Lucullus; Mithridatic Revolt; Mithridatic Wars; Pompey; Sulla, Lucius Cornelius

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See Mithridatic Wars.

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Mithridatic Revolt (63 BCE)

The Mithridatic Revolt of 63 BCE was one of Rome's deadliest provincial revolts. In early 65 BCE, Mithridates VI reached the Crimea, the last remaining vestiges of his kingdom. His son Machares ruled the district and Mithridates hoped to find refuge there while he built alliances with the nearby Scythian and more distant Thracians. He hoped to rebuild his army and launch an invasion of Rome's Balkan territories from Scythian territory. As a ruler who traced his ancestry to both Persian and Macedonian kings, Mithridates hoped to draw troops from Persia, Bactria, and allied contingents from the Scythian and Thracian tribes bordering Rome's

northeastern frontier along the Black Sea's western coast. He had tried to buy time by contacting Pompey for peace terms, but the Roman general's response proved unacceptable. Probably recognizing the ploy, Pompey demanded that Mithridates come in person. The Pontic king refused and began to prepare to continue the conflict. What he did not know was that at least two of his sons and much of his royal court were opposed to any further war with Rome.

His son Machares had contacted the Roman consul Lucullus in 70 BCE and gained the consul's recognition of his authority in Crimea in exchange for client state status. Discovering the intrigue, Mithridates killed his son and took over administration of the Crimea. But the population would not have it. Resentful of his sudden imposition of new, excessive taxes to fund another war, they rose up in rebellion. The Black Sea port of Phanagoria seized three of his sons and two of his daughters. One daughter, Cleopatra, and a loyal garrison unit evacuated the city. Other garrisons along the Black Sea coast joined the rebellion. Desperate, Mithridates tried to send some of his daughters to Scythia in hopes of establishing an alliance through their marriage to tribal princes. However, his demoralized troops were no longer loyal. The princesses' escort killed the palace eunuchs accompanying them and delivered the king's daughters to Pompey. Pompey thwarted his efforts to gain an alliance with Persia.

Mithridates no longer had allies but remained defiant. He wanted to take the war to Italy and is believed to have contacted the Gauls and Spartacus, leader of the Roman slave uprising. However, Mithridates had lost touch with his troops. They had no stomach for such an enterprise and their loyalty was wavering. Both they and his son and designated successor Pharnaces were alarmed at the prospect of such a distant and desperate campaign. Pharnaces probably believed they would be lucky to hang onto their kingdom, given the extent of the rebellion underway and garrison defections to Rome. Unable to convince Mithridates to desist, he moved to overthrow his father. The conspirators were caught and tortured, but Pharnaces escaped to the Roman deserters' camp. There he convinced them and most of the army to turn against Mithridates. The king awoke to find that nearly all of the army and even most of his royal guard had joined his son. Mithridates tried to rally the troops against Pharnaces but they had lost confidence in him, having seen too many comrades die in his service and having seen him murder or execute too many retainers and family

members. They reportedly shouted that they would follow him no more. Finally recognizing his rule had ended and that his son intended to surrender him to the Romans, he had one of his guards kill him. His death ended the last major resistance to Roman rule in Anatolia and along the Black Sea's southern coast. Two decades later, Julius Caesar defeated Pharnaces in a war so brief that Caesar described it as "I came, I saw, I conquered." Ptolemaic Egypt would also fall more easily.

Carl O. Schuster

See also Armenia; Asia Minor; Client Monarchs; Lucullus; Mithridatic Wars; Persia, Arsacid; Pompey; Sertorius; Sulla, Lucius Cornelius

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Mithridatic Wars (89–84 BCE, 83–81 BCE, 73–63 BCE)

King Mithridates VI of Pontus who opposed Rome's expansion into Asia Minor, triggered the three wars that carry his name. Sometimes called Mithridates the Great, he proved to be one of Rome's most determined and dangerous Hellenistic opponents. He spent virtually his entire reign either at war with Rome or preparing for it. Ruthless and vindictive in dealings with friends and foes alike, he fought all the major Roman commanders of his era from Sulla to Pompey the Great and made or sought alliances with nearly every one of Rome's enemies.

He triggered the first Mithridatic War (89–84 BCE) by attacking the kingdom of Bithynia, a Roman client state. Several Greek city-states joined by rebelling against Roman authorities in Greece. Unfortunately for King Mithridates, his Armenian and Persian allies became bogged down in the civil conflict over the Persian succession. Roman troops quickly captured

Thrace and the province of Cappadocia in central Asia Minor. Mithridates recaptured Cappadocia in 88 BCE, slaughtering the Roman and Italian citizens in the areas he captured. His troops entered Greece that summer. Most Greek cities shifted allegiance back to Rome. Only Athens held out, falling to a Roman siege in February 86 BCE. Shortly thereafter, a Roman fleet defeated Mithridates' fleet at Tenedos. The Roman won two land battles at Chaeroneia and Orchomenus, restoring Roman rule over Greece. With Greece lost and Roman troops in Asia Minor, Mithridates signed a five-year peace agreement, restoring the prewar boundaries and paying a large indemnity.

Rome initiated the Second Mithridatic War (83–81 BCE) when Lucius Licinius Murena invaded Pontus on his own authority. Mithridates forced him to withdraw and the Roman general Sulla ordered Lucius to restore the peace. However, Mithridates continued to make alliances and preparations to drive Rome out of the Hellenistic world. His alliance with the Cilician pirates alarmed Roman authorities who had invaded the Cilician coast to end the pirates' threat to Roman shipping. Thus, regional Roman officials seized the opportunity presented in 75 BCE when the Bithynian king Nicomedes IV died without heirs, awarding his kingdom to Rome in his will. With Roman armies mobilizing along his western border and Rome heavily engaged in Gaul, Mithridates invaded Bithynia while his fleet blockaded the Roman naval bases in Asia Minor, launching the third and final Mithridatic War (73–63 BCE). Five Roman legions under Lucius Licinius Lucullus drove Mithridates into lesser Armenia while Marcus Aurelius Cotta secured the coast. Lucullus then invaded Armenia, defeating king Tigranes the Great's army at Tigranocerta in October 69 BCE. Armenia's ally Persia was in no position to send aid, since its army was fighting off an invasion from Bactria. Lucullus defeated the Armenian king again in late 68 BCE but a mutiny saved the kingdom from conquest. Mithridates and Tigranes used the respite to recapture some of their lost territories.

Fresh from his victories in Gaul, Pompey the Great gained command and resumed the offensive in 65 BCE, defeating Mithridates and forcing him to flee to the Caucasus. Pompey then forced Tigranes to become a Roman client monarch. He then pursued Mithridates through the Caucasus to Panticapaeum, where Mithridates murdered his own son to take the throne. The city's population rebelled, allowing the Roman troops to enter in the summer of 63 BCE. Mithridates had his bodyguards slay him by the sword.

The Mithridatic Wars marked the beginning of the end of Hellenistic domination of the Middle East. The remaining Hellenistic kingdoms would fall over the next 20 years. The wars also brought Asia Minor and all but a small portion of the Black Sea coast under Roman authority. Armenia would become a major source of Roman cavalry and heavy infantry for the next 400 years, but the territorial expansion came at a cost of extending the Roman border to Persia's frontiers. With the former Hellenistic buffer states gone, Rome and later Byzantium would face almost continuous conflict along their eastern boundary until the eastern Roman or Byzantine Empire fell to the Ottoman Turks in 1453.

Carl O. Schuster

See also Lucullus; Mithridates VI; Mithridatic Revolt; Pompey; Sulla, Lucius Cornelius

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Monarchy

Deriving from the Greek *monarchia* (*monos*—one, *arche*—rule), monarchy is the rule of a community by a single individual. The early Roman state was a monarchy, odium of which shaped the republican attitude toward monarchy. The consuls and dictators displayed monarchic traits, but attempts by Roman leaders (such as Caesar or Antony) to imitate Hellenistic monarchs met with elite hostility. As a result, the first emperor, Augustus (27 BCE–14 CE), was careful to fashion his sovereignty as non-monarchic,

disguising an essential autocracy that strengthened with time.

The earliest phase of Roman history was the semi-legendary regal period (753–510 BCE). According to ancient historians, the first king was Romulus, who was himself a direct descendant of the kings of Alba Longa, descended in legend from Aeneas. Taking the title of *rex* (king), Romulus was the chief executive of the state, leading the Roman community in war, politics, and religious ceremonies. Following the death of Romulus, the council comprising the leading men of the state (the Senate) gathered to elect Romulus' successor. After an interval (*interregnum*) the Senate decided upon Numa Pompilius as Rome's second king.

Rome's kings continued to be elected by the Senate until the conventional date of 578 BCE when Servius Tullius seized the throne by force from his father-in-law Lucius Tarquinius Priscus. Servius Tullius was later assassinated in turn by Lucius Tarquinius Superbus (Tarquin the Proud), the son or grandson of Lucius Tarquinius Priscus. According to Roman legend, the patience of the Romans with the excesses and arrogance demonstrated by the Tarquins finally ended in 510 BCE, when Tarquin the Proud's son Sextus Tarquinius raped Lucretia, a Roman noblewoman. Lucretia's husband, Lucius Tarquinius Collatinus, along with Lucius Junius Brutus led the Roman people in revolt against the Tarquins and drove them and the monarchy out of Rome.

With the expulsion of the Tarquins, the Roman Republic was born, and its heart was a deep-seated hatred of monarchy. A new governmental system was required that could incorporate the powers and responsibilities the kings had held, while ensuring that the Roman state could never again be threatened by the ambitions of a single individual. Thus, the joint office of the consulship was instituted, whereby two senators would be elected as the leading figures of the state for a one-year period. The consuls would lead the armies in war, and adopted symbols previously held by the Roman *rex*: the 12 lictors and the *fascēs* (a bundle of sticks and an axe symbolizing the authority of the consul to execute individuals on the spot). The monarchical nature of the consulship was commented upon in antiquity, including by Polybius (6.12.1–9) and Cicero (*Laws* 3.2). In a time of crisis a dictator could be elected with supreme powers. This dictatorship was limited to six months or the duration of the crisis and the dictatorial powers were returned to the consuls upon its successful conclusion.

With the removal of the monarchy, new offices were required to take on

the sacred duties that had been performed by the king. The Romans, therefore, established a priesthood termed *rex sacrorum* (king of sacred rites), an office for life, who would be responsible for the daily religious duties. The office of *pontifex maximus*—a priesthood also for life with an accompanying college—had been established during the reign of the second Roman king, Numa Pompilius. Whereas during the time of the Roman monarchy the *pontifices* were a college of religious advisers for the king, in the Republic they became the highest religious authority in their own right, and were consulted for religious guidance in civic matters.

The Roman attitude that their republican system was superior to that of monarchy was an important element in the development of Roman political identity, and was reflected in their interactions with foreign kingdoms. However, this sense of superiority did not mean that Rome refused to engage in friendly diplomatic relations with monarchs. In their dealings with the Hellenistic world, Rome entered into alliances and worked closely with some Hellenistic kingdoms (for example, Pergamon and Ptolemaic Egypt), as well as fought against them (for example, Antigonids and Seleucids). The Romans also formed alliances with many smaller kingdoms, typically on the edge of Roman territory. These “client kingdoms” were to remain a salient component in Roman foreign policy well into the late imperial period. Despite Rome’s inherent notions of superiority over foreign forms of monarchical government, close interaction and involvement with Hellenistic monarchs had an impact upon the political aspirations of some members of Rome’s political elite. Such Romans who then tried to acquire what other Romans viewed as excessive political power and position were often accused of seeking king-like powers or *regnum*. The paranoia among Rome’s leading senators toward the threat of monarchy to the Roman state is best highlighted by the example of Caesar. By defeating his rivals in the civil war of 49–45 BCE, Caesar effectively installed himself as the figure of sole authority at Rome. This was confirmed by his adoption of monarchical trappings—including wearing triumphal dress, erecting a statue of himself alongside those of Rome’s early kings, issuing coins with his image, and possessing the right to speak first in senatorial debates—the office of dictator for life, and the failed charade undertaken by Mark Antony to crown Caesar at the Lupercalia in February 44 BCE. Caesar’s ambitions became too much for many Roman senators to bear, and on the Ides of March 44 BCE Caesar was assassinated. Although this may have removed Caesar, the threat of

monarchy was far from eradicated.

The assassination of Caesar led to a further series of civil wars, which ultimately led to the return of a monarchic regime at Rome. However, during the civil wars, the use of antimonarchic sentiment was still used as a powerful political weapon. In the build up to the final stage of the civil war between Octavian and Mark Antony, Octavian attempted to erode the popularity Antony enjoyed at Rome by depicting Antony in the image of a Hellenistic king whose ambitions were to subsume Rome into his own empire, thus stripping Rome of her own imperial possessions and threatening the existence of Roman political identity. In the “Donations of Alexandria” ceremony (34 BCE), Antony bestowed the titles “King of Kings” and “Queen of Kings” on Cleopatra’s children.

Following his final victory over Antony, Octavian found himself in the unique position of effectively being the sole ruler of the Roman world. However, Octavian had learned from his predecessors’ mistakes and was conscious of the dangers posed by the strength of Roman antimonarchic sentiment. Thus, he carefully constructed his regime through the acquisition of traditional republican powers. Octavian preferred to be called *princeps*, first citizen, rather than a monarch, and also eschewed the dictatorship that Sulla and Caesar had sullied. Second, Augustus emphasized that the powers he received, and that thus gave his regime legitimacy, were granted by the Senate itself. However, the Senate was doubtless acting at Augustus’ behest. In his *Res Gestae*, Augustus declares that the Senate granted him various civic powers; proconsular *imperium* extending over provinces with active fronts; and further titles of *pater patriae* (father of the fatherland) and *Augustus*. The name of Augustus had the advantage of conveying exalted status without actually being associated with any previous political offices.

On the death of Augustus in 14 CE, the Senate offered Augustus’ powers to Tiberius. By this time, Augustus’ regime had lasted 41 years and he had dominated Rome and Italy for much longer; few were alive to remember the old Republic, though the historian Tacitus would pen accounts containing the traditional Roman suspicion of monarchy. The turnover of the Roman elite, as senatorial families died out and families from the provinces were promoted into the Senate, also caused traditional republican antimonarchic sentiment to fade. By the later Roman Empire (from 284), the emperors were clearly autocratic. With the end of the western empire in 476 CE, Rome’s western provinces fragmented into successor kingdoms, with their

respective rulers adopting the title of *rex* (king), something Rome's emperors had never done, hence marking the transition from empire to post-Roman states.

Monarchy is a central concept in understanding the political history and character of Rome. Although originally founded as a monarchy, Rome took great pride in having overthrown the tyranny and decadence of her kings and establishing a Republic. The pride the Romans took in their Republic made them suspicious of individuals who acquired too much power. However, as Rome's empire increased, so did the ambitions of Rome's most powerful individuals. Civil war broke out and would rage on and off until only a single victor remained. With Augustus' success, Rome's republican traditions were subsumed into a new monarchical system, one that was careful to merge old and new, and to create a clear sense of political and cultural continuity.

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See also Augustus; Brutus (Junius Brutus, Marcus); Caesar, Dictatorship of; Caesar, Gaius Julius; Client Monarchs; Overthrow of the Monarchy; *Princeps*, Principate; Republic, Political Structure

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Monomachy (Single Combat)

In contrast with early modern Europe and the early United States, where civilians used duels to resolve private disputes, ancient Greek and Roman

monomachy (dueling or more properly single combat) is confined to a military context, as a contest of champions held before pitched battle or during a siege. Typically, a notable warrior from one army would declare his readiness to fight a member of the opposing army in single combat. The opposing army then volunteered a champion, and the two champions would fight in the space between the battle lines (or outside the besieged city's walls). The outcome of the single combat did not necessarily determine the outcome of the conflict or even prevent the battle itself.

Nonetheless, such formal combats are distinct from informal instances of hand-to-hand combat in normal battle. Many such informal combats occurred simultaneously as the battle fluctuated. In the latter case, if the Roman commander could engage and defeat an enemy leader in hand-to-hand combat and despoil him of his armor, the Roman commander claimed the enemy leader's armor as a renowned prize, the so-called *spolia opima* or "rich spoils." Vignettes of individual soldiers' hand-to-hand combat with the enemy are frequent in Roman narratives of battles, including Caesar's *Gallic Wars*.

The most famous Roman monomachy is probably that of the Roman Horatii (three brothers, all named Horatius) with their Latin enemies, the Curiatii brothers (Livy 1.24–26). This combat belongs to the semi-legendary mid-seventh century BCE, but over 30 single combats are recorded during the Republic. Many of these accounts still belong to the relatively "legendary" early Republic. In another famous single combat, Titus Manlius Torquatus won the surname "Torquatus" ("necklet-wearer") from the golden necklet he took from the Gaul whom he slew in single combat (Livy 7.9.6–11). In 340 BCE, Torquatus put to death his own son, also named Titus Manlius Torquatus, for disobeying orders to remain in the battle line. The son had advanced to fight a member of the enemy in single combat (Livy 8.7.1–22).

Nonetheless, some monomachies were witnessed or at least recorded by contemporary writers. The combat of Scipio Aemilianus (the adopted grandson of Scipio Africanus) with a Celtiberian champion in Spain in 154/3 is recorded by Polybius (Polybius 35.5.1–2; Appian, *Spanish Wars* 53). Scipio defeated the Celtiberian champion and increased his own reputation for courage, probably contributing to his subsequent success in gaining the command of the Third Punic War.

Scipio Aemilianus was not the last Roman noble to fight a single combat. Single combats occurred in the last century BCE, down to the

combat of the Caesarian Antistius Turpio with the Pompeian Quintus Pompeius Niger before the battle of Munda in 45 BCE ([Caesar] *Spanish War* 25.3–5).

Monomachy showcased the Roman military ideal of *virtus* (courage), which both nobles and common soldiers could display. However, the single combat was potentially disruptive to military discipline and remained exceptional. More routine ways of displaying *virtus* were the display of military decorations and of honorable wounds.

Sara E. Phang

See also Elite Participation; Manlius Torquatus, Titus; Military Decorations; Military Discipline; Munda, Battle of; Scipio Aemilianus; *Virtus*

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Mons Graupius, Battle of (83 or 84 CE)

Mons Graupius is arguably the most famous battle in the history of Roman Britain. It was fought at an unknown site in Scotland and marked the culmination of the seventh northern campaign by Gnaeus Julius Agricola in 83 or 84 CE. Mons Graupius' fame is due to the valuable description of the battle recorded by Tacitus in his biography of Agricola.

According to Tacitus, Agricola undertook a series of campaigns to consolidate and expand Roman territory in Britain from 77 CE. By 82 CE, his army had advanced through eastern Scotland beyond the Forth and established a series of marching camps. The following summer campaign saw the climactic battle between Roman and Caledonian forces at Mons Graupius. Tacitus states that the Caledonians assembled a force of more than 30,000 warriors, presumably made up of a coalition of tribes, to face Agricola's army. Although the Caledonians had a number of different leaders, Tacitus highlights the role played by Calgacus and assigns him a famous prebattle exhortation.

The core of Agricola's army was formed by 8,000 auxiliary infantry, who were flanked by an additional 3,000 cavalry troopers. Agricola retained his legionary troops in the rear where they were drawn up in front of the camp ramparts. The Caledonian force occupied the hillside, although their front line was posted on the lower ground facing the Roman lines. The area between the two armies contained Caledonian charioteers.

Massively outnumbered, Agricola had little choice but to expand his front line to prevent his army from being outflanked. Battle commenced with an artillery exchange. Agricola launched his infantry attack by advancing four cohorts of Batavians and two cohorts of Tungrians. These auxiliary troops were well drilled and experienced swordsmen. They forced the Caledonian front line to fall back from the plain and retreat up the hillside. Seeing the enemy in retreat, Agricola ordered his remaining auxiliary troops forward. The Roman cavalry neutralized the Caledonian charioteers. A brief Caledonian attempt to attack Agricola's forces in the rear was repulsed by a reserve cavalry force and prompted the chaotic and disorderly rout of the Caledonian army. The killing of retreating tribesmen continued until nightfall.

If Tacitus is to be fully believed, the scale of Agricola's victory at Mons Graupius was astonishing. Of the Caledonians 10,000 were killed during the battle and its immediate aftermath. Only 360 Roman deaths were recorded, the most senior of whom was Aulus Atticus, an auxiliary prefect. Some scholars have argued that Gaius Julius Karus, an equestrian officer who was highly decorated for his role in the "British war" may have been rewarded for his actions at Mons Graupius (*L'Année Épigraphique* 1951, 88). For his commanding role, Agricola was awarded triumphal ornaments and a public statue by the emperor Domitian.

Although a large number of potential sites have been linked to Mons Graupius, in the absence of archaeological evidence the location of the battle remains unknown. Tacitus' description of Mons Graupius suggests that auxiliaries were being deployed in combat in preference to legionaries (Tacitus, *Agricola* 35, *citra Romanum sanguinem*), a depiction that has drawn some debate from scholars of the *auxilia*.

Jonathan Eaton

See also Agricola; *Auxilia*; Britain, Conquest of; Britain, Roman; Domitian; Scotland; Tacitus

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Munda, Battle of (45 BCE)

The battle of Munda took place in March 45 BCE between the forces of Caesar and those of the Pompeian generals Gnaeus Pompeius (the late Pompey's eldest son) and Titus Labienus, near the town of Munda in Spain. It was the final major battle in Caesar's Civil War.

The forces that met at Munda were significant on both sides; however, the Pompeian forces outnumbered Caesar's considerably. Caesar claims to have had 80 cohorts (approximately 38,000 men) against Pompeius' 13 legions (approximately 62,000 men). Caesar also had a large number of cavalry, which he claims numbered 8,000. This is especially significant because of the vital role they would play in the proceeding battle. Though Caesar's men were fewer in number, they had the advantage of being veterans of many successful battles, and thus of high morale under their victorious general. The Pompeians were facing what would turn out to be their final attempt at gaining a significant victory against Caesar, and so their soldiers may have lacked morale for that reason. Furthermore, their generals did not share the same record of victory as Caesar, even though Labienus was a former legate in Caesar's army during the Gallic Wars.

The forces met on a plain that was sloped in favor of the Pompeian forces, thus, the Caesareans were fighting a literal uphill battle, as they did at Ilerda four years earlier. The clash is described as being a markedly even contest that was very hard fought. Caesar's right wing, the place of honor in all armies, was occupied by his tenth legion, as was his usual practice. The tenth were particularly noted for being very reliable and effective in battle, and this battle was no different. They had begun to push back Pompey's left

wing, which required him to reinforce the wing with soldiers from his right. In doing so, he weakened his right to the extent where they felt great pressure from Caesar's forces. Furthermore, the situation for his left wing, though reinforced, was hardly improved.

The turning point came when King Bogud of Mauretania, who had supplied Caesar's forces with a large number of allied cavalry, decided to outflank the clashing forces and direct an attack on Pompey's camp. Seeing this, Labienus decided to take action against Bogud and protect the camp. However, because the Pompeian forces were already hard pressed and probably had wavering morale, when they witnessed Labienus falling back toward the camp, they assumed that he was retreating. This, in turn, caused the soldiers to lose heart and break into a rout. They soon found out that Labienus was not actually retreating, but by then it was too late. Some soldiers managed to fend off their attackers or find refuge within the town of Munda, but many were killed in the rout and the battle was lost for the Pompeians.

Though casualty figures in the ancient sources tend to be exaggerated, there are claims of upward of half of Pompey's forces having been killed in the battle, whereas only 1,000 dead are claimed for Caesar's forces. Among the dead were Labienus and Attius Varus, the Roman governor of Africa who also fought against Caesar.

It is possible that if Caesar had lost at Munda, the civil war would have turned in favor of the Pompeians. Instead, the battle of Munda enabled Caesar to become dictator for life, though he would only hold that title for another year before being assassinated.

Adam Anders

See also Caesar, Gaius Julius; Civil Wars (I) (49–45 BCE); Pompey; Spanish Wars

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Mutina, Battle of. See Civil Wars (II) (44–31 BCE)

Mutiny

The Roman military of the Republic was a citizen militia. Generally, men were drafted in the *dilectus* and took an oath (*sacramentum*) to serve the commander for the duration of the current fighting season or war. The oath seems to have included language that the soldier would remain disciplined and obedient. Even after Marius' reforms introduced volunteers from among the poor to augment the *dilectus*, citizen recruits continued to take the oath to serve and remain obedient for the duration of the war. Soldiers were not fully professionalized yet. Also, although these post Marian legions have occasionally been called client-armies due to the appearance of soldiers having been more loyal to their generals than the state, the reality was that such loyalty was the exception rather than the norm during the late Republic. Despite these facts, late republican legions had a reputation for strict, effective discipline.

The military of the empire was a fully professional military. Augustus reformed the army, making it a mostly volunteer, long-term service army. With the exception of emergencies, this remained the case for the first two centuries. All soldiers signed up for fixed terms of service and when they retired they received a cash retirement bonus. During the later empire, in addition to volunteers, soldiers were eventually required by Diocletian's reforms to follow their fathers into the military. Soldiers still took an oath that included language that the soldier would remain disciplined and obedient.

Any army that requires discipline to maintain order and ensure its effectiveness in combat will by nature occasionally experience incidents of indiscipline or military unrest. Types of military unrest include military conspiracy (usurpation when it succeeded), mutiny, expressions of grievances, and insubordination, which includes desertion. Insubordination in all its manifestations was the most common form of indiscipline. Mutiny was not the most dangerous type of military unrest as usurpation had a much greater potential for widespread instability and death of leadership.

Despite being less common and less dangerous than some other forms of unrest, because of mutiny's notoriety and the attention that sources for the Republic devote to such incidents, it merits singular attention as a phenomenon. Mutiny is defined as collective, violent (actual or threatened) opposition to established, regular military authority. Not every ancient army was sufficiently regularized with established regulations and penalties for a term such as "mutiny" to apply, but Roman military discipline was sufficiently regular that the term can be applied to numerous incidents in the military history of the Republic.

In theory, mutiny and other forms of military unrest should not have been a threat to the state. Because soldiers were trained to fight, could often be armed, and were accustomed to working together, they represented a much greater threat when they engaged in collective unrest than did typical crowds of nonsoldiers. In addition to its potential for violence, mutiny damaged military order in the units where it occurred and could even undermine discipline among military units that did not participate; therefore, it was a great threat to military stability. The nature of political leadership and army command during the Roman Republic meant that mutiny was not a direct threat to the stability of the state. Soldiers mutinied against their officers, not against Rome itself. During the empire, however, changes in leadership and command contributed to the potential that a mutiny could be a direct threat to the stability of the state. The fact that the military was so critical to the success of the Principate as well as the survival of individual emperors meant collective indiscipline was potentially more threatening.

Roman authors usually blamed mutinies on soldiers' idleness and/or the "madness" of soldiers. Some authors blamed ambitious officers for instigating mutinies. Republican-era mutinies were not limited to the regular soldiers. Centurions became involved in most mutinies and occasionally even tribunes joined, including against Cinna, Caesar, and Octavian. It is not surprising that centurions did so, since they were promoted from the ranks and were closely connected to the soldiers. One of the most infamous cases of an officer inciting mutiny among his men occurred during the first civil war when the legate Gaius Fimbria incited the men serving under Lucius Flaccus to turn mutinous in 86 BCE. While there were cases of commanders inciting indiscipline, such as Octavian's behavior after the battle of Mutina when he instigated his soldiers to march on the

Senate, most mutinies were not the result of political manipulation.

Because the imperial military was made up mostly of poor volunteers whom elite authors saw as uncouth and ill-educated regardless of where they were recruited and because senatorial and equestrian officers enjoyed a huge social separation from their men and so did not usually participate in mutinies it was easier for imperial authors to blame soldiers' insanity. Another common authors' excuse for indiscipline was to blame ambitious officers for instigating mutinies, especially during times of instability. Unlike the Republic, however, when such a cause was uncommon, it was a more common cause of mutiny during the empire due to the nature of individual rule.

One common reason soldiers mutinied was service conditions, including back pay, poor living conditions, and exhaustion. When the men commanded by Scipio the Elder (soon to be Africanus) mutinied at Sucro in 206 they were angry over a lack of pay. Caesar had similar trouble with his men in Spain in 49, although he was able to avoid a mutiny until the march back to Italy. The legions on the Rhine and in Pannonia that mutinied in 14 CE were angry over extended service long past the terms for which they enlisted as well as unsatisfactory retirement bonuses. When Vitellius' legions mutinied in 69, part of the reason was conditions of service in Germany. When Caesar's men mutinied at Placentia in 49 it was over exhaustion—what they perceived as unending warfare. The mutinies Pompey faced in Africa in 81 and Octavian in 36 after the battle of Naulochus were due in part to similar frustrations over continuous warfare. Some of Tiberius' soldiers in 7 CE, Titus' soldiers in 69, and Trajan's during the Dacian wars came near mutiny due to exhaustion. Another cause was political and social instability. Soldiers were not immune from the feelings of uncertainty and instability that flowed through general society in a time of political conflict. The fact that there seem to have been more mutinies during civil wars is partially due to the unstable politics, but it was also a function of the fact that we have more surviving sources for these periods so we have a more complete picture of what occurred.

Every Roman commander who fought long enough encountered a mutiny. Scipio Africanus, Lucullus, Pompey, Caesar, Antony, and Octavian all had to deal with mutinies, some of which were serious. Lucullus faced a mutiny late in his war against Mithridates VI. In addition to the mutiny already mentioned, Caesar had to resolve a mutiny at Vesontio during the

Gallic Wars and before he could go after the Pompeian resistance in Africa in 47, he had to settle a mutiny among his soldiers in Campania by discharging several legions. Antony lost two legions to mutiny in late 44. Octavian had to settle two of the largest mutinies that ever occurred in Roman forces after his victories at Naulochus and Actium. He was able to resolve both by separating the ringleaders from the rest of the force. None of these mutinies resulted in open revolt.

A brief review of some emperors' encounters with mutiny demonstrates the close relationship between emperors and mutinies. Augustus was experienced with mutinies before becoming emperor and had a couple during his reign. Tiberius' reign started with two enormous mutinies in 14 CE, but his nephew Germanicus and son Drusus resolved those. Caligula faced a near mutiny in 40 while campaigning in Gaul but defused the situation quickly. A mutiny threatened Claudius' planned invasion of Britain when the legions refused to board the ships, but they were convinced to go peacefully. Nero panicked and committed suicide at news of the mutiny (near revolt) of the Praetorian Guard and among the Spanish legions. During 68–69, Galba, Otho, and Vitellius all experienced or had incited (or both) mutinies among soldiers, all of which contributed to their respective failure. Titus faced disciplinary problems during the Jewish War in 69–70, but none of these led to serious mutinies or a threat to his command. During the late second and early third centuries, Pertinax, Macrinus, Elagabalus, and Alexander Severus, each died due to mutinies. Although our sources are poor, mutinies seem to have been the cause of death for several emperors during the chaos before 284. The reason some mutinies contributed to or caused political instability during the empire was because some emperors or their subordinates were able to restore military order quickly whereas those emperors who died were politically weak already or had relied on their legions for elevating them to the imperial throne.

Most mutinies in all periods led to no more than a commander having to meet some grievances, such as immediate discharge. Caesar and Octavian both employed a combination of appeals to discipline and concessions to resolve some mutinies. Sometimes, however, mutiny resulted in the death of officers or even a commander, as in the case of Flaccus in 86 and Cinna in 84. Octavian attempted to limit centurions and tribunes from participating in mutinies by increasing their pay and benefits in 36 to the point of

creating a social and economic gulf between the ranks. Germanicus employed a combination of appeals to discipline, punishment, and concessions to resolve the mutinies of 14 CE. Tiberius relocated some of his units that were near mutiny while Titus and Trajan used discipline and a break from fighting to resolve their close calls.

The Roman military in all periods had no policy that officers were required to follow in resolving mutiny. Officers learned by experience so if they had not seen how a mutiny might be resolved they were at a disadvantage. The oath and their power of *imperium* gave commanders great authority and latitude in maintaining discipline while they simultaneously remained aware that legionaries were citizens and so inclined to occasionally express themselves collectively and individually. As a result of having taken the *sacramentum*, any violation of discipline was theoretically punishable by death, but it was not practical to execute everyone in a mutinous legion. Also, during civil wars, officers could not afford to alienate their troops and often had to meet their demands, not punish ringleaders, or both. Cinna may have neglected this point when his men initially mutinied in 84. Sulla, Pompey, Tiberius, Germanicus, Vespasian, and Titus each ignored mutinous behavior at critical times, and the incidents resolved on their own once they had run their course. Caesar, Octavian, and Tiberius had to meet the mutinous soldiers' demands for discharge. When possible, commanders isolated the ringleaders, and the rest of the legion would usually return to order quickly, though more vigilance was needed for a while afterward. Ringleaders might be executed wholesale or decimated, as Caesar at Placentia in 49 and Antony did at Brundisium in 44 and Germanicus in 14 CE. There are reports of soldiers asking to be punished for indiscipline, but these cases were extremely uncommon and may be part of a rhetorical tradition.

The fact that Roman soldiers mutinied during the Republic and early empire does not detract from Rome's reputation as a military success, nor does it detract from the deserved fame of generals such as Caesar, Pompey, Tiberius, and Trajan. The resolution of such incidents and the restoration of order was what distinguished good commanders. The fact that no mutiny grew out of control or led on its own to revolution before 235 is a good indication of the effectiveness of Roman responses. As time passed and emperors became more beholden to their soldiers, indiscipline became a decisive contributing factor to imperial instability.

See also Army in Politics; Augustus; Caesar, Gaius Julius; Centurion (Republic); Civil Wars (I) (49–45 BCE); Civil Wars (II) (44–31 BCE); Claudius I; Donatives; Germanicus; Lucullus; Marius; Military Discipline; Military Oaths; Octavian; Pompey; Praetorians; Rhine and Pannonian Mutinies; Scipio Africanus; Sulla, Lucius Cornelius; Tiberius (Emperor); Titus; Tribune; Usurpation; Vespasian

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N

Nero (Emperor) (54–68 CE)

Nero was born on December 15, 37 CE in Antium, the son of Gnaeus Domitius Ahenobarbus and Agrippina the younger. Nero's bloodline could be traced back to both Mark Antony and Augustus, thus being a direct descendant from the first *princeps*. Nero's birth name was Lucius Domitius Ahenobarbus. It was not until the emperor Claudius I (41–54 CE) adopted him did he take the name Nero Claudius Drusus Germanicus.

When Claudius died, allegedly poisoned by Agrippina, Nero became the youngest emperor so far, acceding at the age of 17. The young ruler had a promising beginning under the guidance of the Stoic philosopher Seneca the Younger and the praetorian prefect Sextus Burrus. Nero promised to be a model emperor, resembling his ancestor Augustus, and he expressed a desire that the Senate and consuls should perform their ancestral roles. He took steps to improve public order, provided charitable distributions of food, guarded against forgery, and reformed and even attempted to abolish indirect taxes throughout the empire.

Nero's first major conflict that he encountered was with his mother, Agrippina the Younger. Her concept of the role of empress exceeded previous expectations established by the Julio-Claudians. The empress or Augusta had no formal political or military powers, but could exert great influence. Agrippina exerted her influence more assertively than usual. She employed her power to have her enemies eliminated, listened to the imperial council behind the curtains, presented herself on coins alongside the emperor, and chastised Nero for his affair with a freedwoman named Acte. Eventually Nero's tolerance of his mother's influence came to an end. Nero removed her from the imperial palace and later had her executed on

charges of conspiracy.



Aureus of Nero, the last Julio-Claudian emperor (r. 54–68 CE), ca. 66–67 CE. The revolts of Vindex and Galba caused Nero's support at Rome to collapse; he fled Rome and committed suicide in June 68, resulting in the War of Four Emperors (69). Located in the Yale University Art Gallery, New Haven, Connecticut. (Christopher Gardner/Yale University Art Gallery)

Under Nero, only a few distant frontiers experienced warfare. In Britain the expansion of Roman rule was delayed when an indigenous queen, Boudicca, and her followers overran several Roman settlements including Londinium (London), slaughtering thousands of Romans before she was finally defeated. At the opposite end, Nero's general Corbulo undertook to engage and detach Armenia from Persian control. In 63 CE, Roman superiority was re-established and an agreement with the Persians was

reached, which enabled Tiridates I, the king of Armenia, to accept the status of a Roman client monarch. In 66 CE, to settle unrest that had begun under the emperor Gaius and that resulted from his policies, Nero appointed the general Vespasian to put down the Jewish revolt in Judaea.

Subsequent to the Great Fire of Rome in 64 CE, Nero tried to blame the small and still illicit sect of the Christians. Many were executed and some, according to the historian Tacitus, were burned alive as human torches.

As with his predecessors Tiberius and Gaius, Nero's relations with the Senate deteriorated and in the year 65 CE a massive plot, the so-called Pisonian conspiracy, to assassinate the emperor was uncovered. The Pisonian conspiracy, led by Gaius Piso, resulted in 19 executions or suicides and 13 banishments. In 68 CE, Nero returned from Greece. His hold on power had weakened further in his absence. In Gaul, Julius Vindex revolted, encouraging the revolt of Servius Sulpicius Galba in Spain and his acclamation as emperor. After the senate declared Nero an enemy of the state, Nero, with the help of one of his slaves, committed suicide on June 9, 68, thus ending the Julio-Claudian dynasty. He left no heirs, and the empire plunged into civil warfare that only ended with the victory of Vespasian (69–79 CE).

Marshall Lilly

See also Agrippina II; Augustus; Boudicca; Claudius I; Corbulo; Succession (Imperial); Tacitus; Tiridates I; Vespasian; War of Four Emperors

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Nerva (Emperor) (96–98 CE)

Born in 35 CE, the Roman emperor Nerva (96–98 CE) was a transitional figure between Domitian (81–96), the last of the Flavian emperors, and Trajan (98–117). For a minor emperor, Nerva has occasioned unusual scholarly debate focused on the conspiracy that led to Nerva's accession and on the

circumstances of Nerva's adoption of Trajan.

Marcus Cocceius Nerva, born in 35 CE, was a Roman senator and the descendant of an illustrious senatorial family. He held junior magistracies, but never held any significant military commands or provincial governorships, living as a courtier during the reigns of the later Julio-Claudian emperors, particularly Nero. The young Nerva played a role in the suppression of the Pisonian conspiracy in Nero's reign. Nerva avoided taking sides in the War of Four Emperors (69 CE) and continued to play the role of courtier during the reigns of Vespasian, Titus, and Domitian.

Nerva was in the imperial palace at the time of Domitian's assassination by palace servants and was probably implicated in the conspiracy, if not its mastermind. He was accepted as emperor by the Senate, which conferred the imperial powers on him. He was also grudgingly accepted by the army, which remained loyal to Domitian.

Nerva was over 60 and in poor health. He appears to have carried out (or delegated) the tasks of imperial government conscientiously. His coin issues suggest that Nerva, like Galba, emphasized the restoration of *libertas*, a traditional republican value, but by this time connoting the emperor's respect for senators, contrasting with Domitian's contempt for the Senate.

However, Nerva was not able to appease the army, particularly the Praetorian Guard. In October of 97, the praetorians rioted before the imperial palace, calling for Nerva to turn over Domitian's assassins. Nerva handed over the men, whom the praetorians killed. This episode cost Nerva his credibility as a leader.

Not long afterward, Nerva announced his adoption of Marcus Ulpius Traianus (the future emperor Trajan), then Governor of Upper Germany (or, as some have argued, Pannonia). As a relatively young but experienced military commander, Trajan was more acceptable to the soldiers and better able to lead them. Trajan also had an extensive network of relatives and allies in the Senate. Nerva died of natural causes in January 98 and Trajan was acclaimed as emperor without incident. The significance of Nerva lies in his choice of adoptive succession, breaking the dynastic succession model of the Flavians and establishing the pattern of adoptive succession for the next three imperial accessions (Hadrian in 117, Antoninus Pius in 138, and Marcus Aurelius in 161).

Sara E. Phang

See also Assassination; Domitian; Nero; Praetorians; Senate, Senators; Succession (Imperial); Trajan; Usurpation

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New Carthage, Siege of (209 BCE)

The siege of New Carthage took place in 209 BCE during the Second Punic War, under the direction of Publius Cornelius Scipio (Africanus), who had been sent to Spain with proconsular *imperium* the previous year. The Carthaginians had 3 armies in the field in Spain but none within 10 days' march of New Carthage (Cartagena), an important and well-supplied harbor city which had great significance as the provincial capital. Scipio resolved to attack the city, although it was defended naturally on one side by a lake and on the other by the sea, and connected to land only by a narrow isthmus. According to Polybius, Scipio discovered from locals that the lagoon to the north was extremely narrow and fordable in many places, and also that the water level dropped through a narrow channel at a predictable time each evening. Addressing his troops, Scipio promised them that at the time of action, Neptune himself would provide divine aid. When the operation began, Scipio attacked by both land and sea, pushing the defenders who had sallied out to meet the army back within their walls. When the water level in the lagoon dropped later that day, he ordered a company of soldiers to cross it with ladders, and the apparent fulfillment of the promise of divine help impressed the soldiers greatly. The account of the successful siege is related by Polybius from excellent sources, including a letter from Scipio himself.

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See also Punic War, Second; Religion and Warfare; Scipio Africanus; Siege Warfare

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New Testament

The New Testament is the foundational collection of Christian texts (“gospel” narratives about Jesus, church history, letters of church leaders, and an apocalypse) written in Greek over the course of the mid- and late first century CE, by different (mostly unknown) authors. These writers and their later editors took pains to stress they were not social or political revolutionaries (for example Jesus’ saying, “Give unto Caesar what is Caesar’s”; or submission to secular authority in Romans 13 and 1 Peter 2); the success of ambitious missionaries such as Paul partly depended on them not appearing anti-Roman.

Yet despite some pacifist tendencies, Jesus was crucified (ca. 33 CE) essentially as a political troublemaker, and one might read subtle anti-Roman bias in some New Testament passages. The seven-hill seat of the “whore of Babylon,” “drunk on the blood of saints and martyrs” in Revelations 17 is usually seen as an attack on Rome, famously situated on seven hills. (Anti-Roman apocalypticism, incidentally, was not unique to Christians; Jews and pagans wrote in this vein as well.) Jesus cast a demonic entity called “Legion” (the Greek text carefully transliterates the Latin military term) into a herd of pigs, which many Jews associated with Roman soldiers. The New Testament consistently criticizes low-ranking Roman soldiers such as the cruel ones at Jesus’ crucifixion (also note Luke 3:14). But the New Testament treats officers—centurions and tribunes—quite positively, and frequently the metaphorical language of military service

(“soldiers of Christ,” et cetera) suggests the complexity of early Christian thought on war and soldiers.

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See also Christians, Persecution of; Cults, Pagan; Heretics and Polytheists, Persecution of

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Noncombatants

Modern noncombatants may serve in the armed forces as support staff (often far from the combat zone) or be unaffiliated civilians. More formally, the Geneva Conventions define noncombatants as civilians who do not participate directly in hostilities, as well as military personnel who are sick or wounded, or whose specific duties (medical or religious) exempt them from combat. The Conventions and similar laws of war are intended to protect noncombatants from harm.

Such differentiation did not exist in ancient Roman warfare. All Roman soldiers (*milites*) were probably expected to fight, and the Republic’s traditional division of *domi* (“at home” status) and *militiae* (the field of war) precluded much respect for citizen noncombatants in the field of war. Roman warfare could treat enemy civilians brutally, enslaving defeated enemy civilians on a large scale.

Brutality toward enemy civilians was particularly routine at the fall of besieged cities, including looting, rape, killing, and other atrocities. Even allied civilians were vulnerable, displayed in the Roman sack of Tarentum during the Second Punic War (218–201 BCE). An individual Roman commander displayed his control over his army and personal mercy (*clementia*) by protecting civilians, as when Julius Caesar forbade his army to sack Corfinium (an Italian city) early in the Caesarian-Pompeian Civil War.

Nonetheless, as the Roman Empire grew, the role of noncombatants associated with the army also grew. These people included military baggage handlers and servants; privately owned slaves; merchants, slave traders, and entertainers; and officers' and soldiers' families. The servants included the grooms (*calones*) of cavalry horses. The baggage handlers and grooms may have been slaves owned by the army. They might be armed and used as a fighting force in an emergency, or equipped as soldiers to deceive the enemy into thinking the Roman forces were larger (a popular stratagem). The category is blurry as many officers and soldiers also owned personal slaves.

Merchants and slave traders followed the army, the latter buying enemy captives on a massive scale after major Roman victories. The merchants probably supplied food and drink other than the Roman army's staples. However, such merchants and entertainers (including actors, fortune-tellers, and prostitutes) were regarded as bad for discipline. Scipio Aemilianus expelled them from the demoralized Roman camp outside Numantia in 134–133 BCE, along with soldiers' personal servants.

In the early and middle Republic, many citizen soldiers left families behind in Roman Italy and returned to them after relatively short service. The season of warfare was originally less than a year, opening in the spring and ending in the fall. In the period of overseas warfare, soldiers probably formed relationships with *de facto* wives or mistresses and had children in the provinces; these families followed the army with the other noncombatants. In contrast with the imperial period, little is known about these *de facto* families during the Republic. In the 170s Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus the elder, father of Tiberius Gracchus the tribune (d. 133 BCE), settled 4,000 Roman soldiers' children in a new Spanish town named Carteia (Livy 43.3.1–3). In his narration of the Civil War (49–45 BCE), Julius Caesar relates that the soldiers of Gabinius (a Roman turned mercenary) had married Egyptian women “and lost the name and discipline of the Roman people” (Caesar, *Civil War* 3.110).

The stabilization of military bases in the early empire meant an increase in *de facto* noncombatant personnel and a change in the *de facto* status of noncombatant civilians. Roman military tradition still required all *milites* (soldiers) to participate in training and combat. However, documentary sources display increasingly specialized military occupations, including artisans (smiths, armorers, builders, et al.), medical personnel, animal herders and tenders, and even musicians. Specialist soldiers were termed

immunes and relieved from fatigues. How much time they devoted to combat training is uncertain. On active campaigns, all soldiers were required to fight, but imperial authors reiterated the stereotype that during peacetime soldiers' combat skills became rusty and praised emperors and commanders who restored old-fashioned rigorous training.

Whether or not there were noncombatant *milites*, military slaves constituted an important group of noncombatant personnel. Perhaps 1,200 slaves per legion may have been state property. According to Josephus, Vegetius, and Dio, the slaves were trained to fight and might be used as combatants in an emergency (Josephus, *Jewish War* 3.69; Vegetius, *Military Affairs* 3.6; Dio 78.26.5). But their main role was to drive the baggage animals and guard the baggage (Josephus, *Jewish War* 3.125, 5.49). Cavalrymen (*equites legionis* or *equites alae*) may have owned their own grooms, who tended their horses. Higher-paid officers (centurion and above) could afford personal slaves to attend them in their quarters. The slaves, servants, merchants, and entertainers who followed the army were termed *lixae* by ancient authors.

Noncombatant civilians populated settlements and entire towns in the vicinity of forts and contributed to the economic and urban development of the frontier provinces. They are attested in archaeological and documentary sources, such as the archaeological remains of these settlements (termed *canabae* outside legionary forts, *vici* outside auxiliary forts), Latin epitaphs and religious dedications, and documents on papyrus and wooden tablets. The informal nature of such documents often leaves it unclear whether such persons were military personnel or civilians.

However, the noncombatant civilians of the *canabae* and *vici* existed on sufferance of the Roman army. They might be expelled whenever the frontier zone became an active war zone, as happened during the Gallic Revolt of 70 CE. In provinces that remained relatively peaceful, legionary *canabae* might develop into formally constituted towns with municipal institutions and permanent and monumental stone architecture, as at Lambaesis in Numidia (North Africa), the base of Legio III Augusta. Military officers, military *collegia* (voluntary associations or fraternities), and veterans dominated the social life of such towns.

Imperial soldiers' de facto families were also among the noncombatant civilians who settled near frontier bases. They are attested in documentary sources, including Latin funerary inscriptions (in which the legally

unmarried partners term each other “husband” and “wife”) and papyri and wooden tablets that show the legal difficulties that the families faced. The emperor Septimius Severus (193–211) granted soldiers the legal right to marry, ensuring that their children were legitimate.

In the later Roman Empire (fourth and early fifth centuries CE), legal sources show that the imperial government provided rations for soldiers’ wives and children and for soldiers’ servants.

Sara E. Phang

See also Caesar, Gaius Julius; Civil-Military Relations; *Clementia*; Documentary Sources; Families of Imperial Soldiers; Gender and War; Inscriptions; Logistics; Military Discipline; Numantia, Siege of; Pay and Finances, Military (Imperial); Prisoners of War and Slavery; Septimius Severus; Vindolanda

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Noncommissioned Officers. See Principales

Notitia Dignitatum

The *Notitia Dignitatum* is one of the most important documents for the institutional and military history of the later Roman Empire. It lists the civil and military officials in the western and eastern parts of the Roman Empire,

from the imperial court down to provincial echelons. Both the eastern and western parts contain series of entries for each official, which give the title and rank of the official, his functions, and a list of subordinate officials. Entries for military senior officers (see *magister militum*, *dux*, and *comes*) list the units and their titles which the officer commanded. The *Notitia Dignitatum* thus presents the nominal order of battle of the later empire, but non-Roman troops (barbarian allies or federates), perhaps the most important development in the later Roman army, are not listed. The *Notitia* clearly had an honorific function, depicting the officials' *insignia* or symbols of office and kept by a high-ranking official, the *primicerius notariorum*.

The date of the *Notitia* is uncertain. The core of the eastern list was compiled and amended just before 394. The original purpose may have been to provide up-to-date records for Theodosius I's campaign against the western usurper Eugenius. The western *Notitia*, on the other hand, shows later emendations, greater discrepancies and a larger number of errors than its eastern counterpart. The last clear datable entries suggest that the various lists were revised and edited until the 420s. The last recorded new unit are the *Placidi Valentiniani Felices*, a clear reference to Valentinian III (425–455), who was born in 419, the earliest possible date. The western *Notitia* is a notoriously difficult source for analyzing fifth-century military history, frustrating attempts to reconstruct the actual order of battle and military strength available to the western empire. The *Notitia Dignitatum* may have an ideological rather than practical purpose, underlining the ideological unity and supremacy of the empire at a time that the western government was at bay.

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See also Comes; Comitatus; Dux; Frigidus, Battle of; Limitanei; Magister Militum; Theodosius I

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Numantia, Siege of (134–133 BCE)

The Numantine War of 143–133 BCE also known as the Celtiberian War was fought between Rome and the Celtiberians of Hispania Citerior and culminated in the long siege of the main Celtiberian city of Numantia in 134–133 BCE. Up to this point the Romans had found the tenacious Celtiberians an obstacle in their progress to subdue the region and suffered a series of military setbacks including several attempts on Numantia. Its position and construction on a hilltop had made it impregnable and it controlled major routes particularly from the River Douro.

In 134, the Roman Senate dispatched the victor of the Third Punic War, Scipio Aemilianus, to complete what many of his contemporaries had failed to do: to subjugate and take Numantia. Since the Roman army in Spain was demoralized by their failures, Scipio imposed a strict training regimen on them. Scipio also raised a large force of allied and mercenary troops and trained them for the siege. Scipio was aware that the city could not be taken by force, so he made arrangements to starve it into submission. He constructed a circumvallation and a contravallation to control access and egress to the city and built several towers to control routes via the Douro. After a cordon that lasted approximately eight months, the population resorted to suicide and cannibalism, eventually capitulating to Scipio's crushing forces. Survivors were sold into slavery and Scipio leveled the city.

Numantia's capture signaled the end of local resistance thus establishing Rome's presence in Spain. It is also remembered for the courageous struggle the inhabitants of the city inflicted on the mighty Roman army. Scipio returned to Rome to receive a second Roman triumph.

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See also Celtiberians; Scipio Aemilianus; Siege Warfare; Spanish Wars

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Numerus

A *numerus* (pl. *numeri*) is a unit of soldiers, and *in numeros referri* means to enlist or enter a recruit on the rolls of a unit. However, *numerus* (pl. *numeri*) was used in the technical sense to denote a unit of native fighters who were permitted to preserve their native fighting specialties, equipment, and training. These distinguished them from the *auxilia*, non-citizens who were organized, trained, and equipped in Roman fashion. The units of *numeri* were small, though 500- and 1,000-man units are attested. The modern term for such units might be “irregulars.” The *numeri* enabled the Roman army to make use of small forces trained in relatively exotic weapons and skillsets, and do not imply that the *auxilia* or legionaries had become less martial or fierce.

Examples of *numeri* include units of slingers (wielders of slingshots) from the Balearic Islands (modern Majorca, Minorca, Ibiza, and Formentera) off the Mediterranean coast of Spain and units of Syrian archers.

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See also *Auxilia*; Divisions of the Army (Imperial); Warlike Peoples

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Numerian (Emperor). *See* *Carinus; Diocletian; Third-*

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Numidia. See Jugurtha; Jugurthine War; Masinissa

O

Octavian (Augustus) (27 BCE–14 CE)

Gaius Julius Caesar Octavianus, the future emperor Augustus (27 BCE–14 CE), termed Octavian before 27 BCE by modern scholars, rose to power in the brutal civil wars of the late Republic after the assassination of his great-uncle Julius Caesar in 44 BCE. Octavian's rise was marked by his exploitation of Julius Caesar's memory and veteran soldiers and by his own disregard of Roman tradition (in contrast with his public image as Augustus). After the elimination of the "Liberators" or assassins of Caesar, Octavian's main enemy was Mark Antony, whom he defeated in the battle of Actium (31 BCE), leaving Octavian sole ruler of the Roman world. The period from 44 to 30 BCE was fundamentally shaped by the relationship between Antony and Octavian, as it continually shifted through an uneasy series of alliances until finally breaking down altogether.

Octavian exploited his connection to his great-uncle Julius Caesar, seen in the changing forms of his name. His own father was Gaius Octavius, a "new man" (praetor in 61 BCE) and his mother was Atia, the daughter of Caesar's sister; thus his birth name was Gaius Octavius. Following normal onomastic rules in Roman adoption, Octavius took the name Gaius Julius Caesar Octavianus when he became Caesar's adopted son and heir. Modern scholars term him Octavian, but the ancient sources routinely refer to Octavian as "Caesar," as he preferred. Octavian also took the name *divi filius*, "son of a god," upon Caesar's deification. He then adopted *Imperator* ("victorious commander") as his first name from about 40 BCE, firmly associating himself with the idea of military success. In this way, he reinvented himself as *Imperator Caesar divi filius*.

Octavian's position as Caesar's heir was crucial to his recruitment of

support from both people and army. When Caesar was assassinated on March 15, 44 BCE, the 18-year-old Octavian was in Apollonia in Dalmatia (Albania), waiting to accompany Caesar on his planned campaign against Persia. Octavian returned to Italy swiftly after the Ides, securing popular support by carrying out the terms of Caesar's will and providing games in Caesar's memory. On June 1, Antony's ambitions became clearer as he claimed control of the key province of Gallia Cisalpina, the strategic entry point into Italy from the Alps, rather than the province allocated to him by the Senate. Cisalpina had been assigned to Decimus Junius Brutus Albinus. Suspicion of Antony in the Senate was inflamed by Cicero's anti-Antonian invectives, the *Philippics*. In the autumn, Antony set off to try to seize Gallia Cisalpina from Decimus Brutus, while Octavian proceeded south into Campania to raise troops from Caesar's veterans, offering them generous cash hand-outs. At the opening of the *Res Gestae*, Augustus represents this act as one of liberating the state. In fact, private levying of troops, along with bribing a legion commanded by a consul (Antony) were both illegal actions.



Silver denarius of Octavian, ca. 36 BCE. After the assassination of Caesar, Octavian, not yet 20, led Caesar's veterans and exploited Caesar's memory, becoming a major contender in the late Republic's final civil wars. Octavian and his opponents struck such coins to pay their soldiers. Located in the Yale University Art Gallery, New Haven, Connecticut. (Yale University Art Gallery)

In 43 BCE, as a result largely of Cicero's influence in the Senate, Octavian was put in charge of troops along with the consuls Hirtius and Pansa to fight against Antony. At stake was control of Cisalpine Gaul, which Antony was trying to wrench away from Decimus Brutus. Thus, at the battle of Mutina in April 43 BCE, Octavian and the two consuls fought against another Caesarian, Antony, to relieve the besieged Decimus Brutus. Antony was defeated, but both consuls died in consequence of the battle, leaving a power vacuum which Octavian promptly exploited, forcing the Senate to

confer the consulship on him, even though he was too young and had held none of the preceding offices. Even though Octavian had played little role in actual fighting at the battle, being left to look after the camp, Cicero praised his prowess, so that Octavian was hailed as *imperator* and honored with a *supplicatio* (festival days of thanksgiving to the gods). Cicero's *Philippics* give vivid insight into the tumultuous sequence of events during 44–43 BCE.

On November 27, 43 BCE, however, Octavian and Antony became unlikely allies, forming the Second Triumvirate along with Marcus Aemilius Lepidus. In contrast with the so-called First Triumvirate of Pompey, Crassus and Caesar (60 BCE), which was an informal alliance, the Second Triumvirate was formally constituted. Octavian, Antony, and Lepidus acted in effect as joint dictators. They focused on avenging Caesar's murder by fighting against his assassins Marcus Junius Brutus and Gaius Cassius. This culminated in the battle of Philippi (in Macedonia) in 42 BCE—or, to be more accurate, two battles on October 3 and 23. In the First Battle of Philippi, Antony defeated Cassius, who then committed suicide in the mistaken belief that Brutus had also been defeated. The Second Battle of Philippi, which again appears to have been fought chiefly by Antony, resulted in the defeat and suicide of Brutus. Antony commanded the Caesarian forces, while Octavian played little active role in the fighting, allegedly being too unwell to fight, or (according to his enemies) hiding in a marsh while the battle took place.

Once Brutus and Cassius had been defeated, the triumvir Lepidus was sidelined, because he had played no part at Philippi, having remained behind to keep charge of Italy. Antony and Octavian divided up Rome's provinces between themselves. Antony remained in the eastern Mediterranean, while Octavian returned to Italy, only to find serious unrest among soldiers demanding retirement benefits. Octavian met their demands by unpopular land confiscations, abetted by proscriptions. In the proscriptions, previously practiced by Sulla, the triumvirs published (*proscribere*) lists of their political enemies, declaring their lives forfeit; the property of the proscribed was confiscated. Relations between Octavian and Antony deteriorated, as Antony's wife Fulvia and brother Lucius Antonius stirred up unrest in Italy against Octavian in the so-called Perusine War. Octavian's problems were increased by a sea blockade by Sextus Pompeius, son of Julius Caesar's rival Pompey the Great, designed to cut off Rome's grain supply. Octavian besieged Lucius Antonius and Fulvia at Perusia

(Perugia) in 41–40 BCE, resulting in the defeat of Lucius Antonius and Fulvia, but the problem of Sextus Pompeius continued. Anecdotes about Octavian's behavior during the proscriptions and the siege represent him as particularly cruel and merciless (for example, Suetonius, *Augustus* 13).

Antony tried to invade Italy, but his soldiers did not support him, forcing him to try to come to terms with Octavian. The Treaty of Brundisium in September 40 BCE was an attempt to reconcile Antony and Octavian, reconfirming the division of empire between the two men, and sealed by the marriage of Octavian's sister, Octavia, to Antony. Lepidus was increasingly ignored. This agreement was much heralded, with the two men even being awarded an ovation, an honor just short of a triumph, only because the two men had made peace with each other, as the official records state. Antony departed to wage war in Armenia against the Persians, where his disastrous campaigning (even losing military standards to the Persians, later recovered by Augustus) only undermined further his position at Rome.

Sextus Pompeius had initially been officially recognized by the Senate as "commander of the fleet and coasts," hoping to use him against Antony in 43 BCE, but he was subsequently proscribed by the triumvirs. Sextus Pompeius seized Sicily and used his fleet in the western Mediterranean to impose a blockade on the grain supply to Rome. By 39 BCE hunger had provoked rioting at Rome, forcing the triumvirs to grant Sextus Pompeius recognition in a treaty which conceded to him control of Sicily, Sardinia, Corsica, and Achaia (Greece). The five-year triumvirate initially elapsed on December 31, 38 BCE, when the triumvirs informally assumed a second five-year period in office down to the end of 33 BCE, which Octavian and Antony agreed upon together in the Pact of Tarentum in the summer of 37 BCE. In 36 BCE, Lepidus helped Octavian resist Pompeius (his status now reduced by his enemies to that of a pirate), culminating in the naval victory of Agrippa at Naulochus (Sicily) on September 3, 36 BCE. Octavian's success against Pompeius contrasted sharply with Antony's dismal failure in Persia.

Octavian was still not unchallenged in the western Mediterranean, however. Having played an important part in defeating Sextus Pompeius, Lepidus made new demands, bidding for control of the island of Sicily. This was a miscalculation that led to Lepidus' marginalization and exile to Circeii, with Octavian taking over the whole of Italy and its western provinces. Antony now remained as Octavian's only rival, and tensions between the two men were accentuated from 35 BCE, as Antony began to

court Cleopatra VII of Egypt and her vast fortune, slighting his wife Octavia in the process, but strengthening his military position. At the same time, Octavian campaigned in Illyricum, where he recovered the military standards lost by Aulus Gabinius in 48 BCE (again accentuating the contrast with Antony), which he then put on public display at Rome, enhancing his military reputation.

The 10-year triumvirate expired at the end of 33 BCE, as hostility between Octavian and Antony gradually increased. By 32 BCE, Octavian was regarded with hostility by many of the leading men in Rome, and felt the need to enter the Senate with an armed guard. Both consuls and a large number of senators proclaimed their support for Antony, and left Rome to join Antony as he mustered forces in the eastern Mediterranean. The situation culminated when Antony divorced Octavia. Octavian declared war upon Cleopatra and exacted an oath of loyalty from Italy and the western provinces. In his propaganda war against Antony and Cleopatra, Octavian also exploited Roman and Italian xenophobia and anti-Egyptian sentiments. After months of skirmishes, the two sides met in naval battle at Actium on September 2, 31 BCE. Antony and Cleopatra fled from Actium to the queen's capital at Alexandria in Egypt, where the following year saw their final defeat and suicides. The culmination of Octavian's military victories was his triple triumph in 29 BCE, celebrated on three consecutive days for victories in Illyricum, Actium, and Alexandria.

From 44 BCE down to his final emergence as sole ruler of the Roman Empire in 30 BCE, Octavian was involved in armed conflict over a variety of territories—from northern Italy to Sicily, from Illyricum down into Macedonia—and he won victories by both land and sea. Statues were set up in his honor at Rome in precious metals (gold and silver), and he was depicted in heroic nudity, his foot upon a globe. Despite such commemoration, it was above all to Antony himself, ironically, and then to Agrippa and other generals that Octavian really owed his success, and this is a trend that continued once he had metamorphosed into Augustus.

Alison E. Cooley

See also Actium, Battle of; Augustus; Brundisium, Treaty of; Brutus (Junius Brutus, Marcus); Caesar, Assassination of; Civil Conflict (Late Republic); Civil Wars (II) (44–31 BCE); Cleopatra; Fulvia; *Imperator*; Mark Antony; Ovation; Persian Wars, Arsacid; Perusia, Siege of; Proscriptions; Second

Triumvirate; Sextus Pompeius; Tarentum, Pact of

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Odenathus (d. 268 CE)

Septimius Odenathus or Odaenathus was a Palmyrene aristocrat who became ruler of Palmyra and Roman commander-in-chief and de facto vice emperor in the Near East during the reign of Gallienus (260–268 CE). Odenathus ruled a multicultural city, for Palmyra was a entrepôt for Silk Road trade and had been settled by Semites, Greeks, Arabs, and Persians. His family had been given the Roman citizenship by Septimius Severus (193–211). In native (Aramaic) inscriptions, Odenathus bore the title “Ruler of Tadmor,” the Aramaic name for Palmyra.

Needing a buffer state to deter the aggressive Sassanid Persian Empire, Gallienus conferred on Odenathus the title *corrector totius Orientis* or “Regent of the East,” giving him commander-in-chief authority over all Roman forces in the Near East. Odenathus also received the title *dux Romanorum* (commander of the Roman forces).

Odenathus successfully campaigned against the Persians, detaching northern Mesopotamia from the Persian Empire and capturing Nisibis; he launched an offensive further into the Persian Empire. Perhaps for this reason Odenathus took the title “King of Kings,” the title of the Persian monarch, attested in inscriptions. Odenathus was then saluted as *imperator* by his troops, a rank that he was not authorized to use and which made him a usurper, but Gallienus was not in a position to suppress him.

Odenathus was married to Septimia Zenobia (born ca. 240). They had several children, at least two sons, Septimius Herodianus and Septimius Vaballathus. Other children may have existed, poorly attested. When

Odenathus was assassinated under mysterious circumstances in 268, he was succeeded by his younger son Vaballathus, and by Zenobia, who governed for her son. Herodianus was dead by this time. Vaballathus and Zenobia began aggressively to extend Palmyrene power in the Near East, conquering Roman Arabia, Egypt, and Syria, and extending into Asia Minor. Aurelian, now emperor (270–275), could not tolerate this threat and made war upon the Palmyrene Empire, reconquering it and capturing Zenobia, whom he displayed in his triumph in 274.

As with much of the history of the third-century crisis, the literary sources for Odenathus and Zenobia are difficult to use and conflicted. Zosimus (writing in the early fifth century) and the *Historia Augusta* are closest in date. Late authors, such as John Malalas and Zonaras, provide detail from unknown sources. The *Historia Augusta*'s later biographies (from ca. 218 onward, and especially from 235–284) are notoriously unreliable. The reigns of Odenathus and Zenobia also can be studied through provincial coinage and documentary sources.

Sara E. Phang

See also Aurelian; Gallienus; Palmyra; Third-Century CE Crisis; Zenobia

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Odoacer (d. 493 CE)

On September 4, 476, the Germanic commander of Rome's Italian Armies captured Ravenna and forced the western Roman Empire's newly installed emperor Romulus Augustus to abdicate. Traditional historians mark that date as the end of the western Roman Empire. The move came just one month after the German *foederati* and Italo-Roman army had proclaimed Odoacer *Rex Italiae* (king of Italy). The Roman Senate quickly followed up

by asking the eastern emperor Zeno, himself only recently ascended to the throne, to accept Odoacer as emperor of the western empire. Recognizing a *fait accompli* he could not undo, Zeno granted Odoacer the title of Patrician and asked him to reinstate the deposed emperor Julius Nepos as emperor of the western empire. However, Odoacer did not allow Nepos to resume his throne. Although Odoacer never took the title of western emperor, that refusal earned him Zeno's enduring animosity, but otherwise, to the average citizens of Rome and Italy, Odoacer's ascension to power appeared unchallenged. He called himself a Patrician, enjoyed the backing of the Roman Senate, and although an Arian Christian, practiced religious tolerance and did not interfere in the affairs of the Orthodox Church.

Little is known about Odoacer's early life or background. That he was a Germanic ally remains unquestioned but of which group is unclear. Most sources describe him as from the Scirii but some chronicles say his people were the Herculi, Turcilingi, or Rugii. As a Roman soldier he took the name Flavius Odoacer. He became an officer in the western Roman army in 470, advancing to a position of imperial bodyguard by 472. Due to his talents as a leader, the *foederati* came to him in 476 when their request for rewards was rejected by Orestes, the Roman military commander for whom they had fought for when he deposed the western emperor Nepos earlier that year. The Italo-Roman troops apparently trusted Odoacer as well for they joined with the *foederati* in electing him king of Italy.

Odoacer was no illiterate barbarian and appears to have viewed his role as protector of the empire's interests in Italy. He gained Sicily from the Vandal king Gaiseric within months of gaining control over Rome and when Nepos was assassinated near Salona, Odoacer pursued and executed the murderers. However, he also conquered the Dalmatian coast and incorporated it into his "kingdom." He elevated the power and prestige of the Senate and enjoyed the Senate's loyalty throughout his reign.

Unfortunately, the emperor Zeno's animosity proved Odoacer's undoing. Zeno promised the Ostrogoths' king Theoderic the Great the crown of Italy if he would remove Odoacer. Theoderic invaded Italy in early summer 489, defeating Odoacer in three successive engagements. Odoacer fled to Ravenna, leaving Theoderic to conquer Italy. The fighting continued back and forth well into 493. Then, Ravenna fell after a three-year siege on March 5, 493. Theoderic had Odoacer and his entire family killed shortly thereafter. The last vestiges of traditional Roman governance died with

Odoacer. Theoderic had no use for the Senate, ruling largely as a German king.

Carl O. Schuster

See also Adrianople, Battle of; Alaric; Attila; Fall of the Roman Empire (West); Federates; Honorius; Romulus Augustulus; Theoderic; Theodosius I; Valens

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Olybrius (Emperor). See Fall of the Roman Empire; Ricimer

Orestes (d. 476 CE)

Orestes was a Roman landowner living in Pannonia in the 440s and 450s at a time when that province was under Hun control. He first comes to our attention as secretary to Attila, king of the Huns. In 449, Orestes was part of a Hunnic delegation sent to Constantinople to negotiate peace terms. The eastern Roman historian Priscus states that Orestes was the son-in-law of the western Roman *comes* Romulus, implying contacts at the western court. After the death of Attila, Orestes disappears from our records until 475 when he was appointed *magister militum* by the western emperor Julius Nepos. Orestes then overthrew Nepos and declared his own son Romulus Augustulus emperor. Orestes died in battle against the warlord Odoacer in 476.

Michael D. Blodgett

See also Fall of the Roman Empire (West); Odoacer; Romulus Augustulus

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Ostrogoths. See Adrianople, Battle of; Goths; Theoderic

Otho (Emperor) (69 CE)

Born in 32 CE, Marcus Salvius Otho (69 CE) usurped the throne from Servius Sulpicius Galba, inducing the Praetorian Guard to assassinate Galba on January 15, 69 CE. Otho was defeated by the Vitellians in the First Battle of Bedriacum in northern Italy on April 14, and committed suicide on April 16. Though his personal reputation was ambiguous, the ancient authors regarded Otho as redeeming his past through the fortitude displayed by his suicide.

Otho came from a relatively distinguished family and became a close friend of the emperor Nero, sharing Nero's luxurious and unconventional lifestyle. He was married to Poppaea Sabina, with whom Nero fell in love. Nero made Otho divorce Poppaea and proceeded to marry her and appointed Otho to the governorship of Lusitania (a province in Spain). Having returned to Rome by 69, Otho hoped to become Galba's heir, but was disappointed when Galba chose Lucius Calpurnius Piso Frugi Licinianus as his heir. Otho borrowed money and used it to provide gifts and favors to the Praetorian Guard, inducing them to aid and support his usurpation.

On January 15 of 69, the praetorians carried Otho off to their camp, where they hailed him as emperor. Other men of the guard seized Galba and assassinated him and Piso. Otho was accepted as emperor by the Senate. Meanwhile, Aulus Vitellius had been already hailed as emperor by the legions in Lower and Upper Germany and his generals, Aulus Caecina and Fabius Valens, were advancing on Italy.

Otho was at a disadvantage in the civil war with the Vitellians, having only the praetorians and urban cohorts and one legion (Legio I Adiutrix) at his disposal. He marched forth to meet the Vitellians and, after some small victories, was decisively defeated in the First Battle of Bedriacum on April 14. As was usual for the Julio-Claudian emperors, Otho did not command the battle in person, but deputized generals. He awaited the outcome at the nearby town of Brixellum.

After his defeat, Otho committed suicide at dawn on April 16 with the intent of sparing himself humiliation by the Vitellians and sparing his army further civil warfare. Otho had not hitherto been reputed a very brave man. His appearance was considered unmanly, since he depilated himself and was rumored to apply a bread poultice, commonly used by women, to his face to discourage the growth of a beard (Suetonius, *Otho* 12). But Tacitus says that “unlike his body, his spirit was not effeminate” (Tacitus, *Histories* 1.22). This judgment was based on Otho’s daring in usurping the empire, but also on the fortitude with which he met his death, displaying calm resolve and stabbing himself with a dagger. Such political suicide was a Roman tradition, whether carried out by leaders who had lost civil wars (as did Cato the Younger, Brutus and Cassius, and Antony and Cleopatra), or imposed by tyrannical rulers upon dissidents. Otho had not designated an heir, and the empire passed without any challenge at that time to Vitellius. Vespasian then revolted from Vitellius in July of 69; his troops defeated the Vitellians in October and captured Rome in December 69.

The main sources for the life of Otho are Tacitus’ *Histories*, Suetonius’ *Otho*, Plutarch’s *Otho*, and Cassius Dio’s *Roman History*. Tacitus’ *Histories* presents the most balanced account; Suetonius and Plutarch’s *Otho* are more negative. The extant epitome of Dio’s *Roman History* for this period contains relatively little material about Otho.

Sara E. Phang

See also Donatives; Emperor as Patron; Galba; Otho; Praetorians; Suicide; Tacitus; Usurpation; Vespasian; *Virtus*; Vitellius; War of Four Emperors

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Ovation

An ovation was a lesser version of the triumphal procession, awarded during the Republic to generals whose victories fell short of a triumph. Both triumphs and ovations required that the commander have held *imperium*. An ovation featured a smaller procession than a triumph, the victor had to walk on foot, and the victor was not permitted to bear the triumphator's insignia (the *toga picta* or purple toga with gold brocade, a scepter, a laurel wreath) or ride in a chariot. The last victor permitted an ovation was Aulus Plautius in 47 CE for the conquest of Britain.

In the middle Republic the right to a triumph versus a lesser ceremony (or none) could be contested hotly in the Senate. The victory might not have produced enough enemy dead for a triumph (though the required number is debated) or the victor might have been relieved of his command. Other technicalities reflect the fierce competition of aristocrats in the mid-Republic. Besides the ovation, another lesser form of triumph was the "Alban" triumph, on the Alban Mount (attested in 231, 211, 197, and 172 BCE).

The ovation is distinct from *triumphalia ornamenta*, triumphal ornaments, in which the general received triumphal insignia but was not permitted to have a triumph ceremony. The development of *triumphalia ornamenta* reflects the emperors' desire to monopolize the prestige of the triumph ceremony for the imperial house. In 19 BCE Lucius Cornelius Balbus was the last nonimperial commander (senator) to be permitted a full triumph. After that time victorious generals who did not belong to the imperial house were granted *triumphalia ornamenta*. They consisted of triumphal insignia: the *toga picta*, scepter, and wreath. The *triumphalia ornamenta* were the highest honor that a senator could hope to receive during the Principate. Receivers of *triumphalia ornamenta* might also be permitted a statue with a laurel wreath.

Members of the imperial house could also be granted *triumphalia ornamenta* if their victories were considered insufficient for a triumph or the emperor in question wanted to monopolize the right to triumph.

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See also Emperor as Commander; Senate, Senators; Triumph; Victory

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Overthrow of the Monarchy (ca. 510 BCE)

The overthrow of the Roman monarchy and the expulsion of the final Roman *rex* (king), Tarquinius Superbus (“Tarquin the Proud”), represents one of the more dramatic and problematic episodes from early Roman history. The literary sources for early Rome were based (at best) on a combination of cryptic annalistic evidence and oral tradition. Modern scholars often interpret them as containing a significant amount of fabrication and elaboration. Indeed many scholars have suggested that the dramatic character of the overthrow—full of sex, violence, and family intrigue—hints that this particular aspect of the narrative draws heavily on various Roman mythic and theatrical traditions and as a result the details of the account should be treated with a healthy measure of scepticism.

According to the literary sources, the Roman monarchy had existed since the founding of the city, traditionally by Romulus in 753 BCE, and by the end of the sixth century BCE Rome had been ruled by seven different *reges* (the word *rex*, pl. *reges*, is often translated simply as “king,” although this term does not fully capture the nature of the ancient office). Despite the longevity of the monarchy, the selection of *reges*, and indeed the institution

itself, seems to have been in many ways an *ad hoc* affair. There was only a loose hereditary claim to the title, which was never successfully exploited, and power ultimately lay with the community which granted each *rex* his *imperium* through a vote of the *comitia curiata*. The institution of the Roman *rex* was therefore vulnerable, dependent on maintaining good will among the people of Rome and relationships/alliances with the powerful aristocratic families which lived around the city to maintain control.

The main events of the overthrow occurred ca. 510 BCE with both Livy and Dionysius of Halicarnassus, our main sources for the period, recording essentially the same story—suggesting that by the late Republic at least this particular aspect of Rome’s early history was reasonably well established. Although there were clearly preexisting tensions in Rome, the expulsion of the final *rex* was supposedly brought about by the rape of Lucretia, the wife of Tarquinius Collatinus, a member of the *rex*’s extended family (a second cousin according to Dionysius *Roman History* 4.64), by Sextus Tarquinius, the son of Tarquinius Superbus. Following the rape, Lucretia called together her father, Spurius Lucretius, possibly her husband, and a number of other family members, along with some prominent outsiders including Publius Valerius (Publicola) and the young Lucius Junius Brutus. Once they had assembled, Lucretia told the men of the rape, had them swear to avenge it, and then killed herself out of shame over her dishonor, providing one of Livy’s key *exempla* of archaic Roman chastity and virtue. Interestingly, it was not Lucretia’s husband or her father who was the first to act but Brutus, an outsider to the family, who proclaimed his outrage, mobilized the people of Collatia, and marched on Rome. Upon arriving in Rome the group was initially greeted with terror and confusion by the local populace, but Brutus was able to sway the people with his account of the rape of Lucretia and the many crimes of Rome’s previous *reges*, mobilizing an even larger force against the Tarquins. When Tarquinius Superbus heard about these events he quickly returned to Rome from Ardea only to find the gates barred against him. Tarquin then went away, supposedly north to his family’s homeland of Etruria, to muster support for his cause and attempt to regain his throne. In his absence, however, the Roman people replaced the monarchy with the Republic (*res publica*) which was headed by two annually elected consuls, to whom were distributed most of the powers of the *rex*. The first two consuls were Brutus and Collatinus in 509 BCE, although the literary tradition for this year is problematic to say the least

and Collatinus was supposedly exiled soon after his rise to power and was replaced by Publicola.

The overt literary narrative therefore suggests an aristocratic coup carried out by those closest to the *rex*, motivated by both a desire for power and anger at Tarquin's oppressive policies toward the aristocracy. The character of Brutus best displays this combination of motivations. Brutus was the youngest son of a powerful Roman aristocrat who was supposedly murdered in the early years of Tarquinius Superbus' reign, as the *rex* attempted to consolidate his power in the city. His brothers were also killed, but the youngest son himself was spared because he was thought to be of low intelligence and was therefore given the nickname "Brutus," meaning "stupid," and became the butt of jokes for Tarquin's sons. It is therefore likely that Brutus' later actions against the *rex* were, at least in part, thought to be motivated by revenge for the treatment of himself and his family. But revenge was not the only motivator at work within the character of Brutus, as seen in Livy's anecdote involving the oracle at Delphi (Livy 1.56). To explain a portent at Rome, Brutus was sent along with the sons of the *rex* to the oracle at Delphi in Greece. Once the priestess had given them the answer for which they had initially come, the young men asked a second question: which of them would succeed the *rex*? The priestess answered, "He among you who kisses his mother first will have the highest power in Rome." The young men all rushed back to Rome to kiss their mothers, but Brutus, who interpreted the oracle more metaphorically, pretended to stumble and kissed the Earth, as the Earth could be seen as the common mother to all mankind. Brutus then went on to claim the highest power in Rome by ousting the *rex* and claiming one of the first consulships for himself. So it seems that in addition to revenge for the wrongs against his family, Brutus also had ambitions to become *rex* himself, or at least achieve the highest power in Rome.

The problems with the literary narrative, however, are clearly evident. The dramatic character of the narrative, with its strong mythic overtones, has led some scholars to doubt even the most basic elements of the story. The foolish young man (often a third son) who becomes heir to a kingdom is a stock character in later European folk tales. But while it is impossible to ever prove the details of this narrative, some of the more basic aspects do seem to be corroborated by outside evidence. Most notably, there is a growing body of evidence supporting the presence of the tensions between

the elites and the *rex* in Rome expressed in the narrative, although not necessarily the result of personal enmity. Instead the elite tensions in Rome were probably the result of region-wide shifts in elite settlement. Both the archaeology and literary traditions for early Rome suggest that, in addition to the increasingly powerful urban centers in the region, there also were a number of powerful rural clans (*gentes*). For much of the archaic era, these clans seem to have maintained a certain degree of independence and were able to move from community to community with little to no loss of prestige or power. Examples of this can be seen in the cases of Coriolanus and Appius Claudius during the early Republic, who were both able to change communities and immediately gain power in their new homes, and even in the figures of the *reges* themselves. However, the relationship between the elite clans of Latium and the region's burgeoning communities is highly ambiguous. Although in many ways intertwined and indeed symbiotic, the points of interaction between them seem to have been surprisingly limited. It was only during the sixth century BCE that the archaeology suggests that these clans began to settle in the hinterland of communities like Rome, permanently associating with them and increasingly vying for power in the communities. So, while previously a single clan or clan leader was able to dominate a community for an entire generation, the increased and long-term focus on settlements by the elite in the sixth century BCE in Latium made this impractical. There were simply too many powerful clans in and around communities like Rome who were competing. This pressure from rival clans may have led the men in power, such as the final *rex* of Rome, Tarquinius Superbus, to become increasingly hostile and oppressive in an effort to maintain their positions. But even if the dramatic events of the overthrow of the *rex* did occur as described, they would only have represented the straw which broke the camel's back.

The consequences of the overthrow of the Roman monarchy would initially have been difficult to discern. Indeed the sources suggest that for the vast majority of the Roman populace the change from a monarchy to a Republic barely registered. The community was still controlled by the region's powerful aristocracy, except now power was shared between two (or perhaps more) aristocrats each year instead of being monopolized by a single clan leader for an entire generation. The early consuls (perhaps called *preators* at this stage, which translates simply as "leaders") seem to have maintained the powers of the *rex*, at least as far as military and political

duties were concerned, and even acquired their grant of *imperium* via the same mechanism—a vote of the *comitia curiata*. Only some of the religious duties of the *rex* were assigned to separate priesthoods. Additionally, the goals and ambitions of the new elite seem to have changed little from those of the *reges*, which is unsurprisingly as they all came from the same social and cultural group. The monarchic period's council of elders, the Senate, persisted in the early Republic and even may have increased in power, excluding non-patricians. The early consuls were, at their core, still clan leaders interested in pursuing their personal and clan-based agendas. Being in charge of the community for a year did not change these goals; it merely gave them more urgency. As a result, Rome's warfare in the early Roman Republic seems to have been dominated by the same pursuit of portable wealth which drove the private clan-based warfare which was also occurring beyond Rome's walls. Indeed, overall the community's military and political continued under the early Republic much as it had under the monarchy, albeit with a bit more movement at the top.

The story of the expulsion is fascinating for a number of reasons, quite apart from the dramatic events it contains. Most notably, scholars have been intrigued by the nature of the figures involved and their various motivations, as many of the key characters in the narrative were either familial relations or trusted companions of the *rex*. So in many ways the expulsion of the Roman *rex* can be seen as a military coup carried out by those nearest and dearest to him. The narrative of the expulsion itself is also intriguing because of the various sub-narratives it contains. Wiseman (1998) has identified four distinct stories or strands within the overarching narrative—that of Brutus, Lucretia, Publicola, and Marcus Horatius—which may have originally been separate stories but were combined to create the meta-narrative as preserved sometime during the mid to late Republic. Additionally, the expulsion of the final *rex*, like many other aspects of early Roman history, has strong parallels within Greek history. Indeed, many aspects of the character of Tarquinius Superbus are thought to have been derived from the archetype of the Greek tyrant and it is likely that his overthrow was meant to mirror that of the Peisistratids in Athens. The narrative condemning the monarchy gained further force from the mid- and late republican Romans' dealings with Hellenistic monarchs and client kings, whom they often regarded with hostility and contempt.

Jeremy Armstrong

See also Brutus (Junius Brutus, Lucius); Consul; Dionysius of Halicarnassus; Etruscan Wars; Lake Regillus, Battle of; Latin Wars; Livy; Patrician-Plebeian Conflict

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P

Palmyra

Palmyra is the Greek name for the city of Tadmor, located in an oasis in central Syria. Palmyra was a major hub for trade with the east. Occupied since 2000 BCE, Palmyra was settled by people from many civilizations: Assyrian, Semitic, Arab, Greek (from the Hellenistic Age), and Persian. These cultures are all evident in the site's art, architecture, and archaeology. The dominant language of the Palmyrenes was Aramaic; their cultural identification was probably Semitic.

Mark Antony attempted without success to conquer Palmyra, but the early Roman emperors accepted Palmyra's de facto independence due to the popularity of luxury goods from India and China (especially spices and silk textiles) at Rome. Palmyra remained a free city till Septimius Severus incorporated it into the adjacent Roman province. However, the Roman army recruited units of Palmyrene auxiliaries, especially archers and cavalry.

In the mid-third century, as the Roman Empire threatened to fragment under the stress of barbarian invasions and civil war, Palmyra became an independent realm, the "Palmyrene Empire," ruled by Septimius Odenathus and then by his widow Zenobia. Odenathus seems to have been confirmed as "Ruler of Tadmor" (attested in Palmyrene inscriptions) by the emperor Philip, as a bulwark against Persia. The emperor Gallienus (260–268) granted Odenathus the title of *corrector totius Orientis*, the emperor's deputy in the eastern empire, permitted to command Roman troops. Odenathus succeeded in reconquering part of Mesopotamia from the Persians, and took the native title "King of Kings." He was acclaimed *imperator* by his troops (around 267). Gallienus, faced with many other

rivals for the purple, tolerated this state of affairs. Odenathus died mysteriously perhaps assassinated, ca. 268, succeeded by his widow Queen Zenobia.

Zenobia governed Palmyra as regent for her son Septimius Vaballathus, but aggressively sought to expand the Palmyrene Empire. She appointed Septimius Zabdas as her general. Palmyra pushed forward into Roman Arabia (where the culture was similar). Zabdas defeated the *dux* (commander) of Roman Arabia and sacked the garrison city of Bostra, and proceeded to capture Judaea and invade Egypt. Zabdas and Zenobia captured Alexandria, despite the resistance of the Roman prefect of Egypt, whom the Palmyrenes defeated. Zenobia then sought to consolidate Palmyrene control of Syria. Coins show that Zenobia and Vaballathus increasingly took Roman imperial titles, Zenobia being *Sebaste* (Augusta) and Vaballathus *Sebastos* (Augustus), then the formal Latin titles *Augusta* and *Augustus* on coins minted at Alexandria and Antioch.

Emperor Aurelian could no longer tolerate this rivalry and reconquered Palmyra for the Roman Empire. He first captured Tyana, a city in Cappadocia at the edge of Palmyrene influence. He then defeated Palmyrene forces in the battle of Immae in Syria and forced Zenobia to flee from Emesa in Syria to Palmyra. Aurelian then besieged Palmyra; attempting to flee to the Persians, Zenobia was captured by the Romans. Aurelian court-martialed Zenobia and her generals and advisers, putting the latter to death but sparing Zenobia. Diocletian (284–305) built walls and an army camp in Palmyra as a frontier outpost.

The Greek and Roman literary sources for the Palmyrene Empire are thin and conflicted, including the fanciful *Historia Augusta* and the Byzantine chronicler Zonaras.

Sara E. Phang



View of Palmyra. Though the architectural style seen here is Greco-Roman, Semitic, Persian, and Arabic cultures also flourished at Palmyra. Permitted semi-independence from the Roman Empire, in the mid-third century CE Palmyra broke away and formed an independent empire, expanding into Roman Syria and Egypt. Palmyra (Ruins), Syria. (SANA/AP Photo)

See also Aurelian; Gallienus; Mark Antony; Odenathus; Third-Century CE Crisis; Zenobia

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Panegyric

Panegyric is a rhetorical genre of Greek and Roman literature, an oration or poem addressed to a ruler or to important personages, idealizing and praising them. Despite the flattery, contemporary panegyric is an important historical source, showing how rulers or other personages such as generals or high officials were regarded by contemporaries, in contrast with historiography, biographies, epitomes (abbreviated histories), and chronicles that were written decades or centuries later and subject to hindsight. Formal panegyrics were orations that were performed or were intended to be

performed in the ruler's presence, but other genres of literature may display elements of panegyric.

Roman imperial panegyric can be used as a historical source with caution due to its flattery and idealization. It may attest the emperor's activities, including military campaigns, though the tendency of panegyric to depict emperors as epic warriors makes it difficult to evaluate the emperor's active role as commander. In some cases, a sequence of panegyrics displays the shifting political alliances of the persons involved. Panegyric is also a major source for the ideology of imperial rule, showcasing the traits of a good emperor.

Extant examples of panegyric are Pliny the Younger's panegyric to Trajan (98–117 CE); the *Panegyrici Latini* (Nixon & Rodgers 1994), including orations addressed to Maximian (286–305) and to Constantine (306–337) that illustrate the complex, shifting alliances of the Tetrarchic Civil War; Pacatus' panegyric to Theodosius I (379–395); and works by the Latin poet Claudian, the court panegyrist of Honorius, writing in the late fourth and early fifth centuries. The opposite of panegyric was invective, the systematic rhetorical vituperation of a villainous personage (such as Gaius Verres in Cicero's *Verrine Orations* or Mark Antony in Cicero's *Philippics*).

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See also Emperor as Commander; Loyalty to Empire; Victory

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Pannonia, Pannonians

The Roman frontier province of Pannonia comprised parts of modern-day

Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia, Slovakia, Hungary, and Austria. The Romans first termed this region part of the province of Illyricum, and divided it into Dalmatia and Pannonia after the Pannonian Revolt (in 8–9 or 19–20 CE). The Pannonians, originally of Celtic origin, merged with the many Roman settlers in this strategically important province. In the third and fourth centuries CE, Pannonia and the neighboring Balkan provinces were remarkable for producing emperors and many of the imperial government's and army's officers and officials.

The Romans first categorized the Balkans, from the Dalmatian coast inland, as Illyricum. Their early involvement was with the Illyrian peoples of the Adriatic coast, but in the Pannonian War of 13–9 BCE, Augustus' generals pushed inland, first as far as the River Drava. Though the push toward the Danube began in the reign of Tiberius, not until Trajan's reign (98–117 CE) was the Danube established as the northern frontier, with a line of forts (many of which became important cities) and a Danube River fleet. The river itself was a major artery for transportation. In Trajan's reign, ca. 103–106, Pannonia was divided into Pannonia Superior (upriver) and Pannonia Inferior (downriver) for easier administration.

In the tradition of Greco-Roman ethnography, Dio regards Pannonia as a distant land with a harsh climate and long winters, so that the Pannonians were unable to grow either grapes or olives. However, the Romanized Pannonians readily imported Mediterranean wine and olive oil. The original cultures were native or Celtic, but many people from around the empire, including the personnel from three legions, settled in Pannonia, as did northern Italian traders and slaves, administrative clerks, and traders from Greece and the Near East. Throughout its existence Pannonia remained a well-garrisoned and strategically important province, keeping watch on the frontier and protecting the empire.

Preconquest Pannonians and the inhabitants of the countryside lived primarily in villages and kinship groupings, lacking highly organized states and possessing very few larger urban settlements. The wealthier peoples, such as the Daesitiates, controlled and profited from gold and iron mines. The Greek authors Cassius Dio (who governed Pannonia in the 220s, and faced a mutiny of his soldiers) and Herodian had a dim view of the Pannonians as stereotypical soldiers, tall, strong, courageous in warfare, but slow-witted.

On the other hand, in the third and fourth centuries CE, Pannonia and

the other Balkan provinces (Dalmatia, Moesia Superior, Moesia Inferior, Thrace) produced a number of energetic soldier-emperors, from Maximinus I the Thracian (235–238) to Diocletian (284–305) from Dalmatia and the House of Constantine (beginning with Constantius I, Caesar 293–305, emperor 305–306) from Moesia, to Valentinian I (364–375) and Valens (364–378) from Pannonia. The region also produced lesser administrators and soldiers, presented by Ammianus Marcellinus as a distinct group, ambitious and capable but heavy-handed.

Blanka Misic

See also Dalmatia; Danube; Illyria; Pannonian Revolt; Pannonian Wars

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Pannonian Revolt (6–9 CE)

The Pannonian revolt is also known as the Pannonian-Illyrian revolt, the Great Illyrian revolt and the *Bellum Batiatum*. After conquering Illyricum during the Pannonian War of 13–9 BCE, Augustus hoped to expand into Bohemia, Dacia, and the Carpathians between 8 BCE and 6 CE. He set his plan in motion by displacing Dacian peoples and preparing for a war with Maroboduus, the leader of the German Marcomanni. By 6 CE the Romans, commanded by Tiberius, were about to defeat Maroboduus, when they learned that the Pannonians and Illyrians had taken advantage of their focus on Maroboduus to revolt. According to Cassius Dio, the Pannonians and Illyrians realized how numerous they were when the Romans ordered them to assemble an army to help them defeat Maroboduus. At the urging

of Bato of the Daesitiates, the Pannonians and Illyrians decided to rebel. The Pannonians resented not just forced military service, but also Roman maladministration and excessive taxation. They may also have been destabilized by the cultural changes introduced by conquest.

Initially victorious against the Romans, the Daesitiates were soon joined with another Pannonian people, the Breuci, and other Pannonians and Illyrian tribes. The Breuci were led by two noblemen, also named Bato (a common name in Pannonia) and Pinnes. Velleius describes Bato of the Daesitiates, Bato of the Breuci, and Pinnes as energetic and skilled in military affairs. Bato of the Daesitiates was a local nobleman who also had served in the Roman *auxilia*, where he (and perhaps other Pannonian and Illyrian leaders) acquired experience with Roman military tactics, Roman culture, and Latin. The Pannonians used Greco-Roman military techniques, including siege works, pitched battles, and effective logistics, to better combat their enemies in the revolt.

The Pannonian rebels, led by the two Batos and Pinnes, now numbered some 200,000 infantry and 9,000 cavalry. They mainly were from the Sava River area. The rebels initially attacked any Roman citizens within their territory, then turned upon wealthy nearby cities such as Salonae and Sirmium, looting and killing. When he learned of the revolt, Tiberius rushed south with his troops. His strategy focused on containing the revolt and preventing it from spreading, while protecting important line of communication and major Roman centers. He sent the Twentieth legion, commanded by Valerius Messala, the governor of Illyricum, to protect Siscia from the rebels. At this point the Breuci and Daesitiates separated; the Breuci attacked Sirmium, while the Daesitiates headed for Salonae. One contingent may have planned to attack Italy via Tergeste, the other to penetrate Macedonia, and a third would guard Pannonia. Responding to the Breucian threat, Tiberius commandeered troops from the neighboring province of Moesia. The governor of Moesia, Caecina Severus, and his legions defeated the Breuci on the Drava River, pushing them back into the mountains. The Daesitiates equally failed to take Salonae, and their leader Bato was severely wounded. The Daesitiates withdrew to Sirmium, hoping to help the Breuci renew an attack on that city. The Pannonian rebels made a last stand on Alma Mons (modern-day Fruška Gora), but were constantly harassed by the Romans' Thracian cavalry, acting on behalf of the Romans. The Romans thus secured major Pannonian cities and contained the rebels.

To finish off the rebels, in 7 CE the Romans sent legions from Moesia and two legions from Asia Minor to Illyricum, in addition to allied Thracian cavalry. These reinforcements gave the Roman force ten legions. On their way toward Siscia, the Roman reinforcements were ambushed by the Pannonians between Alma Mons and the Volcaean Marshes. Despite initial heavy losses, the Romans regrouped and fought their way to Siscia.

Realizing that he could not overcome the rebels in open battle, Tiberius decided to starve them into submission by destroying their crops. The Breuci, facing starvation, surrendered the following year (8 CE). Bato of the Breuci betrayed his comrade Pinnes and surrendered to the Romans. The Breucian allies, and particularly Bato of the Daesitiates, resented this. Bato of the Daesitiates captured and killed Bato the Breucian, inciting the Breuci to revolt. Meanwhile, the Romans, led by Tiberius, moved in to besiege the rebels. They besieged Bato at his stronghold of Andetrium, which fell when Tiberius' forces discovered a secret path into the stronghold. The Romans killed most of the Pannonian rebels, but took Bato of the Daesitiates hostage. Tiberius decided to spare his life, exiling him to Ravenna.

Subsequent to the revolt, Pannonia was reorganized to discourage future rebellions. It was divided into the separate provinces of Dalmatia and Pannonia, placing the territory and the peoples within it under closer Roman supervision. The Romans also reorganized the peoples who had caused the most trouble, dividing large groups such as the Breuci and Daesitiates into smaller groups and separating them by the Dalmatian-Pannonian border. Entire tribal groups may have been relocated to different areas of the provinces. Those young Pannonian men who survived the rebellion were enrolled as Roman auxiliaries and sent to serve in other parts of the empire. This strategy removed the likelihood of a similar revolt breaking out in Dalmatia or Pannonia.

Blanka Misic

See also Pannonia, Pannonians; Pannonian Wars

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Pannonian Wars (35–33 BCE, 13–9 BCE)

The Roman conquest of Pannonia, known as the Pannonian Wars began when Octavian (later the emperor Augustus) attacked the Segestani, who lived near ancient Siscia (modern Sisak in Croatia). The Romans had previously fought the Scordisci in 156 BCE, the Iapodes and Taurisci in 129, and the Colapiani in 119. Octavian, however, launched an offensive leading eventually to the full conquest of Pannonia and its conversion into a Roman province. Cassius Dio presents Octavian’s attack as a training exercise for his troops, while Appian’s *Illyrika* presents the campaign as leading to further expansion into Dacian territory. Octavian’s first objective was to conquer Segestica, a city of the Colapiani. The Colapiani inflicted heavy casualties on the Romans en route, but Octavian besieged and took Segestica, dividing it by a wall and garrisoning it with 25 cohorts (12,000 soldiers). He set up a fleet, the *classis Pannonica*, to carry troops and supplies in wartime and enable communication in peacetime. The Segestani rebelled briefly but were again defeated. Octavian’s conquest of Segestica gave the Romans a stepping stone into the Pannonian interior.

The next major Pannonian campaign (13–12 BCE) was led by Augustus’ right-hand man Marcus Agrippa. Relatively little is known about this campaign. Agrippa was probably sent to subdue the Breuci, a Pannonian people in the region of the Sava and Drava rivers. He successfully established a legionary camp at Poetovio (modern Ptuj in Slovenia). Agrippa’s sudden death caused Augustus’ stepson Tiberius to take over the campaign. Tiberius probably led his troops into Pannonia along the Sava,

stopping at Segestica to reorganize the Roman camp there. Tiberius made an alliance with the Celtic-Pannonian Scordisci and conquered several neighboring peoples, including the powerful Breuci, with their aid. After the surrender of the Breuci, other peoples in the area submitted to the Romans. Tiberius simultaneously waged war against the Illyrians, coordinating attacks from the north and south and capturing two capital cities of the Pannonians, later the Roman cities of Mursa and Sirmium (modern-day Osijek in Croatia and modern-day Sremska Mitrovica in Serbia). As was a frequent Roman practice, Tiberius enslaved many of the conquered Pannonians. The Pannonians and Illyrians attempted to revolt in 10–9 BCE, but did not succeed in dislodging the Roman conquest of Illyricum, which was held by five legions.

Roman strategic objectives for the conquest of Pannonia may have featured its important geographic location, as it had three large navigable rivers (the Sava, the Drava, and the Danube) that enabled transport and communications between Rome and the eastern frontier; it also provided land routes to the eastern empire. Adding Pannonia to the empire meant that Rome had easier access to Macedon, Greece, Asia Minor and the Near East, enabling the Romans to guard their interests in the east. Pannonia also provided a platform for further Roman expansion into Dacia and Germania. Pannonia also had wealth of its own, including gold, silver, and iron, the latter needed for Roman arms and armor. Gaining control of a region so rich in natural resources would fund further Roman expansion. The establishment of Roman military bases (first at Segestica) in Pannonia and of a Roman fleet gave Rome a permanent foothold in Pannonia.

In the last years of the reign of Augustus, Tiberius led the Roman advance even deeper into Pannonian territory, securing the lands along the Sava and Drava rivers and enabling them to advance further south and connect Pannonian territory with the Adriatic coastal cities, which had been under Roman control longer. The Sava branches into several smaller rivers, expediting this conquest. The result was the formal creation of the province of Illyricum, ca. 11 BCE. The Romans proceeded to develop the province by building roads and bridges to expedite transport and travel, and also founded several Roman cities, including Mursa, Cibalae, and Sirmium. The spread of Roman culture to the Pannonians had begun. However, Pannonia would revolt in 6–9 CE, led by noblemen from the most powerful Pannonian peoples. The quelling of the revolt was followed by the permanent

assimilation of Pannonia into the Roman Empire.

Blanka Misic

See also Octavian; Pannonia, Pannonians; Pannonian Revolt; Tiberius (Emperor)

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Papirius Cursor, Lucius (Active Late Fourth Century BCE)

Lucius Papirius Cursor was an early Roman general distinguished for his command in the Second Samnite War, inflicting major defeats on the Samnites at Luceria (320 BCE) and Satricum (319). He was consul five times (326, 320, 319, 315, and 313 BCE) and dictator twice (in 325 and 310). The Samnites, a tough mountain-dwelling people of central Italy, were among Rome’s most formidable Italian enemies.

In 325, Papirius Cursor, then dictator, quarreled with his second-in-command, the *magister equitum* (marshal of cavalry) Fabius Rullianus, who had disobeyed his orders and engaged the enemy. Paralleling the episode of Titus Manlius Torquatus and his son in 340 BCE, Papirius threatened to execute Rullianus by beheading him with the axes carried by his lictors. However, popular outcry by the Senate, people, and tribunes persuaded Papirius Cursor to spare Rullianus (Livy 8.30.1–35.9). The incident is sometimes cited as illustrating the powers of the dictator.

The execution of senior officers for disobedience or military incompetence was never a common practice and is not found after this episode (compare Livy 9.16), whereas military discipline for common soldiers was harsh and included capital punishment.

See also Dictator; Manlius Torquatus, Titus; Military Discipline; Samnite Wars; Samnium, Samnites

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Patrician-Plebeian Conflict, Causes

Investigation of causes of the patrician-plebeian conflict has involved some modern skepticism, since authors of the late Republic and early empire, writing about a period centuries earlier, may have projected onto them the social conflict of the late Republic (particularly the Gracchan period). However, considerable social tension also existed in the early Republic.

Widespread debt caused the First Plebeian Secession of 494 BCE if our sources have merit (Livy 2.23–33; Dionysius, *Roman History* 6.22). Legal punishments for debtors at this time supposedly included private imprisonment and slavery, whipping, and sale outside of Rome. These punishments are highly plausible. Closely tied with debt was the plebeian desire to use Roman public land for farming. Finally, military conscription exacerbated these grievances. The story of the impoverished soldier and the ancient narrative of plebeian discontent emphasizing economic hardship fit very well with contemporary indices of economic crisis: during much of the fifth century, Rome experienced cessations in pottery production and import, military success, and temple building (Cicero, *Republic* 2.58; Livy 2.23; Dionysius, *Roman History* 6.26). Our sources for the period also record plebeian agitation for redistribution of farmland taken from territories recently conquered by Roman armies, pointing to discontent over the customs or laws regulating the utilization of public farmland. Wealthy individuals could dominate the exploitation of this land, perhaps by their patron-client relationship with many farmers.

Aside from economic and agricultural problems, abuse of domestic political authority also accounts for major conflict and reform. Consular

abuse of law probably explains the insistence of the tribune of 462 on the production of a written set of Roman legal statutes eventually created in 451–450 (Livy 3.9–64; Dionysius, *Roman History* 10.1–11.50). Roman tradition states that one of the legislators' insolence caused the plebeians to undertake a Second Plebeian Secession and the tribunes and consuls to return to their office, which had been suspended during the period of the composition of the Twelve Tables of Roman law.

Further conflict stems from two main sources: one, the wealthier plebeians seeking the same opportunities as their patrician counterparts, the other, the poorer plebeians seeking a basic livelihood through reforms in, for example, the use of public land. That these two very different sets of concerns appear together in the sources may point to an inaccurate bundling by later historians, or to clever packaging by historical reformers themselves who realized that the plebeians as a mass could be mobilized only by appealing to both the advantaged and the disadvantaged among their number.

Timothy Doran

See also Patricians; Plebeians; Republic, Political Structure; Tribune of the Plebs

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Patrician-Plebeian Conflict, Course

Roman writers of the late Republic describe a centuries-long conflict between patricians and the plebeians resulting in the latter's legal gains. By the first century BCE, a narrative achieved canonical status. This article assumes a basic thread of accuracy in the traditional narrative.

The strikes known as the First and Second Plebeian Secessions supposedly occurred in the fifth century BCE. A colorful story focalizes

plebeian complaints (Livy 2.23; Dionysius, *Roman History* 6.26): an impoverished, abused plebeian war veteran entered the Roman forum to speak in 494 BCE, stating that Sabine depredations deprived him of his crops, burned his cottage, drove off his flocks, and stole his possessions; taxes oppressed him; lenders seized his farm, property, and person, and imprisoned him, where he was whipped. His pitiful state provoked an uprising of men surrounding the Curia, including men enslaved for debt. At news of a Volscian attack, the plebeians asserted that they would not risk their lives to defend Rome if this man's fate could afflict them. A deal was struck. All plebeians who immediately enlisted would be free of debt slavery. This enticed many plebeians to sign up; the Volscian attack was repelled. However, afterward the consul Appius favored the creditors, resulting in more debt enslavement. The plebeians used physical force against creditors seizing debtors, and threatened a riot when news arrived of an imminent Sabine invasion. No plebeians enlisted, instead seceding to the fortified Mons Sacer three miles from the city, and staying quietly on strike, panicking senators and citizens alike. The plebeians then created their own magistrates, council, and assembly meetings. This first secession is dated traditionally to 494/493 (Livy 2.23–33). Since the Romans were engaged in a war against the Volscians, and plebeians comprised a large percentage of the Roman army, the strike was effective. The patrician-plebeian conflict's next phase involved the Roman legal code known as the Twelve Tables. To compose these, two boards, each of 10 men, the so-called Decemvirs, received consular powers in 451–450 (Dionysius, *Roman History* 10.57.5). These men's abuses of power caused another strike, the Second Secession.

The fourth century witnessed continuing conflict brought about by small farmers' poverty. The legend of Marcus Manlius Capitolinus reveals massive plebeian debt in the 380s (Livy 6.11.7), with debt riots occurring in 380 and 378. The later fourth century saw several developments favoring plebeians. In 339, plebeians were allowed to become censors. In the 320s debt bondage disappeared due both to the new profusion of foreign slaves and, in 326, the Poetelian-Papirian Law was passed, which eliminated debt enslavement for Roman citizens (Livy 8.28). By 300, many prestigious, politically powerful magistracies became open to plebeians, and a law gave them *provocatio*, the right of appeal against a magistrate's physical coercion, including the death penalty.

The third century saw a final diminishing of formally-defined patrician-plebeian conflict. In 287 BCE occurred the Third Plebeian Secession, provoked by war and debt (Dio fragment 37). In response, the *lex Hortensia* mandated that plebiscites now be automatically binding upon all Roman citizens without senatorial approval, a huge concession. But plebeian-patrician conflict had already been subsiding throughout these years by other means. First, as a result of Rome's expansion, colonization and public land acquisitions over the course of the late fourth and third century allowed plebeians more access to farmland. Second, the tribunes became state magistrates, limiting their revolutionary tendencies. Last, the plebeian-patrician legal distinction faded in importance: elite failure to reproduce shrunk the hereditary patrician caste over the centuries, extinguishing many patrician clans. As an index of this process, the consuls of 172 BCE were both plebeians. The passage of the *lex Hortensia* makes most (not all) scholars see 287 BCE as the end of the patrician-plebeian conflict, although it certainly was not the end of wealth polarization, poverty, or civil conflict in the Roman Republic. The active socioeconomic distinction consisted by this time of a *nobilitas* (consisting of both patricians and elite plebeians) versus everyone else.

Timothy Doran

See also Patricians; Plebeians; Republic, Political Structure; Tribune of the Plebs

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Patrician-Plebeian Conflict, Consequences

The first and most important outcomes of this conflict stem from the First

Plebeian Secession of 494 BCE, and were preconditions to all future plebeian reform: the formation of a new council of the plebeians and the creation of the tribunes of the plebs. This counter-magistracy formalized an earlier custom known as the *provocatio ad populum*, an appeal to the People for judgment in cases of magisterial oppression. The tribunes' primary function was offering protection and aid, both physical and legal, to plebeians. They sat outside Senate meetings and could veto any magistrate's proposed legislation (Livy 2.23–33; Dionysius *Roman History* 6.89; Valerius Maximus 2.2.7). The plebeians swore to avenge by execution any assault against the tribunes.

The tribunes soon acquired the right to summon both formal and informal assemblies, the primary mechanism for plebeian input into state decisions. Over the course of the fifth century, they gained the power to bring patricians for trial in front of the plebeians, and to call meetings of and bring proposals before the Senate. They acquired the right to pass plebiscites, that is, rulings from the plebeian assembly that first affected only plebeians and, through gradual and obscure steps, gained broader legal status. Plebiscites may have enjoyed acceptance on an *ad hoc* basis early on and have been treated as sacred, but by the *lex Hortensia* of 287 at the latest, they became recognized as binding over all citizens regardless of Senatorial approval (Dionysius, *Roman History* 7.16, 35, 65, 10.31, 51).

Another consequence was the creation of the new plebeian office known as the aediles, created shortly after the tribunes and subordinate to them. Their earliest responsibility was the upkeep of the temple-precinct of Ceres, Liber, and Libera on the Aventine Hill, an important religious center and meeting place for the plebeians. Here, from 449 BCE onward were kept written records of Senatorial decrees (Livy 3.4.13). Aediles' duties later included supervision of Roman public order, grain supply, markets, and games, and upkeep of Roman streets and public buildings. As an unintended consequence, patrician curule aediles were created to balance this magistracy by 366 BCE.

The next significant consequence of patrician-plebeian conflict is the publication in 451, in inscribed form, of the Twelve Tables of Roman law. This occurred at the demand of the plebeian tribune of 462 BCE (Livy 3.9–64; Dionysius, *Roman History* 10.1–11.50). These tables specified rules for inheritance, debt and debt bondage, marriage and reproduction, walls between neighbors, summons to court, and contracts. They outlawed

plebeian- patrician intermarriage, family vendetta, torture, and execution without trial. Displaying them transferred Roman laws from the domain of privileged elites into the realm of public property where they could be consulted and challenged at any time.

The abuse of power by some of the *decemviri*, the writers of the Twelve Tables, led to the Second Plebeian Secession of 449 BCE. The Valerio-Horatian laws followed in the same year, outlawing the appointment of any magistrate whose rulings could not be appealed, a direct response to the abuse of power by the *decemviri*. These laws may also have made plebiscites valid for the entire citizen body, but probably only with senatorial approval. Four years later, the *lex Canuleia* overturned the Twelve Tables' law against plebeian-patrician intermarriage, creating new possibilities for plebeian advancement through strategic marriage, and patricians created a new magistracy to be held only by plebeians: the military tribunes with consular powers. These tribunes held supreme office for a relatively short time in the early Republic.

The fourth century's reforms benefitted both elite and non-elite plebeians. The Licinio-Sextian legislation of 367 permitted one consul to be plebeian. The *lex Ogulnia* of 300 BCE removed the final obstruction to entering priestly collegia. Increases were made to some priesthoods, surely to provide room for ambitious plebeians: four *pontifices* were added, bringing the total number to nine, and five of the augurs were required to be plebeians. However, some fourth-century legislation also presumably helped the poor. The 367 ruling reformed debt in some way, but also improved poor plebeians' access to public land for their own farming, thus fostering their economic independence from creditors (Livy 6.35). The Genucian Law of 342 further advanced plebeian protections by restraining interest rates from rising to usurious levels and by mitigating debt; plus, it curbed elite power by prohibiting the possession of two magistracies by one person simultaneously, and disallowed repeated holding of an office within one decade. The *lex Valeria* of 300 BCE reaffirmed citizen rights to appeal, benefiting all classes (Livy 10.9.3). Most of the Genucian laws seem to have been abandoned shortly afterward, however, except one reinforcing the plebeian-patrician consular division set up by the Licinio-Sextian Laws.

Patrician-plebeian conflict is considered to have nominally ended in 287, with the *lex Hortensia*. This legislative package, enacted in response to the Third Secession, probably made plebiscites no longer require senatorial

approval. In the final analysis, the reforms sparked over the centuries by this conflict again had two major branches: for the poor, the reforms created occasional relief and outlawed debt bondage. For elite plebeians, the reforms allowed entry into all magistracies, civil and religious, previously reserved for patricians. The plebeian elites' interests came closely to overlap with those of the patricians, sharply diminishing plebeian leadership in reform. In 172, both consuls were plebeian, indicating that a policed division of the consulship was no longer required. However, these reforms did not remove chronic poverty from the Roman citizenry, and the Roman voting system remained deeply committed to underweighting the votes of citizens outside the elite.

Timothy Doran

See also Patricians; Plebeians; Republic, Political Structure; Tribune of the Plebs

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Patricians

In the early Republic, patricians were a hereditary aristocracy that monopolized the consulship and important priesthoods. This definition of patrician became obsolescent after the Licinio-Sextian Laws of 367 BCE. Patrician families persisted, but tended to die out over time.

The origins of the patrician order are obscure. Certain family names were defined as patrician, others as plebeian, and Roman mythology derived some of these patrician gentes from the Trojans led by Aeneas who settled Latium some generations before the founding of Rome in 753 BCE. Though probably non-mythical, the origin of patricians remains vague. Attributed to

the monarchic period, patricians are thought to have comprised the early senators, termed *patres*; after non-patricians were admitted to the Senate, the Senate was termed *patres et conscripti*, the *conscripti* being non-patricians. However, the kings themselves were not patricians, and the grasp of patricians upon the higher magistracies (especially consulship) actually hardened sometime after the end of the monarchy. A small number of plebeian-named consuls are attested in the first decades of the Republic (ca. 509–445 BCE), few between 445 and 427, and almost none between 427 and 401 BCE. Patricians also dominated important state priesthoods. By 400, the patrician order was a closed one; patricians needed to be the children of two patrician parents. However, a ban on patrician-plebeian marriage was repealed in 445 BCE by Gaius Canuleius.



Detail of a procession on the Ara Pacis, ca. 9 BCE, depicting major *flamines* (high priests of Mars, Jupiter, and other gods) wearing ritual pointed caps. Such priesthoods were dominated by patrician clans, though the plebeians gained access to Roman magistracies by the mid-fourth century BCE. *Ara Pacis Augustae*, Rome, Italy. (Emi Cristea/[Dreamstime.com](#))

Writing centuries later, and influenced by the social conflicts of the late Republic, Greek and Roman authors tended to stereotype and exaggerate the conflict of patricians and plebeians. Nonetheless, this conflict resulted in the incorporation of plebeian institutions, legislated by the Valerian-Horatian Laws of 449 BCE. These institutions included plebeian magistracies (originally the officers of the plebs as a separate body): the tribunes of the plebs and the aediles; the *concilium plebis* or plebeian assembly; and the

right of citizens to *provocatio*, appeal from a magistrate's decision. The *lex Poetelia* and Licinian-Sextian laws abolished debt bondage, and required that one of the two annual consuls be a plebeian. It also became possible for politicians to hold both plebeian offices (tribune of the plebs, aedile) and formerly patrician offices (praetorship, consulship). However, some aedileships (curule aediles) were reserved for patrician candidates, and the censorship was also originally patrician.

After the Licinio-Sextian reform, patricians remained an elite body of aristocrats who were descended from and married other patricians, but patricians no longer dominated political office. Plebeians could hold the higher magistracies, including the consulship. As a result of plebeian access to higher magistracies and patrician holding of formerly plebeian magistracies, a patrician-plebeian aristocracy developed in which patricians intermarried with wealthy plebeians. This aristocracy is collectively termed "the nobility" (*nobilitas*) and dominates the Republic of the third through first centuries BCE. A noble from a wealthy plebeian family was as likely as a patrician to identify with the values and goals of wealthy aristocrats, as opposed to those of the *plebs urbana* (urban lower social strata).

Conflict of the wealthy and the poor in the late Republic is best termed factional or social conflict rather than patrician-plebeian conflict. Though it is likely that most surviving patricians sympathized with the wealthy, many wealthy plebeians also sympathized with them, and not all plebeians supported the *populares*. Two members of patrician families, Clodius Pulcher, and Julius Caesar, supported *popularis* causes, Clodius actually undergoing a formal transition to the plebeian order (*transitio ad plebem*) to become a tribune of the plebs.

Patrician families did tend to hold important state priesthoods, such as the *flamen Dialis* (high priest of Jupiter), *flamen Martialis* (high priest of Mars), the *rex sacrorum*, the Arval Brethren, and the *Salii* or "leaping" priests of Mars, named for a ritual dance that they performed. So that their sons would qualify for these priesthoods, patricians had to continue to marry other patricians. This requirement constrained the reproduction of patrician families, who tended to die out, such that Augustus promoted new members into the patrician group so that the state priesthoods could continue to be filled by patricians.

Sara E. Phang

See also Augustus; Consul; Factions; Overthrow of the Monarchy; Patrician-Plebeian Conflict; Plebeians; Religion and Warfare; Republic, Political Structure

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Patronage (Relationship)

Patronage was fundamental to the political and social workings of Roman public life. This was especially true during the Republic, where the success of a Roman magistrate's election campaign often depended upon the social and political network that he had established via the bestowing of *beneficia*, gifts, or favors. While the Roman philosopher Seneca wrote that the offering and acceptance of personal benefits were fundamental to the solidarity of human society (*De Beneficiis* 1.4), members of Rome's elite often used elements of patronage to further their own agenda at the expense of Rome's political cohesion. This is shown during the civil wars and conflicts of the late Republic, as powerful individuals used their personal networks of support to compete for political supremacy. With the creation of the Principate patronage remained an integral social and political concept of the Roman world, but with a single individual, the emperor, recognized as the supreme patron of the empire.

The defining elements of the Roman concept of patronage have been much studied and debated by modern scholarship. Generally, three primary components have been identified and agreed upon. Firstly, the concept involved an exchange of goods and services between two parties that was fundamentally reciprocal in nature. Secondly, the relationship between the two parties involved had to be one that was both personal and persistent. Thirdly, and finally, the relationship was expected to be asymmetrical, that is the two parties involved were for the most part of unequal social standing and the benefactions concerned were of contrasting value. According to this interpretation, patronage was a concept that conflicted with that of *amicitia* (friendship) where social equals exchanged gifts or services. "Friends" considered it boorish to emphasize the reciprocal nature of the gift or favor

as expecting a return.

However, the argument that patronage was always a relationship based on social inequality has recently been challenged as the result of an examination of Seneca's treatise *De Beneficiis*, which discusses the offering and accepting of benefactions in ancient society. It has been argued that patronage did occur between social equals, and that the exchange of benefactions was entirely voluntary, and undertaken on the understanding that the client was not obligated to repay the patron. Consequently, this argument defines the concept as an equal relationship between members of Roman society, the voluntary nature of which served to create strong bonds of *amicitia* between the parties involved, rather than acted as its antithesis. It was the strength of the bonds of *amicitia* then created between individuals that led Latin writers, such as Seneca, to recognize patronage as being essential to human social cohesion (see Griffin 2003). Seneca's presentation of the concept in this way, however, is greatly idealized and offers an ideological contrast to its implementation during the violent transition between Republic and empire.

In political circles patronage was an essential tool, since it enabled individuals to attain the required personal power base to aid their ascent of the *cursus honorum*, the standard Roman political career path. Magistrates competing for election would expend greater sums of money to obtain the required votes, since the bestowal of gifts would obligate supporters to elect candidates. Such a practice of bribery was termed *ambitus* (meaning literally "going around") and was punishable by Roman law. There was no single form electoral bribery could take. Magistrates could bribe other members of the Senate with personal favors, offer monetary gifts to Rome's citizen body, or provide spectacles and popular entertainment such as gladiatorial games. The use of *ambitus* in Roman politics became increasingly common and resulted in politics becoming the exclusive domain of the wealthiest or the most powerful and influential members of Roman society.

Patronage also became a central force within the Roman army of the late Republic. In ca. 107 BCE, Marius introduced a series of reforms whereby Rome's legions could be recruited from landless citizens, known as the *capite censi*. In consequence, the *capite censi* became entirely dependent upon the generals who commanded, equipped, paid, and provided them with land grants following their retirement. Generals were also an

important source of extra income for their troops by giving them bonuses in the form of spoils following victories or during a triumph. The dependence of Roman troops upon their commanders created unbreakable bonds of loyalty between them, and as such Roman legions became in effect the personal armies of powerful individuals. Ultimately, such patronage enabled the civil warfare between Marius (and his followers) and Lucius Cornelius Sulla in 88 and 83 BCE, and several decades later the civil wars between Julius Caesar and the Pompeians (49–45 BCE) and between Caesar's heir Octavian and his opponents (44–31 BCE).

Following the conclusion to the civil wars of the late Republic, patronage became a vital component of the Principate. To maintain the loyalty of the Roman people to the new regime, emperors embarked on ambitious public building projects, put on spectacles and games to commemorate important dates, and embarked on military campaigns to ensure Rome's continued stability and prosperity. By monopolizing public patronage in this way the Principate was able to present itself as a unifying and stabilizing entity, an aspect corroborated by Seneca in his *De Beneficiis*.

Alexander G. Peck

See also Amicitia; Army in Politics; Bribery and Corruption; Civil Wars (I) (49–45 BCE); Civil Wars (II) (44–31 BCE); Client Monarchs; Cursus Honorum (Republic); Emperor as Patron; Marian-Sullan Conflict; Marius; Princeps, Principate; Res Gestae Divi Augusti

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Pay and Finances, Military (Imperial)

Expenditure on the pay, benefits, and supply of the Roman imperial army comprised the largest single element of the imperial budget. This budget was probably recorded in antiquity, but documents at the level of imperial policy have not survived. Modern scholars have reconstructed and extrapolated the finances of the imperial army from remarks in literary authors and from sporadically surviving pay documents. Though no certain conclusion can be made, there is much evidence that the costs of the army were a source of conflict. Emperors and the aristocracy (urban elite) viewed the costs of the army as burdening the imperial finances and criticized the greed of soldiers, but since their power depended on the army, emperors were unable to dispense with military pay, donatives, and benefits. At the same time, the emperor's role as patron and benefactor of his subjects made raising taxes infeasible. The emperors resorted to short-term measures to raise money for the army, including debasement of the silver coinage, with long-term consequences.

This budget may have been documented by the imperial bureaucracy (see *Breviarium totius imperii*, Bureaucracy). Literary authors remark briefly, for instance, that Domitian (81–96 CE) raised pay, as did Severus (193–211) and Caracalla (211–217). Bureaucratic documents that have survived from Egypt and the Near East attest the pay of soldiers for different branches of the service at different points in time. Overall pay scales have been reconstructed and heavily extrapolated by modern scholars, assuming that pay rates remained proportional over time from the first century CE to the third. The total budget further requires reconstruction and/or assumptions about the total size of the Roman armed forces. As a result, conclusions about the military budget as a whole are tentative. The discovery of a new and valuable document might enable scholars to reassess pay rates and the overall military budget.

Surviving evidence shows that legionary infantry in the Augustan period received 900 sesterces (HS) a year, raised by Domitian (81–96) to 1,200 HS. Legionary infantry may have received 2,400 HS under Severus (193–211) and 3,600 under Caracalla (211–217). They received an attested 7,200 HS during Maximinus (235–238). Legionary cavalry received reconstructed rates of 1,050 (Augustus), 1,400 (Domitian), 2,800 (Severus), 4,200 (Caracalla), and an attested 8,400 (Maximinus).

Auxiliary infantry received an attested 750 HS (Augustus), 1,000 HS (Domitian), 2,000 (Severus), and an attested 3,000 (Caracalla) and 6,000

(Maximinus). For auxiliary cavalry, one document attests 900 HS (Augustus), and the proportional rates would be 1,200 (Domitian), 2,400 (Severus), 3,600 (Caracalla), and 7,200 (Maximinus).

Modern estimates of the costs of the imperial army range from 250 million to 500 million HS (sesterces) in the reign of Augustus, to 1.12 billion HS (in the reign of Caracalla). J. B. Campbell has suggested a total cost of 350 to 380 million HS in the early first century CE, including pay for legionaries, urban troops, *auxilia*, and legionary and praetorian pensions, assuming auxiliaries received 5/6 legionary pay. At risk of anachronism, the Roman Empire's GNP has been estimated at 20 billion HS. Some modern industrial societies spend a much greater proportion of their national budgets on defense. The Roman Empire, of course, did not employ modern mechanized warfare. However, much of the Roman Empire's wealth was in land, and thus not directly available to the government as coin.

That the finances of the army were a source of political and social conflict is much better documented. Tacitus and Cassius Dio, as chroniclers of the early empire, were much concerned with it. The educated elite, to which both emperors (before the third-century crisis) and senators belonged, disapproved of excessive expenditure upon the army, especially the Praetorian Guard. The moralistic tradition of military discipline (*disciplina militaris*) emphasized the virtues of simplicity and hardship.

The straitened circumstances of the imperial budget were not merely a matter of political discourse. In 5 CE, near the end of his reign, Augustus extended praetorian service from 12 to 16 years and legionary service from 16 to 20 years, with 5 years in reserve. This extension meant that more soldiers would die of natural causes or the dangers of service before their time expired, and was probably intended to reduce the demands for pensions. The result was the mutinies of the Rhine and Danube legionaries in 14 CE. They complained that they were being made to serve in old age, that their pensions were withheld or consisted of inferior land, and that deductions from their pay for supplies and to bribe centurions consumed most of their pay. Tiberius yielded some concessions. But there was no pay raise until Domitian, who increased legionary salaries by one-third and is said to have reduced the size of the army to do so; inscriptions show that legionary service was also extended to 25 years, probably to reduce the expense of pensions.

In contrast with these somewhat rational policies, the emperor's role as

patron of his troops dictated the payment of donatives, which might be necessary to keep the troops' loyalty but also made subversion possible. Claudius I (41–54) owed his accession to the support of the praetorians, and so gave them a very large donative of 15,000 HS (sesterces) per man. Suetonius remarks that Claudius was “the first to buy the support of the army with a bribe” (Suetonius, *Claudius* 10.4). But refusal to pay a donative could lead to disaster. Nymphidius Sabinus, a commander of the praetorians and supporter of Galba (emperor in 68–69 CE) had promised the praetorians a large donative, but Galba himself refused to pay it, alienating the praetorians. Otho bought their favor and persuaded them to revolt against and assassinate Galba. A similar fate befell Pertinax (193 CE) and Macrinus (217–218 CE) when they attempted to impose fiscal austerity on the army.

Another source of conflict was the supply of the imperial army. During wars, and more and more during peacetime, the Roman army supplied itself locally, requisitioning food, fodder, and transport from the provincials, a practice that increased as the purchasing power of the Roman silver coinage dropped. Military personnel were authorized to commandeer supplies and transport (such as animals) from provincials, who resented this behavior, particularly when it was uncompensated and involved force or insolence. Early in the third century CE, inscriptions from Thrace and Asia Minor show that towns petitioned the emperors for the redress of abusive military requisitions. The emperors issued rescripts intended to reprove and repress the soldiers. The towns commemorated the emperors' justice by inscribing the petition and response on stone.

From the soldiers' very different perspective, personnel had much of their pay deducted for food, fodder, and equipment, including one-time larger expenses such as armor and tents. Ordinary legionaries, and certainly auxiliaries, were paid much less well than the praetorians or officers. They did not receive additional pay for travel expenses or combat duty. Many soldiers attempted to support personal servants (slaves) or wives and children, for whom the army of the Principate did not provide additional pay or rations.

Conflict over expenditure on the army was more severe because the Roman imperial budget lacked what modern scholars term economic rationality and bureaucratic rationality. Income was restricted, and expenditure was required, by a political culture of patronage in which rulers dispensed benefactions to demonstrate benevolence toward their subjects or

to honor high-status individuals or groups. Among these benefactions were exemptions from taxation. Senators and their families, the population of Italy, and soldiers and veterans were all exempt from taxes. The emperors also granted tax remissions or immunities as marks of favor to individuals and communities, and provided overall tax remissions as benefactions to their subjects. In the eyes of their subjects, good rulers (emperors and governors) taxed lightly rather than exacting excessive tribute, which could and did lead to provincial revolts. This political culture placed limits upon income, especially as the imperial budget had no concept of deficit spending. Emperors, such as Vespasian or Diocletian who raised taxation or collected it more efficiently were regarded as avaricious.

Many sources of imperial wealth were ad hoc and intermittent. Some emperors raised money in emergencies by auctioning off the palace furnishings, which contained many expensive items. A major but intermittent source of money was spoils from conquest. Bullion from the exploitation of provincial mines was another source of imperial income, as were confiscations of estates from wealthy aristocrats who were tried and convicted for treason, a practice which some emperors abused.

Expenditures were also irrational and politically determined. The emperors gave donatives to soldiers and *congiaria* (handouts) to civilians at imperial accessions and on major anniversaries or to celebrate fortunate events (weddings, victories). They provided public amenities and entertainments such as gladiatorial games, and were expected to assist members of high-status groups (such as senators) who fell into poverty. Even if an emperor was not personally extravagant on the scale of a Caligula or Nero, the emperors themselves were expected to maintain a certain style of life commensurate with their rank. They met some of their expenses from the vast estates that they came to own, starting with Augustus' payment of 1.43 million HS from his own property for veteran pensions and the initial funding of the *aerarium militare*.

By the mid-second century onward, emperors often met the demands for military payments by debasement of the coinage, alloying silver with base metal and thus increasing the number of but decreasing the value of silver coins. The impact on the Roman economy was gradual. Prices did not rise steeply at first as a result of the debasement but remained relatively stable, rising slowly through the late second century CE. Inflation began to rise steeply after 235, and may have contributed to the political instability of

235–284, since the pay of soldiers was worth less, inducing them to support rival emperors who offered donatives. However, inflation continued to rise steeply during the First Tetrarchy (293–305), when political stability had been restored. Constantine succeeded in stabilizing the currency, minting the gold *solidus* which became the foundation of the later Roman monetary system.

From the late third century to the end of our period, the later Roman government repeatedly sought to repress individual and group evasion or refusal of fiscal obligations. Diocletian and Constantine attempted to set the imperial finances on a more rational footing, creating a more uniform tax system and penalizing persons who evaded fiscal obligations such as the payment of money or provision of services. The first Tetrarchy benefited from a great victory over Persia in 297–298, but the second Tetrarchy faced the expenses of civil warfare. Galerius (305–311) imposed a tax on Italy. However, these practices did not offset the cost of the intermittent civil wars of the fourth and fifth centuries CE, the loss of much of the eastern army in the battle of Adrianople (378), and the loss of parts of the western empire to the Germanic invasions in the fifth century CE, areas which no longer supplied taxes or manpower.

Sara E. Phang

See also *Aerarium Militare*; Army in Politics; Augustus; *Breviarium Totius Imperii*; Bureaucracy (Roman Military); Caracalla; Coinage; Domitian; Donatives; Emperor as Patron; Military Discipline; Plunder; Rhine and Pannonian Mutinies; Septimius Severus; Tacitus; Third-Century CE Crisis; Veterans; War of Four Emperors

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Pay and Finances, Military (Republic)

According to tradition, the Roman army introduced pay (*stipendium*) at the siege of Veii in 396 BCE (Livy 4.59–60; Diodorus Siculus 14.16.5). At that time *stipendium* was probably issued in kind, as grain rations. Because the earliest Romano-Campanian coinage dates from 326 BCE at Naples, the Romans around 400 BCE used uncoined bronze measured in weight and often cast as unstruck lumps (*aes rude*), probably inconvenient for an army on the march. Available coinage in 396 was Greek or Sicilian, and would have been difficult for Roman soldiers to use in the poorly monetized economy of central Italy.

The circulation of coinage in Rome leapt upward with the Punic Wars period and the conquest of the wealthy eastern Mediterranean. Booty in precious metal was melted down and struck into coins. Silver "Roman" didrachms appear around 310 BCE, but around 211 BCE the silver denarius (as opposed to didrachm) was introduced at Rome. There was at yet no Roman gold coinage. The purpose of such silver coinage was probably not to enable soldiers to buy rations, as distribution in kind would be more direct, but to pay donatives (rewards) after successful campaigns. As such, the coins already manifested an ideological element, being (as in the Greek city-states and as today) a "national" symbol. The early issues often depicted the legendary wolf that suckled Romulus and Remus. The production of state coinage became the task of junior Roman magistrates who often advertised their own families on the coins.

The first Roman gold coins were minted by Sulla around 84 BCE to pay his troops, imitated by Caesar and the Pompeians in the Caesarian-Pompeian Civil War (49–45 BCE). Caesar is said to have raised soldiers' pay, though the date of his policy is not known. To pay their soldiers, Brutus and Cassius struck a famous issue depicting the "cap of liberty" between two daggers, boasting of the assassination of Caesar. Likewise, Octavian's and

Antony's moneyers used coin legends and images to propagandize the civil war.

However, the army tended to withhold pay, distributing necessities to the soldiers in lieu of pay. Augustus' legionaries complained that they did not see much of their pay due to this practice (Tacitus, *Annals* 1.17). Overall, the study of military pay in the Republic is hampered by the lack of surviving documents comparable to those in the Principate. More is known about supply (logistics).

Less is also known about the finances of the republican army than that of the imperial period. The *tributum* or tax levied on citizens was used to pay for military *stipendia* and equipment. As a result of the booty from the Third Macedonian War, Roman citizens were exempted from paying *tributum* from 167 BCE onward. As conquered regions developed into peaceful provinces, Rome started pulling in taxes from the provinces, levied by tax farmers (*publicani*) who bid for contracts set by the censors.

The Senate and the quaestors managed the finances of the army, but in the period of overseas warfare, due to the inefficiency of travel and communication, much supply and procurement of coin must have been *ad hoc* and immediate, supplied by plunder and requisitions from allies and client rulers. In his campaign in Spain, Cato the Elder boasted that "the war will be self-supporting" (*bellum se ipsum alet*, Livy 34.9.12). The phrase has justified military plundering through medieval and early modern Europe. In his Greek campaign in 87–86 BCE, because the Marians had declared him a public enemy, Sulla did not have authorization from the Senate to requisition money from client rulers. He turned instead to plundering gold and silver treasures from famous Greek temples. Sulla later took steps to restore the temple treasures.

Beginning with Marius' recruitment of the *capite censi*, the financing of armies now required funding their discharge benefits as well as pay and supply during service. These necessities contributed to the crisis of the late Republic. After returning to Rome in 82, Sulla and his followers raised immense amounts of money by proscribing their enemies and confiscating and auctioning their property. Some confiscated land went directly to Sullan veterans. Pompey's and Caesar's military careers and benefits for their soldiers were funded by immense plunder from the Mithridatic Wars and from the Gallic Wars, respectively. The Second Triumvirate (Octavian, Antony, and Lepidus) resorted to proscriptions and confiscations to provide

their soldiers with pay and discharge benefits. In his *Res Gestae* Augustus emphasizes that he paid his legionaries' discharge benefits from his own patrimony, without mentioning its sources. The rationalization of military benefits (and discouragement of civil war's plundering) would not occur until Augustus created the *aerarium militare*, a military treasury paid from taxation.

Sara E. Phang

See also Army in Politics; Augustus; Civil Wars (I) (49–45 BCE); Civil Wars (II) (44–31 BCE); Coins; Donatives; Logistics; Plunder; Pompey; Punic War, First; Punic War, Second; Sulla, Lucius Cornelius; Veii, Siege of

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Peace

In contrast with the Republic, peace (*pax*) was promoted as a positive value in the early empire, connoting the absence of civil war. As with many other abstract principles, *Pax* was personified as a female deity.

The Romans of the Republic appear not to have valued peace highly, as their political structure and values promoted warfare. Victory in warfare was a source of glory for Roman consuls and lesser magistrates, and a source of wealth for the citizenry through military service. Prowess in warfare was closely associated with *virtus*, “manliness” or “courage.” In contrast, *pax* as inactivity or leisure (*otium*) was associated with negative traits, such as idleness (*desidia*, *segnitia*) and even cowardice (*ignavia*). The Romans of the traditional Republic sometimes went to war just for the purpose of preventing such idleness in the citizen body.

In the Republic, peace was an entity sought by Rome's enemies when they surrendered unconditionally (*deditio in fidem*). Peace was thus an entity sought by non-Romans on Roman terms.

The protracted civil wars and vicious civil conflicts of the late Republic

motivated Augustus, once he had defeated his rivals, to promote *pax* as a positive virtue, in the sense of the absence of civil conflict. At Rome Augustus constructed the *Ara Pacis Augustae*, an elaborate shrine to Augustan Peace that also glorified the imperial family. The historian Tacitus revives the republican negative associations of peace to criticize the emperor Tiberius as “uninterested in extending the boundaries of Roman dominion” and instead persecuting internal rivals (Tacitus, *Annals* 4.32).

By the later empire peace became a more positive virtue, regarded with nostalgia, due to the persistent invasions or threat of barbarian invasion. However, a peace sought on the enemy’s terms was still regarded by Romans as shameful, an attitude manifested by Ammianus Marcellinus in his account of the peace Jovian (emperor 363–364) made with the Persians.

Sara E. Phang

See also Ammianus; *Ara Pacis*; Augustus; Civil Warfare; *Deditio* (Surrender); Janus, Temple of; Jovian; Tacitus; *Virtus*

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Persia, Arsacid

The Arsacid Persians—or Parni—entered history as one of three nomadic tribes making up the Dahae, a Scythian confederacy which lived east of the Caspian Sea. After abandoning the Dahae region (ca. 250 BCE), the Parni settled in the Seleucid province of Parthava, which later became “Parthia.” Under their semimythical leader, Arsaces I, they soon won independence from the Seleucids, prompting Arsaces to found the Arsacid dynasty. In Roman sources, *Parthia* is usually employed for Arsacid Persia.

Over the next two centuries, the Arsacids slowly dismantled the Seleucid Empire. They first swallowed up smaller, neighboring territories such as Hyrcania, Bactria, and Media. But after several victories against the

Seleucids, the Arsacids set their sights on the more profitable regions of Mesopotamia. Babylonia, in particular, with its numerous large cities, eventually became the hub of the Arsacids' new empire, which stretched from the Euphrates River in the west to the Indus River in the east.

The Seleucids' collapse might have taken the Arsacids all the way to the Mediterranean. But by the mid-first century BCE, Rome was already asserting its authority in eastern Asia Minor and Syria. The Roman triumvir Crassus' unprovoked attack on Persia in 53 BCE permanently marred any chance of lasting peace between Rome and Persia. During the next 300 years, the two superpowers engaged each other in a vicious cycle of invasions and counterattacks that, in the end, did little to alter the overall political makeup of the Near East (see Persian Wars, Arsacid).

While neither Arsacid Persia nor Rome ever permanently overcame the other, their long conflict did diminish the Arsacids' prestige at home. The Roman emperor Trajan's invasion of Persia (114–117 CE) was the first to sack the Arsacids' main capital at Ctesiphon. But several of Trajan's successors (Lucius Verus in 165; Septimius Severus in 197; and possibly Caracalla in 215) temporarily seized the capital as well. Although the Romans never held Ctesiphon for long, the city's repeated capture made later Arsacid kings seem weak in the eyes of Persia's nobility.

Civil war, which was a constant bane for the Arsacids, also intensified as royal family members vied with each other for power. By the third century, the nobility's waning confidence in the royal line finally led it to look elsewhere. In 224 CE, an internal revolt of Persian vassals deposed the last Arsacid ruler, Artabanus V. The revolt's leader, Ardashir, the son of Sasan, then established a new dynasty, the Sassanids, who proved a much more difficult foe for Rome in the ensuing decades.

The Arsacid Persians' political system has been described as "feudal." The king, who was required to be an Arsacid, wielded absolute power at the top of the social structure. The only check on his authority was a dual council of nobles and Magi, a special tribe of Zoroastrian priests, which elected each new Arsacid ruler. Below the king, court officials and local administrators, chosen from the Arsacid family or from Persia's seven noble clans, ran the empire's minor kingdoms and larger cities. Although the Arsacids constructed Ctesiphon early on as their main capital, their court remained itinerant for much of its history. Frequent travel allowed kings to supervise administrators in the provinces more closely. But to prevent

corruption or rebellion in far-flung regions, Persian monarchs also employed spies, which were often referred to as the king's "eyes" and "ears."

Other than personal troops and retainers, Arsacid kings had no standing army. When war broke out, kings called upon their "vassals" to supply local contingents of soldiers. Because kings relied on subordinates for troops, gathering a large army could be time consuming and unreliable. Disgruntled vassals might rally when summoned, but they could just as easily refuse. Worse still, they could—and frequently did—join rebellions against the king. On the other hand, if an Arsacid monarch were popular and had his vassals' support, he could amass a considerable fighting force.

Cavalry units made up the bulk of the Persian army. Of these, there were two principal types. Cataphracts were the Persians' heavy cavalry. They fought by charging with a lance and were nicknamed *clibanarii* ("iron pot-men") because both horse and rider wore armor covering them from head to hoof. Persian horse archers, by contrast, were much more famous and feared. They used a powerful composite bow and inspired dread because of a tactic called the "Parthian shot." In battle, horsemen would feign a retreat, lure their enemies into a pursuit, and then turn and fire backward in their saddles to devastating effect.

Like most Mesopotamian cultures, Arsacid Persia's primary economic activity was agriculture. But Persia's strategic position along the famed Silk Road also made the Persians wealthy as traders. They operated as middlemen, facilitating the exchange of slaves, textiles, and spices from the Far East for raw materials, precious metals, and manufactured goods from the Roman Empire. Persian merchants grew rich marking up trade goods flowing in both directions, but the Persian king and aristocracy also profited by levying hefty tolls and taxes.

Nor were the Persians shy about flaunting their wealth. At court, the Persian king sat on a throne made of pure gold. Nobles wore copious amounts of jewelry, and both men and women used cosmetics to improve their appearance. Persian men were typically bearded and styled their hair in elaborate curls. They wore loose-fitting robes, similar to the Asian caftan, but trousers for riding. The aristocracy's favorite pastimes were banqueting and hunting, which the Persians may have done on specially constructed animal preserves.

Arsacid religion was probably some blend of Zoroastrianism and the nomadic (perhaps animistic) rituals. Arsacid kings were, for example,

keepers of the eternal flame, and we know that fire worship was the cornerstone of many Zoroastrian rituals. Yet we also know that the Arsacids' successors, the Sassanids, often accused the Arsacids of being heretics to Zoroastrianism. There may be some truth to this because Arsacid kings were buried first at Nisa and then at Arbela; strict Zoroastrians, in contrast, preferred exposing their dead. However, we should also remember that the Arsacids ruled over a vast multiethnic empire—one which included not just Zoroastrian and nomadic beliefs, but Semitic, Greek, Jewish, and Christian religions as well. Aspects of these other religions could have easily influenced Arsacid religious practices.

John Poirot

See also Carrhae, Battle of; Crassus; Persian Wars, Arsacid; Persian Wars, Sassanid; Trajan

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Persian Wars, Arsacid (53 BCE–215 CE), Causes

Rome's wars with Arsacid Persia spanned almost three centuries. Finding a single cause is difficult. Part of the answer may lie, however, in the expansionist nature of ancient empires. During the first two centuries BCE, Rome and Persia experienced rapid growth. Therefore, in some sense, they were destined to collide.

But in many early encounters, Rome also took a high-handed approach

to diplomacy. When the Persian king Mithridates II dispatched an ambassador to Sulla to open formal relations, Sulla, rather infamously, treated the envoy as a social inferior, seating the diplomat across from one of Rome's minor client-kings. Lucullus used threats and intimidation tactics to assure Persian neutrality while conducting military operations in Armenia in 69, and the Roman general may have even planted spies in the Persian king's entourage. Finally, in 66, Pompey promised the Upper Mesopotamian province of Gordyene to the Armenians, conveniently ignoring that he had already guaranteed the same territory to Persia. When the Persians protested, Pompey ordered his lieutenant into Gordyene to clear out Persian settlers by force.

Rome's condescension toward Persia was rooted in beliefs about Roman racial superiority. Most Romans considered easterners culturally and genetically inferior—even subhuman. The Romans inherited many of these prejudices from the Greeks, who, ever since the Greek-Persian Wars, had regarded non-Greeks as barbarians. In the Greco-Roman mindset, barbarians were thought to be effeminate, decadent, and servile. They were certainly not considered adept warriors or worthy military adversaries. And this, more than any other reason, may be why Sulla, Lucullus, and Pompey initially treated the Persians with such disdain. These same stereotypes also helped motivate Crassus' and Mark Antony's early attempts to conquer Persia (53 and 36 BCE). Both generals believed that the Persian would be easy prey.

The disasters at Carrhae and Praaspa changed Roman perceptions about Persia. This new view, combined with losses Rome sustained during its civil wars, persuaded Augustus that conquering Persia outright was no longer a feasible option. He therefore turned to diplomacy. But while the return of the Roman standards bought a century of peace, it came with a cost. Although the Armenian buffer zone helped end the cycle of invasions and retaliatory raids so characteristic of the late Republic, it was only a temporary fix. And when conflict resumed at the end of the first century, Rome's stake in Armenia actually exacerbated affairs in the Near East by giving the two superpowers another point of contention.

By the second century, fear of slacking legionary discipline and desire for personal aggrandizement led emperors to revive Rome's earlier, more belligerent attitude toward her eastern enemies. Starting with Trajan, emperors began rushing to war for even insignificant diplomatic slights.

Trajan's war (114–117 CE), for instance, began as a relatively minor quarrel over Armenian succession. The Persian king Osroes deposed Armenia's ruler without first consulting Rome. He soon regretted his decision, however, when it became clear that Rome was mobilizing for a full-scale invasion. When Trajan mobilized for a full-scale invasion, Osroes tried to backpedal, offering Trajan a different pro-Roman candidate. However, the emperor ignored the offer and invaded Persia anyway. Thus, scholars believe Trajan used the Armenian crisis as a pretext, that his real motive was personal glory.

John Poirot

See also Armenia; Augustus; Carrhae, Battle of; Corbulo; Crassus; Persia, Arsacid; Tiridates I; Trajan

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Persian Wars, Arsacid (53 BCE–215 CE), Course

The Roman-Persian Wars began when the Roman governor of Syria, Crassus, invaded Persia in 53 BCE. Persia was embroiled in civil war, and one of the parties had asked Rome to intervene. Crassus set out from Antioch with seven legions (approx. 40,000 men). However, local guides led the Romans deep into Upper Mesopotamia where water was scarce. Unaccustomed to desert warfare, the Romans stumbled into a Persian ambush near Carrhae. The Persians pressed their advantage with barrages of arrows and heavy-armored cavalry shock troops. Nearly all of Crassus'

soldiers were killed; Crassus himself was slain while trying to negotiate his army's surrender.

When Phraates IV acceded to the Persian throne in 37 BCE, he secured his position by murdering all 30 of his brothers. He also persecuted the Persian nobility, who again turned to the Romans for relief. Mark Antony, whose purview at the time included the eastern Roman Empire, thought a Persian victory would help him in his propaganda war against Octavian. But, on campaign, Antony became preoccupied besieging Praaspa, a stronghold in Media Atropatene. Poor logistical planning and allied desertions allowed Phraates to capture the Romans' baggage train. Inadequately provisioned, Antony was forced to call off the siege. On the long march home, harried by the Persians and plagued by disease and shortage of water, the Romans lost almost 25,000 soldiers.

As emperor, Augustus could not afford another eastern war; Rome's civil wars had sapped the empire's manpower. He also wished to avoid Crassus' and Antony's mistakes. He therefore negotiated with Persia and, in 20 BCE, gave assurances that Rome would respect the Euphrates boundary and not attempt another invasion. In exchange, the Persians returned Crassus' military standards and accepted Roman hegemony over Armenia, which served as a buffer zone between the empires. Although Augustus had earned no military victory, the return of the standards inspired jubilation in Rome. Augustus even celebrated a triumph and housed the recovered standards in the temple of Mars the Avenger.

Rome's friendly relations with Persia continued for half a century. But when Nero became emperor (54 CE), the Persian king Vologaeses I decided to test the young ruler's resolve. Violating the treaty, Vologaeses installed his brother, Tiridates, on Armenia's throne. In response, Nero dispatched Gnaeus Domitius Corbulo to the eastern frontier. Although Corbulo drove the Persians out of Armenia twice, the surrender of Corbulo's cocommander, Caesennius Paetus, in 62 forced Nero to compromise. Nero agreed to recognize Tiridates as Armenia's king and even held an elaborate investiture ceremony in Rome (Tacitus, *Annals* 15.31).

The emperor Trajan's eastern campaign (114–117 CE) ushered in a new phase in Romano-Persian relations. Trajan shunned the Julio-Claudians' diplomatic compromises, preferring instead to conquer Persia outright. He attacked Armenia in 114, deposed its pro-Persian monarch, and organized the kingdom into a Roman province. He then did the same to Upper

Mesopotamia. For these victories, the Senate awarded Trajan the title *Optimus Princeps* or “Best First Citizen.” But having met little resistance, Trajan decided to attack Ctesiphon. In 116 Trajan’s army marched down the Euphrates accompanied by a Roman supply fleet. North of the capital Trajan transferred his flotilla overland to the Tigris. The Roman army’s size unnerved the Persian king who fled, abandoning his family and golden throne to Trajan. However, Trajan had difficulty consolidating his new provinces. Soon after Ctesiphon’s fall, anti-Roman revolts broke out in Mesopotamia, Armenia, and Judaea. When Trajan died on his way home (117 CE), his successor, Hadrian, relinquished Rome’s claims beyond the Euphrates.

A half century later, another dispute over Armenia sparked a war (163–165 CE) under the co-emperors Marcus Aurelius and Lucius Verus. Verus’ commanders, Statius Priscus and Avidius Cassius, relied heavily on Trajan’s strategy. Priscus occupied Armenia first and then Cassius followed Trajan’s route down the Euphrates. After sacking Seleucia, Cassius stormed Ctesiphon and burned the Persian king’s palace. A sudden outbreak of plague, however, forced the Romans to withdraw.

Septimius Severus fought two campaigns in Mesopotamia. The first, in 195, was a punitive expedition against local rulers who had supported Severus’ political rival, Pescennius Niger. The next year, while Severus was in Gaul, the Persian king reclaimed his lost territory and raided Syria. Severus’ second Mesopotamian expedition (197 CE), which also followed Trajan’s course, was therefore aimed at Persia’s heart. After minimal resistance Severus once again captured Ctesiphon.

Severus’ son, Caracalla, who styled himself as a new Alexander the Great, also attacked Persia (215–16 CE) and may have taken Persia’s capital after luring the king Artabanus V into a trap. However, Caracalla’s own guards assassinated him soon afterward. The emperor’s sudden death spurred Artabanus to counterattack. After a heated, three-day battle near Nisibis, the new Roman emperor, Macrinus, retreated ignominiously. Artabanus forced Macrinus to pay 200 million sesterces to secure the Romans’ safe withdrawal.

Yet the Persian king’s good fortune did not last long. In 220 a revolt led by the “Neo-Persian” Ardashir ended in the ouster of Artabanus, the last Arsacid ruler of Persia. Henceforth, Rome’s contests on the eastern frontier were not with the Arsacids, but with Ardashir’s descendants, the Sassanid

dynasty.

John Poirrot

See also Armenia; Augustus; Carrhae, Battle of; Corbulo; Crassus; Persia, Arsacid; Tiridates I; Trajan

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Persian Wars, Arsacid (53 BCE–215 CE), Consequences

At Carrhae, Rome lost between 35,000 and 40,000 men, a sizable number for any ancient army. This loss had a powerful impact on the Roman psyche. Rome had not experienced a defeat of this magnitude since Hannibal's invasion of Italy during the Second Punic War (battle of Cannae, 216 BCE). The Macedonian and Syrian Wars of the second and first centuries had certainly witnessed their share of Roman setbacks. But in most of these cases Rome's battlefield losses were relatively minor and often attributable to inexperienced or incompetent commanders. Crassus, on the other hand, had been no novice in warfare. He had broken Spartacus' rebellion, something which no other general had been able to do. Furthermore, his Persian invasion force in 53 had been more than adequate. It was one of the largest seen in the Republic, and its officer staff was well trained and battle tested. Crassus' son, who was in charge of the army's cavalry regiment, was a veteran of Caesar's Gallic Wars.

Although some Roman authors tried to blame Crassus personally for the disaster, most contemporary Romans probably believed Rome had lost not because Crassus made mistakes, but because Rome's armies had been bested. Battlefield reports suggested that the legions, which were at this

time composed mainly of infantry units, had been unable to handle the Persians' horse archers. In fact, when news of Carrhae finally reached Rome, fear mongers began speaking of a possible Persian invasion of Italy. Cicero's main concern as governor of Cilicia in Asia Minor (51 BCE) was the looming Persian threat, and Cicero's fears were soon confirmed by the failure of Antony's expedition in 36. By the Republic's end, in many Roman minds, Persia had become more than just another enemy on the empire's fringes; it was now Rome's nemesis, one which posed a real danger to the security of the empire's borders and possibly Italy itself.

The emperor Augustus gained the most from the fear engendered by these late republican contests. Augustus knew that Romans, while afraid of Persia, were also war weary. Agreeing to respect the Euphrates boundary and creating a buffer zone in Armenia helped quell Roman anxieties about the eastern frontier. But Augustus' real motive was to bolster his personal reputation. He touted Crassus' recovered military standards as war trophies and cast himself as Rome's avenger. He claimed that he had restored the honor Rome lost at Carrhae, and this political clout helped solidify his hold on power and aided him in establishing the Principate.

But, in the end, the return of the Roman standards also gave Rome a military advantage over Persia. This was partly the result of Persia's almost incessant state of civil war. Without the threat of Roman invasion, Persia's royal family, the Arsacids, occupied much of their free time feuding with each other. Constant civil unrest alienated Persia's nobility, who, in turn, incited their own rebellions. By the time of Trajan's invasion, the Persian state was in such disarray that it was only able to offer nominal resistance.

However, the Augustan peace also gave Rome time to learn from its late republican errors. By the second century, Roman commanders no longer underestimated Persia's cavalry capabilities or Mesopotamia's environment. Trajan and his later imitators employed larger cavalry contingents to negate the Persians' mobility advantage. The Romans began to develop heavily armored cavalry in imitation of the Persians. Many of Trajan's successors also followed his well-planned invasion route down the Euphrates to assure that their armies had a constant water supply. The Romans were not responsible for ending the Arsacid dynasty—an internal revolt of Persian vassals accomplished this in 224 CE—but Rome's numerous second-century invasions and repeated sacking of Ctesiphon directly contributed to the Arsacids' downward spiral and eventual collapse.

See also Armenia; Augustus; Carrhae, Battle of; Corbulo; Crassus; Persia, Arsacid; Tiridates I; Trajan

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Persian Wars, Sassanid

Early in the third century CE, the Persian Empire’s Arsacid dynasty was supplanted by the Sassanids, a dynasty from Fars or Pars (Greek Persis) that proved much more aggressive toward Rome. This aggression came at a particularly bad time, the Roman Empire being torn by civil war and facing Germanic invasions. The first Sassanid king, Ardashir I (224–242), and his son, Shapur I (ca. 240–ca. 272) inflicted humiliating defeats on the Romans on the eastern frontier. Though Gordian III’s praetorian prefect Timesitheus won a victory, Gordian III (238–244) himself was defeated by Shapur. Gordian’s successor, the emperor Philip (244–249) made peace with the Persians, conceding control over Armenia and paying a large subsidy. The emperor Valerian (253–260) attempted an offensive against Persia, but was badly defeated and captured by Shapur I, whose commemorative relief and inscription (the *Res Gestae Divi Saporis*) at Naqsh-e-Rostam boast of humbling the “Caesars” Gordian III, Philip, and Valerian. The Romans believed that Shapur mounted his horse by stepping on the kneeling Valerian, and that after Valerian died (some years later) his corpse was stuffed or flayed and the skin hung in a temple.

To block further Sassanid incursions, Valerian’s son Gallienus (260–268) granted extensive command in the Near East to Septimius Odenathus, the monarch of Palmyra. Subsequently, Odenathus’ widow Zenobia, ruling for her young son Vaballathus, developed imperial ambitions and invaded

Roman Syria and Egypt. The emperor Aurelian (270–275) defeated Zenobia and returned the “Palmyrene Empire” to the Roman Near East.

The Sassanids suffered from their own dynastic strife in the 270s–280s, preventing the Persian Empire from further aggression. The Roman emperor Carus (282–283) mounted an expedition against Persia, but died and was succeeded by his son Numerian (283–284), who was forced to retreat. Numerian’s successor Diocletian (284–305) and his Caesar Galerius (293–305, Augustus 305–311) renewed the Roman war against the Persian Empire around 296. The winner of the Sassanid dynastic conflict, Narses (293–302), was an aggressive ruler. Galerius’ initial expedition suffered a defeat somewhere between Callinicum and Carrhae. The next year (297) he successfully swept through Armenia, defeating Narses’ forces. In 298 Galerius campaigned through Mesopotamia, capturing Ctesiphon and the Sassanid king’s family. Narses was forced to sue for peace, agreeing to a treaty, the Peace of Nisibis (299), conceding the Romans all territory up to the Tigris, which became the boundary of the Roman and Persian Empires. With this victory and settlement, Galerius avenged the defeat and capture of Valerian in 260, restoring Roman prestige. The Arch of Galerius at Thessalonica boasts of Galerius’ conquest of Mesopotamia.

During the Tetrarchic civil warfare of 306–313 and most of the reign of Constantine I (306–337) the Sassanid Persians were not a threat. Hormizd II (303–9), the son of Narses, was succeeded by Shapur II (309–379), who ascended the throne as an infant. Reaching adulthood, Shapur II developed more aggressive intentions toward Rome, allegedly breaking the Treaty of Nisibis in 337. In his last years, Constantine seems to have planned a war against Persia, perhaps motivated by religion, hoping to halt and avenge Sassanid persecution of Christians within the Persian Empire. Constantine died from natural causes as he was setting out for this expedition, so little is known about it. What is certain is that his son, Constantius II (337–361) inherited this conflict and waged war off and on with the Persian Empire (337–350, 358–361), mainly in the form of siege warfare. Notable engagements were the battle of Singara and the siege of Amida in 359. Constantius elevated his cousins Gallus, then Julian to the rank of Caesar to take command while he fought Magnentius and then the Persians. Gallus fell to an alleged conspiracy, but Julian’s military success in Gaul resulted in his being acclaimed as Augustus by his troops. The Roman Empire was on the brink of civil war when Constantius died from an illness (361).

Julian (361–363) succumbed to the ambition of Crassus, Mark Antony, Trajan, Septimius Severus, Caracalla, Valerian, and Galerius before him, hoping to conquer the Persian Empire in imitation of Alexander the Great’s achievement. Though Julian defeated the Persians at Ctesiphon, overall his expedition in 363 was pyrrhic, being costly for the Roman army and fatal for Julian. Burning his fleet and leading his army further into Sassanid territory, Julian died from a wound received in battle. He had no heir, and the army elevated Jovian (363–364), a guards officer distinguished mainly for his great stature. To extricate the Roman army from Julian’s fiasco, Jovian made a humiliating peace with the Persians, ceding back to them the Roman territories won by Galerius. He died soon after (364), suffocated by fumes from a charcoal brazier in his bedroom.

The reigns of Valentinian (364–375) and Valens (364–378) were marked by a return to status quo conflict and negotiation with Persia, principally over Armenia, which had long been a buffer client state of either empire. During the conflicts of the fifth-century Roman Empire, Sassanid Persia was not an active threat, waging only two short conflicts with Rome in 421–422 and 440. Conflict with Persia resumed in the sixth century CE, particularly in the reign of Byzantine emperor Justinian (527–565). The emperor Heraclius (610–641) inflicted the most extensive Byzantine conquests in Sassanid territory, that were then lost to the Arab conquest in the 630s–640s.

Rome and Persia influenced each other during the third century CE and later, seen in both empires’ adoption of heavily armored cavalry (*cataphractarii*) and in general the Roman Empire’s increasing reliance on cavalry. Whether features of later Roman imperial ceremonial, such as prostration (adoration of the purple), derived from Persian influence or from Hellenistic practices is uncertain.

Sara E. Phang

See also Cataphractarii; Cavalry (Imperial); Cavalry (Republic); Constantine I; Constantius II; Diocletian; Galerius; Jovian; Julian; Palmyra; Persia, Arsacid; Persian Wars, Arsacid; Third-Century CE Crisis; Valens; Valentinian I; Valerian; Zenobia

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Pertinax (Emperor) (193 CE)

A Roman emperor (193 CE), Publius Helvius Pertinax was born in 126 CE in Liguria, allegedly the son of a freedman. He initially trained as a teacher, before joining the Roman army as an equestrian officer. Pertinax served in both major conflicts of Marcus Aurelius’ reign, the Persian and Marcomannic Wars. In 168–170 CE, he helped protect the routes into Italy from the barbarians, and the emperor promoted him into the Senate with the rank of ex-praetor. This was followed by an appointment as commander of the legion I Adiutrix in Pannonia Superior in the early 170s. The historian Cassius Dio records that Pertinax’ “brave exploits” in this role led to the honor of the consulship in 175 CE. His appointment aroused resentment among the senatorial elite, because of his humble birth, but this did not stop Marcus Aurelius from employing Pertinax in further governorships in Moesia and Syria.

After the death of Marcus Aurelius, his son Commodus dismissed Pertinax along with other close confidants of his father. But Pertinax later gained Commodus’ trust and was appointed urban prefect and consul for the second time in 192 CE. When Commodus was murdered at the very end of that year, Pertinax was acclaimed emperor in his place. He adopted the republican title of *princeps senatus* (“first man of the Senate”), to indicate his intention to rule as a benevolent peer. Pertinax was praised for his moderation, but his parsimony alienated the Praetorian Guard, who murdered him in the palace in March 193 CE.

Cassius Dio's *Roman History* and Herodian are sources for the career of Pertinax, as is the *Historia Augusta*.

Caillan Davenport

See also Civil War (Pertinax-Septimius Severus); Commodus; Marcus Aurelius

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Perusia, Siege of (41–40 BCE)

The primary event of the Perusine War between Octavian (later Augustus), and the alliance of Lucius Antonius (Mark Antony's brother) and Fulvia (Mark Antony's wife). The cause of the war was Octavian's grants of land to veterans, resented by Italian communities; Lucius Antonius and Fulvia supported the Italians. After a short occupation of Rome, Lucius withdrew to Perusia (modern-day Perugia) where Octavian besieged him for two months. Starvation eventually forced Lucius to surrender the city to Octavian. Lucius was spared by Octavian, and Fulvia fled to Greece. The city was destroyed entirely, except for the temples of Vulcan and Juno. The citizens of Perusia were executed or sold into slavery.

Alexander G. Peck

See also Augustus; Civil Conflict (Late Republic); Civil Warfare; Civil Wars (II) (44–31 BCE); Fulvia; Mark Antony; Octavian; Siege Warfare; Veteran Settlement

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Pescennius Niger (Emperor) (193–194 CE)

A Roman emperor (193–194 CE), Gaius Pescennius Niger Iustus was a senator who served on the Danube frontier under Commodus. He was later promoted to governor of Syria, and in 193 CE was proclaimed emperor by the eastern legions following the death of Pertinax. Niger's main rival for the purple, Septimius Severus, laid siege to Byzantium (which took two years to fall). Severus defeated Niger's troops in two major battles at Cyzicus and Nicaea, before winning a decisive victory at Issus in March 194 CE. Niger tried to seek refuge in Persian territory, but was captured and beheaded.

Cassius Dio's *Roman History* and Herodian cover the civil war of Severus and Niger; the chapter "Life of Pescennius Niger" in the *Historia Augusta* idealizes him and is highly unreliable.

Caillan Davenport

See also Civil War (Pertinax-Septimius Severus); Pertinax; Septimius Severus

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Petronius Maximus (Emperor)*. See *Fall of the Roman Empire; Majorian; Valentinian III

Pharsalus, Battle of (48 BCE)

Fought in central Greece in 48 BCE, the battle of Pharsalus (mod. Fársala, Thessaly, Greece), was fought in the Caesarian-Pompeian civil war (49–45), and was its most decisive battle. In the 50s, Caesar had successfully campaigned in Gaul amassing wealth, standing, and a devoted army. The Senate, which was led by Pompey, was anxious and ordered Caesar, whose tenureship in Gaul was due to end in 48, to return to Rome. However, with

political and personal distrust at a high between both camps, Caesar refused and crossed the Rubicon River with an army knowing he would begin a civil war. He first dealt with Pompeians in Spain, and then turned to Italy, but Pompey and most of his followers escaped to Greece, where they hoped to raise troops from eastern allies. Caesar and his legions pursued them there. After several skirmishes and a confrontation at Dyrrhachium (modern Durres, Albania) in July of 48, in which Caesar was nearly defeated, the armies confronted each other at Pharsalus.

The advantage was on Pompey's side. His armies were nearly double the size of Caesar's: approximately 40,000 to 22,000, respectively. Pompey also had the advantage of a larger cavalry and his position on high ground next to the River Enipeus protected his left flank. For Caesar to have had any advantage at all, he was going to have to rely on his hardened veteran army and their martial skills. Pompey took the initiative and intended to deploy his cavalry against Caesar's in an attempt to force them into the Enipeus. Caesar, however, had envisaged this maneuver and he stationed legionaries to protect his right flank. This was done to ambush Pompey's cavalry and with Caesar's infantry trained to use *pila* (javelins) in a thrusting motion, they were able to force Pompey's cavalry off the field. This opened up Pompey's flanks to attack from Caesar's legions who poured forward causing Pompey to panic and flee the scene of the battle to Egypt, where he was killed. A general rout ensued and Caesar had won. Troop casualties are hard to determine from the source material, but it is estimated that Caesar might have lost up to 1,200 men whereas Pompey's casualties numbered approximately 15,000 men with up to 24,000 reportedly taken captive. Caesar spared and freed his captives, but Pompey himself fled to Egypt, where as he landed he was assassinated by King Ptolemy's henchmen. Other Pompeians retreated to North Africa, but the backbone of the Pompeian resistance was broken.

Although the Roman Republic was, by the time of Pharsalus, well on the way to collapse, this battle can be seen as the final deathblow. From a military standpoint, Caesar showed his tactical genius as a general against overwhelming forces. Politically, with Pompey now dead and Crassus killed at Carrhae in 53, the informal political coalition known as the First Triumvirate was no more. Caesar had amassed enough wealth and power to rule Rome in his own right. However, his victory was short-lived. His opponents did not appreciate his clemency; they regarded it as humiliating.

They conspired against him and assassinated him on March 15, 44 BCE. As a result of Caesar's death, further series of civil wars broke out; ultimately, Caesar's great-nephew and adopted heir Octavian (the future Augustus) was the victor. Caesar's position as sole ruler paved the way for the Rome of the emperors.

Juan M. A. Strisino

See also Actium, Battle of; Brutus (Junius Brutus, Marcus); Caesar, Assassination of; Caesar, Dictatorship of; Caesar, Gaius Julius; Carrhae, Battle of; Cato the Younger; Civil Conflict (Late Republic); Civil Wars (I) (49–45 BCE); Crassus; Pompey

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Philip Arabus (Emperor) (244–249 CE)

A Roman emperor (244–249 CE), Marcus Iulius Philippus, termed Philip the Arab, was an equestrian officer from Arabia. He served Gordian III as praetorian prefect, accompanying him on his Persian campaigns. Accounts conflict as to how Gordian III died, in battle or murdered by his soldiers. Philip claimed the throne following Gordian III's death in 244 CE, and was forced to conclude a humiliating peace with Persia. As emperor, he embarked on a war against the Carpi on the Danube in 245–247 CE. The following year he celebrated the 1,000th anniversary of the foundation of Rome, which was commemorated on his coinage. Philip's regime collapsed

in 249 CE after the senator Decius was proclaimed emperor by the Danubian armies.

Caillan Davenport

See also Decius; Gordian III; Third-Century CE Crisis

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Piracy

The nautical equivalent of land-based bandits and brigands, pirates launch raids from ships, whether they board and rob other ships on the water or raid settlements on land, usually harbors or islands. This discussion of piracy excludes state-sponsored piracy (privateering), most familiar in the early modern era.

Early Greek (Homeric) warfare was difficult to distinguish from piracy, local nobles and their followers raiding communities by sea. It is likely that this mode of low-intensity conflict never disappeared entirely; piracy remained a way of life for certain peoples in the Mediterranean, especially the inhabitants of Illyria (the Dalmatian coast), Rough Cilicia (along the southern coast of Asia Minor) and the Boukoloi (“Shepherds”) of the Nile Delta, areas with small harbors that made it easy for pirates to escape pursuit.

By the first century BCE, as the Romans gained control of the entire Mediterranean, they began to regard pirates as opponents to Roman control. Pirates endangered shipping (which stuck close to coastlines) and imperiled travelers and traders. Marcus Antonius Creticus, the father of Mark Antony, successfully campaigned against Cilician pirates in 102 BCE. In the 70s Publius Servilius Vatia campaigned vigorously against the Cilician pirates and won the surname Isauricus as a result. The troubled political situation in Asia Minor, contested between the Romans and Mithridates, probably exacerbated piracy. In 67 BCE Pompey was granted an extraordinary

command, with *imperium* extending over the Mediterranean sea and including the coasts of many provinces, to fight pirates in the Mediterranean. His campaign was highly successful; his *imperium* was for three years, but he eliminated the pirates in three months.

It also became conventional for Roman leaders to term opponents who emphasized nautical operations “pirates,” a way of delegitimizing them. In his *Res Gestae* the emperor Augustus characterizes the followers of Sextus Pompeius, among his opponents in the civil wars, as “pirates.”

The development of Roman naval fleets, based at Misenum and Ravenna and also patrolling the Rhine and Danube rivers, had some effect in combating piracy before the naval incursions of the Goths in the mid-third century and the Vandals in the fifth century CE.

Sara E. Phang

See also Asia Minor; Bandits and Brigands; Cilicia; *Imperium*; Pompey

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Piso, Gnaeus Calpurnius (d. 20 CE)

Gnaeus Calpurnius Piso, consul in 7 BCE and governor of Syria in 17–19 CE, was condemned for sedition, illustrating the emperor’s monopoly of patronage of the army and intolerance of potential rivals. The episode of Piso is attested both in Tacitus’ *Annals* and in a surviving decree of the Senate.

Piso belonged to one of Rome’s noblest families. His father had supported Brutus and Cassius, and was well known for his independent spirit. Piso was consul in 7 BCE, with the future emperor Tiberius as his colleague in office, and continued as a friend of Tiberius the emperor until

Piso's downfall in 20 CE. Under Augustus, Piso served as provincial governor of Hispania Tarraconensis, and then Africa, before being appointed in 17 CE as governor of Syria by Tiberius. He replaced Creticus Silanus, whose daughter was engaged to Germanicus' eldest son; this was a potential cause of conflict with Germanicus.

What follows is based largely upon Tacitus' *Annals*. Tiberius may have appointed Piso to restrain the impetuous young Germanicus, who was sent to the Near East to reinforce Roman authority and influence, notably in Armenia, and whose popularity potentially threatened the emperor himself. To expedite his inspections in the Near East, Germanicus was given greater *imperium* than the governors. Tacitus presents a vivid account of the antagonism between Germanicus and his wife Agrippina on the one hand and Piso and his wife Plancina on the other in Books 2–3 of the *Annals*. Whereas Germanicus appears as an affable character, eager to please Rome's provincial subjects, Piso is represented as a rude, unpleasant man, who took his brief from Tiberius to check Germanicus to extremes, opposing and insulting him at every possible opportunity. This culminated in Germanicus formally renouncing friendship with Piso, and removing him from his governorship.

The clashes of Germanicus and Piso began with Germanicus' ordering Piso to accompany troops to Armenia; Piso refused, and Germanicus carried out the mission himself, chiding Piso afterward. Germanicus subsequently made an unauthorized trip to Egypt, hoping to alleviate a famine. Senators were not allowed to visit Egypt, lest they be suspected of revolt. Germanicus thus seemed to be emphasizing his privilege as imperial prince and possessor of greater *imperium*. He requested Piso to see to tasks in his absence, but Piso ignored his requests. Germanicus then fell unexpectedly and fatally ill at Antioch. His deputy carried out a directive to remove Piso from his governorship of Syria.

After Germanicus' sudden death in 19 CE, Piso initially (according to Tacitus) celebrated his demise, but then raised troops in Cilicia to retake control of Syria by military force. His attempted coup failed. Piso returned to Rome, where he was summoned to trial. Although Tacitus focuses chiefly upon the accusation that Piso and Plancina poisoned Germanicus, the real reason for Piso's fall from favor appears to have been his suborning of the army. Piso allegedly behaved as a patron toward the Roman army in Syria, calling himself "father of the army" and giving out favors such as liberal

furlough (Tacitus, *Annals* 2.55). Roman imperial standards of military discipline, emphasizing severity, were intended to minimize senatorial commanders' patronage of the army. Tiberius would not have tolerated any interference in the army's loyalty toward himself.

A lengthy senatorial decree concerning Piso, copies of which have been found inscribed upon bronze tablets in Baetica (part of Spain), reveals that Piso was accused of corrupting military discipline by handing out donatives in his own name, such that his men were even allegedly called Pisonians, in contrast to the emperor's Caesarian troops. Such actions undermined the unique loyalty built up between emperor and army that had been established by Augustus, and caused Tiberius to withdraw his support for Piso, who committed suicide and was condemned at trial by the Senate. The extant decree, termed the *SC de Cn. Pisone patre*, offers many insights into the sedition of Piso. Whereas members of Piso's staff suffered the usual penalty for treason in the form of exile and property confiscation, Piso's younger son Marcus was forgiven for supporting his father's uprising, suggesting that Tiberius took pains to protect Piso's family after his suicide. The *senatus consultum* represents Piso as threatening to resurrect the civil wars and stirring up unrest in Armenia and Persia. It condemns his "wicked plans ... to disturb the present tranquil condition of the commonwealth," and instructs that its judgment of Piso's behavior should be published around the empire.

Alison E. Cooley and Gaius Stern

See also Agrippina I; Army in Politics; Augustus; Germanicus; Military Discipline; Plancina; Suicide; Tacitus; Tiberius (Emperor); Treason; Usurpation

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Plancina (d. 33 CE)

Munatia Plancina was wife of Gnaeus Calpurnius Piso, and granddaughter of republican nobleman Lucius Munatius Plancus. She travelled with her husband to Syria in 18 CE, offending Roman sensibilities by attending training sessions of the soldiers serving under him. According to Tacitus' *Annals*, she and her husband clashed with the imperial couple Germanicus and Agrippina (the Elder) when Germanicus traveled to the eastern provinces on a tour of inspection. Rumor implicated Plancina in the poisoning of Germanicus, but her close friend and patroness Livia, the mother of Tiberius, intervened for her in 20 CE to release her from being tried along with her husband. The historian Tacitus celebrates Plancina's suicide in 33 CE as "a penalty that was late in coming rather than undeserved" (Tacitus, *Annals* 6.26). Hostility to women in public life is prominent in the historiography of the early Principate.

Alison E. Cooley

See also Agrippina I; Gender and War; Germanicus; Piso; Tiberius (Emperor)

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Plebeians

The ancient plebeians were distinguished by certain gentilician names (see "Roman Names") and by their exclusion from important state priesthoods, such as the *flamen Dialis* (high priest of Jupiter), *flamen Martialis* (high

priest of Mars), *flamen Quirinalis*, *rex sacrorum*, and *Salii* (the “dancing” priests of Mars). Plebeian were probably not excluded altogether from the early Senate or from the consulship during the first decades of the Republic. However, by the late fifth century BCE plebeians were nearly always excluded from the consulship. As a result of the Struggle of the Orders (patrician-plebeian conflict) plebeians gained access to all of the magistracies.

Plebeian grievances resulted in the organization of the *plebs* as a separate political group, with its own assembly, the *concilium plebis*, assembling upon the Aventine Hill in ritual *secessio* (secession, withdrawal) and electing its own magistrates, the tribunes of the plebs and the aediles. The tribunes of the plebs represented the interests of the plebs and were oath bound to provide help (*auxilium*) to any citizen who requested it.

Eventually patricians and plebeians reached a compromise with the Valerian-Horatian laws of 449 BCE. Plebeian magistracies were incorporated into the regular political structure of the Republic, with tribunes of the plebs and aediles ranking below praetors, consuls, and censors. The *concilium plebis* was also incorporated, merging at least partially with the *comitia tributa*. Plebiscites (laws passed by the *concilium plebis*, moved by the tribunes) became binding on all citizens. All citizens were granted the right of *provocatio* within the bounds of Rome: the right to appeal against an arbitrary decision of the consul or other magistrates. With the Licinio-Sextian laws of 367 BCE, one of the two annual consuls was required to be a plebeian.

The incorporation of the plebeians into the governing structure of the Republic meant that the *plebs* ceased to be a separate political body and that plebeians who held high office, enriched themselves (usually through war, extortion, or acquisition of land) and married patricians, became part of a new nobility (*nobilitas*), a wealthy patrician-plebeian aristocracy. Plebeians still could not hold the most important state priesthoods, but these carried little political power and might even (as with the *flamen Dialis*, the high priest of Jupiter) burden a patrician’s life with ritual prohibitions. Another remaining distinction was that tribunes of the plebs had to be plebeians; if a patrician wanted to become a tribune of the plebs, he had to ritually transfer into the plebeian order (*transitio ad plebem*). However, by the late Republic, the conflict of interests between the wealthy nobility and the general citizen body or poor masses (especially at Rome, the *plebs urbana* or

urban lower classes) was more relevant than the ancient patrician-plebeian conflict.

Sara E. Phang

See also Consul; *Cursus Honorum* (Republic); Patrician-Plebeian Conflict; Patricians; *Provocatio*; Republic, Political Structure; Senate, Senators; Tribune of the Plebs

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Pliny the Elder (ca. 23–79 CE)

Pliny the Elder was a Roman historian, natural philosopher, and military officer who is known primarily for his composition of the *Natural History* (*Naturalis Historia*). Pliny the Elder was the uncle and adoptive father of Pliny the Younger (61–ca. 113 CE), another Roman author who is known for his large volume of letters to his friends and associates—particularly the emperor Trajan and the historian Tacitus.

Born in 23 or 24 CE, Gaius Plinius Secundus held equestrian military tribunates in the Rhine legions. Under the Flavians, Pliny held a series of procuratorships and advanced into the emperor's confidence, being consulted personally by Vespasian. He was then promoted to commander of the Misene fleet, based at Misenum on the Bay of Naples. According to Pliny the Younger, Pliny the Elder died when he decided to observe the eruption of Vesuvius more closely as a remarkable natural phenomenon. He crossed the Bay of Naples and landed at Stabiae. The eruption's emission of poisonous fumes caused him to suffocate. The eruption and Pliny the Elder's death are described by Pliny the Younger, *Letters* 6.16 and 20.

During his time on the frontier, Pliny composed several treatises including a manual for the use of a javelin for cavalry and a biography of his friend and patron Pomponius Secundus; and he also started a historical work, covering all of the wars between the Romans and the Germans in 20 books. The *Natural History*, which was dedicated to Titus in 77—a work which, according to Pliny the Younger, was “a learned and comprehensive

work as full of variety as nature itself,” was published in a limited capacity during the same year. The full work, which was further revised by Pliny over the two remaining years of his life, is the only one of the historian’s works which survives today.

The *Natural History* contains 37 books, each divided thematically and covering a large assortment of subjects ranging from natural phenomena and prodigies, geographical descriptions of the known world, Roman technology to the history of art within the region of Asia Minor. Pliny’s text has frustrated modern scholars of Roman economics and technology, in part because Pliny largely avoids critical analysis of his own sources and in part because the Roman era was still prescientific, at least at the social level of educated gentlemen (equestrians and senators). Nevertheless, as Pliny did not observe modern disciplinary exclusions, the *Natural History* is a rich source for Roman social history and attitudes. Moreover, the history serves not only as a guide to the state of science, technology, and the arts during the first century CE but also as a model for later encyclopedias and scholarly works, as a result of its breadth of content and Pliny’s meticulous referencing of original sources.

Pliny does not focus on individual conflicts in the *Natural History*, but he emphasizes the important role that Roman and Greek military personnel served as facilitators of new technological, geographical, and cultural discoveries. As a former equestrian officer, Pliny also expresses strong views about the manner in which both officers and soldiers should conduct themselves. He describes his archetypal ideal commander by comparing him with the responsible and diligent farmer. Similarly, Pliny espouses selflessness and austerity as ideal traits for the common soldier; and he asserts that soldiers should be rewarded with nothing more than a simple grass crown. The historian is also exceptionally critical of the carnage and loss of life wrought by Roman military activity—particularly Julius Caesar’s Gallic Wars, which Pliny describes as “a great detriment to the human race even if it was forced upon him” (Pliny *Natural History* 7.92).

Thomas Caldwell

See also Pliny the Younger; Titus; Vespasian

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Pliny the Younger (ca. 61–ca. 113 CE)

Gaius Plinius Caecilius Secundus was born in 61 or 62 CE, the son of Lucius Caecilius of Comum, a well-to-do senator, and was adopted by his uncle Gaius Plinius (Pliny the Elder). Pliny the Elder was a Roman military commander and administrator who wrote the encyclopedic *Natural History* and who died while investigating the eruption of Mount Vesuvius in 79 CE. Pliny the Younger's career was distinguished but less sensational, but his letters provide insights into Roman administration and its typical conflicts and his *Panegyricus* to Trajan displays Roman imperial ideals.

Pliny the Younger held a senatorial tribunate in Legio III Gallica (Pliny *Letters* 7.31), but his career otherwise followed a civilian course, emphasizing judicial affairs and administration. After holding the offices of quaestor, tribune of the plebs, and praetor (the latter judicial rather than military), Pliny was a prefect of the *aerarium militare* or military treasury (Pliny, *Letters* 10.32). He also held the position of *praefectus aerarii Saturni*, in charge of the regular treasury. Pliny was a suffect consul in 100 CE, when he gave a panegyric to the new emperor Trajan (98–117) that was later revised and expanded into the extant *Panegyricus*. The *Panegyricus* to Trajan praises him effusively and contrasts Trajan with the "tyrant" Domitian (81–96).

Subsequently Pliny was *praefectus alvei Tiberis*, in charge of managing the banks of the Tiber, a river that tended to overflow its banks, resulting in destruction of property and legal issues for the Romans (the permanent embankments of today are a nineteenth-century creation).

In 112–113 (though the exact date is disputed), Pliny was then commissioned with his most significant and best known office, governor of Bithynia-Pontus, a small province on the coast of Asia Minor (modern Turkey). Pliny's letters to Trajan and the emperor's replies comprise Book 10

of Pliny the Younger's *Letters*. These letters reflect common concerns of Roman governors, such as the rivalry of Greek cities, the infrastructural problems of cities (local benefactors were unable to finish building projects), the recruitment of the army, and the use of Roman soldiers in policing. Pliny referred to Trajan the question of slaves who had infiltrated the recruits; Trajan ruled that if slaves had volunteered, they were to be put to death (*Letters* 10.29–30). According to Trajan, soldiers should not guard prisons because they would be taken away from their military duties (10.19–20, compare 10.27–28). The Roman Empire lacked a civilian police force, civilian corrections officers or civilian security forces. Soldiers were frequently detached for such duties.

Pliny's letter also displays the question of the Christians, a minority religion in this period. Pliny (*Letters* 10.96–7) regarded the Christians as similar to other illicit cults and associations, a potential source of public disorder. Trajan's reply was relatively tolerant. Pliny is not heard of after 113, so he may have died in Bithynia-Pontus.

The other nine books of the *Letters* reflect Pliny's extensive social network. His friends and acquaintances included the historian Cornelius Tacitus and the imperial biographer Suetonius Tranquillus. Pliny frequently recommended friends or acquaintances for positions in the government, typical of Roman patronage. The *Letters* were revised and edited by Pliny to showcase his mastery of Latin prose style. However, Book 10 is relatively unedited and can be compared with juridical sources.

Sara E. Phang

See also Associations; Christians, Persecution of; Civil-Military Relations; Cults, Illicit; Domitian; Panegyric; Patronage; Public Order; Recruitment of Army (Imperial); Senate, Senators; Trajan

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Plunder

An important element of Roman warfare was plunder, the appropriation of the property of the conquered enemy, including coin and precious metals, movable goods, and livestock. Human captives (enslaved enemy) were also part of the loot, but are treated separately in *CAGR* under “Prisoners of war and slavery.” After a Roman victory, the plunder, booty, or spoils, in Latin *praeda*, was systematically collected by the army and was displayed in a victorious general’s triumphal procession. Whether all of the plunder could be or was displayed in the triumph is unclear; captives were often sold to slave traders shortly after the defeat of the enemy, and it is possible that only a representative sample was displayed.

As a material index of successful conquest, the display of plunder was an important element of the triumph ceremony, the victorious general’s ritual procession through the streets of Rome. Triumphant generals gained prestige from the display and expenditure of plunder for public benefit. However, rivals might contest their misuse of plunder. Material gain as a motivation for warfare aroused some discomfort in Greek and Roman authors, a discomfort which probably reflects the rivalry of the Roman elite. The Roman emperors continued to wage war at least partly for material gain, though the rewards of warfare became more intermittent. Plunder in Roman warfare continues to arouse modern scholarly controversy over its motivation of Roman imperialism.



Detail from the Column of Trajan, ca. 106–113 CE, depicting Roman spoils of the Dacian Wars, including Dacian shields, scale-type armor, and the Dacian dragon-shaped standard later adopted by the Roman army. Typical plunder also included movable wealth and human captives. Located in the Forum of Trajan, Rome, Italy. (Ciolca/[Dreamstime.com](#))

After the triumphal procession, some of the plunder was divided among the general's soldiers as donatives. Part of the plunder went to the state treasury. More typically, generals would use the booty to fund public amusements such as games or more permanent public amenities such as buildings (especially temples). These buildings are recorded as constructed *ex manubiis*, *manubiae* being the part of the *praeda* that the general was allowed to dispose of as he saw fit. He may have been expected to spend *manubiae* upon public benefactions and not appropriate them for his personal use. For instance, Augustus boasts in his *Res Gestae Divi Augusti*, a posthumous biographical inscription, that he constructed the Temple of Mars Ultor, vowed to avenge his adopted father Caesar's death, *ex manubiis* (RGDA 22). Some republican nobles were prosecuted for misappropriation of booty, though such prosecutions were often motivated by their political enemies.

Praeda, and in general the profits of empire, became a source of controversy in the last two centuries of the Republic and distorts the extant literary sources on the subject. As a result, plunder as a motivation for

Roman conquest is a long-standing controversy in the modern scholarship of Roman imperialism. Were the Romans really motivated by greed—a less admirable motive than self-defense, courage, or glory? The subject is prone to exaggeration. Vast sums of gold and silver (on the order of “a billion dollars” in modern economic terms) appear in ancient authors’ descriptions of some triumphs in the second- and first-century BCE Republic. Nonetheless it is apparent that the immediate profits of war had become extremely large, augmented by the longer-term profits from taxation and tribute.

The ancient sources exhibit some discomfort with the subject and attempt to rationalize it. In his *Histories* Polybius, as a Greek captive and foreign observer, emphasizes the rationality of the Romans and stresses the Roman army’s orderly and systematic collection of plunder, which soldiers turned over to the commanding general (Polybius 10.16). Polybius claims that Roman soldiers did not appropriate any of the booty for themselves, though this seems unrealistic, especially with small precious objects such as money or jewelry.

Other rationalizations were moralistic. Ancient authors tended to disapprove of commanders who sought battles and wars solely for the purpose of material gain. Cicero in the *Verrine Orations* (70 BCE) disparages Verres, the governor of Sicily, for “looting” his province (though these military metaphors are rhetorical). Marcus Crassus is depicted as a highly avaricious general, seeking war with Persia in 53 BCE solely for Persian wealth. Sallust, in his *The War with Catiline* (*Bellum Catilinae* 7–11) generalizes that the Roman leaders of the past sought fame and glory, not wealth; the nobles of the late Republic, in contrast, were motivated by greed, rivalry, and extravagance. Greek and Roman authors praised generals who abstained from taking plunder after their victories.

In practice, the pursuit of material gain through conquest was a more complex social phenomenon in which generals’ quest for prestige and fame was indissoluble from their display and expenditure of wealth from conquest. They gained political and social prestige through the display and expenditure of wealth, in the triumph ceremony and associated festivities, in the presentation of games and religious festivals to the public, and in the building of public amenities. (On these processes, Hölscher 2006; Beard 2007.) They also used wealth for social power directly through donatives, especially to soldiers. Very likely the ancient authors’ discomfort with the vast sums of wealth from conquest had more to do with the excessive power

and prestige of the victors and the envy of their rival nobles.

The Roman emperors continued these patterns, lavishing patronage from the wealth acquired through conquest. Augustus' Temple of Mars Ultor has been mentioned above. Augustus is said to have boasted that "I found Rome a city of brick, and left her a city of marble" (Suetonius, *Augustus* 28); in part it was his military victories that enabled him to do so.

However, bonanzas from imperialism in the Principate were somewhat more intermittent, with long periods without the plunder from major victories. Some Roman authors considered that the empire had reached natural boundaries (especially in northern and western Europe) beyond which the native peoples had little wealth worth conquering. Britain lacked plunder, as was remarked by Cicero (*Letters to Atticus* 4.16.7 = 89.6 Bailey) of Julius Caesar's expedition in 55–54 BCE and by Tacitus (Tacitus, *Agricola* 12). However, the Jewish War (culminating in the looting of Jerusalem) and Trajan's Dacian Wars (101–102 and 105–106) resulted in immense plunder. Nonetheless, the decrease in major campaigns yielding major profits had implications for the imperial treasury. Roman emperors could not rely on military campaigns to augment the imperial treasury, and resorted instead to extending the service of praetorians and legionaries (resulting in the mutinies of 14 CE), instituting new taxes, even auctioning the palace furnishings, as Marcus Aurelius (161–180 CE) and Pertinax (193 CE) did, and debasing the imperial silver coinage by adding base metal to silver.

Sara E. Phang

See also Donatives; Emperor as Patron; Imperialism; Pay and Finances, Military (Republic); Prisoners of War and Slavery; Triumph; War Crimes

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Plutarch (ca. 50–120 CE)

Plutarch (Mestrius Plutarchus) was a Greek scholar and author who is best known for his *Parallel Lives*, a series of biographies of important Greeks and Romans. Plutarch also wrote *Lives of the Caesars* (Roman emperors) of which only the *Galba* and *Otho* survive. Of Plutarch's 227 works, many are lost, but other philosophical, rhetorical, and antiquarian works are collected in the *Moralia*. Plutarch's *Parallel Lives* include quasi-mythological figures such as Lycurgus of Sparta and the Roman kings Romulus and Numa, but also many solidly historical personages. Plutarch's method of composition pairs a notable Greek and a notable Roman, for example, Alexander the Great and Julius Caesar, appending a *synkrisis* or comparison at the end (19 of these comparisons survive with the biographies).

Despite his value as a historical source, Plutarch focuses on the lives of great men as exemplars of philosophical and moral virtues and vices, selecting his material accordingly and constructing his narratives with obvious dramatic arcs. For instance, Julius Caesar and Mark Antony are clearly headed toward their dooms. This literary method of composition contrasts with the imperial biographer Suetonius. The dramatic arcs render his biographical narratives tendentious, though highly entertaining. Plutarch's *Parallel Lives* in translation became highly popular in Renaissance and early modern Europe and inspired Shakespeare's plays *Coriolanus*, *Julius Caesar*, and *Antony and Cleopatra*.

See also Caesar, Gaius Julius; Suetonius

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Polybius (ca. 200–ca. 118 BCE)

Polybius was a Greek statesman and historian. For 17 years he was one of many Achaean political prisoners or hostages held in Italy in the custody of the Romans. The status of a hostage in the ancient Mediterranean masked the coercive relationship with hospitality, the custom of “guest-friendship”; hostages were usually elites so that guest-friendship was plausible. Despite Polybius’ captivity, he came to possess a privileged position in Rome with access to the highest strata of Roman society. While in Rome, he devoted himself to the recording of Roman history and Roman interactions within the ancient Mediterranean world. The focus of Polybius’ history is the rise of Rome to Mediterranean dominance, which he wrote during Rome’s establishment of hegemony over the Greek eastern Mediterranean.

Polybius was born in Megalopolis, Arcadia near the end of the third century BCE to a wealthy, aristocratic family. His father, Lycortas of Megalopolis, was an influential statesman. Polybius began writing at a young age but also became involved in politics. In 182, he bore the ashes of his hero, Philopoemen, to burial and acted as an envoy at Alexandria in 180. By the late 170s, Polybius was climbing steadily up the political ladder of the Achaean League and ultimately was elected *hipparchus*, the Achaean second in command and traditional leader of the cavalry, in 170/169. Polybius was poised to be elected *strategos*, the highest position of the Achaean League. However, this would not come to fruition.

Rome was at war with Macedon in the Third Macedonian War against King Perseus. With Perseus’ utter defeat at the battle of Pydna in 168, the Romans deported a thousand prominent Achaeans, including Polybius, whom the Romans sent to Italy as a hostage in 167. Once in Rome, Lucius Aemilius Paullus commissioned Polybius to be a tutor to his sons. Polybius

befriended Scipio Aemilianus, Paullus' younger son, and gained access to the Roman upper class. As the friend of many influential Roman aristocrats, Polybius was able to travel the Roman world, making trips to Africa, Spain, and Gaul. He was released from Roman captivity in 150 and accompanied Scipio Aemilianus on campaign in the Third Punic War. Polybius witnessed the sack of Carthage in 146 firsthand. He briefly returned to Greece and aided in the reestablishment of government and the further transition toward Roman hegemony. He also partook in an expedition to the Atlantic Ocean and likely served as an advisor during the Numantine War.

Through his broad travels Polybius toured the various landscapes of Rome's conquests and conducted interviews with former soldiers and leaders, such as the king of Numidia, Masinissa. Maybe most important of all, Polybius observed the Roman army in combat and in its relationship to Roman politics and society. This combined with his familiarity with Greek military knowledge provided Polybius with the ability to give firsthand and knowledgeable insight on matters of war.

Polybius was writing primarily for a Greek audience, to whom he hoped to explain how the Romans came to dominate the Mediterranean world in a period of 53 years. Polybius was fascinated with Rome's meteoric rise and the role of *tyche* (fortune). He also showed great interest in the Roman constitution. Polybius advocated a mixed constitution: a mixture of monarchy, oligarchy, and democracy. He felt that the Romans had achieved a near perfect balance.

One of the striking qualities of Polybius' writing is his extensive personal experience. He disliked so-called armchair historians and the writers of Hellenistic sensational "theatrical" history, whose goal was to entertain. Polybius was a proponent of *pragmatikē historia*, "practical history" that focuses on political and military affairs with the goal of instructing politicians and soldiers. In this approach, Polybius built upon and expanded the historical approach of Thucydides. Accordingly, *pragmatikē historia* needs to be based on real evidence, including eyewitness accounts, firsthand observation and experience, and the study of contemporary sources. Polybius did not believe in explaining events through supernatural tales or the actions of the gods, and he reduces the role of religion in Roman warfare. As a "practical historian," Polybius' speeches may be more reliable than those of most other ancient authors, who often treated speeches by historical characters as rhetorical exercises,

because Polybius was investigating relatively recent events, easily remembered by his contemporaries, and because he conducted considerable background research whenever possible.

Polybius' writing of *pragmatikē historia* caused him to emphasize moral behavior, presenting models to imitate or avoid. He praises physical caution, bravery, moral courage, loyalty and good faith, restraint in gaining and using wealth, generosity, and self-control and moderation. He criticizes recklessness and impulsiveness, cowardice, debauchery, drunkenness, sloth, and deceit. He emphasizes diligence, perseverance, and education. Polybius often was critical of other historians for their biased and inadequate historical accounts (although Polybius is sometimes guilty of the same bias). For Polybius, facts and practical lessons were needed to benefit real students.

Polybius was one of the first ancients to write universal history and in many ways laid foundations for the writing of history. He emphasized explanation and formulation of beginnings and reasons for historical events. Authors such as Sempronius Asellio, Cicero, Strabo, Diodorus, Livy, Plutarch, Arrian, Athenaeus, and Ammianus read Polybius and were influenced by his work. Livy often used Polybius as his principal source, especially for his accounts of the eastern Mediterranean. However, Livy was a very different author, more rhetorical and "theatrical," and his treatment of the same events bears comparison with the parallel episodes found in Polybius.

Polybius arranged his history in a unique chronological and geographical framework. Chronologically, his history followed the Olympiads. Yet geographically, his work progresses from west to east each year. Polybius' history covers the years 264–146, with emphasis on the growth of Roman power between 220 and 167; it also contains several digressions on geography, historiography, and government. Polybius wrote a number of minor works, including a biography of Philopoemen, a treatise on tactics, and a history of the Numantine war, all of which are lost. Although his history survives, it is not intact. Of the original 40 books, only Books 1–5 remain complete. Books 17, 19, 26, 37, and 40 are almost entirely lost. His history survives mostly in excerpts from other works. The "Excerpta Antiqua" and the *Excerpta* of Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus (905–959) provide the vast majority of the surviving material from Books 6–29 of Polybius' history. Polybius' work is the most significant and extensive

surviving example of history from the Hellenistic Age.

Nikolaus Leo Overtoom

See also Aemilius Paullus, Lucius; Imperialism; Macedonian War, First; Macedonian War, Second; Macedonian War, Third; Punic War, First; Punic War, Second; Rome (History); Scipio Aemilianus

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Pomerium

The *pomerium* was the ritual boundary of the city of Rome, with religious and military significance. According to legend, Romulus, the founder of Rome, ploughed the religious and ritual boundary of the city, the *pomerium*, and set boundary stones. The perimeter was later demarcated by a wall, and *pomerium* can refer both to the sacred perimeter and the wall, excluding the gates.

Warfare was excluded within the *pomerium*. Within its circumference, military activity of any kind, including the mustering of troops, military exercises, and the wearing of military garb, was prohibited. War gods' temples were outside the *pomerium*. The *dilectus* (levy) was held outside the *pomerium* on the Campus Martius. Soldiers trained on the Campus Martius. State ambassadors and generals negotiating for triumphs met with Roman representatives outside the *pomerium*. The triumph ceremony took place as an exception to the military prohibition rule. The triumphant general and his soldiers were permitted to cross the *pomerium* and enter the city after ritual purification. The *pomerium* also excluded some foreign deities, and religious protocol prohibited certain forms of public divination and religious cults, including specific priests, to leave the sacred limits.

The consecrated border of the city of Rome was extended when the city grew, often corresponding to military victory. The “Servian walls” of the fourth century BCE extended the city limits but not the *pomerium*. Sulla enlarged the *pomerium*, though he himself first broke the *pomerium* taboo by marching upon Rome with an army and taking the city by force. Julius Caesar, Augustus (according to Tacitus), Claudius, Vespasian, and Hadrian further increased the sacred limit. While some *pomerium* boundary stones have been unearthed, the exact route remains unknown.

Augustus’ establishment of permanent armed forces in the city of Rome (Praetorian Guard, urban cohorts, and *vigiles*) violated the tradition of the *pomerium*, but paid lip service to it in that the praetorians’ camp was outside the traditional boundary, and soldiers were not permitted to openly carry weapons within the border.

Kristan Ewin Foust

See also Dilectus; Domi/Militiae; Imperium; Praetorians; Religion and Warfare; Triumph

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Pompey (106–48 BCE)

Pompey the Great (Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus) was a major figure in the late Roman Republic, pursuing a career driven by desire for military glory and securing unusual positions.

When Sulla returned in 83 from the eastern Mediterranean and sought to recapture Rome, Pompey, then 23, joined him with a private army of three legions from family clients in Picenum. Impressed by Pompey’s military performance and wanting to bind him closer, Sulla arranged a

marriage first to his stepdaughter, Aemilia, and then on her death to Mucia, a relative of the Metellan nobles who had also helped Sulla.

Sent against Marians in Sicily and Africa in 82–81, Pompey secured Sicily first, then Africa; his execution of opponents led to the nickname “the adolescent butcher.” On his return, Sulla greeted him as *Magnus* (“the Great”), but Pompey used that name only later. Pompey requested a triumph for his African victories; Sulla initially refused, but when Pompey moved his army nearer, Sulla conceded and allowed Pompey his first triumph.


In the consular elections for 78, Pompey supported Lepidus against Sulla’s wishes, but after Sulla’s death, when Lepidus as consul rebelled, Pompey accepted a command against him. Next he requested a command to assist Metellus Pius against Sertorius, a Marian general, who had been holding out in Spain for three years. When the Senate rejected the request, Pompey resorted to his usual method—refusal to disband his army, so the Senate reluctantly gave him proconsular power equal to Metellus. He remained in Spain from 76–71, unable to end the war because of Sertorius’ guerrilla tactics. Finally, Sertorius was murdered by his own officer, Perperna; Pompey easily defeated him and brought Spain under control.

While returning to Rome, Pompey captured 5,000 slaves from the revolt led by Spartacus, largely crushed by Crassus, and claimed some of the credit. He celebrated a second triumph on December 31, 71 for Spanish victories, and then requested the consulship of 70, though technically not qualified. In addition to his great popularity, the threat of an undisbanded army again secured his request. He and Crassus were elected consuls, restoring tribunes’ powers and re-arranging jury-panels.

Pompey next received two extensive commands through tribunician bills passed directly by the assembly, despite senatorial opposition. In 67 Gabinius proposed an extensive three-year command to deal with Mediterranean piracy, which had cut Rome’s grain supplies. Demonstrating his organizational skills, Pompey cleared the seas in three months.

In 66 Manilius secured Pompey’s appointment to take over the war against Mithridates from Lucullus (compare Cicero, *Pro Lege Manilia*). The king was defeated almost immediately; while Pompey failed to capture him as he fled over the Caucasus, Mithridates eventually committed suicide in 63. Meanwhile Pompey had carried out an extensive reorganization in the eastern Mediterranean, creating four new provinces and establishing

Rome's eastern frontier.



Bust of Pompey the Great, ca. 70 BCE. Pompey's unconventional career was marked by extraordinary commands, granted by popular vote to combat piracy through the Mediterranean and to wage war against King Mithridates VI of Pontus in Asia Minor. Located in the National Archaeological Museum, Venice, Italy. (Alfredo Dagli Orti/The Art Archive/Corbis)

Pompey returned in December 62, and (uncharacteristically) disbanded his army before heading to Rome, where on his forty-fifth birthday he celebrated his third, and most magnificent, triumph. He had two more requests: land allotments for his veterans, and ratification of his eastern rearrangements. This time, without his usual bargaining chip—an undisbanded army—the Senate thwarted him. He therefore joined an

alliance with Crassus and Caesar, who were also being blocked in the Senate. This “First Triumvirate,” combining their political resources, was cemented by marriage between Pompey and Caesar’s daughter Julia. The initial aim was to secure the consulship of 59 for Caesar; duly elected, he forced through laws securing the three men’s requests.

Caesar left hurriedly for a five-year command in Gaul, leaving Pompey to face discredit from Caesar’s methods. Clodius, a tribune for 57, began attacking Pompey and forced his supporter Cicero into exile. In late 57 Pompey secured Cicero’s recall, and also received a commission to restore the grain supply, which carried proconsular power for five years, with 15 legates, but no army.

By 56 cracks were appearing in the “triumvirate” because of individual ambitions. The three met at Luca to make new arrangements: Pompey and Crassus became consuls in 55; Caesar’s command in Gaul was extended by five years; following their consulship, Crassus secured command of Syria and a campaign against Persia, while Pompey received Spain which he governed in absence.

Julia’s death in childbirth in 54 broke one link between Pompey and Caesar, but Pompey rejected new marriage arrangements offered by Caesar. In 53 another link was broken when Crassus and his army were annihilated at Carrhae. Meanwhile Caesar’s successes in Gaul, misrepresented at Rome, increased tensions between him and Pompey.

In 52, continuing violence and corruption led to talk of Pompey being appointed dictator, but he was made sole consul instead, with the support of conservative senators, including Cato. He now married Cornelia, the young widow of Crassus’ son, and daughter of Metellus Scipio, who joined Pompey as consul later that year. Pompey was drifting toward the optimates—they probably thought him the lesser of two evils.

A tribunician law had been passed allowing Caesar to run in absence for the consulship when he returned from Gaul; Pompey now had this privilege annulled. This overturned Caesar’s plan to move straight into another consulship to avoid prosecution for force he used in 59. As tension increased, both were urged to disband their armies, but neither would blink. Finally the conservatives had the Senate order Caesar to quit his province immediately and put Pompey in charge of resistance to him. Caesar’s response was to cross the Rubicon and invade Italy.

Pompey realized his troops were no match for Caesar’s battle-hardened

legions, and so he retreated across the Adriatic to regroup and train, while Caesar made a lightning campaign against Pompeian supporters in Spain. Pompey put together nine legions, reinforced by allied contingents, and built up a fleet, which controlled the Adriatic. Even so he could not stop Caesar from crossing to Apollonia. The two had their showdown at Pharsalus in August 48: Pompey had superior numbers, but Caesar's tactics and his veterans' experience brought him victory.

Pompey retreated to Egypt, pursued by Caesar with a small army. On Pompey's arrival the advisers of the young Ptolemy XIII considered whether to offer him refuge, but the advice to choose Caesar prevailed. As Cornelia watched, Pompey left with a small group of companions, heading for what appeared to be a welcoming party, but on disembarking he was murdered, one day before his fifty-ninth birthday.

When Caesar arrived, Pompey's head and seal were presented to him. Caesar was angered at this insult to a great general, his former ally and son-in-law, and executed the murderers. Cornelia was given Pompey's ashes, which she carried back to their country house near Alba.

Bruce Marshall

See also Caesar, Gaius Julius; Cicero; Civil Wars (I) (49–45 BCE); Civil Wars (II) (44–31 BCE); Clodius Pulcher; Crassus; First Triumvirate; Lucullus; Mithridatic Wars; Pharsalus, Battle of; Sertorius; Sulla, Lucius Cornelius

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Portents

Portents were signs of the gods' approval or disapproval of human affairs in ancient Rome, including military campaigns. These signs were either spontaneous events, which required interpretation and expiation, or

deliberately sought via prescribed rituals propitiating the gods, which the Romans believed ensured military success. The spontaneous signs (*prodigia*) could be abnormal births of animals or people, abnormal behavior of animals (such as swarms of bees), lightning strikes, visions in the sky, earth tremors, mysterious voices, and so on. Sometimes, the army was directly implicated in a portent, such as when spiders covered the military standards when the Pompeians disembarked at Dyrrhachium in 48 BCE (Dio 41.14.1), signifying that the Pompeians would lose the war. Any portent involving the *aquilae*, the eagles which were the primary military standard by the late Republic, signaled serious divine displeasure with the general or army.

During the Republic (509–27 BCE) any witness to portents reported them to the senators, so that they could determine whether the portent was a public prodigy (*prodigium publicum*), meaning that the gods were unhappy with the entire Roman people. Sometimes the Senate rejected portents as private or foreign events (for example, in 169 BCE at Fregellae). If the Senate accepted the portent as public, the senators ordered expiatory rituals to be performed to a god or gods, in all temples in Rome, or even throughout Italy. The consuls could not leave for their military assignments (*provinciae*) until all public portents had been expiated. By the time of Augustus (27 BCE–14 CE), most public prodigies were no longer reported; only the portents dealing with the emperors were significant because the emperor embodied the religious health of the state.

The Romans also sought divine favor for specific events, such as battles or Senate meetings, through *auspicium*, a consultation of the will of the gods. Higher magistrates with *imperium* also held the power of *auspicium*, enabling them to practice official divination. When in an established city, the magistrates divided the sky or land into a sacred grid (*templum*) to wait for predetermined bird flights or calls. Depending on bird type and location of the sign, an augur, one of a specialized college of priests, determined the gods' disposition. The Etruscans originated this observation of bird signs. When the army was on the march or aboard ship, the general ordered a *pullarius* (chicken keeper) to feed grain to his sacred poultry to determine the gods' will (a ritual called *tripudium*).

A famous episode of the *tripudium* occurred during the First Punic War (264–241 BCE), when the naval commander Claudius Pulcher (consul in 249 BCE) grew angry when his chickens would not provide a favorable omen by eating; he thus threw the chickens into the sea, saying "If they will not eat,

let them drink!” (Cicero, *Nature of the Gods* 2.7; Suetonius, *Tiberius* 2) Claudius subsequently lost the battle of Drepana.

By the first century BCE, taking the auspices fell out of favor on campaign because many generals were promagistrates and no longer had the correct authority to perform the ritual. By the late Republic, the solitary nature of observing bird signs became subject to manipulation, for example, Marcus Calpurnius Bibulus’ abuse of the practice as an attempt to block Caesar’s legislation in 59 BCE. This manipulation led to a distrust of the auspices, although the practice continued throughout the empire. In his *Gallic Wars* and *Civil War*, Julius Caesar minimizes the use of divination and religious ceremonies in Roman warfare to emphasize the rational qualities of his leadership and the discipline of his troops.

Finally, the Romans sought to know the gods’ will through haruspicy, reading the livers of sacrificial victims. A *haruspex*, one of an Etruscan college of priests, travelled with the legions. These Etruscan priests compared the appearance of the sacrificial animal’s fresh liver with bronze models of a sheep liver, inscribed with the gods’ names, to interpret which unfavorable omens needed expiation to which god. One such extant model is the Piacenza Liver, which dates to the third or second century BCE. A misshapen liver portended unfavorable omens. The *haruspices* practiced regularly in Rome until Christian emperors, beginning with Constantine I (306–337), began to discourage them, starting of course with private divination, regarded as seditious by the emperors. Theodosius I (379–395) prohibited haruspicy along with other pagan practices. The traditional Romans interpreted and expiated all negative portents, whether spontaneous or deliberately sought, to maintain their *pax deorum* (gods’ peace) so that they could continue to be successful in military and political life.

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See also Etruria; *Imperium*; Religion and Warfare

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Praefectus

The Romans employed the title prefect (*praefectus*) for various military officials and civilian administrators, typically equestrian but varying greatly in seniority and authority. The most numerous prefects (approximately 360 per year) were commanders of auxiliary infantry or cavalry units, termed *praefectus cohortis* or *praefectus alae*. High-ranking prefects included the prefect of the grain supply, the prefect of the fire brigade, the prefect of Egypt, and the praetorian prefect. The camp prefect played an important role in managing legionary logistics. Another prefecture, the urban prefect, was a prestigious senatorial post.

In the mid-Republic, units of Italian allies (*socii*) were commanded by Roman *praefecti sociorum*. The practice of recruiting non-Italian allies as cavalry units began in the late Republic. Caesar used Gauls and Germans as cavalry, commanded by native leaders. He depicts two of these leaders, Raucillus and Egus of the Allobroges, as unreliable, peculating from their men and deserting to Pompey (Caesar, *Civil War* 3.59). In the early empire, the Roman army continued to recruit non-Italian peoples with "warlike" traditions into the *auxilia*. Auxiliary units usually took titles denoting their original ethnicity. Auxiliary prefects were originally local aristocrats with natural ties to their men. However, the Romanization of the provinces meant that auxiliary prefects became Romanized, literate men. Many may have been second-generation citizens. Their loyalties were to the empire rather than to their ethnicity. Other equestrian commanders in the early empire were probably of Roman or Italian ethnicity, commanding auxiliary units with men whose ethnicity was non-Italian.

An auxiliary infantry prefect (*praefectus cohortis*) could be promoted to angusticlavian tribune in a legion, ensuring that the *auxilia* and the legions were not isolated from each other. After serving as tribune, he took another post as an auxiliary prefect, this time *praefectus alae* (cavalry commander). These three posts were known as the *militia equestris* and evolved by the mid-first century CE. After *praefectus alae*, the equestrian could enter the imperial civil service as a procurator (a financial official), of which there

were several grades, or hold other equestrian posts in the city of Rome.

The culmination of an equestrian career were the four senior prefectures: the *praefectus annonae* or prefect of the grain supply for Rome; the *praefectus vigilum* or commander of the fire brigade for Rome; the *praefectus Aegypti* or equestrian governor of Egypt; and the praetorian prefect, commander of the Praetorian Guard (sometimes two). The praetorian prefect became the most powerful civil administrator in the empire, deputizing for the emperor in day-to-day administration. Because of the prestige and high salaries of the procurators and the four major prefectures, many equestrians who held these offices probably did not ascend through the *militia equestris*, but received their high-level posts by patronage (the exploitation of social connections). The praetorian prefecture in particular demanded competence in Roman law; some notable jurists in the early third century CE, Ulpian and Papinian, were praetorian prefects.

A legionary centurion could attain the rank of camp prefect (*praefectus castrorum*), an important officer who managed the infrastructure and logistics of the legionary base. If building or siege works needed to be carried out, the camp prefect would organize them. Some early camp prefects were equestrians promoted by patronage. By the mid-first century CE, the most common path to *praefectus castrorum* was through promotion through the hierarchy of centurions to the rank of *primus pilus*, chief centurion of the first cohort of the legion, a highly prestigious rank for a common soldier. The *primus pilus* served for a year and was discharged, attaining equestrian status. He could re-enter the service as *praefectus castrorum*, exploiting his long familiarity with the local economy and the military community, or he could enter the imperial civil service as a procurator. Accordingly the *praefectus castrorum* was middle-aged or more when he attained his rank.

As an exception to the general policy that senators commanded legions, some legions had equestrian commanders: this was the case for the two legions in Egypt, where the governor (*praefectus Aegypti*) was also an equestrian. Legio I-III Parthica, created by Septimius Severus (193–211) also had equestrian commanders, and Severus' new province of Mesopotamia also had an equestrian governor. Some small imperial provinces also had equestrian prefect governors. However, in general equestrians were not permitted to govern provinces or command legions until the mid-third century CE, when equestrians displaced senators from these posts.

The reorganization of the administration and military by Diocletian and Constantine separated civilian and military careers more strictly, so that members of the imperial service could not hold a mixture of civilian and military posts as had been the case in the Principate. The praetorian prefecture was quadrupled, and the city prefect (*praefectus urbi*), always a senator, also rose in prominence as de facto ruler of the city of Rome in the emperors' near-permanent absence. Where old-fashioned legions persisted, they still had *praefecti* as commanders.

Sara E. Phang

See also Auxilia; Caesar, Gaius Julius; Centurion (Imperial); Cohort; Equites, Equestrians; Legate; Legion, Organization of; Patronage; Praetorians; *Primus Pilus*; Senate, Senators; Septimius Severus

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Praemia Militiae

The *praemia militiae* ("rewards of military service," singular *praemium*) consisted of the cash pension distributed to praetorian and legionary veterans at the conclusion of their service during the Principate. Veterans also received additional legal privileges. The *praemia militiae* were a major element of the imperial budget, funded by the *aerarium militare* or military treasury founded by Augustus (27 BCE–14 CE). Augustus thus ended the irregular patronage of the army that had marked the wars of the late Republic, placing the army's benefits on a solid footing, despite an initial shortage of funds that led to the temporary extension of legionary service and the mutinies of 14 CE. The *praemia militiae* thus contributed to stabilizing the imperial order. Caracalla (211–217 CE) is said to have raised the *praemia militiae*, perhaps to keep pace with inflation.

Prior to Augustus, pensions and land grants to veterans had required the

initiative of the Senate and of individual generals. In the mid-Republic, the Senate had settled colonies of Roman citizens, usually veterans, in Italy. This practice fell into disuse in the second century BCE. Leaders in the late Republic, including the Gracchi and Caesar, attempted to revive it, founding a few additional colonies abroad, most notably at Carthage.

As recruits' economic status declined, soldiers became more dependent on their generals to provide funds or grants of land for their retirement. At this time, however, service in the legions was usually short (six years at a time, the longest routine service being 16 years). Men who had served a six-year tour of duty were still young and often re-enlisted, continuing to serve under generals with whom they had a personal bond of loyalty. Nevertheless, Sulla took aggressive measures to provide land for his veterans, confiscating it from his proscribed enemies and expelling the inhabitants from many Italian cities to make room for Sullan veterans. This policy was very unpopular. Julius Caesar settled some of his veterans in overseas colonies, as did Octavian.

Augustus reorganized the conditions of service, discharging many legionaries with pensions paid from his own funds (as he claims in his autobiographical inscription, the *Res Gestae Divi Augusti*) and from the profits of his wars, especially the conquest of Egypt. Praetorians received a pension of 20,000 sesterces, and legionaries a pension of 12,000 sesterces. This was a very substantial amount of money; in the first century CE, legionaries earned only 900 sesterces a year. The *praemium* enabled a legionary or praetorian veteran to buy a farm, should he choose to, or to establish a small business or provide for his descendants. Impoverished and disgruntled veterans had featured in the late Republic's conflicts, either supporting conspirators outright (as the Sullan veterans did with Catiline) or mutinying. To avoid poverty, they enlisted repeatedly, as Caesar's veterans did serving with Octavian and Antony, perpetuating the cycle of war.

In 6 CE Augustus founded a military treasury termed the *aerarium militare*, funded by a tax on the inheritances of Roman citizens and a smaller tax on auction sales. *Praemia militiae* were now drawn from the *aerarium*, intended to be a permanent fund. The *aerarium* thus stabilized imperial rule in contrast with the late Republic's generals' irregular rewards for soldiers and veterans. Augustus capitalized the *aerarium militare* with 170 million sesterces of his own property.

In 5 CE Augustus chose to extend legionary service from 16 years plus four years in reserve, to 20 years plus five years in reserve. The new Praetorian Guard, which had served 12 years, now served 16 years. The extensions were probably intended to reduce the number of beneficiaries (since more men would die from normal attrition) and to spread out the payment of pensions over a longer period of time. These measures reduced the burden of the entitlements on the *aerarium militare*, which was not yet being filled substantially from taxation.

As a result, the legionaries on the Rhine and Danube mutinied in 14 CE, after Augustus' death. They complained of the extension of their service into old age, and of withheld or substandard grants of marginal land, to Germanicus and Drusus, members of the imperial family assigned by Tiberius to suppress the mutinies. Tiberius made concessions, discharging the older legionaries and paying pensions. For a short time legionary service reverted to 16 years. However, legionary service was extended to 25 years sometime in the late first century, perhaps in connection with the pay raise granted by Domitian (81–96) around 83. Soldiers were also discharged every two years to reduce the burden on the *aerarium*.

Since financing the army and provision for veterans were the largest single items in the imperial budget, prudent emperors took various unorthodox expedients to raise money, such as new taxes, confiscations, or even selling off the palace furnishings. Tacitus insinuates that emperors instigated treason trials to raise money from the confiscation of the alleged conspirators' estates. Another option that could not be relied upon was the conquest of wealthy enemies such as the Jews in the Jewish War or the Dacian king Decebalus.

Caracalla (211–217) raised legionary *praemia* to 20,000 sesterces and praetorian *praemia* by some undetermined amount. He was an enthusiastic patron of the army, but this measure may also have been intended to keep pace with inflation. However, the spiraling inflation of the third-century CE crisis period (235–284) contributed to the political instability of this period, with many revolts and rival emperors.

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See also Aerarium Militare; Army in Politics; Augustus; Auxilia; Emperor as Patron; Legion, Organization of; Pay and Finances, Military (Imperial); Praetorians; Res Gestae Divi Augusti; Veterans (Status)

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Praetor

The office of the praetor was highly adaptable and served multiple functions in the Roman Republic. According to tradition, the position was created in 367 BCE to take over part of the civic duties entrusted to consuls. Other evidence suggests that the supreme magistrate(s) in the early Republic may have been called praetors, not consuls, making praetors much more ancient than 367 BCE.

In the classical Republic, praetors were annually elected magistrates with chiefly judicial functions, ranking below the consul in the Roman Republic's traditional political system. Praetors, like consuls, were elected for one year, held *imperium* and *auspicium*, and were accompanied by lictors (ritual attendants that acted essentially as bodyguards), though praetors were subordinate to the consuls' authority and only had six lictors each to each consul's 12. The praetor's primary role was in judicial matters, but additional tasks included handling the civic duties of the consuls while the latter were on campaign. These included presiding over the Senate, administering justice, and governing the city. If necessary, praetors could also take command of an army to support the consuls in the field.

A second praetorship was created ca. 246 BCE which distinguished from the old office. The traditional position was now known as the *praetor urbanus*, who served as the major city praetor and handled the normal civic duties within Rome. The newly created *praetor peregrinus* did alleviate the judicial load on the *praetor urbanus* but primarily served as a backup general who could command another army in an emergency. The *praetor urbanus* only left the city in extreme emergencies, such as at the height of the crisis during the Second Punic War (218–201 BCE), and even then could only be absent from Rome for no more than 10 days at a time.

In a military role, praetors normally handled support tasks such as naval operations and garrison duty. Occasionally praetors saw heavy action and won victories significant enough to earn a triumph, though often they lacked the greater resources given to consular armies and could only afford

defensive actions. Praetors normally were given small armies, usually only one legion and supporting allied forces and sometimes only allied units. This meant that praetors could garrison a province but likely could not hold against major uprisings such as that of Viriathus in Spain in the 140s BCE.

Among the most important roles of the praetor as Rome expanded during the second century BCE was to serve as governors over the newly formed provinces. In 228/227, following the First Punic War, two additional praetors were created to run Sicily and Sardinia. Two more positions were formed to handle the Spanish provinces in 198/197. Sulla increased the number of praetors to eight, and Caesar eventually expanded the position to 16. Praetors could be prorogued if necessary. In that case they became *propraetors* and retained their positions with slightly modified powers. Though necessary to govern the various provinces, this vast increase in number of praetors led to heightened competition in Roman society for the consulship, as only two consuls were elected annually and the pool of former praetors vying for the position only kept growing.

Under the empire, the praetorship greatly lost importance and praetors primarily served only as imperial administrators. Praetors should not be confused with the Praetorian Guard or the praetorian prefect; the office continued to be filled by election, though their powers had been greatly reduced. Though they continued to administer law, praetors no longer served in a joint civic-military role as in the Republic. By the division of the empire in 395 CE, the praetorship had been reduced to a purely municipal role.

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See also Caesar, Gaius Julius; Consul; *Cursus Honorum* (Republic); *Imperium*; *Propraetor*; Prorogation; Punic War, Second; Republic, Political Structure; Sulla, Lucius Cornelius

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Praetorians

The Praetorian Guard was the personal bodyguard of the Roman emperors. Adapted from a republican institution by the first emperor Augustus in 27 BCE, the division soon took on additional tasks both within and outside of Rome. Occasionally the Guard played a pivotal role in the transition of power, but generally in all of their activities the praetorians can be seen as representing the power of the Principate whether for good or for malevolent purposes. Thus the praetorians played a disproportionately large role in politics, compared to the rest of the Roman army.

Considered a separate division of the army for much of its history, the Guard was originally organized into nine cohorts, ostensibly to distinguish them from a legion (which had 10 cohorts). The number fluctuated throughout the first century CE to as many as 12, but by the beginning of the second century there were 10 cohorts which is where the number remained until the demise of the Guard in 312 CE. The effective strength (that is, how many men per cohort) was almost certainly milliary (1000 strong), which meant that these soldiers would have been highly visible in the capital. It was for this reason that Augustus initially only stationed three cohorts at any one time in Rome: he was interested in disguising that his power was reliant on such a large force at his personal disposal.



Relief from the Arch of Claudius, depicting praetorians, ca. 51 CE. Created by Augustus, the Praetorian Guard was an elite force stationed at Rome to guard the emperor and maintain order. Praetorian detachments accompanied major campaigns, particularly when the emperor was present. Located in the Louvre Museum, Paris, France. (Leemage/Corbis)

Praetorians were recruited mainly from Italy, though over time, the area from which these men were drawn was expanded. Furthermore they were paid more than any other soldiers and served for a shorter period of time. It was this that was the catalyst for a conflict early in their history when, at the death of Augustus, the legions on the German frontier complained about their conditions of service compared to the Guard. The challenge was put down, but it highlighted the problems for the rest of the army at this early date of an elite division operating so close to the emperor.

It was under Augustus' successor Tiberius that all of the cohorts were brought together into Rome and a camp especially constructed for them. By

this time (23 CE), the presence of an armed division in the capital had become less of a concern and in fact the *Castra Praetoria* was an imposing structure overlooking the city from the Viminal Hill; the inhabitants of Rome could not help but be reminded daily of the power of the emperor. Inevitably there were conflicts between civilians and soldiers, something mentioned in several of the literary sources: the presence of the Guard not only on the streets but also at such places as venues for the games and at the theater exacerbated the relationship. Indeed, the situation became more strained after Septimius Severus cashiered the Italian Guard in 193 CE and replaced them with legionaries from the provinces. Cassius Dio, a senator in Rome at this time, comments on the boorish demeanor of the new praetorians and it is clear from his comments that the situation had deteriorated after the change (Dio 74[75].2.4–6).

The praetorians were an interested party in any transition of power, though being a pragmatic lot, they did not often take direct action themselves—it was not in their best interests to have disruption at the top. Officers of the Guard were involved in the assassination of the emperor Caligula (41 CE) and that of Caracalla (217 CE) but there are few examples of the rank and file taking part in such activity. The murder of Pertinax in 193 CE is the exception: 200 of the Guard went to the palace to confront the emperor over his strict discipline and in the ensuing encounter he was killed. It was because of this event that Severus decided to cashier the Guard in its entirety, though doing so also allowed him to reward the legionaries who had proclaimed him emperor in Pannonia on the death of Pertinax. And so, although it is a common perception that the Guard was instrumental in many of the changes of power in the imperial period, the evidence does not bear this out.

In the civil war of 68–69 CE, however, the Guard played a pivotal role in the removal of the emperor Galba and the installation of his successor Otho. Angered by Galba's refusal to grant them a donative as promised by the praetorian prefect Gaius Nymphidius Sabinus, it was easy for Otho to seduce them to his side; Tacitus records in his *Histories* that Otho offered incentives to praetorian soldiers whenever the opportunity arose. In particular, he took an interest in a special branch of the Guard, the *speculatores*, who were responsible for such activities as spying, and it was through these men that a large part of the Guard was brought to his side (Tacitus, *Histories* 1.24–5). As a result, Galba was murdered in the Roman

Forum at the hands of his own praetorians. The Guard played a role in the rest of the events in this turbulent year both in the field and in the capital. In fact Otho's successor, Vitellius, is said to have used promotion to the praetorians as a method of rewarding his field troops (Tacitus, *Histories* 2.94), which resulted in these men fighting to the very end against Vitellius' rivals to maintain their newly won status. After the success of Vespasian, however, the system returned to the earlier system of recruitment, though that emperor also reduced the number of cohorts back to nine.

It was only in the second century that the praetorians began to take the field with any regularity. In the first century, they were part of the contingent that had dealt with the revolts in the north in 14 CE; Guard members also had been sent by Domitian to Dacia in the late 80s CE along with their prefect Cornelius Fuscus who was killed in battle. Under Trajan, they played an active role in the Dacian Wars, celebrated on his column. Identification of the praetorians on that monument is tricky because of the similarity of equipment to the legionaries but it is clear from epigraphic evidence that their soldiers took part in battle. The Guard also was involved in the Marcomannic War. Although the praetorians were not set up as a field division at the outset, once the emperors themselves began to see more activity on campaign, it made sense that members of the Guard, along with the *equites singulares Augusti* (set up in the early second century as an additional protection unit) accompanied him.

In the third century during the multiple transfers of power that occurred with great rapidity, the Guard was involved in many of the changes, though it was not usually instrumental in the outcome. One occasion where the praetorians did have a major impact was in the conflict between Pupienus and Balbinus, who had been installed as emperors by the Senate, and the supporters of Gordian III (238–244 CE). In the ensuing dispute, the *Castra Praetoria* was besieged for only the second time (the first having occurred during the civil war of 69 CE); the soldiers were trapped for several days and were forced out only when the water supply to the camp was cut off. The praetorians then went on a rampage, eventually attacking the palace itself and murdering the two emperors, installing Gordian III in their place. The reason for the Guard's anger at Pupienus and Balbinus was fear that they would replace the current members of the division as had happened under Severus 50 years earlier; it is clear that the position of the praetorians was starting to be precarious.

By the late third century, the Guard had become a liability, in particular because of the cost of maintaining the division. The effective strength was reduced by Diocletian in the late third century but the final act was left to Constantine when the Guard supported his rival, Maxentius. In 312 CE, after Constantine's victory at the Milvian Bridge, the praetorians were abolished. Other imperial guards corps, termed *scholae palatinae*, attended the imperial court.

Sandra Bingham

See also Army in Politics; Assassination; Augustus; Civil War (Pertinax-Septimius Severus); Donatives; *Equites Singulares*; Sejanus; Septimius Severus; Tiberius (Emperor); War of Four Emperors

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Primus Pilus

The role of *primus pilus* was the most senior position within the legionary centurionate. Entry into the primipilate granted status and prestige, as well as access to more senior posts across the empire.

The rank of *primus pilus* arose during the republican period when experienced centurions were needed to provide charismatic leadership during prolonged military campaigns. Julius Caesar notes the heroic exploits of Publius Sextius Baculus, who endured so many wounds in battle that he could no longer stand upright (Caesar, *Gallie Wars* 2.25).

The Augustan military reforms cemented the status of the *primus pilus*, who now received a significant salary of 54,000 sesterces. The *primus pilus* was appointed for a single year, although the rank of *primus pilus bis* demonstrates that some did so on two occasions. The retiring *primus pilus* received equestrian rank and a payment of around 600,000 sesterces marking the end of a successful career for many.

The *primipilares* offered the emperor a group of military personnel of proven loyalty and significant military experience. *Primipilares* could advance to a camp prefecture or a tribunate in the city cohorts of Rome. Further possible posts included procuratorships and governorships of equestrian provinces. In some circumstances, *primipilares* reached the praetorian prefecture. Arrius Varus began his career commanding a cohort under Corbulo in the eastern empire. He was later elevated to the primipilate by Nero and eventually reached the praetorian prefecture after the downfall of Vitellius (Tacitus, *Histories* 3.6, 4.2).

Jonathan Eaton

See also Centurion (Imperial); Legion, Organization of; Promotion in Army (Imperial)

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Princeps, Principate

Even though the words emperor and empire are often used to describe the position and regime of Augustus and his successors, Augustus and his early successors preferred to be addressed by the title of *princeps* (first citizen), a

title with strong republican connotations, although never part of a Roman emperor's official titles. Augustus' decision to use *princeps* and not terms more closely associated with monarchic power promoted the image of his regime as an extension of Rome's republican past. The adoption of the title of *rex*, with autocratic and tyrannical connotations, would have too closely associated Augustus and his regime with Rome's early kings or Hellenistic monarchs, and as such would have offended Roman sensitivities. *Dictator* was also a title that contradicted Augustus' message of republican renewal, concord, and reconciliation, since the actions of Sulla and Caesar had sullied the connotations of dictator, an office traditionally held only during times of crisis, contrary to the Augustan image of peace. Finally, although it was Augustus' official *praenomen* and was based in republican tradition, the title of *imperator* stressed military leadership and like that of *dictator* would have contradicted the Augustan message of universal peace. In contrast, rising out of the ashes of civil war, the Principate was a deliberate combination of old and new, creating a sense of continuity with Rome's traditional republican past while looking forward to a stable, prosperous, and more cohesive future for the Roman world.

More clarity can be shed upon Augustus' motives in establishing the Principate by considering the Roman traditional view of monarchy, and the actions of Caesar and Sulla while in the position of supreme power. For the Romans, the concept of monarchy was the antithesis of the Roman political system, since the overthrow of the monarchy led to the creation of the *res publica*. Consequently, the Romans were especially suspicious of anyone who attained and demonstrated what could be recognized as monarchical power. Such fears were realized by the actions of Sulla and Caesar during their dictatorships. Although traditionally only temporarily held during a crisis, Sulla and Caesar both used the office to their advantage, Sulla to eliminate his political rivals, and Caesar to consolidate his monarchical position at Rome by making the office perpetual, a move that ultimately cost him his life. Octavian could not escape these precedents and learned from them to tread with extreme caution while compiling political powers that would set him above and apart from the Roman Senate.

Caesar's assassination in 44 BCE resulted in another period of political uncertainty, as the assassins of Caesar and Caesar's supporters prepared for the inevitable clashes that lay ahead. In 43 BCE the triumvirate of Antony, Octavian, and Lepidus divided the imperial territories between them. They

defeated the assassins of Caesar in battle at Philippi in 42. Their cooperation was short-lived, however, and the expulsion of Lepidus from the triumvirate in 36 BCE made the final showdown between Octavian and Antony inevitable. In the ensuing struggle, a propaganda war was fundamental to Octavian's eventual success. To force Antony into making the first aggressive move, Octavian attempted to erode Antony's standing at Rome by publishing the alleged will of Antony. This document stressed Antony's monarchical behavior in the eastern Mediterranean, including his alleged division of Rome's eastern provinces among his children with Cleopatra as though they were his personal possessions to distribute. In this alleged will, Antony also declared Caesar's son Caesarion as *rex regum*, king of kings. Furthermore, the will's revelation that he wished to be buried with Cleopatra in Alexandria seemed to offer the Roman people the final definitive proof that Antony had abandoned his Roman identity. In this way, Octavian presented the resulting war against Antony as a defense of Roman republican tradition against the tyranny of Hellenistic monarchy, carefully shaping the image of himself as the caretaker of Roman political and cultural tradition, a theme that would remain at the heart of the slow and cautious evolution of the Principate.

In 27 BCE, what has become known as the First Settlement occurred, during which the role of *princeps* began to emerge. Octavian may well have stage-managed events in the Senate with a select group of advisors, including senior senators. On the Ides of January (January 13), Octavian appeared before the Senate and formally handed back command of the provinces and Rome's armies that he had held up until that point. This was an important gesture, since it transferred the power of command back into the traditional hands of the Senate and people of Rome. The Senate reconvened three days later and declared that the future security and well-being of the Roman state depended upon Octavian, and that he should once again assume command of the provinces and Rome's armies. As the situation required, Octavian at first refused, but gradually acquiesced to the Senate's pleading and agreed to assume command of the provinces that were yet to be pacified and the Roman forces within them. He accepted this appointment for a limited period of 10 years. None of this went against republican Roman tradition. Octavian still held the rank of consul, legalizing his command of Rome's armies, and the acceptance of his position for a set and limited period of time maintained the façade that

Octavian was merely the Republic's caretaker. The final announcement made by the Senate at this point was to grant Octavian the name of Augustus, a name emphasizing his exalted or "august" status.

The First Settlement lasted until 23 BCE when, after a serious illness during which it was feared that Augustus would die, a new settlement was reached. This Second Settlement removed obstacles that stood in the way of the advancement of Rome's political elite, and established a clear and quasi-traditional means of political succession. Augustus' constant holding of the consulship every year had restricted the number of Roman aristocrats who could hold Rome's highest political office. Thus, Augustus formally renounced the consulship, and only took it up again twice more, in 5 and 2 BCE. With his retirement from the consulship, Augustus accepted the rank of proconsul, which legitimized his continued command of the provinces and armies he had acquired in 27 BCE. To have authority over the provinces not formally under his jurisdiction, Augustus was granted *imperium proconsulare* that placed him on an equal footing with his fellow proconsuls and allowed him to act in their spheres of influence if and when he felt it necessary. This *imperium proconsulare* was limited to a term of 10 years, and used Cassius' and Brutus' position in 43 as an important republican precedent. Once again, the legality of the emerging Principate emphasized that its authority was obtained from the Senate, and situated firmly in republican Roman tradition.

Politically, however, the rank of proconsul did not provide the *princeps* with any ability to control the situation at Rome itself. Thus, Augustus was first granted a special privilege by which he could cross the *pomerium*, the sacred city boundary of Rome, while still maintaining his rank as proconsul. Except during triumph ceremonies, commanders and armies were traditionally excluded from the *pomerium*. Secondly, Augustus was also granted the powers, without the office, of tribune of the plebs (*tribunicia potestas*). *Tribunicia potestas* allowed the *princeps* to summon the Senate whenever he wished, and to avoid having to follow normal senatorial procedure; it became one of the emperor's standard powers. The settlement of 23 BCE established a clear position of authority and power for the Principate, while allowing some continuation of the Republic's administration. The Principate was at this point almost fully formed.

The final stages in the Principate's evolution occurred in 19, 12, and 2 BCE. Firstly, in 19 the *princeps'* *imperium* as proconsul was extended to

incorporate Rome and Italy. This extension of *imperium* put the *princeps*, on the face of it, on an equal footing with the two consuls, and when combined with his other powers, consolidated his political and constitutional role. In 12 Augustus added the title of *pontifex maximus* to his list of honors, placing him at the apex of Roman religious life, a title that would now be exclusive to the *princeps*. Then in 2, Augustus was awarded the title of *pater patriae* (father of the fatherland), an achievement that Augustus viewed as his greatest, and another title defining the princeps as the sole defender and protector of Rome.

The powers of *tribunicia potestas* and the special *imperium* embodied within the rank of proconsul were central to the Principate's successful continuation. The granting of these powers to Tiberius marked him as Augustus' successor, placing him in a similar position to Augustus when Augustus died in 14 CE. Due to these powers Tiberius was able to convene the Senate, and to read out Augustus' will, the financial and military account of the empire, and Augustus' own biographical account of his life, the *Res Gestae*. The Senate offered the powers of *princeps* to Tiberius, who at first feigned rejection as Augustus had done in 27 BCE, but eventually accepted. Augustus had been successful where Caesar had failed, and established the Principate as a central institution in Roman political life. The Principate would remain in the Julio-Claudian family until the dethronement of Nero in 68 CE. In the subsequent civil war of 68–69 CE, the Principate became the prize for anyone who was powerful enough to both seize and retain it. While successive emperors maintained the composite powers that Augustus had accumulated their personal authority gradually increased as the Principate became more firmly established and the memories of the Republic faded.

Alexander G. Peck

See also Augustus; Caesar, Dictatorship of; Caesar, Gaius Julius; Consul; Dictator; *Imperator*; *Imperium*; Monarchy; Patronage; Proconsul; Republic, Political Structure; *Res Gestae Divi Augusti*; Sulla, Lucius Cornelius; Tiberius (Emperor); Tribune of the Plebs; War of Four Emperors

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Principales

Principales were junior officers in the imperial Roman army below the rank of centurion, recruited from similar or lower social levels. The *principales* received higher pay than common soldiers and exemption from fatigues. Their titles are mostly known to us through inscriptions. Modern scholars have attempted to reconstruct the *principales*' promotion patterns from these inscriptions. The legion had many other occupational specialties known from inscriptions, who were probably not considered *principales*.

The titles and duties of one group of *principales* are closely related to the tactical command of a legionary century. The *optio* was the centurion's second-in-command and might be promoted to centurion. Below him were the *signifer*, who carried the century's standard during battle, and the *tesserarius*, keeper of the watchword. The *aquilifer* carried the legionary eagle standard, while the *imaginifer* bore the emperor's image (probably a painting) on a standard. These two standard-bearers had greater prestige than mere *signiferi*, since losing the eagle standard was a military disgrace and since the emperor's image was a focus of loyalty (the troops of Vitellius, revolting against the emperor Galba early in 69 CE, stoned his images). But a simple *signifer* still had the responsibility of helping maintain order and morale in battle and on the march. Losing an ordinary standard in battle

was also disgraceful. All these officers below the rank of centurion received one and one-half times base pay.

Another group of *principales* was involved in the administration of the legion. *Librarii*, or clerks, kept records. They were overseen by the *cornicularius* or chief record-keeper. Many military records on papyrus and wooden tablets have been found in Egypt, in Roman Britain near Hadrian's Wall, and in Dura-Europos, an outpost in Syria on the Euphrates. They suggest that military paperwork was extensive, though the average soldier may not have been very literate. Legionary soldiers' private letters have been found in Egypt, but fodder receipts for auxiliary cavalry show that these men could barely sign their names. Though a *librarius* only received base pay, he (as with other *principales*) was exempt from heavy labor. However, the clerks were probably still expected to perform combat training and to fight in combat; they could even be promoted into the tactical specialties mentioned above. The Roman army did not maintain large numbers of noncombatant support staff as in modern (twentieth-century) armies.

Principales who distinguished themselves might be promoted to centurion or into the *beneficarii*, a group of junior adjutants who were assigned to headquarters and were often detached from their legion to travel on duty and to assist provincial governors and other functionaries (Vegetius 2.7). *Beneficarii* received one and a half times base pay. Because *principales* were involved in administration, they and centurions were probably the "common soldiers" whom civilians might encounter and who gave the impression that soldiers were a relatively privileged class.

Sara E. Phang

See also Centurion; Civil-Military Relations; Inscriptions; Legion, Organization of; Tactics

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Principes (Republic)

The *principes* were an organizational rank in the manipular army of the Roman Republic (ca. 350–110 BCE). They were the men in the prime of life. Experienced in warfare, they were older than the *hastati*, but not quite as experienced or as aged as the *triarii*. Together with these other ranks of line infantry, they made up the main fighting force of the Roman army. There were ten maniples of 120 *principes* in a legion, totaling 1,200 at full strength.

Their name is derived from the Latin word meaning leading men, though they did not lead the army in the manipular array, rather, the *hastati* did. Their name, therefore, is an allusion to their ability, where their age and knowledge of battle formed the perfect balance: they were experienced, but not old enough to have their age be a detriment to their skill.

The *principes* were probably armed similarly to the *hastati* with two *pila*, a large oval shield (the *scutum*), helmet, greaves, breastplate or mail, and a sword. As with the *hastati* and the *triarii*, the *principes*' differentiation by age, experience, and equipment disappeared with the transition to the cohortal legion, in which all infantry were equipped alike.

Adam Anders

See also Hastati; Legion, Organization of; Maniples; Recruitment of Army (Republic); Triarii; Triplex Acies; Velites

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Prisoners of War and Slavery

Modern international treaties and regulations attempt to impose uniform and humanitarian treatment of prisoners of war. In classical antiquity, these

regulations did not exist. According to common law or the classical “law of nations” (*ius gentium*), captives in war were enslaved by their captors. The Romans often enslaved defeated but unsundered enemy peoples, often on a large scale. Furthermore, Roman law acknowledged that Roman citizens might themselves be captured and enslaved.

Captives must be distinguished from *dediticii*, enemy peoples who made a formal surrender to Rome (*deditio in fidem*). *Dediticii* were at Roman discretion allowed to retain their preconquest internal social and political arrangements. Roman ideology emphasized fair treatment of peoples who had undergone *deditio in fidem*; they owed loyalty to Rome, but they were not slaves. Triumphal iconography blurred this point, depicting newly conquered regions or peoples as captives. The Romans of the early Republic, furthermore, offered Latin or allied status to the peoples of Italy whom they conquered, recruiting them to fight Rome’s wars.

In contrast, enemy peoples who resisted conquest were, when defeated, taken captive. Wealthy or notable captives might be ransomed by their own peoples. Other enemy captives were massacred, usually the fate of enemy adult males. Others were sold into slavery either on the spot or after exhibition in the Roman commander’s triumph. The triumphant general might distribute captives to his soldiers. Female captives were liable to be raped. In short, Roman attitudes toward enemy captives were harsh.

Sale of enemy captives into slavery was probably the most usual Roman manner of disposing of captives. Slave traders followed the Roman army in hope of profiting from Roman victory. For this reason slaves were said to be sold “under a spear” (*sub hasta*) or “under a crown” (*sub corona*), the laurel wreath that symbolized Roman victory. A substantial proportion of the Roman slave population derived from war captives, more so in the mid- and late Republic. Less frequent conquests in the Principate still produced large numbers of slave captives. For instance, after the sack of Jerusalem, 97,000 Jews were enslaved.

Female captives were liable to be raped by their conquerors. The legend of the Sabine women exhibits Roman assumptions about female captives and also suggests the ambiguity of assimilation. Romulus’ war band lacked wives and raided the neighboring Sabines, carrying off their women. The Sabine men, desiring to avenge the insult, made war on the Romans, but the Sabine women intervened to stop the battle (Livy 1.9–11). The legend illustrates that the Romans were able to incorporate defeated peoples as

allies and eventually as citizens, a process well known in historical times.

Some Roman conquerors, such as Scipio Africanus, displayed their humanitarian treatment of female captives. After the fall of New Carthage (209 BCE), Scipio was presented with a Celtiberian noblewoman. Expected to use her as a concubine, he instead returned her, untouched, to her people (Polybius 10.19.3–6; Livy 26.50). Scipio may have imitated Alexander the Great's chivalrous treatment of the Achaemenid Persian king Darius' wives. Centuries later, around 298, the Tetrarchic Caesar (deputy emperor) Galerius imitated Alexander's behavior when he captured the Sassanid Persian king Narses' harem, returning them at the Peace of Nisibis (Petrus Patricius 4.14 Müller). But these anecdotes merely contrast with the more usual rape and enslavement of female captives. Young (adolescent) male captives were also liable to be raped, as Roman sexual mores accepted male citizens' homosexual relationships with social inferiors.

Captivity was a mutual risk. Roman soldiers expected that if the enemy captured them, they would be enslaved. To become a prisoner of the enemy was the worst possible outcome for a Roman fighter. According to Roman military values, capture implied the fighter's cowardice, since he had permitted his capture rather than die fighting. Accordingly, the Roman Senate refused to ransom Roman captives from Hannibal after the battle of Cannae in 216 BCE, equating captives, those who surrendered voluntarily, with cowards (Livy 22.60–61).

However, when Romans fought Romans, in the late republican and imperial civil wars, they did not normally attempt to enslave one another. In his *Histories* of the civil war of 69 CE, Tacitus depicts the Flavians' sack of the north Italian city of Cremona: the Flavian soldiers took many Cremonese captive, attempted to sell them as slaves, and when no one would buy Roman slaves, began to kill them (Tacitus, *Histories* 3.34). This ugly episode appears isolated. The Roman elite was highly sensitive to the mere discourse of slavery in civil warfare and civil conflict, such as the victor's arrogance, insults offered to the losing side, or "servile" behavior by the defeated. Merely surrendering to the victor was an extreme humiliation; some Roman commanders who lost civil war battles chose to commit suicide rather than surrender.

The imperial Roman jurists debated the captivity of Romans in war in a less moralistic manner, as a possible occurrence with legal consequences. The jurists' opinions and rulings in the Digest of Justinian (Book 49.15)

suggest that by the late second century CE, Romans were often captured not as a result of a decisive battle, but due to the dangers of low-intensity conflict or military or civilian travel in remote areas. Both military personnel and civilians were occasionally captured by brigands or enemy raiders and sold across the frontier. These conditions reflect the increased insecurity of the frontiers from the late second century CE onward.

A male Roman citizen captured by the enemy became a slave. *Ipsa facto* he lost his citizen status and all other citizen rights, such as his right to own and inherit property. His legal marriage and rights over his children were dissolved. Persons who were captured by bandits and remained within the boundaries of the Roman Empire did not lose their free status. If sold by the bandits, they might be able to escape and prove their free status.

If the former Roman citizen ever escaped from the enemy and reentered Roman territory, he underwent a process known as *postliminium* to formally regain his citizenship and attendant rights. *Postliminium* also restored the status of the dependents of Roman citizens, such as their children (who did not have full rights to property) and slaves. The jurists ruled that deserters to the enemy should not obtain *postliminium*.

Sara E. Phang

See also Allies; Bandits and Brigands; Cannae, Battle of; *Deditio* (Surrender); Gender and War; Hostages; Latin, Latins; Military Law; Plunder; Triumph

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Probus (Emperor) (276–282 CE)

A Roman emperor (276–282 CE), Marcus Aurelius Probus was born at Sirmium in Pannonia Inferior in 232 CE. He was a senior officer in the Roman army when he claimed the throne after defeating the emperor Florianus in 276 CE. Probus consolidated Rome's hold on its northern frontiers through a series of wars against the Alamanni, Franks, Burgundians, and Vandals in 277–279 CE. The historian Aurelius Victor compares him to the Carthaginian general Hannibal in his knowledge of warfare. Probus' reign witnessed several internal revolts, all of which were dealt with effectively. These included an insurrection in Isauria, a notoriously unsettled region, which was led by the brigand Lydius. He occupied the city of Cremna, killing many of its citizens, until he was defeated by the governor Terentius Marcianus. There were also rebellions by Saturninus, governor of Syria, an unknown governor of Britain, and Proculus and Bonosus in Germany. In 281 CE, Probus staged a triumph in Rome to commemorate his foreign victories, and decided to embark on a Persian campaign the following year. But Probus never made it to the eastern frontier, being killed in Sirmium in late 282 CE after his praetorian prefect Carus staged a revolt. Allegedly, Probus' soldiers mutinied against him because he put them to work draining swamps.

The career of Probus is related briefly in the epitomators Eutropius and Aurelius Victor; the *Historia Augusta's* Life of Probus is unreliable.

Caillan Davenport

See also Aurelian; Carus; Third-Century CE Crisis

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Proconsul

A proconsul was a former consul whose *imperium* had been prolonged for an additional term, usually one year, by prorogation to maintain his command of an army or governance of a province. Proconsuls maintained

similar powers to that of a consul—they had supreme command of their armies. However, the *imperium* of a proconsul was not as supreme as that of a regular consul. Proconsular *imperium* extended only within the *provincia* assigned to the proconsul, and if a regular consul was also in the province, the proconsul was subordinate to the consul. This type of prorogation was mainly used for administering overseas provinces when not enough regular consuls and praetors were available. However, it was also used if a consul had failed to end a campaign during his regular term and required additional time to do so—one such example is that of Titus Quinctius Flamininus in the Second Macedonian War (200–197 BCE).

Unlike the regular consul, the proconsul's appointment was subject to removal. The Senate determined the proconsul's geographic jurisdiction and they also could rescind the prorogation if the proconsul overstepped these boundaries or proved incompetent. In addition, the Senate's appointment of promagistrates could be overruled by the citizen assemblies, as was done during the Jugurthine War when Quintus Caecilius Metellus Numidicus was replaced by Marius in 107 BCE.

Proconsuls did not have to be former consuls. In special cases proconsular *imperium* could also be bestowed on private citizens. Both Scipio Africanus in 211 BCE and Pompey in 76 and 67 were appointed as *privati* to handle major operations; in Scipio's case in Spain and for Pompey his campaigns against Sertorius and the Mediterranean pirates. Neither had held the usual preceding office prior to receiving their appointments. Though Caesar was consul in 59, an extended proconsular *imperium* in Gaul was likewise given to him for five years in 58, renewed subsequently for another five years.

Under the empire, the title of proconsul was mostly associated with the ex-consuls who routinely governed major provinces such as Africa and Asia. Most other provinces were governed by *legati Augusti pro praetore*.

Michael J. Stout

See also Consul; *Cursus Honorum* (Republic); Flamininus; *Imperium*; Marius; Pompey; Praetor; Prorogation; Scipio Africanus; Sertorius

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Promotion in Army (Imperial)

During the Principate (27 BCE–235 CE), the Roman military hierarchy formed a two-tier structure in which high-ranking officers were drawn from the senatorial and equestrian orders. Due to the importance of patronage in Roman society, the promotion of elite officers was determined by prestige and social connections rather than merit or ability; they received no special training, and it is debated whether there was any special tracking of talented officers. Common soldiers were usually recruited from lower-status citizens and noncitizens. Low-ranking officers (centurions and below) were usually recruited from the ranks, though some equestrians obtained the rank of centurion. The army afforded soldiers a degree of social mobility through ascending the ranks of the centurionate to equestrian status, but such ascent took many years. Much is still not known about promotion patterns for lower-ranking personnel, which are studied and reconstructed from inscriptions. On the other hand, low-ranking officers and even simple legionary soldiers were representatives of the Roman power in the provinces and displayed various traits of privilege such as a regular income, literacy, and the use of Latin as a “language of power.” Veterans received further privileges.

In the Principate, senators were eligible for the ranks of provincial governor, legionary legate (commander of a legion), or laticlavian tribune. A young man of senatorial family held the rank of *tribunus laticlavius*, or broad-stripe tribune, in his late teens or early twenties, before he entered the Senate at age 25. Nominally second-in-command to the legionary legate, the laticlavian tribunate suggested continuity with republican tradition, since the *dilectus* recruited citizens from age 17 onward. The youth of the laticlavian tribune ensured that he would not be a serious candidate for the imperial power. A senatorial tribune might still be able to distinguish himself in combat, as did the son of Lucius Apronius, a governor of Africa

during the war with Tacfarinas in the early first century CE.

Senators later in their lives might hold the rank of legionary legate or provincial governor, a *legatus Augusti pro praetore* in imperial (garrisoned) provinces or proconsular governor in public (ungarrisoned) provinces. The distinction between imperial and public provinces and the separation of provincial governors and commanders of legions were instituted by Augustus as an attempt to stabilize imperial rule. Governors of provinces with active frontiers and armies were the emperor's appointees, his trusted men. Governors of public provinces lacked such military opportunities.

Studies of prosopography (the study of elite careers) have suggested that many imperial senators' military experience was limited and that only some distinguished themselves as legionary legates and governors with military responsibilities. But scholars still debate whether men with military aptitude (the so-called *virī militares*) were designated and specially tracked and promoted, receiving the consulship at a younger than normal age so they would still be vigorous in senior commands.

The equestrian order formed a larger pool of potential officers. Many of these men were Romanized provincial elites, stereotyped by Roman authors as more eager for military service and less corrupted by the luxury of the capital. They also owed their commissions and promotions to friendship or patronage. Equestrians might become commanders of auxiliary infantry or cavalry units (*praefectus cohortis* or *praefectus alae*). They might serve in legions as narrow-striped tribunes (*tribunus angusticlavius*, equestrian tribune). There were five equestrian tribunes per legion; they were usually older than the senatorial tribune and had more serious responsibilities, commanding two cohorts each. Equestrians might also seek commissions as centurions. A few equestrian officers were promoted from the ranks, usually from *primus pilus* (chief centurion). The office of camp prefect (*praefectus castrorum*), chief operations officer, a position of great responsibility demanding experience, was typically held by these men. Before the third century, however, equestrian officers, however, could not be promoted to higher military ranks than auxiliary prefect, angusticlavian tribune, or camp prefect unless they were adlected (formally appointed by the emperor) into the senatorial order. It was more common for equestrian officers to be promoted into the civilian administration.

Centurions bridged the gap between the senatorial and equestrian officers and the common soldiers. Some centurions were appointed as

equestrians (*ex equite Romano*), but probably more centurions reached the centurionate after promotion through a sequence of *principalis* and centurion ranks (below). Still other centurions were promoted from service in the Praetorian Guard to centurions in the provincial legions.

Centurions formed a hierarchy within the legion that is still debated. A legion had nine regular cohorts and one first cohort. Each regular cohort had six centurions, ordered hierarchically. The five centurions of the first cohort were termed the *primi ordines*, and their top ranking man was the *primus pilus* or chief centurion. The *primus pilus* typically served for one year and then was promoted into the equestrian order. Such promotion, at least in peacetime, took many years. Centurions typically served longer than the 20 to 25 years of regular service, often holding centurion posts in different legions throughout the empire. They provided long-term experience and continuity in the officer ranks, since senatorial and equestrian officers held their ranks for only a few years at most. The rank of centurion traditionally required bravery in combat and talent at tactical command, as well as a certain toughness, as centurions administered discipline and corporal punishment (for this reason, centurions were often hated by common soldiers). However, the centurionate also required literacy and administrative ability. Centurions might be required to command legionary detachments on special tasks or to perform police duties. A number of papyri from Roman Egypt (discussed in Alston 1995) show that centurions in charge of districts functioned like police inspectors in an empire with no formal police force, receiving and possibly investigating reports of crimes submitted by civilians. Even if the district centurions only passed on the petitions, they show that some civilians turned to the army for assistance.

Below the centurionate, soldiers (*milites*) were divided into common soldiers without rank (*milites gregarii*), *immunes*, and *principales*. The *immunes* were exempted from routine duties and included specialists in numerous occupations, including craftsmen, smiths, masons, engineers, armorers, medics, and clerical staff. *Immunes* did not receive a higher pay grade, in contrast with the *principales*, officer ranks below the centurionate. *Principales* included the *optio* (orderly, second-in-command to the centurion), *signifer* (standard-bearer, a tactical responsibility), and *tesserarius* (keeper of the watchword, responsible for security). *Principales* may have been promoted through *optio*, *signifer*, and *tesserarius* to reach

the centurionate, but this reconstruction is based entirely upon career and funerary inscriptions. It is also not clear whether the clerical staff, including clerks (*librarii*) subject to the head clerks (*cornicularii*), formed a separate track. Some legionaries with administrative training held the rank of *beneficiarius* (assistant) to legionary headquarters or provincial governors; their relationship to the main organization of the legion is also obscure. The *principales*, *librarii*, and *beneficarii* and some of the specialists (such as engineers) all had to be literate.

As some scholars argue, soldiers with these specialized occupations, including craftsmen and clerks, were still expected to fight in combat when the need arose. In contrast with modern armies, there was no noncombatant track. Displaying significant *virtus* (courage) in combat might win a low-ranking soldier promotion as well as military decorations. Under other conditions, legionary common soldiers and specialists (except for the *principales*) were unlikely to receive further promotion. They awaited their discharge and the attainment of veteran status, with greater wealth and formal legal privileges.

The Roman army of the Principate thus provided soldiers a trickle of social mobility through the centurionate into the equestrian order. For those below equestrian rank, social ascent into the upper orders was likely to take two generations or more. The sons of veterans might enter the army at a higher rank than *miles gregarius* and be promoted more quickly. For equestrians, on the other hand, the Roman army was a veritable engine of promotion and assimilation into the imperial elite. Equestrian officers eventually displaced senatorial officers in the mid-third century CE, attaining legionary commands and provincial governorships without first being promoted into the senatorial order. These commanders and governors were given new titles, *dux* and *praeses*, displacing legate and proconsul. The emperor Gallienus (260–268) may have taken steps to formally disbar senators from military commands, but this is also disputed. Most of the emperors of the third-century crisis, culminating in the emperors of the Tetrarchy, came from this equestrian background, obscured by invective (in the case of Christian authors such as Lactantius) or the superposition of stereotypes of the old Republic (in the case of the *Historia Augusta* and Aurelius Victor).

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See also Augustus; *Auxilia*; *Equites*, Equestrians; Inscriptions; Legion, Organization of; Military Law; Praetorians; Senate, Senators; Third-Century CE Crisis; Veterans; *Virtus*

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Promotion in Army (Republic)

In the Roman armies of the early and middle Republic, citizens were assigned to battle lines determined by age, experience, and property classes. A soldier would simply have naturally progressed through different age classes of a unit as he matured. The exceptions to this rule were the richest citizens, the poorest citizens, and those who distinguished themselves in combat. The youngest legionaries served in the *velites*, the light infantry. *Velites* carried only javelins, a small shield and a sword, and so the poorest as well as the youngest citizens were assigned to this unit if they could not afford the equipment required to serve as heavy infantry. Soldiers of a higher property class would go on from the *velites* to the more heavily armed and armored *hastati*, to the *principes* (men in the prime of life) to the *triarii* (the most mature and experienced line). The second highest property class of *equites*, men rich enough to own and maintain a horse, would enter the cavalry rather than the infantry. The higher positions of tribune and legate were restricted to, at a minimum, the property class of the equestrian, and appointed either by the Senate or by the general, from personal friends or promising young noblemen.

Threaded through the legion's structure were commanders of specific subunits, and also several other higher ranking noncommand positions. In

the cavalry, the 300 men were divided into 10 tactical units of 30 squadrons. Each squadron was commanded by three officers, the senior (*praefectus*), the second in command (*optio*) and the third ranking (*decurio*). These officers were appointed by the military tribunes. The legion's main fighting unit was the maniple, which was comprised of 120 men if a maniple of *hastati*, 120 if *principes*, and 60 men in the case of the *triarii*. Each maniple was organized into two centuries. Each century was appointed a centurion, but since the maniple acted in battle as a whole unit, the commander of one century was overall commander, called the *centurio prior*, and the other was the *centurio posterior*, who would take over if the other was wounded or killed. Each centurion had a second-in-command called an *optio* who stayed near the rear to encourage the troops and prevent spontaneous retreats. There were three other junior officers to each century: a standard bearer (*signifer*), a trumpeter (*tubicen*) and a guard commander who supervised the night watches in camp (*tesserarius*). The most senior centurion of the whole legion, called the "first spear" (*primus pilus*) was always in command of the maniple of *triarii* to the extreme right of the line.

The ten maniples of each line gave the legion a total of 60 centurions and 60 junior rear-guard officers (*optiones*). Polybius tells us that the 60 centurions were elected from the legions, and then those men chose the 60 *optiones*. We know, however, that centurions could also be appointed by the Senate or promoted from the ranks by the tribunes. We also know that the relative seniority of the centurions depended on which century they commanded and which line; the *triarii* being senior to the *principes*, and the first century senior to the second, and so forth. This gave each centurion an exact seniority level relative to every other centurion, but how exactly one progressed up through this system is not known. It is important to remember that during the early and middle Republic, the legion was not a standing army or permanent institution. This means that each time a new legion was raised, a previous rank was not "carried over" and thus the centurions were not automatically given the rank they had held when they had last served. This could provide for a fairly *ad hoc* system of appointment for new legions or those receiving substantial reinforcements.

One example of a centurion's career is given to us by Livy, who records a speech allegedly made in the mid-second century BCE by a long-serving soldier called Spurius Ligustinus (Livy 42.34). According to his account, this man spent two years in the ranks before he received promotion from his

general to centurion of the tenth manipule of the *hastati*. Under another consul in another legion he was appointed to centurion of the first manipule of the *hastati*, when enlisting again he was appointed first centurion of the *principes*. Later in his career he served four times as the highest ranking centurion in the legion, the *primus pilus* of the first century of the *triarii*. His progress, as we can see from this account, was irregular, promoted once in the field (perhaps to a vacancy) but moving up more often through being re-enlisted at a higher level. It is likely that this was a common course of promotion in the early and middle Republic, because those who reenlisted often and had a knack for soldiering would be recognized for their experience and expertise by their fellow soldiers, the centurions, tribunes, or even the commander.

A common thread which runs through accounts of promotions in the republican army is bravery (*virtus*). A display of courage seems to be the reason for many in-the-field promotions, while the weight of experience and a proven record of level-headedness were the prerequisite for appointment to a higher position through re-enlistment. Polybius tells us that the Romans looked for talent in command and steadiness in their centurions, someone who would “die in defense of his post.” There are also many instances of soldiers promoted on the spot for their bravery. This bravery, often meaning the same kind of constancy that Polybius implies, the ability to remain in position, the courage not to panic, and the presence of mind to maintain awareness of the situation on the battlefield, were highly valued.

In the late Republic, as armies remained in the field for longer periods of time with the same comrades and commander, in-the-field promotion became more common. Being noticed in battle had been Ligustinus’ big break into the command structure, and this was probably the case for many legionaries of the late Republic as well. By the first century, soldiers were increasingly professional, self-selecting men, and over time the distribution of financial circumstances of many of the soldiers, and especially the junior officers, had changed. The centurions commanding cohorts—now the main unit of the army—were now frequently of equestrian status. Some had achieved that status through profits of booty, but others were appointed from that property qualification, as it seems that the higher ranks of centurion now carried enough prestige to attract the interest of the equestrians.

The ethos of the centurion became famous in this era. Their reputation was still, at its base, steady, strong, and stalwart, but now it had taken on the shine of heroism—centurions must be first to battle and last to retreat. Losses among the centurionate were disproportionately large and there must have been a great deal of movement through the ranks as a consequence. The emphasis had changed from level-headed leadership to the need to catch the commander's eye, and in the pages of Caesar we meet many centurions who had received promotions to their posts on account of some conspicuous act of bravery. As in the earlier periods, this was probably through promotion to a vacant post rather than a steady moving up through the hierarchy of cohorts. Election by comrades was now a thing of the past, while the general, the legates, and the tribunes were the judges of military excellence and hence promotion.

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See also Centurion (Republic); *Hastati*; Legion, Organization of; *Principes*; *Triarii*; *Velites*; *Virtus*

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Propraetor

During the Roman Republic, a *propraetor* most often referred to an elected praetor whose authority had been extended (prorogued) by decree of the Senate for an additional term to command an army or govern a province. Such circumstances normally came about through military or political necessity. A campaign could last beyond a regularly elected term, or there perhaps were too few regular praetors to govern all Roman *provinciae*.

Propraetors still exercised *imperium*, though they were outranked by regular praetors. The reduced *imperium* still granted most of the same powers as a regular praetor, however—a *propraetor* could command troops

and govern a province, though their authority was tied to the Senate's approval. The Senate could rescind their prorogation of *imperium* if the propraetor was failing his mission. The propraetor's *imperium* was restricted to the boundaries of his *provincia*.

Propraetors were not always prorogued. Special commands could warrant those in charge being given propraetorian *imperium* (for example, *Res Gestae Divi Augusti* 1.3). Major commands such as those granted to Pompey, Caesar, or Crassus bestowed proconsular *imperium*, but if a mere legate was granted temporary command over a legion or a province, he would only wield propraetorian authority. This was often done in the imperial period, with the Emperor appointing legates with propraetorian *imperium* to govern imperial *provinciae* in his name as *legati Augusti pro praetore*. This status enabled Augustus himself, possessing proconsular *imperium*, to control them.

Propraetors were also quite common during the late Republic, when there were too few praetors to govern all Roman *provinciae*. Some praetors from the previous year had to be maintained in their commands; even the *praetor urbanus* was often prorogued to account for this deficiency.

Michael J. Stout

See also Augustus; *Cursus Honorum* (Republic); *Imperium*; Legion, Organization of; Praetor; Prorogation

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Prorogation

Prorogation was the extension of elected magistrates' *imperium* for an additional length of time. It was introduced ca. 328/327 BCE, but gained its

greatest utility during the earlier period of Rome's overseas wars, in the Second Punic and Macedonian Wars, thenceforth.

Proconsuls and propraetors continued to exercise *imperium*, though they were outranked by their regularly elected counterparts. Magistrates could be prorogued for many reasons, but mostly it was to continue a military campaign that had lasted beyond their elected term. Notable examples include proconsuls Titus Quinctius Flaminius in 198–197 in the Second Macedonian War (200–197 BCE) and P. Cornelius Scipio Africanus in 211/210 during the Second Punic War (218–201 BCE). The necessity of prorogation was dictated by the slow speed of travel and communications in the ancient world.

Prorogation was key to Roman military flexibility, which regularly involved the use of ad hoc decision-making. According to scholar Arthur Eckstein, the Romans lacked an orderly method of solving strategic problems; they rather “muddled through” (Eckstein 1987: xxii). Roman flexibility is best shown during the Second Punic War. With numerous threats facing Rome, prorogation was used to its fullest extent. T. R. S. Broughton's compilation of Roman Republican magistrates lists that from 218–201 BCE, 139 promagistrates were appointed, while only 119 magistrates were elected, and most promagistrates held military commands.

During the late Republic, prorogation became fully institutionalized, as there were too many *provinciae* for regularly elected officials to govern. The Senate used prorogation extensively. Multi-year commands became commonplace; for example, Pompey received three years to deal with Mediterranean piracy, while Caesar and Crassus were assigned five-year stints in Gaul and Persia. In addition, Caesar's was further renewed an additional five years.

After Augustus established the Principate, the Emperor appointed governors to rule in his name, though it was not traditional prorogation. Though these governors exercised proconsular or propraetorian *imperium*, the practice of prorogation by Senate decree largely ended with the fall of the Republic.

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See also Consul; *Cursus Honorum* (Republic); *Imperium*; Praetor; Proconsul; Propraetor

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Proscriptions

The proscriptions were a series of extraordinary state-sponsored murders of prominent individuals, first under Sulla in 82–81 BCE, then under the Second Triumvirate of Mark Antony, Lepidus, and young Octavian in 43–42 BCE. They were driven by publicly posting the names of targeted individuals, deemed public-enemy outlaws to be killed without trial. The word *proscriptio* originally meant an advertisement of a sale, which is darkly significant to the two proscriptions in Roman history, since they were largely aimed at confiscating property of wealthy equestrians and senators (if not seized by the proscribers themselves, their property was auctioned off with proceeds going to the state). Hundreds—maybe thousands—died in these bloodthirsty affairs, which represent a wretched episode in the collapse of a republic based on civility and respect for the rule of law.

There were controversial precedents for extra-judicial but state-sanctioned killings (see *Senatus consultum ultimum*). Following his first march on Rome in 88 BCE, Sulla publicly outlawed 12 enemies. Cinna and Marius slaughtered many of Sulla's allies, having marched on Rome in 87. Thus Sulla may have seen himself as legitimately retaliating when he published the first proscription list of 80 people, soon after taking Rome by force a second time in November 82. Two more lists appeared during Sulla's irregular dictatorship. June 1, 81 was the last day anyone could be proscribed anew, but names were improperly added, and the whole novel

episode served as an excuse for Sulla's friends to murder rivals or get their hands on desired property. Abettors of proscribed individuals were also punished, even family members. The sources disagree on the number of victims. Appian (*Civil Wars* 1.95) claimed more than 1,640, while another source (possibly reflecting other violent deaths under Sulla) has 4,700. Plutarch's figure of 520 (*Sulla* 31) may be closer to the true total of the officially proscribed. Most victims were rich equestrians, targeted not just for their wealth but as part of Sulla's plans for restoring the primacy of the Senate and senators. Until 49 BCE, sons and grandsons of the proscribed were banned from ever taking part in public life.

Despite the dictator Sulla's later constructive attempts to restore stability, he never lived down the odium his proscriptions caused, and long-lived was the memory of him inspecting and paying for severed heads, even decorating his house with these grisly trophies. Sulla's example cast a shadow over the political violence of the following decades, when many feared proscriptions at the hands of powerful men like Pompey and Julius Caesar. The latter's famed clemency allowed the survival of enemies, some of whom conspired to assassinate him in March 44. This failure of Caesarian *clementia* became a convenient excuse for Antony, Octavian, and Lepidus to announce proscriptions in 43 when they formed the Second Triumvirate. In fact, they were desperate to raise funds for their war against Brutus and Cassius, and many of the proscribed lost all their property but escaped death. Appian (*Civil Wars* 4.5–7) claimed that 300 senators and 2,000 equestrians were killed or had their property taken, but this may not be the number of those officially proscribed; 300 is the most conservative figure. This proscriptions authorized by three dictator-like autocrats were particularly notorious for including family members of the triumvirs, which may have been merely a show of solidarity; like many others, relatives such as Mark Antony's uncle avoided death. There was a real element of targeting specific enemies for elimination. The most famous victim was Cicero, decapitated by a centurion in December 43; Antony had his revenge for the *Philippics*, Cicero's famous speeches against him. The enforcement of the second proscription relied very heavily on soldiers (see Appian, *Civil Wars*, Book 4). The majority of the proscriptions occurred in 43 and 42, possibly extending through 39. The horrors of the proscriptions may have contributed to the Roman elite's disdain for common soldiers.

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See also Augustus; Caesar, Gaius Julius; Cicero; Civil-Military Relations; Marius; Mark Antony; Octavian; Second Triumvirate; *Senatus Consultum Ultimum*; States of Emergency; Sulla, Dictatorship of; Sulla, Lucius Cornelius; Treason; War Dead

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Protectores

The *protectores* (sg. *protector*) were a cadre of staff officers and/or imperial guards in the later Roman army, introduced in the mid-third century CE. The creation of the *protectores* is associated with the other reforms to the organization of the Roman army that took place at this time, such as the organization of a central field army dominated by cavalry, and the exclusion of senators from military commands. Officers who distinguished themselves in some way (in the legions, the Praetorian Guard, or the central cavalry as centurions or noncommissioned officers) might be promoted to the *protectores*, from which they could hope for further promotion. The creation of the *protectores* is one aspect of the greater “professionalization” of the Roman military during the third-century crisis. The same or another group of *protectores*, also termed *domestici*, appear to be the emperor’s bodyguard. In the fourth century, the *protectores* continued to be influential, especially when imperial dynasties came to an end and a new candidate had to be found among the military cadre.

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See also *Comitatenses*; Gallienus; Praetorians; Third-Century CE Crisis

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Provincia

The term *provincia* (pl. *provinciae*) is usually translated as "province," but this sense evolved from its original connotation of "military task/assignment" during the Roman Republic to a regional administrative district. In the classical Republic, a *provincia* was a Roman magistrate's tour of duty or assignment, defined as a task pertaining to a general area rather than a strictly delimited geographic region. The consul, praetor, or promagistrate who held a *provincia* might have the task of conquering a region or people within general geographic limits and the time span of his office. The *provinciae* of the extraordinary commands (such as Pompey's commands against piracy in the Mediterranean or the Mithridatic War, Caesar's command of Gaul, or the Second Triumvirate's division of the empire) were unusually large. However, a *provincia* might entail a specific task such as that of Gnaeus Sicinius in 173 BCE, who was assigned to combat a plague of locusts in Apulia (southern Italy) (Livy 42.10.6–8) or the initial assignment of the roads of Italy to Caesar for 59 BCE. Caesar obviously did not want this trivial project, securing the *provincia* of Cisalpine and Transalpine Gaul instead. The Senate determined *provinciae* and then assigned them to consuls and praetors by lot. In the late Republic, the *provinciae* for the consuls were announced before the elections.

Provinciae gradually evolved into geographically delimited regions, in which promagistrates were required to remain during their term of office; if they left their *provinciae*, they lost their *imperium* and, after a law of Sulla's, committed treason. The geographic boundaries of many *provinciae* were not finalized till the reign of Augustus, who ensured that the "public"

provinces assigned to senatorial proconsuls were geographically delimited, restricting their activities. The “imperial” provinces with active frontiers remained more undefined in the traditional manner, allowing for continued expansion, but their commanders, the *legati Augusti pro praetore*, were chosen by the emperor, who was the ultimate arbiter of military activity in these areas.

The sense of “province” as a region of the empire that Romans administered and governed also emerged slowly. In the middle Republic, the Roman elite still thought of *provinciae* as regions to be conquered, and felt little obligation to govern the inhabitants. Rome’s conquest of the eastern Mediterranean meant that Greek communities, with a strong self-governing tradition, and with elites trained in oratory, sought the aid of the Romans and protested Roman abuses; they expected Roman commanders to adjudicate disputes. Gradually the commanders of *provinciae* evolved into the governors of provinces, who were expected to administer or at least to not pillage or extort from their subjects. The oversight of Roman governors also evolved slowly; the *lex Calpurnia de repetundis* (149 BCE) enabled prosecution of individual governors for extortion, often by political rivals at Rome. Though the Senate and people could take away individual *provinciae* and recall magistrates and promagistrates, there was in fact little positive restriction on the conduct of individual governors. A moral consensus that governors should govern justly underlines Cicero’s denunciation of the abusive governor of Sicily, Gaius Verres. However, the advent of the Principate made the emperors more able to intervene in and regulate provincial governors.

New provinces were added during the Principate, including the Mauretaniae, Britain, and Dacia. Depending on the state of Rome’s wars with Persia, Rome sometimes claimed the buffer zone between the Tigris and Euphrates rivers and converted it into provinces; at other times, client rulers governed this area. The Rhine frontier was converted into two provinces, Upper and Lower Germany, late in the first century CE. The geographic boundaries of provinces were adjusted periodically during the Principate, and subjected to a thorough overhaul in the reign of Diocletian (284–305), who subdivided many provinces into smaller units for greater ease of administration, grouping provinces into larger units termed dioceses.

Sara E. Phang

See also Augustus; Caesar, Gaius Julius; Consul; *Imperium*; Praetor; Prorogation; Senate, Senators; War Crimes

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Provocatio

Deriving from the verb *provocare*, the institution of *provocatio*, or appeal to the Roman people, was a core civil right of Roman citizens during the Republic. *Provocatio* protected citizens from arbitrary violence at the hands of magistrates and provided accused citizens with the right to a trial by the people. In this respect, *provocatio* resembled the medieval right of *habeas corpus*, preserved in Anglo-American criminal law. Roman *provocatio*, however, was delimited and did not apply in certain situations. In the early empire, appeal to the people was largely replaced by appeal to the emperor. In trials involving *maiestas* (treason against the emperors) there was no appeal. The right of *provocatio* largely withered away by the later empire.

The origins of *provocatio* are obscure. In the later Republic, a *lex Valeria de provocatione* was attributed to Valerius Publicola, one of the earliest magistrates of the Republic, but is not extant. It is more probable that *provocatio* developed during the patrician-plebeian conflicts. Marcus Porcius Cato the Elder (censor in 184 BCE) may have been responsible for *leges Porciae de provocatione*. In any case, the developed institution of *provocatio* enabled a citizen, facing the summary authority (*coercitio*) of a magistrate, to appeal (*provocare*) to the Roman People and demand a trial. Such trials originally took the form of *iudicia populi*, ad hoc trials by the comitial assembly, presided over by a different magistrate (aedile or tribune).

Provocatio did not apply in military service, where soldiers were subject to their commanders' unrestricted *imperium militiae* and summary judgment as military discipline. Corporal punishment was routine. Excessive brutality by some commanders in the middle Republic did result in trials at Rome. In the late Republic, the drop in the social status of recruits probably diminished elite concern for brutal discipline.

Provocatio also did not apply within the Roman household. The *paterfamilias* or head of the household, the father or grandfather, possessed

patria potestas (paternal authority) over his children and grandchildren, even over adult sons. *Patria potestas* was in theory absolute, including *vitae necisque potestas*, “the power of life and death,” the right to kill children and expose unwanted infants. In practice, *vitae necisque potestas* was little used. However, a *paterfamilias* had the right to judge his children and descendants and to punish them. In the Republic, women who were guilty of crimes were usually turned over to their *pater familias* for punishment.

Provocatio also did not apply in states of emergency, pronounced by the “last decree” (*senatus consultum ultimum*) of the Senate, which instituted conditions resembling martial law. The use of the *senatus consultum ultimum* in the late Republic’s civil conflicts eroded the value of *provocatio*, as did declarations that enemies were *hostes publici*, public enemies who could be hunted, seized, and killed with impunity. In contrast with these extreme situations, there is some controversy whether the dictator’s *imperium* was restricted by *provocatio*.

In the empire, *provocatio* to the Roman people was replaced by appeal to the emperor; faced with the judgment of a provincial governor, a Roman citizen might request a trial at Rome. However, there was no appeal in cases of treason against the emperor (*maiestas*). In the middle and later empire severe punishments against lower-status citizens convicted of capital crimes became routine; the Republic’s right of *provocatio* against cruel punishment was forgotten. The defense of citizens against abuses of power was more often undertaken by bishops and justified in theological terms.

Sara E. Phang

See also Criminal Procedure; *Domi/Militiae*; Military Discipline; Patrician-Plebeian Conflict; *Senatus Consultum Ultimum*; States of Emergency; Treason

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Public Order

Roman approaches to public order were marked by variety. A number of factors encouraged general stability in Roman society, such as a well-developed tradition of private law, clear social hierarchies and the patron-client relationship, and religion as a means of social control. Moreover, many modern historians have argued that Romans simply tolerated more violence and disorder in their society than we would today.

While Romans lacked our fully-developed police forces and communication systems, we should not underestimate their efforts to impose order by state force, nor their inclination to use approaches akin to policing to enforce the law. As early as the middle Republic, a trio of junior magistrates, the *tresviri capitales*, patrolled the city, dispensed summary punishment to petty criminals, seized runaway slaves, looked out for arson, and administered Rome's small jail near the Forum (the *carcer Tullianum*). Consuls and other officials could themselves impose order on the spot by personal displays of magisterial authority. Furthermore, aediles policed markets and enforced laws affecting public space. A similar situation prevailed in towns outside of Rome, where town mayors, aediles, and other municipal officials carried out arrests and other elements of police work by using staff-attendants such as lictors and public slaves (that is, slaves who were owned by the community they served).

The various crises of the late Republic led to intolerable disorder in Rome and Italy, which ultimately was only settled by means of military force. In establishing a new order amid the awkward transition from Republic to empire, Octavian as Augustus countered several problems by using two innovative means: first, his own novel full authority; and second, the employment of Roman soldiers to impose security among civilians. To quote one example, Suetonius noted in his biography of Augustus (Suetonius, *Augustus* 32):

Many, many rotten problems that were harmful to the public good had endured because of the usual lawlessness of civil wars.... Violent

vagabonds went about in huge numbers, openly armed with swords, as if for the sake of protecting themselves. Travelers in the countryside were seized—both free men and slave—and enslaved into forced labor in owners' private prison-houses (*ergastula*). Also, behind the legal title of new clubs (*collegia*), many factional groups with a political slant were meeting to conspire every sort of crime. So Augustus countered bandit activity by stationing soldiers where needed. He inspected the prison houses, and he dissolved all the *collegia* except the long-standing and legitimate ones.

Here we see Augustus' concern over maintaining the distinction between freedom and slavery, and his eagerness to uphold other Roman legal traditions. Despite the façade of the Principate that the old Republic still existed, Augustus was ultimately willing to use his unrivaled power to impose order in the state, and soldiers were a key element in this effort. The first emperor's approach set the standard for his successors (indeed, his stepson Tiberius, who succeeded him in 14 CE, helped him in the efforts specified above, and later increased the number of military stations in Italy, Suetonius, *Tiberius* 8, 37).

In terms of policing by Roman soldiers, Augustus' greatest innovation was the complement of security forces he implemented in the city of Rome. These included the Praetorian Guard, the urban cohorts, and the *vigiles* (this latter group was mainly concerned with firefighting, but their duties carried over into policing as well). These units grew until they had doubled to a full strength of about 20,000 in Rome by the end of the first century CE, and they continued to be a major factor in Rome until Constantine took the city in 312. Later first-century emperors posted units of *vigiles* outside of Rome in the port cities of Ostia and Puteoli, and urban cohorts in the major provincial centers of Lyon and Carthage. Most of Augustus' and his successors' supervision of provincial disorder, however, was mediated through receiving and replying to petitions. Yet emperors could, and did, use troops at their disposal (especially praetorians) for security errands against bandits, or to murder perceived enemies. Meanwhile, soldiers in imperial Rome, whose very presence violated the republican taboo on having troops in the city, were a mixed blessing for the emperor and his subjects. They helped keep order at games and other public settings, but did not completely prevent riots. What's more, praetorians notoriously involved

themselves in dynastic intrigues.

Roman provincial governors were key figures of public order outside of Italy. These were elite Romans chosen and dispatched by the Senate or emperor to govern each province for a year or more. Each governor had at least a few hundred troops to help him repress and execute bandits and other troublemakers. Governors cooperated with local elites (town councils, municipal magistrates, and in the eastern provinces, actual civilian police officials) to maintain order. Ultimately, each person was responsible for his or her own security, and Roman law recognized the right of self-defense. Roman authorities only rarely disarmed a populace; in fact, people routinely carried weapons for self-protection during a journey. At the broader scale, each provincial community was also responsible for its own security. The existence of police-like forces in some areas does not mean that Rome meant to provide full protection to all the empire's subjects. The noticeable spread of military posts in the empire during the second and third centuries had more to do with the state serving its own needs to control and administer the empire, though ordinary people sometimes enjoyed incidental security benefits. Unfortunately, civilian and military police became notorious for corruption and abuse of civilians.

As the fifth-century CE western Roman Empire fell apart, power moved more toward private rural villas, and to bishops as the Catholic Church replaced some facets of state authority. The eastern Roman Empire, throughout the rest of its later history, continued to see a changing mixture of civilian police, soldiers stationed among civilians, and royal guards, who helped the ruler of Constantinople try to impose his authority in his realm.

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See also Augustus; Bandits and Brigands; Civil Conflict (Late Republic); Praetorians; Rome (City); Urban Cohorts; *Vigiles*

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Punic War, First (264–241 BCE), Causes

Sometime in the early 280s, a group of Italian mercenaries from Campania in southern Italy, formerly in the service of the Syracusan tyrant Agathocles, seized control of the city of Messana (modern Messina) on the northeastern tip of Sicily, massacring and expelling most of its inhabitants. They began calling themselves “Mamertini” (“Sons of Mamers,” the Oscan name for the war-god Mars). By the 260s, Hiero II, the ruler of Syracuse, began a war against the mercenaries. In 264, the Mamertini sought protection from Hiero’s attacks from both Rome and Carthage. The Roman Senate long debated whether to accept the appeal, but eventually decided to do so. The Mamertini performed a formal surrender to Rome (*deditio*), and returned to Messana, only to find a Carthaginian garrison already installed in the city. They expelled the garrison along with its commander, Hanno, who returned to Carthage, where he was later crucified for cowardice.

After considerable delay at Rome, two legions were dispatched to Sicily under the command of one of the consuls of 264, Appius Claudius Caudex. Arriving at Rhegium in southern Italy, Claudius learned that Hiero was now allied to Carthage, and that their combined forces were now besieging Messana. On the consul’s first attempt to cross to Sicily, the Carthaginian fleet forced him to turn back. A Carthaginian attempt to settle the dispute diplomatically failed when Claudius demanded that the Carthaginians depart Messana. Claudius now made a second, successful attempt to cross to Sicily, and may have tried to negotiate a solution with the Carthaginians, but this too failed.

The question of the causes of the First Punic War is bound up with the issue of war guilt: who was more responsible for starting the war, that is, who was the aggressor—the Romans or the Carthaginians? Unfortunately, the only fully-extant account of the outbreak of the war (Polybius’ *Histories*, Book 1, chapters 7–12.4) is a mere summary, and leaves out crucial details

supplied by later, more fragmentary sources. It seems clear, however, that when Claudius and his forces were dispatched to the Straits of Messina, the Romans did not intend or anticipate (at least right away) a full-scale war with Carthage. After all, the aggressor against whom the Romans were to protect the Mamertini was Hiero's Syracuse, not Carthage, and besides, Carthage and Rome were in a formal state of friendship and alliance (they had been treaty partners since 509 BCE)—which is perhaps why the Mamertini thought it sensible to appeal to both in 264. In addition, that the Romans sent only one consular army (consisting of two legions—less than 10,000 men) to the Straits, and the consul was armed with no formal declaration of war on either Carthage or Syracuse, indicates the limited nature of his assignment: to raise the siege of Messina by Hiero's Syracusans, either through force or negotiation. On the other hand, the Carthaginians' crucifixion of Hanno for cravenly abandoning Messina may indicate a more belligerent Carthaginian stance.

Division of Roman opinion on the Mamertine question adds nuance. Those opposing the action cited a moral justification: the Romans would be hypocrites for helping out the bloodthirsty Mamertines after having punished a group of their own mercenaries only a few years before for doing to the people of Rhegium precisely what the Mamertines had done to the inhabitants of Messina. It would be "an error difficult to defend," as Polybius puts it, for the Romans to provide assistance to the Mamertines. In addition, Polybius reveals, "the majority" (whether of senators or of the common people, the historian fails to specify) wanted to avoid a continuation of the high attrition rates in Rome's recent wars in Italy.

Those in favor of aiding the Mamertines, however, won the day. Their views reveal the true causes of the First Punic War, at least as far as the Roman side is concerned. These senators argued that if Rome did not respond positively to the Mamertine request for protection, the Carthaginians might do so, and thus gain a foothold in northern Sicily, from which point they might go on to conquer Syracuse and the rest of the island, which itself would provide the Carthaginians with "a bridge for crossing to Italy" (Polybius 1.10.9). Roman fear of Carthaginian aggression, therefore, was a major cause of the outbreak of the war. Roman motivation was thus largely defensive and preemptive in nature. Roman greed naturally, albeit secondarily, also played a role: some objections were overcome when the consul pointed out the plunder to be had from a war in Sicily.

On the other hand, in this same context, Polybius says the Romans had been content up until 262 to protect the Mamertini. This indicates that one of the Romans' motives for undertaking the war with Carthage was largely moral: once they accepted the absolute surrender of the Mamertini to their discretion (*deditio*), they felt themselves bound and committed to adhere to the *fides* (the bond of trust) that mandated their protection of the surrendered party—no matter what the costs or consequences to themselves. Many Romans did not want or anticipate war with Carthage at first, but once this became a reality, they felt compelled to follow through on their acceptance of the Mamertine *deditio*, and protect the Mamertini—even if it meant a long and costly “hegemonic war” with Carthage.

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See also Carthage (State); *Deditio* (Surrender); *Fides*; Hannibal Barca; Punic War, Second; Treaties and Alliances

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Punic War, First (264–241 BCE), Course

After diplomatic efforts failed to avert conflict with Carthage in 264, Claudius' legions first routed Hiero's forces besieging Messana, then

marched to the Syracusan camp and plundered it. The Romans soon returned to the walls of Messana to attack the Carthaginian troops, routed them as well, and marched on Syracuse and laid siege to the city. In 263, 40,000 Roman troops arrived in Sicily. These destroyed Hadranum, besieged Centuripae, and received the surrender of 67 Sicilian towns and cities and, eventually, after renewing the siege of Syracuse, of Hiero II himself.

The campaign of 262 was dominated by the struggle for the Carthaginian stronghold of Acragas (Agrigentum, modern Agrigento) in western Sicily. The Romans besieged the city for five months before a relieving Carthaginian force arrived, which included war elephants; these were used, perhaps for the first time in Carthaginian history, in the subsequent battle between the Romans and Carthaginians. The Romans were victorious, sacked the city, and sold its surviving inhabitants into slavery.

To expel the Carthaginians from Sicily, the Romans now realized, a decent fleet was necessary, which they began constructing in earnest. The Romans' ships were heavier and less maneuverable than the Carthaginians', and they depended less on ramming tactics than on turning sea battles into land battles through a Roman innovation—the *corvus*, or “crow.” This mechanism consisted of a 24-foot high pole on the bow of the ship with a 36-foot swinging plank attached via a pulley, and having on the underside of its far end a large, iron grappling-hook. In battle, the plank would be dropped onto the deck of an opponent's vessel, which both secured the enemy ship and provided a passageway for Roman troops to board her.

The Romans initially enjoyed mixed success at sea. One of the consuls of 260, Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio, detached 17 ships from the main fleet to try to win over the pro-Carthaginian Sicilian town of Lipara, but was trapped by the Punic fleet and captured. Gaius Duilius, the other consul of 260, relieved the Carthaginian siege of the Sicilian city of Segesta and captured another city, Macella, before taking to the sea with 140 Roman ships, and defeating at the battle of Mylae the Carthaginian general, Hannibal Gisco.

The land war in Sicily ground toward a stalemate. In the first years of the 250s, the Romans confined the Carthaginians to the western end of the island, and opened a short-lived second front on the large islands of Sardinia and Corsica, which were partially controlled by Carthage. The Roman strategy for ending the stalemate was to strike at the Carthaginian homeland, and invade North Africa itself. In summer 256, a Roman fleet

sailed to Cape Ecnomus where it was met by the Carthaginians. In the battle that followed, the Romans were victorious. The Roman invasion of Africa proceeded, and the Roman commander Marcus Atilius Regulus defeated the Carthaginians at Adys.

In winter 256/255, the Carthaginians sent envoys to negotiate a peace with Regulus, but the consul's demands were too severe to be acceptable. In spring 255, a mercenary army under the command of the Spartan mercenary general, Xanthippus, arrived at Carthage. With their help, the Carthaginians defeated the Romans in battle at Tunis. Regulus himself and 500 Romans were captured, 2,000 escaped, and the rest were killed. Regulus was tortured and died in captivity.

In 254, the Romans scored a naval victory over Carthage and rescued the survivors of the African expedition, but on their return journey their fleet was destroyed in a storm off the southeastern corner of Sicily; 80 of 264 ships were destroyed, and 25,000 soldiers and 70,000 rowers were killed.

Sicily once again became the main battlefield of the war. The Romans attacked Carthage's remaining strongholds, Drepana, Panormus (modern Palermo), and Lilybaeum. Meanwhile, storms continued to take their toll on the Roman fleets. In 251, the Romans won a major victory against the Carthaginians at Panormus, but in 249, the Roman commander Publius Claudius Pulcher famously ignored some bad omens (the sacred chickens on board his ship refused to eat, so he threw them overboard, saying, "if they won't eat, let them drink!"), and was defeated by the Carthaginian Adherbal; 93 of Claudius' 123 ships were lost off Drepana. Meanwhile, the fleet of Claudius' colleague, Lucius Iunius Paullus, was wrecked off Cape Pachynus, thus effectively depriving Rome of its navy. Paullus then went on to capture Sicilian Eryx on land.

The Carthaginians now began attacking the southern Italian coast. First Carthalo, and then his successor Hamilcar Barca (the father of the famous Carthaginian general Hannibal, the instigator of the Second Punic War) raided Locri and Bruttium in 248. Hamilcar also forced the Romans into a grinding campaign of attrition in western Sicily. As the sieges of Drepana and Lilybaeum wore on, the Romans rebuilt their fleet from funds borrowed from wealthy Roman citizens. In summer 242, a new Roman fleet of 200 ships blockaded Drepana and Lilybaeum. In spring 241, the Roman and Carthaginian fleets clashed near the Aegates Islands. The Romans were victorious and Carthage sued for peace.

The treaty ending the war mandated that Carthage and Rome should enjoy friendship (*amicitia*) on condition that Carthage evacuate Sicily and all islands between Italy and Sicily, leave Hiero II of Syracuse and his allies in peace, return all prisoners without ransom, and pay 3,200 talents over 10 years. In addition, neither side was to attack the friends and allies of the other, recruit troops, build fortifications, or impose tribute in the dominions of the other, or make friendships with the allies of the other.

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See also Carthage (State); *Deditio* (Surrender); *Fides*; Hannibal Barca; Punic War, Second; Treaties and Alliances

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Punic War, First (264–241 BCE), Consequences

According to Polybius, one of the consequences of the Carthaginian loss of the First Punic War was the so-called Wrath of the Barcids, named after the embittered loser of the battle of the Aegates Islands, Hamilcar Barca. A further consequence was that Rome had now become a naval power of the first rank, and the balance of power in the western Mediterranean had shifted from Carthage's favor to Rome's. Polybius also mentions that Hiero II of Syracuse, who was protected by the Treaty of Lutatius, now tried to balance the power of Rome and Carthage to secure and further his own power in Sicily. Carthage's former Sicilian holdings now became a Roman province.

In the immediate aftermath of the First Punic War, the economy and society of Carthage almost completely collapsed. Carthage was in no position to pay off its large mercenary forces that had fought in the war, so

these now rose up in revolt, first in North Africa itself, and then on the island of Sardinia. The mercenaries in North Africa, under the leadership of Mathos and Spendius, marched on Carthage twice, seized Tunis, and blockaded Utica and Hippo. In 240, Hamilcar Barca raised the siege of Utica, and defeated the mercenaries at the battle of the Bagradas River. After a brief rebel resurgence, which saw them take possession of Utica and Hippo and lay siege to Carthage itself, Hamilcar defeated them twice, in 239 and 238, at a place called “the Saw.” Hamilcar, together with Hanno the Great, again defeated the mercenaries later in 238 at Leptis, this time decisively. The Carthaginians then recovered the Libyan interior, along with Utica and Hippo.

Meanwhile, a revolt broke out on the Carthaginian-controlled island of Sardinia, where another major mercenary force was stationed. In addition to stopping Italian traders supplying the mercenaries in Africa, returning 2,700 Carthaginian prisoners of war without ransom, and refusing to receive the surrender of Utica before it went over to the African mercenaries, the Romans assisted Carthage by refusing a request of the Sardinian mercenaries in 240/239 to occupy the island. In late 238 or early 237, however, after some of the Sardinian mercenaries were forced to flee a revolt of the island’s mixed Punic-Sardinian population, the Romans accepted a second mercenary offer to occupy the island, and dispatched a Roman garrison to take control of it. When the Carthaginians protested the Roman action, and informed them that a Carthaginian force was being prepared to deal with the Sardinian situation, the Romans accused them of preparing war against Rome, and quickly pushed through the assembly a declaration of war against Carthage. Not willing to tangle with Rome again so soon, Carthage backed down, ceded Sardinia (and probably Corsica as well) to Roman control, and agreed to pay a 1,200-talent indemnity.

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See also Carthage (State); *Deditio* (Surrender); *Fides*; Hannibal Barca; Punic War, Second; Treaties and Alliances

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Punic War, Second (218–201 BCE), Causes

The Second Punic War, also known as the Hannibalic War, was the second of three conflicts between the Roman Republic and the Carthaginian Empire (“Punic,” from the Latin *Punicus*, meaning “Carthaginian”). The Romans’ second victory over Carthage in 201 BCE paved the way for the Republic’s dominance over the ancient Mediterranean and the demise of Carthage’s centuries-old maritime empire.

While Polybius and Livy asserted that the Second Punic War ultimately began after Hannibal’s destruction of the city of Saguntum, the true causes of the conflict are rooted as far back as the end of the First Punic War (264–241 BCE) (Polybius 3.6). The loss of Sicily in 241 was a heavy blow to Carthage and while complying with Roman demands the Carthaginians were immediately faced with a massive insurrection of their mercenary troops that led to a three-year campaign in Africa and Sardinia. In 238 BCE, the Romans seized the island of Sardinia under the threat of war and forced the Carthaginians to pay a larger indemnity. To Polybius, this was a chief cause of the Second Punic War, as it deepened Carthaginian resentment for Rome (Polybius 3.10, 13).

Expansion into Spain solved a myriad of problems for the Carthaginians beyond the recovery of territory. The command was given to Hamilcar Barca, an undefeated general from the First Punic War, who used the opportunity in Spain to provide the revenue needed to pay off the Roman indemnity and revitalize the Carthaginian state (Caven 1980: 78). Despite the practical reasons for Carthaginian expansion in Spain, Livy and Polybius saw Hamilcar’s campaigns as preparations for invading Italy

(Polybius 3.10,12; Livy 21.2.1–2). After Hamilcar's death in 229 BCE, the leadership of Carthaginian Spain fell to Hasdrubal, Hamilcar's son-in-law.

Hasdrubal continued to strengthen Carthage's position in Spain, relying on diplomacy rather than force, and established alliances with several southern chiefdoms in the Iberian peninsula. His success prompted Rome to send an envoy in 226 BCE, who sought assurance that Hasdrubal had no intention of carrying his conquests beyond Spain, and established the Ebro River in the north as the limit to Carthaginian expansion (Polybius 3.27.9; Livy 21.2.7). Hasdrubal readily consented to the Roman demands, suggesting that Carthage in fact had no intent of invading Italy. Five years later, Hasdrubal was assassinated, and the Carthaginian army recognized Hamilcar's 26-year-old son, Hannibal Barca, as their leader (Polybius 3.13; Livy 21.3.1).

Polybius, and Livy especially, attributed a lifelong hatred for Rome to Hannibal. When Hannibal was a boy, he enthusiastically asked to join his father on the Spanish campaign. Hamilcar then brought Hannibal to a sacrificial altar and instructed him to swear an oath to bear antipathy always for Rome (Polybius 3.11.5–7; Livy 21.1.4). Hannibal was an energetic commander, much more aggressive than Hasdrubal, and immediately set out on a campaign to the north against a coalition of recalcitrant tribes in the center of the Iberian peninsula. Within a year Hannibal had subdued nearly all of the independent tribes south of the Ebro River. It was on the return from this campaign that he became involved in a quarrel with the Iberian city of Saguntum, an ally of Rome.

Both Livy and Polybius said that Hannibal avoided attacking Saguntum for a time, although the city was apparently harassing several Carthaginian allies. The Saguntines were worried about the growing threat of Hannibal, and sent several embassies to Rome requesting aid in 221 and 220 BCE. The Romans agreed to send a commission to Spain in 220 BCE to investigate Hannibal's activities, and then to Carthage to voice their official complaint. By the time of their departure, however, Hannibal had already besieged Saguntum. When the ambassadors reached Hannibal at New Carthage, they requested that he end the siege, and respect the treaty signed in 226 BCE. (Polybius 3.15; Livy 21.9.2–4). In contrast to Hasdrubal's tactful interaction with Rome, Hannibal outright rejected the Romans' request and asserted that Rome had no right to interfere with Saguntum, further stressing the fact that the Saguntines had attacked Carthaginian allies. The Romans then

departed for Africa itself, while Hannibal wrote to the Carthaginian Senate, warning them of the Romans' approach. At Carthage, the Romans received a similar reply, after which they then returned to Rome.

By all accounts, Hannibal seems to have abided by the treaty with Rome, as Saguntum was south of the Ebro. Preceding their quarrel with Hannibal, the Romans were called in as arbitrators in a local dispute at Saguntum in 223, likely as the behest of Massilia. During their mediation, the Romans advocated executing several leaders of the opposing faction in the city, thereby securing the positions of a pro-Roman faction (Polybius 3.30). The Romans were historically inclined to respond to the appeals of allies, and such appeals had been used as justification in the past for war, specifically the First Punic War. While the Romans were not likely overtly attempting to provoke Carthage in a war, the alliance with Saguntum could be seen as a forward defense against the Carthaginians in Spain.

When the Roman diplomats returned from Africa, they informed the Senate of the hostile spirit at Carthage. Simultaneously, news reached Rome that Saguntum had fallen to Hannibal after an eight-month siege (Livy 21.16.1). The Senate was alarmed and decided on war with Carthage immediately (Polybius 3.20.1, 6–8; Livy 21.16.1–2). In accordance with the formalities of warfare, the Senate first put the question of war to the centuriate assembly, and sent a final delegation to Carthage to demand the surrender of Hannibal (Livy 21.17.3–4, 18.1–2). The Carthaginians noted the absurdity that the Romans were threatening war against their entire state because of the acts of a single individual. Moreover, the Carthaginians addressed the fact that the Romans had no right to claim Saguntum as an ally. In the first treaty made after the First Punic War, the Romans and Carthaginians agreed to respect and abstain from attacking each other's respective allies. There was no mention of Iberia in the treaty, and Saguntum was not an ally of Rome at that time (Polybius 3.21; Livy 21.18.4–12).

In a famous scene, the Roman diplomat, Fabius Buteo, held up the folds of his toga, and declared to the Carthaginian Senate, "Here we bring you war and peace, take which you please," to which the Carthaginians replied that Buteo should choose whichever he liked. Buteo then answered that he had let fall war, prompting the Carthaginians to cry back that they accepted it. With this said, the Roman delegation departed, and both sides began gathering allies and preparing for war (Polybius 3.33; Livy 21.18.12–14).

See also Allies (Status); Cannae, Battle of; Carthage (State); Carthaginians; Demography; Fabius Maximus; Hannibal Barca; Hasdrubal Barca; Imperialism; Lake Trasimene, Battle of; Marcellus; Metaurus, Battle of; New Carthage, Siege of; Polybius; Punic War, First; Scipio Africanus; Spanish Wars; Treaties and Alliances

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Punic War, Second (218–201 BCE), Course

Hannibal aimed to humble the Roman Republic by destroying its vast network of alliances in Italy and in 218 BCE, led his army toward Roman territory via the Pyrenees and Alps Mountains since Roman sea power prevented a naval invasion.

In December 218 BCE, a Roman army awaited the Carthaginians at the foot of the Alps. Underestimating the enemy's forces based on their haggard appearances (Hannibal lost thousands of men, baggage, and most of his war elephants to hostile Celtic tribes and the harsh conditions of crossing the mountains in winter), the Romans engaged the Carthaginians in battle and

were defeated at the Trebia River. Though Hannibal's army was outnumbered, the Carthaginian general showed his strategic brilliance by exploiting his army's flexibility to outmaneuver and overwhelm the Romans' straightforward, frontal assaults. Approximately 15,000–20,000 Romans and allies were slain.

The Carthaginians moved south, ambushing and defeating another Roman army at the battle of Lake Trasimene in June of 217 BCE. Hannibal employed similar enveloping tactics, resulting in the deaths of roughly 15,000 Romans and allies, including consul Gaius Flaminius, and the capture of an additional 10,000 men. Carthaginian casualties numbered about 1,500 men. The Romans, terrified that Hannibal would march on Rome, revived the emergency office of dictator and elected Quintus Fabius Maximus. Recognizing that the Roman army could not best Hannibal and his cunning tactics in pitched battles, Fabius initiated a war of attrition where he and his troops trailed the Carthaginians from high ground and periodically sprang surprise attacks that prevented the enemy from foraging supplies. The aim of this tactic was to slowly starve and wear down the enemy, a plan that most likely would have worked since Hannibal was always short of supplies (he was to receive reinforcements only once during the 15 years he spent in Italy). Fabius' countrymen, and especially his second-in-command, however, balked at the dictator's delaying tactics; they considered the tactics cowardly and alien to the typically aggressive Roman ways of war.

After Fabius' dictatorship expired six months later, the Romans returned to what they knew best—strong, frontal assaults—and readied the largest force to come out of the Republic for another battle. In August of 216 BCE, the opposing armies fought outside the small town of Cannae in what would become one of Rome's most devastating defeats and Hannibal's greatest victory. Using the Romans' strengths against them again, Hannibal's forces encircled the Romans and killed approximately 50,000 Roman and allied troops, including the consul Lucius Aemilius Paullus, 80 senators, and other officers. The surviving consul, Gaius Terentius Varro, and 10,000 soldiers managed to escape the massacre. Hannibal lost approximately 5,000 men.

For the next decade, Hannibal was relatively successful in humbling the Roman Republic; he traversed the length of the Italian peninsula virtually unopposed, persuading many Italian communities to abandon their alliances with the Romans. In the meantime, the Republic stretched its diminishing

resources and struggled to regain those lost territories while avoiding pitched battles with Hannibal: Roman troops were stationed in Spain, preventing Hannibal's brother, Hasdrubal Barca, from joining Hannibal in Italy; more forces were sent to Greece to keep Philip V of Macedon from aiding Hannibal; and additional soldiers were sent to Syracuse, a previous Roman ally that came under pro-Carthaginian leadership in 215 BCE.

By 209 BCE, the Romans were slowly recovering their allies and cornering Hannibal in southern Italy. In 207 BCE, after dogged persistence, prudent decisions, and hard-learned lessons, the Romans won a significant victory over the Carthaginians at the battle of the Metaurus River against Hasdrubal Barca. The combined Roman armies led by consuls Marcus Livius Salinator and Gaius Claudius Nero coordinated their attacks in an unusual show of professionalism and successfully executed both frontal assaults and flexible maneuvers. The Carthaginian army was destroyed. Hannibal, who was stationed south in Apulia, was not aware of his brother's defeat or of his death in battle until Nero had Hasdrubal's severed head flung into Hannibal's camp.

Roman fortunes continued to grow under the generalship of Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus, a survivor of the battle of Cannae. In 211 BCE, Scipio became the commander of the Roman army in Spain and implemented more training for his soldiers so that they could withstand and overcome clever tactics. Five years later, Scipio and his hardened troops eradicated the Carthaginian presence in Spain.

In 205 BCE, Scipio received senatorial approval for an invasion of Africa. His army, uniquely composed of the Cannae veterans and 7,000 volunteers, reached Africa the following year. Scipio's army won battle after battle as they worked their way toward Carthage. Alarmed, the Carthaginian senate recalled Hannibal. The opposing forces met at the battle of Zama in October of 202 BCE and for the first time during the war, the two sides were evenly matched in terms of strength and experience. It was not until Scipio's cavalry executed a timely enveloping move late in the battle that one side gave way; Hannibal's army was surrounded and defeated. Carthage surrendered and the war was over.

Annamarie Vallis and Dustin Cranford

See also Allies (Status); Cannae, Battle of; Carthage (State); Carthaginians; Demography; Fabius Maximus; Hannibal Barca; Hasdrubal Barca;

Imperialism; Lake Trasimene, Battle of; Marcellus; Metaurus, Battle of; New Carthage, Siege of; Polybius; Punic War, First; Scipio Africanus; Spanish Wars; Treaties and Alliances

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Punic War, Second (218–201 BCE), Consequences

The Romans remembered the Second Punic War as their climax of greatness and their impressive victory forever changed the Republic: demands were put on political and economic practices to manage newly acquired territories; the spoils obtained during the war ushered unparalleled amounts of wealth into Rome; and the new precedent of long-term military command added further strain to Roman customs and policies that would eventually cripple the Republic.

Although the Romans triumphed over Hannibal, the memory of the skilled general haunted them. Between 218 and 216 BCE, Hannibal killed and captured some 80,000 to 100,000 Romans, an incredible number in the ancient world. Consequently, Rome's terms ending the war were harsh:

Carthage had to pay an indemnity of 10,000 talents over fifty years; Carthaginian armed forces were severely reduced; they lost power over their foreign policy; and Rome acquired Spain and other overseas Carthaginian territories. Ultimately, Rome would not be satisfied until Carthage was utterly destroyed in the Third Punic War (149–146 BCE).

Annamarie Vallis and Dustin Cranford

See also Allies (Status); Cannae, Battle of; Carthage (State); Carthaginians; Demography; Fabius Maximus; Hannibal Barca; Hasdrubal Barca; Imperialism; Lake Trasimene, Battle of; Marcellus; Metaurus, Battle of; New Carthage, Siege of; Polybius; Punic War, First; Scipio Africanus; Spanish Wars; Treaties and Alliances

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Punic War, Third (149–146 BCE), Causes

The Third Punic War was largely a reaction to the second. Hannibal Barca opened the Second Punic War with a string of victories that frightened the Romans worse than any threat in their previous history (Appian, *Punic Wars* 134). Eventual Roman victory never entirely stilled that fear. The years between the Second and Third Punic Wars remained tense as the Romans sought to assure themselves that Carthaginian humiliation was final. Ultimately, failure to find that assurance led the Romans to create it.

The treaty ending the Second Punic War forced Carthage to pay Rome a

war indemnity of 10,000 talents over a 50-year period. Rome gained control of Spain and all the Mediterranean islands previously held by Carthage. The Carthaginian navy was reduced to ten warships; the army was forced to surrender its elephants. Carthage, now a client state of Rome, was not allowed to conduct foreign policy, declare war, or engage in battle without Roman consent. The Carthaginians were forced to make restitution to Masinissa, an ally of Rome, and return all recently captured Roman transport ships, with crews and cargo. The defeated city was required to return all prisoners of war, runaway slaves, and Roman deserters. They were also forced to supply grain to, and pay the salary of, Roman forces in Africa, until the treaty was ratified. As a sign of good faith, Rome demanded Carthage supply hostages during negotiations (Appian, *Punic Wars* 54). Though not part of the original treaty, Hannibal, whose generalship had frightened the Romans so and whose diplomatic leadership they feared almost as much, was eventually forced to flee the city, with the encouragement of Carthaginians who opposed his anti-corruption policies.

Surprisingly, Carthage rebounded strongly. Stripped of its army and foreign territories, the city focused on trade and farming. Wealth soon returned to the city, and Carthage offered to pay off the war indemnity early. Rome declined, wanting to keep Carthage in a state of submission as long as possible. Carthage continued to pay on time and accumulate wealth. The accumulation of Carthaginian wealth caused discomfort to some Roman leaders. If Carthage recovered, yet a third challenge to Roman supremacy in the western Mediterranean might be made. A group of Romans, reportedly led by Cato the Elder, made it their business to see that the Carthaginian threat never developed (Appian, *Punic Wars* 58).

Other issues lingered as well, including Numidian encroachment on Carthaginian territory. Numidia, a neighbor and former ally of Carthage, took advantage of Carthaginian weakness, and the terms of the treaty between Rome and Carthage, gradually extending Numidian borders at Carthaginian expense. Unable to act without Roman consent, Carthage repeatedly requested permission to defend themselves, or that Rome force Numidia to desist. Rome habitually sided with Numidia, and Carthage felt continuously less protected. Eventually, an aggressive party took control of the city government. After particularly egregious Numidian prodding, Carthage struck back without Roman consent. It was a mistake twice unfortunate. First, the Numidians easily defeated the inexperienced

Carthaginian army. Second, the Roman war party saw in this action their excuse to inflict a final humiliation on Carthage (Appian, *Punic Wars* 69–74).

Carthage quickly disavowed the action, replacing their government with one willing to submit to almost any Roman terms to avoid war. Rome held out the possibility of peace, but their intent was only to weaken Carthage as much as possible before war began. Rome demanded Carthage surrender 300 noble children as hostages before any discussions took place. Carthage complied. Rome then demanded that Carthage completely disarm. Though the numbers are open to question, Carthage reportedly surrendered 200,000 suits of armor, 2,000 catapults, and mounds of munitions. Only then did the Romans make their final demand. Carthaginians must destroy their own city. They could move anywhere they wanted within their territory, as long as it was at least 10 miles from the sea. Such a move would have destroyed Carthage as a center of trade. Convinced, now, that Rome meant to destroy them under any circumstance, Carthage chose war (Appian, *Punic Wars* 76–93; Polybius 36:3–7).

David R. Smith

See also Carthage (State); Carthaginians; Mars; Prisoners of War; Punic War, First; Punic War, Second; Siege Warfare; Treaties, Rome and Carthage

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Punic War, Third (149–146 BCE), Course

The Third Punic War began in 149 BCE. Carthaginian defenses were formidable. The city, sited on a peninsula, was surrounded by a wall (Appian, *Punic Wars* 95). Rome, on the other hand, faced the Carthaginian

challenge with a large but poorly trained army with inadequate logistics (Appian, *Punic Wars* 94). The consuls Manius Manilius commanded the army and Lucius Marcius Censorinus the navy (Appian, *Punic Wars* 75). The Roman commanders opened the war with a combined attack. Manilius led his legions against the front wall, while Censorinus attacked a portion of the south wall, perceived as weaker. The combined attack failed. A second attempt met the same fate. A third attack breached the outer defenses of the city's front wall, but could not scale the wall itself (Appian, *Punic Wars* 97).

Manilius ordered two large rams built. Both created breaches in the city wall, but the Carthaginians held off the Romans, blocking their penetration into the city. That night Carthaginian raiding parties burned both rams. The Carthaginians repaired the breaches in the wall as well as they could in the darkness, but morning found one still usable by the Romans. Manilius attacked, pushing past the first defenders, but the assault broke down, and the Romans fell back. Carthaginian leaders pressed their advantage and Manilius escaped the city only with the help of Scipio Aemilianus, adopted grandson of Scipio Africanus, who defeated Hannibal at Zama. Scipio, with great presence of mind, held his men in reserve, and his disciplined and unshaken soldiers covered the retreat of the main army (Appian, *Punic Wars* 98).

Hasdrubal, the general previously condemned for attacking the Numidians, remained in command of 30,000 men who had not returned to Carthage after that conflict, being under threat of death. Carthage now appointed him commander of all forces outside the city (Appian, *Punic Wars* 70, 74, 96). He led a successful campaign against Roman foraging parties (Appian, *Punic Wars* 100). On one occasion, he staged a night attack against the main Roman camp, throwing the Romans into disorder. Scipio, refusing to panic, formed his cavalry and led them against the Carthaginian flank. The darkness that covered Hasdrubal's attack also left him uncertain how many Romans were attacking him. In the dark literally and figuratively, Hasdrubal withdrew (Appian, *Punic Wars* 99). When the wind was in their favor, the Carthaginians also sent fireships against the Roman navy, inflicting significant damage on the Roman fleet (Appian, *Punic Wars* 99).

Winter, inadequate logistics, and lack of progress forced a new strategy on Manilius. He attacked nearby cities, punishing them and gathering supplies. Initially this seemed promising. Unfortunately, most Roman

commanders acted incautiously, spreading their formations in search of food. Hasdrubal saw this opportunity and took advantage of it, sending his cavalry to punish the searchers when they dispersed. Only Scipio operated efficiently, keeping his men together and maintaining a reserve (Appian, *Punic Wars* 100–101). As Manilius returned to the main Roman camp, the Carthaginians mounted another night attack, raiding the small camp guarding Roman transport ships. Again Scipio responded, his force carrying lit torches into the rear of the Carthaginians. Fearing a large counterattack, the Carthaginians withdrew into the city (Appian, *Punic Wars* 101).

Embarrassed and hurt by Hasdrubal, Manilius turned his attention to defeating the Carthaginian leader and the forces he commanded outside the city. This strategy fared no better than previous Roman efforts. Finding a strong hilltop position, Hasdrubal stopped the Romans and forced them to withdraw. As the Romans recrossed a river on their way back to Carthage, Hasdrubal struck. Scipio and 300 cavalry counterattacked, holding Hasdrubal at bay while the Romans escaped. Still under attack, Scipio then withdrew his own force across the river. Discovering that some Romans remained trapped by Carthaginian forces, Scipio led his cavalry back across the river, cut his way through to the trapped men, and led them to safety (Appian, *Punic Wars* 102–104). On the way back to camp, the Romans suffered further losses from enemy cavalry and from a raiding party sent out from Carthage itself (Appian, *Punic Wars* 104). Manilius attempted a second attack on Hasdrubal in the spring, but was again unsuccessful, with one exception. Scipio persuaded Hasdrubal's cavalry to desert, joining the Romans (Appian, *Punic Wars* 108). Hasdrubal then returned inside Carthage, taking control of the city by killing his political rivals (Appian, *Punic Wars* 111).

In 148 Rome sent only one consul to Africa, Lucius Calpurnius Piso Caesoninus. He determined, once again, to subdue cities supporting Carthage (Appian, *Punic Wars* 110). His failure encouraged Macedonia to revolt, a situation the Romans contained only with difficulty.

That year Scipio returned to Rome to run for office. Initially he announced for an aedileship, but as the only successful commander in Africa, many supported him for consul. Too young to hold that office, the Senate voted him a single year exception. He won easily and was assigned the African command (Appian, *Punic Wars* 112).

Lucius Hostilius Mancinus commanded the navy in 148. As Scipio

returned to Africa, Mancinus spotted a weakness in the city walls. Forcing his way through a gate, he drove into the city. His men, however, unequipped for a land battle, were pressed back. Scipio, learning of Mancinus' situation, sailed into view with his replacements lining the decks of their ships. The Carthaginians, thinking Scipio brought the entire army, stopped attacking long enough for Mancinus to escape (Appian, *Punic Wars* 113–114).

Scipio imposed a tight blockade, building a fortification in front of Carthage with a tower allowing him to spy on the city. He dug a mole across the mouth of the harbor. The Carthaginians, working at night, dug a new channel, sallying with the remainder of their fleet. After a daylong battle, the Carthaginians pulled back, but their inexperienced navy blocked the entrance to the harbor. Rome destroyed most of their ships before order was restored (Appian, *Punic Wars* 121–123).

Scipio attempted to breach the city walls near the harbor, but the Carthaginians attacked and burned his siege engines. He ordered them rebuilt, along with a large brick wall to defend them. While this work progressed, he attacked Carthaginian forces outside the city. Organizing and conducting his campaign skillfully, he forced the cities remaining in support of Carthage to capitulate (Appian, *Punic Wars* 124–146).

Returning to Carthage, Scipio deceived Hasdrubal regarding his point of attack and broke into the city. The Romans fought their way along streets lined with six story buildings, Scipio sending men ahead to clear the rooftops of the burning buildings, without regard for people trapped inside. Over the next six days, he forced his way ever deeper into the city until all but Hasdrubal, his family, and some Roman deserters surrendered. Finally, Hasdrubal surrendered. The deserters, knowing surrender meant torture, committed suicide. Legend suggests that Hasdrubal's abandoned wife, screaming insults at her cowardly husband, killed their children and threw them into the flames, stepping into the fire after them. Carthage had fallen (Appian, *Punic Wars* 127–131; Polybius 39.3–4).

David R. Smith

See also Carthage (State); Carthaginians; Mars; Prisoners of War; Punic War, First; Punic War, Second; Siege Warfare; Treaties, Rome and Carthage

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Punic War, Third (149–146 BCE), Consequences

For Carthage, the aftermath of the war was swift and brutal. Those not killed in the fighting were sold into slavery. The Roman army pulled Carthage down and burned it. Carthaginian allies suffered a similar fate (Appian, *Punic Wars* 133). Carthaginian lands became the province of Africa, among the leading grain producers of the Roman Republic (Appian, *Punic Wars* 135).

The destruction of Carthage in 146 BCE left Rome the sole superpower of the ancient Mediterranean world. Many Romans of that time and after believed victory over Carthage led to the fall of the Roman Republic (Appian, *Punic Wars* 69; Plutarch, *Cato the Elder* 27,1–2; Sallust, *Bellum Catilinae* 10, *Jugurthine War* 45). They believed that with no significant enemy keeping Romans vigilant and challenged, Rome grew soft and demoralized. Such ideas are often self-sustaining, but the argument still intrigues ancient historians. The reality, however, is that no way exists to determine such things with certainty.

Carthage disappeared as a state, but Punic culture and influence remained strong in northwest Africa throughout the imperial period. It could hardly be otherwise given the impact Carthage had on the region. The wealth of Carthage sustained the area for centuries, most of the nearby cities were Carthaginian allies, and many of them were founded by the great city. If the Carthaginian state never returned, the city itself did. The first attempt to rebuild on the original site was the city of Junonia by Gaius Gracchus, part of his land reform program (Appian, *Punic Wars* 136). Though Junonia did not survive, Caesar built a city named Carthage near the original site a century later, as a colony for retired soldiers. It grew into a large and wealthy city, becoming the center of northwest African grain trade during the imperial period (Appian, *Punic Wars* 136).

See also Carthage (State); Carthaginians; Mars; Prisoners of war; Punic War, First; Punic War, Second; Siege Warfare; Treaties, Rome and Carthage

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Pupienus and Balbinus (Emperors, 238 CE)

Roman emperors (238 CE), Marcus Clodius Pupienus Maximus and Decimus Caelius Calvinus Balbinus were acclaimed joint emperors in January 238 CE to lead the senatorial resistance against Maximinus I. Pupienus advanced north to Ravenna to check Maximinus' advance, while Balbinus remained in Rome. The imperial college was augmented by the addition of the teenaged Gordian III, grandson of Gordian I, as Caesar. After Maximinus was murdered by his own troops outside Aquileia, the government of Pupienus and Balbinus began to collapse. The two emperors frequently disagreed, and they were hated by the Praetorian Guard, who murdered them in May 238 CE.

Caillan Davenport

See also Gordian III; Maximinus I; Third-Century CE Crisis

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Pydna, Battle of (168 BCE)

The battle of Pydna was the decisive battle of the Third Macedonian War, fought on June 22, 168 BCE between a Roman force led by Lucius Aemilius Paullus and the Macedonian army of King Perseus. After previous consuls led indecisive campaigns in Macedon during the years 171–169, Paullus was sent out to bring the war to an end. Due to corruption of the sources, the timeline of the years 168–167 is uncertain, but a military tribune called Gaius Sulpicius Gallus who was serving with the army is said to have predicted an eclipse of the moon on the night previous to the battle, enabling a precise date of June 22, 168 BCE.

The disposition of the battle is preserved in the literary account. Romans were pursuing the retreating army of Perseus when they arrived at a plain near the ancient town of Pydna, where Perseus had set up camp. Some of Paullus' officers argued that they should give battle immediately, lest they give Perseus a chance to escape. Seeing the fatigue of his men, however, Paullus elected to wait. According to Livy, Paullus moved his army onto the foothills, terrain unsuitable for the phalanx, the main fighting unit of the Macedonians. On the following day, with his line facing east, Paullus made sacrifices to the gods, hoping to obtain a favorable omen, but did not receive one until the death of the twenty-first beast. Even then, the result indicated that the Romans would need to act on the defensive. Paullus waited until the afternoon to prevent the sun shining in the eyes of his soldiers. The battle was started either by a trick of Paullus, who had his soldiers "accidentally" drive a runaway horse into the Macedonian lines, or a Macedonians attack on a foraging party. In either case, Paullus' traditional religious scruples were fulfilled, as the Macedonian forces advanced forward to the attack. Traditional religious protocols of warfare represented the Romans as fighting defensive wars, attacked first by the enemy (see "*Ius fetiale*," "Formal declaration of war").

At first the greater reach of the Macedonian phalanx, due to their use of the extra-long 18-foot pike called the *sarissa*, pushed the Roman troops back. Since the Romans, using shorter weapons, could not engage with the Macedonian front, the Romans retreated slowly, until uneven ground and the irregular course of the battle began to open up gaps in the Macedonian lines. It was then that Paullus exploited the particular strength of the manipular legion, its maneuverability, and ordered maniples to attack the

weakest and most poorly protected areas of the Macedonian phalanx: its flanks and rear. The Macedonians, carrying heavy *sarissae*, were less able to maneuver. The Romans were better armored and their shorter weapons were more advantageous at close quarters, and they soon turned the tide of the battle. We are told that 25,000 of the Macedonians were killed, compared to some 80–100 Romans, and that the nearby River Leucus ran red with blood. King Perseus fled in the wake of this disastrous defeat, but was eventually caught and gave himself up to Paullus, ending the Third Macedonian War with victory for Rome.

Kathryn H. Milne

See also Aemilius Paullus, Lucius; *Ius Fetiale*; Macedonian War, Third; Portents; Religion and Warfare; Tactics

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Pyrrhus, War with (280–275 BCE)

Faced with a war against Rome in 281 BCE, the Greek city of Tarentum in southern Italy invited King Pyrrhus of Epirus to cross the Adriatic Sea and aid them in their war. Pyrrhus invaded Italy with a force of 25,500 infantry, 3,000 cavalry, and 20 elephants. He fought three major battles against the Romans: Heraclea in 280, Asculum in 279, and Beneventum in 275. Although victorious at Heraclea and Asculum, Pyrrhus suffered heavy casualties throughout the conflict that proved irreplaceable.

Roman expansion into southern Italy created a tenuous political and military relationship between the Tarentines and Romans. The Tarentines reacted by sinking several Roman warships and attacking a Roman garrison at Thurii. With full-scale war against Rome eminent, the Tarentines called upon Pyrrhus to defend the Greek cities of southern Italy and pledged their support to him. Before sailing to Italy, Pyrrhus secured from Tarentum the finances necessary to pay for his campaign and was awarded the supreme command of all allied forces. Pyrrhus managed a difficult crossing of the

Adriatic with his army and first met the Romans at Heraclea.

Pyrrhus chose to seize the initiative and led an indecisive cavalry charge against the Roman lines. Yet his phalanx and elephants were able to rout the Roman army. After the battle, Pyrrhus marched on Rome to force a peace treaty. He got within 37 miles of the city, but the Romans refused to come to terms. Pyrrhus had to turn south to face a two consular Roman army at Asculum. The two forces were evenly matched and fought for a full day on broken ground. The next day another desperate fight ensued on more open ground, allowing Pyrrhus to utilize his cavalry and elephants. The Romans eventually retreated to their camp but did not rout. This second battle was more costly than the first. The Romans suffered nearly twice as many casualties. However, Pyrrhus had been wounded, he had lost several officers, and he was unable to replace his losses. Additionally, the promised reinforcements from his Italian allies did not materialize in significant numbers.

After Asculum, Pyrrhus became distracted by a campaign in Sicily. For three years he fought a frustrating war against the Carthaginians, while the Romans attacked his allies in southern Italy. A Roman and Carthaginian alliance put added pressure on Pyrrhus, and he was forced to return to Italy to give aid to his allies. With half of his remaining forces, he marched to meet a Roman consular army at Malventum (later renamed Beneventum). His surprise night attack failed, and he was drawn into another costly battle. Pyrrhus' elephants panicked and charged against his own men; the Romans forced Pyrrhus into a disorganized retreat. He no longer had the men or the money to continue the war in Italy. After stationing a strong garrison at Tarentum, Pyrrhus returned to Epirus with only 8,000 infantry and 500 cavalry. The Epirote garrison at Tarentum held out against Roman attacks until 272.

Pyrrhus won two legitimate victories against the Romans at Heraclea and Asculum, and the sources exaggerate Pyrrhus' casualties at Beneventum. Additionally, the Romans suffered heavy losses in the Pyrrhic War. However, Pyrrhus' missed opportunities in Italy and his failures in Sicily proved too costly for a sustained campaign against Rome. This is the source of the term "pyrrhic" to denote a victory achieved at excessive cost.

Nikolaus Leo Overtoom

See also Punic War, First; Tactics

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Q

Quaestor

A quaestor was a junior Roman magistrate who assisted consuls or promagistrates on campaign or with civilian administration, or who administered financial and other local affairs at Rome. The quaestorship was the first significant magistracy normally held in the republican *cursus honorum*, succeeded by aedileship (not required), praetorship, and consulship. Once quaestors were elected, the Senate allocated quaestors to particular magistrates. Consular quaestors assisted the consuls at first on campaign and, when *provinciae* began to entail civil administration, with that as well. Typical campaign duties included the management of pay for the troops and supplies. The advent of prorogation meant that propraetors and proconsuls might be attended by quaestors. At Rome, at least one *quaestor urbanus* administered the treasury (*aerarium*). It was possible for consul and quaestor to conflict, but in such instances the consul was able to overrule the junior magistrate.

The number of quaestors gradually grew as Rome's overseas dependencies increased. During his dictatorship (82–81 BCE), Sulla raised the number of quaestors to 20 and required senators to have been quaestors (thus lowering the bar to membership in the Senate). Caesar increased the number of quaestors to 40. Their number may have been reduced again by Augustus. The quaestorship, now attached to the emperors' staff, continued to exist in the Principate as an honorific post for young aristocratic men. It took on greater importance with legal secretarial duties in the later Roman Empire.

The term *quaestor* is lexically related to but should not be confused with *quaesitor*, a magistrate supervising the criminal courts (*quaestiones*) as a

prosecutor or inquisitor.

Sara E. Phang

See also Aedile; Consul; *Cursus Honorum* (Imperial); *Cursus Honorum* (Republic); Praetor; Proconsul; Proprætor; Sulla, Lucius Cornelius

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Quincunx

The quincunx (Livy 8.8.5–8) was a tactical formation used in the period of the manipular legion (mid-Republic). When the legion deployed for battle, it formed three lines (the *triplex acies*): *hastati* in front, *principes* in the middle, and *triarii* in the rear. The *hastati* were deployed in 15 maniples, the *principes* in 15 maniples, and the *triarii* in groups of 15 termed *ordines*.

According to this passage, the maniples were not deployed in a single continuous line but alternating with empty spaces, forming a checkerboard pattern or quincunx, like a number five die face or playing card, repeated to use all the maniples being employed in an engagement. In battle, the forward maniples could fall back, enabling the middle and rear maniples to move forward into the empty spaces and replace exhausted men. This formation would have required extensive drilling and in combat was vulnerable to outflanking, the enemy entering into the gaps. Accordingly, some scholars have questioned its existence.

Sara E. Phang

See also *Hastati*; Legion, Organization of; Maniples; *Principes*; *Triarii*; *Triples Acies*

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R

Radagaisus (d. 406 CE)

Radagaisus was king of a barbarian confederation that invaded Italy in 405–406 CE (Zosimus 5.26.3–5). Nothing is known of his origins or background prior to his invasion of Italy, possibly motivated by the advance of the Huns in central Europe. Radagaisus' forces are said to have included hundreds of thousands of warriors, an unbelievably high estimate given army numbers in the later Roman Empire. In response, the *magister utriusque militiae* Stilicho gathered 30 units of the western Roman field armies, supported by barbarian auxiliaries such as Alans, Goths, and Huns. Such a force may realistically have numbered 15,000 men. Radagaisus' hordes initially met with little resistance and devastated northern Italy. His army split into in three forces, probably due to lack of supplies.

Radagaisus' main force besieged Florence during the spring of 406, which was about to surrender until the timely arrival of Stilicho's army. The western Roman army surrounded Radagaisus near the hill of Fiesole and blocked all access to supplies, thereby starving his forces. Radagaisus tried to escape but was apprehended and executed near Florence on August 23, 406. Stilicho suffered minimal losses and managed to incorporate 12,000 of Radagaisus' forces into his auxiliary forces. It is possible, however, that survivors of Radagaisus' army fled Italy over the Alps and contributed to the invasion of Gaul in 406.

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See also Goths; Stilicho; Zosimus

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Raetia

Raetia was a Roman province overlapping with parts of modern Switzerland, southern Germany, and Austria. The region, bordering barbarian Germany and controlling the Alpine passes into northern Italy, was strategically important. Tiberius (the future emperor) and his brother Drusus conquered western Raetia in 15 BCE, and a province termed Raetia et Vindelicia was created, with a capital at Augusta Vindelicum (Augsburg). Raetia was at first garrisoned by auxiliaries, then by a new legion, Legio III Italica, stationed at Castra Regina from 170 onward.

On the German frontier, the northern border was defined not by a river but by a *limes* (frontier) work east of the Rhine that bordered Upper Germany to the west and Raetia to the north, bending near the border between Upper Germany and Raetia. This *limes* work took the form of a patrol road with forts rather than a wall, built in stages by Vespasian and Domitian; Hadrian added a palisade. The whole is termed the Odenwald-Neckar *limes* after its modern geographical termini. Around 150 the Odenwald-Neckar *limes* garrisons were moved 12–15 miles eastward. The area between the Rhine and the *limes* was termed the *Agri Decumates*. It was evacuated and lost to the empire during the third-century crisis invasions.

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See also Domitian; Drusus; Frontiers; Germanic Wars; Third-Century CE Crisis; Vespasian

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Recruitment of Army (Imperial)

The recruitment of the imperial Roman army (27 BCE - 235 CE) varied with the branch of the service: Praetorian Guard, urban cohorts, legionaries, *auxilia*, fleet, and *vigiles* (the fire watch in the city of Rome). The minimum age for recruitment was probably still 17 years; the emperor Hadrian ruled that younger boys or old men should not be recruited (*Historia Augusta, Hadrian* 10.8). Slaves and persons with dishonorable status (deserters, convicts, and probably prostitutes, actors, pimps, and gladiators) were excluded, though due to the lack of standard identification papers such exclusion was probably impossible to enforce.

The Praetorian Guard were recruited from Italians until Septimius Severus (193–211) disbanded the Italian praetorians for assassinating Pertinax. Severus recruited the new praetorians from the Danubian provinces, promoting legionaries into the Guard. Recruitment from the Balkans probably continued through the third century until Constantine the Great (306–337) disbanded the Guard permanently in 312 to punish them for supporting his rival Maxentius. The Italian praetorians were also recruited from a slightly higher social stratum than legionaries (below) and received higher pay and a shorter term of service, 16 years, enabling the promotion of praetorian veterans into staff officer positions while they were still relatively young, in their early thirties.

In contrast, the recruitment of the *equites singulares Augusti* or Emperor's Horse Guards bore closer resemblance to the *auxilia* (below). The *equites singulares* were recruited from Germanic peoples in the Rhineland, particularly the Batavi and Ubii, who had strong cavalry traditions.

The recruitment of the legions shifted geographically from northern Italy in the early first century CE to the Romanized provinces and eventually to the frontier areas near legionary bases. At the time that Augustus reorganized the Roman army, legionaries were still recruited from Italy, and in particular from northern Italy (called "Gallia Cisalpina," but long Romanized). By the late first century CE, recruitment from Spain and southern Gaul took over, followed by recruitment from the Danubian provinces. In the third century, recruitment from the areas near frontiers and military bases became common; over the first two centuries CE, extensive settlement had occurred around many military forts, and the settlements surrounding legionary forts tended to grow into small cities. These shifts are attested through inscriptions, largely epitaphs and dedications.

The social status of legionary recruits is difficult to determine, due to the remote perspective of the literary authors, extremely wealthy and highly educated senators and equestrians who regarded common soldiers (*milites*) as socially far beneath them. Cassius Dio, a Roman senator from Asia Minor, regarded Augustus as recruiting those men who were “strongest and most in need of a livelihood” (52.27.4) who otherwise would turn to brigandage to support themselves. Dio thus suggests that soldiers were poor men, even desperate, a stereotype that persisted from the period of Marius’ recruitment of the landless *capite censi*. Dio and other literary authors also persistently depict soldiers as uneducated. However, other sources, both legal and documentary, do not suggest that legionaries were impoverished, at least by the second century CE after Domitian (81–96 CE) raised pay. The Roman jurists discussed Roman citizen soldiers’ property rights, including savings accounts and testation (the making of wills). Letters and documents from Roman Egypt show that soldiers could write (or at least have letters written for them) and had disposable income, requesting and sending gifts. Basic literacy and numeracy were assets to promotion as *principales* (junior officers below the centurionate).

The recruitment of the *auxilia* also underwent geographical or cultural shifts. They were originally recruited from non-Italian ethnic communities (the term “tribes” is misleading) with a warlike tradition. Due to the spread of the Latin language and the Roman citizenship, by the mid-second century CE auxiliaries became indistinguishable from legionaries. Many auxiliary units retained ethnic titles, but these are not a reliable guide to the actual ethnicity of auxiliary soldiers without further evidence (for example, nomenclature, depiction of ethnic dress or weapons on tombstone reliefs). Service in the *auxilia* was not necessarily inferior to legionary service, despite slightly lower pay; provincials might regard auxiliary service as a good prospect.

Less is known about the recruitment of the fleet and *vigiles*. Despite their construction of a navy during the First Punic War, the Romans were never principally a naval power and often relied on Greek allies to supply and man ships. Fleet service was the least prestigious branch of the regular service. The fleet soldiers based at Misenum (on the Bay of Naples) and Ravenna were probably recruited from southern Italy, Greece, and the Illyrian coast and were of Greek ethnic origins. The *vigiles*, Rome’s fire watch, were initially recruited from freedmen, probably residents of the city

of Rome who knew its neighborhoods well. Later in the empire they were probably recruited from freeborn as well. They were not considered to be regular soldiers.

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See also Auxilia; Cassius Dio; Equites Singulares; Fleets; Legion, Organization of; Pay and Finances, Military (Imperial); Pay and Finances, Military (Republic); Praetorians; Vigiles

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Recruitment of Army (Later Empire)

The later Roman army (from ca. 284), facing a possible shortage of recruits, employed various means of compulsion to recruit manpower, including conscription, hereditary service, and the conscription of defeated enemies settled within the empire.

The manpower needs of the later Roman army can only be a rough estimate. The size of the later Roman army is debated; during the fourth and fifth centuries, it consisted of somewhere between 300,000 and 600,000 men scattered across the empire from Britain to Syria, but the current estimate is perhaps 400,000 to 500,000. To maintain this strength the Roman army needed to enlist at least 15,000 recruits and as many as 27,000 to 45,000 per annum. More might be needed in times of crisis or to replace casualties suffered by units in combat. Some battles had very high casualties; two-thirds of the Roman army at Adrianople (378) was lost, or 10,000 to 26,000

men. Recruits served for 20 years in the *comitatenses* (mobile units) and 24 years in the *limitanei* (border units).

Although there is some evidence of voluntary enlistment in the Roman army, most citizen recruits were conscripted. Regular conscription can be dated to the reign of the emperor Diocletian (284–305). Hereditary conscription of the sons of soldiers and veterans was one practice. Conscription was also a “form of taxation” (Lee 2007: 80) in which landowners would annually deliver tenants as recruits. This tax could be commuted to cash payments (the *aurum tironicum*). The burden of conscription seems to have fallen on the rural population of the empire. Certainly Vegetius argued that rural conscripts were superior to urban conscripts because they were inured to the heavy work and long marches soldiers needed to be able to endure. Certain regions were known for the superiority of their recruits, such as Illyricum in the fourth century and Isauria in the fifth. These regions were mountainous and harsh, known for producing bandits as well as soldiers.

Military service seems to have been unpopular among Roman citizens, as we have reports of individuals cutting off their thumbs to avoid conscription. Imperial law punished the shirkers brutally; recruits were also tattooed to discourage desertion. On the other hand, once conscripted Roman citizens seem to have served loyally and efficiently.

In addition to citizen conscripts, Rome also recruited from non-Roman (once referred to as “barbarian”) populations. Some of these non-Roman recruits joined the Roman army voluntarily. The Roman army, in this case, offered the potential for regular meals and pay, travel, and the potential for promotion within the Roman military.

Another source of recruits was the *dediticii* (captives, surrendered peoples). In this case, defeated non-Roman fighters would have the option of serving in the Roman army under Roman officers. Service was probably preferable to enslavement or execution, the other usual fates of captives. A third category of non-Roman recruitment was the *laeti*, tribal groups who had received permission to settle on Roman territory in return for military service. In this case, it appears that the *laeti* were required to provide a certain number of recruits in return for the right to live in Roman territory. Like the *dediticii*, recruits from the *laeti* served under Roman officers.

The habit of recruiting from among non-Roman populations, either prisoners of war or free men, has raised questions concerning the

“barbarization” of the Roman army. This argument dates back to Gibbon’s *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* (1776–1788). Gibbon identifies barbarization of the Roman army as a factor in the collapse of Roman authority in the western empire. In short, Gibbon argued that Christianity had robbed the Romans of their martial spirit, leading them to increasingly depend on non-Roman recruits to man the Roman armies. When these non-Roman recruits reached a critical mass, they turned against Rome, causing the collapse of Roman institutions in the west. The evidence tends not to support Gibbon. As long as they were regularly paid and served under Roman officers, non-Roman recruits in the regular army were as loyal as Roman recruits. Usurpations that destabilized the fifth-century CE western Roman Empire emanated from the commanding officer cadre.

The recruitment of the regular Roman army is distinct from the employment of barbarian peoples, such as the Visigoths and Huns, who retained their own leaders and organization. These peoples, the fifth-century allies or *foederati*, were effectively clients (like earlier client monarchs and peoples, but allowed to settle within the empire) and received subsidies from the imperial government. Not all of these peoples turned on the Roman Empire and extorted subsidies; some fought as loyal allies. However, those that proved unreliable contributed to the fragmentation of the western Roman Empire.

Michael D. Blodgett

See also *Comitatenses*; Diocletian; Fall of the Roman Empire (West); *Federates*; *Limitanei*; Theodosius I; Vegetius

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Recruitment of Army (Republic)

Though many phases are only known in schematic terms, during the Republic (509–27 BCE) the Roman army evolved from an army of citizen yeomanry (farmers, small property owners) supplemented by formally

allied Italian forces, to an army of propertyless professional soldiers supplemented by non-Italic auxiliaries. In the earliest (monarchic) period, property owners above a certain minimum were recruited into the hoplite phalanx of heavy-armed infantry.

The so-called Servian constitution, reconstructed by Roman antiquarian authors, displays a more elaborate timocratic structure. Citizens were arranged into *classes*; the first *classis*, drawn from men worth 100,000 *asses* or more, comprised 80 centuries; the second *classis*, men worth 75,000 to 100,000 *asses*, comprised 20 centuries; class three, worth 50,000 to 75,000 *asses*, 20 centuries; class four, worth 25,000 to 50,000 *asses*, 20 centuries; class five, worth 11,000 to 25,000 *asses*, 30 centuries. 18 centuries of cavalry (*equites*) were drawn from the aristocracy, originally patrician, later opened to well-to-do plebeians. Army engineers formed two centuries; musicians, two centuries. Men with less than 11,000 *asses* of property, the *capite censi*, were not recruited; they were assigned to a single century, even though they must have been a large portion of the population (Livy 1.43; Dionysius, *Roman History* 4.16–18).

What this schematic arrangement actually meant for recruitment is still unclear. A century probably did not signify literally 100 men. The largest category was probably the fifth, from which the bulk of the legions were recruited: subsistence farmers who owned a small amount of land. Before the adoption of coinage, the Romans used bronze (*aes*) by weight as a measure of wealth. Though the exact value of the *aes* (pl. *asses*) is debated, its value was low.

By the classical Roman Republic (ca. 264–133 BCE), recruitment no longer followed the Servian census classes, which were used to structure voting in the *comitia centuriata*, and instead was geographical, organized according to the regional groups (tribes) that citizens belonged to. At the start of the campaign season, the consuls summoned the male citizens to the Campus Martius (outside the *pomerium* or boundary of the city of Rome, which an army was forbidden to enter), organized by tribe. The consuls called each man up and chose or rejected him for military service. They could reject unsuitable men, so that the army of the mid-Republic was in fact not a mass conscript army, in contrast with the *tumultus* or *levée en masse*. In a *tumultus*, an emergency was declared and an emergency chief magistrate, the dictator, was appointed; he could conscript every able-bodied male citizen into the army to meet the crisis.

Rome also relied heavily on Italian allies, who might make up half or more of a mid-republican force. These allies, the *socii*, were bound by treaties (the oldest being the treaty of Rome with the Latins, the *foedus Cassianum*) and by a document termed the *formula togatorum*, which specified how many men each Italic community was required to provide. Allies were organized into *alae* or “wings” that in battle stood to either side of the Roman legions. The *alae sociorum* might be both cavalry and infantry. Allies might be rewarded with conquered land and plunder, but as the centuries went by, and the profits of Roman warfare increased, the Italians grew increasingly resentful of their lack of Roman citizenship and exclusion from the Roman political process. The Republic might also recruit the military forces of client monarchs or client peoples, especially to secure military skill sets that most Romans and Italians lacked, such as archery, handling war elephants, or crewing ships.

The Punic Wars and especially the Hannibalic War, with its massive Roman defeats at the Trebia (218 BCE) and Lake Trasimene (217) and Cannae (216), put a great strain on the Roman system of military recruitment. A large proportion of citizens served in the army. At one point, slaves were freed and enrolled in the army. It is not clear, though, that service in the Roman army caused Roman soldiers to lose their land. In this view, as Rome’s wars increasingly became overseas wars, soldiers were unable to manage their farms, fell into poverty, and lost their land, which was bought out by wealthy property owners. Other causes of citizen poverty, such as overpopulation, have also been suggested. The demographic and economic conditions of Roman Italy in the second century BCE have been extensively debated (see de Ligt 2012).

For whatever the reason, the Republic lowered the property qualification for recruits from 11,000 to 4,000 *asses* (214 BCE) and subsequently to 1,500 *asses* (140 BCE). This policy was also intended to attract recruits due to the unpopularity of the Spanish Wars in the mid-second century BCE. The Spanish Wars were arduous and offered ordinary soldiers little plunder; the Romans suffered humiliating defeats at the hands of Viriathus and the Numantines, adding to the wars’ unpopularity.

In 133 and 123–122 BCE, Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus, the famous tribunes of the plebs, promoted policies that were intended to increase military manpower by distributing land to poor citizens, enabling them to meet the property qualification for service. The land redistribution program

was unpopular with Rome's wealthy landowners, who stood to lose from it, and in the resulting violent conflicts both Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus lost their lives (133 BCE; 121 BCE). Another method to increase military manpower was needed.

Around 113 BCE, the Germanic Cimbri and Teutones first invaded Transalpine Gaul, a Roman province since 121 BCE. Ferocious warriors, the Cimbri and Teutones were a threat to Italy. They defeated the Romans in several battles, the worst being Arausio in 105 BCE. The resulting manpower losses probably motivated Gaius Marius to recruit the *capite censi* or propertyless Roman citizens (beginning ca. 107–100 BCE), a drastic move that in the long run created legions of soldiers who depended on their commanders for their pay and benefits, including land allotments for veterans. Such armies followed their generals' interests rather than those of the Roman state, though to term the soldiers "clients" of their generals is probably an exaggeration.

The Italians also agitated for the Roman citizenship, finding a champion in the tribune Lucius Appuleius Saturninus, who aided Marius in his first conflict with Sulla. However, the allies did not receive the citizenship at this time. The tribune who also proposed Italian enfranchisement, Marcus Livius Drusus the younger, was assassinated in 91 BCE, touching off the Social War (91–87 BCE) between the Romans and the Italians. The war was ended when the Romans enfranchised the Italians who surrendered to them.

After the Social War, recruitment of the legions spanned Italy and increasingly was drawn from northern Italy (Cisalpine Gaul). The widening of recruitment ensured more effective soldiers, but dissociated soldiers further from the Roman political process; they might know little and care less about Roman politics other than their generals' interests. Recruits in this period (the first century BCE down to about 13 BCE) still served for relatively short periods, six years up to 16 years at a time. Veterans thus might still be young men and willing to serve again, often re-enlisting under their previous general.

With the enfranchisement of Italians, the Roman army needed a new source of cavalry and turned increasingly to non-Italic peoples who were good horsemen and had a strong warlike tradition, first in Cisalpine Gaul (a process that had begun earlier, in the years before the Second Punic War) and then, best known from but preceding Caesar's Gallic Wars, from continental Gaul and Germany. Rome had always recruited client peoples.

These non-Italic mostly cavalry forces were the beginning of the *auxilia* of the Principate.

The volunteer army of Roman and Italian soldiers manned the Caesarian-Pompeian Civil War (49–45 BCE) and the triumviral wars (44–31 BCE). The number of legions swelled to around 60. After 31 BCE, Augustus, the first Roman emperor, faced the challenge of demobilizing many of these soldiers and converting the remaining legions and *auxilia* into a long-service army that would not support civil wars.

Sara E. Phang

See also *Alae Sociorum*; Allies; Augustus; *Auxilia*; *Dilectus*; Divisions of the Army (Imperial); Extraordinary Levies; *Formula Togatorum*; Gaius Gracchus; Legion, Organization of; Marius; Servian Constitution; Social War (91–87 BCE); Tiberius Gracchus

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Religion and Warfare

For Romans during the Republic (509–27 BCE), military success was intimately connected to religious piety. Polybius (ca. 200–118 BCE), a Greek historian and first-hand observer of the Third Punic War (149–146 BCE), asserted that the Romans were superior to everyone in the strength of their religious convictions. According to Livy, Hannibal, the Carthaginian leader in the Second Punic War (218–201 BCE), declared the Romans would control all of Africa, Spain, and Italy because the gods willed it. The Romans performed many rituals, both regular and spontaneous, to maintain the *pax deorum* (gods' peace), which led to military success. The following sections describe Roman gods of war, the rituals in Rome, rites before battles, and the religious and military spaces in Rome.

The Romans worshipped many gods of war. Mars was the war god and crop protector, which reflects the republican ideal of the farmer-soldier. In Rome, he had temples outside the Porta Capena (388 BCE) and in the Circus

Flaminius (133 BCE). The archaic war goddess, Bellona, had a temple on the Campus Martius (296 BCE), where the Senate met recently returned generals and where the fetial priests declared war on distant enemies. Minerva was the tutelary goddess of the arts, but she was depicted as a warrior goddess in the Capitoline triad (Jupiter, Juno, and Minerva). Minerva's syncretism with the Greek goddess Athena strengthened her military aspect. Sometimes the personification of the city of Rome, the goddess Roma, also wore military dress. This goddess did not have a temple in Rome until the reign of the emperor Hadrian (117–138 CE), but she received cult in the Greek world from the second century BCE. Roma's cult allowed allied cities to demonstrate their allegiance to Rome despite rapidly changing politics, especially during the civil wars of the first century BCE.

The Romans also deified abstract military concepts. This practice developed from contact with the Greeks in Magna Graecia (southern Italy and Sicily). The Greek goddess of victory, Nike, thus inspired the Roman goddess Victoria. Victoria received a temple on the Palatine Hill in Rome in 294 BCE. In the late Republic, other gods also gained the title Victor or Invictus (unconquerable). For example, Lucius Mummius, who sacked the Greek city of Corinth in 146 BCE, used the spoils to build a temple to Hercules Victor on the Caelian Hill in Rome; he dedicated this temple in 142 BCE. Victorious generals often used plunder to build temples, reinforcing the association of religion with victory.

Every year, the consuls sacrificed to various gods, including Capitoline Jupiter, to ensure the success of their military campaign. The Salian priests of the war god Mars celebrated the religious opening of the military year, the *Quinquatrus*, in Rome on March 19 and the religious closing ceremonies, the *Armilustrum*, on October 19. This priesthood devoted to Mars was instituted by King Numa Pompilius in the seventh century BCE. The priests' primary function was to guard the *ancilia*, the sacred shields copied from the one given by Jupiter to King Numa. From March 19 to 23, the Salian priests held a festival culminating in the *Tubilustrum*, the polishing of the battle trumpets in preparation for war. On May 23, the priests again held the *Tubilustrum*. Finally, on October 19, the Salian priests held the *Armilustrum*, during which the priests purified the arms before storing them until the next campaign season. These symbolic lustrations were distinct from regular cleaning. Each festival involved a procession in which the priests danced, sang the *Carmen Saliare* (the song of the *Salii*),

and feasted.



Detail from the Column of Trajan (ca. 106–113 CE), depicting a military sacrifice. The emperor as commander-in-chief presided over such sacrifices, which ritually marked the beginning and end of a campaign, purifying the Roman army and promoting victory by assuring divine good will. Located in the Forum of Trajan, Rome, Italy. (Alfredo Dagli Orti/The Art Archive at Art Resource, NY)

To guarantee that the Romans only entered into just wars, the fetial priests ritually declared war on Roman enemies and evaluated the religious aspects of treaties. If a campaign was going badly, the Senate consulted the priests to institute special rituals for the gods, including games to honor the gods, sacrifices in all the temples in Rome, or a *lectisternium* (banquet for the gods). In the Second Punic War (218–201 BCE), the Senate vowed the *ver sacrum* (sacred spring), which required the sacrifice of all livestock born in the spring to Jupiter. Although the Romans made the vow in 217 BCE, they only fulfilled it in 195 BCE. Finally, if the Romans had resolved all military conflicts, they would shut the doors of the temple of Janus in the Roman Forum. Because of the continuous military conflicts the Romans undertook, Janus' doors were only closed once during the Republic: in 235 BCE by the consul Titus Manlius Torquatus.

In the field, Roman priests and generals performed specific battle rituals to ensure the gods' approval of the current war. When a new commander arrived or two legions were joined, the generals purified the army with a ritual procession of animal sacrificial victims around the legions (*lustratio*). Before every battle, the generals sacrificed sometimes multiple victims to ensure the gods' favor for that specific engagement. A *haruspex*, an Etruscan priest and diviner, read the gods' will in the liver of the sacrificed animal. The generals also took special auspices called the *tripudium* in which a bird-keeper fed the sacred chickens grain. If the chickens did not eat, the gods were against the engagement (for example, before the disastrous battle of Drepana in 249 BCE). The Romans also interpreted certain spontaneous omens before a battle as signs of divine ill-favor.

If an engagement was going poorly, a general had several options. The most extreme option was to dedicate himself and the opposing army to the infernal gods. Thus, by his death he would guarantee Roman victory, for example, Publius Decius Mus "devoted" himself in 340 BCE to defeat the Latins, plunging suicidally into the mêlée. Another option to gain divine favor during a siege was to perform an *evocatio*, which persuaded the gods of the enemy to desert their community and seek a better cult in Rome, assuring enemy defeat. The most famous of these vows is the *evocatio* of Juno Regina from the Etruscan city Veii in 396 BCE. During any battle, a general could also vow a temple to the god of his choice. If successful, the general would then build the temple in Rome using the spoils from his victory.

If a battle was successful, the general owed a sacrifice to the gods who assisted him. Quintus Fabius Maximus Rullianus vowed a temple in Rome and all the enemy spoils to Jupiter Victor in his battle against the Samnites and Gauls at Sentinum in 295 BCE. After his victory, he burned the collected enemy armor as an offering to Jupiter. A general could also dedicate spoils in the temples in Rome to advertise his success. The most prestigious dedication was the *spolia opima*, the armor of an enemy leader defeated in single combat. Finally, if the legions had killed more than 5,000 enemy soldiers (the required number varies), the general celebrated a triumphal procession through the center of Rome. The triumph advertised the general's success by displaying spoils and captives to the people in Rome.

Traditional Roman religion, like other polytheisms, emphasized sacred locations and buildings. The army trained and met in its voting assembly,

the *comitia centuriata*, on the Campus Martius (Field of Mars), which lay outside the sacred boundary of Rome near the Tiber River. The main altar to the war god Mars and many of the army's religious monuments stood here, including temples vowed to gods in battle, such as the four small republican temples in the modern Largo di Torre Argentina. These temples advertised the military success and piety of the vowing general often as aid to future elections. Thus, military activity enriched Rome's landscape during the Republic. Similarly, Roman allies also enriched their home cities throughout Italy thanks to their participation in Roman campaigns.

Even as the Romans embellished their own temples through war, the ideal was to respect the enemy temples and gods. According to Appian's *Punic Wars*, when the Roman general Censorinus demanded the Carthaginians abandon their city during the Third Punic War (149–146 BCE), he said he would not harm the temples there when he destroyed the rest of the city. Although a certain amount of plunder was acceptable, generals who took too much from enemy temples could be put on trial. Despite this ideal, the spoils from many enemy temples beautified the temples in Rome. The overall goal for the Romans was to maintain the *pax deorum* (approval of the gods) so that they might continue to be successful in war.

In the Principate, emperors and generals continued to carry out traditional rituals of military religion, seen on the Column of Trajan where Trajan officiates at sacrifices intended to purify the Roman army. The new feature of military religion was the imperial cult. Soldiers not only took oaths to the emperor, they venerated his images carried on special standards, and they celebrated the day of his accession and other imperial holidays recorded in the *Feriale Duranum*, a calendar of military holidays from a Roman auxiliary unit at Dura-Europos in the early third century CE. Soldiers' religion also broadened in scope beyond the traditional state religion of Rome, which many, recruited from outside Roman Italy, may have been unfamiliar with. Pagan cults from many areas of the Roman Empire flourished in the Roman army, including the cult of Mithras, a Near Eastern deity associated with light and whose cult featured a complex hierarchy of initiations.

Amanda J. Coles

See also Campus Martius; Devotio; Fetiales; Ius fetiale; Janus, Temple of; Mars; Pomerium; Portents; Triumph

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Republic, Political Structure

The classical Roman Republic, *res publica*, maintained an unwritten, seemingly "balanced" constitution that distributed power between the various elements of the polity. Developed over the fourth and third centuries BCE, and pertaining most to the period from the First Punic War (264 BCE) to the Gracchi (133), this constitution incorporated monarchic, aristocratic, and democratic elements, working together and in opposition to create stability and balance (Polybius 6.3). Not all Roman citizens had equal power or responsibility, but the Roman political structure required the direct participation of its citizens. It should be remembered that Polybius' and the following description are a reconstruction, which evolved over time; the existence of features of the classical Republic in the earlier period (fifth and fourth centuries BCE) has been fiercely debated by modern scholars.

Polybius dubbed the annually elected consuls, the chief executives and commander-in-chiefs, the "monarchic" element of the constitution because they held powers similar to kings, if in a limited fashion. Indeed, the foundation myths of Rome often feature the theme of one unjust monarch being overthrown by a pair of champions, such as Romulus and Remus, who then take his place. The two consuls held *imperium* (the power to command) and *auspicium* (the power to consult the gods through ritual divination). With *imperium* went *coercitio*, the power to coerce or impose punishment. They commanded the military outside the sacred boundary of Rome (*pomerium*) and kept order within it. They could enforce existing laws and

introduce new ones to the citizen assemblies. They wore togas trimmed in purple and sat in special chairs inlaid with ivory, reminiscent of earlier kings.

However, the powers of the executive consuls were restricted by built-in features of the Republic. The consuls were elected yearly by the citizens. In office, each consul held the power of veto and could thereby limit the other's power. The consuls and other office holders typically served one year terms and dealt with each other, as well as other elected officials, face-to-face, as Rome had no bureaucracy in the modern sense. Senior magistrates had *apparitores*, staff who handled paperwork, but these functionaries lacked formal authority. Competition for office holding, both magistracies and priesthoods, could be fierce. Those with political aspirations were expected to run for and achieve lower offices first, proceeding upward in the *cursus honorum*, in traditional succession before attempting the top offices of consul and censor. If an office holder was found to have abused his position of power while in office, the Roman Senate could investigate and bring charges of wrongdoing against him.

The Roman Senate was from its beginnings an advisory body, traditionally made up of the leading men of the founding families of Rome. The Senate is the "aristocratic" element in Polybius' analysis of the Roman constitution. In the Republic, the Senate had no legislative power as a body, but exercised great authority: *auctoritas*. Membership in the Senate was determined not by popular election but by a ranking of the leading men of Rome conducted by the popularly elected censors every five years. To make the "cut," a senator had to be among the top 300 (or more) men of Rome based on wealth, military service, moral character, and success in running for political office (the minimum rank of quaestor was required). A senator served for life unless the censors determined that he was deficient in wealth or character. Being removed from the ranks of the Senate was a mark of shame for the former senator and his family. During the third and second centuries, the Senate grew in power and authority, becoming influential in religious matters, supervising the state's finances and foreign affairs. Because members tended to serve for life, the Senate became one of the few well-defined political and social groups in Roman society. Despite this, its members often worked at cross purposes, competing for offices, courting the voting public.

The democratic element identified by Polybius resided in the various

voting assemblies. Roman citizens came together at the city of Rome to vote for office holders, vote for laws, vote to condemn or acquit citizens accused of capital crimes, vote on declarations of war and peace, and form juries for public trials. Voting took place over the course of a single day. Citizens were represented by centuries instead of voting directly, but Roman citizens gathered to listen and debate the issues placed before them. Roman citizens could express their displeasure with the state of affairs at Rome in such assemblies but participation was limited in many ways. The people could not introduce legislation themselves, for example. Voting was not by individual, *per se*, but by groups. The centuriate assembly (*comitia centuriata*) voted by century—not by individuals—with each century having one vote. Voters were arranged in centuries by the censors, with the oldest and wealthiest citizens occupying the first centuries to cast their votes. In practice, this gave older and wealthier elements in Roman society more influence, and the vote was likely to be decided before the poorest had their chance to vote.

The tribal assembly (*comitia tributa*) voted by tribe; there were 35 in all. The urban tribes had more sway than the rural tribes given their proximity to the city. Those living in or near the city often carried more weight in the assemblies and in the state. The original *concilium plebis* had excluded patricians. In some scholars' view, after plebeians gained access to the normal magistracies and the tribunes of the plebs became a mainstream magistracy, the *concilium plebis* or plebeian assembly merged with the *comitia tributa*. Others argue that the *concilium plebis* remained separate, restricted to plebeians and convened by the tribunes, even though its legislation, the *plebiscita*, was binding on all Romans.

SPQR: The Senate and People of Rome ruled the Republic. The political institutions of the Roman Republic favored those members of society who had the wealth and leisure to campaign for office and serve in unpaid leadership positions. The system also favored those voters who had the time and the ability to come to Rome on election day. While the elite in society exercised more power, the whole of the citizen body had the opportunity to participate. The Roman Senate held the most influence and perhaps the most power of any institution in the Republic. The members' wealth, political and military experience, and sense of unity offered the best avenue for leadership and power. However, the competition for offices, military campaigns, and family honor, combined with a genuine desire to support

the Republic and her people, were often at odds with the body's charge to advise the leaders of state in the best interests of the state. Over time, the strains of gaining and governing a territorial empire tested and bested this once elegant balance of monarchic, aristocratic and democratic elements, giving way to the Principate.

Cheryl L. Golden

See also *Comitia Centuriata*; Consul; *Cursus Honorum* (Republic); Dictator; *Equites*, Equestrians; Overthrow of the Monarchy; Patrician-Plebeian Conflict; Polybius; Praetor; Quaestor; Senate, Senators; Tribune of the Plebs; Triumph

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Res Gestae Divi Augusti

The *Res Gestae Divi Augusti* (RGDA), “Achievements of the Deified Augustus,” was composed by Augustus or his secretaries probably during the last months of his life. It was read out to the Senate at its first meeting after his death, and then displayed as an inscription outside his Mausoleum at Rome. The inscription at Rome has not survived, but virtually the whole text has been reconstructed from three copies found in Galatia in Asia Minor. A version in Greek and Latin was displayed on the walls of the Temple of Rome and Augustus in the provincial capital at Ancyra; a copy in Latin was inscribed on a monumental gateway celebrating Rome's conquests in Pisidian Antioch; and a Greek version was displayed upon a large base bearing statues of members of the imperial family at Apollonia. The Greek translation softens the imperialist tone of the Latin original, perhaps in recognition of the different attitude toward Roman rule to be

found in the newly conquered province of Galatia.

The heading of the text declares: “Below is a copy of the achievements (*res gestae*) of the deified Augustus, by which he made the world subject to the rule of the Roman people, and of the expenses which he incurred for the state and people of Rome.” Speaking in the first person, Augustus emphasizes his military achievements—by pacifying the whole world by land and sea, he implicitly surpassed even Alexander the Great—and the large expenditures he made as a result of his conquests. His foreign conquests, especially his defeat of Cleopatra VII at Actium, were key to his financial security, allowing him to undertake a vast building program in the city of Rome, invest in the city’s grain supply, and make cash donatives to its population. The *RGDA* delineates Augustus’ unique relationship to the army, as he molded for himself a role as commander-in-chief of Rome’s military forces: soldiers swore their oaths of loyalty to him; veterans received land on retirement or payments from his own funds; cash donatives marked his triple triumph; troops hailed him as *imperator* 21 times. Unequivocally, the Augustan era is represented as a golden age of peace and prosperity, attributed to the personal achievements of Augustus himself, marked by the closing of the gates of Janus. The *RGDA* is a document of imperial propaganda; this representation should not be accepted at face value.

The *RGDA* starts with the civil wars in the aftermath of Julius Caesar’s assassination. Augustus states, “I liberated the *res publica* from the tyranny of a faction,” depicting his younger self’s illegal raising of a private army as an act of liberation. The *RGDA* mentions Octavian’s victory at Philippi and his clemency toward Roman citizens, but ignores Antony’s crucial role at Philippi and Octavian’s ruthless proscriptions and reputation for cruelty in this period. The second half of the text deals with Augustus’ foreign conquests, describing how peoples from beyond the limits of the empire—including Britain and India—requested friendship with Rome. The *RGDA* gives a positive gloss to the Augustan campaign in Arabia, described by a contemporary, Strabo, as a dismal failure. The *RGDA* also minimizes problems in the client kingdom of Armenia and tensions with Persia which continued beyond Augustus’ death. Nonetheless, the *RGDA* is a central document in the study of the reign of Augustus and of the transition from Republic to Principate.

Alison E. Cooley

See also Augustus; Acclamations; *Aerarium Militare*; *Ara Pacis*; Civil Wars (II) (44–31 BCE); *Clementia*; Emperor as Commander; Emperor as Patron; *Imperator*; Imperialism; Inscriptions; Military Oaths; Octavian; Pay and Finances, Military (Imperial); Pay and Finances, Military (Republic); *Praemia Militiae*; Triumph; Veteran Settlement; Victory

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Resistance to Draft

For much of the Roman Republic, the consuls could rely upon volunteers to provide both experienced and new recruits to fill the ranks of the citizen army needed for each year's campaigning. Military service was a responsibility of Roman male citizens. As the demands of governing a territorial empire and year round campaigning set in (beginning as early as the third century BCE), our sources begin to indicate that Roman citizens were reluctant to serve in troublesome regions (such as Spain) where the fighting was prolonged, victories less certain, and plunder difficult to obtain. The traditional *dilectus* (which was a "selection," not mass conscription) resulted in a shortfall of troops, causing the property qualification for service to be lowered even before Marius eliminated it in 107 BCE. Mass conscription in an emergency, the *tumultus*, was rarer and could be required in response to an extraordinary military challenge or disaster (such as the Varian disaster, 9 CE). Those unwilling to be called up could provide substitutes (*vicarii*). Augustus sold an equestrian into slavery who cut off his sons' thumbs to prevent their being called up for service (Suetonius, *Augustus* 24). Conscriptions were hugely unpopular in Italy during the imperial era; emperors rarely used them. In the later Roman Empire, punishment for those who resisted conscription became harsher. At no time do Roman citizens appear to have resisted conscription out of principle (as in modern conscientious objection).

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See also Dilectus; Recruitment of Army (Imperial); Recruitment of Army (Republic); Spanish Wars

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Revolt

Two types of revolt are apparent: one type of revolt was instigated by a would-be emperor, who might win a civil war and become a successful usurper; the other type did not seek to install a new emperor, but was motivated by provincial subjects' dissatisfaction with Roman rule. This article concerns the second type, provincial resistance (for the first type, see "Usurpation").

Examples of anti-Roman provincial revolts are the Pannonian revolt of 6–9 CE, the Varian disaster of 9 CE, the British revolt of 60/61, the Batavian-Gallic revolt of 69–70, and most famously, the Jewish War of 66–70 (sometimes called the First Jewish War to distinguish it from the Bar Kochba revolt of 132–135, the Second Jewish War). In these provincial revolts, several patterns stand out. First, the provincial subjects had been conquered relatively recently; this applies to all these instances except the Jewish Wars and the Gallic revolt of 69–70. Second, the new subjects resented Roman maladministration, taxation, or conscription. Third, local native aristocrats emerged as leaders, but they had no desire or ability to become Roman emperors because of their hatred of Rome and because of their relatively low status and ethnic origins. Fourth, many of these leaders had served in the Roman army, typically in the *auxilia*, as was the case with Bato of the Daesitiates (a leader of the Pannonian Revolt), Arminius and his brother Flavus (leaders of the Varian disaster or German revolt), and Julius Civilis, Julius Classicus and Julius Tutor (leaders of the Gallic revolt). They acquired a working knowledge of Roman military strategy, tactics, logistics, and leadership which they applied to their rebel armies. Exceptions also

stand out: the British revolt (60/61 CE) was allegedly led by Queen Boudicca of the Iceni, and the Jewish War and Bar Kochba revolt were partly motivated by religious conflict.

Because these accounts of provincial revolts invariably (with the exception of Jewish sources) are written by Greco-Roman authors, they pose major problems of framing and interpretation. Postcolonial approaches to the Roman Empire have questioned and sought to deconstruct the imperial production of knowledge about Rome's enemies. The *topos* that veterans of the *auxilia* defect and lead revolts is particularly interesting. The interpretation of other forms of evidence, documentary or archaeological, for evidence of provincial resistance is another approach to provincial revolt.

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See also Arminius; Bar Kochba Revolt; Boudicca; British Revolt; Gallic Revolt; Jewish War; Pannonian Revolt; Usurpation; Varian Disaster

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Rhine (River)

The River Rhine, 1,230 kilometers or approximately 765 miles in length, runs northward from the Swiss Alps to the North Sea. In Roman antiquity, the Rhine (Rhenus) became the de facto northern border of the Roman Empire with barbarian Germany. The Rhine was a major transport route for the Roman army and for civilian shipping, and many important legionary bases were built on the river.

In his *Gallic Wars*, Julius Caesar relates his expeditions across the Rhine

and his bridging of the river, a triumph of Roman engineering and of the labor of his soldiers (*Gallic Wars* 4.39). However, in the Augustan period Augustus' general Drusus advanced the Roman frontier eastward to the Elbe (Albis). The Rhine-Meuse-Scheldt delta was not easy to navigate, so Drusus also constructed a canal, the *fossa Drusiana*, connecting the Rhine with the IJssel and thus with the North Sea. In 47 CE, Domitius Corbulo constructed another canal, the *fossa Corbulonis*, connecting the Rhine with the Meuse.

After Drusus' death and after the Varian disaster (9 CE), the Romans withdrew the German frontier to the Rhine, where it remained despite Germanicus' punitive expedition into Germany where he defeated Arminius in 16 CE. However, the Rhine must not be considered a rigid, linear barrier separating Rome from barbarian Germany. The Romans needed to operate on both banks of the Rhine and extended Roman control eastward into German territory. The "provinces" of Upper and Lower Germany, formally constituted in Flavian times, were restricted to the Rhineland.

The Rhine was patrolled by a fleet, the *classis Germanica*, based at Cologne, that provided heavy transport for troops and supplies and that also kept watch along the river. Civilian shipping also employed the Rhine as a major waterway. Legionary bases on the Rhine grew up into major settlements, some of which, such as Bonn, Colonia Claudia Ara Agrippinensium (Cologne/Köln), Mogontiacum (Mainz am Rhein), and Nijmegen, are important cities today.

Sara E. Phang

See also Arminius; Caesar, Gaius Julius; Drusus; Frontiers; Germanic Wars; Varian Disaster

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Rhine and Pannonian Mutinies (14 CE)

In 14 CE, legions posted along the lower Rhine River and in the province of Pannonia mutinied simultaneously. Although the mutineers in both camps were unconnected, the incidents were triggered by the death of Augustus

and shared the same underlying causes—terms of service. The incidents are highly informative of Roman responses to military unrest. Once resolved, these were the last large-scale mutinies for at least 50 years.

Augustus, the first emperor of Rome, died in August of 14 CE. At the time the legions assigned to Pannonia (VIII, IX, and XV) were gathered together for summer duties. As soon as the news reached Quintus Iunius Blaesus, the commander of the assembled legions, he declared a break of several days from standard camp duties for the men to rest and honor Augustus. During this break, some of the soldiers began grumbling about conditions and gathered to complain. Soon a mutiny erupted among members of all three legions. Blaesus responded by trying to calm down the men. Although he was unable to stop the mutiny entirely he did get the men to pause long enough to send envoys to Rome and await their return. While the envoys were gone the mutiny in Pannonia flared up again and turned violent resulting in the death of a centurion and some pillaging of the local area. Despite this violence the mutinous legions mostly remained in the camp, an indication that they did not seek to desert or revolt, but wanted to secure legal discharge with the promised cash bonuses.

Nearly simultaneously with events in Pannonia, the four legions assigned to the lower Rhine River (I, V, XX, and XXI) also mutinied. As with Pannonia, the four legions were assembled together in a summer camp to complete seasonal operations. The camp was under the command of Aulus Caecina Severus, legate in the region. When he received news of Augustus' death he also gave his men a couple days' break from standard duties so that they could mourn the death and celebrate the new emperor. During this rest period the mutiny erupted over the conditions of service, a grievance that seems already to have been an issue among the legionaries, and over the rapacity of certain centurions. This mutiny turned violent immediately as the soldiers attacked selected centurions, killing at least one and expelling them from the camp. The soldiers did not attack the commander or the higher-ranking officers or civilians. They also did not pillage the local area, but demanded to send envoys to Rome. As in Pannonia, the super-annuated legionaries wanted release from service after 16 years under the terms in effect when they had enlisted and replacement of some centurions. The legions maintained a form of order in camp and did not desert the fort.

The release from normal duties may have been the trigger for these

outbreaks, but it was not their cause. Primarily, the mutineers sought restoration of the conditions under which they were enlisted, especially honorable discharge after 16 years with a cash bounty, as originally promised (Tacitus, *Annals* 1.26.1). When Augustus had established in 13 BCE regular, lengthy army service he promised to release soldiers after 16 years with a cash bonus, *praemia*. None of our sources suggest that continued service as reserves was expected. According to the *Res Gestae Divi Augusti* (16.2), he paid these bonuses in 7, 6, 4, 3, and 2 BCE. When in 5 CE Augustus reformed the terms of enlistment he extended the length of service to 20 years and increased the *praemia*, but also added five years additional service as reserves for all retired soldiers (Dio 55.23.1). It appears from our sources (Tacitus, *Annals* 1.17.2–6, 26, 31; Dio 57.5.4) that men were not being discharged on schedule, and this had been the primary cause of mutiny in both legionary camps.

Tacitus also reports (*Annals* 1.17.4) that in Pannonia an additional grievance was that discharged men received poor quality land instead of cash. Augustus had created a new military treasury in 6 CE (*RGDA* 17.2; Dio 55.24.9) to pay the soldiers' retirement bounties. This treasury had apparently run into financial difficulties and had been unable to fund all the retirements. The stopgap solution was to retain soldiers past their normal discharge, decreasing the number of veteran candidates for *praemia* through natural attrition. The other solution was to grant marginal land, which displeased the soldiers. In addition to restoring the conditions under which they had enlisted, the soldiers wanted immediate discharge for men who had served their full time. In the case of the Rhine mutiny they also demanded the replacement of certain cruel or corrupt centurions. The two mutinies shared the same cause, but were entirely separate and uncoordinated.

The new emperor, Tiberius, was a seasoned commander, but had his hands full in Rome with the transition and so ordered his nephew Germanicus and son Drusus to take care of the mutinies. Germanicus, adopted son of Tiberius and commander of the legions in Gaul and on the Rhine, was already in Gaul and so went to the mutiny on the Rhine. Germanicus found the mutineers unsympathetic, but peaceful. In an impromptu assembly (*contio*) the soldiers made en masse demands (*acclamatio*) and threatened to raid the countryside and march on Rome. After a botched effort at quick resolution in which he tried to deceive them

with a fake letter from Tiberius, Germanicus was able to conciliate the soldiers sufficiently to return them to obedience. He did so by promising to meet their reasonable demands for discharge if they would return to service. The men took the oath (*sacramentum*) to Tiberius and dispersed to their two winter forts. Germanicus then went up the Rhine to make sure the legions upriver were settled.

Drusus went, accompanied by Aelius Sejanus and two cohorts of praetorians, from Rome to resolve the Pannonian mutiny. Drusus found the mutineers agitated and met with no luck negotiating initially. But a full lunar eclipse, frightening the superstitious soldiers, soon after he arrived provided an opportunity to turn the tables on the ringleaders by swaying some wavering soldiers over to his side. With the support of more men Drusus had the praetorian cavalry surround the camp as he moved against the ringleaders and violently put down the mutiny. Once he had restored order he may have discharged the remaining superannuated soldiers and after issuing a new military oath dispersed the legions to separate winter quarters. The Pannonian mutiny was thus resolved completely.

Events in Lower Germany, however, were less settled. After Germanicus returned to the Lower Rhine legions, he discovered they remained agitated. A new mutiny erupted in his own camp at Ara Ubiorum where legions I and XX were stationed. The Senate had sent representatives to the camp to inform Germanicus his authority had been extended. They had been sent out before news of the original mutiny had reached Rome. Members of legion I, fearing that the envoys had arrived to rescind Germanicus' promises, rioted in camp. Because Germanicus had issued a new oath to the legions after the previous violence, this outburst was effectively a new mutiny. Germanicus addressed his men the next day. Realizing the legions were still restive, he sent the noncombatants away, a clear signal that he intended to use violence to restore order. As a result, the mutineers lost heart and Germanicus was able to seize the initiative with support of sufficient loyal men. The recently mutinous legion then suffered a self-inflicted punishment similar to decimation as they had to judge and execute their fellow soldiers.

Having restored order at Ara Ubiorum, Germanicus turned to Vetera where a new mutiny had also erupted among the two legions (V and XXI) under the command of Caecina Severus. Germanicus gathered *auxilia* with the legions and marched on the camp with a considerable force. Caecina,

ordered to resolve the mutiny before Germanicus arrived, moved against the ringleaders violently with considerable casualties. With the violence completed, the mutinies along the Rhine were resolved.

Afterward, Germanicus led the formerly mutinous legions on campaign across the Rhine. They raided and pillaged local tribes and then withdrew back across the Rhine. The campaign gave the survivors a chance to prove their valor and discipline while rebuilding unit cohesion. It also reasserted Germanicus' control of the units and Caecina's role as a commander. After this campaign, order was restored, and Germanicus returned the legions to their respective winter quarters. The mutiny was resolved.

Although both mutinies occurred at roughly the same time and for similar reasons, there is no indication that the mutinies were in any way coordinated or connected directly. The triggering incident for both incidents was the relaxation of normal discipline following the death of Augustus. The fact that mutinies occurred among no other legions in 14 CE is probably a function of Caecina's and Blaesus' decision to relax discipline. Both incidents followed a similar course not only because of how our sources narrate them, but because such collective unrest often follows the same general pattern or stages.

In the aftermath, once all the long-service veterans had been discharged and the bounties paid out to these two sets of legions, Tiberius canceled Germanicus' promises of 16 years' service on account of the expense and the difficulty in finding sufficient volunteers. Although it may seem like a risky decision given the size of the mutinies, there were no further mutinies over length of service for more than a century, and there would not be another large-scale mutiny for more than 50 years. Despite the size of these incidents, they did not cause harm to the empire or the military because they were handled quickly and resolved completely.

Lee L. Brice

See also Aerarium Militare; Augustus; Germanicus; Legate; Legion, Organization of; Military Discipline; Military Oaths; Mutiny; Praemia Militiae; Praetorians; Tacitus; Tiberius (Emperor); Veteran Settlement

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Ricimer (d. 472 CE)

Flavius Ricimer, supreme commander of the western Roman army in Italy (457–472), was notable for elevating and deposing many of the last emperors of the western empire. He was born into a royal family of Visigoths and Suebi in 418. Despite his highborn barbarian background, Ricimer’s career was exclusively Roman. His early prominence probably started under Aetius, whom he served with his future colleague Majorian. Ricimer is first attested as a senior general (*comes*) during the short reign of Avitus (455–456). Ricimer defeated the Vandals at Agrigentum in Sicily in 456 and succeeded in ambushing a Vandal fleet of 60 ships near Corsica the same year. Avitus’ Gallic background and reliance on Visigothic allies made him unpopular in Italy, and the Italian field army revolted with Majorian and Ricimer as its commanders. Both men defeated Avitus near Placentia in October 456 and deposed the emperor afterward. Ricimer was awarded the honor of Patrician and the position of *magister utriusque militiae* by Majorian. While Majorian campaigned as emperor in different provinces, Ricimer remained in Italy where he fostered strong ties with the senatorial aristocracy. After the failure of Majorian’s campaign against Vandal Africa, Ricimer turned on Majorian. He had Majorian executed and elevated his puppet emperor Libius Severus (461–465). Imperial armies in Gaul and

Dalmatia refused to accept Severus, but Ricimer exploited alliances with Visigoths and Burgundians to ward off a potential counter-offensive from Gaul, while employing diplomatic ties with Constantinople to defuse the Dalmatian crisis. During Severus' reign, Ricimer defeated an incursion of Alans in northern Italy. When Severus died, allegedly poisoned by Ricimer, Ricimer governed Italy on his own authority for 18 months. Eventually Ricimer accepted Anthemius as western Roman emperor in 467, as a compromise with the eastern empire to receive military support against the Vandals. Anthemius was the choice of the eastern emperor Leo, as an experienced commander who had served in Illyricum and had a respectable aristocratic pedigree. To secure ties between both men, Ricimer married Anthemius' daughter Alipia.

Anthemius and Leo began a campaign to reconquer Vandal Africa, but Ricimer did not participate in the campaign, which ended as a massive fiasco in 468. Ricimer became increasingly disgruntled with Anthemius and retreated to Milan with his army in 470, while the emperor resided in Rome. An uneasy truce was struck between both contenders which lasted for a year. Ultimately, both men fell out again and Ricimer laid siege to Rome in 472. Anthemius called upon reinforcements from Gaul who were intercepted and defeated by Ricimer. Ricimer then proclaimed the western senator Olybrius as emperor and had Anthemius executed after capturing Rome on July 11, 472. Neither Ricimer nor Olybrius lived long to enjoy their victory; both died from natural causes soon afterward. Ricimer was an Arian Christian (the most widespread heresy of the time) and endowed the church of Saint Agata dei Goti at Rome. Sidonius Apollinaris calls Ricimer "unconquered" (*invictus*) and there is indeed no reference to Ricimer having ever lost a battle (Sidonius, *Second Panegyric*, 352).

The representation of Ricimer in Roman sources is predominantly negative, due to his barbarian background and elevation of and deposition of emperors. His policies were predominantly aimed at the defense of Italy, in which he was relatively successful. However, Ricimer's violent opposition to western Roman emperors who wished to pursue independent policies accelerated the disintegration of imperial rule in Western Europe outside Italy.

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See also Aetius; Fall of the Roman Empire (West); Majorian; Usurpation

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Roman Citizen Colonies

Roman citizen colonies were created by the Roman state during the Roman Republic. They were small settlements, with no more than 300 colonists. The settlers were Roman citizens and retained the Roman citizenship; Latins and allies could only join such colonies after the Second Punic War. At the time of the foundation, all settlers received small parcel of land, probably two *iugera* (0.5 hectares).

These colonies were usually placed on the Italian coast, and were crucial for Roman defense strategy: as coastguard stations, they had to watch the most important approaches into the peninsula. Many Roman colonies were established during the First Punic War, at which time naval attacks were a serious possibility. To make sure that the colonies remained up to strength, the colonists were given an exemption from normal military service. From the Second Punic War onward, they were forbidden to stay away from the colony for more than 30 days in a row.

After the Second Punic War a new type of Roman citizen colony was established, which contained 2,000 settlers per colony, who received slightly larger parcels of land; these were no longer exclusively settled on the coast. This change intended to make joining a colony more attractive: colonists had to be offered larger plots and be able to retain their citizenship. At the same time the threat to the Italian coast was less pronounced, so that colonization now increasingly functioned as a mechanism for poor relief rather than a military strategy.

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See also Civis Romanus; Latin Colonies; Veterans (Status)

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Rome (City)

The city of Rome centers on the fabled “seven hills of Rome,” the Quirinal, Viminal, Esquiline, Caelian, Palatine, Capitoline, and Aventine, that thrust up out of the Tiber River flood plain. The site enables the fording of the Tiber and hence was settled since earliest times (eighth and seventh centuries BCE), the early inhabitants occupying the tops of the hills rather than the swampy and unhealthy valleys. The height difference between the hills and valleys was greater than today because millennia of continued occupation have raised the valley floors and the first-century CE buildings are now below street level.

In the late seventh century BCE, the Romans constructed drains to convert the waterlogged central valley into the Forum, in early Rome a meeting place and market place lacking the splendid buildings later associated with it. Public works in mid-republican Rome emphasized aqueducts that brought clean spring water from the neighboring highlands to the city, enabling the population to grow. The Tiber remained prone to flooding (the embankments that now constrain the Tiber are nineteenth-century works) and wealthier people still preferred to inhabit the hills such as the Palatine, poorer citizens inhabiting the valleys. By the first century CE, Rome had grown to approximately a million inhabitants, the largest city in western Europe before London in the late eighteenth century.

In the Republic, the city of Rome was the center of political life and state religion. Assemblies and debates (*comitiae*, *contiones*), deliberations of the Senate, and elections occurred at Rome; as the population of Roman

citizens in and outside Italy grew, their participation in the political process declined because most could not travel to the city to vote. The state religion, particularly the cults of Jupiter Optimus Maximus, Juno, and Minerva, were based at Rome, with their temples on the Capitoline Hill. Roman cities in the provinces reproduced many of these institutions, cities with temples, forums, and baths becoming symbols of the empire to its subjects.

The city of Rome was also a center of conflict. The concept of the city was intended to exclude armed conflict; the city was surrounded by a ritual boundary, the *pomerium*, which could not be entered by soldiers under arms. The army was mustered outside the *pomerium*, and only a triumphing general and his soldiers were permitted to breach the *pomerium* to hold the triumph ceremony.

Nonetheless urban violence broke out from time to time. In the early Republic, during the patrician-plebeian conflict, the *plebs* repeatedly seceded (took flight to) the Aventine Hill, then relatively remote, and there held their own assemblies and elected their own magistrates, the aediles and tribunes of the plebs. The incorporation of the *concilium plebis* and the aediles and tribunes of the plebs into the mainstream Roman political system meant that the Aventine was no longer an alternate location of power.

In the late Republic, conflicts came to a head with outbreaks of violence, most notably the lynching of Tiberius Gracchus and his followers (133 BCE), followed by the destruction of Gaius Gracchus and his followers in 121, who had followed ancient tradition and occupied the Aventine Hill, where they were besieged. Tribunes such as Lucius Appuleius Saturninus and Publius Clodius Pulcher fomented mob violence and were themselves assassinated. Violent conflict was legitimated by the Senate's creation of states of emergency, such as the *senatus consultum ultimum* (SCU), a decree that suspended normal restrictions on the power of magistrates. A state of emergency was declared against the attempted conspiracy of Catiline (63 BCE).

However, the worst violence in late Republican Rome was the product of civil war, beginning with the conflict of the Marians and Sulla. Sulla's capture of Rome in 88 and 82 marked the entry of a conquering Roman army into the *Urbs*. Sulla's proscriptions created a reign of terror for their victims. The civil war of Caesar and the Pompeians, and the war of Caesar's heir Octavian with the "Liberators," did not threaten the city of Rome

directly, but did not need to; the memory of Sulla lived on, revived when the Second Triumvirate began proscribing their enemies (43–42). The peace that Augustus emphasized was specifically the cessation of civil war.

Shrewd politicians in the late Republic, and the emperors in the Principate, sought to reduce social and political conflict in the city of Rome, as violent conflict was dangerous in a densely inhabited city (prone to fire). Gaius Gracchus instituted a grain ration at a fixed price for poor adult male citizens; the tribune Clodius Pulcher made it free in 58 BCE. Augustus fixed the recipients of the grain ration at 200,000; olive oil was added to the dole by Septimius Severus (193–211 CE) and Aurelian (270–275) changed the grain ration to bread and added pork. These rations were probably not sufficient to support entire families, who continued to depend on gifts from patrons and on whatever earning power individual members possessed.

To maintain public order, the Republic had relied on only a few magistrates, the aediles and junior magistrates such as the *tresviri capitales*. These probably used slave or freedmen dependents as police. The popular agitators of the late Republic had collected gangs of followers whose clashes contributed to public violence. Augustus created the Praetorian Guard, urban cohorts, and *vigiles* to maintain a military presence in the city and maintain public order (though they probably were not a police force in the modern sense of also investigating crime). Though the urban troops did not openly carry weapons, thus upholding the ancient ritual prohibition on weapons within the *pomerium*, nonetheless they were a constant reminder that the emperor's power depended on military force. The praetorians, however, proved a new source of conflict, learning that they could elevate and assassinate emperors, beginning with the assassination of Gaius and elevation of Claudius (41 CE), continuing with the assassination of Galba and elevation of Otho (69), and later the assassination of Pertinax and “auction of the empire” (193).

Elaborate building programs advertised the power of Roman warlords of the late Republic and of Roman emperors, perhaps assisting to defuse conflict by emphasizing legitimacy. Such projects, which might take years, also provided work for Rome's inhabitants. These triumphal monuments, including the Forum of Augustus, the Arch of Titus, the Column of Trajan, and the Column of Marcus Aurelius, emphasized the victories of Rome over external enemies. Though Augustus built a Temple of Mars Ultor (Mars the Avenger) to emphasize his role in avenging Julius Caesar's assassination, he

also built the *Ara Pacis Augustae* (Altar of Augustan Peace).

However, the wrong kind of building could alienate the Romans. The Great Fire of 64 CE burned large areas of the city. After the fire, the emperor Nero (54–68) took advantage of the destruction by building the Domus Aurea, a huge palace complex, which did not endear him further to his subjects.

Long the symbolic center of the empire, a center of trade, immigration, and culture, Rome began to decline as the center of the empire when the emperors no longer visited it. From the late second century CE onward, emperors were frequently away on campaign in the provinces. The emperors of the mid- and late-third century onward hardly ever visited Rome, preferring instead to develop provincial capitals that were nearer the frontiers. Constantine I (306–337) founded the most famous new capital, Constantinople, which survived the fall of Rome and the western empire. Late antique Rome continued to be governed by the Senate and by the city prefect (*praefectus urbi*), a senior official of senatorial rank; when Christianity became legitimate, the bishop of Rome (later the Pope) also became influential. The sack of Rome by the Goths in 410 CE stunned the inhabitants of the Roman Empire, but did not by itself cripple an empire which center(s) of power had shifted elsewhere.

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See also Ara Pacis; Arch of Titus; Augustus; Aurelian; Civil Conflict (Late Republic); Clodius Pulcher; Column of Marcus Aurelius; Column of Trajan; Constantine I; Constantinople; Gaius Gracchus; Marian-Sullan Conflict; Patrician-Plebeian Conflict; *Pomerium*; Praetorians; Proscriptions; Public Order; Septimius Severus; States of Emergency; Sulla, Lucius Cornelius; Tiberius Gracchus; Trajan; Triumph; Victory

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Rome (History)

Rome's origins as a small settlement in central Italy are rooted in myth and legend; the Roman monarchy (ca. 753–510 BCE) was supposedly founded by Romulus and Remus, twin brothers and descendants from the mythological Aeneas, a refugee from the Trojan War. The monarchy was overthrown in 510 by the founders of the Republic to avenge wrongs by the last king, Tarquin the Proud, and his son. This period is mainly legendary, rendered most famously by the Latin historian Livy (59 BCE–17 CE).

The Roman Republic, employing a strategy of allying with the peoples it conquered and using them as manpower in subsequent wars, conquered first its neighbors, the Latins and Etruscans, and then central and southern Italy and northern Italy (termed “Cisalpine Gaul”). Rome's first oversea challenger was Carthage, a major maritime and commercial empire based in what is now Tunisia in North Africa. The First Punic War (264–241 BCE) ended in a draw and a treaty for both states. Carthage employed mercenaries for its army, led by the male members of Carthaginian families with a tradition of such leadership. Hannibal Barca was one of these leaders. In the Second Punic War (218–201 BCE), Hannibal led Carthage's attack against Rome on land, invading Italy from the north and inflicting several stunning defeats (the worst being Cannae, 216 BCE) on the Romans. The Romans, however, were not easily defeated. Fabius Maximus, termed Cunctator (“Delayer”), employed a strategy of attrition on the Carthaginians in Italy; Cornelius Scipio, later surnamed Africanus, attacked Carthaginian possessions in Spain and drew Hannibal away from Italy to North Africa, where he defeated Hannibal in the battle of Zama (202 BCE). Rome imposed harsh treaties on Carthage as a result of the war, but proceeded in the Third Punic War (149–146 BCE) to destroy her already weakened rival completely.

In the second and first centuries BCE, Rome came into conflict with the Hellenistic monarchies, first Macedon, which at this time controlled Greece. The Romans claimed to liberate the Greeks from their Macedonian overlords, but in fact added Greece to their possessions. They proceeded to conquer the Hellenistic Near East, goaded by the resistance of local monarchs such as Mithridates VI of Pontus (in northern Turkey). Immense wealth flooded into Rome as a result, but it failed to enrich all strata equally: the elite benefited while the middle strata, from which Rome's soldiers were recruited, received much less wealth, some falling below the

property qualification required for the recruitment of soldiers. Around 107 BCE, Gaius Marius, one of the late Republic's most successful commanders, took the step of recruiting soldiers from the landless poor and thus creating an at least partly professional army, economically dependent on its commanders.

A pattern appeared in which Roman leaders, given unprecedentedly long and powerful commands against overseas enemies, used the plunder of these conquests to pay their armies. This dynamic separated the interests of the army from those of the state. Gaius Marius' rival Lucius Cornelius Sulla discovered that he could march his army against the city of Rome. Sulla's control of Rome lasted only a short time (82–81 BCE), but he set a dangerous precedent followed by Julius Caesar, who was granted an extended command to wage war in Gaul in the 50s BCE and refused to give it up, choosing instead to begin his civil war with Pompey the Great and his followers (49–45 BCE).

After defeating the Pompeians, Caesar became the *de facto* sole ruler of Rome, adopting the title of dictator. A Roman dictator was a temporary sole magistrate; the term, like the Greek *turannos*, did not necessarily have a tyrannical connotation. However, Caesar declared himself dictator for life and otherwise alienated the Roman republican aristocracy, which assassinated him on March 15, 44 BCE (the "Ides of March"). Nearly two decades of civil war followed, resulting in the rise of Caesar's great-nephew and adopted heir Gaius Julius Caesar Octavianus (Octavian) to sole ruler of the now shattered Republic. Octavian thus became the first of the Roman emperors, taking a new name, Augustus (27 BCE–14 CE). He retained command of the army and thus was termed *imperator* (whence "emperor") but was more often termed *princeps* ("first citizen"). The early Roman Empire from Augustus to the third century CE is termed the Principate.

The Principate (ca. 27 BCE–235 CE) enjoyed relative stability during the first and most of the second centuries CE. Emperors waged campaigns against external "barbarians," annexing parts of Germany, Britain, and eastern Europe. But the main source of conflict was internal: disgruntled senatorial aristocrats who conspired against the emperors, overthrowing Augustus' descendant Gaius (Caligula) in 41 CE and the Flavian dynastic emperor Domitian in 96. Another source of internal conflict was revolts of the army in favor of usurpers who won the support of the armies, whether by cash payments or other patronage. This happened in the so-called Year of

Four Emperors, 69 CE, named for its three short-lived emperors Galba, Otho, and Vitellius; the fourth was its victor Vespasian (69–79). Internal conflict also occurred on the edges of the empire, most famously the revolt of Britain in 60/61 CE, of the Jews in 66–70 CE, and of the Gauls in 69–70 CE.

In the late second and early third centuries, after about 193, the pattern of revolts and usurpations began to spin out of control. A strong dynasty, the Severans, rose to power from a civil war and maintained its grip till 217, when Caracalla, the son of the founder Septimius Severus, was assassinated. Two of his successors, Elagabalus (218–222) and Alexander Severus (222–235), exploited links with the Severan dynasty. The third century, especially after 235, was marked by a succession of short-lived emperors and by renewed incursions along the frontiers. Stability was restored by the emperor Diocletian (284–305) and his imperial colleagues, the Tetrarchy or “four rulers,” which reorganized the empire for more effective administration and dropped the illusion of “first citizenship” and cooperation with the Senate.

Unfortunately, Diocletian attempted a system of non-hereditary imperial succession that his colleagues and successors did not succeed in maintaining. A period of civil war ensued that enabled the rise of Constantine the Great (306–337), who was the first to revolt in 306 and eliminated most of his rivals by 312. He established his own sole rule (after 324) and reverted to dynastic succession. Though Constantine built upon and strengthened the administrative institutions that Diocletian had reorganized, Constantine is most famous for his conversion to Christianity, an unprecedented event (his immediate predecessors had persecuted the Christians). The later Roman emperors from Constantine onward were Christians, with the exception of Constantine’s nephew Julian (361–363), who was raised as a Christian but, influenced by Greek philosophy, converted to paganism. New sources of conflict arose, Christian doctrinal controversies and persecution of heretics.

The later Roman Empire in Western Europe (284–476) was under pressure from migrating peoples outside its boundaries, but was able to cope before the battle of Adrianople (378), a massive defeat. Internal conflict may have increased, though our evidence for it is an unprecedented volume of imperial legislation that shows Roman government’s struggles to maintain the army, collect taxes, and assert its power against increasingly powerful local landowners.

After the 390s, the empire was divided into its western and eastern (Greek-speaking) halves, each ruled by one of the sons of Theodosius the Great (379–395). A pattern developed in which the western emperors, increasingly figureheads, relied upon powerful generals who commanded often non-Romanized troops against the incursions of other “barbarian” peoples. Civil war and usurpation continued to destabilize the later Roman Empire, particularly in the western empire. Eventually the western generals found that they could do without emperors. Central authority in western Europe devolved into a series of “barbarian” or post-Roman kingdoms. In the eastern Roman Empire, the central authority and urban civilization were stronger; the empire was able to fend off outside threats. Though diminished by the Arab conquests of the seventh century, the eastern Roman Empire persisted as the Byzantine Empire until 1453 CE.

Sara E. Phang

See also Augustus; Civil Wars (I) (49–45 BCE); Civil Wars (II) (44–31 BCE); Diocletian; Elite Participation; Fall of the Roman Empire (West); Gracchan Land Conflict; Patrician-Plebeian Conflict; *Princeps*, Principate; Republic, Political Structure; Senate, Senators; Third-Century CE Crisis

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Rome, Siege of (410 CE)

In the “siege of Rome” in 410, the Visigoths threatened the city of Rome for the third time and actually sacked it during August 410. After the downfall of the western Roman supreme commander Stilicho in 408, there was nothing to stop the demands of the Visigothic warlord Alaric. Alaric had

previously attempted to invade Italy in 401–402 but had been halted by Stilicho at the battles of Pollentia and Verona.

After he received a western military command, Alaric moved to Noricum in 408. He then demanded 4,000 pounds of gold in tribute, nominally as payment for his troops, which was refused by the emperor Honorius. In the winter of 408–409, Alaric and the Visigoths reached Rome and threatened to besiege it. Instead, the Visigoths cut off the city's grain supply from Portus, the port of Rome in the later empire, and the looming threat of famine forced the Senate to negotiate an agreement. In return for huge sums of gold, silver, silk, spices, and a great number of slaves, Alaric withdrew his forces to Tuscany while arranging a meeting with imperial representatives near Rimini in the spring of 409.

At these talks, Alaric mainly used Rome as a tool to pressure Honorius' court into negotiations. During the first talks he demanded the rank of *magister utriusque militiae* (commander-in-chief, Stilicho's former position), gold and grain for his soldiers, and the provinces of Venetia, Dalmatia, and Noricum to station them. Honorius' court refused these terms, after which Alaric merely requested grain and the province of Noricum. When this was also refused, Alaric marched on Rome again and commenced a second "siege," or rather show of strength near the city to intimidate the Senate. In collaboration with Alaric, the Roman Senate acclaimed the city prefect Priscus Attalus as emperor in December 409. Attalus appointed Alaric as his supreme commander, and together they tried bringing the cities of northern Italy to their fold during the first half of 410. They laid siege to Ravenna where Honorius' garrison was on the verge of mutiny. The timely arrival of 4,000 eastern Roman soldiers in the harbor of Ravenna meant an unexpected reinforcement of Honorius' position. Meanwhile, Alaric and Attalus had failed to secure the African provinces. The African regional commander Heraclian remained loyal to Honorius, sent the emperor financial aid, and, more importantly, annulled grain shipments to Rome, thereby critically undermining Attalus' authority in the city. A dire famine broke out among the Romans, who allegedly even resorted to cannibalism.

Alaric attempted one last time to negotiate a settlement with Honorius, deposing Attalus as a gesture of good will. An unexpected raid on the Visigothic camp by a rival Gothic commander in Honorius' service ultimately broke down these peace talks. Alaric saw no alternative but to satisfy the demands of his troops and returned to Rome for a final siege. The

Visigoths entered the city through alleged treachery from within, when at least one Roman opened the Salarian Gate to them. From August 24 to 27, 410 the Visigoths were allowed to sack the city, on the condition that no arson was committed and citizens seeking sanctuary in churches be spared. The Visigoths withdrew due to shortage of food and progressed through Italy until Alaric's unexpected death from illness later in 410.

Politically and militarily, the sack of Rome did little to change the stalemate between the Visigoths and the imperial court. Nevertheless, the sack of Rome created a major outcry among Romans around the Mediterranean and stirred intellectual debate between pagans and Christians.

Jeroen W. P. Wijnendaele

See also Alaric; Fall of the Roman Empire (West); Goths; Honorius; Stilicho

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Romulus Augustulus (Emperor) (475–476 CE)

Romulus Augustulus, the last Roman emperor, was the son of Orestes, who was made *magister militum* by the emperor Julius Nepos in 475. In August of that year Orestes, with the aid of the Heruli, Torclingi, and Scirian *foederati*, seized the city of Ravenna, the capital of the diminished western Roman Empire. However, Orestes did not capture Julius Nepos who fled to Dalmatia. Orestes placed his son Romulus Augustulus ("little Augustus") on the throne of the western empire. Augustulus was then 12 years old, implying that he was a figurehead for his father's rule.

Orestes sought recognition for his son from the eastern Roman Empire, but such recognition was not forthcoming, Constantinople preferring to

maintain its support for Julius Nepos. Orestes then attempted to consolidate his hold over what remained of the Roman state. Orestes, however, made a fatal mistake by reneging on a promise made to his *foederati* to give them Italian land to settle on. The *foederati* in turn deserted Orestes and allied themselves with the warlord Odoacer. Orestes rallied the remaining Roman forces to his son's cause and met Odoacer in battle near the city of Placentia (Piacenza). Orestes' force was defeated and Orestes himself captured and executed. Odoacer then deposed Romulus Augustulus, sending him into exile in Campania. Augustulus then disappears from the historical record. With the exile of Augustulus the Roman Senate, in conjunction with Odoacer, wrote to Zeno, the eastern Roman emperor, placing themselves under his rule. Odoacer, in theory, then ruled Italy in the name of the eastern Roman Empire. In practice, Odoacer ruled Italy as an independent king. He allegedly refused the imperial regalia, sending them back to Constantinople.

Michael D. Blodgett

See also Fall of the Roman Empire (West); Odoacer; Orestes

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S

Saguntum, Siege of (219–218 BCE)

In May 219 BCE, the Carthaginian general Hannibal Barca besieged the Iberian east coastal town of Saguntum (modern Sagunto, Spain). The siege lasted some eight months precipitating the Second Punic War (218–201). From 237, the Barcid family had been establishing the Carthaginian presence in Spain and was slowly advancing this northward. It is in this context that Rome took an interest, fearing their dominance of the region. However, Rome was preoccupied with Gaul and Illyricum and had no interest in engaging Carthage in war and signed the Ebro Treaty (226/225) with Hannibal's brother-in-law, Hasdrubal, prohibiting Carthaginian expansion beyond the river, which is some 150 kilometers north of Saguntum. Technically, then, Saguntum was under the aegis of Carthage. But, by 220/219, the Saguntines were wary of Hannibal's advances and appealed to their ally, Rome, to intervene, warning Hannibal of potentially contravening the treaty.

The order of events leading to the siege of Saguntum is not clear in the sources but appears to be as follows. Its strategic position on a hilltop close to the Mediterranean Sea was vitally important for Hannibal's plans to invade Roman territory. He thus ignored Roman demands and stormed the town. His aggressive stance was immediately noticeable, but he underestimated the opposition and this led to a protracted siege with many Carthaginian casualties including Hannibal himself. In the meantime, the Saguntines appealed to Rome for help, but it never arrived. The assault was fierce. Siege tactics and sophisticated weaponry and machinery, including battering rams and catapults were deployed. During Hannibal's recuperation, his men constructed further siege works and the fighting

continued with incessant ferocity. Nevertheless, the Saguntines showed their own determination, resilience and were adept defenders in their own right. They adopted the use of the *falarica*, described by Livy as a fearsome javelin coated with pitch and sulfur and set alight before being hurled: it was used with some success. In the end, however, superior machinery and numbers won the day and the reduction of Saguntum was completed. Hannibal ordered instructions that survivors of military age should not be spared. The town itself was ransacked, captives were sold, and plunder was dispatched to Carthage. Hannibal was now in a position to invade Italy.

Carthage's defeat and indignity after the First Punic War (264–241), coupled with Rome's behavior in Corsica and Sardinia, can be seen as the prime factors for the causes of the Second Punic War. War was thus unavoidable, and the capture of Saguntum provided the incentive. The result was a 16-year war in which Rome, though almost defeated, would emerge victorious once again. Although Hannibal was to threaten Rome's military machine on several occasions, notably Cannae (in modern Apulia, Italy) in 216, the eventual consequences for Carthage were devastating. For Rome, it established their presence in Spain for some 600 years.

Juan M. A. Strisino

See also Cannae, Battle of; Hannibal Barca; Hasdrubal Barca; Punic War, First; Punic War, Second; Siege Warfare; Spanish Wars

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Sallust (86–ca. 35 BCE)

Gaius Sallustius Crispus was a senator in the late Roman Republic who is best known for his surviving historical works, the *Bellum Catilinae* or “Catilinarian Conspiracy,” and the *Bellum Jugurthinum* or “Jugurthine War.” He is the first Latin historian whose works survive intact; earlier historians’ works only survive in fragments quoted by later authors.

Sallust was quaestor ca. 55 BCE, and tribune of the plebs ca. 52, when he sided against the tribune of the plebs Titus Annius Milo. In 50 the censors expelled Sallust from the Senate for his alleged personal immorality, though the prominence of moralizing in Sallust’s historical works suggests the subsequent exaggeration of this anecdote for ironic contrast.

The support of Caesar enabled Sallust to be elected to another quaestorship, which permitted him to reenter the Senate. In return, Sallust served as one of Caesar’s military officers during the civil war of Caesar and the Pompeians. Sallust was not a very successful military officer, failing to quell the mutiny of Caesar’s soldiers in Campania (Appian, *Civil Wars* 2.92; Dio 42.51.1). Nonetheless, Caesar made Sallust proconsular governor of Africa. As governor, Sallust allegedly enriched himself through extortion (Dio 43.9.2). Sallust was prosecuted for extortion upon his return. Despite his acquittal, he retired from politics and devoted himself to writing. He died sometime after 35 BCE. Besides the *Bellum Catilinae* and *Bellum Jugurthinum*, Sallust wrote a *Histories* which has not survived extant; fragments are quoted by other authors.

The *Bellum Catilinae* covers the Catilinarian Conspiracy of 63 BCE and events leading up to it. It can be compared with Cicero’s contemporary speeches, the *Catilinarian Orations*. Cicero was consul in 63 and emphasizes his role in suppressing the conspiracy. In contrast, Sallust downplays Cicero’s role to showcase Catiline himself and sketch a colorful array of conspirators, including Sullan veterans, barbarians, and women. Sallust contrasts the speeches of Cato the Younger and Caesar, advocating respectively for Catiline’s execution and acquittal. These speeches may have been based on Cato’s and Caesar’s actual words; however, as is common with speeches in ancient historiography, Sallust the historian uses them to present his own analysis of the situation. The *Bellum Catilinae* is most famous for its programmatic preface, presenting an abbreviated and moralistic version of Roman history that contrasts a virtuous past, when

Roman men were motivated by *virtus* (courage in battle, virtue) and military glory, with the decadent present, motivated by *avaritia* (greed) and *luxuria* (luxury, self-indulgence).

The *Bellum Jugurthinum* treats the history of the Jugurthine War (ca. 112–105 BCE) and the rise of Marius and Sulla. In contrast with the *Bellum Catilinae*, its characters are less clear-cut. Though Marius defends himself (*Jugurthine War* 85) in a long speech vituperating the decadent aristocracy, and aligning himself with traditional Roman military virtues, Marius' conduct elsewhere in the *Bellum Jugurthinum* is clearly criticized by Sallust. During the Jugurthine War, Sulla was Marius' quaestor, a relatively junior officer, but with hindsight Sallust sketches his formidable character. The *Bellum Jugurthinum* sketches a gloomy portrait of Roman politics: "Romae omnia venalia esse" (*Jugurthine War* 8.1): "at Rome, all things are for sale."

Sallust's work is regarded as a major influence upon the Latin historian Tacitus, who wrote in the early second century CE and employs a similar terse style and similar moralizing.

Sara E. Phang

See also Caesar, Gaius Julius; Catiline; Cato the Younger; Conspiracy of Catiline; Jugurthine War; Marius; Sulla, Lucius Cornelius; Tacitus

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Samnite Linen Legion

A military force raised by the Samnites in 293 BCE that fought against the Romans at the battle of Aquilonia. According to Livy, the Samnites were

hard pressed by the Romans and employed a brutal ritual to secure victory (Livy 10.38). An area was enclosed with linen strips within which sacrifices were made following precepts of a linen book. Men were then brought in, 10 at a time, and swore an oath not to run from battle or suffer a curse on themselves, their households, and their families. Any who refused the oath or broke it were to be killed. Supposedly 16,000 men were enrolled in the Linen Legion, outfitted with impressive weapons and armor, and paired with another force of 20,000 men of similar quality. This episode fits into Livy's narrative of the Samnites' increasingly desperate and ineffective attempts to oppose the Roman conquest. Ancient authors often associate linen with archaic rituals. The ritual resembles a *lex sacrata*, which was a method of raising and unifying military forces through rituals which other early Italian peoples are said to have used. Livy emphasizes the inhuman nature of the ritual, reflecting negatively on the Samnites. Since Samnium, a region of central Italy, was impoverished, the lavish armor is probably a later fabrication. The Linen Legion was defeated in battle purportedly due to Samnite dread of their own ritual and Roman stratagems.

Patrick Kent

See also Livy; Military Oaths; Samnium, Samnites

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Samnite Wars (343–ca. 272 BCE)

In Italy, Romans and Samnites fought each other in a series of conflicts known as the Samnite Wars stretching from 343 to ca. 272 BCE. Traditionally there are three Samnite Wars with the Pyrrhic War as essentially a Fourth Samnite War. Italy at this time was a chaotic and dangerous land with communities fighting for survival against aggressive neighbors. As a result of these conflicts, the Romans consolidated their control over Italy, creating a cohesive political and military network, and used the resources of the peninsula to conquer the Mediterranean.

Early Italy was a land divided among hundreds of communities that ranged from small pastoral villages to large cities with varied levels of organization. Some connections linked Italian peoples, including common religious shrines/sanctuaries, trade, intermarriage, and language. Through the fifth and fourth centuries BCE isolated communities developed a sense of regional identity, based on common language, culture, and geography, making it possible to speak of "Samnites," "Latins," and other peoples acting in a somewhat cohesive fashion. In part, such changes can be traced to increased contact with the Etruscans, Greeks, and Carthaginians. Growing regional identity allowed greater cooperation among Italian communities, but did not end intra-regional conflicts.

By the mid-fourth century BCE, pressure from neighboring peoples spurred the Romans to consolidate loose control over the Latin cities in a military alliance. The Samnites slowly consolidated into larger tribes (the Pentri, Hirpini, Caudini, and Caricini) and then the broader confederation of Samnium. The poor resources of Samnium also propelled the Samnites to raid their neighbors as well as migrate when population grew too large through a *ver sacrum* (sacred spring) ritual in which all of the youths born in a certain year were dedicated to follow a totem animal to a new place to live. By the mid-fourth century BCE, the Romans and Samnites could coordinate the military efforts of their regions in prolonged conflicts.

As the Romans and Samnites amalgamated regionally, they began to expand their influence further through military alliances. Italian society was heavily militarized. Generally men's position in society and politics was determined by military accomplishment. The peninsula was divided among peoples who required military achievement to fuel domestic influence, resulting in a self-replicating pattern of aggression. Military alliances between communities further enhanced both defensive and offensive capabilities. In 354 BCE, the Romans and Samnites concluded their first alliance, perhaps in an effort to avoid conflict as their spheres of influence drew closer. War broke out nonetheless.

Over this period, the causes of the conflicts changed in response to shifting circumstances. The First Samnite War resulted from Samnite raids against the Sidicini, a small people of northern Campania who called for help from Capua who in turn looked to Rome. After a debate in the Senate, Roman desire to expand their alliance network won out over their existing Samnite alliance following a pattern of Roman behavior of allying with

people that resulted in war with a third party. So too, between the First and Second Samnite Wars the Romans and Samnites competed for allies, primarily in Campania, resulting in slowly building tensions that eventually led to another war. In the face of continued threats (both real and perceived) the Romans sought to subdue neighboring peoples and, in time, all the peoples of Italy. By the end of the fourth century BCE, Samnite motivations for opposing Rome shifted to a resistance of growing Roman hegemony in Italy that was seen as threatening regional independence.

The sources for Rome's wars in Italy are distorted in favor of the Romans and depict the wars as epic conflicts. The most complete narrative is the history of Livy (written during the reign of Augustus), the extant portion of which describes the Samnite wars down to 293 BCE. Later Roman conceits about the nature of their rise to prominence shaped the narrative of the wars into a slow and inevitable Roman victory. Roman authors falsely portray the conflict as one that both the Romans and Samnites knew would determine the leadership of Italy.

The First Samnite War (343–341 BCE) is difficult to assess due to Roman elaborations of the narrative. It began as a result of Samnite raids into Campania, forcing Capua to ask for Roman aid. The war was likely small in scale, limited to minor battles in Campania and nearby. After three years, the Romans and Samnites made peace. Afterward, Rome's allies refused to stop fighting. As a result, the Romans waged a war to assert their dominance over their allies in the Great Latin War (341–339 BCE), in which the Samnites provided important assistance aiding Roman victory.

The largest of the Samnite Wars was the second (326–304 BCE). In the years since the Great Latin War, the Romans and Samnites expanded their alliances at the expense of each other, resulting in war. Early on, the Romans lost two major battles at the Caudine Forks and Lautulae, which Roman historians minimized. Subsequently, the Romans slowly isolated Samnium by expanding the war, establishing colonies throughout central Italy and expanding their military alliances into central and southern Italy. By the end of the war, Roman armies broke their way into Samnium and inflicted heavy losses, forcing the Samnites to sue for peace.

Weakened by the previous wars, the Samnites resorted to new tactics in the Third Samnite War (298–290 BCE). The Romans commanded huge resources through their alliances, resulting in a polarization of the peninsula into Rome's alliance system and the rest of the Italians. The Samnite general

Gellius Egnatius forged an alliance of Samnites, Gauls, Etruscans, and Umbrians against Rome; the Samnites and Gauls fought at Sentinum in northern Italy in opposition to Roman hegemony. After a close battle, the Romans were victorious. Later, the Samnites attempted to raise a new army known as the Linen Legion through a dreadful ritual meant to inspire and unite them, but this force too was defeated. Unable to resist Roman invasions of Samnium, the Samnites surrendered again.

The Romans and Samnites fought again in the Pyrrhic War (280–275 BCE), which was a kind of fourth Samnite War. In 282 the Greek Tarentines of southern Italy attacked a Roman fleet and invited Pyrrhus of Epirus to help them, promising Samnite support. Pyrrhus, the Samnites, the Tarentines, and other allies defeated the Romans in two battles and briefly invaded Latium. Heavy losses, a failed invasion of Sicily, and defeat in a third battle against the Romans prompted Pyrrhus to return to Greece. The Samnites continued to fight until 272 but were forced to surrender.

Among the most prominent Roman generals of the Samnite Wars were Quintus Fabius Maximus Rullianus, Lucius Papirius Cursor, and Publius Decius Mus, who boasted multiple consulships, dictatorships, and triumphs.

The Samnite Wars were a key factor in the Roman conquest of Italy resulting in huge amounts of resources and manpower in Roman hands that they could use to fuel expansion. The Romans had seized huge swaths of territory from their defeated foes, some of which was used to settle citizens and colonies but most became public land of the Roman people. Extensions of Roman citizenship were a means of incorporating and controlling allied communities in the fourth century BCE. As such, many of the Latins were full citizens while the Campanians and Sabines were citizens without the vote. Due to land seizures and citizenship extensions the Romans controlled resources and population far outstripping other Italians. Such extensions ceased after the Samnite Wars as citizenship gained enhanced value due to greater Roman power, resulting in discontent among those Italians who desired to play a more influential role in the Roman political system.

Throughout the Samnite Wars, the Romans founded a number of Latin colonies, which were made up of former Roman citizens mixed with some Latins and local population. Principally meant to act as garrisons in potentially hostile territory, they also spread Roman culture through local economic and social contacts knitting the peninsula together. Citizens of Latin colonies had rights of intermarriage, commerce, and emigration with

Rome.

Roman hegemony had significant effects on the peoples of Italy. Urbanization occurred throughout the peninsula, especially in those areas where cities had been less common. Trade and commerce greatly expanded within Italy and beyond, taking advantage of growing Roman influence. Many Italian elites found it expedient to tie themselves closer to Rome for their own economic and social benefit. In the third and second centuries BCE, the Romans promoted a concept of Italy as a whole (*tota Italia*) to create a common sense of identity. Following the trends of regional differentiation of previous centuries, regional cultures strengthened even as Roman culture became more influential. Latin became a lingua franca, but rarely replaced local Italic languages, which survived into the late first century CE.

By 265 BCE, all the peoples of Italy were tied to Rome through bilateral alliances or other similar ties. The only requirement Rome imposed on allies was military service. Italians made up half of Roman armies. The intra-Italian warfare endemic in earlier periods ceased, which aided growing economic prosperity and created a vast pool of military resources for the Romans. Polybius estimates the total manpower available at 700,000 infantry and 70,000 cavalry (a third of which were Romans). In terms of fielded numbers, in 212 BCE the Romans deployed nearly 250,000 men (half Italians) shortly after losing over 100,000 men to Hannibal. No other ancient state had similar manpower reserves.

After Roman consolidation there was some surviving resentment and new sources of discontent, especially among the Samnites. They joined Hannibal's army in Italy and rebelled against Rome alongside the rest of the Italians in the Social War (91–87 BCE) in the face of increasing Roman imperialism and a refusal to extend citizenship. Despite some residual hostility, the Romans forged Italy into a cohesive whole that provided the means of creating their empire. In time, the peoples of Italy would lose their individual regional identities and become Romans in the aftermath of the Samnite Wars.

Patrick Kent

See also Decius Mus, Publius; Imperialism; Papirius Cursor; Samnite Linen Legion; Samnium, Samnites; Social War (91–87 BCE); Treaties and Alliances

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Samnium, Samnites

Samnium (*Safinim* in Oscan, an Italic language the Samnites spoke) was a mountainous region of Central Italy that was the homeland of the eponymous Samnites. The Apennine Mountains in this region are not uniform in arrangement, but are made up of various subranges that divide the area into small valleys and plateaus. The high peaks of Samnium's mountains remain covered in snow much of the year and give rise to a number of rivers that flow down into the neighboring plains, although within Samnium the rivers are modest in size. The mountains lack any significant mineral wealth. Prior to increased deforestation in the second century CE, some of the mountains were covered in noteworthy forests. The high altitude of Samnium produces some of the harshest winters in Italy, with significant amounts of snowfall. Summers are hot and dry. Samnium was not as agriculturally productive as the lowland plains of Campania, and though some Samnites were farmers, many were herders, a practice which expanded during the second century BCE when Rome acquired more public land in the area that could be used to support large herds of animals. Samnium's poor resources resulted in few major urban centers. Their largest urban centers were Malventum and Bovianum. After the Samnite Wars ended in the early third century BCE, the Romans founded Latin colonies at Malventum, which they renamed a more positive-sounding Beneventum, and Aesernia, and extended the Via Appia across the region. Augustus placed Samnium in region IV of his division of Italy.

As a result of the harshness of the mountains, Samnium could not support a population to match other regions of Italy. When the local

populations grew too large for the land to support, the young men of the community migrated to other areas of Italy, often following a totem animal in a ritual called the *ver sacrum* (sacred spring). The ritual migrants were not necessarily welcome elsewhere, leading to conflict.

Divided into four major tribes, the Pentri, Hirpini, Caudini, and Caricini, the Samnites spoke an Oscan dialect, a subset of the Italic family of Indo-European languages. Their society was organized into extended family groups or clans. They however were not isolated from the rest of Italy and the Mediterranean; they had acquired extensive aspects of Greek culture, including artistic motifs, an alphabet, and religious practices, and were in close contact with the other peoples of Italy through trade, intermarriage, alliances, and cultural exchange.



Detail of tomb fresco from Paestum, depicting Samnite warriors, fourth century BCE. The Samnites, occupying the mountains of central and southern Italy, were particularly fierce warriors, finally defeated by the Romans in three wars from 343 to 290 BCE. Located in Paestum, Italy. (Leemage/Corbis)

The Romans discovered that Samnium was one of the most difficult regions of Italy to conquer, partly because of the geography and partly because the Samnites were tough and aggressive. Approaches into Samnium were few and often difficult to traverse. The Samnites were able to exploit

the mountain passes and their dispersed fortifications to help protect their lands from invasion. In 321 BCE, the Samnites ambushed and captured an invading Roman army in a small valley called the Caudine Forks. As late as 277 BCE, the Samnites inflicted a severe defeat on a Roman army that attacked them in the otherwise unknown Cranite Mountains.

The Samnites themselves were a warlike people. By the fifth century BCE, the four major tribes formed a confederacy that could coordinate military activity to some degree. Samnites men were warriors and are depicted as such in surviving Samnite art. Tribal elites led bands of loyal warriors, relying on personal connections rather than an institutionalized army. Some Samnites served as mercenaries for the Carthaginians and Greeks. The Romans fought the Samnites in three long, brutal wars, from 343 to around 272 BCE. When Pyrrhus and Hannibal invaded Italy in the late third century BCE, the Samnites aided them against Rome.

In the Social War (91–87 BCE), the Samnites played a central role in the Italian rebellion against Roman rule. They refused to accept peace and Roman citizenship along with the other allies. Consequently, Sulla took terrible reprisals on the Samnites and forcibly subdued Samnium in 82 BCE. It is unlikely that Sulla succeeded in genociding the Samnites, since their mountains offered many refuges, but in subsequent centuries the Samnites disappeared, being absorbed into the general population of Italy.

Patrick Kent

See also Religion and Warfare; Samnite Wars

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Sarmatians

The *Sarmatae* or Sarmatians were a Central Asian people north of the Black Sea who migrated into the lower Danube region between 250 BCE and 50 CE, coming into conflict with Rome in the late first through third centuries CE.

They are poorly distinguished from the similar Scythians in Greek sources, and even in the middle empire Greek authors sometimes term them Scythians.

There were two major groups of Sarmatians: the Roxolani, occupying the Danube delta, and the Jazyges, who migrated to the region north of Pannonia Inferior. The Romans fought an alliance of the German Suebi and the Sarmatians in Domitian's reign, which motivated Domitian (81–96) to make peace with the Dacian king Decebalus. In the middle second and third centuries CE, the Jazyges joined with the Marcomanni and made raids across the Danube. The Roxolani raided into Moesia Inferior.

On Trajan's Column, the Sarmatians wear distinctive scale armor, covering every part of their bodies except their heads, which wear pointed helmets. Their horses are armored similarly. This rendering seems implausible, but archaeologists have found metal scale armor at Sarmatian sites. Their armor precedes the Persian and Roman cataphract (heavy armored) cavalry of the mid-third century and later.

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See also Column of Trajan; Dacian Wars; Decebalus; Domitian; Marcomannic War

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Scipio Aemilianus (185/4–129 BCE)

Publius Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus, often called Scipio Africanus the Younger or Scipio the Younger, was a prominent Roman aristocrat, politician, and general of the mid-second century BCE. He commanded the siege of Carthage in the Third Punic War (149–146 BCE) and destroyed the city of Carthage, eliminating the Republic's most formidable enemy. He also commanded the Numantine War (134–133), besieging and destroying Numantia, a Celtiberian settlement that had offered stiff resistance to the Romans in the conquest of Spain. Closely related to Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus, he became an opponent of Tiberius' land commission and died in 129 under mysterious circumstances.

Scipio's family connections were very illustrious. He was the second

oldest son of Lucius Aemilius Paullus, the commander of the Third Macedonian War in 168 and victor of the battle of Pydna. While still a child, Scipio was adopted by a son of Scipio Africanus, Publius Cornelius Scipio, who had no living children. Scipio Aemilianus' agnomen thus indicated his original family, the Aemilii. Africanus (who had died in 183) had married Aemilia, Aemilius Paullus' sister, and had two daughters, one of whom, Cornelia, married Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus and had three surviving children, Sempronia, Tiberius Gracchus, and Gaius Gracchus (the future tribunes of 133 and 123–122 BCE). Scipio Aemilianus was later married to Sempronia, but they had no children.

Such distinguished ancestry put pressure on young Roman nobles to live up to them. After the end of the Third Macedonian War, Aemilius Paullus befriended the Achaean hostage Polybius, who focuses on and is favorable to Paullus and Scipio Aemilianus in his *Histories*. According to Polybius (31.23.1), the young Scipio confessed to him that he felt inadequate to his family's expectations of him. He had not yet begun speaking in the courts and assemblies, as was usual for young nobles at this time. Polybius appears to have counseled Scipio to distinguish himself in other ways, through good moral conduct (moral decline is a theme in Polybius) and through generosity with the money he inherited.

Scipio also proceeded to distinguish himself in military service. The protracted and difficult Spanish Wars were proving unpopular with Roman soldiers. In 151 the consuls held the *dilectus*, but a poor turnout resulted in their coercion of recruits. The consuls were confronted by the tribunes of the plebs, whose task it was to defend citizens against the magistrates' use of violence. As this conflict erupted, Scipio Aemilianus created a sensation by volunteering to serve in Spain as a military tribune. He could have elected easier and more lucrative service in the eastern Mediterranean. In Spain Scipio distinguished himself, winning a duel with a Celtiberian champion and winning a mural crown for being the first to storm a besieged settlement.

Scipio served in the Third Punic War (149–146 BCE), first as a tribune, rescuing Roman troops (for which he was awarded another crown) and negotiating aid from the now very old Masinissa, the king of Numidia, who aided Scipio due to friendship with his adoptive grandfather Africanus. Scipio returned to Rome in 147 to run for aedile. Instead the people of Rome awarded Scipio the consulship to wage the Third Punic War, even though

Scipio was not yet old enough and had not yet been aedile or praetor (the offices that preceded the consulship). He was awarded command in Africa, overriding the usual assignment of provinces by lot. The parallel was with Africanus, who also had received special nomination for the consulship at age 31 to wage the Second Punic War in 205.

Taking charge in Africa, Scipio Aemilianus cut off Carthaginian access to their harbor and besieged the city of Carthage, destroying it house by house and capturing the citadel (146 BCE). He sold the Carthaginians into slavery and razed the city. Carthaginian North Africa was reorganized as the Roman province of Africa. Returning to Rome, Scipio was awarded a triumph and took the name Africanus. Scipio, now famous, was sent to the Hellenistic eastern Mediterranean in 143 to negotiate with various monarchs. He held the censorship in 142.

In 135, Scipio was elected consul for the second time for 134, to wage war against the Numantines, a Celtiberian (Spanish) people who resisted Roman conquest. The Numantine War was effectively a war of vengeance for Celtiberian resistance and for the humiliation of the Romans: a few years before, the Roman commander Gaius Hostilius Mancinus had conceded a treaty with the Numantines (in effect a surrender) that the Senate then rejected, forcing the Romans to surrender Mancinus to the Numantines. Tiberius Gracchus had assisted Mancinus in his negotiations; Scipio supported the Senate's rejection. In Spain, Scipio first imposed severe discipline on the Roman army, which was demoralized from the long, unsuccessful war. He threw out thousands of camp followers (including officers' servants, entertainers, prostitutes, and soothsayers) and imposed hard labor on the soldiers. He then besieged Numantia, erecting massive earthworks, and starved the city out, which finally surrendered. Scipio enslaved the surviving Numantines and returned to Rome to triumph. In his absence, the land conflict had come to a head; because of actions during his tribunate in 133, Tiberius Gracchus and his followers had been massacred by Scipio Nasica and his followers.

A consummate aristocrat, Scipio Aemilianus was probably opposed in principle to the Gracchan land redistribution program. To oppose it, he defended Rome's wealthy Italian allies who held *ager publicus* that was subject to redistribution by the Gracchan program. Scipio influenced the Senate to remove judicial powers from the Gracchan commission, reserving these powers for the consuls. This aroused great popular anger against

Scipio. One morning in 129, Scipio was found dead, apparently having died in his sleep, but there were rumors that he had been assassinated (poisoned or strangled) by those with reason to hate him, including his own wife Sempronia and mother-in-law Cornelia. There was no investigation into the cause of his death.

The sources for Scipio Aemilianus' life are incomplete. Plutarch wrote a biography that is not extant. Polybius' original *Histories* covered the period of Scipio's life at least through the destruction of Carthage, and Polybius may also have written a history of the Spanish Wars, but his continuous narrative for these periods is also not extant. Appian's *Spanish Wars*, probably based on Polybius, provide a continuous narrative. Livy's *History of Rome* also covered the period of Scipio's life, but the surviving text breaks off shortly after the Third Macedonian War; summaries of Livy survive, the *Periochae*. Cicero's *De re publica* (*Republic*), *De senectute* (*On Old Age*), and *De amicitia* (*On Friendship*) employ Scipio Aemilianus as an idealized character and interlocutor. Reputed to have wept at the destruction of Carthage because he forebode the destruction of Rome, the historical Scipio probably agreed with Polybius' theory of constitutional cycles, in which monarchy is overthrown and replaced by aristocracy, which degenerates into oligarchy; spurred by demagogic leaders, oligarchy is replaced by democracy, synonymous in Polybius' view with anarchy and leading to the rise of another monarchy.

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See also Aemilius Paullus, Lucius; Carthage (State); Elite Participation; Gracchan Land Conflict; Macedonian War, Third; Monomachy (Single Combat); Numantia, Siege of; Polybius; Punic War, Third; Scipio Africanus; Spanish Wars; Tiberius Gracchus

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Scipio Africanus (236–183 BCE)

Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus (Scipio the Elder) was a republican

Roman statesman and war hero best known for his victory over Hannibal Barca and his ending of the Second Punic War (he was given the honorary agnomen “Africanus” to commemorate his success over Carthage). Scipio’s political and military achievements were unequaled in scope until the large-scale exploits of the late republican generals (Marius, Sulla, Pompey, and Caesar). Nonetheless, Scipio Africanus’ career remains impressive given that it occurred at a time when the Roman elite largely respected the Republic’s political and martial limits.

Scipio was born into the patrician Cornelian clan and was the second son of Publius Cornelius Scipio (consul of 218 BCE). His wife was Aemilia, the daughter of Lucius Aemilius Paullus (consul of 216 BCE) and together they had two sons and two daughters. Their son, Publius, later adopted Scipio Aemilianus, who would become a war hero in his own right; he followed in his grandfather’s footsteps and defeated Carthage in the Third Punic War (149–146 BCE) where he earned the same agnomen Africanus. Cornelia, one of Scipio Africanus’ daughters, later became the mother of the republican reformers, Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus.

Scipio first entered the historical scene in November of 218 BCE as a soldier serving at the battle of the Ticinus River during the Second Punic War where he may have rescued his father, the commanding general, from Hannibal’s cavalry. Scipio was a military tribune at the battle of Cannae in 216 BCE and was one of the 10,000 legionaries to successfully push through the Carthaginian center and avoid the pitiable fate of the rest of the Roman army.

Scipio’s career took an unprecedented turn in 213 BCE when he was elected aedile despite his unfinished 10-year cavalry service and ineligibility due to age. Timing, talent, and family connections, however, allowed him to quickly rise to the top military and political positions. In 211 BCE his father and uncle were killed while campaigning in Spain and a new Roman commander was needed to replace them. Since he resembled his father in appearance, Scipio gained the support of the Roman troops and obtained the Spanish command even though he was still customarily unqualified for the position.

Scipio lived up to his family’s prodigious reputation. In five years he successfully expelled the Carthaginians from Spain; more importantly, he adapted to the Carthaginians’ clever fighting techniques and learned from his experiences. Scipio was one of the few Romans during the Second Punic

War who had a talent for martial affairs and he shaped his soldiers into a more disciplined and flexible fighting force so they could better withstand and overcome assaults by Hannibal's professional troops. He made adjustments to traditional legionary formations and had his cavalry actively participate in battle in addition to their traditional role of reconnaissance and the routing of fleeing enemies. Scipio's changes paid off; his forces defeated Hannibal's brother, Hasdrubal Barca, at the battle of Baecula in 208 BCE, prompting Hasdrubal to flee Spain, and they overpowered Hannibal's other brother, Mago Barca, at the battle of Ilipa in 206 BCE where Mago received mortal wounds.

Because of his successful techniques and inspiring leadership, Scipio 's soldiers hailed him as *imperator*, possibly the first instance of such recognition. In addition to being a cunning general, Scipio also was known for his generosity and mercy; he dealt fairly with the native Spanish tribes that were previously allied with Carthage and did not press his rights of conquest on the women. Though his exploits in Spain were worthy of a Roman triumph, Scipio was denied a triumph because he lacked the customary prerequisites. He honored republican political processes and the authority of the Senate by not appealing the decision, thus earning him more praise by his contemporaries.

Scipio attracted more attention when he was unanimously elected consul in 205 BCE at the age of 31, a good 10 years younger than the traditional age of consuls. His ambitious plan to invade North Africa added fuel to envious fires; rumors spread that Scipio meant to sidestep the Senate and obtain the African command by popular vote if the Senate refused him approval. A heated debate ensued between the young commander and the Senate leader, Quintus Fabius Maximus, but ended with Scipio gaining approval, though he had to provide his own supplies and troops. Undaunted, Scipio raised two legions comprised of volunteers and Cannae veterans (that the Senate previously had refused to muster and posted to Sicily) and departed for Africa. In addition, he bolstered his position by making alliances with some of Carthage's old allies, in particular, Masinissa of Numidia, who provided Scipio with a strong and disciplined cavalry.

The Romans slowly fought their way toward Carthage, winning victories at the battles of the Great Plains and Cirta. Anxious with this new turn of events, Carthage recalled Hannibal. The two generals may have met before engaging in battle near the city of Zama. According to Livy,

Hannibal poignantly stated that he was no longer a young man and learned the lessons of successes and failures. Desiring to embrace reason instead of chance, he suggested a truce. Scipio, however, promised the Senate and people of Rome that he would defeat the Carthaginians and refused. Both departed to prepare for battle.

Scipio harnessed the strengths of both traditional Roman tactics and the newer skills acquired throughout the war for a solid but flexible, well-coordinated attack. Placing his most experienced troops on the flanks, the Roman army efficiently accommodated the mad charge of Hannibal's 80 elephants, successfully pushed through the Carthaginian center, and enveloped the entire Punic army with their Roman and Numidian cavalries. Hannibal, for the first time, was defeated.

Scipio's victory over Hannibal and the subsequent ending of the Second Punic War was a monumental victory for any Roman and a remarkable one for such a young and seemingly nontraditional general. Older ambitious Romans tried to pilfer credit for Scipio's accomplishment; the new consul for 201 BCE initially objected to Scipio's peace terms with Carthage and the young commander almost was recalled from Africa before his work was finished. In the end, Scipio's final terms held firm and he was rewarded with one of the most impressive triumphal processions the Republic ever witnessed.

After the war, Scipio assimilated back into political and civil life, becoming censor in 199 BCE and consul for a second time in 194 BCE, this time without any controversy. His achievements over Hannibal, however, forever shadowed his later life; while he had high social standing and great political influence, his past notoriety continued to invite criticism from other Romans, most notably Marcus Porcius Cato the Elder.

Cato served under Scipio in Africa and developed a bitter hostility for his commander. Part of this was due to Scipio's fascination with Greek culture, an interest the traditionalist Cato found dangerous to Roman pride and convention. In addition, it was said that Scipio was moved by dreams, a disposition typically embraced by eastern peoples but deemed superstitious by Romans. When Scipio returned from Asia in 189 BCE after defeating Antiochus III of Syria, Cato accused Scipio of living luxuriously (living like a "Greek"). More to the point, Scipio and his brother, Lucius Cornelius Scipio Asiagenes, were accused of receiving monetary bribes from Antiochus III. Cato also alleged that Scipio allowed his portrait to be

stamped on eastern coins in place of Hannibal's, an action that upset many Romans since the Republic, unlike eastern kingdoms, did not condone portraits of people on their coins, at least at that time. Such provocative accusations against a famous war hero resulted in a trial and though the ruling was in Scipio's favor, damage was already done to his reputation. He retired to his estate at Liternum in Campania and died in 183 BCE.

Scipio and his remarkable career were products of their time. War casualties and the advanced age of some Second Punic War leaders paved the way for Scipio to ascend the career path as quickly as he did; his family connections, talents, and victories made his unprecedented feats tolerable. While the republican system "made" Scipio, it also destroyed him. Scipio's career was too successful, the conqueror of Hannibal was too famous, and later Romans were alarmed at the precedents he created by his anomalous career. The nature and significance of Scipio's accomplishments made it near impossible for other Romans to reach such levels of achievement and therefore, many Romans resented his popularity; magistrates of the Middle Republic were highly competitive and were naturally inclined to prevent citizens, especially war heroes, from becoming too powerful. It is telling that one of the Republic's greatest heroes ended his life in relative obscurity.

Since most of Scipio's Second Punic War contemporaries predeceased him, he became a scapegoat for all of the unc customary actions taken during the war and a target for critics. Though Scipio's wartime career may have inspired the later extraordinary military commands that brought an end to the Republic, he was one of the few Romans to fully succeed in what all aspiring politicians and military commanders hoped for--victory over a talented and extremely dangerous enemy of Rome.

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See also Cannae, Battle of; Carthage (State); Cato the Elder; Cavalry (Imperial); Consul; Elite Participation; Fabius Maximus; Hannibal Barca; Hasdrubal Barca; Lake Trasimene, Battle of; Marcellus; Masinissa; Metaurus, Battle of the; New Carthage, Siege of; Punic War, Second; Republic, Political Structure; Siege Warfare; Zama, Battle of

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Scotland

The Romans first invaded Scotland in 79 CE, as part of the campaigns of the current governor of Britain, Gnaeus Julius Agricola. First-century Scotland was an Iron Age civilization, politically divided into many different tribes, each in control of its own territory, although the Romans referred to most of them as Caledonians. Agricola and his Roman army of four legions, some 20,000 troops with additional auxiliaries, made a swift advance into Scotland, establishing forts between the rivers Forth and the Clyde, a natural frontier, and rejecting the more difficult western route after investigating it by boat.

Instead the Romans took a route near the east coast, often finding the native tribes elusive and more inclined toward surprise attacks on fortresses and camps than pitched battles. In 83 or 84 CE the Romans met and defeated a concentration of Caledonian tribes at the battle of Mons Graupius, the location of which has never been conclusively identified. Likely suggestions are Bennachie, close to Inverurie, or Craig Rossie in Perthshire. Agricola was recalled from Britain shortly after the battle, and although his successor

began to construct forts and roads in the area, the soldiers were soon transferred to the volatile Danubian provinces. The Romans fell back progressively over the next 40 years, and the building of Hadrian's Wall in the 120s marked their temporary withdrawal from Scotland.

The Roman absence from Scottish territory did not last long. Hadrian's successor Antoninus Pius ordered the legate Lollius Urbicus to push the frontier northward. From 142–143 CE the Romans constructed a new frontier wall 37 miles long between the Forth and the Clyde, complete with fortlets every mile or so and forts at wider intervals. The wall remained the northern frontier of Roman Britain until 160–170 CE, when, either due to disturbances by local tribes or the order of the emperor Marcus Aurelius, the Romans again pulled back to Hadrian's Wall, and many forts to the north were destroyed or abandoned.

The third invasion of Scotland was led by the emperor Septimius Severus in 209 CE, who launched a campaign from Hadrian's Wall which progressed to, we are told, the end of the island. A treaty was made with the Caledonian tribes and Severus, as well as his son Caracalla who had accompanied him, took the title "Britannicus," or conqueror of Britain. Caracalla repressed a rebellion which sprang up soon after the conquest, but when his father Severus died in 211 CE, Caracalla left Scotland to consolidate his succession as emperor of Rome, effectively abandoning the Roman interest in Scotland. The last records of Roman intervention in Scotland come from the late third and early fourth centuries CE, when we hear of raids from hostile northern tribes and a battle with the Picts. Today evidence of Roman walls, ditches, forts, and material culture can still be seen in Scotland, primarily at the Antonine wall, but also as far north as the mouth of the Spey.

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See also Agricola; Britain, Roman; Caracalla; Hadrian's Wall; Septimius Severus

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Sebasteion of Aphrodisias

The Sebasteion (derived from *Sebastos* = Augustus in Greek) at Aphrodisias in Caria (southwestern Turkey) was a large sanctuary complex, containing a monumental gateway, processional way, and temple honoring Venus Genetrix and the Julio-Claudian emperors. It reflected the special relationship between Aphrodisias and Rome, as initiated by Caesar, who wished to emphasize his family's descent from Venus (that is, Aphrodite), the city's patron deity. In return, Aphrodisias was treated as a free allied city by Rome. Constructed under Tiberius, it was reconstructed under Claudius and then Nero by two local families. The gateway displayed statues of members of the Julio-Claudian dynasty and their mythical ancestors. The processional way was articulated on both sides by a three-story high architectural façade, which friezes depicted mythological, allegorical, and historical scenes of imperial victories, conquered peoples, Olympian gods, and myths of Greece and Rome. The reliefs offer a Greek perspective on Roman imperial power, presenting it as unashamedly monarchical and divinely justified. Allegorical scenes included personifications of Day and Ocean. Emperors of Rome appeared in heroic nudity: Augustus was represented, as might be expected, as conqueror by land and sea, but more incongruous are scenes of Claudius dealing the death blow to Britannia, and Nero to Armenia. Conquered peoples from around the world were represented as women whose distinctive costume and attributes may have been derived from prototype statues at Rome. The overall program visualized the idea of a Roman empire unlimited by time or space, as expressed by Jupiter in Virgil's *Aeneid* and as commemorated by Augustus' *Res Gestae*.

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See also Armenia; Augustus; Britain, Conquest of; Caesar, Gaius Julius; Claudius I; Cult of the Emperor; Emperor as Commander; Gender and War; Imperialism; Nero; *Res Gestae Divi Augusti*

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Second Triumvirate

The Second Triumvirate was the political alliance of Mark Antony, Octavian, and Marcus Aemilius Lepidus against their common enemies, namely the assassins of Caesar and their supporters in the Senate. It lasted from 43 to 33 BCE.

In late 44 BCE, Antony had illegally claimed the province of Cisalpine Gaul and in 43 attempted to drive out the legal governor, Decimus Junius Brutus (one of the leading assassins of Caesar), beginning a civil war. Octavian temporarily joined forces with the consuls of 43 BCE, Aulus Hirtius and Gaius Vibius Pansa, to stop Antony. Meanwhile, Lepidus delayed committing himself, allowing Cicero and the Senate to believe he would defend their interests.

Hirtius and Pansa defeated Antony in the battle of Mutina (April 43), but also themselves died, thus leaving Octavian in control of their army. When Octavian demanded the consulship and credit for the victory, the Senate reminded him he was too young to hold office legally and awarded it to Decimus Brutus for defeating Antony. Antony fled to Gaul. A dubious tradition, hostile to Lepidus, says that Antony took over Lepidus' army by force of personality, but a new theory suggests that Lepidus, who had previously been rejected when he offered to ally with Antony on equal terms, was now the stronger, so he forced the weakened Antony to accept him on equal terms. Antony and Lepidus agreed to unite with Octavian and formed the Second Triumvirate (November 43).

The triumvirs forced the Senate to accept Octavian as a candidate for the vacant consulship, and Octavian, crushing Cicero's hopes to guide and mentor him as a fellow consul, chose his own cousin, Quintus Pedius, instead as colleague. In August, Octavian and Pedius took office and immediately prosecuted the assassins of Caesar. They also passed a law formally constituting the Second Triumvirate and assigning the triumvirs the task of reorganizing the Republic. Then they began to proscribe their enemies, as well as many wealthy neutrals, confiscating their property to

raise money to fight the remaining assassins and reward their own troops. Many of the proscribed were hunted down and killed for rewards. Cicero was among the victims, targeted by Antony because of old familial resentments (Antony's wife Fulvia was the ex-wife of Clodius Pulcher, Cicero's old enemy) and because Cicero had vituperated Antony in the *Philippics* orations.

In October 42, Octavian and Antony defeated Brutus and Cassius in the two battles of Philippi, while Lepidus stayed in Italy to supervise affairs at home. Brutus and Cassius committed suicide. The few surviving opponents who would not seek terms joined Sextus Pompeius to continue resisting the Second Triumvirate. The victories at Philippi brought Antony much credit and began the diminution of Lepidus' powers.

Octavian returned to Italy to reward the veterans, while Antony toured the eastern provinces, punishing his enemies. It was during this time that he met Cleopatra, who utterly captivated him. In his absence, his brother Lucius Antonius and Antony's wife Fulvia fought Octavian unsuccessfully in the Perusine War (41–40). Antony returned to Italy, too late to save his brother, but nearly broke apart the Second Triumvirate.

A peace was negotiated between Antony and Octavian by the Cocceius Nerva brothers in the Treaty of Brundisium in 40. As part of the terms, Antony married Octavian's sister Octavia, although she was a widow and pregnant. Antony then persuaded Octavian to make peace with Sextus Pompeius in the Pact of Misenum in 39 and restore the exiles (except for the surviving assassins of Caesar) to their former civil rights, including Sextus who was assigned a consulship (probably for 35) and an augurship. Antony then relocated to Athens with Octavia, where their older daughter was born.

However, Octavian soon wrecked the peace with Sextus in 38. Antony failed to provide much assistance from Greece. Octavia reconciled her brother and her husband in the Pact of Tarentum (37), which also renewed the powers of the Second Triumvirate for an additional five years until December 31, 33. The Second Triumvirate then brought its full forces against Sextus, who was driven out of Sicily after two successive defeats at Mylae and Naulochus in 36. Lepidus' attempt to improve his position in the Second Triumvirate was checked by Octavian, who persuaded Lepidus' soldiers to defect. Lepidus was stripped of all offices and powers except the high priesthood and confined to Circeii. Octavian spared Lepidus so as not

to appear vindictive and assumed that Lepidus would soon die. In fact, Lepidus lived another quarter century.

Meanwhile, with help from Cleopatra, with whom he had renewed his earlier relationship, Antony invaded Persia in 35. The campaign was a disaster. To salvage some semblance of glory, Antony treacherously captured the king of Armenia, whom he paraded in a triumph in Egypt. Antony also formally recognized Cleopatra's oldest son as the son of the Divine Julius and gave Roman territory to all of her children in the infamous Donations of Alexandria. He also divorced Octavia and married Cleopatra.

Octavia initially refused to leave Antony's house and refused to surrender custody of his children and their children, until forced to give up his sons by the courts. Since his support in Italy was initially weak, Octavian used the cause of his wronged sister, as well as anti-Egyptian xenophobia, to whip up popular sentiment against Antony. When the year 33 closed, the Second Triumvirate expired. The successes of Octavian against Sextus had augmented his standing. Many of the most talented men loyal to the Second Triumvirate were now following Octavian, for Antony's reputation had suffered greatly from the Persian War and even more from his frivolity with Cleopatra, from his wasteful spending of monies, from his callous treatment of Octavia, and especially from donating Roman lands to a foreign power. Furthermore, Octavian laid aside his official powers derived from the Second Triumvirate, but Antony continued to exercise them in 32. He was maneuvered into rupturing the alliance for a war that would fight on a far greater battlefield than did the war of 43.

Gaius Stern

See also Augustus; Civil Wars (II) (44–31 BCE); Brundisium, Treaty of; Fulvia; Mark Antony; Octavian; Proscriptions; Tarentum, Pact of

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Sejanus (d. 31 CE)

Lucius Aelius Sejanus served as praetorian prefect under the emperor Tiberius (14–37 CE). An equestrian, Sejanus was the son of Seius Strabo who served in the position before him. Appointed in 14 CE shortly after Tiberius came to power, Sejanus initially held power with his father but within two years he occupied the post on his own; contrary to popular belief, the praetorian prefecture was not necessarily collegiate, and that he held the office without a colleague should not be viewed as an anomaly. Sejanus was instrumental in the establishment of a permanent camp in Rome (the *Castra Praetoria*) for the Praetorian Guard in ca. 23 CE. Given that all the cohorts had now been brought into the capital this was certainly a pragmatic decision, although Tacitus (*Annals* 4.2.1) hints at a more malevolent intention, namely that Sejanus wanted to ingratiate himself with the large number of troops now in Rome and under his command to control the city.

When Tiberius decided to leave the capital for the island of Capri three years later, Sejanus stayed in Rome where he apparently monitored events, looking after the emperor's interests and reporting activities via the praetorians, much to the dismay of the senatorial order in particular. In fact, the prefect is associated in the literary sources with many of the malicious actions undertaken in the late 20s by Tiberius, for example, the exile of Agrippina the Elder, widow of the popular general Germanicus, and the death of Tiberius' own son, Drusus. That Sejanus was influential there can be no doubt: he received many honors, including the *ornamenta praetoria* (giving him the rights of a praetor without having held the office), and in 31 CE, he served as consul with the emperor himself. Yet later that same year, his downfall was cleverly engineered by Tiberius; the reasons are unknown. Later literary sources (for example, Josephus, Juvenal, Suetonius; though Tacitus is missing for much of the period 30–31 CE, there are hints elsewhere in the *Annals*) suggest that Sejanus wanted power for himself, though it is doubtful that an equestrian would have been accepted as emperor in the early Julio-Claudian period. In fact, Cassius Dio records that while the prefect was uncertain about Tiberius' attitude toward him, he did not conspire against the emperor. It is more probable that Sejanus had made some powerful enemies in the years after Tiberius left Rome and these men were able to convince the emperor that an individual in charge of so many soldiers (at this point, the praetorians may have numbered as many as

12,000) was a great risk, more to them than to Tiberius himself. The prefect was arrested at a meeting of the Senate and executed along with his family on the same day.

Sejanus was the first of many powerful praetorian prefects. The office grew in importance in the second century, praetorian prefects deputizing for the emperor in civilian administration. Some praetorian prefects, such as Macrinus, Philip, and Carus, usurped the imperial power. Others, such as Sejanus or Septimius Severus' prefect Plautianus, fell to imperial suspicions of treason.

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See also Cassius Dio; *Praefectus*; Praetorians; Tiberius (Emperor)

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Senate, Senators

The Roman Senate, an aristocratic council with several hundred members or senators, was the major governing entity of the Roman Republic; during the Principate, it lost actual power to the emperors and their staff, but continued to command prestige and influence. During the Republic, the Senate oversaw foreign affairs, military policy, and financial affairs for the growing Roman Empire. In the Republic, the Senate was a check upon the powers of the higher magistrates (consuls, praetors, or dictator). In the empire, the Senate was a check upon the emperors' potential tyranny. That emperors should cooperate with the Senate and respect it (at least, spare the lives of individual senators) became a standard element of Roman imperial ideology, maintained into the later empire. However, executive magistrates and emperors also sought to control the Senate by regulating its composition and changing the qualifications for membership. For various reasons, the Senate failed at natural self-reproduction and had to be

replenished from without, admitting first Italian, then provincial aristocrats. Participation in Roman senatorial tradition was more dependent on the acquisition and display of culture than on genealogical descent from ancient families.

According to Roman tradition, the archaic Senate advised the kings. The Latin *senatus* and *senator* are related to *senex* (old man) and *senectus* (old age), indicating that the Senate was a council of elders; another term for the Senate was the *patres* (fathers). After the overthrow of the monarchy in 510 BCE, the Senate remained an advisory council, though its numbers and exact composition are unclear. Even in this period, all senators were not necessarily ex-magistrates or patricians. As a result of the patrician-plebeian conflict, after 367 BCE plebeians were admitted to the consulship and thus might enter the Senate.



Relief from the Forum of Trajan (ca. 118–125 CE), depicting senators in procession. Though Augustus reorganized Roman military hierarchy and provincial administration to discourage senators from revolting against the emperors, senators

still commanded great prestige in Roman society. Located in the Louvre Museum, Paris, France. (Alinari/Bridgeman Images)

The *lex Ovinia* of 319/318 BCE codified membership in the Senate, probably restricting it to ex-magistrates, at this time ex-consuls and ex-praetors. The *lex Ovinia* required the censors to examine the membership of the Senate and to choose worthy individuals (including plebeians and equestrians) to add to the Senate while demoting unworthy senators. Thus another term for the Senate was *patres et conscripti*, referring to the traditional members and to those who had been chosen for admission. Senators at this time were required to possess at least the equestrian census (landed property worth 400,000 HS).

In the middle and late Roman Republic (from ca. 264 to 27 BCE), the Senate had important political, military, and fiscal responsibilities. The Senate received foreign embassies and thus handled Rome's diplomatic relations with other states, arbitrating disputes between allies. The Senate assigned commanders their *provinciae*, their theaters of war and areas of administration. It assigned consuls and praetors their funding and assistants, including the quaestors, who managed logistics and military pay. The Senate thus had some control over Roman foreign and military policy and over the consuls as commanders-in-chief, even though, given the slowness of communication in the ancient world, the Senate might be out of touch with the consuls or praetors in their provinces. The Senate had competence over state religion, authorizing new cults and receiving reports of portents, such as the birth of deformed animals and humans or plagues of insects, that might require religious expiation.

The powers of the Senate even grew in the last two centuries of the Republic. The Roman people traditionally had the power to declare war and vote on legislation, but in this period the Senate deliberated and voted on such decisions and the popular vote was only a rubber stamp. Occasionally, governors were appointed by popular vote, which gave Marius command of the Jugurthine War and Pompey the command of the campaign against Mediterranean piracy and the Mithridatic War. The Senate also determined the prorogation of magistrates, extending their tenure of command in their provinces.

The Senate might also authorize criminal trials upon receiving complaints from Roman citizens or provincials. However, it did not preside

over such trials during the Republic. From 149 BCE, individual senators might serve on jury boards in the criminal courts (*quaestiones*), though the composition of these juries varied. Sometimes legislation requiring jury panels of equestrians or lower-status citizens was passed to avoid the conflict of interest when senators sat in judgment upon senators.

Above all the Senate was a conservative force, representing Rome's most aristocratic and wealthiest elements; even its plebeian members were well-to-do aristocrats whose interests aligned with the patricians rather than with the lower social strata. The Senate thus was a countering force to the equestrians, the popular assemblies, and the tribunes of the plebs. This remained the case even when Senate membership was opened to former aediles and quaestors (junior magistrates). Procedure within the Senate gave greatest influence (*auctoritas*) to the highest-ranking ex-magistrates, permitting them to speak first in debate, starting with the patrician ex-censor who was termed *princeps senatus*. However, the Senate as a whole had its own *patrum auctoritas*.

In the late Republic, the conflict intensified between the Senate's wealthy and conservative nobles (often termed oligarchs or optimates) versus *populares* (the tribunes, assemblies, and *plebs urbana*, and politicians who supported or exploited them). Marius owed his consulship of 107 BCE to tribune activism; the tribunes and their supporters also played a major role in the Marian-Sullan Conflict. In reaction, Sulla as dictator (82–81 BCE) instituted various conservative reforms intended to shore up the power of the Senate and reduce the influence of the tribunes. He increased the size of the Senate to 600 and opened the Senate to former quaestors; since he also enlarged the number of quaestors to provide Roman commanders and governors with more efficient administration, he added many new senators. Sulla also promoted many equestrians, including Italian aristocrats, into the Senate.

Caesar, as dictator (49–44 BCE) and the triumvirs (43–33 BCE) also increased the size of the Senate, promoting their supporters into the Senate. As a result the Senate's size increased to 900 under Caesar (Dio 43.47.3) and over 1,000 by the end of the triumviral period. As a result, Augustus cut back the ranks of the Senate to 600 and imposed other policies to stabilize the Senate and differentiate it from the equestrian order. He increased the property requirement to 1,000,000 HS and, in the role of censor, examined the qualifications of senators, demoting the unworthy and elevating suitable

new senators from the equestrian order.

The imperial Senate was markedly less powerful, but Augustus sought to mask this reality, presenting himself as cooperating with the Senate. Senate decrees continued to be promulgated and acquired the force of law. The Senate conducted criminal trials involving its own members. Though the senators continued to debate policy in the Curia, in reality decisions were made by the emperor and his staff, and in the provinces by senatorial governors. However, it became part of imperial ideology that “good emperors” treated the Senate with respect; “bad emperors,” such as Tiberius, Nero, or Domitian, persecuted and humiliated senators.

In some respects the imperial Senate resembled a hereditary aristocracy, but it was not exclusive or strictly hereditary. The son of a senators became eligible to wear the *latus clavus* (a broad-striped tunic, traditionally worn by senators) at 17, but he was not yet a senator; he served a year as military tribune and then as a *vigintivir*, a very junior magistracy at Rome. To become senator, he still had to be elected quaestor at age 25. The Senate, rather than the citizen assembly, now voted for quaestors, aediles, and praetors; consuls and governors of imperial provinces were appointed by the emperor. Governors of public provinces were selected by lot.

The republican and imperial Senate notably failed to reproduce itself by natural (hereditary) processes. Political competition in the republican Senate was fierce; a minority of prominent families attained the higher magistracies in every generation, but most senators were unlikely to do so. Roman partitive inheritance, dividing property among all surviving children, meant that a family with many children might fall below the property qualification for senators; on the other hand, a senator with few children might die without sons. Running for office in the Principate was still highly competitive. Furthermore, when some emperors persecuted senators whom they perceived as threats, they extinguished some families and motivated many senators to withdraw from politics until a better regime arrived.

As a result, the turnover of Senate membership was high and resulted in the provincialization of the Senate. The Julio-Claudian emperors promoted wealthy local aristocrats in Romanized Spain and southern Gaul into the Senate. In an edict that survives as an inscription at Lyons (*ILS* 212; compare Tacitus, *Annals* 11.23), Claudius I (41–54 CE) defended the elevation of Gauls to the Senate. By this time, a century after Caesar’s conquest of Gaul, some

Gallic aristocrats had acquired the Roman citizenship and the necessary wealth and education for Senate membership. Later senatorial families hailed from the Greek eastern empire (among them was the historian Cassius Dio) and from North Africa. The Senate of Dio's time probably had very few members who were directly descended from families of the middle or even late Republic. But the Senate maintained its prestige as a guardian of Roman traditions.

In the late second and early third centuries CE, equestrians began to supplant senators in military commands, culminating in the mid-third century with the exclusion of senators from military commands and provincial governorships. The governors and legates were now equestrians. The extent to which the exclusion was formal (attributed to the emperor Gallienus) is unclear; even the Tetrarchs, stereotyped as hostile to the aristocracy, still promoted senators to prestigious posts such as the proconsulship of Africa and the city prefect of Rome. In a period when emperors rarely visited Rome, the city prefect (*praefectus urbi*) governed the city of Rome in their stead. Admittedly these posts lacked military responsibilities.

When Constantine (306–337 CE) chose Byzantium as his new capital and renamed it Constantinople, he also established a Senate equal in prestige to the Roman Senate. In the later Roman Empire, promotion to the rank of senator was now an imperial honor resulting from service in the civilian or military administration that had little to do with presence in Rome or in Constantinople. The numbers of persons with senatorial rank thus greatly increased. However, the senators of Rome continued to play an important cultural role, most notably as defenders of paganism against the increasingly militant Christian emperor Theodosius I (379–395).

Sara E. Phang

See also Aedile; Augustus; Caesar, Gaius Julius; Cassius Dio; Claudius I; Constantine I; Consul; *Cursus Honorum* (Imperial); *Cursus Honorum* (Republic); *Equites*, Equestrians; Patricians; Plebeians; Quaestor; Sulla, Lucius Cornelius; Tiberius (Emperor); Tiberius Gracchus

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Senatus Consultum Ultimum

The *senatus consultum ultimum* (SCU), the so-called last decree of the Senate, was an emergency decree passed by the Roman Senate that gave Roman magistrates leeway to employ unrestricted force against perceived enemies of the state. In form, as with all decrees of the Senate, the SCU was an advisory statement issued to a magistrate, usually the one who presided over the meeting of the Senate at which the decree was passed. The normal wording empowered the presiding magistrate, sometimes together with other executive officers of the Roman Republic, “to defend the state and see to it that the state suffers no harm.” In terms of practical effect, the decree could not in itself institute a state of emergency. The passage of the SCU, however, clearly demonstrated that the magistrate who called for its use believed that a state of emergency was currently in existence, and the magistrate was seeking the approval of the members of the Roman Senate for any actions he might take that would under normal conditions violate the statute law of the Roman Republic. The legitimacy of violence undertaken against public enemies subsequent to the passing of a SCU was hotly disputed.

The first historical attestation of its passage was in 121 BCE, when the consul Lucius Opimius had the Senate pass a decree calling upon him to defend the state in response to the perceived threat of potential violent revolution arising from the activities of Gaius Sempronius Gracchus and his followers, who advocated reforms that threatened the material interests of the oligarchy. Tribune of the plebs in 123 and 122, Gaius was no longer

tribune in 121 and was not protected by tribunician sacrosanctity. Following the passage of the decree, Opimius gathered an armed following and attacked Gaius Gracchus and his supporters, killing many of them. Gracchus' remaining followers were then tried by a special tribunal set up to prosecute them. While it has been argued that the decree gave Opimius the power and authority to take these actions in response to a perceived threat to the safety and security of the Roman state, opinion about the legality of his actions has been debated since ancient times into the current era. Opimius relied mainly upon his powers as consul (*imperium*) to suppress Gracchus, though he also openly flouted both statute law and recognized political customs. The legality of his actions were only confirmed in the aftermath, when Opimius was prosecuted for putting Roman citizens to death without formal trial (a violation of statute law), but was acquitted.

While the passage of this decree might have been only a single exceptional incident, when another tribune of the plebs, Lucius Appuleius Saturninus, and his associates, including the praetor Gaius Servilius Glaucia, threatened open civil war in Rome in 100 BCE, the consul Marius had the Senate pass the SCU. Subsequently, Marius gathered armed forces and suppressed the attempted rising by Saturninus, Glaucia, and their associates. With this second use of the decree, a firm precedent for its use was established.

In the decades following the suppression of Saturninus and Glaucia, the SCU was passed on eight further occasions. In 83 BCE it was employed by the supporters of Marius (who was dead by then) and Cinna in Rome in response to Sulla's invasion of Italy; the Roman Senate considered Sulla a renegade at the time. The SCU was passed in 77 BCE to mobilize support to counter the seditious activity of Marcus Lepidus. It was passed in 63 BCE to rally forces against the conspiracy of Catiline. The SCU was passed again in 52 BCE to suppress the massive street riots that followed the murder of the tribune Publius Clodius Pulcher. In 49 BCE the Senate passed the SCU to counter Caesar's threat to invade Italy. In 47 the SCU was passed against Dolabella and Trebellius. In 43 BCE the SCU was employed to raise an armed force to counter Mark Antony, who was attempting to seize northern Italy by armed force. The Senate also passed the SCU for the last time against Octavian in the same year, as he marched against the city of Rome with an army to force his election as consul.

In summary, the SCU was a public statement by the Roman Senate, in

response to the request of a Roman magistrate, that an emergency existed in Rome. It indicated that the Senate was calling upon the magistrate, along with other public officers, to take any and all actions to see to it that the state suffered no harm. While the Senate could not actually grant magistrates any further powers, nor could it confer any special immunity on magistrates who used extra-legal means which violated statute law to suppress threats against the state, the Senate could provide political cover for a magistrate who went beyond the law to suppress a crisis situation that threatened violence against the government. The SCU thus provided some justification for violent reprisals against perceived threats to public order.

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See also Appuleius Saturninus, Lucius; Civil Conflict (Late Republic); Conspiracy of Catiline; Gracchan Land Conflict; Marius; Public Order; Republic, Political Structure; State of Emergency; Sulla, Lucius Cornelius; Tribune of the Plebs

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Sentinum, Battle of (295 BCE)

The battle of Sentinum (295 BCE), described in Livy 10.27–30, broke Samnite resistance in the Third Samnite War (298–290 BCE). Sentinum, commanded by the consuls Quintus Fabius Maximus Rullianus and Publius Decius Mus, was the largest battle that the Romans had fought to this date. It featured a remarkable coalition of Rome's enemies. After the battle of Sentinum, the end of the Samnite wars became inevitable.

The Samnites made a remarkable alliance with the Gauls (of Cisalpine Gaul, Italy north of the Po). They also allied with the Etruscans and Umbrians (Livy 10.21.11–15). However, only the Samnites and Gauls appeared at the battle.

Sentinum was the largest battle that the Romans had yet fought. The Roman forces are estimated at 30,000 to 40,000 men. Ancient authors provide exaggerated figures for the enemy (for example, 650,000 in Livy 10.30.5) which are not credible.

In the battle, Publius Decius Mus sacrificed himself by *devotio*, vowing his death in battle to the gods in return for victory and suicidally plunging into the thick of combat to take as many as possible of the enemy with him. The same act is attributed to his father Publius Decius Mus at the battle of Veseris (340).

The Samnite resistance was broken by the battle of Sentinum. The surviving Samnites regrouped and offered battle at Aquilonia in 293, but were also defeated by the Romans. The Romans acquired large parts of Samnium and forced the Samnites to become allies; in this period also the remaining Etruscan cities were conquered.

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See also *Devotio*; Gaul, Gauls; Samnium, Samnites; Samnite Wars

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Septimius Severus (Emperor) (193–211 CE)

Lucius Septimius Severus (emperor 193–211 CE), a victor of civil war and founder of the Severan dynasty, was born ca. 145 in Lepcis Magna, a city in Roman North Africa. His grandfather was a local notable in Lepcis; his father entered the senatorial order. Severus was thus of senatorial rank and prior to 193 followed a regular senatorial career, holding the consulship in 190. He married Julia Domna, a Syrian aristocrat, not many years before 188; their elder son Bassianus (later Marcus Aurelius Antoninus, the emperor Caracalla) was born in 188, their younger son Geta in 189. Severus was appointed governor of Upper Pannonia, the office he held when

Commodus (181–192) was assassinated and Pertinax became emperor.

Pertinax' strictness displeased the praetorians, who assassinated him. 12 days later, Severus was acclaimed emperor by his troops at Carnuntum. Severus marched on Rome claiming to avenge Pertinax. At this time he obtained the support of Clodius Albinus, then governor of Britain.

At Rome, the praetorians "auctioned" off the empire to the man who promised them the largest donative. Sulpicianus, Pertinax' father-in-law, was outbid by Didius Julianus, who became a short-lived emperor. As Severus neared Rome, the Senate supported Severus and condemned Didius Julianus, who was done away with. Severus entered Rome to unanimous support on June 19, 193.

Severus punished the disloyalty of the praetorians (and their impiety for murdering emperors) by disbanding the Guard and discharging its members en masse without benefits. He recruited a new Guard, recruited not from Italy as hitherto had been the case, but promoted from the Danubian legions. He also enlisted three new legions, raised military pay, and granted serving soldiers the right to marry. The Greek historian Herodian (*History of Rome* 3.8.5) represents these measures as catering to the army's demands, but Severus' policy resolved the legal problems of soldiers' families. Soldiers previously had formed de facto marriages with women and had illegitimate children, making it difficult for the women and children to inherit.

Pescennius Niger revolted and was proclaimed emperor in Syria in April 193. After consolidating his position at Rome, Severus marched his army east and defeated Niger at Cyzicus and Nicaea by winter 193. Niger died in spring 194. Severus punished Syria by dividing it into two smaller provinces. Severus then campaigned aggressively against the Persians, perhaps to punish them for supporting Niger, but victory over Persia was also a traditional goal. His campaign was successful, adding Mesopotamia and Osrhoene to the Roman Empire.

Clodius Albinus, Severus' erstwhile ally, revolted and invaded Gaul. Severus declared war on Albinus, invaded Gaul, and defeated Albinus at Lyons in February 197.

Severus then took reprisals against the supporters of Albinus, putting to death 29 senators. He left Rome for another Persian campaign in 198, capturing the city of Ctesiphon. He then organized Mesopotamia as a Roman province, also visiting Egypt and reorganizing the administration.

Severus promoted his two sons as intended heirs, renaming his older son

Bassianus Marcus Aurelius Antoninus (claiming a dynastic link with the admirable Marcus Aurelius) and raising him to the rank of Caesar, then, after the capture of Ctesiphon, co-Augustus. Imperial edicts and correspondence from 198 to 211 name Severus and Antoninus (Caracalla) as co-emperors. Geta was only elevated to the rank of Caesar. Severus stayed in Italy in 203–208, then traveled to Britain with his sons and campaigned in Scotland. He elevated Geta to the rank of Augustus in 210. Septimius Severus died from natural causes at York in north Britain in 211, succeeded by his sons Caracalla and Geta, though Geta would rule only briefly, assassinated by Caracalla (211–217).

Severus has been termed a “military monarch” by modern scholars for his emphasis on military power; he proved a ruthless and aggressive military leader, and on his deathbed he allegedly told his sons, “Be harmonious, enrich the soldiers and despise everyone else.” However, the urban elite at Rome and in other major cities, such as the Greek senator and historian Cassius Dio, had a motive to exaggerate Severus’ favoritism toward the army. In the urban elite’s view, emperors should favor the Senate and other educated elites, not the army, which offered social mobility to relatively low-born men. Severus also promoted the rule of law, promoting highly talented jurists such as Papinian and Ulpian. When Severus’ praetorian prefect Plautianus was suspected of disloyalty and condemned, Severus appointed the jurist Papinian as praetorian prefect (the emperor’s deputy in civilian administration). The tendency for equestrians to attain key administrative posts and military commands becomes apparent in the Severan period.

Severus’ founding of a dynasty was successful in that (except for the emperor Macrinus in 217–218) Severan relatives held the throne until 235, but unsuccessful due to dynastic strife and civil war. Caracalla assassinated Geta, and Caracalla had no sons. Julia Domna’s sister Julia Maesa and her nieces, Julia Soaemias and Julia Mamaea, promoted as emperors Soaemias’ and Mamaea’s respective teenage sons, Elagabalus (218–222) and Alexander (222–235). The resulting weak rule and instability promoted the third-century crisis.

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See also Alexander Severus; Caracalla; Civil War (Pertinax–Septimius Severus); Clodius Albinus; Didius Julianus; Elagabalus; Empresses; Families

of Imperial Soldiers; Macrinus; Pertinax; Pescennius Niger; Praetorians; Third-Century CE Crisis

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Sertorius (ca. 123–72 BCE)

Quintus Sertorius was unique among the ranks of notable Roman generals for his ability to effectively command irregular forces against other Romans. The highly competitive nature of Roman politics led to intense rivalries between politicians that could and did lead to violence during the last century of the Republic. A Marian supporter, Sertorius played a major role in the Social Wars and the strife between Marius and Sulla. After Sulla’s victory, Sertorius was exiled and made his way to Spain. Once there, he made himself a reputation as a first-rate commander and administrator while leading a guerilla-style campaign against Sullan supporters in Spain. Those supporters included Pompey, and Sertorius proved to be Pompey’s greatest obstacle in his early military career.

Sertorius’ family was part of the aristocracy of the city of Nursia, and he almost certainly was the first of his line to run for office in Rome itself. He served under Marius during the invasion of the Cimbri and the Teutones at the end of the second century BCE, and earned a reputation for bravery while

operating as an undercover spy during the invasion. Sertorius further secured his reputation in Spain in 97 BCE when he quelled an uprising by the Celtiberians and their Oretani allies in the city of Castulo. The rebels had caught the Roman garrison of the city off-guard, and during the chaos Sertorius rallied as many men as he could, held open a city gate, and proceeded to kill every Celtiberian male able to bear arms. This ruthless victory was followed by a shrewd move to punish the Oretani immediately. Sertorius dressed his men in Spanish tunics, and learned enough words of the language to pass as a true Celtiberian. The deception allowed the Romans to be welcomed into the city by a cheering crowd. Many of the Oretani were killed and the majority of the rest were sold into slavery. His exploits in Spain earned Sertorius the election to the quaestorship, once again serving under Marius.

As quaestor, Sertorius was in charge of raising, training, and even leading troops during the Social War. He led boldly from the front, infusing his troops with his contempt for the enemy and trusting his own arms for protection. He became very popular in Rome for his military exploits. After Sulla's march on Rome in 88 BCE, Sertorius remained allied to Marius, but after Sulla's victory, Sertorius was expelled from Rome. He spent a few years wandering the Mediterranean, but after defeating a Sullan army in Mauretania he answered an appeal by Lusitanians in the Iberian peninsula to rid them of their oppressive governor. It was in the wars in Spain from 80–72 BCE that Sertorius fought his greatest battles, largely against other Romans.

Sertorius was heavily outnumbered; according to Plutarch his forces originally mustered only 2,600 legionaries, 700 cavalry, and 4,700 allied infantry compared to the 122,000 infantry and 6,000 cavalry fielded by the Roman governors in Spain. Yet Sertorius proved victorious in battle after battle, defeating both governors in 80 and the replacement governor of Nearer Spain in 79. The replacement for Further Spain, Quintus Caecilius Metellus Pius, could not best Sertorius in combat, and suffered a string of defeats over the next few years. With each victory, Sertorius' army and power grew. Sertorius had a strong relationship with local natives in Spain, and even had a mystical side to his leadership. He kept a tame white doe which became a sort of soothsayer for his men—news would be announced as if it came from the fawn, and Sertorius would also decorate the doe with garlands when he heard about a victory won by a detachment of his men.

These methods greatly impressed his Spanish allies.

By 77, Sertorius was in control of much of Roman Spain. He continued to call himself the properly appointed magistrate of the Roman Republic, even forming his own “Senate” and holding elections. He instilled Roman discipline, formations, and tactics in his mixed army. He also received reinforcements from Italy; remnants from a failed rebellion against the Senate by Marcus Aemilius Lepidus fled to Spain under the command of Marcus Perperna Vento, who eventually joined Sertorius’ forces.

Sertorius faced a new opponent when the Roman Senate appointed Pompey the province of Nearer Spain in 77. Pompey quickly attempted to bring Sertorius to battle. He closed in on Sertorius while the latter besieged the city of Lauron, but was outflanked and withdrew. Pompey then suffered a serious setback when a foraging force was ambushed by Sertorius’ men, and the legion sent by Pompey as reinforcements was also surrounded and crushed. Pompey could only stand by and watch as 10,000 of his men perished.

After the disaster at Lauron, Pompey and Metellus merged their armies. Sertorius again defeated the Roman governors at another major battle near the River Turia in 75, in no small part due to Sertorius personally leading his men. In addition, his white doe, which had gone missing, had been found in a nearby clearing, and the find reinvigorated his soldiers’ morale. Sertorius was able to counter every attempt at trapping his army, eschewing battle in favor of attacking Roman supply lines. Both sides received reinforcements, Pompey getting the Senate to send two legions, while Sertorius made an alliance with Mithridates of Pontus to receive ships and funding—though the alliance failed to amount to anything substantial. Pompey and Metellus still could not win any sort of decisive victory against Sertorius, however.

While Sertorius was not losing the war, it was clear by now he could not win it. Sulla had retired in 79, and the Senate was filled with his supporters. Sertorius and his “Senate” would not be recognized by the official Senate of Rome. With Sulla’s death shortly after his retirement, the cause for fighting the war was gone. Sertorius offered to surrender to Metellus and Pompey on the condition that he be allowed to return to Rome to live as a private citizen. This was refused. The futility of the conflict caused Sertorius’ army to fall apart. Many of his men deserted, and his supporter Perperna spread rumors undermining Sertorius’ authority. Perperna had no intention of

surrendering and tricked Sertorius into joining him for meal and entertainment, where Perperna had him killed. Pompey quickly crushed Perperna's army and ended the war in Spain in 72.

Sertorius had the misfortune of fighting for the losing side during a civil war. He had fought extremely well with limited resources against his fellow Romans, and his gifts as a commander, leader, and administrator were of the finest quality.

Michael J. Stout

See also Germans; Marius; Mithridatic Wars; Pompey; Spanish Wars; Sulla, Lucius Cornelius

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Servian Constitution

The Servian constitution, ascribed to King Servius Tullius (578–535 BCE) but probably a development of the fifth century BCE Republic, organized the Roman citizen body according to *classes* (sg. *classis*) and centuries (*centuriae*). This organization assisted military organization, but was not directly descriptive of the organization of the Roman army. It was more closely related to the Roman voting system.

The Servian constitution is described by Livy 1.43 and Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *Roman History* 4.16–18. The first class of infantry, comprised of men with a property rating of 100,000 *asses* or more, comprised 80 centuries, 40 being *seniores* (men aged 46–60), and 40 *iuniores* (men aged 17–45). Class two, worth 75,000 to 100,000 *asses*, comprised 10 centuries of *iuniores* and 10 of *seniores*; class three (worth 50,000 to 75,000 *asses*) and four (worth 25,000 to 50,000 *asses*) likewise; class five (worth 11,000 to 25,000

asses) comprised 15 centuries of *iuniores* and 15 of *seniores*. These five classes, totaling 170 centuries, were all infantry. Cavalry formed 18 centuries; army engineers, two centuries; musicians, two centuries; and *proletarii* (men without property), one century.

Assignment to the classes was determined by the census, another supposed institution of Servius Tullius, which listed male citizens by name and assigned their class and century. The property estimation in *asses* reflects an early stage of Roman coinage, though probably later than fifth century BCE.

Livy and Dionysius relate the centuriate organization to military service: members of the first class were responsible for providing their full armor, including a helmet, a round shield, a breastplate, and greaves; those of the second class provided a helmet, oblong shield, and greaves; those of the third class provided only a helmet and oblong shield. This armament probably reflects fifth- and fourth-century BCE warfare, as it resembles the hoplite panoply of classical Greece. The *iuniores*, as younger adult men, were the front-line soldiers; the *seniores* formed a rear guard.

However, neither the classes nor the centuries map directly onto the structure of the mid-republican legion, ca. 220–170 BCE, which consisted of 4,200 men according to Polybius, including 3,000 heavy infantry and 1,200 *velites* (lighter-armed troops). The number of men in each Servian century is uncertain, as wealthier men in the first and second classes must have been less numerous than those in the subsequent classes. A *centuria* in the Roman legion might well number less than 100 men (usually 60 to 80). In the actual *dilectus* or levy, men assembled according to their tribes, and the magistrates picked out the most suitable men for enlistment. Rather, the Servian constitution provided a basis for taxation and a structure for voting in the centuriate assembly, in which the wealthier citizens (cavalry and infantry in the first class) voted first and *seniores* had precedence over *iuniores*. This voting structure favored the wealthy and older men over the poor and younger men.

Sara E. Phang

See also Comitia; Dilectus; Legion, Organization of; Recruitment of Army; Republic, Political Structure; Servius Tullius

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Servius Tullius (578–535 BCE)

Servius Tullius was Rome's sixth king, who according to tradition rose from servile origins but may have been an Etruscan adventurer. Many important institutions of the early Republic are attributed to Servius, probably anachronistically.

According to Roman legend, Servius was the son of a Latin captive woman, born in the palace of Tarquinius Priscus and marked by portents that he would one day be king. Tarquinius Priscus and his wife Tanaquil accordingly favored Servius, and when Tarquinius Priscus was assassinated by the sons of Ancus Marcius, Tanaquil covered up his death and declared that Priscus had appointed Servius as his successor. The death of Priscus was then announced, and Servius was accepted as king. Though the legend treats Servius favorably, he appears to be an usurper. The emperor Claudius I (41–54) was a scholar of Etruscan history and argued that Servius was an Etruscan mercenary named Mastarna (*ILS* 212, an address to the Senate advocating the promotion of Gauls into the Senate), possibly identifiable with *Macstrna* in Etruscan inscriptions. Thus an Etruscan warlord may have made himself king, marrying the daughter of Tarquinius Priscus according to legend. The reality of the monarchy was probably not a succession of hereditary dynasts but a succession of “tyrants” in the Greek sense, strong men who negotiated their way into or seized power, being confirmed as kings by the patricians who made up the Senate. In his turn Servius was assassinated by Tarquinius Superbus and by his wife Servius' daughter Tullia. The conventional legend of Servius Tullius is told in Livy's *History of Rome*.

The “Servian constitution,” the “Servian Wall,” the censors and census, the tribes, and Roman coinage and military pay are all attributed to Servius Tullius. These attributions are anachronistic. The Servian Wall dates from the early fourth century BCE, and Roman coinage from the late fourth

century. The Servian constitution and other elements of the Republic's political structure were probably formulated much later than the sixth century BCE. In the opinion of Timothy Cornell, Roman antiquarians ascribed these institutions to Servius Tullius to grant them time-honored antiquity, without incurring the odium attached to the last king, Tarquinius Superbus.

Sara E. Phang

See also Etruria, Etruscans; Livy; Overthrow of the Monarchy; Servian Constitution

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Severus (Emperor) (306–307 CE)

Not to be confused with the emperors Septimius Severus (193–211) or Alexander Severus (222–235) or Libius Severus (461–465), Flavius Valerius Severus was one of the minor Tetrarchs, raised to the rank of Caesar in 305 and becoming Augustus in the western empire on the death of Constantius I (306). However, Severus was unable to cope with his many rivals, Constantine I, Maximian, and Maxentius, all of whom revolted and claimed the title of emperor after the death of Constantius. Charged with ruling Italy and Africa, Severus attempted to suppress the revolt of Maxentius at Rome in 307. He did not reach Maxentius, being deserted by his own soldiers, most of whom were Maximian's veterans and unwilling to fight Maxentius, the son of Maximian. Severus fled to Ravenna, where Maximian forced him to abdicate. Severus was a prisoner for some time until Maxentius forced him to commit suicide.

Sara E. Phang

See also Constantine I; Constantius I; Maxentius; Maximian; Tetrarchic Civil War

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Sextus Pompeius (ca. 75–35 BCE)

Sextus Pompeius was the youngest son of Pompey the Great. During the Civil War between Pompey and Caesar, Sextus was sent to Lesbos with his stepmother. After Pompey's defeat at Pharsalus in 48 BCE, Sextus traveled with him to Egypt where he witnessed Pompey's assassination. After the defeat at Thapsus in 46 BCE, Sextus and his brother Gnaeus fled to Spain where Caesar defeated them at Munda in 45 BCE. While Gnaeus died, Sextus escaped. Thereafter, Sextus was accused of piracy while gathering men who had served under his father and brother. Eventually, Mark Antony arranged for peace with Sextus by compensating him for his father's confiscated properties and given command of the sea. The peace was short as Sextus was accused again of piracy and took control of Sicily. To secure grain for Rome, a peace was struck between Sextus, Octavian, and Antony. It gave Sextus Sicily and the Peloponnesus and married Octavian to Scribonia, a relative to Sextus by marriage. This agreement collapsed and war resumed between Octavian and Sextus. Sextus twice defeated Octavian off Messana. Octavian then joined with Lepidus' army in Sicily while Agrippa, Octavian's general, defeated Sextus at sea off Naulochus in 36 BCE. Sextus escaped to Bithynia and was executed on Antony's orders in 35 BCE at the age of 40.

Robert Vigus

See also Caesar, Gaius Julius; Civil Wars (II) (44–31 BCE); Mark Antony; Munda, Battle of; Octavian; Pompey; Second Triumvirate

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Sicilian Slave War, First (135–131 BCE)

The First Sicilian Slave War or First Servile War was a slave revolt in Roman Sicily from 135–131 BCE. It arose due to the growth of large slave-worked estates, where many recently acquired slaves were mistreated and poorly managed. The initial revolt in Enna inspired other rebellions, leading to a crisis that threatened Rome's food supply and briefly the stability of the Republic. Only after several defeats and the loss of many lives did Roman armies suppress the uprising.

As the slave population of Roman Italy rose steeply during the second century BCE, more and more slaves from the Greek-speaking eastern Mediterranean were concentrated on large estates especially in Sicily, a major producer of grain for Roman Italy, providing the opportunity and manpower for the revolt. Many of the slaves were freeborn and some were even soldiers sold into slavery as prisoners of war. According to Diodorus Siculus, the wealthy slave-owners branded them and deprived them of every means of survival, forcing many escapees into a life of brigandage. The survival skills they learned well prepared the future rebels for the upcoming revolt. Although they saw the problem worsening, the Roman governors of Sicily were unable or unwilling to curb the scope of slavery for fear of reprisal from the owners who were Roman equestrians, as equestrians composed the juries when a provincial governor was tried for corruption or extortion (Diodorus 34.2.3, 31). As a result the abuses escalated to the point that Sicily became unsafe for travelers.

A wealthy Sicilian, Antigones of Enna, owned a Syrian slave from Apamea named Eunus, who used to perform magic tricks and make prophecies. Eunus often predicted that he would be king one day and impressed the credulous by using a device to blow fire from his mouth. The slaves of Damophilus and his wife Megallis, driven to extremes by vicious punishments, consulted Eunus as to whether they should revolt. Promising them success, Eunus incited them to kill their masters and take over the city. About 400 slaves with Eunus at their head broke into the houses of the

owners and tortured and killed their masters. Damophilus was publicly beheaded, and Megallis was tortured and thrown off a cliff. Notably, however, the rebels spared their daughter and escorted her to safety because she had always showed kindness to them. To Diodorus, this proved that the slaves abused and killed the masters not because slaves are by nature savage, but in revenge for the ill treatment they had previously suffered.

The slaves then chose Eunus as their king. He ordered the execution of all the citizens of Enna except those who could make weapons for them. Arming 6,000 men, with makeshift weapons such as axes, sickles, stakes, or even kitchen spits, Eunus began to plunder the countryside. He soon attracted another 4,000 followers and inspired the slaves near Acragas to rebel as well (Diodorus 34.2.17, 43). Led by a Cilician slave named Cleon, they overran Acragas. Much to the distress of the Romans, who hoped the two rebels would turn against one another, Cleon and his 5,000 men voluntarily joined forces with Eunus. Eunus now proclaimed himself King Antiochus of Syria, claiming he was not from the island of Sicily, but from the Greek eastern kingdoms and himself a Seleucid monarch. He also elevated to his court a Greek slave named Achaeus who was very skilled in organization and military matters.

The Romans sent Lucius Plautius Hypsaeus with 8,000 men to suppress Eunus, but the larger slave army of 20,000 men defeated him. This victory further swelled the ranks of Eunus' forces, allegedly to the number of 200,000, but this figure seems exaggerated ([Livy] *Periochae* 56.11; Orosius *Against the Pagans* 5.6 puts the figure at 70,000; Florus 2.7 at 60,000). Additionally, the success of the slaves inspired other slave revolts in Minturnae, Sinuessa, Athens, Delos, and even in Rome. The one Sicilian city to avoid disturbances was Messina, where the citizens allegedly treated their slaves better (or the slaves were afraid to revolt).

Many of the cities of Sicily fell to the slave rebels, including Mamertium and Tauromenium, which Eunus made his capital. Only with great difficulty did the Romans recapture the island, city by city in the successive campaigns; the most successful Roman general against the rebels was Publius Rupilius. To reduce Tauromenium, Rupilius allegedly drove the defenders to cannibalism and then executed all those he captured, but Eunus escaped. He was finally captured and died in prison infested with lice. Marcus Perperna received an ovation for ending the war, rather than a triumph, so that the dignity of a triumph not be degraded by a victory over

slaves (as also was the case of Crassus' later victory over Spartacus).

The duration of the First Servile War owes in large part to the distraction of the Romans who were fighting the Numantines in Spain and fighting in Asia Minor, as well as suffering the civil discord of Tiberius Gracchus' tribunate. Anxiety over these different forms of conflict probably made the Roman response harsher in all these cases.

Much of Livy's lost fifty-eighth book contained a detailed history of the rebellion, without which Diodorus, Strabo, Appian, Florus, and Orosius are the surviving sources.

Gaius Stern

See also Bandits and Brigands; Diodorus Siculus; Prisoners of War and Slavery; Spanish Wars

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Sicilian Slave War, Second (104–101 BCE)

The Second Sicilian Slave War or Second Servile War was led by the slaves Salvius (Tryphon) and Athenion on the island of Sicily, some 30 years after the First Servile War. The main source is Diodorus Siculus, who focuses on Sicilian affairs.

Diodorus Siculus 36.2–3 mentions several short-lived, minor slave revolts in Italy, the third of which in Capua in 104 BCE, Diodorus describes as a prelude to the Second Servile War. Immediately afterward, Licinius Nerva, the governor of Sicily, rescinded a new decree of the Senate that all citizens

of an allied state held in slavery in a Roman province must be set free (Diodorus 36.3; Dio 27 frag. 101). Wealthy landowners, irritated at the loss of their property, persuaded Nerva to reject all slaves petitioning for their freedom and to tell them to return to their masters. Instead the slaves under one Varius raised a rebellion. Nerva repressed the followers of Varius, but he unwisely ignored a second group of rebels near Mount Caprianus. When Nerva finally sent a force of 600 against the slaves near Heracleia, they were defeated, and the slaves gained both additional recruits to the number of 6,000 and Roman weapons with which to arm themselves. As in the previous Servile War, they also armed themselves with farm implements which could be improvised into weapons.

The slaves now chose as their king a man named Salvius, who claimed to divine the future. Salvius then attacked Morgantina, forcing Nerva to march to relieve the city. At first, Nerva's force of 10,000 captured Salvius' camp, but when Nerva tried to break the siege of Morgantina, he met with defeat. Again the rebels captured many Roman arms and 4,000 captives. This victory brought Salvius even more recruits, with which he renewed the siege of Morgantina.

The successes of Salvius led to more rebellions elsewhere, most notably near Segesta and Lilybaeum, where under a Cilician slave by name Athenion, 200 slaves rose up and attracted 800 followers. Athenion attacked Messina during a public festival and killed many, very nearly capturing the town. He then fortified Macella as his base and ransacked the country, all the while attracting many new recruits. Surprisingly, Athenion was very selective about whom to accept as soldiers into his army, often requiring new recruits to continue their past work to support his army. He also was skilled at astrology, and told his followers he was destined to be king of all Sicily. With a force of 10,000 he laid siege to Lilybaeum, but was unable to take it, so he told his men that the gods had ordered him to withdraw and promised defeat if they did not obey. Very soon after, they were defeated, establishing Athenion's credibility as a prophet.

Meanwhile, Salvius continued to plunder the country. He proclaimed himself king and took the name king Tryphon and assumed the status of a Roman king with a purple toga and lictors as bodyguards. Next, he summoned Athenion to consult, and together they assaulted Triokala, which they made Tryphon's capital. Alarmed at Tryphon's success, the Romans sent Lucullus with 17,000 men to defeat him, although they were at that

time pressured by the campaign against the Cimbri and the Teutones. Tryphon first imprisoned Athenion under charges of conspiracy, then released him and gave him a command against Lucullus.

In battle near Scirthaea, Lucullus completely defeated the slave army many times his size. Tryphon and Athenion retreated to Triokala, and withstood Lucullus' subsequent siege. When Lucullus learned he had been replaced, he razed his camp (which Athenion then captured) and abandoned his province, so as not to assist his successor in any way. For this, he was prosecuted and exiled. A new praetor, Gaius Servilius was unable to recover the situation and even lost his camp to Athenion, who had succeeded Tryphon a king.

The Senate then sent one of the consuls for 102, Gaius Aquilius, to Sicily against the rebels. Following the example of Perperna, Aquilius cut off the slaves' supplies and used hunger to force the enemy to capitulate. Diodorus and Florus differ on Athenion's end: Florus 2.9.12 says he was captured, but accidentally torn apart by different men who wanted the reward; Diodorus 26.10 that he fell in battle. Aquilius then eliminated the remaining 10,000 rebels one siege at a time until the final contingent surrendered to him. Those captives he brought to Rome to fight as gladiators, but many chose to kill each other rather than fight in the arena. A denarius issued by the consul's direct descendant under Augustus commemorates the conclusion of the war.

Although the Slave War threatened the security of Rome, at the same time as the invasion of the German Cimbri and Teutones, it was less of a risk to national security than the previous major slave uprising in Sicily. It probably contributed to Roman anxiety over the invasion of the Cimbri and Teutones, the climate in which Marius introduced recruitment of the propertyless *capite censi*.

Gaius Stern

See also Astrologers; Diodorus Siculus; Germanic Wars; Sicilian Slave War, First

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Siege Warfare

Although a siege is usually encountered as one event in the larger narrative of a campaign or war, Roman siege warfare was in fact a distinct form of conflict clearly defined in both time and space. The Romans conducted siege warfare by an unwritten set of "rules" and demanded military qualities very different from those of open battle.

Sieges were inherently decisive—the city fell or the besieging army marched away in defeat—and thus lent themselves to increasingly suspenseful narratives, which ancient writers often organized around the dwindling of food supplies, the escalating use of siege machines and defensive countermeasures, or the moral effects of mounting casualties and exhaustion. Sieges fall into two quite distinct operational categories: active sieges, which sought to take the city or fort by assault, often after breaking through the fortifications; and blockades, which aimed to starve the defenders into submission.

For both practical and cultural reasons, the Romans preferred to win a siege by assault (despite the likelihood of heavy casualties for the attacker) since it demonstrated valor and avoided the logistical and strategic problems of keeping an army in one place for a long time—but an active siege could lapse into a blockade after failed assaults. The siege of a city differed not least from other forms of conflict in that the lives of children, women, and the elderly were explicitly at stake. Defeat meant slavery, and fighting men could expect to be killed out of hand. If the siege was a long one, the sack was likely to involve violent pillage, mass rape, and even outright massacre. If the story of the besieger is one of labor, ingenuity, and aggressive valor, the story of the besieged is one of real desperation.

Although the great kingdoms of Mesopotamia had been practicing siege warfare for millennia, serious fortifications and siege engineering were unknown in western Europe during the early years of Rome. The walls of

Italy's small cities and towns deterred surprise attacks by raiders, but the fact that there were few if any proper sieges before the middle Republic is attributable not to the lack of technology (after all, blockading by wall and ditch, or assaulting with siege mounds and ladders did not require much expertise) but rather to cultural preference. Early Roman warfare, like early Greek warfare, usually meant invading and pillaging, until a force marched out to meet the invaders, fighting brief, bloody battles in the open. To stay behind the city walls indicated an unwillingness to fight, a cowardice that was morally equivalent to being already defeated. Since respectable communities were expected to fight "fairly" in the open, harsh treatment of those that refused to surrender was considered just.

The story of Roman siege warfare begins with Livy's account of the siege of Veii, but this was an anachronistic fiction, rather than a legitimate historical account. The siege's Homeric dimensions—it was said to take 10 years—and Livy's anachronisms overshadow a more important association, which is that Veii marked the first time that Roman soldiers were paid. Livy thus associated siege warfare with professionalism, foreshadowing the development in later centuries of the technologies of siege engineering, which required both professional skill and the long labor under fire that early Rome's armies of moonlighting farmers could not provide. But in reality, early Roman sieges rarely lasted longer than weeks and were resolved by stratagem, treachery, starvation, or simple assaults either on gates or, by means of ladders, over the walls.

The Second Punic War brought Rome into full contact with the mature siege technologies of the Hellenistic world, the most significant of which were torsion artillery and siege towers. This artillery consisted of stone- and, later, arrow-shooting engines, crossbow-shaped and ranging widely in size, powered by the spring-like energy of twisted cords or ropes. Torsion artillery was never powerful enough to seriously damage walls, but, in sufficient numbers, artillery could be decisive during assaults. Artillery on the walls could slaughter the assault troops as they approached, or, conversely, artillery could help an assault succeed by suppressing the fire of the defenders. Siege towers, several stories high and wheeled, might suspend a battering ram and/or contain small artillery pieces, but, provided that the defenders did not sally and burn them or undermine their approach, siege towers seem to have been most effective as a means of delivering assault troops to the top of a wall.

Ancient historians and writers of military handbooks lavished much attention on a menagerie of odd, impractical, and even downright impossible devices which might help approach or defend a wall. But real sieges were not decided by enormous “city-takers,” and even the most ingenious or effective machines only enabled the besiegers to approach their enemy, not defeat them. Simple devices that protected soldiers while they approached the fortifications (“mantlets,” or wooden screens, and simple movable sheds, called by a variety of names) were more common and more useful than the super-sized gadgets made famous by Archimedes and the Hellenistic kings.



Detail from the Column of Trajan (ca. 106–113 CE), depicting the siege of a Dacian settlement during the Dacian Wars (101–102 and 105–106 CE). Greco-Roman siege warfare employed torsion weapons such as catapults and ballistae to fling projectiles, as well as siege towers, mantlets, and rams. Located in the Forum of Trajan, Rome, Italy. (Erich Lessing/Art Resource, NY)

Tactically, sieges were simple. The wall protected the defenders, so the besiegers had to go over, under, or through the wall. The real challenge was more motivational than technological: whatever means were used to deal

with the fortifications, small numbers of soldiers would still have to fight their way through well-prepared defenders. Maintaining morale was therefore crucial, and Rome evolved a military culture well-adapted to the particular problem of encouraging highly motivated soldiers to take the lead in siege assaults. To be the first man through a gate or tunnel, the first to climb a ladder or leap from tower to parapet, is a very different thing than fighting bravely in the open surrounded by the men of your unit—and much more likely to be fatal. Roman commanders encouraged this heroic bravery: they gave pointed motivational speeches before assaults, promised promotion and large monetary rewards, and recognized the valor of assault troops both in public ceremonies and in the reports they sent back to Rome. A Roman innovation was to award formal military decorations, and there was a specific award—the “wall crown”—for the first man into an enemy city or camp. If he survived, fame and fortune would await.

The Roman practice of siege warfare, as it solidified in the last centuries of the Republic (it would make more sense to speak of “habits” or “traditions” rather than any formal “doctrine” of siege warfare) made much use of artillery, screens, towers, and ladders, but rarely involved extensive tunneling or the construction of the more outlandish machines. Rather, it depended on two general capabilities: a willingness to labor and strong combat motivation. Just as a legion built a new camp after each day’s march, a proper Roman siege began with the complete encirclement of the target with a ditch and wall—and sometimes a double wall, to defend the besiegers from any relieving army. Rome had a well-earned reputation for relentlessness, and it had the wealth and logistical sophistication to supply a besieging army and build enormous siege works. However impressive the fortifications, Rome would labor until its fiercest fighters could come to grips with the enemy.

In Caesar’s *Gallic Wars* and *Civil War*, and in the histories that describe siege warfare during the empire, the same pattern repeats, albeit with many variations. The Romans first made an intimidating show of force and a demand to surrender. A weak target might be assaulted with the help of nothing more than ladders and supporting missile fire. But if this was impractical, or if an initial assault had failed, the Roman commander, relying on the advice of his increasingly skilled (but never formally trained) engineering officers and perhaps on his reading of histories and handbooks, began to work from the playbook of stratagems, techniques, and

technologies. If a city surrendered before heavy engineering got under way (traditionally, before a battering ram touched the wall) it would be allowed to surrender. If not, the works—most often earth-and-timber ramps topped by siege towers—were continued until the wall could be assaulted by sufficient numbers of assault troops.

The “laws” of siege warfare dictated that the commander give the town or city over to his men to sack, but commanders were probably unable to restrain their enraged assault troops when they finally broke through, despite some stories to this effect in the sources. Mass rape and looting were usually combined with the killing of the remaining men of military age. All survivors were enslaved. The more the besieging army suffered, the more violent the sack was likely to be—some ended with the massacre even of women and children. Rome made effective use of such intimidation (terror would perhaps be a more accurate term), eliciting many capitulations simply by threatening a full siege. The willingness of Roman commanders to press sieges even in the face of relentless resistance, putting their disciplined legions to work building and rebuilding huge ramps and towers until the exhausted defenders could be overwhelmed, maintained the credibility of this threat.

The best way to understand Roman siege warfare is to read any extended narrative by an eyewitness or by a knowledgeable writer who had interviewed participants. Of these there are three: Caesar’s accounts of several sieges of Gallic towns, Josephus’ sensational but still comprehensible rendition of the siege of Jerusalem in 70 CE, and Ammianus’ descriptions of Roman-Persian siege warfare in the fourth century, including his own experience in a city under siege. Each provides compelling descriptions of the terror and suffering of a siege, of the deployment of artillery and machines and the laborious construction of siege mounds, and of the death-defying final assaults, in each case led by a handful of volunteers.

Joshua Levithan

See also Alesia, Siege of; Carthage, Siege of; Gallic Wars; Jerusalem, Siege of; Military Treatises; Numantia, Siege of; Saguntum, Siege of; Vegetius

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Social War (91–87 BCE)

The Social War (the *bellum sociale* or war of the allies) was fought between Rome and a group of rebel Italian states who revolted against the unequal terms of their alliance with Rome. Appian is the only surviving source to provide a complete narrative of events, though we lack details for many of the key battles and campaigns. After the rebellion of the Italian states in 91 BCE, a Roman expedition against them did not begin until 90 BCE. There were two principal campaigns, one against a rebel alliance centered on the Marsi in central and eastern Italy and one against the Samnites in central and southern Italy. The strategy of the rebels may have been to inflict quick defeats on Rome, encouraging the hitherto loyal Italian states to defect, before Rome's superior manpower (in both Italy and the wider empire) tipped the balance.

This strategy was initially successful. The campaigns of the year 90 BCE resulted in a series of Roman defeats, mostly caused by inexperienced generals rushing to give battle. The heaviest defeat of the year was the battle of the River Tolenus, in which the consul Publius Rutilius Lupus was killed, along with 8,000 men, in battle with the Marsi and their allies. The campaign was rescued by Marius, who was one of Lupus' legates, rescuing the Roman army and inflicting a defeat on the Marsi. A further defeat of another legate, Quintus Servilius Caepio, resulted in Marius' taking sole command for the rest of the year. In another campaign, Gnaeus Pompeius Strabo, the father of Pompey the Great, overcame defeat and besieged the rebel stronghold of Asculum.

The other consul, Lucius Julius Caesar, fared no better in the campaign against the Samnite alliance, suffering defeats at the battles of Aesernia and Taenum. The Samnites followed this up by besieging and capturing a

number of loyal Roman colonies in the region. The winter of 90–89 BCE saw the culmination of the rebel strategy, with revolts in Etruria, Umbria and Transalpine Gaul in support of the Samnite rebels. Though few details survive, it is clear that these rebellions were swiftly crushed, in Etruria and Umbria by Lucius Porcius Cato and in Transalpine Gaul by Gaius Caelius. The Roman victories in these campaigns proved to be crucial to the outcome of the war. They stopped the rebellion from spreading further, allowing Rome to concentrate on suppressing the original rebel states. This was aided by the Senate's and People's decision to offer Roman citizenship to those states that had not yet rebelled.

In 89 BCE, two consuls with proven military records were elected: Pompeius Strabo and Lucius Porcius Cato, both of whom moved against the Marsic alliance. Pompeius won a major victory at the battle of Asculum and his legates defeated a number of lesser rebel states. Lucius Porcius Cato also won a string of victories, but was defeated and killed at the battle of Lake Fucinus, possibly murdered by mutinous elements of his army. To the south, the Samnite campaign was led by Sulla, the future dictator, who also scored a number of victories, driving the Samnites from Campania and back into Samnium itself. The year ended with only the Marsi and Samnites themselves fighting on.

Fighting continued on into 88 BCE, with Quintus Caecilius Metellus Pius scoring a final victory over the Marsi in an unnamed battle, killing the key rebel leader Poppaedi Silo, which ended the Marsic campaign. To the south, however, the Samnites continued to fight on, aided by the outbreak of the Marian-Sullan conflict, the first of the late Republic's civil wars. Rome's attention had also been diverted by the outbreak of the Mithridatic war in Asia Minor. The Social War's fighting continued on into 87 BCE when the surviving rebel leaders launched an audacious bid to invade and capture Sicily as a new base of operations. They hoped to gain support from the slave population, which had revolted twice in the last 50 years. However Gaius Norbanus, the governor of Sicily, swiftly moved to relieve the siege of Rhegium and prevent the rebels from crossing the straits.

The advent of new civil conflict at Rome, this time between the two consuls of 87 BCE, Gnaeus Octavius and Lucius Cornelius Cinna (supported by Marius), resulted in an upswing in the rebels' fortunes. Metellus Pius was recalled to Rome to relieve the siege that Cinna and Marius had established and was unable to come to terms with the Samnites, simply quitting the

campaign. Not only did this relieve the pressure on them, but Cinna and Marius sent envoys, led by Gaius Flavius Fimbria, to negotiate an alliance. Thus the Social War was displaced by the new civil war, with the remaining Italian rebels merely allying with one of the two factions in Rome. When Cinna and Marius seized Rome in 87 BCE, the Senate probably ratified the terms and ended the war with the Samnites. What exact concession the Samnites received is not known, but greater autonomy from Rome has long been postulated.

A postscript to the war occurred five years later during the second phase of the Marian-Sullan Conflict, Sulla's invasion of Italy in 83 BCE. By the following year Sulla and his allies had defeated all the Marian commanders and captured Rome itself. Clearly fearing for the future of their newly won autonomy, the Samnite commanders raised a fresh army of 70,000 men and took to the field against Sulla, aided by the handful of surviving Marians. Marching on Rome, they fought a major battle at the Colline Gate against Sulla. Although Sulla's wing of the battle was defeated, the overall battle was won by Crassus (the future triumvir), annihilating the Samnite army. The prisoners who did survive were executed by Sulla outside of Rome. Whatever terms the Samnites had extracted in 87 BCE were probably annulled by Sulla and the Social War was finally won by Rome, almost by default. The long-term results of the Social War were the integration of Rome's former Italian allies as Roman citizens, and the consequent disappearance of the non-Latin Italic languages and cultural identities.

Gareth C. Sampson

See also Allies; Cinna; *Civis Romanus*; Colline Gate, Battle of; Marian-Sullan Conflict; Marius; Samnium, Samnites; Sulla, Lucius Cornelius

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Spain. See Punic War, Second (218–201 BCE), Causes; Punic War, Second (218–201 BCE), Course; Punic War, Second (218–201 BCE), Consequences; Spanish Wars, Causes; Spanish Wars, Course; Spanish Wars, Consequences

Spanish Wars, Causes

The Spanish Wars display the gamut of motivations of Roman imperialism. Rome's first involvement in Spain was strategic, intended to weaken and destroy the Carthaginian foothold in Spain so that Hannibal Barca, whose family had extensively colonized the Spanish coast, would be weakened and cut off from Spanish manpower and resources. The Barcids had made alliances with the native Spanish, and Spain was rich in iron and silver. Scipio Africanus succeeded in ejecting the Barcas, neutralizing Spain as a threat.

After the defeat of Carthage in the Second Punic War, the Romans probably held onto Spain to exploit its silver mines, which Polybius says produced 2,500 silver drachmas a day. Individual generals sought commands in Spain to win victories and triumphs and enrich themselves from plunder. This imperialism often took an ugly turn.

During the Lusitanian War, Lucius Licinius Lucullus (consul 151, a possible ancestor of the more famous late republican Lucullus) waged war on the Vaccaeii without authorization of the Senate. Appian (*Spanish Wars* 51) says that Lucullus was motivated by desire for victory and wealth, but the Vaccaeii did not have the gold he wanted. As proconsul the next year, Lucullus teamed with the new consul Servius Sulpicius Galba (ancestor of the 69 CE emperor Galba) in enslaving or massacring thousands of Lusitanians (accounts differ) who had surrendered to the Romans. Such treatment was a breach of Roman *fides*.

These anecdotes may be partisan, for the original source is probably Polybius, flattering his patron and friend Scipio Aemilianus and presenting Scipio's rivals in a bad light. The Spanish Wars had become unpopular, and few young men came forward for the *dilectus* in 151. Scipio created a

popular sensation by volunteering to serve as military tribune. He distinguished himself in Spain, winning a duel with one of the enemy and winning a mural crown. He also seems to have made enemies of Lucullus and Galba.

Cruel treatment at the hands of individual Romans intensified Spanish resistance. Polybius termed the Spanish Wars “fiery,” long-burning and hard to put out. The Lusitanians found a leader, Viriathus, who inflicted defeats on Romans, killing the consul Vetilius. At other times, Romans were forced into humiliating treaties with the enemy. In 137 BCE Gaius Hostilius Mancinus found his forces trapped by the Numantines. To escape, Mancinus made a treaty with the Numantines, without Senate authorization, subsequently rejected by the Senate. In agreement with the treaty, Mancinus had to be surrendered to the Numantines, who let him return to Rome. Tiberius Gracchus (the subsequently famous tribune of the plebs, 133 BCE) had helped Mancinus arrange the treaty, and found his career blighted for a time. The Romans regarded Mancinus’ treaty as a national humiliation. Due to these humiliations, Roman commanders and armies in Spain probably became motivated by vengeance. Vengeance was behind the Roman people’s nomination of Scipio Aemilianus for consul in Spain in 134 and motivated Scipio’s merciless tactics in the siege of Numantia.

The brutal civil wars and conflicts of the 80s (termed the Marian-Sullan conflict in *CAGR*) spilled over to Spain when the Marian supporter Sertorius escaped and established himself in Spain. He resisted all attempts to subdue him until Pompey the Great (a former Sullan supporter) invaded Spain.

Augustus’ motives in the Cantabrian War were to consolidate the conquest of Spain, extending the provinces to the Atlantic Ocean. By this time Spain had become a province in the sense of a region under Roman government, settled by citizens. Many Roman and Latin colonies had been founded in Spain, and the full conquest of the region was probably intended to protect them. Augustus also needed victories over external enemies and the external expansion of the empire to add to his prestige and stability as emperor.

Sara E. Phang

See also Augustus; Caesar, Gaius Julius; Carthage (State); Civil Wars (I) (49–45 BCE); Ebro, Battle of; Hannibal Barca; Hasdrubal Barca; Ilerda, Battle of; Munda, Battle of; Numantia, Siege of; *Provincia*; Punic War, Second;

Saguntum, Siege of; Scipio Aemilianus; Scipio Africanus; Sertorius; Viriathus

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Spanish Wars, Course

The Roman conquest of Spain (Hispania) falls into five phases: the Second Punic War, the Lusitanian or Viriathic Wars, the Celtiberian War, late republican civil wars, and the Cantabrian War. Rome committed military forces to Spain during the Second Punic War (218–201 BCE). During the Lusitanian or Viriathic Wars (ca. 155–139 BCE) and the Celtiberian War (155–133 BCE), the Romans struggled with the conquest of the native Iberians. This phase of the Spanish Wars was often humiliating for the Romans, who reacted with greater than normal brutality. In the fourth phase, Roman civil wars migrated to Spain; Sertorius occupied Spain till defeated by Pompey, and Caesar inflicted defeats on the Pompeians in Spain. The fifth phase (26–19 BCE) represents the final conquest of Spain in the reign of Augustus. After that time, Spain became a Romanized and peaceful province, eventually occupied by only one legion.

The geography of Spain is dominated by a large central plain surrounded by mountains to the north (the Pyrenees) and mountainous country also to the east and south. The land is arid and there are few rivers. The Mediterranean coast was colonized by Greeks, Phoenicians, and Carthaginians. The Carthaginians had first colonized in the eighth century BCE, but in the decades preceding 218 BCE the Barcids, Hannibal's dynasty, expanded an empire in Spain, founding the city of New Carthage (Cartagena), making alliances with the Spanish, building up manpower, and exploiting Spanish silver mines.

Thus the Second Punic War began in Spain. The Romans had an agreement with the Carthaginians that neither would cross the Ebro River, and possibly an agreement that the town of Saguntum was under Roman

protection, though this is disputed by experts. In 219–218 BCE the Carthaginians laid siege to Saguntum. The Romans responded to this as an act of war, and sent Publius Cornelius Scipio (the father of Africanus) and his brother Gnaeus to Spain. Publius and Gnaeus Scipio inflicted a defeat on Hannibal and his army at the Ebro in 217. They recaptured Saguntum in 212, but were defeated and killed by Hasdrubal Barca at the Second Battle of the Ebro.

Seeking vengeance for his father and uncle, Publius Cornelius Scipio (the future Africanus) obtained command of the Roman army for Spain in 209, by popular acclaim even though he was only 26. Scipio Africanus crossed the Ebro and besieged and captured New Carthage. He destroyed the Spanish Carthaginian army at the battle of Ilipa and the Carthaginians withdrew from Spain.

The Romans held onto Spain, though they had far from conquered it. They divided Spain into Hispania Citerior (Nearer Spain) and Hispania Ulterior (Farther Spain). Spain may not have been a high priority for Rome between 193 and 155 BCE, when many Spanish campaigns were commanded by praetors rather than consuls; during this period, the most prestigious wars and triumphs were over the eastern Mediterranean and Carthage. However, Spain's silver mines eventually produced 2,500 silver drachmae a day for Rome (Polybius 34.9.8).

The Lusitanians put up a fierce resistance, known as the Lusitanian War. It is also known as the Viriathic War due to the rise of a Lusitanian leader, Viriathus, who inflicted defeats on the Romans. Viriathus slew a Roman army and the consul Vetilius in 145; the consul of 140, Quintus Servilius Caepio, eventually had Viriathus assassinated. The overlapping war with the Celtiberians (155–133) is known as the Numantine War after Numantia, the settlement that put up the longest resistance to the Romans. The Numantines were eventually defeated by Scipio Aemilianus, the adoptive grandson of Africanus and victor of the Third Punic War (149–146 BCE). Aemilianus was chosen as consul for 134 and assigned to Spain. After imposing severe discipline and training on the Roman army in Spain, restoring Roman morale, Scipio surrounded Numantia with earthworks and starved it out, destroying the city when it fell. After the fall of Numantia, Celtiberian resistance sputtered on but was essentially broken.

The late Republic's civil wars migrated to Spain. The Marian supporter Sertorius established a base in Spain, employing Celtiberians as guerrilla

warriors and separating Spain from republican control from 82–72 BCE, until he was defeated by Pompey. In the civil war between Caesar and the Pompeians (49–45 BCE), Caesar first campaigned against the Pompeian generals Afranius and Petreius in Spain, using the country's arid landscape to trap them without food or water so that they were forced to surrender to him without bloodshed (the "battle" of Ilerda). Spain remained a refuge for the Pompeians, defeated by Caesar at the battle of Munda in 45 BCE.

The final phase of the conquest of Spain was the Cantabrian Wars (26–19 BCE). The Celtiberians were completely defeated. As a result of the Cantabrian wars, Roman Spain was extended to the Atlantic Ocean. Its three provinces were Hispania Baetica, Lusitania, and Tarraconensis, boasting 26 Roman citizen colonies, 24 municipia, and numerous Latin and native communities recognized by the Romans.

Sara E. Phang

See also Augustus; Caesar, Gaius Julius; Carthage (State); Civil Wars (I) (49–45 BCE); Ebro, Battle of; Hannibal Barca; Hasdrubal Barca; Ilerda, Battle of; Munda, Battle of; Numantia, Siege of; *Provincia*; Punic War, Second; Saguntum, Siege of; Scipio Aemilianus; Scipio Africanus; Sertorius; Viriathus

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Spanish Wars, Consequences

The immediate consequences of Rome's conquest of the Carthaginian territories in Spain was the weakening of Carthage, which lost the

manpower and resources that the Barcids had built up in Spain, and ultimately lost the Second Punic War. Hannibal was forced to fall back upon Carthage's older possessions in Africa, where he was defeated in the battle of Zama. The Romans also acquired access to Spanish silver, which became a major source of Roman wealth.

The organization of Spain into the provinces of Nearer and Farther Spain marked the beginning of the conversion of *provinciae* (military assignments) into geographically demarcated provinces. The western and northern boundaries of Nearer and Farther Spain were allowed to remain vague as the Romans extended into native Spanish territory.

However, other consequences of Roman imperialism in Spain over the next seven decades (from 206 to 133 BCE) were less positive. The individual motivations of Roman imperialism, personal glory, greed, and vengeance, were amply displayed, and the Spanish responded with fierce resistance, inflicting humiliating defeats on the Romans. As a result, young Roman men were less willing to serve in the legions. This "recruitment crisis" has sometimes been viewed as due to an actual shortage of manpower, which is unlikely in demographic terms. The fall in the number of recruits willing to serve motivated the Senate to lower the property qualification for legionary service, leading ultimately to Marius' recruitment of the propertyless *capite censi* as soldiers.

Once the conquest of Spain was completed, however, the provinces became peaceful and populated with many Roman colonies and municipia. City charters (the most famous is from Urso, Colonia Julia Genetiva, a Caesarian foundation) have been preserved. Many Romans and Italians settled in Spain. Their descendants furnished the new senatorial aristocrats of the early empire. Emperors Trajan (98–117) and Hadrian (117–138) came from Roman Spain, as did famous literary authors such as Seneca the Elder, Seneca the Younger, and Martial. The Roman army also recruited in Spain, recruiting *auxilia* from the mountainous areas that had originally put up such fierce resistance to Roman conquest.

Sara E. Phang

See also Augustus; Caesar, Gaius Julius; Carthage (State); Civil Wars (I) (49–45 BCE); Ebro, Battle of; Hannibal Barca; Hasdrubal Barca; Ilerda, Battle of; Munda, Battle of; Numantia, Siege of; *Provincia*; Punic War, Second; Saguntum, Siege of; Scipio Aemilianus; Scipio Africanus; Sertorius;

Viriathus

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Spartacus, Revolt of (73–71 BCE)

Spartacus (d. 71 BCE) was a Thracian gladiator famous for leading one of the largest and most successful slave revolts in the ancient world. According to one ancient author, Spartacus had deserted from a Roman auxiliary unit, was subsequently caught and sold into slavery, and ended up at the gladiatorial barracks of the trainer Gnaeus Cornelius Lentulus Vatia, in Capua. In 73 BCE, Spartacus was one of 74 men who broke out of the school using only farming implements as weapons, and soon became a leader among the band of fugitives. The gladiators moved south down the Via Appia and stopped at Mount Vesuvius, where they obtained weapons, ravaged the rich countryside, and were joined by thousands of runaway slaves. Rome, disdaining the rebels as slaves and barbarians, responded by sending the praetor Gaius Claudius Glaber with a force of 3,000 men. Spartacus and his army of Celtic, Thracian, and German slaves launched a surprise attack and captured Glaber's Roman camp during the night. In the next few months, the growing band of rebels defeated three Roman armies and raided two of their camps, until Spartacus and his co-leader, Crixus, disagreed on strategy. Spartacus wanted to head north, out of Italy, and let each man make his way to his homeland. Crixus wanted to keep plundering and to fight the Roman army following them. As a compromise, Spartacus and Crixus moved south to recruit shepherds and herdsmen to their cause. Shortly afterward they defeated the Roman army led by the praetor Varinius, capturing Roman standards and even the praetor's horse. Spartacus became famous, even revered, among the lower social strata, and even more men joined the revolt.

At the end of the year 73, the Romans sent two consular armies,

consisting of two legions each, to address the crisis of the slave revolt. During 72 BCE Crixus and Spartacus split, the latter taking around three quarters of the army, estimated at about 30,000 men. Crixus and his army were defeated, but Spartacus bested the second consul. He held funeral games for the dead Crixus, using Roman prisoners to fight as gladiators in a humiliating reversal of roles. The army started north, but for unknown reasons, turned south again. By then the Romans had appointed a new commander, Crassus (the future triumvir), who took the offensive against the rebels and defeated a detachment of about 10,000 rebels. Forced down to the very foot of Italy, the rest of the Spartacan army arranged passage to Sicily with local pirates, but were betrayed. Spartacus and his followers made for the Aspromonte Mountains, but that winter the Roman legions under Crassus built a defensive line of fortifications across their path. Although Spartacus was able to break through under cover of a winter storm, the discipline of his troops was waning and a group of Spartacans who attacked without orders was soundly defeated by Crassus' troops. Unable to stop his own men from turning to fight, Spartacus engaged in battle. Even Roman authors marveled at Spartacus' bravery as he threw himself toward Crassus, killing two centurions in his path, before he was overwhelmed. His body was never found.

Kathryn H. Milne

See also Crassus; Sicilian Slave War, First; Sicilian Slave War, Second

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Standards, Cult of

The *signa militaria* were the military standards of the Roman army. Physically the basic framework of each type of standard was a tall pole, or cross, made of wood. On this frame a range of objects could be placed. Different units carried different standards. From the time of Marius onward the most prominent standard of each legion was the *aquila* (eagle), which

replaced a range of other “animal” standards formerly carried by the legions (Pliny the Elder *Natural History* 10.16; Vegetius, *Military Affairs* 2.13). Each legion could also carry a “heraldic” standard that contained an image of an animal or god associated with the legion. Another common standard was the *signum* (though all standards are spoken of as *signa*). This standard bore objects such as an image of an open hand and medallions and was carried by individual cohorts within a legion and auxiliary units. A linen flag called a *vexillum* was carried by legionary detachments, particularly of cavalry. From the mid-second century CE cavalry units carried a standard called a *draco*, a dragon’s head from which trailed a long banner. In the imperial era all army units also carried an *imago*, a portrait of the ruling emperor.

The most basic role of the standards was to help to identify and distinguish between individual units and to provide a rallying point during battle. However, standards also played a highly symbolic role in establishing group identity. The standards symbolized a unit’s *esprit de corps* and military achievements and bonded the troops together by providing a focal point of group identity. To lose a standard, especially an eagle, was considered the greatest disgrace. Historians record many examples of soldiers undertaking heroic acts to save their standards from the enemy. (Tacitus, *Histories* 3.22.4; Livy 34.46.10–13) A unit that lost its standards effectively ceased to exist and a number of large-scale military campaigns were undertaken to recover lost standards. Germanicus invaded German territory to recover the standards lost during the Varian disaster in 9 CE.

The standards were also objects of great religious significance, with the Christian writer Tertullian even claiming that they were worshipped as gods (Tertullian, *Apology* 16.8, *Ad Nationes* 1.12). Although this claim is exaggerated, the standards were treated with great reverence by the troops. While on campaign the troops saw incidents involving the standards as divinely inspired portents. The historian Dio notes that during Crassus’ invasion of Persia in 53 BCE a standard carrying an eagle became stuck fast in the ground. Later a *vexillum* was blown into the river—both events were viewed with great dismay by the army who believed they were signs that the campaign would fail. (Dio 40.18)

The standards played a formal role in the religious life of the army. They were viewed as sacred objects and stored in the camp shrine (*sacellum*). Troops would deposit a part of their pay “at the standards” (*ad signa*) knowing that nobody would dare risk stealing from this sacred place.

Likewise in the Rhine mutiny of 14 CE the senator Munatius Plancus sought refuge in a camp *sacellum* because he believed he would be safe there from the angry troops (Tacitus, *Annals* 1.39). Numerous inscriptions record individual soldiers' dedications to the standards in the hopes of winning the favor of the gods (for example, *CIL* VII 1031). A number of dedicated festivals were held in honor of the standards. Each year the date on which the legion's eagle was conferred, or the "birthday of the eagle" (*natalis aquilae*) was celebrated (*CIL* II 6183). Also celebrated was the "crowning of the standards" (*Rosalia Signorum*), a festival in which the standards were adorned with garlands of roses. Among all the standards the eagle had the greatest religious significance. The eagle was associated with Jupiter; the god's divine favor was thought to bring the Romans victory (Tacitus, *Annals* 2.17; Suetonius, *Augustus* 94.7, *Vitellius* 9).



Detail from the Column of Marcus Aurelius (ca. 180–192 CE), depicting Roman soldiers with standards. The standards were used as visual markers to keep order on the march and in battle. The standards were also a focus of loyalty due to their sacred nature. Located in the Piazza Colonna, Rome, Italy. (Universal History Archive/Getty Images)

In the imperial age emperors sought to use the intense loyalty the troops felt toward the *signa militaria* for their own political ends. Each unit carried the imperial image somewhere on their standards and from the reign of Tiberius onward the standards were viewed by the troops as an imperial gift (Tacitus, *Annals* 1.42.3). Additionally *vexilla* carried the name of the

reigning emperor on them. (Suetonius, *Vespasian* 6.6; Dio 40.18.3) The emperor was so closely identified with the standards that if a unit wished to mutiny against him they could do so by tearing down his image from their standards (Tacitus, *Histories* 1.55, 2.85; Herodian 8.5.9). The *signa* also played a central role in ceremonies designed to encourage loyalty to the emperor. The troops swore their military oath (*sacramentum*) on the standards and they were also prominently displayed during imperial addresses to the troops and distributions of pay.

Mark Hebblewhite

See also Army in Politics; Legion, Organization of; Portents; Religion and Warfare; Tactics

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States of Emergency

In ancient Rome, there were two formal declarations which officially announced that a state of emergency existed. As is the case with modern states of emergency, while the statute law of the state does not cease to be in effect, executive authorities are authorized to suspend the enforcement of laws that might hinder their attempts to provide for the safety of citizens and the survival of the state. Modern states of emergency have a wider scope of use, being employed as a response to natural disasters as well as man-made ones (war, terrorism, et cetera). In the Roman Republic, the two

declarations were only used in cases of severe military threats to the Roman state. These two declarations are called *tumultus* and *iustitium*.

In extreme cases of sudden danger threatening the city of Rome from nearby or from the Gauls to the north, the Roman government, usually through a senatorial decree or an edict issued by a dictator, if one was in office, could declare a state of *tumultus* to be in existence. The declaration of a *tumultus* signaled that a dire threat which could result in immediate physical harm to the Roman state and its citizens existed, and urgent military action was necessary to counter that threat. After the declaration of a *tumultus*, an emergency draft of men into the army would be held, one that would involve a suspension of the normal rules for conscription. Under Roman law, certain classes of persons, such as priests of the state religion and the personal staff of a Roman magistrate, were by law exempt from all military service while holding that official status. When a *tumultus* was declared, however, all such exemptions could be temporarily revoked for the period of the state of emergency, pressing into service all available men no matter their rank, station, or even age. As an indication of the dire nature of the situation envisioned during a *tumultus*, the Roman military commander as he led his army against the enemy was further empowered to enlist men he met along the route of march on the spot. This was distinct from the regular levy or conscription.

The declaration of a *tumultus*, however, was limited in use as it was only invoked for two clearly defined tactical situations, which formed part of the formal declaration of the state of emergency. The two types of declaration were those of a *tumultus Italicus* and a *tumultus Gallicus*. A *tumultus Italicus* signified that one of the various Italian peoples, Rome's immediate neighbors, had suddenly taken up arms and threatened to attack the Roman state. This declaration could also be employed in response to slave uprisings such as the revolt of Spartacus. A *tumultus Gallicus* indicated that a major invasion of Gauls, the Celtic peoples to the north of Italy, was expected to occur. The Romans took this threat extremely seriously ever since their early, and traumatic, experience in 390 BCE when the city was according to traditional accounts seized and sacked by a marauding army of Gauls. While later tradition may have embellished upon the actual details of the encounter, the psychological effect on the Romans is apparent from their later actions whenever a *tumultus Gallicus* was declared in later times.

The *tumultus* lasted as long as the threat remained. Once the immediate military threat had been neutralized, any soldiers who were irregularly pressed into military service would be released from that service, and the declaration of the *tumultus* would be lifted.

Separate, but often related to a declaration of a *tumultus* was a declaration of *iustitium*, the suspension of all public and private business, including closing the law courts and cancelling meetings of the public legislative assemblies. The presiding magistrate (consul or dictator) passed an edict declaring an *iustitium*. Whenever a *tumultus* was declared, an *iustitium* and a special draft of emergency soldiers would follow, but an *iustitium* could be announced by itself when no state of *tumultus* was in effect, with known historical examples. During the period of *iustitium*, private business, such as public auctions and the opening of shops, would be suspended along with the ban on public actions other than those related to military affairs. Once issued, the suspension of all business could only be revoked by the authority (the consul, dictator or other magistrate working with the Roman Senate) that issued the edict.

While the *senatus consultum ultimum* would later gain greater attention for its role in signaling that a state of emergency was in effect, the passage of that decree was often followed by the declaration of a *tumultus* or *iustitium*, which were the only methods of instituting a true state of emergency, where statute law could be temporarily altered or suspended for the period of the emergency.

Gregory K. Golden

See also Allia River, Battle of the; Civil Conflict (Late Republic); Consul; Dictator; *Dilectus*; Extraordinary Levies; Gracchan Land Conflict; Public Order; *Senatus Consultum Ultimum*

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Stilicho (d. 408 CE)

Flavius Stilicho was supreme commander (*magister utriusque militiae*) of the western Roman army (394–408). Stilicho was the son of a Roman noblewoman and a Vandal cavalry officer (Claudian, *Stilicho's First Consulship* 35–39). Stilicho's barbarian heritage did not affect his upbringing or career, which was exclusively Roman. His career started under Theodosius I (379–395) and he is first attested on a diplomatic mission to Persia (383–384). He negotiated a crucial treaty between both empires and received the hand of the emperor's niece Serena as a reward. Stilicho rapidly rose through the eastern chain of command, first as commander of the imperial guards (*comes domesticorum*), then as senior general (*magister militum*). Stilicho accompanied Theodosius to the west for the civil war against Eugenius.

After Theodosius' death, Stilicho found himself in the unique position of the most senior commander to have survived the battle of the Frigidus, and indeed the most powerful man in the western empire below the emperor. Stilicho claimed that Theodosius had appointed him as guardian of both his sons Arcadius and Honorius. For the next 13 years Stilicho effectively governed the imperial west in name of the boy emperor Honorius, but his control of the east was heavily contested by Constantinople. Diplomatic relations between both realms soured and led to a phase of "cold war," when Stilicho intervened twice in the Balkans to battle Alaric (395 and 397). On both occasions, Stilicho had to withdraw due to lack of discipline in his army and political maneuvering by his eastern enemies. Despite these setbacks, Stilicho succeeded in making his authority in the west quasi-absolute by bringing the entire western army under his sole command. He further strengthened his control over Honorius, by marrying his elder daughter Maria to Honorius in 398 and, after Maria's death in 407, his younger daughter Thermantia.

Despite his political dominance, Stilicho's military strategy wrestled with the threat of Alaric and other barbarian incursions. After Alaric's invasion of Italy in late 401 and 402, Stilicho managed to fight him twice to a standstill at the battles of Pollentia and Verona in 402. On both occasions,

Alaric was able to retreat with sufficient forces. It is possible that Stilicho either lacked the resources to destroy Alaric or wished to use his Gothic force as auxiliaries for future campaigns. By 405, Stilicho had given Alaric a command in Illyricum, but needed to deal with the invasion of Radagaisus before pursuing his eastern ambitions. Even though he vanquished Radagaisus, Stilicho's neglect of the Rhine frontier allowed barbarian tribes to invade Gaul in 406, which triggered a series of usurpations in Britain. Stilicho had effectively lost control over the transalpine provinces by 407 and meanwhile was pressured by Alaric for subsidies. Stilicho maneuvered the Roman Senate into paying Alaric, which cost him influence.

Stilicho eventually found that he could not outmaneuver his political enemies. When Arcadius died on May 1, 408, Stilicho planned to travel to Constantinople and supervise the imperial succession. His enemies in the imperial court represented him as planning to seize the imperial throne from the infant Theodosius, Arcadius' son. Stilicho and his retinue were arrested on charges of treason. His supporters were massacred at Ticinum. Stilicho did not resist his own arrest and execution at Ravenna on August 22, 408, despite his continued access to barbarian auxiliaries. Notwithstanding hostile accusations of treason, Stilicho ultimately died as a loyal servant of Theodosius' dynasty.

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See also Alaric; Frigidus, Battle of; Honorius; *Magister Militum*; Radagaisus; Rome, Siege of (410 CE)

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Stratagems

The term “strategy” derives from Greek *strategos* (general) and directly

from *stratagemata*. *Stratagemata* (“stratagems”) were “tricks” or devices used to deceive the enemy. The imperial author Frontinus collects many stratagems, organized thematically. They included shrinking the dimensions of a Roman camp, which was laid out in a standardized format, to make it appear smaller and deceive the enemy into thinking that the Roman force was smaller; the camp could also be expanded for the opposite effect, and camp slaves and followers disguised as soldiers to convey the impression of a larger force. Many other stratagems for deceiving the enemy existed, some rather melodramatic, such as dressing slaves as soldiers and vice versa, or men as women and vice versa, relying on Greco-Roman expectations of social roles. In Greco-Roman literature, stratagems might be contrasted with courage (*virtus*), the more highly valued virtue.

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See also Frontinus; Strategy

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Strategy

Roman “strategy” in the geopolitical sense or “grand strategy” may well be an anachronistic, modern concept, as is the division of strategy into grand strategy, theater strategy, and operational strategy. The Greco-Roman use of the term *stratagemata* (stratagems) is much narrower, comprising techniques or tricks used to deceive the enemy. Nonetheless we can classify as strategic the Romans’ military policies that ensured spatial and political control of the Republic and of the growing empire.

The Republic was marked by a policy of military expansion, endorsed at all social levels, while there were ultimately few checks on the development of civil warfare. In contrast, with a few exceptions the imperial period was much less expansive, and the government and army were organized to discourage civil warfare. Imperial strategy thus emphasized maintaining internal security. Fighting civil wars became a priority, resulting in a deadly

center-periphery instability that nearly toppled the empire in the third century crisis and led to the western empire's downfall in the fifth.

In the Roman Republic, society was organized at all levels for external conquest, regarding it as an absolute good. Both elite and masses served extensively in the army, though before the late Republic (ca. 107 BCE) this was a citizen army recruited from small landowners. Military service was endorsed by codes of masculinity (*virtus* means both "courage" and "manliness") and by elite familial tradition. Elite success in warfare was rewarded by political ascent and fame, though if a consul or praetor lost his battles, his political career does not seem to have been greatly affected because the troops' lack of discipline was blamed. The Romans paid ordinary soldiers and also rewarded them for valor, awarding military decorations and promotions. Especially from the Punic Wars period onward, warfare brought a flood of wealth into Rome from the looting of enemy cities and communities. Such wealth was redistributed to the community, both directly (as military pay and donatives) and in the form of the triumph ceremony's festivities, temples, games, and other amenities.

Another trend in the scholarship of Republican Roman imperialism has emphasized defensive concerns and interstate relationships (see Burton, "Imperialism"). The Republic appears to have stumbled into some of its largest wars, the First and Second Punic Wars and the First and Second Macedonian Wars, out of defensive concerns and to defend allies and client peoples or rulers. Once Rome's growing dominance became apparent, other communities in the Mediterranean sought Roman aid. Such aid, however, often presented the Roman nobility with more opportunities for war. Defensive concerns also were uppermost, of course, in the Second Punic War (Hannibal's invasion of Italy) and died hard; as long as Hannibal and the state of Carthage remained alive, the Romans perceived them as threats.

During the Republic, Roman direct geographic control over the empire was limited. The greatest extent of control was exerted over Italy by building roads, because Italy's rivers are intermittent during the summer months, making water transport infeasible, and by establishing colonies. Elsewhere, Rome established alliances with foreign states and rulers (client monarchs). These alliances depended on *fides* (loyalty), a strategic value for the Romans. Surrendered enemies entered the *fides* of the Romans; client rulers the *amicitia* (friendship) of the Romans. Subjects or external peoples who violated *fides* were punished with extreme severity.

Direct government by Roman magistrates developed, but a provincial “governor” even in the late Republic was still principally a military commander. A *provincia* was originally a military assignment or theater of war, and the sense of *provincia* as a region to be governed arose only gradually. The late Republic saw the tendency to grant magistrates repeated commands (as with Marius’ consulships) or temporally or spatially extended commands to address military challenges that overlapped traditional *provinciae*. This extraordinary commands were a strategic choice that, combined with the problem of rewarding soldiers, led to civil war.

Rome typically conquered and co-opted other Italian peoples, rewarding Italians with plunder and citizens with colonies and virginal land grants. Since the allies aided Rome in conquering even more territory, this policy resembled a modern pyramid scheme (though without fraudulent intent). The “pyramid scheme” was probably sustained for an abnormally long time by the profits of conquest. When Italy was completely conquered and foreign wars became less profitable, as in Spain in the mid- and late second century BCE, the scheme began to collapse. The result was the Social War (91–87 BCE), ended by granting citizenship to the Italians.

Though its causes are still debated, the drop in Roman citizen recruits’ socioeconomic status during the second century BCE suggests a growth in poverty among the citizen lower strata. The policies of the Gracchi brothers, Marius’ recruitment of the *capite censi*, and the Social War all illustrated the need for a new strategy—one that rewarded poor soldiers. As Sulla demonstrated by twice leading his army against the city of Rome, this strategy favored civil warfare and led to the destruction of the Republic. The shortage of land could be addressed by seizing land from its owners, as in the proscriptions of 82–81 and 43–42 BCE.

In contrast, in the Principate Augustus (at least by his death in 14 CE) adopted a much less expansive strategy and reorganized the empire to prevent civil war. Augustus left a directive, part of the *breviarium totius imperii*, instructing his successor Tiberius not to further extend the boundaries of the empire. Tiberius (14–37 CE) obeyed him, but subsequent emperors did engage in external conquest, acquiring Britain, Scotland, Dacia, and (temporarily) Mesopotamia. However, the emperors were now careful to monopolize the credit for conquest. At least in the early and mid-first century CE, emperors did not command in person, but nonetheless were represented as commanders-in-chief and as conquerors in imperial art and

coinage. They (and members of the imperial family) monopolized the triumph.

The administration and elite careers of the Principate were reorganized to deter civil war by discouraging the rise of formidable rival generals. Augustus structured his powers to give himself *imperium* over all the frontier provinces (“imperial” provinces garrisoned with legions), overriding their governors, whom he personally appointed. Members of the senatorial aristocracy, notionally the descendants of the republican nobility, faced more limited military careers, holding posts for only a year to a few years at a time, in rapid rotation to prevent any one officer from building up a power base in a given region. Many senatorial aristocrats only saw minimal military service (the legionary tribunate, preceding entry into the Senate). Eventually, in the mid- and late third century CE, senators were eliminated from military commands and civil and military careers were separated altogether.

Geographical control in the Principate shifted to the fortification of frontiers via *limes* works, most famously Hadrian’s Wall in north Britain, but also the Odenwahl-Neckar *limes*, the *fossatum Africae* or North African *limes* works, and generally the construction of forts and roads along the Rhine and Danube rivers. The significance of such *limes* works has been extensively debated. These, even the walls, were not impermeable barriers intended to exclude the “barbarians” and keep them beyond the frontiers. Peoples were allowed to cross back and forth, subject to monitoring (and customs duties). Nor did the *limes* exclude internal threats, such as bandits and piracy, which governors and the Roman army were expected to repress.

However, the control of the periphery might conflict with internal security. When there was a coup or revolt within the empire, the incumbent emperor’s and the challenger’s first priorities were to eliminate their rivals and maintain their own power, even if doing so required pulling troops from the periphery. Native revolts or external incursions in the periphery might follow. This pattern is clear in events of 68–70 CE, where the revolt of Julius Vindex and Galba in Gaul and Spain encouraged the collapse of Nero; the revolt of Vitellius and Otho’s assassination of Galba followed upon each other, though it is uncertain whether Otho had heard of Vitellius’ revolt by January 15 of 69. Subsequently, Vitellius’ removal of legions from the Rhine to fight a civil war with Otho encouraged the revolt of the Batavians and Gauls.

In the third century crisis and the later empire, external raids and invasions from across the frontier further accelerated this pattern. Instability at the center probably encouraged external peoples to raid and invade the empire. From 235 to 476, the Roman Empire fought as many as 50 separate civil wars (most of them short), which, combined with serious military disasters in external conflicts, such as Julian's ill-fated Persian expedition (363) or the battle of Adrianople (378), debilitated the army and led to the use of federate troops, non-Roman peoples organized under their own native leaders, who were often allowed to settle within the empire. These Germanic federates, in effect client peoples, eventually carved out parts of the western empire for themselves. In a vicious cycle, stripped of geographical extension, the western empire lost the effective ability to tax or recruit a traditional army.

The study of Roman grand strategy has been constrained by the use of modern terminology, which many scholars have argued are anachronistic when applied to antiquity. The most controversial work has been Edward Luttwak's *The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire: From the First Century A.D. to the Third* (1976, revised ed. 2002). Classical historians have challenged Luttwak as anachronistic, emphasizing the limitations of ancient Roman elites, the limited information available to them, and the modern interpretation of military installations. Modern strategic planning was implausible; in the Republic, the Senate, which bore the closest resemblance to a permanent strategic planning board, nonetheless depended on third-hand information and could not maintain control over generals overseas, who acted largely on their own initiative. Greco-Roman knowledge of nonclassical peoples was often inadequate, marked by stereotyping and credulity, and commanders frequently launched campaigns almost into the unknown, as did Caesar when he invaded Britain in 55 and 54 BCE. Decisions to go to war might be motivated by personal and internal concerns, such as a general's or emperor's desire for plunder or glory, rather than by a rational assessment of external threats. These perspectives have been emphasized by Susan P. Mattern's *Rome and the Enemy: Imperial Strategy in the Principate* (1999). In fact, we do not often know much about how strategic decisions were made, and many ancient historians stereotyped such decisions to glorify or vilify the authority figures involved.

Archaeological evidence for strategy is the hardest to interpret. Luttwak interpreted later Roman military installations in the interior of frontier

provinces as representing “defense in depth,” a strategy allowing external enemies to penetrate the interior, to be repulsed by fast-moving field armies. But such installations may represent the development of more extensive internal security, intended to police and prevent revolts within the empire. The latter argument was made famous by Benjamin Isaac’s *The Limits of Empire* (1988, revised ed. 1992). However, proponents of Luttwakian grand strategy also have put forward their arguments. Strategy continues to be one of Roman military studies’ most vital and challenging areas of scholarship. Related controversies include the role of the Senate vs. general in decision making; the defensive or offensive nature of Roman imperialism; and the reason for the hiatus in conquest in the early Principate.

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See also Augustus; Civil Warfare; Client Monarchs; Fall of the Roman Empire (West); Frontiers; Imperialism; Military Intelligence; *Princeps*, Principate; Republic, Political Structure; Senate, Senators; Stratagems; Third-Century CE Crisis; Triumph

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Succession (Imperial)

In the absence of a hereditary monarchy, the most frequent forms of Roman imperial succession were quasi-dynastic succession, in which candidates from the emperor's family were designated as probable successors, and adoptive succession, in which a nonrelated man might be chosen. These methods were not mutually exclusive. They contrast with usurpation, in which a would-be emperor seized power in a coup, or revolt, in which the new emperor was acclaimed by the army.

In the view of modern scholars, the ancient Roman monarchy (753–510 BCE) itself may have been not so much a hereditary dynasty as a series of tyrants, military leaders who seized power and were backed by the Senate, at that time a body of patricians. Nonetheless, the vicissitudes of the legendary Tarquin dynasty and of the contemporary Hellenistic monarchies poisoned mid- and late republican Roman attitudes toward hereditary monarchy. The principate was never a hereditary monarchy. Thus in the description which follows, the term "heir" is used in its most general sense without the strict connotations of English "heir apparent" or "heir presumptive," terms pertaining to English hereditary monarchy and aristocracy.

Though Caesar adopted his great-nephew Octavian as his heir, a connection exploited by Octavian in his rise to power, Augustus himself had no sons, only a daughter, Julia. Julia was assigned several political marriages—the most prominent being to Marcus Vipsanius Agrippa, Augustus' most reliable deputy—but was exiled for adultery. Agrippa and Julia had two sons, Gaius and Lucius, whom Augustus adopted as sons, marking them out as potential successors. Gaius and Lucius received various titles and honors, such as *Princeps Iuventutis*, and became commanders at young ages. However, both young men died within a few years of each other, and

Augustus was forced to look elsewhere in the family for possible successors. Tiberius (the future emperor) and his brother Drusus were the sons of Augustus' wife Livia by her previous husband. They were grown men who had proven themselves as generals. Since Drusus had also died in a riding accident, Augustus designated Tiberius as potential successor, and upon Augustus' death in 14 CE Tiberius succeeded without incident. Though strict father-to-son succession did not occur, Augustus and Tiberius clearly promoted the concept of the imperial family as an unity through their reigns' coinage and official art and decrees (see Severy 2003; Lott 2012).

Tiberius' brother Drusus the Elder predeceased him, as did Drusus' son Germanicus in 19 CE, whom Tacitus depicts as a popular potential successor contrasting favorably with the unpopular Tiberius. Tiberius' own son Drusus the Younger also predeceased him (23 CE). Running out of adult options, in part because he had extirpated other members of the imperial family for suspected treason, Tiberius chose Germanicus' son Gaius (Caligula) as his eventual successor, who succeeded Tiberius in 37. Indeed Gaius, being young, was at first highly popular with the public. But Gaius designated no successors, and upon his assassination the praetorians elevated Germanicus' brother Claudius, now middle-aged. Due to various physical disabilities, Claudius had held only an augurship and never any military command. The quasi-dynastic principle was so routine by this time that Claudius' accession was accepted without contest. Though Claudius had a son, Britannicus, by his first empress Valeria Messalina, he was persuaded by his subsequent wife and empress Agrippina the Younger to adopt her son Nero (from a previous marriage) and designate him as his successor. Agrippina was the daughter of Claudius' brother Germanicus, giving Nero a hereditary claim. After Claudius' death, Agrippina and Nero proceeded to eliminate Britannicus.

It became conventional for dynastic or adopted potential successors to receive the title of *Caesar* and some of the emperor's formal powers, such as the *tribunicia potestas*, some years before the emperor's death if possible. Such potential successors also advanced more rapidly in their careers, being promoted to military commands and to consulships while still quite young. The Senate affirmed the conferral of these titles, powers, and offices. On accession, the new emperor was confirmed by the Senate and acclaimed by the army (not always in that order).

The death of Nero in 68 revealed the weakness in quasi-dynastic

succession: not only did it demand the designation of family members, it could be challenged by revolt and usurpation. There were no more Julio-Claudian candidates for the role of emperor. Through successful revolt, the elderly Galba became emperor, accepted by the Senate; he then fell to usurpation, via the coup of Otho, aided by the Praetorian Guard. In the Rhineland the army of Vitellius acclaimed him as emperor and began to march on Rome. The resulting civil war is termed the War of Four Emperors (counting Galba, Otho, Vitellius, and Vespasian). The forces of Vitellius defeated Otho at Bedriacum; Otho committed suicide. Acclaimed by his army in the eastern empire, Vespasian directed his ally Antonius Primus to invade Italy and defeat the Vitellians; the Flavian army besieged Rome and Vitellius, having lost all support, was murdered. The Senate ratified the accession of Vespasian (69–79), a successful usurper and the victor of the Jewish War, with the *lex de imperio Vespasiani*, affirming his imperial powers.

In his turn, Vespasian created a quasi-hereditary dynasty, succeeded by his elder son Titus (79–81) and Titus' younger brother Domitian (81–96). The unpopularity of Domitian with the Roman elite meant that for a few generations an alternative form of imperial succession was employed: the adoption of an adult and relatively unrelated man. Nerva (96–98) was probably an usurper from Domitian, being involved in the palace plot against Domitian. However, Nerva adopted the unrelated Trajan (98–117) as his son and designated him as successor, a formula followed by Trajan with Hadrian (117–138); by Hadrian with Antoninus Pius (138–161); and by Pius with Marcus Aurelius (161–180). (In fact Hadrian arranged the adoption of both Pius and Marcus.) There was also a slight dynastic element in that the adoptees married into the adopters' families; adoption and quasi-dynastic succession were not mutually exclusive. Hadrian married Trajan's great-niece Sabina.

Marcus Aurelius reverted to dynastic succession in designating his son Commodus as successor, as did Septimius Severus with his two sons. Marcus also promoted his adoptive brother Lucius Verus as co-Augustus. Though Marcus was clearly the more powerful of the two, Marcus and Lucius are named together in official edicts and correspondence. The Severans' reliance on dynastic principle enabled revolts favoring the great-nephews of Septimius Severus, Elagabalus (218–222) and Alexander (222–235), both of whom were very young men, proving weak rulers who were

assassinated.

The third-century crisis was a period when most emperors were acclaimed by the army. Though individual emperors seem to have favored hereditary succession, elevating their sons as Caesars, Valerian's son Gallienus (junior emperor 253–260, senior emperor 260–268), a mature man at his accession, was the only stable hereditary successor. Gallienus attempted to promote his own sons as Caesars, but they were killed. The army and its powerful generals apparently lacked confidence in boy emperors or Caesars and often overthrew them, a pattern that recurred in the late fourth and fifth centuries.

Diocletian (284–305) made a drastic return to the adoptive mode of succession, first adopting as “son” and then as brother (co-Augustus) his comrade Maximian (286–305), then designating two mature men as Caesars, Galerius and Constantius I, in 293. These Caesars had more powers than previously, being in effect co-emperors, the four rulers enabling greater control of the provinces. It is controversial whether Diocletian intended the two Augusti to abdicate after a set period (20 years) and be replaced by the Caesars, promoted to Augusti, or whether the abdication of Diocletian and Maximian in 305 was unplanned. In any case, the Second Tetrarchy, in which Galerius and Constantius became Augusti, the new Caesars being Maximinus II and Severus, soon fell apart and civil war ensued. The victor, Constantine the Great (306–337), strongly emphasized the dynastic principle, making his three surviving sons Caesars before his death and co-Augusti upon his death in 337.

The quasi-dynastic principle remained strong in the later Roman Empire. However, the army sought emperors by vote of a council of military officers in 363, when Julian (the last of the Constantinian dynasty) died without sons, and in 364 after the successor of Julian, Jovian, died suddenly. This council of officers would choose a military officer without recourse to the increasingly obsolete Roman Senate. After Valens was killed in the battle of Adrianople (378), Valentinian's son Gratian and the officer council settled on Theodosius I (379–95), who founded a dynasty that remained in power until the death of Valentinian III (425–455).

However, the Valentinian and Theodosian dynasties' emphasis on the elevation of family members produced weak child emperors. Gratian (co-Augustus with Valentinian I in 367–375 and with Valentinian II in 375–383) was murdered by the general Magnus Maximus in 383. His even younger

brother Valentinian II (375–392) was elevated to Augustus at the age of four by the army and was probably assassinated in 392 by Arbogast, another powerful general. Theodosius I's civil wars with Magnus Maximus and Arbogast consumed military manpower that the empire could ill afford to lose after the battle of Adrianople. Theodosius died in 395, leaving his young sons Arcadius and Honorius as emperors. The passivity of Honorius promoted the rise of powerful generals in the western empire, the *magistri utriusque militiae* or commanders-in-chief, a pattern persisting in the reign of Valentinian III (425–455), who became emperor at the age of six. After Valentinian III was assassinated in 455, the *magistri utriusque militiae*, especially Ricimer, elevated and deposed a succession of short-lived emperors in a period of instability and civil war that ended the western empire (476).

At no time could a reigning empress succeed to the purple. This exclusion was embedded in Roman tradition: in the Roman Republic, women could not hold political office or military commands, and the role of emperor remained in principle a military commander, acclaimed as *imperator* by the army. The wife of the reigning emperor might receive the title *Augusta*, but lacked any formal political powers. She might, however, exert considerable unofficial influence and control over a figurehead emperor, and be a powerful advisor and patron. The most influential empresses were Livia, the wife of Augustus; Agrippina the Younger, the wife of Claudius; Julia Domna, the wife of Septimius Severus; her nieces Julia Soaemias and Julia Mamaea; and Galla Placidia, the daughter of Theodosius I, sister of Arcadius and Honorius, and mother of Valentinian III.

Sara E. Phang

See also Adultery; Agrippina II; Augustus; Caesar, Gaius Julius; Constantine I; Diocletian; Domitian; Empresses; Galla Placidia; Hadrian; Theodosius I; Tiberius (Emperor); Trajan; Usurpation; Vespasian; War of Four Emperors

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Suetonius (ca. 69–ca. 140 CE)

Gaius Suetonius Tranquillus was a biographer of the dictator Caesar and the first 11 emperors. Suetonius lived during the Flavian era and the reigns of the first three of the “five good emperors” (Nerva, Trajan, Hadrian). More famous for his sensationalism than his strict historical accuracy, Suetonius nevertheless is one of the leading sources for the early imperial era and was an eyewitness to the reigns of Titus (79–81) and Domitian (81–96).

Suetonius was born in or very close to the “Year of the Four Emperors,” 69 CE. His father Suetonius Laetus was a centurion under the emperor Otho and a participant in the civil war that year until the Vitellian victory at the First Battle of Bedriacum (April 69). Suetonius Laetus knew Otho personally and was present when Otho received the news of the defeat at Bedriacum, upon which Otho chose to commit suicide rather than prolong the civil war and increase the number of deaths of valiant men serving under him. Laetus passed this information to his son the biographer (Suetonius, *Otho* 10). A more distant connection to the general Suetonius Paulinus, who served under Nero in Britain and Otho in the civil war, can be assumed, although the biographer fails to mention him by name (Suetonius, *Nero* 18, 39). Due to the prominence of Suetonius Paulinus in the pages of Tacitus, this is surprising, but not in any way proof that the two were hostile or unrelated.

Much detail in the *Twelve Caesars* originates from primary sources that other extant historians (except perhaps Tacitus or Pliny) seem not to have used. Suetonius employs letters found in the state archives, many of them in the handwriting of the emperor himself. Nevertheless, Suetonius’ authority has been criticized for his preference for scurrilous and sensational content rather than numerical data and strict chronological sequence. The veracity of Suetonius has often been called into question, and rightly so, for assuming the factuality of repeated rumors and character assassinations (such as charges of Agrippina’s incest with Nero). Nevertheless, on some

matters Suetonius is a much closer authority and has correct information in conflict with a later authority such as Dio or Eutropius. In such cases, while there is no universal rule in the absence of other authorities' testimony, Suetonius is often to be preferred as closer to the events in question (especially when he was an eyewitness) rather than disregarded as a scandal-monger. Due to the large lacuna in Tacitus' *Annals*, Suetonius is also one of our few extant sources on the reign of Gaius Caligula and the early years of Claudius' reign.

To illustrate additional problems with Suetonius' method, Suetonius arranges imperial behavior and actions under rubrics or conceptual categories, for example, (to name only a few), birth and childhood, rise to power, accession, comportment toward the Senate, military policy, benefactions, physical appearance, personal habits (including eating, drinking, and sexual behavior), death and last words, and portents. The topical arrangement can make chronology difficult, and also tends to stylize imperial behavior, so that Suetonius' attitude becomes clear. Though an equestrian, Suetonius adopts the "senatorial" point of view that approved of emperors who cooperated with the Senate and treated the army strictly. Conversely, he disapproves of emperors who were too dependent on the army. Suetonius also has a worrying tendency (found in other Latin authors) to generalize plurals from singular incidents.

As a depicter of civil war and usurpation, Suetonius is relatively superficial in contrast with Tacitus. Suetonius covers the civil wars fought by Julius and Augustus in his lives *Divus Julius* and *Divus Augustus* and very briefly in his biography of Tiberius, but war is not his chief preoccupation. The biographies of the emperors Nero, Galba, Otho, Vitellius, and Vespasian form the narrative of the second era of civil war in Suetonius' work, but he focuses not on military strategy and tactics or political forces but on the moral qualities of each emperor that resulted in their defeat or victory. As a result, Suetonius too willingly repeats Flavian propaganda against Vitellius, who is depicted as a monstrous glutton who sought the throne to satiate his appetite, rather than for the true reason all ambitious leaders seek power, ambition to exercise power. Even if Suetonius allows Flavian propaganda to diminish the reputation of Galba, Otho, and Vitellius in his writings, he is still a crucial source along with Plutarch and Tacitus for the "Year of Four Emperors" (for which Dio is fragmentary).

Unfortunately, the biographies in the latter half of the *Twelve Caesars*

are considerably shorter and slighter than those of the first half. Scholars believe that Suetonius' dismissal by Hadrian from the imperial civil service in approximately 120 CE caused him to lose access to the imperial archives, limiting his ability to produce as entertaining works with direct quotations and with the same level of veracity. The loss of access possibly led to his decision not to continue with a life of Nerva and Trajan. Furthermore, due to Hadrian's adoptive relationship to Nerva and Trajan, Suetonius may have elected not to continue his biographies to avoid any prospect of irritating the notoriously sensitive Hadrian.

In addition to biographies of the emperors, Suetonius also produced a series of lesser biographers of famous grammarians, poets, courtiers, courtesans, and a number of other lost works on antiquarian topics such as the Roman year, Roman festivals, and timekeeping. Almost all of the above are lost. Suetonius' *De poetis* survives in part, with biographies of Terence (a dramatist), Virgil, Horace, Lucan, and Pliny, as does his *De grammaticis* and *De rhetoribus*.

Suetonius was a very popular author in the Roman world and beyond. He followed a tradition of biography that includes Cornelius Nepos, but differs in its objective to reach a wider audience. Many other sets of biographies were modeled upon him, including especially the *Historia Augusta*, Einhardt's *Charlemagne*, and Vasari's *Lives of Famous Artists*. Plutarch's *Caesar*, *Galba*, and *Otho* are extant and can be compared with Suetonius; Plutarch has a more overtly moralizing style and constructs coherent narrative arcs focusing on personality and character rather than rubrics.

Gaius Stern

See also Historia Augusta; Tacitus

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Suetonius Paulinus (ca. 11–after 69 CE)

Gaius Suetonius Paulinus held governorships in Africa and Britain. His campaigning in the African mountains of Mauretania included military successes and observations of flora and fauna. In Mauretania, he suppressed a revolt of native peoples and claimed the region for Rome as far as the Atlas mountains. Though Paulinus' geographical works have not survived, Pliny the Elder attests his descriptions of the desert area of the River Ger. Paulinus' governorship of Africa ended around 43.

Paulinus became governor of Britain in 58. Unrest in the west led Paulinus to fight the Silures and Ordovices in Wales. His campaign continued north to the island of Mona (Anglesey). Overcoming native resistance, the Romans destroyed sacred groves of the Druids. Around this time, Paulinus became aware of the revolt of the Iceni and other peoples in the east, led by the Iceni queen Boudicca, in 60/61 CE. The British rebels sacked the Roman veteran colony of Camulodunum (Colchester). Allegedly, the rebel forces of up to 230,000 outnumbered the Roman forces of Paulinus, which numbered only 10,000. Therefore, his men were unable to defend Verulamium and Londinium, which the Britons also sacked. The rebellion ended when Paulinus was able to defeat Boudicca and her forces in a set battle.

While Paulinus was in charge during the British revolt, he was not blamed for the revolt. However, Nero did recall Paulinus to Rome shortly thereafter, in 61. The Roman historian Tacitus insinuates that Paulinus had ambitions to match the success of Cnaeus Domitius Corbulo in Armenia. However, the situation in Britain was different.

Although recalled, Paulinus maintained his prestige at Rome. His namesake was given a consulship in 66. Paulinus himself became one of Otho's generals during the civil war of 69.

Robyn Rider

See also Boudicca; Britain, Roman; British Revolt; Corbulo; Nero; Otho; Pliny the Elder

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Suicide

Modern Western societies tend to regard suicide as a pathological action, resulting from clinical depression or other severe emotional disturbances. In Roman culture, though suicide remained an act of extremis, it might be a rational and honorable act, safeguarding the reputation and status of the victim. As such, suicide was preferable to other forms of death or to dishonor. Suicide might be the option taken by commanders and by entire communities who faced certain defeat in warfare. Such honorable suicides are represented as meeting death with calmness and courage. For this reason “forced suicide” or “political suicide” (these are both modern terms) were offered to Roman aristocrats who faced execution, usually as a result of prosecution for treason during the early empire.

Deliberate self-killing should be distinguished from seeking death in combat at the hands of the enemy, whether as *devotio* (consecrating one’s death in combat to the gods) or without such consecration. The enemies of the Romans sometimes committed suicide rather than face defeat and the humiliation of captivity or surrender. Entire communities are represented as immolating themselves rather than be captured and enslaved. The most famous instance of mass suicide is the Jews who were besieged at Masada in 73 CE. Even if the defeated were not killed or enslaved, ritual surrender, *deditio*, humiliated them. In mass suicides, the parties often agreed to kill each other, as at Masada.

Consequently, in the civil wars of the late Republic, Cato the Younger (commanding Pompeian troops in Africa) chose to commit suicide rather than surrender to Caesar and receive Caesar’s clemency. Cato’s suicide was

deliberate and displayed Stoic endurance; when his hosts attempted to bind up his wounds, he tore them open and bled to death. Cato's death was much admired by the Roman aristocracy and set the tone for the "political" suicides of the early empire. Marcus Junius Brutus and Gaius Cassius Longinus, Caesar's assassins and opponents of Caesar's heir Octavian, also committed suicide after defeat in the battles of Philippi in 42 BCE. In 30 BCE, rather than surrender to Octavian, Antony and Cleopatra committed suicide, though Cleopatra's suicide, using poisonous snakes, has been questioned by skeptical scholars who suggest that Octavian had her assassinated. In this tradition, Marcus Salvius Otho (emperor 69 CE) also committed suicide after his army's defeat by the Vitellians, allegedly to spare his army further losses. Also in a military context, the emperors Maximian and Valentinian II may have committed suicide or been forced to do so in 310 and 392 CE, in these cases by hanging, regarded as a shameful form of death. Favored methods of suicide involved bloodletting and the endurance of pain, displaying courage and resembling battle deaths, whether by stabbing oneself or by cutting one's veins.

These "military" suicides should be distinguished from "forced" or "political" suicides associated with treason trials. In the Republic, some Roman aristocrats facing prosecution for extortion, military incompetence, or treason chose to kill themselves. In the early empire, Gnaeus Calpurnius Piso "Pater" was charged in 20 CE with murdering Germanicus and fomenting sedition as governor of Syria. Before his conviction, Piso committed suicide, but apparently of his own volition. The emperor Claudius offered Valerius Asiaticus, who had conspired against him, the "free choice of death" (*liberum mortis arbitrium*) (Tacitus, *Annals* 6.29.1–2; compare 11.1–3, 13.43.3; Dio 60.29.4–6). Asiaticus was required to die, but was thus invited to kill himself, sparing himself and his family the humiliation of public execution and also protecting the emperor's reputation. Republican Romans had been protected from capital punishment by the right of *provocatio*, a right abrogated in the Sullan and triumviral proscriptions; nevertheless the emperors did not wish to appear to butcher their aristocratic subjects. Furthermore, in treason cases, convicted defendants lost their property and lost the right to make a will; their children might also be deprived of civil rights. Suicide prevented confiscation and ensured the continuity of family property. It also ensured that the suicide victim's family would be able to bury and mourn him.

These rights were denied to those executed for treason, whose corpses might be desecrated and who might undergo *damnatio memoriae* (the systematic erasure of their status and public record).

However, especially in the later years of Nero (54–68 CE), “forced” suicide allegedly got out of hand. Many aristocrats who were condemned for or even suspected of sedition against Nero committed suicide (Tacitus, *Annals* 15.68–9, 16.10–11, 21–25). Suicide even became “political” as a statement of opposition to Nero, who was very unpopular with many aristocrats for his murder of his mother Agrippina and condemnation of his formerly trusted advisers Burrus and Seneca (both of whom committed suicide). Many senators also disapproved of Nero’s undignified, un-Roman singing and acting careers. The suicide of Thrasea Paetus (Tacitus, *Annals* 16.21–25) was clearly political. “Forced” suicide reappears in Domitian’s persecution of the Vestals in 83 CE (Suetonius, *Domitian* 8.3–4).

For members of the lower social classes, who had less reputation to defend, suicide held less prestige. The suicide of soldiers in peacetime may have been regarded as an attempt to desert from military service, since the emperor Hadrian had to defend suicide as permissible if a soldier was motivated by depression, sickness, madness, or shame (Digest 49.16.6.7). The suicide of slaves was condemned by the jurists as an attempt to escape bondage, similar to running away (Digest 21.1.17.4–6, 21.1.23.3). Christian condemnation of suicide as violating the first commandment (“Thou shalt not kill”) or as rejecting God’s gift of life may have arisen later (compare Augustine, *City of God* 1.20). However, Christian generals and emperors defeated in later Roman civil wars still sometimes committed suicide.

Sara E. Phang

See also Brutus (Junius Brutus, Marcus); Caesar, Gaius Julius; Cassius Longinus; Cato the Younger; Claudius I; Cleopatra; *Damnatio Memoriae*; *Devotio*; Masada, Siege of; Maximian; Nero; Otho; Piso, Gnaeus Calpurnius; Tacitus; Treason

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Sulla, Dictatorship of (82–81 BCE)

Sulla's dictatorship in 82–81 BCE came at a time of crisis for the Roman Republic, and serves as a transitional period in Roman history. It has been viewed alternately as foreshadowing the end of the Republic, as interrupting the proper functioning of the Republic, and even as restoring the Republic. In any interpretation, the dictatorship was for Sulla a means of restoring the authority and influence of the Senate and aristocracy which had been undermined by the growth in power of the tribunate and assemblies in recent decades. Sulla's dictatorship was unusual for several reasons. First, he was appointed dictator not by one of the consuls, but by an *interrex*. Second, no dictator had held office in Rome since the end of the Second Punic War, 120 years earlier. Third, Sulla was appointed dictator *legibus faciendis et rei publicae constituendae* (to make laws and reform the state). Finally, and perhaps as a consequence of the first three oddities, Sulla's office was not clearly limited to six months. Each of these factors marks a change in nature of the dictatorship, setting a precedent for Caesar's dominance in the 40s BCE.

The consuls of 82 BCE, Gnaeus Papirius Carbo and Marius the younger, had both died during the civil war which Sulla fought upon his return from the First Mithridatic War. Lucius Valerius Flaccus (consul 100) was therefore appointed *interrex* to oversee the consular elections for 81 BCE. Following his second march on Rome, though, Sulla urged that the present crisis warranted a dictator; Flaccus agreed and appointed Sulla. By this period, the dictatorship was an archaic relic, a vague constitutional memory, but one which offered a legitimate title and supreme *imperium* with which Sulla could introduce reforms to the Republic. It was, in other words, an office which was both republican and beyond the Republic, not unlike the fifth-century *decemviri* who were also appointed by an *interrex*. As a magistrate beyond the constitution, as it were, the dictator was the only magistrate who could suppress the increasing violence within the constitution and establish a way forward—Sulla's way. It has been argued that Sulla was free from the traditional six-month limit on the dictatorship due to his appointment by an *interrex*; appointment by the *interrex* thus gave him a tenure long enough to complete his mandate. As dictator, he implemented the following reforms, several of which reflect initiatives from his consulship in 88 BCE ([Livy] *Periochae* 87; Appian, *Civil Wars* 1.59).

Although the *lex Villia* of 180 BCE had attempted to formalize the *cursus honorum* with minimum ages for and intervals between curule magistracies, exceptions had been made. Perhaps motivated by Gaius Marius' uninterrupted string of consulships between 104 and 100 BCE despite the law, Sulla reiterated the minimum ages for the quaestorship, praetorship, and consulship and the 10-year interval between consulships. At the same time, the quaestorship and praetorship became more accessible, as Sulla increased the annual number of these magistrates to 20 and 8, respectively. Upon election, quaestors automatically became members of the Senate.

Throughout the second century, the Senate had numbered around 300 members, but after the civil war and the purges of Marius and Sulla, there may have been as few as 150–175 members. Sulla appointed new members from the equestrian order and from the most outstanding of his veterans to bring the Senate up to 600 members. Moving forward, each year's new quaestors may have been intended to offset death among the membership to maintain the enlarged body, but Roman demography suggests that 20 new members every year would not always make up for deaths in battle or of natural causes.

Sulla intended this larger Senate to take a greater role in the operation of the Republic. The Senate's traditional role as a deliberative body became increasingly legislative, though the Senate itself still did not pass laws. Sulla saw the divisive careers of the Gracchi brothers, Sulpicius, and other tribunes, as having undermined the authority of the Senate. Therefore, Sulla now required tribunes to secure senatorial approval before presenting their proposed laws to the people, replacing a traditional expectation with a legal requirement. Most of Sulla's senators, however, were inexperienced "new men" and unlikely to take much initiative (Flower 2010).

Senators regained their monopoly of the standing juries, which Gaius Gracchus had reassigned to the equestrians in the late 120s. Senatorial supervision of aristocratic behavior, particularly in matters of provincial administration and treason, was further increased by the establishment of several new standing courts. This brought the total number of standing courts up to eight, each one to be supervised by one of the year's praetors.

Praetors and consuls were now required to remain in Rome during their year of office, following which they would be allotted a *provincia* for an additional year. As propraeors or proconsuls, their range of activity in their provinces was narrowed: a governor who crossed the boundaries of his

province with or without his army, provoked a war, left his province to return to Rome early, or remained in his province more than 30 days after the arrival of his replacement without senatorial approval could be prosecuted for *maiestas* (treason).

Tribunes of the plebs were also brought more firmly under the authority of the Senate. Tribunes now required senatorial approval for their laws, as above, and faced reductions to the power of their veto and to their right to convene assemblies. Moreover, Sulla barred former tribunes from holding higher offices, which had the effect of preventing ambitious and capable men from pursuing this office. The reduction in the powers of the tribunate corresponded to a reduction of popular power in the assemblies.

Sulla also implemented religious and social reforms. The civil war and urban violence had damaged many of the buildings of Rome, including the Temple of Jupiter Optimus Maximus, destroyed by fire in 83 BCE. Sulla's work on restoring the temples included reforms to the priesthoods. He increased the numbers of pontiffs and augurs, and restored the ancient practice of cooptation, replaced by election through a *lex Gabinia* of 139–138 BCE. Sulla also enacted a series of sumptuary laws, but it is unclear to what extent he expected these laws to be implemented. He limited the expenses of feasts and funerals (and was accused of violating both), and he may have reformed Rome's marriage laws.

During the proscriptions which preceded the dictatorship, Sulla had confiscated a great deal of land in the name of the Republic; he now used this land to settle the veterans of approximately 23 legions from the civil war. Depending on their rank, veterans received packages of land of between 10 and 100 *iugera*. Plutarch suggests that many of the recipients were not successful farmers, and returned to the cities as landless citizens or took up lives as brigands (Plutarch, *Cicero* 14); their land was bought up by larger landowners.

Varied and wide-sweeping, Sulla's reforms were not the haphazard changes of a military dictator, but rather constitutional enactments intended to undo reforms and developments of the second century which had undermined the supremacy of the Senate, and particularly the belief-turned-practice that the popular assemblies were sovereign and could therefore overrule the Senate, tradition and law. Sulla's earlier career, though, ensured that his reforms could not last. For all that he attempted to restore an aristocratic Republic directed by an active Senate, Sulla could not prevent

his own career from becoming a dangerous precedent, nor could he undo the empowerment of the tribunate. As a whole, the Senate may have approved of Sulla's reforms and intentions, but was highly critical of the means by which he had implemented them. Cicero, for instance, notes "all was basically admirable, though temper and moderation were somewhat lacking" during Sulla's dictatorship (*Letters to Atticus* 11.21.3).

Ancient and modern scholars are divided on Sulla's dictatorship. It was reactionary or conservative, antiquated or revolutionary, republican or monarchical depending on one's view of the demise of republican politics in Rome. The proscriptions and land redistributions associate Sulla closely with the traditional image of a tyrant. Appian thus calls Sulla a "king or tyrant in deed, but not elected" (Appian, *Civil Wars* 1.11.97). Cicero suggests that Sulla's dominance depended on force, but was incomplete (Cicero, *On His House* 79). Caesar, on the other hand, famously derided Sulla's folly in surrendering the dictatorship (Suetonius, *Iulius* 77). Sulla's own attitude to the dictatorship may be suggested by his actions: he implemented his reforms from a traditional office, and he seems to have resigned that office once he viewed his task as complete. The date of his resignation as dictator is unclear, but falls sometime between late 81 and 79 BCE. Since he was consul for the second time in 80 BCE (within 10 years of his first, it should be noted), he may have resigned the dictatorship toward the end of 81 BCE.

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See also *Cursus Honorum* (Republic); Dictator; Marian-Sullan Conflict; Republic, Political Structure; Sulla, Lucius Cornelius

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Sulla, Lucius Cornelius (138–78 BCE)

Lucius Cornelius Sulla (consul in 88 and 80, dictator in 82–81 BCE) was one of the most charismatic and divisive leaders of the late Republic. A rival to Marius, an instigator of civil war, and the first dictator in over a century, he violated law and tradition, and inflicted bloody reprisals on his enemies to shore up a tottering Republic.

A patrician by birth, Sulla belonged to an impoverished branch of the Corneli which had not produced a consul since the third century BCE. Legacies from his stepmother and his first mistress relieved his youthful poverty and enabled a political career. Although Sulla aimed to restore his family to the highest circles of the *nobilitas*, he nevertheless continued to socialize with the humble companions of his youth throughout his career.

As quaestor (106 BCE), Sulla served under Gaius Marius in the Jugurthine War, in which his most notable deed was the capture of Jugurtha in 105 with the aid of Bocchus of Mauretania. This achievement has often been seen as the beginning of the rivalry between Marius and Sulla. Nevertheless, he continued to serve under Marius during the invasions of the Cimbri and Teutones. He enjoyed some successes under Marius and distinguished himself by his conduct, but transferred his services to Quintus Lutatius Catulus, Marius' consular colleague in 102.

Sulla's first bid for the praetorship (probably that of 98 BCE) failed, but he won the praetorship of (probably) 97, allegedly through extensive bribery. His praetorship was particularly known for the extravagant *Ludi Apollinares*, games advertising both his public role and his reputation. Following his praetorship, he was governor of Cilicia, still a haven for pirates despite the efforts of Marcus Antonius in 102. As propraeor with proconsular *imperium*, Sulla may have taken action against the pirates, but his major achievements were his resistance to the ambitions of Mithridates VI of Pontus in Cappadocia and the establishment of diplomatic contact with the Arsacid Persians. Around this time Sulla began to emphasize his special relationship with the gods (particularly Fortuna and Apollo), leading to his adoption of the cognomen *Felix* (fortunate, lucky, blessed).

Sulla's patrician birth, his successes in the east, and Marius' recent lack

of success, made Sulla more acceptable to the *nobilitas* to counter Marius' plebeian presumption, fostering his hopes for the consulship. In 91, Bocchus of Mauretania dedicated a sculptural group depicting the capture of Jugurtha and emphasizing Sulla's role, further supporting Sulla's pursuit of the consulship. The Social War (91–87 BCE), fought over the citizenship rights of the Italian allies, provided additional opportunity for advancement. He and Marius commanded armies as legates of the consuls of 90 and even cooperated to defeat the Marsians in that year. After the death of one of the consuls of 89, Sulla received proconsular *imperium* and captured several important cities of the Italian rebels. These successes led to his first consulship of 88 BCE and the prestigious command against Mithridates VI of Pontus (the First Mithridatic War).

The end of the Social War did not settle the question of Italian citizenship. When Sulla, as consul, blocked Publius Sulpicius Rufus' tribunician legislation to allot Italian citizens equally in the voting tribes, Sulpicius incited a brawl, driving Sulla from the forum and the city. Sulla returned to his army at Nola, where he learned that Sulpicius had passed his legislation and transferred the Mithridatic command to Marius.



Bust of an unidentified Roman aristocrat, long thought to be the dictator Sulla. In his conflict with Gaius Marius, Sulla captured Rome in civil war in 88 and 82 BCE. In 82–81 BCE, Sulla established himself as dictator, inflicting vicious reprisals on the surviving Marians. Located in the Glyptothek, Munich, Germany. (PHAS/UIG via Getty Images)

The loss of Sulla's command, following the use of violence against his consular authority, threatened an ignominious end to his career. Sulla therefore gambled on his army, carefully ascertaining his soldiers' loyalty before marching on Rome. All but one of his officers deserted Sulla, preferring desertion to the sacrilege of marching against Rome; similarly, the Senate as a whole rallied, if not behind Marius, at least against Sulla. Nonetheless, Sulla occupied Rome as Marius and Sulpicius fled into exile.

During his occupation of Rome, Sulla stressed his desire to protect the citizens from the violence of Marius and Sulpicius, who, along with 10 others, were declared public enemies. He then introduced a series of reforms resembling those of his later dictatorship, to strengthen the Senate and weaken the tribunate. He also promoted a limited remission of debts, new restrictions on interest rates, and the creation of 12 new colonies for veterans of the Social War. The aristocracy and the people may have supported these reforms, but Sulla had little opportunity to establish them: Lucius Cornelius Cinna, as consul in 87, reversed them.

Sulla had also declared Sulpicius' legislation invalid and recovered the command against Mithridates. He was on campaign in the east for several years, and in his absence, Cinna recalled Marius and declared Sulla himself a public enemy. Marius became consul for 86, but died in early January 86; his consular replacement, Lucius Valerius Flaccus (suffect consul 86 BCE), was dispatched to replace Sulla as proconsul. Sulla, however, refused to acknowledge Flaccus' legitimacy, and instead continued his efforts against Mithridates' general in Greece, Archelaus. Deprived of Roman support, Sulla funded his campaign by confiscating temple treasures from, among other sanctuaries, Delphi and Olympia. He captured and sacked Athens on March 1, 86 BCE, before confronting Mithridates' remaining forces in Boeotia. Here, Sulla defeated a larger force of Pontic troops, attributing his victory to his own skill but also to *felicitas* (good luck). Following a second victory in Boeotia, Sulla imposed a tribute on the region which would repay the despoiled sanctuaries and negotiated a peace treaty with Mithridates. In exchange for retaining his kingdom and becoming a Roman client, Mithridates withdrew his forces within the traditional boundaries of Pontus, paid an indemnity of 2,000 talents and provided Sulla with 70 ships. Sulla's status as a public enemy and the presence in the east of Flaccus' army, which had mutinied in favor of Gaius Flavius Fimbria, complicated both his ability to offer such terms and his arrangements for the Greek cities in Asia. He was able to win over the Fimbrians, but only in 83 could he return to Italy, marching on Rome for a second time.

Although Marius and Cinna had died in 86 and 84, respectively, Sulla's return prompted civil war with the surviving Marians. Sulla won a series of victories, supported by several senators and *equites*, including Pompey, who had fled Cinna's regime, and Crassus, who played the central role in the final Sullan victory at the Colline Gate. The leaders of the Marians, Gnaeus

Papirius Carbo (consul in 85, 84, 82) and Marius the younger (consul in 82), fled Rome, leaving Sulla the undisputed master of the city for a second time.

Sulla began with the proscription of his enemies, a bloody purge of the Senate and aristocracy which resulted in the deaths of as many as 2,000 senators and *equites*, though the exact figure is disputed. Nothing like this had been seen before at Rome. However, Sulla's aim was pragmatic: to remove "dangerous" figures from the state. Communities as well as individuals were punished: the younger Marius had found refuge in Praeneste after his defeat, prompting Sulla's execution of all male citizens of the town. Once begun the proscriptions got out of hand, as Sulla's lieutenants and friends settled personal grudges and enriched themselves.

After the suicides of both Carbo and the younger Marius, Lucius Valerius Flaccus (consul 100 BCE) was appointed *interrex* to oversee the consular elections for 81. Sulla, however, persuaded Flaccus that the only solution to the violence in Rome was the revival of the dictatorship, an office unused for 120 years. Flaccus accordingly appointed Sulla dictator *legibus faciendis et rei publicae constituendae* (to make laws and organize the Republic) and sanctioned Sulla's earlier actions. As dictator, Sulla occupied a unique position of authority from which to enforce his efforts to strengthen the Senate and reduce the power of the tribunes. Sulla's dictatorship was not limited by the traditional six-month term, but the date of his resignation is disputed. Since he held a second consulship in 80, he may have resigned late in 81, but he may also have retained the office as late as 79. Sulla died of illness soon after at his estate in Dicaearchia in 78.

The proscriptions and violence which Sulla used to impose his reforms as dictator in 82–81 have colored almost all ancient and modern assessments of him. However, Sulla should not be dismissed as a bloodthirsty tyrant. He conceived a solution to the "crisis" of the Republic and spared no effort in implementing it. In his attempt, three trends stand out. First, he was in all things practical, ready to do whatever he believed necessary (or expedient) to accomplish his personal and political goals. His marches on Rome and the proscriptions are, perhaps, the best examples. Second, his emphasis on *felicitas*, Fortuna, and Apollo suggest a belief that his actions were approved and justified by the gods. He displayed piety toward the gods and loyalty toward his friends, repaying the confiscated dedications in Greece and retaining the humble friends of his youth even at the peaks of success. Most importantly, Sulla was a master of command, understanding the collective

and individual temperaments of his soldiers. He understood when and how to restrain his troops, and when not to try. Thus, Sulla permitted their sack of Athens in 86, but carefully guarded against a similar treatment of Rome in 82. He won and retained the loyalty of his troops even as he undertook revolutionary actions, such as his two marches on Rome. However, he was not a military despot: for Sulla, soldiers and armies were tools for the betterment of the Republic.

For all his good fortune and charisma with his troops, though, Sulla was in some ways a failure. His efforts to restore the Republic did not long survive him, and his own supporters undid many of his measures. Republican politics did continue for about a generation after Sulla, but his career set a precedent for ambitious generals which his reforms could not limit. He had shown Rome that soldiers and violence could bring supreme power. Thus, Cicero remarks on the frequency of Caesar's comment, *Sulla potuit, ego non potero?* (if Sulla could, why can't I?) (Cicero, *Letters to Atticus* 9.10.2). Sulla has been seen as a savior of the Republic and an illegitimate usurper who suspended the Republic, as the "last republican" and an "unelected tyrant."

The major sources for the life and career of Sulla are Sallust's *Jugurthine War* (ca. 40 BCE), Plutarch's *Life of Sulla* (mid- to late first century CE) and Appian's *Civil Wars* and *Mithridatic Wars* (ca. 120 CE). The narratives of Livy and Cassius Dio survive only in epitomized form. Sulla's memoirs have also been lost, though our major sources will have relied on this to varying degrees.

C. Bailey

See also Cinna; Civil Conflict (Late Republic); Colline Gate, Battle of the; *Cursus Honorum* (Republic); Dictator; Marian-Sullan Conflict; Marius; Mithridatic Wars; Proscriptions; Senate, Senators; Social War; Sulla, Dictatorship of

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Sulpicianus (d. 197 CE)

Sulpicianus, the father-in-law of Helvius Pertinax, was an imperial candidate in 193 CE but failed to become emperor. Pertinax was murdered in March 193. In what became known as the “auction of the empire,” the praetorians offered the role of emperor to the man who promised them the largest donative. Sulpicianus bid against Marcus Didius Julianus, who outbid him and so became emperor. However, Didius Julianus soon lost the support of all groups at Rome. Septimius Severus, then governor of Pannonia, was acclaimed by his troops and marched on Rome to avenge Pertinax and secure his own bid for power. The Senate backed Severus, and Didius Julianus was condemned and executed.

Sara E. Phang

See also Didius Julianus; Donatives; Pertinax; Praetorians; Septimius Severus

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T

[Tacfarinas \(d. 24 CE\)](#)

Tacfarinas was a Numidian leader of a North African revolt against Roman rule in 17–24 CE. He had served in the *auxilia*, a pattern displayed by other native leaders of revolts such as the German Arminius and the Gauls Julius Civilis and Julius Classicus (leaders of the Gallic revolt in 70 CE). A deserter from the *auxilia*, Tacfarinas organized his followers in Roman military fashion. He could not win against the Romans in open battle and after some defeats, resorted to guerrilla type attacks, a common strategy of Rome's native enemies. To police these attacks, the Roman commander Junius Blaesus dispersed his forces for longer-term occupation. In 24 CE, Publius Cornelius Dolabella succeeded in ambushing and destroying Tacfarinas' forces; Tacfarinas chose to fall in battle rather than be captured by the Romans.

Sara E. Phang

See also Arminius; Bandits and Brigands; Desertion; Gallic Revolt; Low-Intensity Conflict; Revolt

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[Tacitus \(ca. 56–after 113 CE\)](#)

Tacitus is one of the most important Roman historians of the early Principate. His works are fundamental for understanding the history and politics of the first century CE, as well as contributing to our understanding of other subjects such as the ethnography of the ancient Britons and Germans. Yet the historian himself remains an enigma. It is immensely difficult to reconstruct the life and career of Tacitus using his works. Fortunately, his funerary inscription (*L'Année Épigraphique* 1995, 92) provides some supplementary biographical information for this elusive historian.

Tacitus was probably born in 56 or 57 CE, in northern Italy or southern Gaul, to an equestrian father who had been procurator of Gallia Belgica and the German provinces. In 77 CE Tacitus married the daughter of Gnaeus Julius Agricola. He may have served as a legionary tribune under Agricola. Tacitus pursued a normal political career during the reign of Domitian (81–96), to his later embarrassment. Tacitus became quaestor in 81 or 82 CE, praetor eight years later, and was suffect consul late in 97 CE. In this role he delivered the funeral oration for Verginius Rufus, who had famously rejected the offer of imperial power after the death of Nero. Tacitus' last recorded post is the proconsulship of Asia in 112–113 CE.

Tacitus' first work, the *Agricola*, was published in 98 CE. The *Agricola* takes the form of a biography of his father-in-law with particular emphasis on the latter's tenure as governor in Britain, and describes the conquest, administration, and pacification of Britain in the first century CE. Tacitus' account of the battle of Mons Graupius is particularly important for our understanding of how the imperial army actually fought. The text also carries an important political message in that good men (like Agricola) can still conduct themselves well and win renown, even under bad emperors like Domitian. (Tacitus, *Agricola* 42) Since Tacitus' own career may have been advanced by Domitian, he needed to apologize in this manner. Tacitus depicts Domitian in the *Agricola* as a paranoid tyrant in contrast to his more enlightened successors.

Tacitus' second work, the *Germania*, is an ethnographic study of the peoples of Germany. His choice of topic may have been influenced by the importance of military campaigns in Germany during the reign of Domitian, which seemed likely to continue under Trajan. It is possible that Tacitus had visited the German provinces during his military service. The *Germania* covers a range of subjects including German customs, political

system and dress. It also shows an acute understanding of the different German tribes.

Possibly attributed to Tacitus, the *Dialogus de oratoribus* is of uncertain date, most likely around 102 CE. It is an unusual text and unlike his other work. In the *Dialogus de oratoribus*, Tacitus explores the state of contemporary oratory in comparison to that of the past.

By 107 CE, Tacitus was working on the text which is perhaps most valued by military historians, the *Histories*, which covers the events in Rome and the provinces from the beginning of 69 CE through the first few months of 70 CE. Tacitus traces the brief reigns of Galba, Otho, and Vitellius, as well as the Flavian seizure of power. The text breaks off during an account of the Batavian Revolt. The *Histories* remains our most useful source for the War of Four Emperors in 69 CE. Part of the value of Tacitus' text lies in his depictions of the actions of a wide range of individuals from common soldiers to generals such as Antonius Primus, as well as the imperial candidates themselves. The *Histories* also contains a number of detailed descriptions of battles, most notably the First and Second Battles of Bedriacum. Tacitus skillfully demonstrates that "emperors could be made elsewhere than at Rome" (*Histories* 4) by the powerful provincial armies.

After completing the *Histories*, Tacitus decided to examine the history of the early Principate rather than contemporary events, as he had previously promised. Tacitus' decision to refrain from writing about the reign of Trajan has prompted much discussion among modern scholars. The *Annals* describes the consolidation of the Julio-Claudian regime after the death of Augustus. It originally encompassed 18 books, although not all of these are still extant. Tacitus records the reigns of the Julio-Claudian emperors with particular emphasis on their impact upon the upper classes. Despite its focus on the political arena, the *Annals* has much to offer the military historian. In particular, Tacitus describes the campaigns of Germanicus and Corbulo in Germany and Mesopotamia, respectively. He also discusses military activities in Britain after the Claudian invasion. Tacitus shows a particular interest in the career of Domitius Corbulo and indeed claims to have used the general's autobiography as a source.

The dates of the writing of the *Annals* and the death of Tacitus remain a source of contention among modern scholars. Traditionally, the historian was not believed to have outlived Trajan (d. 117). Ronald Syme argued forcefully for a Hadrianic date for the *Annals* and claimed that the Tiberian

section of that text can be read as a critique of the emperor Hadrian. In the absence of new evidence, it seems likely that the death of Tacitus, like so much of his life, will remain an enigma.

Jonathan Eaton

See also Agricola; Britain, Roman; Gallic Revolt; Germans; War of Four Emperors

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Tactics

The Roman army grew from the small army of the early Republic to the multiple divisions familiar in the imperial period, including 25 or more legions, the Praetorian Guard, the *auxilia*, the fleets, and other specialized corps. During the Republic, the legion was internally reorganized to adapt to changing tactics. The divisions of the imperial army may have had different tactical roles. The Roman army underwent further reorganization in the third century and later empire. Much is not well known about Roman military organization and tactics during the early and middle Republic. Latin and Greek authors, writing centuries later, essayed antiquarian reconstructions. The documentary sources that provide so much information about the Roman army of the Principate did not yet exist.

The army of the earliest Republic (ca. 509–400 BCE) probably resembled the hoplite phalanx, which characterized Greek city-state armies of the sixth and fifth centuries BCE. Attributed to King Servius Tullius, the archaic Roman legion was drawn from the three wealthiest classes in the Servian

constitution who could provide their own equipment, resembling hoplite equipment (Livy 1.44; Dionysius, *Roman History* 4.16–21). The hoplite phalanx was employed by the Etruscan cities, Rome's nearest neighbors, so it is not surprising to find it at Rome as well. The hoplite phalanx was a relatively rigid close-order formation in which warriors overlapped their shields to protect one another and withstand shock when the phalanx collided with its opponent. This formation required flat, level ground, and maneuvered poorly, in contrast with the later maniples and cohorts. Hoplites were armed with heavy, thrusting spears; sword-fighting was secondary. Rome's defeats during the early Republic and her expansion into mountainous central Italy may have motivated the abandonment of the hoplite phalanx.

During the conquest of Italy and down to 311 BCE, Rome's legions grew in number to two, then four, each consul commanding two legions. As Rome expanded into Italy and took on allies, she could field as many allied contingents, organized into *alae* ("wings," not necessarily all cavalry), creating a combined force as large as 40,000 at the battle of Sentinum (295 BCE).

Perhaps between the late fifth century and the early third century BCE, the manipular legion superseded the hoplite phalanx. Each legion consisted of 30 maniples, more maneuverable units that employed missile javelins and swords rather than thrusting spears. Each maniple comprised two centuries of 60 to 80 men each. Within each maniple, the troops were divided into groups characterized by their age and experience, ranked in three lines. The *hastati*, young men armed with javelins, made up the first line of battle. The *principes*, mature men somewhat more heavily equipped, made up the second line and carried out the brunt of the fighting. The *triarii*, older and experienced men, made up the third line and were expected to stand their ground in the fighting. Therefore the phrase "it has come to the *triarii*" signified desperate straits. The three-rank battle line that resulted, *hastati*, *principes*, and *triarii*, was termed the *triplex acies*. A corps of *velites* or light-armed troops, recruited from the poorest property-owning stratum, was responsible for scouting and skirmishing ahead of the main force. Polybius 6.19–42 describes the manipular legion of ca. 220–170 BCE.

Livy 8.8.5–8 may describe an intermediate stage, dividing the line of the *triarii* into *triarii*, *rorarii*, and *accensi*. Livy thus describes five classes, corresponding to the five Servian census classes. Recent research argues that

the *rorarii* should probably be identified with the “light troops” (*velites*) stationed to skirmish in advance of the legion. It has also been argued that the *accensi* were not light troops as Livy claims, but rather noncombatant assistants, as is the connotation of Latin *accensus*. Possibly Livy was confused about the manipular legion, as he wrote a century after it became obsolete.

In a much debated passage of Livy 8.8.5–8, the maniples deploy in a formation termed *quincunx* by modern scholars, in which maniples alternated with open spaces so that the entire *triplex acies* resembled a checkerboard pattern. After the *velites* completed skirmishing, they would retire through the open spaces. Then the maniples of *hastati* would close their gaps, causing the legion to present a solid line at the front. When the time came for the *hastati* to retire, every other maniple would fall back into the gaps between the maniples of *principes*, who would then move forward into the space created by the *hastati*, thus maintaining a solid front. The remaining *hastati* would repeat this maneuver, allowing all of the *princeps* to come to the front of the legion, while the *hastati* retired behind the *triarii*. This type of maneuver required excellent discipline and no doubt extensive drilling. It was most practical on level, flat ground, as any lack of coordination would enable the enemy to outflank and surround the Roman maniples by entering the open spaces. The *quincunx* maneuver hence has been suggested to be a parade ground drill, poorly attested in actual battles. Indeed, the advantage of maniples was that they could cope with rough, uneven ground better than the Macedonian phalanx, allowing Romans to defeat the Macedonians at Cynoscephalae (197) and Pydna (168).

In a manipular legion’s typical battle, the *velites* would range ahead, scouting and stirring up the enemy; when both forces were ready for battle, the Romans advanced at a steady pace, forming the *triplex acies*. At a signal, the *hastati* cast javelins (*pila*) at the enemy. If this did not rout the enemy, both sides then drew swords and began hand-to-hand combat. If the enemy was routed, the Romans pursued the enemy, often killing them. However, no battle was really “typical,” varying depending on the layout of the ground, the available troops, and the numbers and fighting methods of the enemy. Fighting was probably not continuous; though some battles are said to have lasted for hours, the effort of hand-to-hand combat can only be sustained for a short time, and periods of intense fighting probably alternated with periods of relative inaction (Sabin 2000).

In this period, military discipline emphasized remaining in formation, but with less rigidity than the hoplite phalanx. Discipline was maintained by the military oath (*sacramentum*) and probably by peer pressure. Soldiers swore oaths not to flee and not to leave the line of battle—except to advance to retrieve a weapon or strike down the foe. They might move relatively freely within the line to engage the enemy in hand-to-hand combat. Soldiers prized skill, experience, and courage (*virtus*), displayed in hand-to-hand combat.

In the late Republic, the legion transitioned to the use of cohorts, 10 per legion. Cohorts appear as early as the Second Punic War (218–201 BCE)’s Spanish campaigns, but did not become dominant before the early first century BCE. Marius was not the first to use cohorts, but he emphasized their use, and his military successes made maniples obsolete, last used by Metellus Numidicus in the Jugurthine War. Cohorts, being larger than maniples, more easily withstood shock; they were still small enough to maneuver easily, especially on rough ground. With the cohort system, the old division of *hastati*, *principes*, and *triarii* was abolished; the *velites* were also superseded. Within cohorts, all legionaries were divided into centuries, but otherwise the legionaries were treated alike. Cohorts continued to be used in infantry into the later empire.

The army’s command hierarchy played a major role in inducing soldiers to fight and obey. Each century of 60 to 80 men was commanded by a centurion—officers who obtained their commands by promotion through the ranks (very much like modern noncommissioned officers). Each cohort thus had six centurions, and the sixty centurions of the legion were promoted in an elaborate hierarchy. Centurions led their men from the front, engaging in battle alongside them. In this way, soldiers and their small-unit commanders maintained a close relationship, sustaining social pressure to obey and display valor. The centurion’s second-in-command, the *optio*, usually made sure the men held their ground from the back of the unit. As the centurion personally selected the *optio* from among his men, the second-in-command probably also held the same respect as the centurion, further inducing the soldiers to obey.

Every unit in the army had its own battle standards, which were regarded as sacred. Each unit followed their standard—carried by a standard bearer—into battle. Because the standards were sacred, they also induced soldiers to fight. Having a standard captured was one of the highest forms

of dishonor for a unit, and indeed many probably considered it better to die than to have their standard captured. Because of this, troop movement and engagement could be carefully controlled by the placement of the standards.

The Roman army also had an extensive system of reward and punishment, which played a major role in inducing soldiers to fight and obey. Made from precious metals, military decorations were both valuable in themselves and signified great honors. Decorations included crowns (wreaths) for being the first to scale a wall during a siege, saving a fellow citizen's life, and for rescuing Romans from a besieged city. Other rewards included necklets, armbands, bronze sculpted discs, spears, and horse trappings. Monetary bonuses were likewise a form of reward, and they too were often presented for bravery. In this way, soldiers were motivated both to hold the line and to display valor.

Punishments (s.v. military discipline) on the other hand were severe, including fines, corporal punishment, reduction in rank, and the reduction of rations (or replacement of wheat with barley). The collective punishment of decimation, in which a few were selected by lot from a cowardly or disobedient unit for beating or stoning to death, was one of the worst possible punishments, but shaming punishments might be imposed on troops who showed cowardice.

Caesar's *Gallic Wars* and *Civil War* illustrate the role of the general in the late Republic. He commanded from just behind the front lines, where he was not occupied fighting the enemy in person but could move about (on horseback) to observe the battle and encourage his men. Occasionally, generals of the late Republic fought alongside their men in the front, boosting their morale; however, such a location made it hard for a general to observe the course of a battle.

Caesar's soldiers were well trained and could orient themselves according to the standards carried by the centuries. At the battle of the Sambre Caesar's men, out of fear, had become too crowded together to fight effectively; he urged them to move their standards apart, enabling a looser formation where each man had space for combat. He urges his men away from low points in the topography, "unfavorable ground" which an army burdened with the weight of arms and armor would have to fight its way uphill to escape. In contrast, "favorable ground," being higher than the surrounding topography, gave soldiers more impetus when running downhill against the enemy (see Lendon 1999). Caesar ensured that his

soldiers were highly motivated, rewarding them with donatives and the plunder of Gaul (in contrast, he downplays plunder in the civil war with Pompey).

Roman tactics against non-Romans varied with the people and their fighting methods. Barbarians' rash mass attacks usually resulted in their defeat by the Romans, whose soldiers were better disciplined. Gauls, Germans, and Spanish were more successful when they launched guerrilla attacks and ambushes, especially when Roman forces were more vulnerable when strung out on the line of march (*agmen*), though the Romans had ways to organize the *agmen* so that it was more defensible. Converting a line of march into a line of battle was also a vulnerable undertaking that might take hours.

In the Principate, the main controversy over tactics is whether the *auxilia* had a different tactical function than the legions. Tacitus (*Agricola* 35.2) asserts that at the battle of Mons Graupius (83 or 84 CE) victory was achieved without shedding Roman blood, the noncitizen *auxilia* carrying out the fighting. This doubtless rhetorical statement has been taken seriously, based on Trajan's Column where legionaries are depicted at work on engineering projects, while auxiliaries (distinguished by their equipment) are seen more often in combat. However, documentary and archaeological sources do not suggest that legionaries and auxiliaries had different tactical purposes. In fact, both were eventually recruited from the same pool, the frontier provinces and especially the military zone.

Another feature of the middle and later empire was a resurgence of the use of the phalanx or "shield wall," described for example in Arrian's *Ectaxis contra Alanos*. The Alani were a Central Asian barbarian people who invaded the Danube region. The motivation for the use of the phalanx is debated; it may have reflected nostalgia for classical Greece in a period when the Greco-Roman elite venerated classical texts (Lendon 2005).

Tactics shifted to an emphasis on cavalry in the third-century crisis and later empire. The emperor Gallienus (260–268) organized a central field army based on cavalry, able to move faster than infantry to crisis areas of the empire. Because of the behavior of horses, cavalry tactics are different from infantry tactics; horses will not run into a massed object (such as a battle line) but will swerve around it, making cavalry battles faster moving and more fluid. The Romans employed light cavalry to tire out Persian mounted cataphracts, heavy-armored cavalry where both riders and horses

wore elaborate armor. Also good against cavalry were slingers and archers, striking at a distance. The emphasis on cavalry meant that the *spatha* or long cavalry saber replaced the infantry *gladius*. However, all Roman cavalry were hampered by a lack of stirrups, which would not be invented until later in the Middle Ages.

In the later empire, regular Roman troops seem to have been trained in the usual way as infantry and cavalry. Though Vegetius, author of the early fifth-century *Epitome of Military Science*, laments that present-day soldiers do not train, this was a stock complaint used to praise commanders by claiming that their predecessors had let training slide. The Germanic *foederati*, however, retained their native fighting methods and organization.

Adam Anders and Sara E. Phang

See also Arms and Armor; Caesar, Gaius Julius; Cohorts; Legion, Organization of; Maniples; Military Decorations; Military Discipline; Military Oaths; Servian Constitution; Vegetius; *Virtus*

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Tarentum, Pact of (37 BCE)

The Pact of Tarentum was a renewal of the Second Triumvirate in 37 BCE between Octavian, Mark Antony, and Lepidus. It was managed in large part by Octavia, sister of Octavian and wife of Mark Antony. It was intended to unite the triumvirs in a naval effort to suppress Sextus Pompeius.

Following the short-lived Pact of Misenum, Octavian had renewed his war against Sextus Pompeius. However, he met with several defeats. Antony returned to Italy officially to help his colleague, but actually to raise troops for a campaign against the Persians. The two commanders began to dispute and blame the other's lack of cooperation for their military setbacks, but Octavia was able to reconcile them. Appian, *Civil Wars* 5. 95 says Antony was to supply Octavian with 120 ships against Sextus, while Octavian was to provide 20,000 legionary soldiers against the Persians (Plutarch, *Antony* 35.4 says only two legions and 100 ships). Octavia secured an additional 1,000 picked praetorians for Antony and 10 light triremes for her brother. In addition, they renewed the Second Triumvirate for an additional five years without seeking ratification from the people. Furthermore, they stripped Sextus of his augurship and the consulship that he had been promised (probably 35 BCE).

As with the Treaty of Brundisium, a marriage bond settled the treaty. Octavian betrothed his infant daughter Julia to Antony's older son, and Antony betrothed his older daughter by Octavia to the son of Domitius Ahenobarbus, his lieutenant.

Dio 48.54 believes that neither party planned to respect the terms of the Pact of Tarentum, but that both were acting out of expediency and planned to violate the agreement.

Gaius Stern

See also Brundisium, Treaty of; Civil Wars (II) (44–31 BCE); Mark Antony; Octavian; Second Triumvirate; Sextus Pompeius

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Tetrarchic Civil War (305–312 CE), Causes

There is no accepted name for the civil conflicts of the Second Tetrarchy (305–312) in which Constantine the Great (306–337) rose to power despite his exclusion from the Tetrarchic succession. The conflicts are termed the Tetrarchic Civil War in this encyclopedia.

Besides the personal ambitions of the individual leaders, the Tetrarchic Civil War was driven by the tension between the Tetrarchic model of nondynastic succession and a more standard model of dynastic imperial succession. It was probably not driven chiefly by religion, despite the perspective and claims of the Christian historians Lactantius and Eusebius.

The Second Tetrarchy might have continued longer if Constantius I (Caesar 293–305, Augustus 305–306) had not died in 306, enabling his troops to acclaim his son Constantine as emperor. It was routine for usurpers to claim that their armies acted spontaneously rather than that they instigated their revolts. Constantine's intense personal ambition is confirmed by Aurelius Victor (40.2) and Eutropius (10.5, 7). However, the support of his father's army shows the popularity of dynastic succession, in contrast with Diocletian's nondynastic Tetrarchic arrangement in which nonrelated adult men were tapped to become Caesars and intended successors of the Augusti. In the creation of the Second Tetrarchy, both Constantine and Maximian's son Maxentius had been passed over for Caesars. Subsequently at Rome, Maxentius was also elevated to emperor by popular sentiment and the support of the praetorians.

Despite the Christian emphasis of Lactantius and Eusebius, it is unlikely that the entire Second Tetrarchic conflict was motivated by religion. The depth and extent of Constantine's initial Christian sympathies and conversion before the battle of the Milvian Bridge remain debated by scholars. Lactantius and Eusebius wrote in hindsight, glorifying Constantine and the Church. Without the imposition of Christianity, the Tetrarchic Civil War resembled other Roman imperial civil wars (compare the War of Four

Emperors, 69 CE; the wars of Septimius Severus, 193–197; and the third-century crisis).

However, differing religious sympathies and the persecution of the Christians may well have divided the rival Second Tetrarchs further; Galerius and Maximinus were fervent pagans and harsh persecutors of the Christians, whereas Constantius was allegedly sympathetic to Christianity.

Sara E. Phang

See also Civil Warfare; Constantine I; Constantius I; Diocletian; Eusebius; Galerius; Lactantius; Licinius (Emperor); Maxentius; Maximian; Milvian Bridge, Battle of; Succession (Imperial); Third-Century CE Crisis; Usurpation

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Tetrarchic Civil War (305–312 CE), Course

Constantine first allied himself with Maximian Herculius (Augustus 286–305), and, after the deaths of his other rivals, defeated his main rival in the western empire, Maxentius, in the battle of the Milvian Bridge on October 28, 312. Constantine then faced Licinius and Maximinus II Daia as rivals; after the elimination of Maximinus, Constantine and Licinius ruled the empire until 324, when Constantine overthrew Licinius. The conflicts of the Second Tetrarchic period are attested in relatively extensive but highly partisan Christian narratives, due to Constantine's conversion to Christianity. Pagan sources, such as the *Panegyrici Latini* and the epitomators, present their own difficulties.

The Second Tetrarchy was established on May 1, 305 when Diocletian, the senior Augustus, and his co-Augustus Maximian abdicated in favor of

the Caesars Galerius (305–311) and Constantius I (305–306) who became the new Augusti. Two new Caesars were elevated: Severus and Galerius' nephew Maximinus. The two young men who had hoped to be appointed Caesar, Maximian's son Maxentius and Constantius' son Constantine, were passed over.

In 306 Constantine joined his father in the northwestern empire. After Constantius' death, Constantine was acclaimed emperor at York by his father's soldiers. This was the first rupture with the Tetrarchic system. However, Constantine seems to have been content with the title of Caesar, which his father as senior Augustus had been able to confer and which Galerius reluctantly confirmed.

On October 28, 306, Maxentius revolted, supported by the inhabitants of Rome, the Praetorian Guard, and the Italians. A short time later Maximian came out of retirement, which he had probably not regarded with enthusiasm, and claimed the title of emperor again. Galerius dispatched the Caesar Severus to invade Italy and suppress the revolt of Maxentius. Maximian confronted Severus. The troops of Severus included many of Maximian's veterans, who refused to fight their former leader. Abandoned by his army, Severus fled and took refuge at Ravenna, where Maximian captured and imprisoned him; Subsequently Severus died, allegedly put to death by Maxentius.

Around this time Constantine allied with Maximian and Maxentius. A panegyric to Constantine and Maximian addresses Maximian as "eternal emperor" and links Constantine with the Herculian dynasty. Constantine was betrothed to and in 307 married Fausta, Maximian's young daughter. Maximian apparently conferred the title of Augustus on Constantine, but the other Tetrarchs probably did not regard his title as legitimate. Even so, it is conventional to date Constantine's reign from 306 to 337.

In April 308 Maximian attempted to depose Maxentius, but failed and fled to Constantine for protection. Galerius invaded Italy with the goal of suppressing Maxentius, but was forced to turn back. In November 308 Galerius, attempting to keep the Second Tetrarchy together, called a conference of the current and retired emperors at Carnuntum in Pannonia, including Diocletian, Maximian, Galerius, Maximinus, and Constantine. Maxentius was not included, and was even declared a public enemy. Galerius probably hoped that Diocletian would resume the purple and restore order, but Diocletian refused to become emperor again. He

persuaded Maximian to abdicate for the second time. Galerius appointed Licinius, an old friend of his, as Augustus to replace Severus and accepted Constantine and Maximinus as Caesars, technically *filii Augustorum* (“sons of the Augusti”), which failed to satisfy them.

In 310 Maximian revolted against Constantine in another bid to regain the imperial power. He was besieged at Massilia and defeated by Constantine. Captured by Constantine, Maximian may have been put to death by hanging or may have been forced to commit suicide. After the death of Maximian, Constantine’s panegyrists depict Maximian as a traitor and instead claim that Constantine’s father Constantius was descended from Claudius II Gothicus (268–270), one of the great (but short-lived) emperors of the third-century crisis, creating a dynastic lineage and greater legitimacy for the house of Constantine.

In 311 Galerius died from a long and painful illness. He issued an edict on his deathbed rescinding the persecution of the Christians. After Galerius’ death, Constantine adopted the title of Augustus, a title also claimed by Maxentius; in the eastern provinces, Licinius and Maximinus were now rivals headed toward civil war. Constantine forged an alliance with Licinius, to whom he betrothing his sister Constantia.

In the western provinces, Constantine and Maxentius were now open rivals. Constantine invaded Italy and fought and defeated Maxentius on the outskirts of Rome at Saxa Rubra and at the Milvian Bridge on October 28, 312. Maxentius was forced to retreat across the Tiber River and drowned (variant accounts exist). Constantine entered Rome and was accepted as emperor.

According to Eusebius (*Vita Constantini* 1.28), before the battle with Maxentius, Constantine saw a cross of light appear in the sky and regarded it as a sign that the Christian God would bring him victory. He painted the labarum (the Chi-Rho monogram, standing for Christ) on his soldiers’ shields. According to Lactantius (*DMP* 44), Constantine was inspired by a dream to do this before the battle. After defeating Maxentius, Constantine proceeded to pass edicts of toleration and restitution, restoring to the Church and to Christians property that had been seized in the persecution of 303–311.

Around this time (311 to 313) Diocletian died; Lactantius claims (*DMP* 39, 41–2) that he lived long enough (after the death of Galerius in 311) to learn how his wife Prisca and daughter Valeria were mistreated by

Maximinus and Licinius, who forced them out of Galerius' court and into exile. Licinius subsequently apprehended and put Prisca and Valeria to death.

In 313 Maximinus invaded Thrace and besieged Byzantium (not yet Constantine's capital). Forced to abandon the city, Maximinus was defeated in battle at Adrianople (not to be confused with the more significant battle of Adrianople in 378) and, after attempted flight, committed suicide or died of a disease at Tarsus. Constantine and Licinius were left as Augusti. They maintained an uneasy coexistence, breaking into civil war in 316–17; in 324, when Licinius allegedly invaded Constantine's territory, Constantine rapidly defeated him, exiling Licinius to Thessalonica where he was executed the following year.

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See also Civil Warfare; Constantine I; Constantius I; Diocletian; Eusebius; Galerius; Lactantius; Licinius (Emperor); Maxentius; Maximian; Milvian Bridge, Battle of; Succession (Imperial); Third-Century CE Crisis; Usurpation

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Tetrarchic Civil War (305–312 CE), Consequences

The collapse of the Second Tetrarchy destroyed the credibility of adoptive or nondynastic succession, and subsequently the later Roman emperors from Constantine through the Theodosian dynasty (379–455) relied on dynastic succession, elevating family members to Caesars or co-Augustus.

Constantine himself elevated his three sons, Constantinus II, Constantius II, and Constans, and a nephew, Delmatius, to Caesars during his reign. After his death, the four were supposed to reign as co-Augusti, an arrangement that soon succumbed to a purge of the collateral branch of the dynasty (including Delmatius), civil war between the sons, and the usurpation of Magnentius, leaving Constantius II (337–61) as sole ruler. Constantius elevated his cousins Gallus, then Julian, as Caesars; Gallus was accused of conspiracy and executed, while Julian, successful in his wars against the Germans, was acclaimed Augustus by his troops and was spared a civil war by Constantius' death from illness. Subsequently, Valentinian I (364–75) elevated his brother Valens to co-Augustus, and Valentinian's sons, Valentinian II and Gratian, later became co-emperors. Selection of unrelated, adult candidates for the purple occurred only when dynasties terminated without candidates, as after the deaths of Julian in 363, Jovian the following year, and Valens in the battle of Adrianople (378). After Adrianople, the unrelated Theodosius I (379–395) was chosen by Gratian and a council of officers, but subsequent reliance on dynastic succession eventually weakened the Theodosian dynasty and contributed to the fall of the western empire.

The farthest-reaching consequence of the Tetrarchic Civil War was Constantine's conversion and promotion of the Church, ushering in a new age of history. It is difficult to imagine the Byzantine Empire, the European Middle Ages, and the European Renaissance and Baroque eras without Christianity. No people of the time could have foreseen these ages. In the short term, Constantine's conversion had less impact than Lactantius and Eusebius claimed. They heralded Constantine as a savior and ruler of a Christian golden age. Eusebius' *Vita Constantini* (Life of Constantine), a eulogy written after the emperor's death, is perhaps most exaggerated in its claims for Constantine's conversion, projecting backward from the later years of a long reign. Constantine took more interest in theological controversies later in his life, summoning the Council of Nicaea (325) to settle disputes over the relationship of Christ to God.

At the time of the Tetrarchic Civil War in 312, Constantine staked his belief in the Christian God on his victory over Maxentius. After Constantine achieved this victory, he declared edicts of toleration of the Christian religion, restored to Christians property seized in the persecution, and bestowed vast wealth and estates on the Church. But Constantine still

treated the Christian God as one god among many worshipped in the empire. His personal conversion is undoubted, but he did not persecute paganism or attempt to impose monotheistic Christianity on all inhabitants of the empire. Theodosius I (379–395) would attempt this. For a few years Constantine also continued to depict Sol Invictus (the Invincible Sun) on his coinage, a pagan solar deity with eastern origins worshipped by the emperor Elagabalus (218–222) and Aurelian (270–275). Constantine even permitted individuals to continue to worship him in the imperial cult, and perpetuated the exalted ceremonial that surrounded the emperor from the Tetrarchic period onward.

The main narratives for the Second Tetrarchic conflict are Lactantius' *On the Deaths of the Persecutors* (DMP), written around 316–17; and Eusebius' *History of the Church and Life of Constantine*, written in Constantine's reign. Both Lactantius and Eusebius are highly favorable to Constantine, depicting him as a savior of the empire and of the Christians, rather than as a usurper who began the destruction of the Second Tetrarchy. The pagan emperors are depicted as tyrants, including Diocletian, Galerius, Maximian, Maxentius, and Maximinus. The *Panegyrici Latini*, a collection of Latin orations praising the later Roman emperors, includes orations to Constantius I, Constantine and Maximian, and Constantine alone after his defeat of Maxentius. Pagan in outlook, the panegyrics have the advantage of contemporaneity and show the shifting of alliances and claims of legitimacy.

In contrast, the Latin epitomes (mini-histories) Eutropius' *Breviarium*, Sextus Aurelius Victor's *De Caesaribus*, and the anonymous *Epitome de Caesaribus* were written decades later, in the middle and late fourth century. They also cover the First and Second Tetrarchy and Constantine's rise to power. Eutropius and Aurelius Victor were secular in their approach and are much more favorable to the pagan emperors, especially Diocletian and Galerius, but their narrative of the Second Tetrarchy clearly derives from a source favorable to Constantine.

Written in the late fourth century, the pagan historian Ammianus Marcellinus' *History of Rome* is not intact for this period. On the other hand, the early fifth-century Greek historian Zosimus (*New History*) is very unfavorable to Constantine.

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See also Civil Warfare; Constantine I; Constantius I; Diocletian; Eusebius; Galerius; Lactantius; Licinius (Emperor); Maxentius; Maximian; Milvian Bridge, Battle of; Succession (Imperial); Third-Century CE Crisis; Usurpation

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Theoderic (ca. 454–526 CE)

Flavius Theodericus, in English Theoderic, was the first king of the Ostrogoths (471–526) and from 493 to 526 ruled Ostrogothic Italy, one of the earliest prominent successor kingdoms. Theoderic was probably born in Pannonia around 454. During the disintegration of Attila's Hunnic Empire, several Gothic tribes separated from the Huns and settled inside the Illyrian provinces of the eastern Roman Empire. Theoderic's father was leader of one of these tribes and made a treaty with the Romans, in which the young Theoderic was sent to Constantinople as a hostage. In this period, though little is known, Theoderic presumably acquired an exposure to classical culture.

In 470–471, Theoderic returned to the Pannonian Goths and became their king. Throughout the 470s and 480s Theoderic repeatedly ran into conflict with Goths settled in Thrace, but by 484 had gained leadership over both Gothic confederacies. The eastern Roman emperor Zeno solicited his support against various rivals, for which Theoderic was appointed *magister militum* and even received the consulship. Both parties were intermittently also at odds, however. Eventually Theoderic and Zeno reached a compromise: the Ostrogothic leader would march to the west and replace Odoacer, former supreme commander of the western Roman army, who had deposed the last western Roman emperor and governed Italy autonomously.

Theoderic defeated Odoacer's forces in 489 at the Isonzo River and at Verona. However, during the winter of 490, Odoacer besieged Theoderic at Ticinum (Pavia). A timely intervention of the Visigoths broke the siege. Theoderic defeated Odoacer a third time at the Adia River in 491, followed by a two-year siege at Ravenna. Only after assassinating Odoacer during a banquet that ostensibly celebrated a negotiated peace, did Theoderic gain complete dominance over Italy in 493.

The Vandals had attempted to take over Sicily during the war in Italy, but Theoderic's forces evicted them and seized most of the island. In the following years, Theoderic concluded several marriage alliances with the royal families of various successor kingdoms: his sister married the Vandal king, his daughter married a Visigothic king, and his other daughter married a Burgundian prince, while Theoderic himself married a sister of the Frankish king. This did not prevent the Franks from attacking the Visigoths in 507, so that the Visigoths lost most of their Gallic territories. Theoderic sent an Ostrogothic army that secured the Mediterranean coast and preserved the rule of his Visigothic relatives in Spain.

By 513, Theoderic directly controlled Italy, Sicily, Provence, and the western Illyrian territories, while exercising the regency of his grandson in Spain. This effectively meant that for the first time since the death of the western Roman emperor Majorian (461), one ruler's hegemony in western Europe stretched from the Atlantic to the Danube. Though he significantly chose to be a king rather than a Roman emperor, Theoderic left intact many of the governmental and social institutions of late Roman Italy, preserving elements of classical culture. Toward the end of his reign, tensions rose between Theoderic and both the eastern Roman government, to which he nominally was still subservient, and members of the Italian elites. After his death, these mounting crises would culminate in full-scale war between the Ostrogoths and Constantinople. Nevertheless, during his life and reign Ostrogothic Italy proved to be the most formidable of all post-Imperial kingdoms.

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See also Attila; Fall of the Roman Empire (West); Goths; Odoacer; Vandals

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Theodosius I (Emperor) (379–395 CE)

Theodosius I (known as the Great) came from a Spanish family and was promoted from relative obscurity to rule of the eastern Roman Empire. Born ca. 345, he reigned from 379 to 395 and he was the last emperor of a unified Roman Empire.

At Adrianople, in 378, the eastern Roman army was smashed by the Visigoths and the emperor Valens was killed, leaving no heir. The young western Roman emperor Gratian (375–383) appointed Theodosius I as *magister militum* for the eastern empire in 378. Faced with a power vacuum in the eastern empire, Theodosius rebuilt his army with mass conscription and recruited barbarian allies as client armies, the *foederati*. For his success, Theodosius was made Augustus in the eastern empire in the year 379. He fought a protracted campaign against the Visigoths for the next three years.



Gold solidus of Theodosius I (379–395 CE), the last Roman emperor to rule a unified empire. At his death, the empire was divided between his sons, Arcadius in the East (395–408) and Honorius in the West (395–423). Located in the Yale University Art Gallery, New Haven, Connecticut. (Yale University Art Gallery)

In 382, after several victories, Theodosius concluded an alliance with the Visigoths, granting them federate status. He settled them in Moesia, where they lived under their own laws, but they were obligated to fight as allies of the Roman Empire. This federate system became an important means of maintaining Roman military power, and it also led to an increased barbarian presence in the Roman Empire.

In 383, Magnus Maximus, the governor of Britain, proclaimed himself emperor of the western empire. Maximus routed Gratian's army and killed Gratian, becoming emperor of Britain and Gaul. Maximus sought to

peacefully reconcile with Gratian's brother, the child emperor Valentinian II (b. 371, reigned 375–392). Delaying tactics gave Valentinian's troops time to secure the Alps. Maximus accepted this standoff, allowing Valentinian to remain the ruler of Italy and Africa. During these years, Theodosius recognized Maximus as a co-emperor

In 387, Maximus invaded Italy. Valentinian II fled to Thessalonica. There, Theodosius I sealed his alliance with Valentinian by marrying his sister Galla. Theodosius invaded Italy by land and by sea, defeating Maximus' army at the battles of Siscia and Poetovio in 388. The triumphant Theodosius sent Valentinian to Gaul, with his trusted general Arbogast. Theodosius ruled from Milan for three years, attempting to provide some stability in the western empire. His older son, Arcadius, stayed in Constantinople to administer affairs in the eastern empire. In 391, Theodosius restored Valentinian II to his throne and headed east.

In 392, Valentinian II was found dead. Ancient sources claim that his *magister militum* Arbogast killed him or forced him to suicide by hanging. Arbogast, a pagan Frank, made a teacher of rhetoric named Eugenius western Roman emperor. Eugenius' regime (although, Eugenius was at least superficially a Christian) might have been based on anti-Christian sentiment among pagans, though this is now disputed by several historians. Eugenius and Arbogast revived pagan cults in Rome. The two were defeated and killed in 394 at the battle of the River Frigidus. Many of Theodosius' Visigoth troops fought on the front line and took heavy casualties at the battle, which led to their defection under Alaric, who would later sack Rome. Theodosius I died the next year from natural causes. He divided the empire up among his sons, Honorius in the western empire, and Arcadius in the eastern empire.

Theodosius I was deeply involved in Christian religious politics; he was a devout orthodox Nicene Christian and the Church had a great deal of influence over his policy, particularly in the person of Ambrose of Milan. In 380, Theodosius issued an edict recommending that all subjects of the Roman Empire become orthodox Nicene Christians. Theodosius actively intervened in church politics, deposing the Arian bishop of Constantinople. He was relentless in the pursuit of heretics; he sought to deprive them of their rights wherever possible. In some cases, they were even to be hunted down and killed. Theodosius had also convened ecumenical councils in Constantinople to resolve the differences between eastern and western

version of orthodox Christianity.

During the first half of his reign, Theodosius I was considered relatively tolerant of paganism, despite the fact that sacrifice was now illegal. Local officials would sometimes force pagans to convert and destroy pagan temples, but this was at least alleged to not be the explicit policy of the imperial government. In 391, Theodosius issued a new ban on all forms of sacrifice and closed pagan temples to public access, in essence banning paganism. Despite Theodosius' laws, paganism persisted, because of lax enforcement. This was a turning point for the empire, since even the ceremonial pagan rites of the city of Rome were now banned. Theodosius presided over an imperial government that had begun to see itself as overtly Christian and whose policy explicitly advanced Christianity.

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See also Arcadius; Fall of the Roman Empire (West); Federates; Heretics and Polytheists, Persecution of; Honorius; Magnus Maximus; Valens; Valentinian II

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Theodosius II (Emperor) (408–450 CE)

Theodosius II was the son of the eastern Roman emperor Arcadius and his wife Aelia Eudoxia. Born in 401, he became eastern Roman emperor in 408. Theodosius II is remembered as a weak emperor, who was dominated by regents, first the praetorian prefect Anthemius, then his older sister

Pulcheria, followed by his wife Aelia Eudocia. In 413, Anthemius built a circuit wall around Constantinople that survives to this day. This wall proved crucial when the Huns invaded the eastern empire.

Early in Theodosius' reign, persecution of Christians in Mesopotamia led to a war with the Sassanian Empire from 421–422. In 422, with imperial troops preoccupied, the Hunnic king Rua invaded Thrace. Theodosius began paying him an annual subsidy not to attack. In 423, following the death of Honorius, Valentinian III arrived in Constantinople, fleeing the usurper Johannes. In 424, Theodosius II's army defeated Johannes and returned Valentinian to power in 425. Valentinian married the daughter of Theodosius II, sealing their alliance.

In 431, Theodosius again sent troops west to combat the Vandal invasion of North Africa, attempting to halt the Vandal advance on Carthage. Defeated, they ceded the province to the Vandals, who invaded Sicily around 440. Theodosius dispatched a naval force to Sicily and after some initial success was forced to retreat due to a simultaneous invasion by the Huns and the Persians. Theodosius' return allowed the Vandals to cement their control over Africa. The Vandals also increasingly became a naval power in the western Mediterranean.

With the death of Rua and the accession of Attila to kingship over the Huns, the subsidy increased. In 447, Attila renewed the offensive, taking advantage of famine and plague in the eastern empire. He decisively defeated the eastern Roman army in 443, overrunning the Balkans and threatening Constantinople. Attila imposed a steep subsidy upon the eastern empire and annexed the territory a five days' ride south of the Danube.

Theodosius II died in a riding accident in 450. His successor was the general Marcian, who married his sister Pulcheria.

Theodosius II was legendarily pious. He passed stringent laws against heretics and pagans, though they seemed to have mattered little in reality, since many Arian Christians (Gaias, for instance) still served in his army. Paganism continued during his reign. Theodosius found himself entangled in Christian doctrinal disputes, originally supporting the bishop of Constantinople Nestorius, who emphasized the humanity of Christ, but after the council of Ephesus in 431 and Nestorius' expulsion, Theodosius threw his support behind Cyril of Alexandria's faction, which stressed the godhood of Christ.

Theodosius II is associated with the Theodosian Code, which collected

and arranged laws by topic and in chronological order, beginning with Constantine. It later became the basis for the barbarian law codes and ultimately, those of medieval Europe. Work on this code began in 429 and it was published in 438. Theodosius is also responsible for the creation of the University at Constantinople.

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See also Arcadius; Attila; Codex Theodosianus; Huns; Valentinian III

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Third-Century CE Crisis, Causes

The immediate causes of the third-century crisis were the invasions by Sassanid Persia and the Germanic barbarians. The long-term causes were embedded in the geography of the empire. The Roman Empire covered a wide geographic area, from Britain in the west to the Rhine and Danube; in the south, North Africa; in the east, Asia Minor, Syria, Egypt and the Mesopotamian frontier. Travel and communications were slow and unreliable. Not trusting the central power to respond in time, frontier regions faced with a local invasion or with civil war elsewhere might support their own imperial candidates to restore local order. At the center, subjects might then lose confidence in an emperor who was unable to control the periphery. A vicious cycle of revolts and coups ensued, with breakaway “empires” in Gaul and the Near East.

Another long-term cause was the evolution of the Principate. Augustus sought to partially demilitarize senators by limiting their access to military commands. The emperors promoted a relatively small number of senators as experienced military commanders; most senators spent only a year or two

as high-ranking but inexperienced officers. The emperors increasingly promoted equestrians as military officers and civilian administrators. The result was a cadre of experienced military officers of equestrian rank or promoted into the Senate (Decius and Valerian were senators at their accessions), with a close relationship with their armies. These men regarded imperial authority as created by the army, and during the crisis they were elevated and (often) deposed and assassinated by the army. The Senate itself was now remote and ineffectual.

Another cause was economic weakness, particularly in the money supply. The Roman Empire had relatively low taxation (compared with modern societies). It furthermore was a patronage society, where the emperors and their delegates could remit taxation or grant immunities from taxation to reward or privilege individuals, communities, and status groups (the population of Italy had not been taxed since 167 BCE). Revenues were thus uncertain; emperors might resort to ad hoc measures, such as auctioning imperial property or confiscating the property of wealthy persons accused of sedition (an unpopular policy). The empire also relied on its silver coinage, the denarius. There was no paper money and no concept of deficit spending. Rather than raise taxes, the emperors of the crisis resorted to debasing the coinage: adulterating the silver content of the denarius with base metal to mint more coins. As the public lost confidence in the coinage, inflation rose, weakening the economy further. Invasions and civil wars also caused local economic disruption. In these conditions, armies were probably motivated by donatives and gifts to support imperial candidates, as in previous, better-documented civil wars.

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See also Alexander Severus; Aurelian; Carinus; Carus; Decius; Diocletian; Gallienus; Gordian I; Gordian II; Gordian III; Maximinus I Thrax; Odenathus; Palmyra; Persian Wars, Sassanid; Philip Arabus; Probus; Senate, Senators; Succession (Imperial); Tacitus; Usurpation; Valerian; Zenobia

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Third-Century CE Crisis, Course

The third century crisis was a period of chronic warfare, invasions, and political instability in the Roman Empire. It is usually reckoned from the death of Alexander Severus in 235 CE to the accession of Diocletian in 284. During the years of the crisis, there were about 20 legitimate rulers (the persons mentioned by name in this summary) and many short-lived pretenders or usurpers; the two emperors with the longest reigns (Valerian and Gallienus) ruled only eight or nine years, and many others ruled for only a few years. Of all these emperors and pretenders, only a few died of natural causes; the rest were assassinated or died in battle. A resurgence of Persian expansionism led to Roman defeats and the capture of the emperor Valerian (260). Parts of the empire broke away as quasi-separate Gallic and Palmyrene Empires. Germanic barbarians invaded the empire along the northwest frontier and from the Black Sea. Reforms to the army and the heroic efforts of emperors Gallienus (260–268), Aurelian (270–275), and Probus (278–282) resulted in the reconquest of the Roman Empire and expulsion of the Goths, Alamanni, and other peoples.

The onset of the crisis begins (conventionally) with the events of 235–238 CE. A weak ruler influenced by his mother Julia Mamaea, Alexander Severus (222–235) was campaigning on the Rhine frontier against the Germans. When Mamaea and her advisers suggested paying the Germans subsidies to avoid fighting, the troops became angry with Alexander, and assassinated him and Mamaea early in 235. In Pannonia, the legions elevated Maximinus I (235–238), a career soldier and officer who was nicknamed Thrax, “the Thracian.” Thracians had a tough and warlike reputation. Maximinus raised money for the army through confiscations of senatorial property. Accordingly the pro-aristocratic literary sources depict

Maximinus as cruel and barbaric. Modern scholars have somewhat revised this evaluation.

In response to the accession of Maximinus, landed aristocrats in Roman Africa elevated the elderly senator Gordian I and his middle-aged son Gordian II. The Gordians did not rule very long. Capelianus, the legate of Numidia, supported Maximinus and crushed the younger Gordian in battle; the elderly Gordian I committed suicide when he heard of the defeat. To oppose Maximinus, the Roman Senate then elevated two elderly senators, Pupienus and Balbinus. The Roman populace forced them to elevate Gordian I's young grandson, Gordian III, as Caesar. In response, Maximinus and his army marched on Italy, besieging Aquileia. Here Maximinus' own troops mutinied against him and assassinated him (238). Subsequently, the praetorians became dissatisfied with Pupienus and Balbinus and assassinated them. The 13-year-old Gordian III became emperor (238–244).

After 238, the Carpi and Goths invaded Moesia and Dacia, and Ardashir, the new Sassanid king of Persia, invaded the eastern empire (241). Gordian III and his praetorian prefect, Timesitheus, launched a new Persian campaign. Timesitheus died and was replaced by Philip, who deposed and killed Gordian III (the details are unclear) and was acclaimed as emperor by the army. Philip (244–249) made peace with the Persians, conceding control over Armenia and paying a large subsidy. He may have had little choice, as the Roman Empire was descending into crisis. However, Philip also returned to Rome to celebrate Rome's 1,000th birthday (248).

Decius had been appointed by Philip to suppress a revolt and fight the Goths and Carpi. He defeated them and was hailed as emperor by his troops. Decius and Philip went to civil war, Decius defeating Philip in the battle of Verona (249). To appease the traditional gods of Rome, Decius authorized a persecution of the Christians, requiring all subjects of the empire to sacrifice to the gods or the emperor. Decius made his son Herennius Etruscus co-emperor, but entrusted his other son Hostilianus to Licinius Valerianus (Valerian). Decius, however, fell in battle with the Goths (251).

In Moesia, the legions revolted and raised to emperor the provincial governor Trebonianus Gallus (251–253). Gallus and his son prepared to fight Aemilian, a pretender, but instead the soldiers killed Gallus and his son and went over to Aemilian. Aemilian then prepared to fight Valerian, but was assassinated by his own soldiers, conveniently for Valerian, who became

emperor (253–260).

Valerian elevated his adult son Gallienus to co-Augustus and assigned him the western empire, turning to the eastern frontier and the invasion of Shapur, the new Sassanid king. Valerian's Persian campaign ended in disaster for the Romans when, during negotiations, Valerian and many of his officers were ambushed and captured by Shapur (260). Shapur kept Valerian alive as a prisoner of war. According to Roman legend, Shapur deliberately humiliated Valerian by using him as a footstool and, when he died, stuffing his body with straw and keeping it on exhibit (or flaying him and hanging his skin in a temple).

Gallienus became sole emperor (260–268), though faced with the revolts of many would-be emperors, the most prominent being Postumus, the governor of Gaul, who established a virtually independent "Gallic Empire." Though he is depicted unfavorably in the literary sources, Gallienus addressed the crisis with many of his policies. He organized fast-moving cavalry strike forces that could move more quickly than legionary infantry to address a crisis. He organized a cadre of talented officers, the *protectores*, who could be marked out for further promotion. Gallienus removed senators, who lacked the experience and the connection with the troops that were needed at this time, from military commands. Gallienus also attempted unsuccessfully to reform the currency.

Gallienus was obliged to tolerate both Postumus and to recognize the Palmyrene Empire, governed by Septimius Odenathus. To combat the Sassanids, Gallienus conferred on Odenathus the titles *dux Romanorum* (giving Odenathus command of Roman troops in the Near East) and *corrector totius Orientis*. Odenathus campaigned successfully against Persia and liberated Nisibis. However, Odenathus was killed in 268 and was succeeded by his widow Zenobia, ruling for her son Vaballathus.

Gallienus succumbed in 268 to a conspiracy of his own officers, subsequent to the revolt of Aureolus, his field army commander. Around this time the Black Sea Goths invaded the Aegean Sea and attacked cities in Greece and Asia Minor. Gallienus was succeeded by his officers' choice, Claudius II (268–270), surnamed Gothicus from his decisive defeat of the Goths at Naissus. Unfortunately, Claudius died from the plague. He was initially succeeded by his brother Quintillus, but the army supported the acclamation of Aurelian (270–275).

Aurelian first defeated the Juthungi and Vandals (Germanic peoples) in

Raetia and suppressed a conspiracy of the moneyers at Rome. He then built Rome a wall, the “Aurelian Wall” which still stands today, as much to maintain civilian morale as to actually defend the city. Aurelian then went to war against the Palmyrene Empire, reconquering the Near East for the Roman Empire and defeating Zenobia’s forces. He captured Zenobia and exhibited her in his triumph at Rome.

Aurelian then reconquered the Gallic Empire, now ruled by Tetricus. Postumus had been assassinated in 269 by his own troops. Postumus’ successor Victorinus (who ruled with his mother Victoria) had been assassinated, succeeded by Tetricus. Aurelian defeated Tetricus in 273–274. Minor revolts of pretenders continued to occur.

Aurelian then evacuated the province of Dacia, which lay north of the Danube and was indefensible, moving the inhabitants south of the Danube. The exact date of this policy is uncertain. Aurelian also promoted the cult of *Sol Invictus* as the chief state god, though he did not suppress other cults or persecute Christians. He campaigned against Persia in 275, but was assassinated by a cabal of his own officers, who mistrusted his perceived arrogance and cruelty.

After a period of deliberation, Aurelian was succeeded by Tacitus, an elderly senator who may have been another Illyrian army officer. Tacitus punished the murderers of Aurelian, but died soon afterward, either from natural causes or in an assassination.

Tacitus was succeeded by Florian, his half-brother, and then by Probus (278–282), another highly active military emperor. Probus expelled the Germanic Vandals and Burgundians from Gaul, then fought Germans on the Danube. He was assassinated by his troops when he put them to work draining swamps and planting vines in the Danubian provinces. Alternately, Probus’ praetorian prefect, Carus, may have engineered Probus’ assassination.

The emperor Carus (282–283) died when he was mysteriously struck by lightning during his campaign against Persia. He was succeeded by his sons Carinus (283–285) and Numerian (283–284), both young men, Carinus in charge in the western empire, Numerian attempting to continue Carus’ Persian campaign on the eastern frontier. Forced to retreat, Numerian died in his tent under mysterious circumstances. He may have been poisoned by his praetorian prefect Aper, though the story that his body was concealed until the odor of decay revealed it is probably fantastic (resembling the

death of Tarquinius Priscus in Livy). The commander of the emperor's bodyguard, Valerius Diocles, arrested Aper and accused Aper of murdering Numerian. Diocles stabbed Aper to death in front of the army, and was elevated as emperor by the troops. As emperor, Diocles took a new name: Diocletian (284–305). He faced civil war with Carinus, who was killed at the battle of Margus (285), leaving Diocletian as emperor. Gaul was overrun by bandits, and Britain was lost to a usurper, Carausius. That Diocletian's accession marked the end of the third-century crisis was apparent only in hindsight.

The third-century crisis is a poorly documented period. Textual sources for the period are unsatisfactory. The Greek historian Herodian includes events of 235–238, but after that the fragmentary contemporary Dexippus, the fifth-century historian Zosimus, and the twelfth-century chronicler Zonaras are the main Greek sources. In Latin, the epitomators (authors of mini-histories) Eutropius, Aurelius Victor, and the anonymous *Epitome de Caesaribus* cover the period briefly. The part of Ammianus Marcellinus' *Roman History* that probably covered the crisis is lost. The *Historia Augusta* provides biographies of the emperors (and usurpers) down through Numerian (283–284). However, the *Historia Augusta* for the crisis period is very unreliable. Accordingly, the narrative history of the crisis is often thin and conflicted. It can be supplemented somewhat with legal and other documents, especially coins, as even the most ephemeral emperors issued coins in their names. Some of the emperors of the crisis period are known to us mainly from their coins.

Sara E. Phang

See also Alexander Severus; Aurelian; Carinus; Carus; Decius; Diocletian; Gallienus; Gordian I; Gordian II; Gordian III; Maximinus I Thrax; Odenathus; Palmyra; Persian Wars, Sassanid; Philip Arabus; Probus; Senate, Senators; Succession (Imperial); Tacitus; Usurpation; Valerian; Zenobia

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Third-Century CE Crisis, Consequences

One of the consequences of the third-century crisis was the reorganization of the Roman army. The crisis emperors (Gallienus and successors) created mobile cavalry forces that could reach areas of crisis faster than the traditional legionary infantry. This emphasis on cavalry persisted through the later empire.

An aspect of this reorganization was the removal of senators from military commands and provincial governorships, attributed to Gallienus. The policy does not seem to have taken place uniformly (experienced equestrian officers had been promoted to senatorial rank in previous decades). However, senators no longer held the ranks of laticlavian tribune or legionary legate. Governors, formerly termed proconsuls or *legati Augusti pro praetore*, were now termed *praesides* (sg. *praeses*). Wider, solely military commands were created, extending across provinces; such commanders might be termed *duces* (sg. *dux*). Diocletian (284–305) consolidated the exclusion of senators from military commands and governorships, with the exception of Italy where senatorial appointees had no military role.

Another consequence was the advantage of multiple co-existing emperors. Gallienus had accepted this practice in a de facto sense, tolerating Postumus in Gaul and Odenathus in the Near East. Multiple emperors were able to control the periphery of the empire, and their cooperation discouraged revolts and usurpations by outsiders. Thus the Tetrarchy's four emperors. Constantine himself tolerated Licinius, his de facto co-emperor in the eastern empire, until 324. However, Constantine and subsequent later Roman emperors, reverting to the dynastic principle, resorted to family to provide multiple rulers; Constantine elevated his three sons as Caesars.

Another consequence of the crisis was the temporary loss of confidence in dynastic (hereditary) succession. Many of the crisis emperors had young sons whom they elevated to Caesar and designated as successors. As seen with the boy emperor Gordian III, assassinated by Philip, the sons were unable to hold onto power; most were assassinated. Diocletian elevated an unrelated adult colleague, Maximian, in 286, and created the Tetrarchy in 293, elevating two unrelated adult men and experienced commanders as Caesars. The Tetrarchy, however, fell apart in civil strife after 305 and Constantine the Great (306–337) reverted to dynastic succession.

A speculative consequence is that the crisis motivated emperors to espouse beliefs in transcendent deities, as Gallienus did with Neoplatonism, Aurelian with Sol Invictus, and eventually Constantine with the Christian God. However, not enough is really known about the crisis emperors to examine their religious motivations.

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See also Alexander Severus; Aurelian; Carinus; Carus; Decius; Diocletian; Gallienus; Gordian I; Gordian II; Gordian III; Maximinus I Thrax; Odenathus; Palmyra; Persian Wars, Sassanid; Philip Arabus; Probus; Senate, Senators; Succession (Imperial); Tacitus; Usurpation; Valerian; Zenobia

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Thrasea Paetus was a Roman senator opposed to the reign of Nero (54–68 CE) on philosophical grounds, eventually committing political suicide. He was an adherent of Stoic philosophy and admirer of the traditional Republic. He at first supported Nero, but became hostile to the emperor and refused to vote on motions in the Senate as a mode of protest. He was condemned in 66 and committed political suicide. His downfall is chronicled by Tacitus (*Annals* 13.49, 14.12, 48–9, 16.21–35). His son-in-law Helvidius Priscus continued his tradition.

The “Stoic opposition” to the emperors was motivated in part by nostalgia for the traditional Republic. In this nostalgic view, republican Roman senators had been able to pursue political careers and seek triumphs unhindered by the emperors’ monopoly of victory; their *libertas* (freedom of speech) had not been restrained by fear of tyrannical emperors. In fact, these senators had as often been hindered by the political rivalry of their peers, for example, prosecuting each other for alleged misgovernment and attempting to deny each other triumphs.

Sara E. Phang

See also Bribery and Corruption; Helvidius Priscus; Nero; Senate, Senators; Suicide; Tacitus; Triumph; Victory

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Tiberius (Emperor) (14–37 CE)

A Roman military and political leader, Tiberius succeeded Augustus as the second emperor of Rome from 14 to 37 CE. Born in 42 BCE, Tiberius was a Claudian by birth. His mother Livia divorced his father, Tiberius Claudius Nero, and married Octavian (later Augustus) in 39 BCE, although pregnant at the time with Tiberius’ brother Drusus. A talented commander, Tiberius was less successful as emperor, being remembered for his increasing paranoia and persecution of members of the Senate and imperial family for treason.

In the military sphere, Tiberius excelled, being a highly skilled field

commander. Accounts of his military leadership depict Tiberius as a true soldier's soldier. During the Cantabrian War (26–19) Tiberius first tasted Roman military life, most probably under Augustus' direct leadership of the campaign (26–25). In 20–19, Tiberius commanded an expeditionary force to Armenia. With this force Tiberius placed Tigranes upon the Armenian throne, and collected the standards captured by Persia from Crassus at Carrhae (53 BCE), the return of which Augustus had successfully negotiated. In 19, Tiberius was appointed governor of Transalpine Gaul, a highly volatile region due to tribal feuding. In 15, Tiberius joined forces with his brother Drusus in campaigns against various Alpine tribes, successfully conquering the Raeti. In 6, Tiberius' list of conquests was expanded in Pannonia, being credited with the conquest of the Breuci and Dalmatae. For his triumphs Tiberius received an ovation in 9 and a triumph in 7 BCE.



Bust of the emperor Tiberius (14–37 CE). An experienced general, Tiberius (born in 42

BCE) became emperor in late middle age. Persecuting dynastic relatives for suspected treason, Tiberius depleted his possible heirs and finally designated his young great-nephew Gaius (Caligula) as intended heir. Located in the Getty Villa, J. Paul Getty Museum, Malibu, California. (The J. Paul Getty Trust)

After his sudden retirement from official duties between 6 BCE and 4 CE, Tiberius returned to the military stage, undertaking several campaigns in Germania (4–6). There he continued the work of his brother Drusus in pacifying the region as far as the River Elbe. In 6, Tiberius was sent to crush the Illyrian revolt, halting his German campaigns. After three years of fierce conflict, Tiberius, in command of 15 legions, finally succeeded in subduing all of Illyricum. Immediately following the Varian disaster (9) Tiberius was instrumental, along with his nephew Germanicus, in stabilizing the situation on Rome's northern frontier.

Tiberius' political career marked him as the probable successor of Augustus. Directed by Augustus, Tiberius held the posts of quaestor (24 BCE), praetor (19), and consul (13 and 7), and was given tribunician power in 6 and 4 CE, clearly highlighting him as a candidate for the succession. By 13 Tiberius was effectively co-emperor with Augustus.

Tiberius acceded to the imperial power in 14, but proved not to be a proactive ruler. Respecting Augustus' last wishes, Tiberius did not undertake any major military operations to expand the empire. His first challenge was the Rhine and Danube mutinies (14 CE) which were pacified by his son Drusus and nephew Germanicus. Rather than acting as a strong moral and political leader like Augustus, Tiberius encouraged the Senate to take control of most political matters in his name, and rarely overruled them. Consequently, Tiberius' political reluctance made him easily manipulated by those around him, most famously by Lucius Aelius Sejanus, Tiberius' praetorian prefect. Sejanus became powerful enough to persuade Tiberius to retire from Rome in 26, giving Sejanus free rein at Rome. Sejanus' position became so strong as to pose a direct and severe threat to Tiberius' position as emperor, and he met his violent and bloody downfall in 31.

Tiberius' difficulties extended into the familial sphere. Following Agrippa's death in 12 BCE, Tiberius divorced his beloved wife Vipsania and married Augustus' daughter Julia. Although the marriage advanced Tiberius' prospects regarding the succession, the marriage was an unhappy

one, arguably embittering Tiberius' character. The breakdown of the marriage strained Tiberius' fragile relationship with Augustus, partially explaining Tiberius' first retirement to Rhodes in 6, and Augustus' reluctance to then recall him. Tiberius had one son by Vipsania, Drusus (the Younger).

Although close to his brother Drusus, Tiberius did not possess the same affection for his nephew Germanicus. Rather, Tiberius appears to have been suspicious of Germanicus' actions on many occasions, complaining publicly to the Senate at Germanicus' unauthorized visit to Egypt in 19 CE. To discourage revolt, senators were not permitted to visit Egypt without imperial authorization. Tiberius frequently attempted to diminish Germanicus' military achievements, suggesting his envious resentment of Germanicus' success. Following Germanicus' sudden and suspicious death in 19 CE, for which Gnaeus Calpurnius Piso was officially blamed, Tiberius' poor relationship with Germanicus caused suspicion to be openly directed at him. Suspicions were compounded by Tiberius' absence from Germanicus' funeral, and his antagonism toward Germanicus' widow Agrippina and their children.

Tiberius' relationship with his mother Livia was also tense, being irritated by her great political influence and suspecting her of wishing to be his co-ruler. Consequently, Tiberius vetoed a series of political honors to Livia. Ultimately, Tiberius appeared fearful of seeming to be controlled by his mother, and strongly opposed any reference that supported such an idea. Tiberius often publicly argued with Livia, and resented her to such an extent that he visited her just once in the last three years of her life. Tiberius did not attend her funeral, and opposed her deification.

The combination of Tiberius' political reluctance with his challenging familial relations help to explain his motives for retiring to the island of Capri in 26, escaping the strains, stresses, and boredom of public life. Tiberius' retirement to Capri was an event that forever blackened his character and overshadowed the successes and strengths of his youth. The Roman elite, offended by their *princeps'* withdrawal, spread nasty rumors about his immoral activities on the island. Nevertheless Tiberius remained on Capri until his death in 37, and was succeeded by Germanicus' son Gaius (Caligula).

Of the extant biographical accounts of Tiberius, that of Tacitus is undoubtedly the most infamous. Tiberius receives a highly negative

portrayal in Tacitus' *Annals*, being depicted as arrogant, sly, and morally corrupt. Tacitus portrays Tiberius as a tyrant, his reign becoming increasingly despotic and his character increasingly debased and corrupt. Consequently, Tacitus uses Tiberius' reign to illustrate the inherent corruptibility of the Principate.

Alexander G. Peck

See also Agrippina I; Armenia; Cannae, Battle of; Cult of the Emperor; Germanic Wars; Germanicus; Monarchy; Pannonian Wars; Piso, Gnaeus Calpurnius; *Princeps*, Principate; Sejanus; Senate, Senators; Spanish Wars; Tacitus

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Tiberius Gracchus (ca. 163–133 BCE)

Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus was one of the most famous tribunes of the plebs, introducing radical land reform in 133 BCE and being killed in office by a senatorial mob. His career began a trend of radical tribunes of the plebs, including his younger brother Gaius (tribune in 123–122), who was also

killed by the Senate; Lucius Appuleius Saturninus, a partisan of Gaius Marius; Marcus Livius Drusus the younger, whose agitation on behalf of the Italians started the Social War; and, among others, Publius Clodius Pulcher, Cicero's arch-enemy.

Tiberius Gracchus hailed from one of Rome's most illustrious plebeian families. His father, Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus, held the offices of consul (177, 163) and censor, while his mother Cornelia was a daughter of Scipio Africanus; his sister Sempronia married Scipio Aemilianus, the adopted grandson of Scipio Africanus.

Prior to embarking on a political career, Tiberius served in the Third Punic War (149–146 BCE) under Scipio Aemilianus and in the Numantine War in Spain around 137–135. Tiberius Gracchus subsequently returned to Rome to run for the tribunate of 133. As tribune he addressed one of the most important issues of his time: a perceived manpower shortage in recruitment to the Roman legions. Recruitment to the legions was restricted to *assidui* or small property owners, meeting a minimum property requirement, which had already been lowered during the second century BCE. Contemporaries and many modern historians, most famously Arnold Toynbee, have believed that due to the depredations of the Hannibalic War (218–201 BCE) and overseas military service, the *assidui* became unable to manage their farms in absentia and lost their land, becoming landless and ineligible for military service. The landless poor, termed *proletarii* or *capite censi*, drifted to Rome and joined the urban populace, feared and despised by the nobility. The land lost by the *assidui* was bought up by wealthy owners, who created large estates worked by large numbers of slaves.

Recent archaeology of second-century BCE Italy has questioned the impoverishment of the *assidui* and growth of large estates throughout the second century. Nathan Rosenstein has proposed that, instead of the depopulation supposedly caused by the Hannibalic War, wealth from Rome's conquests caused a population overshoot in the second century, with impoverishment in the following generations. So what Tiberius Gracchus is said to have observed—the impoverished small farmers and the slave plantations—may have been a relatively recent development and may have been localized. He is said to have noted the growth of slave-worked estates in Etruria (Tuscany). Elite anxiety over popular unrest was high due to the slave rebellion in Sicily (135–131 BCE), a revolt which had shocked the Roman elites.

Gaius Laelius, a friend of Scipio Aemilianus, had raised the issue of land redistribution earlier, but his proposal had been dropped in the face of opposition from the landowners. Therefore Tiberius Gracchus used his tribunate to raise the issue once more, backed by his family and their supporters in the Senate. Reenacting ancient legislation, Tiberius proposed a *lex Sempronia agraria* limiting the amount of *ager publicus* (public land owned by the state) possessed by any one individual to 500 *iugera* (the Roman acre). Any public land above this amount would then revert to the state which would distribute it to landless citizens, enabling them to meet the property qualification for military service. This measure would restore the legions' manpower base, and would also reduce the numbers of the urban poor in Rome and the growth of slave plantations.

Nevertheless Tiberius Gracchus' proposal was opposed by the great landowners and even by their tenants, as well as by political enemies of Tiberius Gracchus and his family connections. Both the Senate and centuriate assembly and some of the tribunes opposed Tiberius Gracchus' program. If the law itself was controversial, then Tiberius Gracchus' methods only inflamed the situation. Facing opposition in the Senate, he did not present the law to them, but took it straight to the popular assembly (*concilium plebis*), which although legal was against accepted tradition and a clear snub to the Senate. When vetoed by a fellow tribune, Marcus Octavius, rather than resolve the issue by negotiation, Tiberius Gracchus had the man deposed from office by popular vote, claiming that Octavius was betraying his office by obstructing a measure which clearly benefited the people. This was perhaps the most outrageous step Tiberius took, claiming a theory of popular sovereignty, which had no precedent. Although in theory the popular assembly could vote out a tribune, there was no precedent; it undermined centuries of Roman political practice and turned many in the Senate against him.

Since the remaining eight tribunes did not present vetoes, Tiberius' agrarian legislation was passed and a three-man commission set up to administer the process, composed of Tiberius Gracchus, his younger brother Gaius, and his father-in-law, which hardly mollified his opponents. The funding of the agrarian legislation, which may have included farm equipment with the land grants, posed a new crisis. Attalus III, king of Pergamum, had just died and left his entire kingdom to Rome. It was the Senate's traditional prerogative to administer such bequests. Once again

Tiberius Gracchus broke with tradition and overrode his opposition by proposing that Attalus' bequest to Rome be used to fund the agrarian legislation. This proposal extended tribunician authority over matters of foreign affairs and state finance, both within the Senate's oversight. Again, Tiberius was backed by popular vote; his opponents were powerless to prevent this, though they accused him of *regnum*, aspiring to "monarchic" or tyrannical power.

With his year in office coming to close, Tiberius Gracchus faced the danger, first of all, of stepping down, for tribunes were protected by *sacrosanctitas*, inviolability of person; second, that his opponents would back a tribunician candidate who would oppose his program, present counter-legislation, and even prosecute him for corruption in appropriating the Pergamene legacy. Again Gracchus chose to break with custom and practice and ran for a second and consecutive tribunate, which had not occurred for several centuries and was synonymous with the radical tribunes from the early Republic. Again his opponents were faced with no legal means of preventing this, but at the electoral assembly for the next year's tribunes, rival supporters became violent. Needing only this pretext, Publius Cornelius Scipio Nasica claimed that Tiberius Gracchus was acting tyrannically and that to save the Republic direct action was needed. Nasica led a senatorial lynch mob that attacked Gracchus and 300 supporters at the assembly and beat them to death, throwing their bodies into the Tiber.

The deaths of Tiberius and his supporters were followed by the establishment of a consular commission to try the surviving Gracchan supporters, resulting in many condemnations, executions, and exiles. Tiberius Gracchus' legislation itself was left intact as was the commission that had been set up to distribute the land and equip the farms, but it was not able to do its work for long; it was opposed by Scipio Aemilianus, who died suddenly in 129.

The murder of Tiberius Gracchus and his supporters continued to dominate the Roman political scene in the years following his death, and came to a head when his younger brother Gaius became tribune himself in 123 BCE. Contemporaries and subsequent Roman commentators saw the death of Tiberius Gracchus as ushering in an era of violence and bloodshed into Roman politics, which culminated in the civil wars of the first century and the fall of the Republic. Many modern historians have shared this view.

Gareth C. Sampson

See also Civil Conflict (Late Republic); Factions; Gaius Gracchus; Gracchan Land Conflict; Punic War, Third; Scipio Aemilianus; Tribune of the Plebs

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Tigris (River)

The Tigris River is one of the two great rivers of Mesopotamia, east of the River Euphrates. The Tigris was occasionally an eastern frontier of the Roman Empire, forming a boundary with the Arsacid or Sassanid Persian Empires. More usually, the Romans of the late Republic and empire exerted indirect control of Mesopotamia, the area between the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, through client kingdoms that served as buffer states. The campaigns of Trajan against the Persian Empire won Mesopotamia for the Roman Empire; however, due to revolts in the new eastern provinces, Trajan’s acquisitions were immediately abandoned by his successor Hadrian (117–138). Septimius Severus also campaigned against Arsacid Persia, establishing Mesopotamia as a Roman province in 197. However, these gains were soon lost. Severus’ son and successor Caracalla, who also campaigned against Persia, was assassinated, resulting in civil war during the reigns of Macrinus (217) and Elagabalus (218–222). In the reign of Alexander Severus (222–235), a new and more aggressive dynasty, the Sassanids, took control of the Persian Empire and soon overran Mesopotamia and made incursions into

more permanent Roman territory in the Near East. Other parts of the Roman Near East were lost to the Palmyrene Empire, governed by Odenathus and his widow Zenobia.

Defeating the Palmyrene Empire, Aurelian (270–275) began to reestablish Roman control in the Near East, but the campaigns of Galerius (Caesar 293–305, Augustus 305–311) against the Sassanid Empire in 296–298 resulted in a great victory that extended Roman control eastward to the Tigris, established in the Peace of Nisibis (299). However, in the later fourth and fifth centuries, beginning in the reign of Constantius II (337–361), the region between the Euphrates and Tigris rivers continued to be contested between Rome and Sassanid Persia, with occasional aggressive Roman campaigns such as Julian's (363).

Sara E. Phang

See also Alexander Severus; Aurelian; Euphrates; Galerius; Hadrian; Julian; Odenathus; Palmyra; Persian Wars, Arsacid; Persian Wars, Sassanid; Septimius Severus; Trajan; Zenobia

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Tiridates I (d. ca. 72 CE)

Tiridates I was king of Armenia during the latter half of the first century CE (56–60 and 63–72). His reign is often cited as part of the diplomatic compromise that ended Nero's eastern wars (58–63 CE). Following his accession, Rome and Persia entered into an uncharacteristically long period of peaceful relations which lasted until Trajan's Persian campaign (114 CE).

Tiridates was first installed on the Armenian throne by his brother, the Persian king Vologaeses I. Doing so, however, violated a long-standing Romano-Persian treaty which gave Rome the right to choose Armenia's successor. In response, Nero dispatched Domitius Corbulo to the eastern frontier. After capturing Armenia's capital, Corbulo forced Tiridates to flee, replacing him with a pro-Roman candidate.

But Rome's candidate quickly became unpopular, prompting additional Persian meddling. Moreover, Nero's next choice for eastern commander,

Caesennius Paetus, had none of Corbulo's military skill. Paetus foolishly allowed Vologaeses to ambush him while wintering Rome's troops at Rhandeia. The Rhandean disaster persuaded Nero that the Armenian succession crisis required a diplomatic solution. He thus agreed to recognize Tiridates as Armenia's king if the prince traveled to Rome and received his crown personally from the emperor.

Vologaeses consented, and in 66 Tiridates journeyed to Rome to pay homage to Nero. The emperor not only crowned him amid an elaborate public ceremony, but showered him with gifts, including 500,000 sesterces to rebuild his capital. Tiridates remained a faithful client-king of Rome until his death ca. 72 CE.

John Poirot

See also Armenia; Client Monarchs; Corbulo; Persian Wars, Arsacid

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Titus (Emperor) (79–81 CE)

The emperor Titus (Titus Flavius Vespasianus, 79–81 CE), the second of the Flavian emperors, enjoyed a popular but short reign. According to Suetonius, Titus was born in 41, the year Gaius Caligula was murdered; other sources show that he was born on December 30, 39. Titus was the oldest son of Vespasian and was brought up in the imperial palace with Britannicus, the son of Claudius. Titus married Arrecina Tertulla, the

daughter of Caligula's praetorian prefect; after Tertulla's death, Titus married Marcia Furnilla. He had no sons and his presumed successor was his younger brother Domitian (the emperor Domitian, 81–96).

The young Titus had extensive physical and mental talents, including a good memory, artistic talents, horsemanship, music, and skill with weapons. He began his military career as a laticlavian tribune in Germany and Britain, where he served with distinction. His next office was the quaestorship of 67 CE. Titus was then promoted to legionary legate in Judaea, assisting his father who commanded the suppression of the Jewish revolt (66–70 CE).

At the same time, in the western empire, Julius Vindex revolted in Gaul and Servius Sulpicius Galba revolted in Spain; Nero, losing all support, fled the imperial palace and committed suicide (68). The Senate and People of Rome accepted Galba as emperor. Vespasian dispatched Titus to congratulate Galba on his accession, but Titus, prudently avoiding the civil war (War of Four Emperors, 69 CE) returned to Jerusalem. Titus remained in Jerusalem when Vespasian was proclaimed emperor in Alexandria on July 1, 69. While his father was preoccupied with planning for civil war, Titus was in complete control of military operations in Judaea and completed the suppression of the revolt, destroying Jerusalem and the Jewish Temple in 70. Titus' troops acclaimed him as emperor, but out of modesty and loyalty to his father, Titus refused the imperial role. The Jewish Flavius Josephus, subsequently the author of the *Jewish War* and *Jewish Antiquities*, became a client and friend of Vespasian and Titus, and prophesied Vespasian's accession as emperor. Vespasian celebrated a triumph which is depicted on the Arch of Titus at Rome.

Titus was clearly his father's loyal subordinate and presumed successor. It became quickly apparent that he would work closely with his father to administer the empire. Titus was granted tribunician power (an attribute of the emperor, often conferred on potential successors) on July 1, 71 and later held the office of censor with his father. Along with his brother Domitian, Titus received the honor of *Princeps Iuventutis*, or "leader of young men," a title that had been given to Augustus' grandsons and possible successors Gaius and Lucius. Titus and Domitian also held consulships (now honorific offices only). The existence of Titus and Domitian guaranteed the survival of the Flavian dynasty.

Vespasian further distinguished Titus by conferring the praetorian

prefecture on him in 71 CE. This office was one of great responsibility, as the praetorian prefect was not merely commander of the Praetorian Guard, but the emperor's deputy in civil administration. Though proven as a commander, Titus was still relatively young. The prefecture earned Titus the hatred and jealousy of some men. Specifically, Aulus Caecina Alienus (a former adherent of Vitellius and thus enemy of the Flavians) and Eprius Marcellus plotted against Titus but the plot was quickly exposed and both men were executed.

Vespasian died on June 23, 79, and Titus finally became emperor. By this time the Senate looked with misgiving on the succession of young heirs as emperors, having witnessed the misgovernment of Gaius (Caligula) and Nero. However, Titus proved to be a very capable emperor like his father. One of the things Titus is famous for is the completion of the Colosseum, begun by his father. Titus was reputed for generosity, bestowing gifts and favors on his subjects; once, when forced to admit that he had not benefited anyone on that day, Titus said, "Alas, I have wasted a day!" (Suetonius, *Titus* 8)

Titus died on September 13, 81 from natural causes, despite rumors that his brother Domitian had assassinated him.

Javier Lopez

See also Domitian; Jewish War; Josephus; Succession (Imperial); Vespasian; War of Four Emperors

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Training, Military

The Romans regarded military training as one of the reasons why Rome had conquered the world (for example, Vegetius, *Military Affairs* 1.1.2; compare Josephus, *Jewish War* 3.70–5). Roman military training emphasized both hand-to-hand combat and mass exercises. Discipline was what distinguished Roman soldiers from “barbarian” warriors who also employed swords and spears. However, the warrior element of combat was also

necessary to victory. Less is known about training in the Republic than in the empire, when documentary and archaeological evidence are more abundant.

Modern mass armies emphasize an institutionalized period of “basic training,” often temporally and geographically distinct. In the traditional Roman Republic, when military service ritually began in March, the consuls held the *dilectus* and soldiers carried out training exercises on the Campus Martius. Another traditional exercise was the *transvectio equitum*, in which all of the *equites* (aristocratic cavalry) paraded on the Campus Martius.

However, later military service was year-round, and though some sources mention a *tirocinium* (apprenticeship or training) for recruits (*tirones*), training appears to have been ongoing and routine. Recruits accustomed to farming and hunting probably already possessed basic physical fitness and did not need extensive additional conditioning. In the traditional Republic, Roman fathers taught their sons how to ride, swim, endure extremes of weather, and use a sword and spear. Cato the Elder instructed his son Marcus in this manner (Plutarch, *Cato Maior* 20.4). In any case, the *dilectus* or levy was a “selection” and not a conscription *en masse*; the officers conducting the *dilectus* could select the most promising recruits. In the early and middle Republic, men probably experienced social pressure to display physical fitness and competence with weapons and to prove their courage and prowess in battle.

Commanders also imposed training in the field, with various benefits. Besides the physical benefits, training was thought to restore obedience and reinforce discipline and morale; it also displayed and enforced the commander’s authority. After quelling the mutiny of his troops, Scipio Africanus put on a display of training at New Carthage. On the first day, soldiers ran in armor for four miles; on the second day, they cleaned and tended their arms and armor; on the third day, they practiced combat and mock battles; and on the fourth day, they rested (Polybius 10.20.2–3; Livy 26.51.4). To still his senatorial critics, Scipio Africanus put on a similar display of military exercises at Syracuse (Livy 29.22.1–3). Scipio Aemilianus imposed training to restore the demoralized Roman army at Numantia (for example Appian, *Spanish Wars* 85; Frontinus, *Stratagems* 4.1.1), stressing the construction of camps, ditches, and walls preparatory to the circumvallation of Numantia, as toil on building projects played a similar role in discipline.

Roman combat training probably altered as the tactics of the republican legion changed, from the “phalanx” phase of the early Republic, attributed to the Servian constitution, to the period of the manipular legion, and thence to the use of cohorts. But details are lacking on how these changes were implemented and what new drills were required.

The commander’s personal participation in physical training, including marches and hand-to-hand combat training, became a stock subject of praise in classical authors. Such participation and example-setting helped the general to bond with his troops, an important feature as armies of the late Republic more and more resembled the personal armies of their generals. Both Marius and Pompey were praised for their active role as leaders of their troops.

The training of Roman soldiers was believed to produce courage, preparing soldiers to experience the shock of combat and accustoming them to the use of weapons. Practice could prepare a new recruit for the shock of actual combat, risking and enduring his own wounds (Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations* 2.37–8) and inflicting wounds on the enemy. Except in psychopathic individuals, killing at close range is not a natural human impulse; learning to do so requires extensive training. For their part, the enemy (if barbarian) had less training and discipline and might be inclined to flee in terror.

Soldiers also needed to practice to maintain formation and battle order while simultaneously fighting hand-to-hand combats with individual enemy. Such training in mass movement was particularly important because after the early Republic, Roman formations were not reinforced by extreme close order as in the archaic hoplite phalanx (or early modern infantry, where close-order formation was designed to enhance the effectiveness of coordinated volleys). A Roman line of battle was probably more spread out to give individual soldiers the space to engage the enemy. It was kept in line visually by the standards, which soldiers orientated themselves by; if the standards became too close together, the soldiers were huddled together out of fear and could not use their weapons effectively. Officers rode up and down the lines directing troops to spread out and get back into line or move to where they were most needed against the enemy. Flight from the line of battle was punished by death (in theory, according to Roman lawyers in the Severan period). In practice, commanders took into account whether their soldiers were well trained or recent recruits.

Additional training may have been necessary for infantry soldiers to coordinate movement in close formations such as the *testudo* (“tortoise,” in which soldiers overlapped shields to form an impenetrable surface) or the revival of the phalanx or “shield wall” in the second century CE and later empire.

In the imperial period, inscriptions attest *campidoctores*, specialists in combat training, who instructed regular soldiers. In the late Republic in 105 BCE, Rutilius Rufus first hired gladiatorial trainers to assist with combat training (Valerius Maximus 2.3.2). The archaeological excavation of Roman camps has reconstructed training grounds, some under cover to enable wintertime training. Larger-scale exercises, *exercitationes* or *decursiones*, may have resembled mock battles. It is likely that within a legionary or auxiliary unit, all soldiers underwent physical and combat training; the *immunes* attested in documentary and legal sources were exempt from Roman-style fatigues, heavy labor usually on building projects. As in the Republic, such labor on building was regarded in itself as a form of training and discipline.

Training for aristocratic officers is less well attested. Augustus instituted or revived the *iuventus*, paramilitary groups for senatorial youths that demonstrated riding and perhaps weapons skills. In combat, senatorial officers could still display the *virtus* of their ancestors; two of Domitian’s legates died in the first Dacian War. This ethic, also displayed by the political suicides of various aristocrats in the reigns of Julio-Claudian and Flavian emperors, may later have waned, a possible reason for the displacement of senatorial officers from military commands in the third century CE.

In contrast, the emperors as commanders took a prominent, if often symbolic, role in training. The emperors apparently did not fight in combat before Maximinus I (235–238), but Domitian, Trajan, Marcus Aurelius, Severus, and Caracalla campaigned in person, and the emperor’s exertions on campaign, including participation in training, became a subject of panegyric (for example, Trajan, Pliny, *Panegyricus* 13–16; Hadrian, *Historia Augusta*, *Hadrian* 10). In the third century onward, emperors not only actively campaigned but fought in battle; some died in combat.

Training may not have differed among the branches of the service, except for the obvious differences of cavalry training. Some scholars asserted that by the late first century CE, legionaries were deployed less often

in combat than auxiliaries. The auxiliaries were recruited from less Romanized peoples and were thus more natural fighters. This assertion is based on Tacitus' depiction of the battle of Mons Graupius (Tacitus, *Agricola* 35.2), a victory won "without shedding Roman blood," and on the depiction of soldiers on Trajan's Column, where legionaries more often build projects and auxiliaries more often fight in battle. However, the preferential deployment of auxiliaries in combat is not supported by other sources. *Vexillationes* (detachments) of legionaries were often transferred to fight in campaigns.

Other divisions of the army were also trained for combat. The Praetorian Guard accompanied the emperor on campaign; at least by the reign of Domitian, and certainly after Severus began promoting legionaries into the Guard, praetorians were experienced in combat. The duties of fleet soldiers were primarily logistic, but they are recorded as *milites* in funerary inscriptions and they were probably trained in hand-to-hand combat for ship-boarding operations. The Romans had few naval battles after Actium in 31 BCE, but the fleets also combated piracy. Only the *vigiles* may not have been combat-trained, since their duties were to fight fires instead of people (even angry owners who did not want their buildings demolished).

Cavalry training is illuminated by a famous inscription at Lambaesis in Roman North Africa (*ILS* 2487, 9133–9135; Speidel 2006; Document 23). In his tour of Africa around 128, Hadrian (117–138 CE) addressed the Roman army in a speech that was subsequently inscribed on a monument; the surviving text describes, praises, and criticizes the cavalry exercises of Roman soldiers, which included the use of weapons (throwing spears at a target while riding past) and coordinated exercises. Cavalry training is also depicted by Arrian's *Tactica*, which describes *hippika gymnasia* (Greek for "cavalry exercises") as a colorful spectacle in which the riders wore elaborate armor and uniform. Examples of the armor, such as full-face silver portrait masks, have survived. In battle, cavalry tactics are necessarily more speedy and fluid, since horses will swerve to avoid obstacles such as an enemy line of battle. There is also archaeological evidence for cavalry training grounds.

In the *Epitome of Military Affairs* (ca. 400 CE), Vegetius asserts that the Roman army no longer sufficiently trains its soldiers, but this complaint may be paralleled with many others at an earlier date. What was more deleterious after 395 was the recruitment of the *foederati* or Germanic

“allies,” who did not receive Roman-style training but fought in the manner characteristic of their ethnicities.

Sara E. Phang

See also *Auxilia*; Cannae, Battle of; Cohorts; *Dilectus*; Elite Participation; Emperor as Commander; Hadrian; Military Discipline; Scipio Aemilianus; Scipio Africanus; Servian Constitution; Tactics; Vegetius; *Virtus*

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Trajan (Emperor) (98–117 CE)

Born in 53 CE, Marcus Ulpius Traianus (Trajan, 98–117 CE) second of the “Five Good Emperors,” was one of the most aggressive Roman emperors, conquering Dacia (Romania) and large parts of the Middle East and thus extending the Roman Empire to its maximum size. He is regarded extremely favorably by the Roman authors Pliny the Younger, Suetonius, and Tacitus who wrote during his reign or later and who contrasted him with the unpopular Domitian. Trajan also was known for various beneficent and monumental projects, including the famous Column of Trajan in Rome.

Trajan was born in Italica, Spain to local gentry (descended from Roman settlers) on September 18, 53, making him the first emperor born outside of Italy. His father's military service under Vespasian earned an honorary consulship, triumphal *ornamenta*, and patrician status for the family. Trajan served in the army as military tribune for many years and held a consulship in 91 under Domitian (81–96). Domitian's successor, the childless Nerva (96–98), appointed Trajan as governor of Upper Germany. In 97, the Praetorian Guard mutinied against Nerva, whom they disliked because Domitian had favored the praetorians. Nerva hastily adopted Trajan as a son and potential successor, elevating him to Caesar or junior emperor (as with Titus under Vespasian). Therefore, Nerva and Trajan held the ordinary consulship in 98. During Trajan's return to Germany, news came that Nerva had died on January 27, leaving Trajan sole emperor.

Trajan first sent a letter to the Senate conciliating the senators and promising not to execute any senator without good cause, thus pledging not to repeat the evils of Domitian. He then embarked on a tour of the provinces and gave a donative to the army and a distribution of money to the people of Rome before entering Rome. His wife Plotina, upon entering the palace, won praise for her modesty, by saying "I enter here such a woman as I would wish to be when I leave" (Dio 68.5.5). His wife and sister Marciana both received the title Augusta.

Trajan enjoyed a warm working relationship with the Senate and lobbied successfully for the deification of Nerva. Trajan also had his natural father deified, and also deified Marciana after her death with the Senate's approval. Pliny the Younger delivered the famous *Panegyric of Trajan*, which commences an era of literary output that includes the great historian Tacitus and the biographer Suetonius. These authors all regarded Trajan very favorably in contrast with Domitian. Pliny is also known for Book 10 of his *Letters*, which chronicle his exchange of letters as governor of Bithynia (in Asia Minor) with Trajan and illustrate Trajan's policies. Trajan also expanded the *alimenta*, a system of endowments granted to Italian towns to support children. This "child welfare" measure had been begun by Nerva. It is commemorated on the Arch of Trajan at Beneventum.



Bust of the emperor Trajan (98–117 CE). Trajan commanded the First and Second Dacian Wars (101–102, 105–106), adding the new province of Dacia (modern Romania) to the Roman Empire. His war against the Persian Empire had less lasting success. Located in the Capitoline Museums, Rome, Italy. (Araldo de Luca/Corbis)

Trajan's moderate approach to absolute power can be seen by the fact that he held only four consulships as emperor, in 100, 101, 103, and 112 (not counting those held under Domitian and Nerva), just as had Nero and Claudius. By contrast, the Flavian emperors had tended to monopolize the consulship. Trajan received all the usual titles and offices (*Pontifex Maximus*, *pater patriae*, et cetera) but at a slower pace than Claudius, Nero or Domitian.

When King Decebalus of Dacia, who had formerly agreed to a truce with Domitian, renewed hostilities with the Romans, Trajan declared the First Dacian War (101–102) and forced Decebalus to yield. Decebalus became a client monarch of the Romans. The Romans also recovered the

legionary eagle lost under Cornelius Fuscus in Domitian's Dacian war. However, peace did not last, and a Second Dacian War (105–106) broke out, in which Trajan sacked Decebalus' capital, Sarmizegetusa. Trajan survived an assassination attempt instigated by Decebalus, and thereafter intensified the destruction of Dacia. Decebalus, at the moment of capture, killed himself. For this victory the Senate gave Trajan the title *Dacicus*. Highlights of the Dacian Wars are depicted on the Column of Trajan, providing rich detail about the Roman army at this time.

The victory over Dacia brought immense spoils into the Roman treasury, which funded a massive building project in downtown Rome. Much of the Esquiline Hill was dug out to make room for a huge, new Forum of Trajan (designed by Apollodorus of Damascus), which included an immense market of over 100 shops—the world's first shopping mall—a temple, a basilica, two libraries, and Trajan's Column. A few other projects of note include the Arch of Trajan at Beneventum; a war monument, the *Tropaeum Traiani*, at Adamklissi (Romania); new harbors at Ostia, Centumcellae, and Ancona; new baths in Rome; and a road linking Beneventum and Brundisium—the *via Traiana*.

Relations with the Mediterranean world's other superpower, Persia, deteriorated in the last few years of Trajan's life. Trajan decided to go to war with the Persians in 112 on the pretext that the Persians had installed a new king of Armenia, a task Trajan claimed for the Romans (Tiberius and Nero had tried to characterize it as a Roman right). Assembling a large force, Trajan wrested Armenia away from the Persian nominee, Parthamasiris, and placed Armenia under a Roman governor, Catilius Severus. Trajan refused to reinstate Parthamasiris, who had hoped to be reinstated as king as Nero had done for Tiridates. Advancing from Armenia into Persia in 115, Trajan conquered Mesopotamia, for which the Senate gave him the title *Parthicus*. At the end of the season, Trajan withdrew to Antioch, where he wintered before renewing hostilities.

That winter, a great earthquake struck Asia Minor, killing thousands. According to Dio 68.24, Trajan himself narrowly escaped death by crawling out a window. Nevertheless, after directing relief programs for the rest of the winter, the undeterred Trajan reinvaded the Persian Empire in spring 116. He pushed on as far as the capital Ctesiphon, which he captured and sacked. This was the first time in history that the Romans had penetrated so deeply and so successfully into Persia. Trajan divided his new

Mesopotamian conquests into two additional provinces and explored as far as the mouth of the Tigris on the Persian Gulf, but decided that he was too old to push on to India, as had his role model, Alexander. In his absence, some of the territory behind him had revolted, so he divided his army into three forces and marched back to quell the rebellions. His general Lusius Quietus very effectively repressed the revolts and subsequently was sent to put down a rebellion of the Jews in Alexandria. Fearing that the Persians would invade in his absence, Trajan decided to enthrone Parthemaspatēs over the Persians in return for peace.

Trajan planned to return to Rome to celebrate a triumph for his eastern campaign, but fell ill in Selinus in Cilicia. He believed he had been poisoned, but Dio 68.31 suggests that he suffered a stroke. Upon Trajan's death, his kinswomen circulated a story that on his deathbed Trajan had adopted Hadrian. According to detractors in the Senate, Hadrian succeeded by means of a palace coup. Hadrian immediately purged several capable senatorial rivals, which generated plausible rumors that the adoption was spurious, at the expense of the true heir (one of the executed men), and cast a shadow on Hadrian's reign. Hadrian's decision to evacuate Trajan's new eastern conquests further clouded Hadrian's reputation among contemporary and subsequent generations. Hadrian had Trajan deified and held a triumph in Trajan's name with an effigy of Trajan in the victor's chariot.

Gaius Stern

See also Dacia, Dacians; Dacian Wars; Hadrian; Nerva; Persian Wars, Arsacid; Succession (Imperial)

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Treason

Treason, *perduellio* in archaic Rome and the early Republic, later known as

maiestas (*laesa populi Romani*), “harm to the greatness of the Roman people,” covered a wide range of crimes, including aid to the enemy in wartime, obstruction of the political process, and threats to the public safety in peacetime. In the Principate, *maiestas* found its most notorious application as “harm to the greatness” of the emperor, abused by tyrannical emperors and corrupt courtiers. *Maiestas* trials represented an exception to the usual scale of penalties that protected the physical bodies and status of the elite; in cases of treason, elite persons might be liable to torture and execution.

The crime of *perduellio* is known to us from Livy 1.26, recounting the legend that Horatius killed his sister for mourning one of the Curiatii, enemies of Rome. Horatius was accused of *perduellio* (not the more appropriate *parricidium* or killing a close relative). In the punishment of *perduellio*, two specialized minor magistrates, *duumviri*, judged the case, and the guilty man was tied to an *arbor infelix* or “fruitless” tree and scourged with rods till he died. The next instance is from the late Republic. In 63 BCE Caesar and his friend Labienus proposed to try Gaius Rabirius for *perduellio* for having murdered the radical tribune Lucius Appuleius Saturninus in 100 BCE. Cicero defended Rabirius (Cicero, *Pro Rabirio perduellionis*) and the trial was aborted procedurally. In his speech, Cicero emphasizes the horror of the archaic penalty. Since Caesar later advocated mercy toward the Catilinarian conspirators, he is unlikely to have carried out the cruel death of the elderly Rabirius; the proposal may have been a political stunt (the way contemporary opponents of the death penalty might suggest the revival of public hanging). Though the Romans crucified rebellious slaves, and governors and emperors sometimes inflicted the equally archaic “sack” (*culleus*) penalty, sewing a parricide into a leather sack and throwing it into the sea, otherwise the Romans seem not to have inflicted the punishment of the *arbor infelix*, which may be entirely an antiquarian reconstruction.

In the late Republic, the term *perduellio* was replaced with *maiestas minuta* or *laesa populi Romani*, “damage to the greatness of the Roman people.” *Maiestas* as treason was codified by the *lex Appuleia de maiestate* (a law moved by the same Saturninus, ca. 103), which established a standing court for treason (*quaestio de maiestate*). The *lex Iulia de maiestate*, usually attributed to Julius Caesar (sometimes Augustus), remained the prevailing statute throughout the Principate (Digest 48.4.1).

CAGR separates “war crimes” (crimes in warfare) from civilian treason, but the Romans may not have made this distinction. In the late Republic, individual cases of “war crimes” (the massacre or enslavement of surrendered enemies, or outright cowardice or aiding the enemy) and of extortion from subjects were sometimes prosecuted as *maiestas*. The dictator Sulla (82–81)’s *lex Cornelia de maiestate* defined as treason a governor’s trespassing the boundaries of his province with an army, and also covered extortion. The *lex Iulia de maiestate* covered extortion, abuse of subjects, and abusive billeting. (Lintott 1993)

Prosecution of *maiestas* depended on private accusers and was, like the other public prosecutions, used for political purposes. Appuleius Saturninus used the *maiestas* law to prosecute his political rival Servilius Caepio for violently obstructing the vote. For less dangerous forms of *maiestas*, the penalty was usually exile or a fine rather than the death penalty. Thus, the *lex de maiestate* was not the most powerful weapon in the arsenal of the state to repress threats to its safety. More severe public threats were dealt with as policing matters, through the declaration of a state of emergency and passing of the *senatus consultum ultimum*, or through the declaration of certain persons as *hostes publici* (public enemies) in the proscriptions of 82–81 and 43–42 BCE. Perceived public threats might be countered entirely through self-help, the recourse of a mob to lynching, as in the deaths of Tiberius Gracchus or Clodius Pulcher.

In the early empire, treason was not usually prosecuted in the *quaestio de maiestate*, which (like other standing courts) fell into disuse. Treason was prosecuted by the Senate in the Julio-Claudian period, usually dealing with fellow senators and other members of the upper orders. An unhealthy dynamic developed: as with other public crimes, *maiestas* depended on delation, in which private citizens came forward with accusations. The *lex Iulia de maiestate* rewarded delators with property confiscated from convicted persons. Corrupt courtiers thus had a personal interest in lodging accusations of treason. Seeking to gain influence, they played on the anxieties of suspicious emperors such as Tiberius, Gaius, Claudius, and Nero. Rival senators even delated against each other (Harries 2007).

Due to the emperors’ anxieties, trivial cases were also accused, such as the treason of Marcus Scribonius Libo Drusus. Libo Drusus was a young man whose dabbling in astrology and magic, encouraged by his flatterers, motivated him to allegedly conspire against Tiberius (Velleius 2.129–30;

Tacitus, *Annals* 2.27–30; Suetonius, *Tiberius* 25; Dio 57.15). The accused Libo Drusus committed suicide. The story shows that the treason trials under Valentinian and Valens (below) were not just a case of the greater “superstition” of the later Roman Empire; consulting astrologers or magicians about the imperial succession was always regarded as treason.

The new view of *maiestas* as “harm to the emperor’s greatness” expanded the definition of treason to include not just sedition, revolt, or attempted assassination, but also dissent, defamation, and insults to imperial images. Defamation included humorous or scurrilous verses attacking the emperors and serious historiography critical of the transition from Republic to empire (Tacitus, *Annals* 1.72.3–4, 4.34–6; Suetonius, *Augustus* 35; Dio 55.4.4, 57.24.2–4). Insults to imperial images (statues, paintings, et cetera) were possible because images of the emperor were focuses of loyalty and veneration (Tacitus, *Annals* 1.73). It was seriously proposed whether taking an emperor’s coin (bearing his image) into a public latrine constituted *maiestas* (Suetonius, *Tiberius* 58).

Attacks on members of the imperial family might also be prosecuted as *maiestas*, as in the recently rediscovered senatorial decree (20 CE) condemning Gnaeus Calpurnius Piso, governor of Syria, who was accused of murdering Germanicus, the nephew and putative heir of Tiberius, in 19, and of subverting the army. The trial of Piso is also attested in Tacitus’ *Annals*.

Maiestas accusations cut a swathe through the Julio-Claudian imperial family. Tacitus emphasizes that Tiberius also persecuted other members of the imperial family (notably Agrippina the Elder, Germanicus’ wife) for suspected disloyalty, eventually exiling and eliminating them. Claudius I (41–54) put to death his first empress, Valeria Messalina, and her lover Silius for adultery and suspected conspiracy; Messalina was ordered to commit suicide, but lacked the courage and was killed by a soldier. Nero, notoriously, had his mother Agrippina the Younger assassinated, claiming to the public that she conspired against him.

One of the most damaging features of *maiestas* prosecutions was the violation of senators’ and equestrians’ legal privileges. During the late Republic, the Romans rarely inflicted the death penalty on citizens, preferring to impose exile and confiscation of property. Torture to produce evidence and execution were imposed on slaves. An exception was the proscriptions, when the victims, decreed *hostes publici* (public enemies),

were killed out of hand. In the early empire's *maiestas* trials, high-status persons frequently faced death sentences; they escaped execution through suicide, which enabled them and their families to salvage their reputations and estates.

Above all Tacitus, but also Suetonius and Dio, are the main sources for these abuses of the *maiestas* law in the Julio-Claudian period and the reign of Domitian. *Maiestas* prosecutions were much less frequent the reigns of Vespasian and Titus and during the second century CE. Emperors swore that they would do no harm to senators. Nonetheless, significant conspiracies and revolts continued to occur and might result in treason trials, presided over by the emperors and their deputies rather than the Senate; their judgment might be summary.

In the later empire, Constantine the Great (306–337) put to death his eldest son Crispus on suspicion of conspiracy; his wife Fausta may also have been implicated and put to death. More treason trials occurred in the reigns of Constantius II (337–361), Valentinian I (364–375), and Valens (364–378). Constantius II elevated as Caesar Gallus, a remote cousin and the older brother of Julian; Gallus fell amid suspicions of revolt. Constantius also persecuted other suspected conspirators (Ammianus 19.12). Valentinian and Valens persecuted the aristocracy for suspected use of magic, whether to harm the emperors or to determine the imperial succession (Ammianus 28.1). Ammianus dwells on the horrors of the torture of members of the aristocracy. Throughout the imperial period, treason trials showed the worst face of the autocracy and undermined the advances of the Romans in the field of law.

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See also Adultery; Astrologers; Bribery and Corruption; Caesar, Gaius Julius; Civil Rights; Criminal Procedure; Germanicus; Military Discipline; Piso, Gnaeus Calpurnius; Proscriptions; Public Order; *Senatus Consultum Ultimum*; States of Emergency; Tacitus; Usurpation; War Crimes

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Treaties, Rome and Carthage

Carthage and Rome had a long history of treaty relationships before the First Punic War. From the Greco-Roman sources, it is possible to reconstruct three or four different treaties, dating to 509/508, 346, 306, and 279 BCE. Three of these treaties are recorded in a continuous narrative written by Polybius in which he describes the history of treaties between Carthage and Rome. The fourth, that of 306 BCE, is attested only in alternate sources (Philius of Agrigentum and Livy), and is deliberately attacked as a fabrication by Polybius.

In 509/508 BCE, Rome and Carthage concluded their first treaty, according to Polybius. In this treaty, the Carthaginians established a commercial relationship with Rome on very strict terms of interaction. Rome is only allowed permission to enter into Carthaginian territories in Sicily, Sardinia, or North Africa for the purpose of conducting trade or if blown of course by a storm. In exchange, Rome required that Carthage not conduct warfare against the Latin peoples subject to Rome or make any attempt to build a colony in Roman territory.

A second treaty between Rome and Carthage in 346 BCE is an important document for the reconstruction of the Carthaginian Empire. The terms of the treaty appear to establish an exclusive zone of Carthaginian commercial control in the western Mediterranean, as Carthage greatly restricted the number of ports that Roman traders could access compared to the earlier treaty. Carthage claimed all of North Africa and Sardinia as its exclusive zone of economic control and prohibited Roman traders from all of these ports except Carthage itself. Even preexisting Phoenician city-states near Carthage, such as Utica, appear as part of the Carthaginian Empire rather than independent city-states in the text of the treaty. From this document, therefore, it is possible to argue that Carthage had established a large home territory for its empire in North Africa by this point in its history. In

addition, it is evident that Carthage believed its control of Sardinia to be absolute by this period. In this treaty the Carthaginians appear to harden their stance toward Roman commerce and traders. In exchange, the Romans appear to have gained very little from this treaty, other than a guarantee that the Carthaginians would respect Roman territorial claims in Italy. The Romans also claimed the right to emancipate any Roman subject who the Carthaginians held as a slave if that slave was brought into a Roman or Latin port on a Carthaginian ship.

The treaty of 306 is known only from Polybius' attack on its veracity, but it was originally recorded in the writings of Philinus of Agrigentum. Livy mentions a "renewal" of the treaty between Carthage and Rome for the same year, but does not reveal the explicit terms. According to Philinus, as preserved in Polybius, the terms of this treaty state that Rome had to avoid all activity in Sicily. In turn, the Carthaginians agreed to cease all activities in Italy. Philinus further stated that the Carthaginians believed that Rome had broken this treaty specifically when it invaded Sicily at the start of the First Punic War.

A final treaty was concluded in 279 BCE during Pyrrhus' invasion of Italy. In this treaty, the Romans and the Carthaginian reaffirm the conditions of their earlier agreements and add a new clause concerning military affairs. In this new clause, the Romans and the Carthaginians agree to assist each other if invaded by an enemy force.

It should be noted that no epigraphic evidence has been recovered to prove the existence of any of these treaties.

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See also Carthage (State); Carthaginians; Punic War, First; Punic War, Second; Treaties and Alliances

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Treaties and Alliances

Treaties (Latin *foedera* [sing. *foedus*]) typically refer to treaties of peace (*pax*) and treaties of alliance (*societas*) entered into and formally ratified by the Roman people. Although one of the principal outcomes of a successfully

agreed *foedus* is friendship (*amicitia*), there were no “treaties of friendship” as such; friendship was the transcendent bond that was established by the successful striking of a *foedus* and performance of its terms. *Foedera* are also to be distinguished from temporary *pactiones* (sing. *pactio*), “agreements to surrender,” sometimes involving the exchange of hostages and/or oaths, *indutiae* (sing. *indutia*), “truces,” and *sponsiones* (sing. *sponsio*), “battlefield agreements,” entered into by a Roman general in the field without senatorial approval and subject to ratification by the Roman people.

It used to be thought that *socii*, “allies,” and *socii et amici*, “allies and friends,” were distinguished from *amici* by their possession of formal treaties with Rome, but this has now been shown to be a false dichotomy; not all states referred to as *socii* and *socii et amici* in the sources necessarily possessed *foedera*. Also disproven is the imaginary formal-legal division of Roman treaties into *foedera aequa* (“equal treaties”) and *foedera iniqua* (“unequal treaties”). It is now generally acknowledged that *foedera aequa* and *iniqua* are rhetorical descriptions by Roman historians and do not refer to a technical-legal difference between two types of treaty: Italian treaties of alliance, and extra-Italian treaties (Republican period).

The once common scholarly division of Italian *foedera* into “equal” treaties, especially the *Foedus Cassianum*, enjoyed by members of the Latin League from 493 to 338 BCE, and “unequal” treaties, referring to the status of the nonannexed Latins after 338 and the rest of Rome’s Italian allies throughout the Italian peninsula, is no longer tenable, not only for the reason just mentioned, but also because the number of known Italian *foedera* is so small. Of the Latin states, only Praeneste and Tibur were known to have possessed individual treaties of alliance with Rome after 338 (Polybius 6.14.8), while the total number of Italian states possessing such treaties is around 30 (far fewer if dubious cases and multiple treaties with the same people are deducted). This seems rather small relative to the total number of 125–150 known Italian allies (listed in the *formula togatorum*, “the list of togate peoples,” kept at Rome, specifying the number of troops each ally had to contribute to the Roman army on an annual basis).

There are also relatively few securely attested extra-Italian treaties of peace (8) and alliance (28) with the Romans. Treaties of peace typically laid down the conditions under which relations between Rome and the other signatory or signatories could establish or revert to a position of friendship. A peace treaty usually included stipulations for the payment of a war

indemnity to Rome and sometimes for the delivery of hostages.

It is much harder to generalize about treaties of alliance. Some, such as Rome's first treaty with Carthage, dated to 509, were designed to establish exclusive zones of influence and activity whose purpose was primarily commercial and economic (Polybius 3.22–23). The Ebro treaty between Rome and Carthage (ca. 226) established similar territorial restrictions, but for more obviously military-strategic purposes (Polybius 3.27.9). Some treaties of alliance, such as those between Rome and the Aetolian League in 211 against Philip V of Macedon (Livy 26.24.8–14; *SEG* 13.382), and between Rome and Carthage ca. 280 against Pyrrhus of Epirus (Polybius 3.25.1–5), may be more precisely characterized as mutual defense pacts, since their primary purpose was to ensure that each party would come to the aid of the other when threatened by a common enemy (if they were able), that neither would make a separate peace with the common enemy without consulting the other, and that both would have the same enemies and friends. Treaties of alliance also meant different things to different parties at different times. So, the pre-183 Achaean League treaty, struck on Achaean initiative and reluctantly granted by the Romans, who wished to avoid being tied down by formally articulated obligations, was meant to advertise the formal equality of the signatories. The Rhodians practically had to beg, on repeated occasions over many years, for the treaty of alliance that was formally granted them by Rome in 164 or 163. For the Rhodians, the treaty was meant to signify to the rest of the world that all was well between themselves and Rome after a period of tension; for the Romans, whose power in the eastern Mediterranean was now uncontested, it was a token gesture they cost them very little. The much later treaties with insignificant states, such as that with tiny Astypalaea in 105, were, from the Roman perspective, similarly tokenistic, but from the perspective of the inferior parties, prestigious markers of international esteem. Some treaties, such as the peace with the Aetolian League in 189 (Livy 38.11; compare Polybius 21.32), and the alliance with Spanish Gades in 78 (Cicero *Pro Balbo* 35), contained a “*maiestas* clause,” that is, a statement that pledged Rome's treaty partner “to preserve readily and without fraud the majesty of the Roman people” (*maiestatem populi Romani comiter et sine dolo malo conservare*). This clause was clearly designed to ensure performance in treaties of peace, and, in the case of alliances, to articulate an otherwise unarticulated hierarchy of power.

See also Alliances; Allies; *Amicitia*; Federates; Treaties, Rome and Carthage

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Triarii

The *triarii* were the third and final line of defense in the manipular Roman army of the early and middle Republic. There were 600 *triarii* in each legion, deployed as 10 maniples, and they composed of the oldest and most experienced of Rome's soldiers. Their task was to remain in the rear of the fighting line to stem the enemy's onslaught and, if necessary, to cover the retreat. Thus, to fall back upon the *triarii* (*ad triarios redisse*) was a Roman expression meaning to be in dire straits. The *triarii* were equipped with bronze helmet, pectoral, and greaves, and carried an oval shield and a thrusting spear called a *hasta*. As with the other two ranks of the manipular army, the *hastati* and *principes*, the age and equipment distinctions of the *triarii* were abolished with the establishment of the cohortal legion in the late second century BCE. In the cohortal legion, all infantry were equipped the same way.

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See also Arms and Armor; *Hastati*; Legion, Organization of; *Principes*; Tactics; *Triplex Acies*

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Tribune

A legionary tribune (Latin *tribunus*, pl. *tribuni*) was a high-ranking officer subordinate to the commanding magistrate and his *legati* during the Republic. In the Principate, tribunes were high-ranking officers subordinate to the legionary legate or commander of the legion. The legionary *tribunus* should not be confused with the tribune of the plebs (*tribunus plebis*), a representative of the popular assembly (*concilium plebis*), an office that had no military responsibilities and that faded into obscurity during the Principate.

In the early Republic, for some years (ca. 444 BCE, 408–394, 391–367) military tribunes with consular power (*tribuni militum consulari potestate*) held summary executive authority, resembling the dictator or consuls but numbering more than two per year, normally six per year but sometimes three or four. This office represented a departure from the normal tier of magistracies and was not revived after 367 BCE. It was a compromise during the period of the patrician-plebeian conflict, as it allowed plebeian military tribunes with consular power to share the office with patricians. A more radical interpretation suggests that the *tribuni militum consulari potestate* were competing clan leaders in the prestate period of the archaic Republic (see Drogula 2015).

By the middle Republic, *tribuni militum* were senior officers of legions, six per legion, subordinate to the consul, praetor, or promagistrate in the field. The “consular” legions, numbered I–IV, the first four to be raised in the yearly *dilectus*, required 24 tribunes; 14 had to have served at least five campaigns, while 10 had to have served 10 (Polybius 6.19.1–4). These tribunes were elected by the *comitia tributa*, though the consuls also had the right to appoint tribunes. In this period, *tribuni militum* could be senators or equestrians. Their authority over legions was displaced by the *legati*, the commander’s deputies, in the late Republic. As their name suggests (from *legere*, “to choose”), *legati* were chosen by the commander rather than elected by the assembly.

In the Principate, each legion had six tribunes. The highest-ranking tribune, second-in-command to the legionary legate, was the *tribunus laticlavius* or “broad-striped tribune,” named because as the son of a senator, he wore the *latus clavus* or broad-striped tunic of senatorial rank. The *tribunus laticlavius* was between 17 and 24 years old and had not yet entered the Senate. He obtained the post of tribune through patronage, and held it for a year.

The broad-striped tribune’s second-in-command authority must have been nominal. Though expected to replace the legate if the legate died or was incapacitated, he was also expected to learn from the legate and his nominal inferiors, the *praefectus castrorum* and the equestrian tribunes. Distinction in combat added prestige to his record, but was probably not necessary. For many imperial senators, the laticlavian tribunate represented their only military experience. After it, they proceeded to run for the quaestorship and so enter the Senate, but only a few (who usually held the praetorship first) became legionary legates in their late 20s or early 30s.



Funerary *stela* of Sextus Adgennius Macrinus, a military tribune, late first century CE. Officerships in the Roman army were a major mode of advancement for provincial citizens of the empire. *CIL* XII 3175, located in the Archaeological Museum, Nîmes, France. (DeAgostini/Getty Images)

The other five legionary tribunes were equestrians, termed *tribuni angusticlavii* (narrow-striped tribunes) from the narrow-striped tunic that that equestrians wore. The narrow-striped tribunes were somewhat older than the broad-striped tribune, and had usually served for some years, though the formal *militia equestris* or *tres militiae* did not appear until the mid-first century CE or a little later. The *militia equestris* comprised *praefectus cohortis* (commander of an auxiliary infantry unit); legionary tribune; *praefectus alae* (commander of an auxiliary cavalry unit). Each post was held for three or four years, so that the *tribunus angusticlavius* was at least in his late twenties. The responsibilities of equestrian tribunes were chiefly administrative. However, each tribune commanded two cohorts. Each century in a legion had its own tactical command structure (headed by a centurion).

An equestrian who completed the *tres militiae* would either enter the civilian imperial service at the rank of procurator, or seek service as an officer in the Praetorian Guard or urban cohorts. Eventually he might attain the peak of an equestrian career as *praefectus annonae* (prefect of the grain supply), *praefectus vigilum* (prefect of the fire brigade at Rome), *praefectus Aegypti* (governor of Egypt), or praetorian prefect, the highest ranking post open to equestrians. The emperors might promote equestrians with distinguished careers into the senatorial order; he then could appoint them to senatorial posts such as provincial governor or legionary legate. In the mid-third century CE, when senators were excluded from military commands, equestrian tribunes could be promoted directly to legionary commanders or provincial governors, though the exact structure of the more fluid hierarchy of this period is not known.

Career inscriptions and epitaphs provide our main evidence for the hierarchy of the legions and *auxilia*. Literary authors provide some evidence, but did not bother to explain organizational structures that must have been familiar to everyone.

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See also Auxilia; Centurion (Republic); Elite Participation; Equites,

Equestrians; Inscriptions; Legate; Legion, Organization of; *Praefectus*; Recruitment of Army (Republic); Senate, Senators

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Tribune of the Plebs

The tribunate of the plebs was a highly distinctive office of the Roman Republic, which had its origins in Rome's early social conflict, but came to play a central role in the republican system and ultimately destabilized the Republic. The office originated in the early years of the Republic and grew out of the struggle between the patricians and the plebeian order, whose exact nature in this period is difficult to determine. This clash, labeled the struggle of the orders, resulted in a plebeian secession from the city of Rome in 494 BCE, in protest at the levels of debt and military service they were burdened with. Dissatisfied with the response from the consuls and the Senate, they chose their own magistrates; the tribunes of the plebs, to guard their own interests and check the official magistrates.

Between its creation and suspension for the Decemvirate in 451 BCE the office existed outside of the official structure of Roman politics, only representing the weight of the plebeian order. The exact number of tribunes chosen each year is a matter of debate; the most common stance being initially two, then five, then finally 10. Following the fall of the Decemvirate in 449 BCE the office was re-established with the official recognition of the Senate, but remaining open only to men of the plebeian order.

From 449 to 287 BCE, the office held an anomalous position, still being the chief plebeian magistracy and the main tool for the pursuit of the plebeian

political and economic agenda, but also a recognized office of state. This dual role was enhanced by the plebeian elite gaining access to the Senate and becoming part of Rome's ruling nobility. The Senate itself soon saw the potential of the office for domestic legislation and as a counterweight to the consuls. Following the *lex Hortensia* of 287 BCE the tribunes gained the ability to legislate for all the Roman population rather than just the plebeian order, ending the struggle between patrician and plebeians.

However the office never really moved away from its dual nature and by the mid- and late Republic was simultaneously the highest plebeian magistracy and a junior post for the political class. An analysis of the office holders reveal that the majority hailed from nonsenatorial families, who went no further than the tribunate. The plebeians from senatorial families generally held the office between the quaestorship and the aedileship, and usually around the age of 30. The candidates ran for election in the tribal assembly and took office on December 10 each year.

Yet for such a relatively junior office the tribunate's powers were potentially unlimited in the domestic sphere. Its primary proactive power came from the right to legislate in the tribal assembly, with laws requiring only a majority of the 35 tribes to pass, making it Rome's most efficient method of legislating. Any or all of the 10 tribunes could propose legislation, though the sources do indicate that initial discussions were held within the tribunician college to work out a program and ensure that all 10 were in agreement. Following 287 BCE, tribunician legislation was binding on the citizen body, whereas prior to this it had been restricted. As the Republic expanded then so did the scope of tribunician legislation, which was originally limited to domestic matters in or around Rome. However various individual tribunes expanded this scope to meet their own agendas, usually at the expense of the Senate's authority; conquered lands in Italy, state finances, colonization programs, state subsidies, military reforms, and ultimately military commands. In practice there were no limits to the scope of tribunician legislation.

The tribunate also had a great range of reactive powers; they could veto official actions and protect individuals. The former was the *ius intercessio*, which any tribune could use to block an official action or proposal by any magistrate, the Senate or even a colleague. The *ius auxilii* was the power to intervene and protect an individual from any official action, backed up by the personal tribunician sacrosanctity.

In terms of limitations, the greatest formal one was that tribunes were not allowed to leave the city, beyond the first milestone, or spend the night outside of Rome itself, without special dispensation. The greatest practical restriction was the number of tribunes itself, which always gave rise to internal struggles or opposition, with tribunes being able to veto their colleagues actions or proposals. There are numerous examples of this happening throughout the Republic, which would paralyze the college until the next elections. While there was no formal ban on tribunes being re-elected to consecutive tribunes, it was a practice that had fallen out of custom in the fourth century, until the time of the Gracchi in the second century BCE.

Although there had always been clashes between individual tribunes, or groups, and the Senate, the late Republic saw a number of ambitious politicians use the office in increasingly aggressive ways, resulting in violence and ultimately bloodshed in Roman domestic politics. This began with Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus, who had one of his colleagues removed from office, and continued through to Sulpicius in 88 BCE. Following his two coups, Sulla passed legislation limiting the powers of the tribunate between 88 and 79 BCE, but these were overturned and this cycle continued, taken to new heights by Clodius in the 50s BCE. However, the role of the tribunate in causing the fall of the Republic can be overstated. Generals and their armies did more directly to topple it.

This use, or misuse, of the tribunate was only ended by Augustus when he took tribunician powers for himself for life, without holding the office itself and used them as one of the two pillars of the Principate. Tribunician power continued to be an important tool to the emperors throughout the imperial period. The office itself continued, though a shadow of its former self, to at least the fourth century CE.

Gareth C. Sampson

See also Clodius Pulcher; Factions; Gaius Gracchus; Gracchan Land Conflict; Livius Drusus the Younger, Marcus; Patrician-Plebeian Conflict; Plebeians; Republic, Political Structure; Sulla, Lucius Cornelius; Tiberius Gracchus

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Triplex Acies

The *triplex acies*, or “triple battle line,” was the standard deployment of infantry in the Roman army from the mid-Republic through the imperial period. In the earlier Republic, due to Etruscan influence, the Romans employed the Greek-type hoplite phalanx formation, in which men maintained close order with overlapping shields and thrust with heavy spears. The phalanx was inflexible and could not maneuver easily; it required flat ground.

The phalanx was superseded by the manipular legion, which prevailed down to the late second century BCE. Study of the manipular legion has focused on Polybius and on a problematic passage in Livy (8.8.5–8). They describe a three-line formation in which each line was differentiated by the age, experience, and equipment of the soldiers that comprised it. In the first line stood the *hastati*, younger soldiers armed with javelins.

The second line consisted of the *principes*, men in the prime of life. According to Polybius, the third or rearguard line consisted of the *triarii*. Livy 8.8.5–8, which may represent an earlier phase of the manipular legion, divides the third line into three additional ranks, the *triarii*, *rorarii*, and *accensi*. The *rorarii* and *accensi* are skirmishers, so that their presence in the rear line is implausible. Livy also states that the maniples were arranged in a checkerboard pattern, alternating with empty spaces in between the

maniples, accomplishing a complex maneuver to allow fresh soldiers to replace tired ones during the course of a battle. The subject of extensive academic debate, this maneuver would require intensive drilling to achieve perfect coordination and would work only on a level, unobstructed surface. Gaps between maniples might allow enemy units to surround the first-line maniples or cohorts and cut them to pieces. Consequently, it seems more likely that the legions presented a solid battle line when they engaged their enemies. The *triplex acies* then allowed them to replace the front line quickly from reserves, and this was probably done during the lulls in battle that our sources mention on occasion.

In practice, Roman battles were adapted to the layout of the ground and any obstructions; the deployment of maniples, and even more so of cohorts, enabled a greater degree of flexibility. The commander was not restricted to a three-line deployment. A longer two-line or single-line deployment was possible. One of the drawbacks of the *triplex acies* was that any deep formation took time to deploy from the looser marching formation. Enemies frequently attempted to ambush Roman armies on the march, because the Romans would not be able to form up for battle immediately.

Adam Anders

See also Hastati; Legion, Organization of; Maniples; *Principes*; *Quincunx*; Tactics; *Triarii*

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Triumph

The triumph was the ceremonial procession through the city of Rome in honor of a Roman general's victory. It displayed the war's material plunder, representative captives, and captive enemy leaders. The victorious general, who in the role of *triumphator* received much-debated symbolic honors, was accompanied by his soldiers. The procession often culminated with

religious rites in honor of Jupiter and sometimes with the sacrificial death of captive enemy leaders. The triumph was also a festival for the people of Rome, often marked by largesse, lavish feasts, and public games.

The Roman triumph was also a significant cultural institution. In the Republic, the Roman aristocracy competed for triumphs and regarded them with ambivalence, especially from the period of overseas conquest onward, for the escalating display of military glory, wealth, and extravagance in the triumph aroused envy and jealousy. In the late Republic's civil wars, triumphs, furthermore, were tainted by the opprobrium of victory over fellow citizens. After Augustus became the first emperor, triumphs were restricted to the emperor and his deputies, members of the imperial family. Senatorial commanders were allowed a lesser honor, triumphal ornaments (*ornamenta triumphalia*). Triumphs became an important element in imperial iconography, often alluded to in abbreviated form as the emperor's victory titles or in coin legends and images. Triumphal imagery was an important aspect of Roman public or historical art, both in the urban center and in the provinces of the empire.

No one ancient source attests all of the features of the triumph which modern scholars have reconstructed, focusing on the anthropological or religious significance of the ceremony. In this reconstruction, the *triumphator* was elevated to the status of a king (suggested by his ceremonial purple toga decorated with gold) or a god (equated with Jupiter) for the duration of the rite. Other features of the ceremony, such as the derisive songs sung by his soldiers, were intended to deflect human or divine envy. According to Suetonius, Caesar's soldiers sang songs deriding his youthful misconduct as the sexual partner of the client monarch Nicomedes of Bithynia (*Iulius* 49). According to another source, a slave stood behind the monarchic or godlike *triumphator*, whispering in his ear: "Remember, you are only a man!" Such details are preserved in late and antiquarian classical sources, written often many centuries after the actual events.

The triumph contained many religious elements. The *triumphator* ascended the Capitoline hill and made sacrifices to Jupiter, the king of the gods; these rites sometimes included human sacrifice of enemy leaders. However, the triumph was also an opportunity for the display of the wealth obtained by conquest. The *triumphator* redistributed some of this wealth to his soldiers in the form of triumphal donatives and to the civilian

inhabitants of Rome as largesse, public feasts, and gladiatorial games. The triumph even served to educate the public, as the parade might feature floats and paintings depicting the campaigns and the landscapes and peoples of the conquered regions.

The triumph was also a divisive cultural institution. In the Republic, Roman generals competed for the right to hold a triumph. It is possible that a victor had to declare 5,000 enemy casualties to be voted a triumph by the Senate; he had to negotiate for this right, which his jealous peers in the Senate might deny him. The jealousy may motivate the ambivalence with which Roman authors regarded the triumph, admiring prowess in war but doubtful of the moral value of the immense wealth on display. They often claimed that the moral decline of the Republic (a stock theme in literary authors) began with a certain general's triumph, varying from author to author. The relationship of war to wealth was unmistakable, but wealth and luxury were believed to corrupt *virtus*, courage (Sallust, *Bellum Catilinae* 11).



The Gemma Augustea, a cameo, early first century CE. In the imperial period, the triumph was monopolized by members of the imperial family and symbolically by the emperors. This cameo (a carved sardonyx gem), known as the Gemma Augustea,

depicts a mythologized version of the imperial triumph. Located in the Museum of Art History, Vienna, Austria. (Erich Lessing/Art Resource, NY)

When the civil wars of the late Republic began, many of the Roman elite regarded triumphs over fellow Romans with distaste. In elite discourse on the triumph, more virtuous generals of the past had even declined triumphs which the Senate offered to them. Caesar's triumph over the Pompeians allegedly displayed paintings of the suicides of his rivals, which increased the bitterness of his surviving opponents (Appian, *Civil Wars* 2.101).

With the Principate, the emperors and their immediate families monopolized the triumph. Senatorial commanders were no longer permitted to triumph; instead, a victor of senatorial rank could merit *ornamenta triumphalia* (triumphal ornaments), a lesser honor. In the Republic, a lesser version of the triumph, the ovation, had been granted to commanders who did not merit a full triumph.

Triumphal culture persisted beyond the immediate triumphal ceremony. The triumph became part of imperial iconography, often alluded to in abbreviated form such as the victory titles of the emperors: Germanicus, Britannicus, Dacicus, or Parthicus, referring to the emperor as conqueror of Germany, Britain, Dacia, or Persia. Emperors tended to retain the victory titles of their predecessors.

Triumphal imagery became an important aspect of imperial art, featured on victory monuments and historical reliefs. Some monuments (such as the Arch of Titus) depict the triumphal procession itself; others use more abbreviated imagery. The Roman triumphal procession has also inspired more recent European art, especially during the Renaissance and neoclassical periods. In short, though gladiatorial games are often thought of as quintessentially "Roman," the triumph is also a focal point of Roman society and culture.

Sara E. Phang

See also Elite Participation; Emperor as Commander; Human Sacrifice; Imperialism; Imperial Titles; Ovation; Plunder; Prisoners of War; Religion and Warfare; Sallust; Victory; *Virtus*

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Tropaeum Traiani

Termed also the Adamklissi Monument from its location near Adamklissi (Adamclisi) in Romania, the *Tropaeum Traiani* is a large drum-shaped monument 100 feet in diameter, erected by the emperor Trajan in 107–108 CE in celebration of his victory over Dacia. The monument, dedicated to Mars Ultor (Mars the Avenger), shows 54 scenes representing the Dacian Wars, emphasizing Roman battle with Dacians. In one, Trajan on horseback rides down a Dacian, a scene that presents the emperor as heroic warrior rather than the emperor (as on Trajan's Column) as commander. In contrast with the Column of Trajan and the Great Trajanic Frieze, monuments completed by expert sculptors and exhibited at Rome, the style of the *Tropaeum Traiani* reliefs is provincial and rough. The emphasis on combat is perhaps expressive of the sentiments of ordinary soldiers. The reliefs were probably completed using locally available sculptors, perhaps military artisans.

The *Tropaeum Traiani* is located near, but distinct from, an earlier monument erected on the site of a Roman defeat in Domitian's Dacian War in 90 or 91. This altar (*CIL* III 14214 = *ILS* 9107) lists the names of over 3,000 Roman soldiers who died in this battle. It is unique in commemorating the Roman war dead rather than Roman victory, in contrast with Greek war monuments (compare Perikles' Funeral Oration) and with modern war monuments, particularly those of the twentieth century.

Sara E. Phang

See also Column of Trajan; Dacian Wars; Domitian; Emperor as Commander; Great Trajanic Frieze; Mars Ultor; Trajan; War Dead

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Turma

A *turma* (plural *turmae*) is a subunit of a Roman cavalry regiment. The mounted *equites* of the early republican legion were divided into *turmae* of approximately 30 cavalrymen, as were the allied cavalry. In the imperial period, the auxiliary *alae* and *equites singulares Augusti* (the emperor's mounted bodyguard, dating to Flavian times and later) were divided into *turmae* of 32 cavalrymen each. Each *turma* was commanded by a decurion. The *turma* is roughly the equivalent of the legionary century. As with the century, the *turma* served to identify individual cavalrymen.

Sara E. Phang

See also *Alae*; *Auxilia*; Cavalry (Imperial); Cavalry (Republic); *Equites Singulares Augusti*

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U

Urban Cohorts

Augustus (27 BCE–14 CE) created three urban cohorts (*cohortes urbanae*) as a supplement to the nine Praetorian Guard cohorts created earlier. The urban cohorts grew in size (four cohorts of 1,000 men each in Rome by the late first century) and became increasingly distinct from the praetorians. They seem to have shared the praetorians' camp until getting a separate base in the late second or third century. Their terms of employment (pay, years of service) were better than legionaries' but not as good as praetorians'. Like praetorians, urban-cohort soldiers (*urbaniciani*) mostly came from Italy, until Septimius Severus took power in the 190s. Thereafter, the urban prefect who commanded the urban cohorts accrued considerable policing jurisdiction throughout Italy. Augustus had created or revived this office to be held by eminent consular senators, perhaps as a political concession to the senatorial order since equestrians commanded the *vigiles* and praetorians. *Urbaniciani* exercised law-and-order functions such as providing security at the games, but little is known of their basic routine.

Units styled "urban cohorts" were sometimes posted in other cities during the first and second centuries CE, including Ostia (Rome's nearby port) and Puteoli in Italy, and in Lyon and Carthage. They seem to have supported local stability and imperial interests, such as the mint at Lyon, and major hubs of Rome's grain supply. On a few known occasions (esp. under Domitian in the 80s) individual urban cohorts served actively in frontier wars.

Christopher J. Fuhrmann

See also Augustus; Divisions of the Army (Imperial); Domitian; Praetorians;

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Usurpation

Usurpation (in which one emperor displaced another) is here distinguished from provincial resistance or rebellion against Roman rule in general. A usurper might choose the path of revolt, rebelling against the existing emperor. He might succeed in displacing the incumbent emperor, becoming a successful usurper. The accessions of Galba, Vespasian, and Septimius Severus are all instances of usurpation achieved through military revolt and subsequent civil war (luckily for Galba, Nero committed suicide). If he failed and lost, he was an unsuccessful usurper (such as Avidius Cassius and Pescennius Niger). A successful usurpation might also occur through a coup: an assassination or other displacement of the incumbent ruler without a military uprising, for example, a palace conspiracy such as the assassinations of Claudius, Domitian (supplanted by Nerva), or Commodus.

Civil war propaganda usually downplayed the fact that the new, successful usurper had committed revolt and usurpation, by presenting his predecessors as illegitimate in some way, usually in moralistic terms: tyrants of cruelty, greed, or folly. The truth of such stories is often unavailable, since history is written by the victors. Such a systematic character assassination of Vespasian's immediate predecessors is visible in Tacitus' *Histories*, flattering Vespasian, victor of the War of Four Emperors. Since usurpers were stereotypically bad characters, the *Historia Augusta*, with its typical tongue-in-cheek humor, writes flattering biographies of the unsuccessful usurpers (rivals of Severus) Pescennius Niger and Clodius Albinus.

To succeed, a usurper needed to secure the support of his armies, through the bestowal of donatives and/or privileges, and he was careful not

to alienate the soldiers. He was equally careful, at least in the first two centuries CE, not to alienate the Roman Senate. A successful new emperor sought the Senate's approval and promised not to execute senators (a promise that many rulers could not keep). He advertised his accession through the customary media, minting coins with his name and portrait and disseminating his imperial statues and painted portraits to the provinces. He encouraged literati to propagandize his reign by delivering panegyrics or writing histories. He was greatly assisted by wealth from legitimate sources, not obtained by looting temple treasures or confiscating aristocratic estates. He assured himself of probable successors, whether family members or adopted heirs, promising political stability. His pleasant disposition and good morals reassured his subjects, particularly the sensitive urban elite, that he would not insult or outrage them. Above all, he was lucky. He needed military and personal success to stabilize his regime; defeat in war or other disasters might cause his supporters to melt away or turn on him. We use "he" advisedly: where empresses succeeded in ruling the Roman Empire, they employed a male relative as figurehead.

On the one hand, it became doctrine that a good emperor had no fear that he would be usurped; Trajan legendarily handed his praetorian prefect a sword, saying, "If I rule well, use this for me; if not, against me" (QQ 33). On the other hand, a bad emperor saw potential threats to his power everywhere, elevating possible successors only to eliminate them, as Constantius II did with his cousin Gallus, elevating him to Caesar and then executing him for suspected conspiracy. Gallus' brother Julian, elevated to Caesar in his term, quoted Homer, "By purple death I'm seized" (QQ 39).

In the crisis of the third century, usurpation seems to have become widespread, though due to the skimpy nature of the sources the details of how one emperor supplanted another are often not known. Many emperors ruled only a few years; young emperors (raised to Caesar or Augustus by their fathers) were particularly vulnerable to usurpation. The pattern of usurpation seems to have merged with provincial revolts, the Gauls establishing a "Gallic Empire" with their own emperors (Postumus and others); in the east, Zenobia of Palmyra claimed rule of Arabia, Syria, and Egypt. However, we cannot know the extent to which these breakaway empires were supported by provincials dissatisfied with Roman rule.

The fourth and fifth centuries CE also boasted a particularly large number of usurpers, leading eventually in the mid-fifth century to the end

of the western Roman Empire; the last usurper, Odoacer, chose to become king of Italy rather than Roman emperor. Modern scholars have sometimes attempted to map religious controversies onto revolts and provincial unrest in the fourth century CE. Such a correlation is particularly difficult to assess. Two examples will be discussed here. In Roman Africa the Donatists, a Christian sect regarded as heretical by the Nicene Christians (Roman Catholics), became a source of routine low-intensity conflict with the Roman authorities. However, religion was their foremost concern; they do not seem to have been political separatists. In the civil war of Theodosius I (379–395) with Arbogast and Eugenius, earlier modern scholarship suggested that Arbogast and Eugenius supported the pagan cause, revolting against Theodosius’ crusading Catholicism. In fact, Eugenius seems to have been Christian and was above all Arbogast’s figurehead, Arbogast being a usurper in all but name.

Sara E. Phang

See also Army in Politics; Assassination; Civil Warfare; Fall of the Roman Empire (West); Loyalty to Empire; Revolt; Succession (Imperial); Third-Century CE Crisis; Vespasian; War of Four Emperors

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V

Valens (Emperor) (364–378 CE)

Flavius Valens was the emperor of the eastern Roman Empire between March 28, 364 and August 9, 378. He was born at Cibalae in Pannonia ca. 328 and was the son of the general Gratianus and brother to the emperor Valentinian I (364–375). Valens' preimperial career was undistinguished. He served as a low ranking army officer and was only named emperor after the army forced his brother Valentinian to choose an imperial colleague (Ammianus 26.4.3). Valentinian's choice of Valens was not a popular one, and in 365, Julian's relative Procopius revolted, challenging Valens' rule. Procopius enjoyed early success and attracted a range of military units to his cause. However in 366, he was defeated by Valens' forces and subsequently executed. This event left Valens increasingly fearful of betrayal, and in 371–372, he executed high-ranking officials who he believed were engaging in magical practices designed to remove him from power.

Valens was an able administrator who kept taxation under control and fought against entrenched patrimonial corruption among public officials, albeit with limited success (Ammianus 31.13.1–3). Valens' religious impact was limited, although some Christian writers state that he was an aggressive supporter of the Arian cause (Theodoret 4.12.1–4; Sozomen 6.7; Socrates 4.1). Valens was active on the empire's frontiers. In the east, he forcefully intervened in the internal politics of Armenia in an effort to counter Persian claims on the kingdom. He was only dissuaded from launching a full-scale invasion due to troubles with the Goths on the Danubian frontier, which had been problematic throughout his reign. From 367 to 369, Valens had campaigned against the Goths but limited success meant he was forced to negotiate for peace. In 376 he allowed Gothic tribes

to settle in Thrace in return for providing military recruits. However, when local officials mistreated the Goths, they attacked Roman forces and heavily defeated them. Because he was based at Antioch preparing a campaign against the Persians, Valens was not able to move immediately to meet the Gothic threat and only personally moved into Thrace in 378. On August 9, he ignored advice to wait for military assistance from Gratian and engaged the Gothic army at Adrianople. In the course of the battle, the Roman army was annihilated and Valens himself was killed. Accounts differ as to the manner of his death (Ammianus 31.13.12–14; Zosimus 4.24.2). He was succeeded by Theodosius I, another high-ranking army officer (emperor 379–395).

Mark Hebblewhite

See also Adrianople, Battle of; Bribery and Corruption; Goths; Gratian; Jovian; Persian Wars, Sassanid; Valentinian I; Valentinian II

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Valentinian I (Emperor) (364–375 CE)

Flavius Valentinianus was emperor of the western Roman Empire between February 26, 364 and November 17, 375. He was born in 321 CE at Cibalae in the province of Pannonia Secunda and was the son of the elder Gratian, a leading military commander under the House of Constantine (Ammianus 30.6.6). Little is known of Valentinian’s youth, although it is likely that he accompanied his father when the latter served in Africa. Valentinian may also have served as an imperial bodyguard. Valentinian definitely served as

a tribune under Julian in Gaul, where in 357 he was sent home in disgrace after failing in a mission (Ammianus 16.11.6). The next stage of Valentinian's career is uncertain although some Christian sources claim that he was exiled by Julian due to his adherence to Christianity (Orosius 7.32.2). More certain is that Valentinian served under Jovian (363–364), who promoted him to the command of an imperial bodyguard unit and sent him west to proclaim news of his accession. Upon the death of Jovian, Valentinian was chosen to be Augustus by a conclave of military and civil leaders. He was formally accepted as Augustus by the army in a ceremony held at Nicaea on February 26, 364 (Ammianus 26.1.5; Zosimus 3.36.2). Shortly afterward he appointed his brother Valens as co-Augustus and gave him responsibility for the eastern half of the empire.

Valentinian was militarily active throughout his reign. He based himself in Trier to be closer to the Rhine frontier and even chose to continue campaigning in the west instead of marching to Valens' aid during the Procopian revolt (Ammianus 26.5.12–13). He sent commanders to campaign in Africa and Britain and himself led successful campaigns against the Alamanni and the Quadi as well as constructing significant new fortifications on Rome's northwest frontier. Although Valentinian was an orthodox Nicene Christian, his religious policy was generally one of tolerance towards Christian controversies and paganism. He did however move to outlaw certain sects, most prominently the Donatists and Manichaeans (*Codex Theodosianus* 16.5.3, 6.1).

Valentinian's reign was marked by a number of internal political upheavals. In 367 he was afflicted with a serious illness, causing rampant speculation in the imperial court regarding his potential successor. Upon recovering, Valentinian was forced to proclaim his young son Gratian Augustus (co-Augustus with Valentinian I in 367–375, co-Augustus with Valentinian II in 375–383) to secure his family's grip on power (Ammianus 27.6.4–16). In 372 Firmus, a Roman military commander serving in North Africa, rebelled against Valentinian, who sent Theodosius the Elder (the father of Theodosius I, emperor 379–395) to end the revolt. Valentinian also had strained relations with the senatorial aristocracy of Rome. As well as advancing Pannonian adherents to powerful positions usually reserved for aristocrats, Valentinian tried and tortured numerous senators for supposedly engaging in witchcraft, a practice considered as treason against the emperor. Valentinian's economic policies were generally restrained and he is credited

with being an able administrator who sought to end rampant corruption (Ammianus 30.9.1) However, the later years of Valentinian's reign were marked by an increasingly heavy taxation burden (Ammianus 30.5.5–10; Zosimus 4.16.1).

Although ancient writers lauded Valentinian as a strong emperor they roundly criticized him for his temper, cruelty and irrational hatred for the cultured and educated (Ammianus 27.7.1–4, 30.8.2–10). Valentinian died on November 17, 375 at Brigetio in Pannonia after suffering an aneurysm reportedly induced by his rage at the arrogance of Quadi envoys (Ammianus 30.6.3). A dubious legacy of Valentinian I's reign was the elevation of two young emperors, his sons Gratian (367–383) and Valentinian II (375–392, raised after his father's death by the army), who both succumbed to usurpers, unleashing civil wars that the later Roman Empire could ill afford.

Mark Hebblewhite

See also Gratian; Jovian; Succession (Imperial); Valens; Valentinian II

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Valentinian II (Emperor) (375–392 CE)

Valentinian II, the younger son of Valentinian I, became a western Roman emperor at age four, reigning from 375 to 392 CE. He was apparently acclaimed by the army, the soldiers favoring the continuance of Valentinian I's dynasty. Originally, he shared power with his half-brother Gratian (375–

383). After Gratian's assassination in 383 by Magnus Maximus, Valentinian retreated from Gaul and ruled Italy. Valentinian and his ally Bishop Ambrose of Milan succeeded in delaying Maximus from invading Italy until 387. In 388, the eastern Roman emperor Theodosius I and the forces of Valentinian defeated Maximus at the Save, Siscia, and Poetovio; Maximus surrendered and was executed at Aquileia. Theodosius I appointed the Frankish general Arbogast as Valentinian's *magister militum*. The ambitious Arbogast increasingly dominated the young emperor, and Valentinian's courtiers slipped away from him. After Valentinian's failed attempt to dismiss Arbogast, Valentinian II was found dead by hanging in his chambers in 392. It is not clear whether his death was an assassination, voluntary suicide, or forced suicide. Having thus burned his bridges, Arbogast supported a new puppet emperor, Eugenius (a mature man but a rhetorician rather than a general) in open revolt against Theodosius I. Arbogast and Eugenius were defeated at the battle of the River Frigidus in 394; Arbogast fled into the wilderness where he committed suicide.

Nathan Schumer

See also Frigidus, Battle of; Gratian; Magnus Maximus; Succession (Imperial); Theodosius I; Usurpation; Valentinian I

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Valentinian III (Emperor) (425–455 CE)

Born in 419 CE, Valentinian III (425–455) was the son of Galla Placidia, half-sister of the western Roman emperor Honorius, and Constantius III (emperor in 421). After Constantius' death in 421, Galla Placidia and Valentinian fled to Constantinople. Honorius died in 423 and Valentinian's throne was usurped by Johannes. Supporting Valentinian's claim to the

western throne, Theodosius II married Valentinian to his daughter Eudoxia, and the six-year-old Valentinian became emperor in Ravenna in 425.

Valentinian fell under the influence of successive de facto regents, first his mother Galla Placidia, and then a series of commanders-in-chief, culminating in the de facto regency of the *magister utriusquemilitiae* Aetius, known as the “last of the Romans.” Valentinian inherited an empire that was already partitioned by barbarian tribes. He was forced to recognize Vandal rule in Africa and the permanent settlement of Visigoths, Burgundians, Franks, and Alans in Gaul.

By 450, Attila’s powerful army of Huns had turned west, threatening the empire. Aetius convened a massive coalition of barbarians and Romans, who defeated Attila at the battle of Châlons in 451. Gaul was saved, but in 452, Attila moved into Italy. After ravaging northern Italy, Attila and his army turned back because of famine and plague. They spared Rome. Attila’s death in 453 cemented Aetius’ position.

In 454, Valentinian betrothed his daughter to Aetius’ son. Later that year, fearful of Aetius’ growing power, Valentinian and his alleged fellow conspirator Petronius Maximus killed Aetius in a private audience. In March 455, Valentinian was assassinated at the instigation of Petronius Maximus, who seized control of the throne.

Nathan Schumer

See also Aetius; Attila; Fall of the Roman Empire (West); Galla Placidia; Honorius; Huns; Succession (Imperial); Theodosius II; Usurpation; Valentinian II

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Valerian (Emperor) (253–260 CE)

Publius Licinius Valerianus was a senator from an old and distinguished family, born around 193 CE. In 253 CE, he became the emperor Valerian I. His rule marks one of the most disastrous and volatile periods of the third-century crisis. At least five usurpers claimed the throne in various parts of the empire during Valerian's reign. Plague was rampant. The Roman frontiers were under attack from a multitude of enemies, including the Goths in Greece and Asia, the Franks and Alamanni in Gaul, the Saxons on the North Sea, the Persians in Syria, and the Quadi and the Marcomanni in Pannonia. Valerian sent his son and co-emperor Gallienus to take care of the military threats in the western provinces, while he himself went to the eastern frontier, where by 257 CE he had recovered Antioch from the Persians. At this point he faced the Gothic invasion of Asia Minor in 258, then in 259 moved to Edessa to address a renewed Persian attack. Many of his soldiers died of the plague, and in 260, he became the first Roman emperor to become the prisoner of a foreign power when he was captured during negotiations by Shapur I of Persia. According to the Christian writer Lactantius, he was then subjected to humiliations, such as being used as a footstool for Shapur to mount his horse. When he died, we are told that his body was stuffed with straw and mounted in a Persian temple as a trophy. These humiliations may not have actually happened, but Valerian remained a prisoner of the Sassanids for the rest of his life.

Kathryn H. Milne

See also Gallienus; Persian Wars, Sassanid; Third-Century CE Crisis

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Vandals

The Vandals were a Germanic people who played a key role in the

dismemberment of the Roman Empire in the fifth century CE. Originating in southern Scandinavia, the Vandals, who consisted of a group of Germanic tribes, distinctly appear in the historical record of the Mediterranean world in the first century CE. By the second century, the Vandals had migrated to central Europe and settled on the northern border of Dacia, where they became Roman allies. Vandal warriors were primarily cavalrymen equipped with lances, swords, and shields. Some also carried war axes. There is no sign, however, that they used archery in combat.

In 270, bands of Vandals and other barbarians crossed the Danube and invaded Roman Pannonia, where they were badly defeated and surrendered the following year. Although Roman authorities provided provisions for their return journey to the vicinity of Dacia, a band broke away from the main Vandal force and plundered the Roman province of Moesia, where they were again defeated by Rome. Vandal leaders placated the Romans by killing the survivors of this band. Two thousand Vandal cavalrymen subsequently served as auxiliaries with the Roman army. One unit was even deployed to Egypt. In 277, and again in 278, Rome defeated Vandal bands threatening the Rhine frontier. Captured Vandals were enlisted in the Roman army and assigned to Britain, where they served reliably. In the late fourth century when the Huns defeated the Goths, the Vandals were swept up in the resulting flight of barbarian refugees to the west. Although some Vandal tribes forced their way across the Danube into Roman Pannonia in 400, their great opportunity occurred in 406, when Roman forces were fighting the Goths in Italy.

Vandals and other warrior bands took advantage of the opportunity presented by insufficiently manned Roman defenses along the Rhine River and crossed the river near Mainz on New Year's Eve. The invaders subsequently rampaged across Gaul for three years. In 407, a Roman force from Britain crossed the English Channel and rallied the remaining Roman forces in Gaul. They subsequently attacked the Vandals, pushing them to the south. In 409 the Vandals and other barbarians crossed the Pyrenees Mountains into Spain. Twenty years later they crossed the Straits of Gibraltar and swept across Roman North Africa to the city of Carthage and beyond. At sea their ships conducted piratical raids against northern Spain and around the Mediterranean, including the Aegean Sea. In 440, they attacked Sicily, and in 455 they even plundered the city of Rome. In 533, the eastern Roman emperor Justinian launched an invasion of North Africa that

quickly destroyed the Vandal kingdom. Vandal prisoners were then sent to serve on Rome's eastern frontier with Persia.

Glenn E. Helm

See also Africa; Fall of the Roman Empire (West); Goths

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Varian Disaster (9 CE)

In the Varian disaster, one of Rome's worst military defeats, three Roman legions commanded by Publius Quinctilius Varus were ambushed and destroyed by Germans in the Teutoburg Forest near Kalkriese in 9 CE. The disaster halted a policy of Roman imperial expansion dating back to the fourth century BCE, and in particular expansion into Germany, beginning with Caesar's crossing of the Rhine in 55 and 53 BCE and continuing with Augustus' expansion into German territory as far as the Elbe. In preparation for the conquest of Germany, Augustus directed the construction of military bases along the Rhine between 16 and 13 BCE. To pacify the region, the Roman army conducted a series of campaigns east of the Rhine from 11 BCE onward, with mixed success. In 3 BCE a Roman army crossed the Elbe River and constructed an altar honoring Augustus. In 5 CE another Roman force reached the Elbe, where it was met by Roman warships coming upriver from the North Sea.

When Augustus appointed Varus to civil and military command of Germany east of the Rhine in 7 CE, most of the German tribes appeared to have been pacified. Two years later, near the end of a summer campaign in northern Germany, Varus was leading his command of approximately 20,000 Roman soldiers—consisting of the Seventeenth, Eighteenth, and Nineteenth Roman legions, as well as additional cohorts and auxiliary units. Accompanying the Roman force was Arminius, a prince of the Cherusci

tribe as well as a Roman auxiliary veteran, who led a Roman auxiliary force of fellow German tribesmen. Using the experience gained in years of Roman military service, Arminius planned and organized an ambush of Varus' Roman force by approximately 18,000 German warriors. As the Roman column followed a route through the forest between the steep Kalkriese Hill and the Great Bog, located near the modern city of Bramsche, it was tricked into turning onto a narrow path along the base of the Kalkriese Hill. Along the path was a sod wall constructed to aid the ambush.

Marching into the ambush, the Roman column, as often with Roman marching columns, was probably strung out over more than two miles. Cavalry and auxiliary units were likely positioned at the front and rear of the column, with the three Roman legions guarding the baggage wagons in the middle. Roman legionaries typically marched between nine and four abreast, and on the narrow forest track hemmed in between the sod wall and the forest and swamp, the column's width probably narrowed to four or five abreast. Mounted auxiliary troops serving as scouts, but loyal to Arminius, failed to warn of the impending ambush. The battle likely commenced with a massive volley of spears hurled by German warriors located behind the sod wall. The Romans column was thrown into chaos. Dead and wounded Roman soldiers, as well as panicked horses and mules, brought the front of the column to a halt while the rest of the Roman force continued to advance—not realizing the trap. The Germans launched an infantry assault into the disorganized but tightly packed Roman ranks at the front of the column. Thousands of additional German warriors next swarmed against the rest of the Roman force, which lacked sufficient space to deploy for battle. When Varus and other senior officers realized the situation was hopeless they committed suicide rather than face capture and torture at the hands of the Germans.

The bloody struggle raged for three days, leaving 16,000 dead and wounded Romans on the battlefield. The Germans suffered relatively few casualties—only about 500 killed and 1,500 wounded. In the chaos many Roman soldiers seeking to escape the battlefield were pursued and killed, while others drowned in nearby swamps. Approximately 1,500 Romans were captured and enslaved; others were sacrificed to German gods or thrown into nearby marshes. Some fortunate Romans escaped, eventually reaching the sanctuary of Roman positions along the Rhine River. Wounded Roman soldiers found on the battlefield were killed by the victors. The

Germans removed their own dead from the battlefield and took them back to their home villages, where their bodies were burnt on funeral pyres.

At Rome, Augustus was shocked by the disaster. He swiftly dismissed his personal German bodyguards, and reinforced and reorganized Roman defenses along the Rhine. Due to their disgrace, the three lost legions were not replaced. The disaster appears to have conditioned Augustus' directive, in the *breviarium totius imperii*, to Tiberius to not further extend the frontiers of the empire.

In 15 CE Germanicus launched an expedition across the Rhine in retaliation for the Varian disaster, and visited the site of the disaster which was covered with scattered human remains and weapons. After interring many of the Roman dead, Germanicus and his army departed. The Germans then returned to what they considered a sacred site and dug up the bones, scattering them once more. Germanicus pursued and defeated Arminius at the battle of Idistaviso (16 CE).

The site of the battlefield, containing weapons, military equipment, and coins, as well as human and animal remains, was rediscovered in 1987. The Museum und Park Kalkriese, located on the battlefield to the east of the city of Bramsche, contains an exhibit of materials recovered during archaeological excavations.

Glenn E. Helm

See also Augustus; *Breviarium Totius Imperii*; Civil-Military Relations; Disbandment; Frontiers; Germanic Wars; Germanicus; Germans; Idistaviso, Battle of

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Varus, Publius Quinctilius (d. 9 CE)

Despite an otherwise distinguished senatorial career, Publius Quinctilius Varus is most remembered as the Roman commander who lost three legions and his life in Germany in the *clades Variana* or “Varian disaster” of 9 CE, one of Rome’s worst defeats.

Varus was well connected, holding a consulship in 13 BCE with Tiberius (the future emperor), and marrying a daughter of Marcus Vipsanius Agrippa. Subsequently Varus married Claudia Pulchra, a grandniece of the emperor Augustus. He held the post of proconsul of Africa in 7–6 BCE, and later was legate of Syria.

In 9 CE Varus was legate of the Rhine army. According to Cassius Dio, Varus’ imposition of taxes angered the Germans, and Varus was overly complacent that the new province had been pacified and failed to keep his troops together and on guard. His forces were lured into the Teutoburg Forest by news of an uprising, a rumor planted by the Germans Arminius and Flavus, both veteran auxiliary officers who remained loyal to their original people rather than to Rome. The Germans ambushed and destroyed the Roman forces; Varus committed suicide rather than be captured. The site of the Varian disaster is near modern Kalkriese, located by archaeologists who found the remains of Roman military equipment.

Sara E. Phang

See also Arminius; Augustus; Varian Disaster

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Vegetius (Active Late Fourth Century CE)

Publius Flavius Vegetius Renatus was a Roman writer and author of *De Re Militari* (*Concerning Military Affairs*), also termed *Epitoma rei militaris* (*Epitome of Military Affairs*). He probably wrote during the reign of Valens (364–378) and Theodosius I (379–395), but a later date, in the early fifth

century, has been suggested. The contrary argument is that if the sack of Rome (410 CE) had already occurred, Vegetius would have mentioned the empire's military disaster.

Vegetius was probably of high rank; some of the extant manuscripts give him the rank of *comes*, a honorific borne by senior bureaucrats and by senior military officers. He apparently had no practical military experience, ruling out the latter. The *Epitoma rei militaris* draws heavily on former military treatises, possibly going back to Cato the Elder's *De re militari*, now lost, and other lost treatises. It is a highly literary work, with digressions of a rhetorical type familiar in Latin historiography, despite preserving technical detail that historians of the Roman army can still use with caution. The *Epitoma* needs to be used with caution because, though Vegetius may depict practices of the traditional Roman army of the Principate (27 BCE–235 CE), he is steeped in nostalgia for a period which he did not witness himself.

Vegetius' overriding editorial concern is that Roman armies are no longer able to defeat Rome's enemies. In the *Epitoma rei militaris*, Vegetius advocates the rebuilding of Roman military power through traditional practices. Vegetius begins with an analysis of the Roman army of his time, which he concludes lacks discipline in comparison with earlier Roman legions. Vegetius recommends several reforms to restore Roman armies to ancient standards, beginning with recruitment. Recruits, Vegetius argues, should be drawn from the rural population because peasants from birth learn to endure all kinds of weather and are inured to heavy labor. Once conscripted, soldiers should undergo strict discipline and regular training in arms. Specifically, Vegetius argues that soldiers should be required to march in formation a minimum of 20 miles in five hours at regular cadence, and 24 miles in the same time at quick cadence. In addition to the issues of discipline and training, Vegetius argues that the organization of the contemporary Roman army is faulty. The legion, Vegetius argues, were the perfect military machine in which heavy infantry were superior to the cavalry and light-armed troops in combat. This system has declined, according to Vegetius, because losses in legionary units have not been made good by conscription, and Roman volunteers have preferred enlistment in auxiliary units with laxer discipline. The solution, according to Vegetius, is to return to the ancient legionary organization of 10 cohorts supported by ballistae (bolt-throwing machines) drawn on carriages.

Vegetius provides no information about the Roman military organization of his own day, in which the *Notitia Dignitatum*, a roster of civilian and military ranks drawn up around the same time, shows that legions continued to exist but were subordinated to the mobile field force or *comitatenses*, supported by frontier forces or *limitanei*.

Michael D. Blodgett

See also Comitatus; De Rebus Bellicis; Federates; Legion, Organization of; Limitanei; Military Treatises; Recruitment of Army (Later Empire)

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Veii, Siege of (406–396 BCE)

The siege of Veii was a turning point in early Republican Rome's wars with the Etruscans, Rome's neighbors to the north. Though Veii was not closely allied with the other Etruscan cities, it was one of the most powerful. After the capture of Veii, Rome's victory in the Etruscan Wars was inevitable. The siege was commanded by Marcus Furius Camillus, and the town was captured by digging a tunnel under the walls.

Roman tradition on the capture of Veii illustrates the close relationship of Roman religion and warfare. The Romans sought to promote the capture of the city by *evocatio*, a religious ritual persuading Juno Regina, the patron goddess of Veii, to abandon the Etruscan city and come to Rome (Livy 5.22). After the city was captured, its cult statue of Juno Regina in Veii was brought to Rome.

Another tradition linked the siege of Veii with later important economic practices. At the siege, pay (*stipendium*) for Roman troops was instituted for the first time (Livy 4.59–60; Dionysius *Roman History* 14.16.5). The Romans did not yet coin money at this date, so the anecdote is anachronistic.

Camillus also sold the captives of Veii into slavery (Livy 5.22.1). The sale of captive enemy would become a major source of wealth for the Romans.

Sara E. Phang

See also Camillus; Etruscan Wars; Pay and Finances, Military (Republic); Prisoners of War and Slavery

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Velites

The *velites* are probably the best-known example of light infantry in the republican Roman army, although they only appear in the mid-Republic. Polybius (6.22) tells us that they were the youngest and poorest soldiers and were armed with a sword, a small round shield and several javelins. They wore a helmet, usually adorned with some sort of animal skin, so that the individual would be recognizable to his officers, particularly when performing deeds of valor. Their body armor consisted only of a chest protector, a plate or disc worn over the heart, attested in Italic archaeology from the mid-Republic.

Regarding their organization, from Polybius we also know that the *velites* were not divided into maniples, and from this that they were not assigned any centurions or *optiones* either. Rather, he tells us that the *velites* were “divided equally among all the companies” (Polybius 6.24) although this must have been only for administrative purposes since we know that they started the battle as skirmishers, ahead of all the maniples. According to Polybius, there were probably about 1,200 *velites* in a paper-strength manipular legion.

The *velites* probably existed by 255 BCE, the date for the battle of Tunis, where Polybius first mentions them. However, it is nevertheless impossible to determine the exact date of the *velites*’ establishment, particularly because

of the confusion between the Polybian and Livian accounts (Livy 8.8.5–8) of the Roman legion. Another term for the *velites* was the *rorarii*, attested in Livy and antiquarian authors. However, as Oakley has put it “decisive proof in favor of Polybius is wanting, but, given Livy’s unreliability elsewhere, he is clearly to be preferred” (Oakley 1988: 465). The last we hear of the *velites* is during the Jugurthine War, under Metellus, just before the military reforms attributed to Marius. Their role as light-armed troops, used for skirmishing, was replaced by the noncitizen *auxilia*.

Adam Anders

See also Auxilia; Hastati; Legion, Organization of; Maniples; Principes; Triarii; Triplex Acies

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Vengeance

The main Latin terms for vengeance are *ultio* and *vindicatio*, extending from retribution for wrongs or injuries to vengeance in the sense of acting as a champion for another. Romans felt revenge to be part of the natural order, and the principle of *talio* (equivalent retribution) appears early in Roman law. Vengeance was often an explicit motive for Roman conquest and conflict.

Cicero explicitly links vengeance and warfare: “except for the cause of avenging (*ulciscendi*) or of repelling enemies, it is possible to wage no just war” (Cicero, *Republic* 3.35). Indeed, the archaic fetial rituals for declaring war assumed Rome to be seeking retribution or recompense for some grievance. Vengeance is cited as a reason for war when the Romans

intervene for an ally—for example, for Saguntum against Carthage in 218 BCE. Avenging mistreated Roman citizens, above all ambassadors (*legati*), was a fairly frequent *casus belli*, employed in conflicts against Samnites, Gauls, Tarentines, Illyrians, and above all the sack of Corinth in 146 BCE. The destruction of Carthage the same year, prompted by fears of Carthaginian strength, was by the latter first century ideologically justified as revenge on the long-dead Hannibal. The tendency to avenge was well-known enough to use cynically: Polybius tells us that Gnaeus Octavius, ambassador to the Seleucids, was killed in 162 BCE by a certain Leptines, who was handed over to Rome for punishment, but Leptines was kept alive by the Senate to keep open a possible grievance against the Seleucids in case it were needed (Polybius 31.11–12).

Vengeance was not an unproblematic good. In the later Republic and imperial period, it needed to be tempered by clemency, justice, and humanity. Lucius Opimius was criticized for his harsh handling of Gaius Gracchus and his followers as seeking revenge for a private feud, but the distinction between private and public was often one of scale rather than kind. Caesar describes his initial invasion of Gaul in 58 as revenge for the deaths of Lucius Cassius Longinus and Lucius Piso (Caesar's great-grandfather-in-law) in 107, as taking revenge for a private wrong (Caesar, *Gallic Wars* 1.12–13). Sulla was perhaps regarded as the most vengeful of the Romans, taking terrible reprisals upon the followers of Marius. According to Plutarch, his memorial bore the epitaph “No man ever did more good for his friends, or more harm to his enemies” (Plutarch, *Sulla* 38.4). Both Sulla and Caesar were later viewed as avenging their honor and personal wrongs in launching civil wars. The theme of clemency toward one's enemies became even more cogent in the Principate, due to the emperor's autocratic power and the abuses of prosecution of *maiestas* (treason).

Octavian, in the war between the Second Triumvirate and the assassins of Caesar, shows the positive ideological value of military vengeance most clearly—revenge for his adoptive father's murder was his avowed aim and justification. Even after Augustus established his sole rule, the war of revenge was canonized in the temple of Mars Ultor (Mars the Avenger) in his new Forum. The temple became a favored locale for declaring wars and conferring grants of *imperium*. Subsequent emperors continued to present vengeance as a justification for warfare. The Augustan and Tiberian wars

against the Germans and Trajan's Dacian Wars were represented in terms of vengeance for raids; Trajan built another monument dedicated to Mars Ultor, the *Tropaeum Traiani* near Adamklissi, in connection with his conquest of Dacia, and the goddess of retribution, Nemesis, was associated with imperial power as early as Claudius' reign.

There is of course a difficulty in perceiving whether the urge to avenge was a *real* motivation for war or just a pretext, but it is clear that the Romans considered revenge a legitimate cause for war, and presented themselves as acting upon it.

Christopher Malone

See also Augustus; Caesar, Gaius Julius; *Clementia*; Dacian Wars; Gaius Gracchus; Mars Ultor, Temple of; Punic War, Second; Punic War, Third; Sulla, Lucius Cornelius; Trajan; Treason; *Tropaeum Traiani*

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Vercingetorix (Gallic Leader) (d. 46 BCE)

Vercingetorix was an Arvernian noble, son of Celtillus, and leader of the major Gallic revolt against Caesar in 52 BCE. After forcefully expelling Vercingetorix' opposition, his supporters proclaimed him king. He allied with many Gallic tribes and attempted to keep Caesar, who was returning from Rome, from the bulk of his army. He also attacked Caesar's Gallic allies to loosen his coalition. Vercingetorix suffered many initial setbacks and he changed strategies. He cut the Romans off from supplies by evacuating and destroying unprotected Gallic towns and attacked the Roman foraging parties.

At Gergovia, Vercingetorix took the high ridge surrounding the town. Caesar's forces attempted to give the Gauls the impression that they were surrounded but the Romans were overwhelmed and Caesar withdrew from

the greatest defeat he would suffer in Gaul. Vercingetorix then attacked the Romans on the march with their supplies, but was driven back and forced to withdraw to Alesia near the end of 52 BCE. Caesar's army followed and invested Alesia with elaborate circumvallations. At Alesia, Vercingetorix sent out riders to gather allies to attack the Romans, thus attempting to pincer them between two armies before his provisions ran out. However, the attack by Vercingetorix' allies was repelled and with his supplies exhausted, Vercingetorix surrendered. He was executed at the end of Caesar's triumph in 46 BCE.

Robert Vigus

See also Alesia, Siege of; Caesar, Gaius Julius; Gallic Wars; Gaul, Gauls

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Verres, Gaius (ca. 114–43 BCE)

Gaius Verres was a governor of Roman Sicily in 73–71 BCE, who has become notorious to history chiefly through Cicero's *Verrine Orations* (*In Verrem* I and II), one of the most elaborate examples of invective in classical literature and the most famous depiction of Roman corruption.

Little is known of Verres outside the *Verrine Orations*. He was quaestor in 84, a legate in Cilicia, and urban praetor in 74. Cicero claims that as quaestor Verres embezzled and was implicated in Sulla's atrocities, and that in Cilicia Verres extorted money and looted art objects; as urban praetor Verres also took bribes and abused his office. These claims cannot be proven or disproven.

As proconsul of Sicily in 73, Verres allegedly extorted from the

provincials, abusing his role as judge, robbing temples, looting art objects, and molesting the wives of respectable citizens. Verres was authorized to combat piracy in the waters of Sicily, but instead appropriated the funds intended for ships and sailors and even took money from the pirates not to pursue them. A type of pirate himself, Verres exploited the wealth and luxury of Roman Sicily, colonized by the Greeks before Roman rule.

The Senate passed a decree condemning Verres' actions, but Verres succeeded in extending his command. In 70 Cicero prosecuted Verres in the *quaestio de repetundis* (the standing court on corruption) for extortion, delivering the speeches known as *In Verrem* I. His reputation demolished, Verres was now unable to secure support. Before Cicero could deliver *In Verrem* II, Verres fled into exile at Massilia in southern Gaul. However, Cicero made public *In Verrem* II. Little more is known of Verres; he lived in obscurity at Massilia until the Second Triumvirate's proscriptions targeted him in 43 BCE.

The scope of Cicero's invective against Verres is exceeded only by Cicero's *Philippics* against Mark Antony. However, Verres was certainly not the only corrupt Roman magistrate and governor; corruption and extortion were frequent, especially under the chaotic conditions of the late Republic.

Sara E. Phang

See also Bribery and Corruption; Cicero; Cilicia; Piracy; War Crimes

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Veseris, Battle of (340 BCE)

The battle of Veseris decided the Romano-Latin war and resulted in the dissolution of the Latin League. Veseris is near Mount Vesuvius though modern scholars have suggested a more northern location for the battle. The

Roman commanders were consuls Titus Manlius Torquatus and Publius Decius Mus. Torquatus became notorious for executing his son before the battle for disobeying his orders and leaving the battle line to fight a duel with the enemy. Decius Mus became famous for committing *devotio*, vowing his death to the gods in return for victory and plunging suicidally into the thick of the battle.

After Vesperis, the Latin League was dissolved. From this time forward, Rome made individual treaties with allied communities, a “divide and conquer” approach.

As a result of the battle of Vesperis, Roman citizenship was granted to many Latin communities. The inhabitants of Lanuvium, Aricia, Nomentum, Pedum, and Tusculum all were granted the Roman citizenship; so were the inhabitants of Velitrae and Antium, though their governing elites were punished, and Antium surrendered its fleet. To the Campanian communities of Capua, Suessula, and Cumae, which had been allied with the Latins, the Romans granted *civitas sine suffragio*. The extensive grants of Roman citizenship greatly increased Roman manpower.

Sara E. Phang

See also Alliances; *Devotio*; Latin, Latins; Latin Wars; Manlius Torquatus, Titus

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Vespasian (Emperor) (69–79 CE)

Vespasian (Titus Flavius Vespasianus, 69–79 CE) was born on November 9, 9 CE near Reate in Sabine Italy and raised by his paternal grandmother, a woman named Tertulla. Before the reign of Claudius, Vespasian’s senatorial career was unremarkable. He served as legionary tribune in Thrace, as quaestor to the provinces of Crete and Cyrene, as aedile, and as praetor. He

married Flavia Domitilla, a woman of only Latin status, until her father Flavius Liberalis proved her Roman citizenship in a lawsuit.

Under Claudius, Vespasian commanded a legion in Germany and then moved to Britain. He benefited from his friendship with Narcissus, a freedman of Claudius. While he was in Britain, Vespasian was able to subdue two powerful British peoples and numerous other communities. This earned him triumphal decorations, the highest honor accorded to senators in this period; he was also rewarded with two priesthoods. He held a governorship in Roman Africa, where he was unpopular.

The reign of Nero brought forth change for Vespasian as he accompanied the emperor on his tour of Greece in 66 CE. Vespasian did not find the same favor under Nero as he had under Claudius because he often fell asleep during Nero's musical and theatrical performances. Around late 66 CE, Nero appointed Vespasian to subdue the Jewish rebellion in Judaea. Nero allegedly wanted to send away competent potential rivals for the imperial power, though Vespasian's small-town origins made him a low risk.



Aureus of Vespasian (r. 69–79 CE), ca. 74 CE. Vespasian and his son Titus commanded the suppression of the Jewish revolt known as the Jewish War (66–70 CE). Vespasian became emperor as victor of the civil war termed the War of Four Emperors (69 CE). Located in the Yale University Art Gallery, New Haven, Connecticut. (Christopher Gardner/Yale University Art Gallery)

Another reason Vespasian was chosen to subdue the revolt in Judaea was his military ability as a leader and disciplinarian. In two years, 67–68 CE, Vespasian had subdued the rebellion for the most part except for Jerusalem. While in Judaea, Vespasian met a Jewish prisoner named Josephus who declared that Vespasian would become emperor. Vespasian made no move toward seizing imperial rule, although his troops were ready to follow him and he doubtless paid close attention to events in Italy, where Galba, Nero's successor, was assassinated by Otho, who in turn was defeated by the army of Vitellius in April 69. While still in Judaea with his son Titus, Vespasian was declared emperor by the legions at Alexandria on

July 1, 69 CE. The acclamation was probably stage-managed by Tiberius Julius Alexander, the prefect of Egypt. Two days later Vespasian's troops in Judaea followed the lead set by the legions in Alexandria and hailed him as emperor. Vespasian's allies, Licinius Mucianus the governor of Syria, and Antonius Primus in the Balkan provinces, led armies into Italy to fight the Vitellians. Primus defeated the Vitellians at Cremona in October 69 and besieged Rome.

After the downfall of Vitellius in December 69, the Senate declared Vespasian emperor on December 22. The rebellion in Judaea was left for Titus to subdue as Vespasian headed for Rome to quell any remaining disharmony left by the civil wars. Vespasian accomplished this by discharging soldiers loyal to Vitellius and punishing others but, to maintain balance, he did not indulge his own soldiers.

A successful usurper, Vespasian desired legitimacy and the reputation of a traditional emperor, along the lines established by Augustus. He caused a law to be passed, the *lex de imperio Vespasiani*, preserved in fragments, that conferred on him the traditional powers of the emperor. His relationship with his son Titus was very close as Titus was clearly his designated successor and assistant. Vespasian even conferred the praetorian prefecture on Titus. This, however, angered certain senators who disapproved of dynastic rule. Vespasian thus had to deal with certain Stoics and Cynics, led by Helvidius Priscus, by exiling and executing Helvidius. However, there was a more serious plot to overthrow Vespasian but it was discovered and defeated by Titus in 79 near the end of Vespasian's reign.

Vespasian began a restoration program that began in 70 CE with the rebuilding of the Capitoline Temple, destroyed in the capture of Rome in December 69. Other works include a temple of Peace, a temple to the Deified Claudius, and an amphitheater that was begun by Augustus. Vespasian also began construction on the Colosseum. This extensive building required more efficient taxation and exploitation of unoccupied public land. Vespasian became notorious throughout the empire for his imposition of financial austerity, both imperial and senatorial.

Vespasian's small-town origins were never a source of embarrassment for him. In fact, Vespasian was amused by people who corrected his accent or reworked his ancestry. Vespasian was a rough, honest and blunt man whose competence earned respect from most of the senatorial order as there were few internal conflicts during his reign.

In 73 CE, Vespasian became censor with his son Titus. Vespasian conferred honors on highly distinguished Italians and provincials by elevating them to the Senate, refilling its ranks which had thinned because of the civil wars. Through such patronage, he obtained the loyalty and favor of the new senators. Vespasian also gave Latin rights to all of the towns of Spain and founded many provinces throughout his reign. The focus of strategy shifted to securing the frontiers while keeping the number of legions at 28. Wales was completely brought under Roman rule, which advanced as far as Scotland. While in the western empire, the Germanic frontier was enhanced by creating new roads and forts between the Upper Rhine and the Danube.

Vespasian died on June 23, 79 of illness; his alleged last words were “Alas, I’m becoming a god!” He was deified by his son and successor, Titus. Tacitus speaks highly of Vespasian, the man and emperor. His legacy was the Jewish War and the subsequent peace, advertised on his coinage. With his sons, Titus and Domitian, the Flavian dynasty created a legacy of imperial stability.

Javier Lopez

See also Domitian; Jewish War; Nero; Succession (Imperial); Titus; War of Four Emperors

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Veteran Settlement

The settlement of Roman citizens, who might be veterans, in Latin or Roman colonies during the Republic is distinct from the allotment of land to discharged veterans as a specific reward for service, which is a phenomenon of the late Republic, from Marius through the triumvirs, and early empire. It was discontinued by the late first century CE and replaced by cash payments.

In the mid-Republic, Rome planted colonies (*coloniae*) in newly acquired

territory at least partly as a means of holding down such territories. Cicero later called such colonies *propugnacula imperii*, “bulwarks of empire” (Cicero, *On the Agrarian Law* 2.73). These colonies might be Roman citizen colonies, in which the citizens retained their full rights, though the colonies themselves were self-governing and the citizens were not expected to vote at Rome. In Latin colonies, the colonists did not possess Roman citizen rights.

Roman and Latin colonies may have had some military role. Many male settlers may have been veterans, having served for some time in the Roman army. The settlers in colonies in hostile country were probably expected to defend their new cities, many of which had formidable walls. Many of these Roman citizen colonies were located on the Italian coast and termed *coloniae maritimae*. One of their functions may have been to guard the coast. The locations of Latin colonies in the early fourth century BCE suggest that they were probably sited to intimidate the Samnites during the Samnite Wars.

However, Roman and Latin colonies were not military as such. Especially the physical form and institutions of Roman colonies echoed the city of Rome, with forums, senate houses, basilicas, assembly areas, temples, and other amenities; Roman colony charters from other areas of the empire show that they had magistrates and elections like those at Rome, on a smaller scale. These magistrates (typically two *duoviri*) were responsible for internal administration.

These colonies contrast with the mass viritate (per man) assignments of land to reward discharged veterans in the late Republic and early Principate. These were begun by Marius to reward his soldiers recruited from the landless *capite censi*. Marius allied with the populist tribune of the plebs Lucius Appuleius Saturninus to force through a law authorizing land distributions to his veterans in 103 BCE. Due to Saturninus’ violent methods of popular agitation, Marius dissociated from Saturninus but still obtained more land distributions by popular vote in 100.

To reward his followers, Sulla as dictator passed a law that confiscated land from 18 Italian towns and assigned it to his veterans. These individual distributions planted veterans in towns that already existed, allegedly with the purpose of intimidating the townsfolk in regions that had supported Marius. Pompey also attempted to secure land for his veterans, but met opposition until his alliance with Crassus and Caesar, forming the First

Triumvirate. He obtained land for some of his veterans.

Having observed the hostility to land redistribution in Italy, Caesar as dictator created citizen colonies outside Italy, notably Urso in Spain (where a charter inscription has been found), Carthage, and Corinth. He allegedly settled 80,000 veterans, both Caesarian and Pompeian. After Caesar's death, Octavian was able to call up the Caesarian veterans in Italy to serve in his army (since the maximum length of service in the republican army was 16 years, many were still of fighting age).

The Second Triumvirate (Octavian, Antony, and Lepidus) made extensive confiscations from their enemies and rewarded their veterans with confiscated land, allegedly following the Sullan practice of assigning land in areas that were hostile to the triumvirs *pour encourager les autres*.

The settlement of veterans in colonies and on individual land grants peaked in the Augustan period, declining thereafter. As emperor (27 BCE–14 CE), Augustus faced the problem of demobilizing some 60 legions that had accumulated during the civil wars. He reduced their number to 28 legions by dismissing over 3,00,000 men between 31 and 2 BCE. Instead of making confiscations, Augustus bought land with his own fortune, spending 860 million HS for the mass discharges of 31 BCE and 14 BCE, followed by 400 million HS between 7 and 2 BCE (*Res Gestae Divi Augusti* 16, 28). Augustus also created 28 colonies in Italy and many outside Italy, particularly in the eastern Mediterranean.

To regularize pensions for veterans, Augustus created the *aerarium militare* or “military treasury,” capitalizing it with 170 million HS of his own money (*Res Gestae* 17), and funding it permanently with a five percent tax on inheritances and one percent tax on the sale of slaves. By the time of his death in 14 CE, however, the *aerarium* was experiencing a shortfall, the initial fund being exhausted. Augustus and Tiberius adopted the policy of extending legionary service, so that natural mortality would reduce the number of veterans who claimed pensions. However, this extended service was one of the grievances of the legionaries in the Rhine and Danube mutinies (Tacitus, *Annals* 1.17.2). They also complained that their land grants took the form of marginal land (1.17.3).

During the early empire, more Roman citizen colonies with veterans as colonists were founded, such as Timgad in Numidia and Colchester and Lincoln in Roman Britain. In Nero's reign, veterans were deducted to Tarentum and Antium (Tacitus, *Annals* 14.27.2–3). But Tacitus says that the

veterans did not stay there, preferring to return to the locations where they had served. Because of this factor, it became usual for veteran pensions to be commuted to cash grants, and allotments of land were abandoned. The founding of Roman colonies continued, but not for the purposes of veteran settlement.

Sara E. Phang

See also *Aerarium Militare*; Augustus; Caesar, Gaius Julius; Latin Colonies; Marius; Pompey; *Praemia Militiae*; Proscriptions; *Res Gestae Divi Augusti*; Roman Citizen Colonies; Sulla, Lucius Cornelius; Veterans

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Veterans (Status)

During the Republic, legionary veterans were not accorded a special status; recruited from small landowners, when discharged they returned to their farms. The decline in the social and economic status of recruits in the late Republic meant that veterans' benefits became a major issue. Little is known about veterans' special legal status during the Republic; probably it was not different from other Roman citizens.

Imperial Roman soldiers who reached the end of their term of service underwent honorable discharge and became veterans, receiving a substantial financial bonus (the *praemium militiae*) and various legal

privileges, instituted by the emperors in their roles as patrons of the army. These privileges defined veterans' status in imperial Roman society, especially with respect to taxation and criminal penalties. In the Principate, most of these privileges were also accorded to veterans who had been discharged early for medical reasons (*missio causaria*). In the later empire, the greater fiscal and manpower demands of the state meant that veteran privileges were graduated more stringently according to the years that they had served in the army and their records as soldiers. In the middle empire, veterans were a modestly well-off and privileged group. They remained a distinct social group, tending to settle near where they had served, though many merged with local landowners.

The most famous legal privilege for veterans of the Roman army was the right to marry the women with whom they had been cohabiting during service. From the reign of Augustus, serving soldiers were not permitted to contract legal marriages, but documentary sources show that many soldiers cohabited with women whom they regarded as wives. Military diplomas (inscribed bronze tablets) given to praetorian, auxiliary, and fleet veterans state that each veteran is given *conubium* (the right to marry) with the woman with whom he has been living, or any woman whom he takes in marriage afterward, and that the children of this marriage are legitimate and Roman citizens. Hundreds of these diplomas (copies of official documents kept at Rome) have been found. Legionary veterans did not receive diplomas and there is also controversy over whether they received the right of *conubium*; perhaps they were assumed to marry Roman citizen women with whom this would be unnecessary.

Veterans who received *honesta missio*—praetorians after 16 years, legionaries after 20 years (25 years after the late first century CE), auxiliaries after 25 years, fleet soldiers after 26 to 28 years—were granted other legal privileges by the emperors. The emperors thus displayed favor to their soldiers on whom their power depended. The Principate had various forms of taxation, many of which were administered locally at municipal level. Veterans were exempted from most forms of local taxation, including tolls, corvée labor, and poll tax, but not from the fees that they would have to pay if they sought municipal office. The emperors also granted veterans exemptions from other legal obligations, such as guardianship or the assumption of some public offices.

Veterans were also exempted from various exacerbated or degrading

punishments. Criminal law in the Principate stratified into a two-tier system, in which the upper stratum or *honestiores* were exempt from the corporal punishment, hard labor, and exacerbated death penalties to which the *humiliores* (“the more lowly”) were subject. Veterans were among the *honestiores*: they could not be beaten with rods, condemned to hard labor in mines or on roads, or thrown to wild beasts in the arena. Since soldiers in the Roman army were subject to corporal punishment and the death penalty as part of military discipline, their status as veterans markedly improved in this respect.

Veterans who were discharged early from the army for medical reasons (*missio causaria*) might seek reinstatement if they could prove that they were physically fit to serve, attested by at least two physicians and a magistrate. However, there must always have been some soldiers who left the army permanently for medical reasons, whether due to chronic illness or due to permanent disability from combat injuries or occupational accidents. In the Principate, the emperors permitted these veterans with *missio causaria* to enjoy most of the privileges of regular veterans; they received the *praemia militiae* and legal privileges.

In the later empire, from Diocletian and Constantine onward, the state’s increased demands for manpower and fiscal resources meant that tighter controls were placed on veteran privileges. Only those veterans who had served their full term of service (now set at 20 to 24 years) could receive the full complement of privileges. Personnel who had left before completing their full term received lesser privileges on a scale graduated according to length of service. Lesser privileges were also accorded to veterans of the *auxilia* in the Tetrarchic period, and, with the Constantinian reorganization of the army, to veterans of the *limitanei* or border troops. The later Roman army also required the sons of veterans to enter the army in their turn, though this may have been less onerous than it seems because the descendants of veterans had long tended to enter the service voluntarily.

In the Principate, especially from the late first century CE to the early third century, veterans became a modestly well off and privileged social group. Many veterans became local landowners or business owners, though few of them entered careers in municipal politics, which perhaps would require a social and educational background they lacked and which were, in any case, expensive. Veterans tended to settle in the provinces near the frontiers; they preferred not to settle in dedicated veteran colonies, as the

historian Tacitus remarks (*Annals* 14.27). Veterans tended to marry into each other's families. Their sons formed a recruiting pool for low-ranking officers. In this way the Roman army afforded intergenerational social mobility as well as direct social ascent for talented soldiers.

Sara E. Phang

See also Civil Rights; Documentary Sources; Emperor as Patron; Marriage of Soldiers; Military Diplomas; Military Law; *Praemia Militiae*; Veteran Settlement

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Vicesima Hereditatium*. See *Aerarium Militare

Victoria (Goddess)

Victoria was the Roman goddess or personification of Victory, the equivalent of the Greek goddess Nike. Victoria is conventionally depicted as a winged female figure. She appears in Roman triumphal art and coinage, often bearing a wreath or crowning the victorious general or emperor. For instance, on Trajan's Column scene 78, Victoria inscribes a record of Trajan's conquests on a shield.

Other personifications in triumphal art might be female, such as Nox (Night) who appears in a scene (no. 38) on Trajan's Column depicting a nighttime exploit where the Romans ambushed the Dacians. The personifications of conquered regions and peoples were also often female (typically, a woman in native dress), as were representative captives, such as the native women being taken prisoner by Roman soldiers on the Column of Marcus Aurelius. The cultural significance of these symbolic women is

thought-provoking, given that the Romans excluded actual women from military service.

Sara E. Phang

See also Column of Marcus Aurelius; Column of Trajan; Gender and War; Prisoners of War and Slavery; Sebasteion; Triumph; Victory

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Victory

Victory was central to Roman warfare and imperialism, structuring elite values and careers and the public image of the emperors. It was also a value shared by the Roman population, a remarkably high proportion of which served in the army in the last two or three centuries of the Republic.

During the Republic, Roman consuls and praetors (also consular tribunes during the relevant period) were military commanders, as were the prorogued magistrates (*pro consule*, *pro praetore*) usually translated “governors.” They sought victories to further their careers and bring fame (*laus* or *gloria*) to their names and their families. Victory demonstrated a commander’s *virtus* (his courage, prowess, or manliness). If a commander’s victory was significant enough, the Senate might award him a triumph, the height of his career and which ensured him an entry in the triumphal *fasti*, the inscribed lists of triumphant generals and their victories. It is likely that soldiers identified with their generals’ victories; the third-century BCE Latin dramatist Plautus created a play termed *Miles Gloriosus*, or “boastful soldier,” after its chief character.

Victory also brought material benefit to Roman generals, their soldiers, and the public. Successful campaigns brought home plunder, in the form of gold and silver, art objects, other movable goods, and slaves. The sale of the slaves yielded more money. Generals gave donatives, cash gifts, to their soldiers after a victory and at triumphs. The triumphing general was expected to spend lavishly on the triumphal procession and associated festivities. Individual Roman aristocrats made more permanent use of plunder to build first temples and shrines to gods, later public amenities

such as forums. In such public places, statues and historical reliefs reminded viewers of the victories that had enabled their creation. With the resources of an empire at their disposal, the Roman emperors expanded this conversion of victory into architecture and memorial art. The Forum of Augustus, the Temple of Mars Ultor, the Arch of Titus, the Forum of Trajan and Trajan's Column, and the Column of Marcus Aurelius are the best known of these monuments. The proceeds of victorious warfare were also redistributed on games (chariot races, gladiatorial, and beast shows), baths, and free rations for the poor.

Though victory over foreign enemies was an indisputable good, the right of individual commanders to celebrate their victories with triumphs was hotly contested during the classical Republic. The Roman nobility was jealous and competitive; at this time, individual senators were not encouraged to aggrandize themselves over their peers. The Senate could evaluate an individual general's victory and grant or deny him a triumph, based on the enemy body count and other criteria.

In the late Republic and in the empire, victory in civil war was regarded with greater ambivalence. At best, the victor was praised for restoring peace and justice, for typical civil war propaganda depicted his rivals as cruel and unjust. If the victor could display clemency toward his defeated rivals, so much the better. It was preferable for the victor to begin an aggressive external campaign that would bring victory over external enemies. In his last year, Caesar is said to have planned a campaign against Persia, but he was assassinated before he could begin. Augustus followed up his victory over Mark Antony with the conquest of Illyricum and parts of Germany.

The emperors emphasized their role as victors. They might not campaign in person, but nonetheless their public images often presented them as warriors, wearing military dress or personally subjugating barbarians. A common coin motif depicts the emperor standing with one foot on the head of a barbarian. Imperial victories were advertised through imperial titles such as Germanicus (Conqueror of Germany), Britannicus (Conqueror of Britain, adopted by Claudius I, Septimius Severus, and Caracalla) and Parthicus (Conqueror of Persia). The title *Parthicus* was an exaggeration, as the boundary between the two empires fluctuated but Rome could never be said to have "conquered" the Persian Empire. Nonetheless, the importance of victory required that Roman generals and emperors attempt to defeat Persia to erase previous humiliating defeats (the defeat of Marcus Crassus at

Carrhae, 53 BCE; the defeat and capture of the emperor Valerian, 260 CE). In the third century CE and later, imperial titles expanded to add *maximus* (greatest) as in Parthicus Maximus, and even *invictus* (unconquerable).

As this description shows, the quest for victory motivated many republican generals' and emperors' strategic planning, often regardless of cost/benefit analysis. By the early first century CE, the material benefits of further conquests were doubtful. The conquest of the wealthy Hellenistic eastern Mediterranean had brought untold riches, and even the conquest of relatively primitive Gaul had brought great wealth (not least from the sale of slaves; Caesar's wars were said to have killed one million Gauls and taken one million captive). The conquest of Germany or Britain seemed less profitable. Trajan's conquest of Dacia luckily brought with it the gold of Dacia, both King Decebalus' treasure and the mines in the Carpathian Mountains. The conquest of Judaea also brought great wealth for Rome. Nevertheless, emperors and their generals continued to pursue victory, an ideology that grew more important in the late second century CE onward as the external threats to the Roman Empire grew.

Sara E. Phang

See also Arch of Titus; Augustus; Caesar, Gaius Julius; Caracalla; Column of Trajan; Dacia, Dacians; Dacian Wars; Donatives; Forum of Augustus; Gallic Wars; Imperial Titles; Mars Ultor, Temple of; Persian Wars, Arsacid; Plunder; Triumph

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Vigiles

The *vigiles* were Rome's fire brigade, recruited at least originally from freedmen and charged with preventing the spread of fires in the crowded megalopolis of imperial Rome. Before Augustus' reign, Rome had no permanent fire brigade. Fire was common in the city, especially in *insulae*, multiple-storied apartment blocks. Notoriously, Crassus (a member of the First Triumvirate) maintained a private fire-fighting force of 500 slaves. When a building was threatened by fire, he offered to buy it from the owners; only if the owner accepted would Crassus allow his fire brigade to suppress the fire by destroying the building (Plutarch, *Crassus* 2). Marcus Egnatius Rufus, aedile for 21 BCE, gained more popularity by organizing a fire brigade from his own slaves (Dio 53.24). Disapproving of Rufus' popularity, Augustus then provided the aediles (the magistrates responsible for public amenities and order) 600 slaves to fight fires (Dio 54.2).

In 6 CE Augustus organized a fire brigade of freedmen on a permanent basis. Their organization is associated with Augustus' partition of the city of Rome into 14 *regiones* and 265 wards in 7 BCE, making the magistrates of each ward (usually freedmen) responsible for firefighting. The *vigiles* were 7,000 men strong, organized in cohorts of 1,000 men. Each cohort was responsible for two *regiones*. The commander of the *vigiles*, the *praefectus vigilum*, was an equestrian. He also had jurisdiction in minor criminal cases, so it is thought that the *vigiles* also served as a police force, though this is uncertain. The *vigiles* may not always have been recruited from freedmen after the early empire.

The tactics of firefighting in imperial Rome relied on demolishing buildings to make fire breaks and prevent the spread of fire, though the *vigiles* also used bucket brigades and a rudimentary water-pumping engine. Despite the efforts of the *vigiles*, the Great Fire of 64 CE in the reign of Nero burned a large part of the city.

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See also Aedile; Augustus; Crassus; Divisions of the Army (Imperial); Public Order; Rome (City); Urban Cohorts

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Vindolanda

The Roman military fort at Vindolanda was established in ca. 85 CE and occupied into at least the fifth century CE. It was originally part of the military consolidation of northern Britain along the Tyne-Solway isthmus after Agricola's campaigns to the north. Vindolanda was part of the earliest frontier here, a fortified road between modern Corbridge and Carlisle with forts monitoring activity in the area. The first fort at Vindolanda was a timber construction for a quingenary (500-man) auxiliary unit of Tungrian troops raised in northern Gaul. The site has four periods of pre-Hadrianic occupation, all of which were forts of varying sizes built in timber. The Period 4 fort, ca. 105–120 CE and leading up to the construction of Hadrian's Wall, was a very substantial oak construction, and some evidence points toward the occupation of more than one unit at this time, perhaps part of preparation for the massive construction to the north.



Wooden writing tablets from Vindolanda (ca. 100 CE). This particular document

depicts the Britons as "nude" (unarmored) horsemen, fighting without swords, and as "nasty little Britons" (*Brittunculi*). This description of the enemy may have been a Roman intelligence report. *Tab. Vind.* II 164, early second century CE, located in the British Museum, London, United Kingdom. (The Trustees of the British Museum/Art Resource, NY)

An inscription found at Vindolanda for Titus Annius who died in combat is one piece of evidence that may show the volatility in the area leading up to the construction of Hadrian's Wall. Vindolanda remained in use throughout the shifting occupation of the area in the mid-second century, at which point the first of three stone forts was constructed. The site played a part in the movements of Septimius Severus to the north into Scotland in the early third century, with an unusually small fort equipped primarily with barracks and workshops, and an extensive ditch suggesting heightened defense at this time. The last fort was built in 213 CE and remained occupied with additions and alterations to the end of Roman Britain and later. One of the most notable finds at Vindolanda is extensive letters and documents written on thin wood tablets, preserved in bog-like conditions.

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See also Britain, Conquest of; Britain, Roman; Bureaucracy (Roman Military); Documentary Sources; Hadrian's Wall

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Virgil (70–19 BCE)

Publius Virgilius Marois the author of the *Eclogues*, the *Georgics*, and the *Aeneid*, the latter of which became the national epic almost immediately upon publication, for which Virgil is thought by many to be the greatest Roman poet.

Virgil (or Vergil) was born near Mantua in the suburbs of Andes on October 15, 70 BCE. Our knowledge of Virgil's life comes from the commentators Donatus and Servius and a brief biography by Suetonius, whose lost sources including Varius Rufus. Mantua escaped the earlier ravages of civil war during Virgil's early upbringing. Quintilius Varus Cremonensis sponsored his education in Cremona—Greek and possibly some knowledge of Etruscan. The influence of Lucretius' Epicureanism with the desire to escape from the anxiety and danger of war and politics in favor of tranquility and peace of mind permeates much of Virgil's work. As an adult, Virgil benefited from the patronage of Asinius Pollio, a general of Caesar and patron of the arts, but was later lured away by Maecenas, when Virgil's literary talent became widely known from lesser works.

Virgil's *Eclogues* ("Chosen Poems," also called the *Bucolics*) serve as a Roman version of Theocritus' *Idylls*. The *Eclogues* react to the chaos and violence of the Roman world in the 40s BCE by praising and preferring a life removed from the dangerous, urban world of power politics in favor of a rustic world of agriculture, ranching, and simple pleasures. The most famous of them, the *Fourth Eclogue*, predicts a great leader to be born ca. 39 BCE who will bring peace and justice to the world. Many scholars believe that Virgil was predicting a yet-unborn son of Mark Antony and Octavia, but they had two daughters.

The *Georgics* ("On Farming") also praise the rural life (Virgil's *dolce vita*), following the style of the archaic Greek poet, Hesiod. Like the *Works and Days*, the *Georgics* serves as a farmer's almanac and tells how to cultivate bees. After the publication of the *Georgics*, Augustus encouraged Virgil to write an epic about Rome, Horace having declined the project.

The original opening of the *Aeneid* well illustrates Virgil's complete *volte-face* from the poetry of the rural Italy to the theme of war, civil war, and empire. With this poetic transformation Virgil revived epic in a distinctly new Roman style, far beyond what Lucretius had done with allusions, interplay, adaptations, sequels, and corrections to the Homeric epic cycle. Furthermore, although the *Aeneid* occurs in the remote mythological past of over 1,000 years earlier, it frequently alludes to historical events from the lifetime of the audience and to mythology outside the Aeneas theme (Daedalus carving the doors of the Sibyl, for example). The *Aeneid* is justifiably the masterpiece of Roman literature because it invokes themes and events that reverberated with the Romans for

generation after generation, long beyond Virgil's lifetime, such as survival, self-sacrifice, utilitarianism, tyranny, and justice run awry. Although the *Aeneid's* chief theme is the glorious founding of the Roman people after the Fall of Troy, Virgil repeatedly details the hardships of the Trojan refugees, striving to reach their new home through numerous privations and dangers. Virgil addresses formerly one-sided themes such as betrayal, treachery, the conflict of duty and desire, and false hope, even arousing sympathy for the defeated or wrongdoers. Virgil emphasizes the destructive nature of war, no matter how justified. Virgil drew from personal experience, for his family farm had been confiscated and handed to a veteran of the civil wars. Eventually, through the intervention of Maecenas (or possibly Asinius Pollio), the farm was returned, but after this experience, Virgil shunned a military or political career.

To complete his research, Virgil returned to Greece in 20 BCE, subsequently joining Augustus on the latter's return from the eastern empire. On the voyage home, Virgil fell ill and upon landing in Italy, died on September 21, 19 BCE in Brundisium. His famous epitaph read "Mantua gave birth to me, the Calabrians took me, now Naples holds me. I sang of pastures, the countryside, and commanders." The so-called Tomb of Virgil has been discovered in the Parco di Virgilio in Piedigrotta, near the Mergellina harbor of old Naples in the direction of Pozzuoli.

In the Middle Ages, Christians believed that Virgil was divinely inspired to prophesy of the birth of Christ. They considered Virgil a pagan sage and the foremost Roman poet. Virgil's elevated status and the events in *Aeneid* 6 made him the logical choice for Dante to guide the poet through the Inferno and into Purgatory in *The Divine Comedy*.

Gaius Stern

See also Augustus; Civil Wars (II) (44–31 BCE); *Princeps*, Principate; Succession (Imperial)

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Viriathus (d. 139 BCE)

Viriathus (also spelled Viriatus) was a notable opponent of the Romans during the 140s BCE, when he led the Lusitanians and other tribes in the Iberian peninsula (*Hispania*, today Spain and Portugal, where he is considered a national hero). He survived a treacherous Roman massacre of his people in 150 BCE, and went on to use guerrilla tactics to defeat a number of Roman generals. The Senate and people of Rome ratified a peace treaty with him in 141–140, but ficklely reopened hostilities the next year. The Roman commander Gnaeus Servilius Caepio then finally eliminated Viriathus not by arms but by treachery, bribing insiders to assassinate him in 139 BCE. By this point Viriathus had helped stir up the Celtiberian tribes, who would keep their Roman opponents occupied for most of the decade as the main bulwark against Roman expansion.

Viriathus' career highlights Rome's dark record in their lengthy, difficult conquest of Hispania. His appearance in a diverse array of sources shows the deep impact he had on Roman memory. Historians Velleius Paterculus (2.1) and Cassius Dio (22.73) saw him as the quintessential bandit-king; despite his mean origins, they admired his robust physical bravery and mental acuity. Frontinus mined Viriathus' maneuvers to teach his readers stratagems (*Stratagems* 2.5.7, 13.4, 3.10.6, 11.4). Cicero mused on the philosophical meaning of Viriathus' relative success (*On Duties* 2.40), as did Ammianus Marcellinus (14.11.33) over 500 years after the death of this memorable Roman enemy.

Christopher J. Fuhrmann

See also Celtiberians; Spanish Wars

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Virtus, or “manliness/courage,” was an important value in Roman military culture. It derives from the Latin *vir*, “man” or “male,” so that *virtus* in its oldest sense signifies “manliness.” In the traditional Republic, *virtus* also signified courage or prowess in battle. A Roman soldier showed great *virtus* if he fought the enemy boldly and killed many of them, risking his own life, or if he also risked his own life to save fellow citizens in combat. Roman aristocrats were expected to fight in combat in the early Republic (509–264 BCE) and middle Republic (264–146). Many of them died in the Republic’s bloodiest wars such as the Second Punic War (218–201 BCE). Displaying *virtus* in combat, rather than unconditional military success, brought Roman aristocrats prestige, fame, and elections in the race for office. *Virtus* was also rewarded in ordinary soldiers, who received military decorations for brave exploits.

However, modern scholars have devoted more attention to shifts in the semantic and cultural meaning of *virtus* in the last two centuries of the Republic. Its parallel Greek term, *arete*, originally denoted the excellence of the victor in battle or in athletic contests, but came to connote any form of excellence. Similarly, *virtus* may have expanded in scope to mean any excellence or “virtue,” especially in the plural, *virtutes*. This shift occurred in the late Republic as Latin literature developed and became more sophisticated, incorporating Greek philosophical concepts and technical disciplines (McDonnell 2006).

It is possible that with this expansion of *virtus* into other activities, the Roman elite became less focused on military participation as the route to manliness. Cicero allegedly boasted, “Let arms yield to the toga” of the orator (Cicero, *On Duties* 1.77). However, this passage is often taken out of context; as governor of Cilicia, Cicero also boasted of his siege of Pindenissum and sought a triumph from the Senate. The civil warfare of the late Republic also left bitter memories. Many civil war leaders and followers had displayed great military *virtus* (in the sense of courage or prowess) in the process of destroying the Republic, a far from virtuous goal. In the *Conspiracy of Catiline*, the late first-century BCE historian Sallust emphasizes the martial *virtus* and courage of Catiline, who attempted to overthrow the state. The mid-first-century CE poet Lucan in his *Pharsalia*, an epic poem on the civil war of Caesar and Pompey, emphasizes a similar paradox.

Though he had risen to power through conquest, Augustus chose to stress moral *virtus*. The *clipeus virtutis* or “Shield of Virtue” of Augustus depicted four moral virtues that spoke more of his aspirations and public image as emperor than of his role as a conqueror. Furthermore Augustus imposed at least a partial demilitarization on the senatorial order. Young senatorial aristocrats served as laticlavian tribunes, but the number of senators who pursued significant long-term military careers is small. Equestrian officers, lower in status than senators, were more likely to display military *virtus*.

The senatorial historian Tacitus disapproves of this demilitarization. However, Tacitus did not endorse its alternative, civil warfare and usurpation. He also depicts *virtus* in civilian resistance to unjust emperors, in which some Roman aristocrats were sentenced to political suicide and displayed great courage in taking their own lives.

In a military context, the technical sense of *virtus* as prowess in combat was not abandoned. During the Principate’s intervals of peace, *virtus* may have undergone expansion to refer to the efforts of the emperor as commander, toiling besides his soldiers, or the muscular power (in Latin *vis*, plural *vires*) of soldiers erecting fortifications. When the crisis of the empire arrived in the mid-third century, imperial coins advertised the *virtus Illyrici* or prowess of the Illyrian armies who reconquered the empire.

Sara E Phang

See also Augustus; Cicero; Elite Participation; Gender and War; Military Decorations; Suicide; Tacitus; Victory

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Visigoths. See Alaric; Goths

Vitellius (Emperor) (69 CE)

Born in 15 CE, Aulus Vitellius, governor of Lower Germany in 68, was acclaimed emperor by his troops and by the legions of Upper Germany on January 2–3, 69. He was emperor for less than a year. His legates, Aulus Caecina and Fabius Valens, advanced into north Italy and defeated the army of Marcus Salvius Otho in the First Battle of Bedriacum on April 14, 69. Otho committed suicide shortly thereafter, leaving Vitellius as emperor in Italy. Vitellius was then faced with the revolt of Vespasian in the eastern empire in July 69. He made some preparations to resist the Flavian army, but overall was an ineffectual leader. His army was defeated in the Second Battle of Bedriacum (October 69) near Cremona. The Flavians advanced on Rome; Flavian supporters within the city of Rome occupied the Capitol and fought the Vitellians within the city. As the main Flavian army neared Rome, on December 20, Vitellius attempted flight and was lynched by the Roman *plebs urbana*.

Aulus Vitellius was notable mainly for his father, Lucius Vitellius, who had courted and retained the favor of Tiberius, Gaius, and Claudius. On the strength of this distinguished ancestry, Aulus Vitellius held a consulship in 48, then governorship of Africa. As governor of Lower Germany in 68, Vitellius was open-handed and generous, bestowing favors on many, and thus contrasted favorably with the parsimonious, harsh Galba. The soldiers of Upper Germany stoned Galba's images at the annual oath to the emperor on New Year's Day, and both Upper and Lower Germany acclaimed Vitellius as emperor seemingly spontaneously, though Tacitus depicts Aulus Caecina and Fabius Valens as exerting influence.

Vitellius' legates Aulus Caecina and Fabius Valens were energetic, unscrupulous leaders. They advanced rapidly through Gaul and northern Italy, failing to maintain order in their armies (legionaries quarreled with auxiliaries), and plundering the countryside and several local communities. This may not have been merely anti-Vitellian propaganda, as Tacitus depicts the Flavian army led by Antonius Primus, Vespasian's general, as behaving similarly.

Caecina and Valens entered Italy by different routes, but joined up near

Cremona and decisively defeated the Othonians in the First Battle of Bedriacum on April 14. Otho committed suicide at dawn on April 16, leaving Vitellius emperor. Vitellius was accepted by the Roman Senate and people. The Vitellian soldiers were lodged in private houses in Rome and their riotous behavior alienated the city residents.

In the pro-Flavian sources, Vitellius has the reputation of a glutton and a spendthrift, squandering 900 million sesterces on banquets during the year of his reign (Tacitus, *Histories* 2.95). Beneath the invective, Vitellius appears to have adopted the rule of a lavish patron and perpetual *triumphator*, progressing through Italy in the manner of a victor. In conventional Roman ideology, a general should not indulge in triumphal celebrations before he wins a decisive victory. As patron to his soldiers, Vitellius granted generous leave and reinstated personnel who had been demoted in rank; he failed to restrain the soldiers' disorder, drunkenness, and violence. This representation of Vitellius is colored by Flavian propaganda, especially since Vespasian as emperor emphasized parsimony, restored military discipline, and sought to restore the finances of the empire. Nonetheless, the invective emphasizes Vitellius' failure as a leader, retreating into a drunken stupor rather than lead his civil war against the Flavians.

Vespasian revolted from Vitellius in July of 69. He remained at Alexandria to blockade grain shipments to Rome, while his supporter, Licinius Mucianus, the governor of Syria, marched his legions eastward through the Danubian provinces. Antonius Primus, legate of Legio VII Gemina, supported Vespasian and was able to invade Italy first, leading the Danubian legions, and fought and defeated the Vitellians in the Second Battle of Bedriacum (October 69), near Cremona. After their victory, the Flavian army sacked Cremona, enslaving, raping, and killing the civilian inhabitants. Aulus Caecina's troops surrendered to Antonius Primus, diminishing the forces available to Vitellius.

Vitellius prepared for the defense of Rome by blockading the descent from the Apennine passes, but his forces were further diminished by his brother Lucius Vitellius' suppression of the Misene fleet's mutiny. Vitellius attempted to abdicate, but was prevented by his praetorians and the crowd in Rome. Flavian supporters, led by Vespasian's brother Flavius Sabinus, then city prefect, occupied the Capitoline Hill. They were besieged by the Vitellians in Rome; the Capitoline Temple of Jupiter was destroyed by fire. Vitellians and Flavians fought throughout the city. On December 20,

Vitellius, despite his attempts to hide and escape, was discovered by the Roman mob, publicly humiliated, and killed. He left a six-year-old son, allegedly assassinated by Licinius Mucianus. Mucianus entered the city shortly after Vitellius' death and established order. Vespasian himself did not reach Rome until later in 70.

The sources for the life of Vitellius are Tacitus' *Histories*, Suetonius' *Vitellius*, and Cassius Dio's *Roman History*. Suetonius emphasizes Vitellius' vulgarity and cruelty. Tacitus presents a more nuanced characterization of an essentially passive man whose genial temperament was insufficient to make him an effective leader; he was unable to restrain his officers or troops and thus was passively responsible for much of the destructiveness of the civil war.

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See also Donatives; Emperor as Commander; Emperor as Patron; Galba; Otho; Licinius Mucianus; Praetorians; Suetonius; Tacitus; Vespasian; War of Four Emperors

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W

War Crimes

The modern definition of war crimes is based on international law and upheld by international nongovernmental organizations such as the United Nations. No such organizations existed in classical antiquity, and common law, *ius gentium*, was ill-defined and accepted the enslavement of captives, a practice of many peoples in the classical world. The Romans perpetrated many actions that today would be considered genocidal, killing, and enslaving conquered peoples on a large scale. Nonetheless, the Romans did develop a concept of war crimes, focused on the breaking of treaties, mistreating citizens and allies, military incompetence and cowardice, aiding the enemy, and fighting without authorization. The prosecution of such crimes was sporadic and depended on individual initiative. In the Republic, prosecution of a commander for “war crimes” was frequently a tactic of political rivals. The Senate might also prosecute the unauthorized actions of commanders. In the empire, the emperor monitored the actions of his commanders, and “war crimes” were most likely to arise in civil war or against barbarians.

In the traditional Republic, a Roman magistrate (consul, praetor, or promagistrate) originally had unrestricted *imperium militiae* and could take whatever actions he saw fit as a military commander. Nonetheless, his *imperium* was restrained by the Roman concept of *fides* (loyalty, good faith). When enemy communities formally surrendered (*editio in fidem*), they entered Roman *fides*, establishing mutual obligations: the Romans would provide protection to their new allies or subjects, who owed loyalty in return. A Roman commander could be prosecuted for violating this treaty-relationship and killing or enslaving the surrendered community. In

189 BCE the Rhodians appealed to Cato the Elder as their patron, and Cato advocated against the abuse of allies (Livy 37.54.15–17; compare Polybius 21.23.4–9). As governor of Gaul, Lucius Quinctius Flamininus beheaded a prisoner (in some accounts a hostage) at his banquet table to gratify a prostitute. As censor in 184 BCE, Cato expelled Lucius from the Senate (Seneca, *Controversiae* 9.2.25; Livy 39.42.5–43.1; Plutarch, *Cato Maior* 17, *Flamininus* 18.7–19.4).

In 173 BCE Marcus Popilius Laenas accepted the *deditio in fidem* of the Statellati, a Ligurian people (in the modern Italian Riviera). He then destroyed their towns and sold 10,000 Ligurians as slaves. The Senate condemned his cruelty and freed the Ligurians (Livy 42.8.1–9.6, 21–22). In the Third Macedonian War, Roman commanders inflicted similar abuses on the Greeks ([Livy] *Periochae* 43.4.8–11, 7.10–8.1). Greek communities complained, and the commanders were prosecuted. In the Spanish Wars in the 150s BCE, Servius Sulpicius Galba, praetor in 149 BCE, accepted the *deditio* of the Lusitanians and then enslaved or killed 30,000 Lusitanians (Livy 43.21.1–12; [Livy] *Periochae* 49; Appian, *Spanish Wars* 60; Suetonius, *Galba* 3.2).

However, the Romans also severely punished breaches of *fides* by allies or subjects. The Romans punished the Campanian Revolt harshly (214–211 BCE). After the battle of Pydna (168 BCE), Aemilius Paullus sacked 70 cities in Epirus and allegedly enslaved 150,000 Epirotes for supporting Perseus in the Third Macedonian War. In the Social War (91–87 BCE), Sulla targeted the Samnites for supporting the Marian cause, massacring 8,000 Samnites after the battle of the Colline Gate and killing more at Praeneste and Antemnae ([Livy] *Periochae* 88; Plutarch, *Sulla* 29–30; Appian, *Civil Wars* 1.93–95, 4.28–29).

A commander might also be tried for cruel treatment of fellow Romans, as was Quintus Pleminius, the Roman commander who occupied Locri in southern Italy during the Second Punic War (205 BCE). Pleminius' troops sacked Locri brutally. His military tribunes attempted to check them, and Pleminius' soldiers mutinied against the tribunes. Pleminius had the tribunes arrested and flogged. The tribunes' men attacked Pleminius and cut off his ears and nose. Scipio Africanus arrived and restored Pleminius' command, ordering the tribunes to be sent to Rome for trial. As soon as Scipio left, Pleminius seized the tribunes and tortured them to death. At the urging of Locrian envoys, the Senate sent a 10-man commission to Locri to

investigate both Scipio (Pleminius' superior) and Pleminius. Scipio exonerated himself. Pleminius ran away (accounts differ slightly) and was caught, imprisoned at Rome, and died in prison (Livy 29.7–9, 16–22; Diodorus Siculus 27.4).

However, severe military discipline was not usually regarded as criminal, depending on the cause and the credibility of the commander who inflicted it. A commander would be regarded as at fault who pursued a personal vendetta or who exceeded standards of punishment for free Romans, as did Pleminius.

A commander could be prosecuted for military incompetence (losing an engagement). In the First Punic War, Publius Claudius Pulcher was prosecuted for losing the Roman fleet at Drepana and also with impiety for drowning the sacred chickens. The Romans sought favorable omens before battle by offering grain to sacred chickens and observing how eagerly they fed. The chickens in this instance refused to eat and Pulcher became angry and threw them into the sea, saying "If they will not eat, then let them drink!" (Cicero, *De natural deorum* 2.7) Fulvius Flaccus was prosecuted in the assembly after his disgraceful defeat in the Second Punic War (Livy 26.1–3). He fled into exile before the verdict was given. The defeat of Arausio (105 BCE) motivated the tribune of the plebs Gaius Appuleius Saturninus to prosecute the consuls of 106 and 105, Quintus Servilius Caepio and Gaius Mallius Maximus, for military incompetence. The consul Mallius was immune from prosecution, but Caepio was convicted and exiled ([Livy] *Periochae* 67; Cicero, *Rhetorica ad Herennium* 124).

A commander could be prosecuted for cowardice. Gaius Plautus, governor of Spain in 146 BCE, lost four legions but survived the defeat by running away; he was prosecuted by the Senate (Appian, *Spanish Wars* 64; [Livy] *Periochae* 52). Gaius Popilius Laenas was prosecuted in 106 BCE for surrendering to the enemy (Cicero, *De inventione* 2.72–3, *Laws* 3.30, *Rhetorica ad Herennium* 1.25, 4.34). In the Spanish Wars, Gaius Hostilius Mancinus surrendered his army to the Numantines and made a treaty with them which the Senate rejected, trying Mancinus and giving him up to the Numantines (Appian, *Spanish Wars* 80; [Livy] *Periochae* 55).

Since the Senate authorized the *provinciae* of magistrates, restricting the *imperium* of promagistrates to these regions, a commander or governor who exceeded the boundaries of his *provincia* (for example, making war beyond its borders) also committed a war crime, ratified by a law of Sulla the

dictator, the *lex Cornelia de maiestate*. Aulus Gabinius was prosecuted for invading Egypt and restoring the Ptolemaic king to his throne without Senate authorization; because Ptolemy rewarded Gabinius with 10,000 talents, Gabinius was prosecuted for extortion and forced to surrender the money (Dio 39.55.5–6). The Senate prosecuted Marius Primus, governor of Macedonia, for making war without its authorization (Dio 54.3.3).

Commanders might be accused of treason for aiding the enemy. The emperor Tiberius accused Vibius Serenus and Gaius Silius, legate of Upper Germany, of abetting the revolt of Sacrovir in Gaul (24 CE) (Tacitus, *Annals* 4.13, 18–20; Dio 57.24.8). In the Principate, commanders and governors might be prosecuted for sedition against the emperor or his family; the most famous case is that of Gnaeus Calpurnius Piso in 20 CE, accused of murdering Germanicus, Tiberius' putative heir, and of attempted revolt (*SC de Cn. Pisone patre*; Tacitus, *Annals* 2.55). "Civilian" treason cases are not discussed here.

The most frequently prosecuted "war crime" was extortion of money, goods, or services from provincials. This began to be criminalized in the period of Rome's wars with the Hellenistic world; formerly, looting and plundering had been accepted, and extortion was more common in active war when troops needed to be raised, supplied, and paid on the spot. In the Second Punic War, Marcus Claudius Marcellus' sack of Syracuse was criticized. In 187–184, the Scipios (Africanus and his brother Lucius) were prosecuted for alleged embezzlement of monies during the war with Antiochus III. As in many of these cases the trial was political in nature, instigated by the rivals of the Scipios.

Extortion trials are attested in the 170s, when a board of senatorial *recuperatores* was established. The *Lex Calpurnia de repetundis* established a *quaestio de repetundis* or standing criminal court on extortion in 149 BCE. The ambit of the *quaestio de repetundis* was revised and extended by many subsequent laws to include other abuses that were not strictly pecuniary, overlapping with the development of a law on *maiestas* (treason). Extortion and other war crimes might be construed as "diminishing the majesty (*maiestas minuta*) of the Roman people." As the *provinciae* of Roman commanders developed into geographically bounded regions to be governed rather than conquered, extortion became more unacceptable and was discouraged as a cause of revolt. The *Lex Calpurnia de repetundis* did not specify positive rules, but subsequent more specific laws pertaining to

individual provinces, such as the *lex de provinciis praetoriis*, pertaining to Asia and Macedonia, did so.

Civil war brought new scope for “war crimes” (see “proscriptions”), justifying the conflict. In his account of the civil war, Caesar emphasizes the cruelty of Pompeian commanders toward their soldiers, such as Marcus Petreius who punished the fraternization of his men with the Caesarians in Spain after the battle of Ilerda, or Marcus Calpurnius Bibulus who captured Caesarian transport ships that were crossing the Adriatic and burned the ships together with their crews (Caesar, *Civil War* 3.16.3). Most of the accounts of “war crimes” in the imperial era are during civil wars (see “War of Four Emperors”). Outside civil war, the emperors determined the scope of senatorial commanders’ military actions and also monitored abuses by governors and their subordinates.

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See also Bribery and Corruption; Civil-Military Relations; Criminal Procedure; *Deditio* (Surrender); Military Discipline; *Provincia*; Revolt; Treason

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War Dead

The burial or other disposal of the war dead (Romans and enemies) is sharply differentiated between foreign wars and civil war or violent civil conflict. In foreign wars, the Roman war dead probably received cremation

or burial at the battlefield, but individual families were allowed to take home the ashes for funerary rites. Victory monuments tended to celebrate victory rather than focus on the war dead. In contrast, in civil war and other violent civil conflicts, the victims went unburied and were even desecrated.

Greek tradition emphasized providing rites for the dead after battle. Homer depicts the combatants pausing during the Trojan War to recover their dead and give them funerary rites. In contrast, the Roman disposal of their war dead after battle is surprisingly poorly attested; Roman casualties were often relatively low, and Roman memorialization of war tended to focus on victory (below). However, Roman culture honored the individual dead, whose families revered them as the *Di Manes*, deified spirits. Hence it is likely that after the burning of the Roman dead, as was the custom in the Republic and early empire, families were allowed to take home family members' ashes, as Agrippina did with Germanicus (who died in Syria not in battle but from alleged murder). Only if the battle resulted in such great losses that few or no personnel remained on-site to care for the dead, as at Cannae or the Varian disaster (9 CE) would the bodies go unburied. In 15 CE, Germanicus visited the site of the Varian disaster and buried the Roman remains (Tacitus, *Annals* 1.61–2).

Roman public institutions that memorialized war included *tropaea*, funerary processions and *elogia*, triumphal processions, and victory monuments. Only *tropaea*, originally a Greek custom, might be erected at the battle site, and in fact the Romans erected most monuments distant from the actual battle sites. A monument near Adamklissi in Dacia (Romania), *CIL* III 14214 = *ILS* 9107, lists over 3,000 names of soldiers who died in the Dacian Wars. It is unusual in memorializing the war dead as individuals. Most other forms of war monuments were located at Rome. In contrast with Athenian funerary orations for the collective war dead, Roman funerary processions and orations were held for individual Roman aristocrats and glorified family lineages and their military deeds. Triumphal processions also emphasized Roman victory rather than death, as did triumphal monuments (arches, the Column of Trajan, et cetera). The only cultural form that emphasized Roman deaths was historiography, narrating important battles, including historic defeats such as the battle of Cannae (216 BCE), dramatizing notable deaths, and listing the number of casualties. Most private funerary monuments of military personnel do not mention

death in combat.

On the other hand, in civil wars, the bodies of the dead went unburied as a stark symbol of the horrors of civil war. Cicero tries to present the unburied dead at the battles of Philippi (42 BCE) in a more positive light: to be unburied “when incurred for one’s country, is not accounted miserable” (Cicero, *Philippics* 14.34). However, the imagery of the unburied dead more usually emphasizes the horror of civil warfare. Vitellius himself visited the site of the First Battle of Bedriacum, 40 days after the battle, to find it littered with unburied bodies of men and horses (Tacitus, *Histories* 2.70). Instead of showing respect, Vitellius gloated that “only one thing smells sweeter than a dead enemy, and that’s a dead citizen” (Suetonius, *Vitellius* 10.3). The Flavians were no better, plundering the bodies of their enemies after the Second Battle of Bedriacum (Tacitus, *Histories* 3.17).

In violent civil conflicts (proscriptions, lynchings, usurpations), the bodies of victims were often desecrated and went unburied. The bodies of Tiberius Gracchus (d. 133 BCE) and Gaius Gracchus (d. 121 BCE) and their followers went unburied and thrown into the River Tiber. In the Marian-Sullan conflict, the Marians killed many Sullans and left their bodies unburied; the Sullans took their revenge in the proscriptions (82–81 BCE), prohibiting the victims to be buried or mourned. The heads of the proscribed were often decapitated to claim rewards. A similar fate met the victims of the triumviral proscriptions in 43–42 BCE. Cicero’s head and hands were cut off, nailed to the Rostra (the speaker’s platform in the Roman Forum), and gloated over by Antony, one of Cicero’s worst enemies. Many of the bodies of the proscribed were thrown into sewers or the Tiber. In the violent assassination of Galba (69 CE), Galba’s head was cut off and paraded on a pole; Otho, Galba’s usurper, handed over the head and body to the riff-raff to mock (Suetonius, *Galba* 20). In the Severan conflicts, the corpse of the deposed Elagabalus was thrown into a sewer (222 CE).

The bodies of those who succumbed to accusation of *maiestas* (treason) in the Principate were also desecrated. The body of Lucius Aelius Sejanus, Tiberius’ unpopular praetorian prefect, was thrown down the Gemonian Steps in Rome and left unburied. Such mistreatment of the dead was part of *damnatio memoriae*, the comprehensive erasure of the victims’ reputation and history; their descendants were forbidden to mourn them.

Suicide by the losing generals and officers in civil war was regarded as preserving their heroism and honor, sparing their bodies from mistreatment.

Famous such suicides included Cato the Younger, Brutus and Cassius, and Otho (emperor in 69 CE). Suicide by aristocrats who were accused of or condemned for *maiestas* (treason) ensured that they would receive normal burial and mourning and that their property would pass to their heirs, maintaining family continuity.

Sara E. Phang

See also Casualties; Cato the Younger; Civil Conflict (Late Republic); Civil Warfare; *Damnatio Memoriae*; Elite Participation; Otho; Proscriptions; Suicide; Treason; Triumph

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War of Four Emperors (69 CE), Causes

The War of Four Emperors (69 CE) was the first major civil war during the Principate, involving Spain, the Rhineland and Gaul, the Danube, and the east, though the major battles of the war occurred in Italy. The War was preceded by the revolts of Julius Vindex and Galba (68 CE), triggering the

downfall of Nero (54–68). In January 69, Galba succumbed to the coup of Otho at Rome, and in the Rhineland, the legions revolted against Galba and acclaimed Vitellius. Otho and Vitellius then waged a civil war, the Vitellians defeating Otho in April 69. Vitellius then was challenged by Vespasian, who revolted in the eastern provinces and whose troops marched on Italy. By late December 69, the Flavians had captured Rome, Vitellius was dead, and Vespasian was the final victor.

The immediate cause of the War of Four Emperors was the downfall of Nero, leaving a power vacuum at the heart of Rome. Nero, the last of the Julio-Claudian dynasty, had no surviving children and left no potential dynastic successors. His unconventional behavior and persecution of suspected conspirators had alienated the Roman aristocracy. He was, however, popular with the Roman populace. Having relied for so long on dynastic succession, the Principate had no established model for the transfer of power in the absence of a dynastic heir. Instead, the empire learned that, in Tacitus' words, "emperors could be made elsewhere than at Rome" (Tacitus, *Histories* 1.4) in revolts supported by provincial armies.

A pattern had established itself in the late Republic in which soldiers expected and depended upon material pay, benefits, and rewards from successful generals. This pattern is seen through the hindsight of imperial sources, who regarded it as the cause of civil war and blamed the venality of the common soldiers, to whom generals had to give gifts or risk mutiny. Tacitus shares this view, though he also regards the pattern as inescapable; Galba's attempt to reverse it, saying, "I levy my soldiers, I don't buy them," earned his assassination by the praetorians.

In the civil war that followed, events depended very much on the personality of the emperors. Reacting to these personalities, the soldiers were not simply motivated by self-interest. They saw their relationship to the emperors in personal terms. At Rome the praetorians reacted against Galba's parsimony and contempt, preferring the younger and more generous Otho; in the Rhineland, the legions reacted against Galba, preferring the easy-going Vitellius. In their turn, Otho and Vitellius both failed as leaders; Otho won respect from his men mainly due to his courageous suicide, traditional for losing generals in civil wars. Their failure had a longer-term cause: during the early Principate, most of the emperors did not command in person, assigning the role of field commander to relatives or other trusted generals. This model was acceptable in external

wars, but did not work well in civil war, when personal leadership was desirable. In contrast, Vespasian and his son Titus had already proven themselves as military leaders in the Jewish War. Their choice to let Antonius Primus prosecute the war against Vitellius did not harm their cause.

Larger, structural causes of the civil war also existed. The Roman Empire was spread over a wide geographic area, extending from Britain in the north to North Africa in the south, from Spain in the western empire to Egypt, Syria, and the frontier with Persia. Travel and communications were relatively slow and inefficient. A power vacuum or instability at the center often provoked revolts in the periphery; even a strong power at the center might be unable to respond in time. In a vicious cycle, one coup or revolt encouraged others. This pattern recurred in the civil wars of Septimius Severus (193–197) and the late Severans (218–222) and particularly in the third-century crisis (235–284), when barbarian invasions exacerbated the cycle.

Sara E. Phang

See also Army in Politics; Donatives; Emperor as Commander; Emperor as Patron; Galba; Military Discipline; Otho; Praetorians; Suetonius; Tacitus; Usurpation; Vespasian; Vitellius

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War of Four Emperors (69 CE), Course

In March 68 Julius Vindex, governor of Gallia Lugdunensis, revolted. He did not call himself an emperor; as a Gallic nobleman, he was not a credible imperial candidate in this period. He sought the aid of Servius Sulpicius

Galba, the elderly governor of Hispania Tarraconensis. Revolting in his own name, Galba was acclaimed as emperor by his legion (VI Victrix). Galba collected recruits for another legion, VII Galbiana, and marched on Rome. Vindex' rebellion was suppressed by Verginius Rufus.

At Rome, the Senate declared Nero a public enemy. Nero was abandoned by his praetorians and by the populace. Nero panicked, fleeing Rome, and committed suicide (June 68). A patrician of illustrious family, with a stern and authoritarian reputation, Galba was accepted as emperor by the Senate. He had no sons and adopted a young aristocrat, Lucius Calpurnius Piso Frugi Licinianus, as his prospective successor. Galba's supporter, Nymphidius Sabinus, had promised the Praetorian Guard a large donative in Galba's name. Galba now refused to give this donative, for the imperial treasury had been depleted by Nero's extravagances, and responded with a harsh parsimony, saying, "I levy my soldiers, I don't buy them" (Tacitus, *Histories* 1.5). This angered the praetorians, causing them to support Marcus Salvius Otho, a younger man who gave them gifts and promised donatives. Otho allegedly had expected to be adopted by Galba.

In the Rhineland, on New Year's Day, the legions took their annual oath to the emperor. The legions in Lower Germany did so with reluctance, but those of Upper Germany stoned Galba's portraits that were attached to the legionary standards. On January 3, the Rhineland legions acclaimed Aulus Vitellius, the governor of Lower Germany, as emperor. Vitellius had a lenient, genial reputation, and the legions remembered Galba's harshness as governor of Upper Germany in ca. 39–43.

On January 15, the praetorians carried off Otho to their camp in Rome. In the ensuing confusion, Galba and Piso tried to regain control of the situation. Believing a rumor that Otho had been killed, Galba left the palace and was seized by the praetorians and assassinated; Piso and others of Galba's followers were also killed. Otho was acclaimed by the praetorians as emperor, and was accepted by the Senate.

In the Rhineland, Vitellius' legates, Aulus Caecina Alienus and Fabius Valens, assembled their armies (Caecina had about 22,000 legionaries and auxiliaries, Valens about 19,000) and marched south rapidly through Gaul. Their soldiers mistreated local communities on the way. Crossing the Alps, they descended into north Italy. Vitellius himself followed more slowly.

Otho prepared for civil war with the Vitellians. Since legions were not normally stationed in Italy at this time, he had only Legio I Adiatrix and the

praetorians and urban cohorts, totaling about 10,000 men, commanded by Otho's brother Salvius Titianus and Annius Gallus. Otho chose not to wait for more legions to arrive from the Danube. The Othonians met the Vitellians in battle on April 14, near a town called Bedriacum, on the River Po near Cremona. Otho did not command in person, but awaited events at the neighboring Brixellum. The Othonians were outnumbered and defeated, and Otho committed suicide on April 16, intending to spare his men further conflict. The Othonian officers swore allegiance to Vitellius, as did the Senate and people of Rome.

Displaying his typical inaction, Vitellius himself did not reach Rome until July 18. He entered Rome in a festive parade resembling a triumph. He rewarded his men not with money but with privileges such as unrestricted furlough and the reinstatement of rank for demoted personnel. According to Tacitus, Vitellius' indulgences did not cause his men to respect him, but demoralized them. Vitellius allegedly wasted enormous sums on extravagant eating and drinking, behavior which disposed him further to inaction.

In the eastern provinces, Vespasian's powerful acquaintances, Tiberius Julius Alexander the prefect (equestrian governor) of Egypt, and Licinius Mucianus the governor of Syria, encouraged his acclamation. Tiberius Alexander and his troops took an oath of loyalty to Vespasian on July 1; Vespasian's soldiers acclaimed him as emperor on July 3, and Mucianus persuaded his soldiers and the civilian inhabitants of Syria to swear allegiance to Vespasian before July 15. Vespasian's acclamation was also encouraged by prophecies. Mucianus persuaded the Syrian legions to support Vespasian by spreading the rumor that Vitellius intended to transfer them to the Rhine frontier.

Vespasian moved to Alexandria to blockade grain shipments to Rome, while Vespasian's general Antonius Primus led the Syrian legions through the Danubian provinces, adding the Danubian legions as he went. Primus' arrival in north Italy induced Caecina to defect to Vespasian, adding his forces to the Flavian army. Fabius Valens still commanded the other Vitellian army, and met the Flavian forces in a protracted night battle (the Second Battle of Bedriacum or battle of Cremona) in October 69. The Vitellians were defeated and many of their officers defected to the Flavian side. Elated by their victory, the Flavian soldiers sacked the city of Cremona, an atrocity later blamed on Primus (Tacitus, *Histories* 3.33).

At Rome Vitellius was ineffectual. He retained the praetorians, but had lost Caecina's officers and troops and retained only part of Valens' forces; his Rhine legionaries had been debilitated by lack of training and Rome's endemic diseases. As Primus and the Flavians approached Rome, many Vitellian officers defected to them. Antonius Primus offered Vitellius the opportunity of surrender and a wealthy retirement, but Vitellius only vacillated. Primus attempted to recruit Flavius Sabinus, the city prefect and Vespasian's brother, urging him to stage a coup and hand the city over to the Flavians, but Sabinus refused, distrusting violence and not wishing to upstage Vespasian. On December 18, Vitellius made a spontaneous attempt to abdicate, but was forestalled by the derision of the Roman crowd. On the same day Sabinus and his followers occupied the Capitoline Hill, where they were besieged by the Vitellians.

The Flavian army reached the outskirts of Rome by December 20. Within the city of Rome, the Flavian supporters and Vitellians fought each other. In the siege of the Capitoline Hill, the Capitoline Temple was burned down. Flavius Sabinus was captured and put to death by the Vitellians. The Vitellian army (mostly praetorians) clashed with the Flavian troops outside Rome, and the Flavians forced the Vitellians to fall back to the city.

On December 20, Vitellius, now abandoned by everyone, was dragged out of the imperial palace by the Roman crowd, which stripped him, mocked his physical appearance, and lynched him, beheading his body. Antonius Primus entered Rome with his army on December 21, and the Senate accepted Vespasian as emperor. Order was restored to the city when Licinius Mucianus arrived with his Syrian and Danubian legions. Vespasian himself did not arrive at Rome until the autumn of 70.

The main source for the War of Four Emperors is Tacitus' *Histories*, written a generation later (around the turn of the second century CE). He relates events in perceptive detail, though prone to moralizing, reflecting the Flavian propaganda effort against Vitellius. The extant *Histories* break off part way through the narrative of the Gallic revolt in 70 CE. They are supplemented by Suetonius' biographies of Galba, Otho, Vitellius, and Vespasian. Plutarch's biographies of Galba and Otho are less valuable.

Sara E. Phang

See also Army in Politics; Donatives; Emperor as Commander; Emperor as Patron; Galba; Military Discipline; Otho; Praetorians; Suetonius; Tacitus;

Usurpation; Vespasian; Vitellius

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War of Four Emperors (69 CE), Consequences

The most obvious consequence of the War of Four Emperors was the accession of Vespasian and his establishment of a new dynasty, the Flavians (69–96). He was accepted by the Senate, army, and people, but sought legitimacy; the Senate passed an enabling law, termed by modern scholars the *lex de imperio Vespasiani*, surviving in fragments. Vespasian also took the praenomen *Imperator*, which had been adopted by Augustus but not by his successors. To some degree, the Flavian emperors adopted a more military persona; Vespasian and Titus did not need to prove their ability to command, but Domitian, who had been too young at the time of the Jewish War and War of Four Emperors, campaigned against the Germans and Dacians.

The civil war of 69 CE had refreshed the horrors of civil war, last experienced in the triumviral wars (44–31 BCE). Vespasian's financial exactions gave him a reputation for avarice, but he needed to rebuild, and emphasized the rebuilding of the Capitoline Temple at Rome as a symbol of the restoration of order.

An immediate consequence of the civil war was the Gallic Revolt (70 CE), led by assimilated Gallic nobles who had served in the Roman auxiliary forces, and encouraged by the Vitellians' withdrawal of legions from the Rhine. The revolt was suppressed by Petilius Cerialis.

Sara E. Phang

See also Army in Politics; Donatives; Emperor as Commander; Emperor as Patron; Galba; Gallic Revolt; Otho; Praetorians; Suetonius; Tacitus; Usurpation; Vespasian; Vitellius

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Warlike Peoples

In the Greek and Roman literary tradition, northern peoples were more warlike than those of the south, and western Europeans more fierce than peoples of the eastern Mediterranean. To some extent, this doctrine appears to have influenced recruitment policies. Haynes (2013) on the recruitment of the *auxilia* argues that native peoples from mountainous areas or with warlike traditions were preferentially recruited, giving ethnic or regional names to their auxiliary regiments, for example, *ala Thracum* (“ala of Thracians”) or *cohors Batavorum* (“cohort of Batavians”). Mountainous areas were difficult for the Romans to control. Being thinly settled and often impoverished, mountainous regions lacked powerful native rulers or communities to intimidate or co-opt. Mountainous areas offered refuges for bandits. Banditry might be hard to distinguish from native peoples with raiding traditions and hostility to Rome. Recruiting the native peoples as Roman auxiliary troops was a good way to bring them under control and into the empire, as long as the recruitment was handled without giving offense. Tacitus relates that the Batavian revolt in 70 CE was sparked by Roman recruiters’ mishandling of the levy of Batavian recruits (Tacitus, *Histories* 4.14, 22). However, the extent to which Roman soldiers were “warlike” is blurred by classical elite authors’ regarding them (both legionaries and auxiliaries) as uncultivated and prone to violence even off the field. Cassius Dio writes, in Maecenas’ imaginary speech advising Augustus, that “soldiers ought to be recruited from the part of the population that is strongest and most in need of a livelihood, for otherwise they will turn to brigandage” (52.27.5).

In contrast with the *numeri*, the non-Roman auxiliary units do not seem to have maintained their native traditions of dress, appearance, or weapons

and other equipment. Archaeological evidence suggests that the *auxilia* presented a relatively standard Roman appearance; the ethnic equipment (such as the flowing robes of Syrian archers) depicted on Trajan's Column is probably fanciful or else denotes *numeri*, not *auxilia*.

Sara E. Phang

See also *Alae*; *Auxilia*; Bandits and Brigands; Barbarians; Cohorts; Column of Trajan; *Numerus*; Tacitus

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Z

Zama, Battle of (202 BCE)

The battle of Zama took place in 202 BCE between the forces of the Roman Republic, led by Publius Cornelius Scipio, and the forces of Carthage, led by Hannibal Barca. It was the final battle of the Second Punic War, decisively marking its end.

After having won several major victories in Spain, Scipio took the war to the Carthaginian homeland in Africa. When the opposing armies met at Zama, Scipio's forces totaled approximately 34,000 infantry and 6,000 cavalry, while Hannibal's totaled slightly more at 45,000 infantry and 6,000 cavalry as well as over 80 war elephants. Hannibal's forces were of mixed ethnicity with men from Gaul, Liguria, and the Balearic Isles, as well as Carthaginians and Libyans. He placed them in three lines with his least reliable troops in front and his veterans at the rear. He stationed his cavalry on the wings, as was standard practice, and he had his elephants stationed in front of all his forces. Scipio used the standard Roman deployment of having the *hastati* in the front line and the *principes* behind them, with the *triarii* taking up the rear. On this occasion however, Scipio did not deploy these lines in the standard *triplex acies* or "three line" formation with the *principes* covering the gaps in between the maniples of the *hastati* and the *triarii* doing the same for the *principes*. Rather, he made sure his maniples were stationed one behind the other, creating gaps between them, which he then filled with the *velites*, or the light javelin men of the Roman Republican army. Scipio also had his cavalry on the wings.

The cavalry were the first to engage and they skirmished with each other for some time. Then, Hannibal ordered his war elephants to charge the Roman infantry. The *velites* drew the elephants into the gaps between the

maniples and showered them with their darts. Though the Roman javelin men did not come out of this encounter unscathed, they successfully led the elephants through the gaps and, as per their orders, they then took refuge among the line infantry, allowing the frightened and injured elephants to flee in panic beyond the rear of the Roman forces, thus ceasing to be a threat.

The battle between the line infantry then began and it was particularly hard fought. The mercenaries that held the front ranks of the Carthaginian lines managed to wound many *hastati* with their skill at arms, but the Romans relied on their discipline to continue to push forward. This tactic proved to be effective as it eventually drove the mercenaries back on their own men, confusing both battle lines as some mercenaries fought Carthaginians in desperate attempts to flee. As a result, both commanders reorganized their lines into one solid, long line, and the forces re-engaged.

Once again, the battle was toughly contested, and it was not until the Roman cavalry, who had by this time routed their Carthaginian counterparts, returned from their pursuit to crash into the Carthaginian rear, that Hannibal's forces collapsed. About half of the Carthaginian army was killed in the defeat, and almost as many were taken prisoner. The loss was total for Carthage and it decisively won the war for the Romans.

After their defeat, Carthage sued for peace and the Romans granted it with particularly harsh terms. These terms included the stipulation that Carthage was not to make war without Rome's consent. This would later lead to the Third Punic War, when Carthage defended themselves against Numidian attacks, prompting Rome to carry out their long-desired complete destruction of Punic power.

Adam Anders

See also Hannibal Barca; Punic War, Second; Scipio Africanus

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Zenobia (ca. 240–ca. 275 CE)

The ruler of Palmyra, Septimius Odenathus, was married to Septimia Zenobia (born ca. 240). They had several children, at least two sons, Septimius Herodianus and Septimius Vaballathus. Other children may have existed, poorly attested. When Odenathus was assassinated under mysterious circumstances in 268, he was succeeded by his younger son Vaballathus (born ca. 258), and by Zenobia, who governed for her son. Vaballathus and Zenobia began aggressively to extend Palmyrene power in the Near East, conquering Roman Arabia, Egypt, and Syria, and extending in to Asia Minor. Aurelian, now emperor (270–275), could not tolerate this threat and made war upon the Palmyrene Empire, reconquering it and capturing Zenobia, whom he displayed in his triumph in 274.

Zenobia took an active role as queen of Palmyra, and is said to have worn armor when she reviewed her troops, but she did not command her own army, employing a Palmyrene general, Septimius Zabdas. Zabdas first invaded Roman Arabia, defeating the Roman governor in battle and taking the provincial capital of Bostra. He advanced to Egypt, driving out the governor of Egypt, Tenagino Probus; taking Alexandria; and defeating Probus in combat. Zabdas, Zenobia, and Vaballathus then took control of Roman Syria and extended their power into Asia Minor.

These events can be followed also from documents and from the coinage minted at Alexandria and Antioch (see Southern 2008). Documents show that Vaballathus bore the titles Ruler of Tadmor (Palmyra), King of Kings, and *corrector totius Orientis*. The Alexandrian and Antiochene mints first produced coins with Emperor Aurelian on one side, Vaballathus on the other, and did not use the title Augustus for Vaballathus. The coins then back-dated Vaballathus' reign to his father's death in 268. They named Vaballathus *imperator* and *dux Romanorum*, titles that he was not entitled to use and that showed him to be a usurper. Finally, the coins of Antioch displayed Vaballathus alone (omitting Aurelian; other coins displayed Zenobia) and named Vaballathus and Zenobia Augustus and Augusta. These

coins were probably produced in defiance after Aurelian declared war on Palmyra. Inscriptions in Greek also named Vaballathus and Zenobia Sebastos and Sebaste, the Greek forms of Augustus and Augusta.

Aurelian first entered Asia Minor and encountered resistance at Tyana, a city in Cappadocia. He captured it by siege, but spared the human inhabitants (having said, "I will not leave a dog alive," he let his soldiers kill the dogs). He then met in battle with the Palmyrene forces outside Immae, a town on the route between Antioch and Beroea. He defeated Zabdas by forcing the Palmyrene cataphract (heavy armored) cavalry to chase the Romans, and then doubling back and slaughtering the exhausted Palmyrenes. Zabdas and Zenobia escaped and fell back on Emesa. Aurelian approached and captured Emesa; Zenobia escaped and fled to Palmyra. It is possible that Vaballathus escaped with his mother, and also escaped from Palmyra with her (below), and was taken prisoner with her by Aurelian, but the literary sources are interested mainly in Zenobia.

As Aurelian approached Palmyra, Zenobia seems to have decided to flee to the Persians, seeking aid there, though Persia was involved in its own succession crisis at that time and could lend little help to Palmyra. She fled across the desert on camels, but was apprehended by a Roman cavalry force. Palmyra surrendered to Aurelian, who spared the citizens but put Zenobia and her advisers and generals on trial. He put to death many, but spared Zenobia's life because he wanted to exhibit her in his triumph. He left for the European Roman Empire, taking Zenobia with him as a prisoner. In his wake Palmyra revolted; Aurelian punished it harshly, taking reprisals and allowing the Romans to loot the city. Palmyra never recovered, and the western hub for the Silk Road trade moved northward to Batnae.

The literary sources conflict on the fate of Zenobia. According to one author, she died on the way to Rome; the other sources state that she lived and was displayed in Aurelian's triumph in 274, laden with golden chains. She probably survived afterward and was allowed to settle in or just outside Rome for the rest of her natural life.

As with much of the history of the third-century crisis, the literary sources for Odenathus and Zenobia are difficult to use and conflicted. Zosimus (writing in the early fifth century) and the *Historia Augusta* are closest in date to events. Late authors, such as John Malalas and Zonaras, provide detail from unknown sources. The *Historia Augusta's* later biographies (from ca. 218 onward, and especially Loeb SHA III) are

notoriously unreliable. The reigns of Odenathus and Zenobia also can be studied through provincial coinage and documentary sources.

Sara E. Phang

See also Aurelian; Gender and War; *Historia Augusta*; Odenathus; Palmyra; Third-Century CE Crisis

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Zosimus (Active Late Fifth–Early Sixth Centuries CE)

Zosimus was a Greek historiographer who wrote a “new history” (*Historia Nova*), which was the last major pagan history and described the history of Rome from its mythological origins in the Trojan War to the sack of Rome in 410. Zosimus probably held a position in the imperial chancellery at Constantinople during the reign of Anastasius I (491–518). Zosimus writes from a militant pagan stance and treats the reigns of Constantine I and Theodosius I with scorn. His work is valuable because it draws upon the lost histories of Dexippus, Eunapius, and Olympiodorus, whom Zosimus copied extensively, while providing the only continuous secular history for the period 378–410. The scale of his work increased as Zosimus drew nearer his own time, as Book 1 covered the period from Augustus to Probus (278–282); books 2–4 covered the fourth century CE to 395, and books 5–6 covered the period 395–410.

Jeroen W. P. Wijnendaele

See also Ammianus; Constantine I

Further Reading

Document 30.

- Liebeschuetz, Wolfgang. 2003. "Pagan Historiography and the Decline of the Empire." In Gabriele Marasco, ed. *Greek and Roman Historiography in Late Antiquity: Fourth to Sixth Century A.D.* Leiden: Brill, pp. 177–218.
- Ridley, R. T. 1982. *Zosimus: New History*. Sydney: Byzantina Australiensia 2.

Appendix: Quotable Quotes—Romans on War

Introduction

The quotations below are a mix of famous and less well-known ancient Roman quotations relating to conflict. They are organized chronologically by speaker. The quotations are drawn from the Loeb Classical Library series and, in the case of Livy, from the Everyman's Library editions.

Cato the Elder (234–149/148 BCE)

1. Cato the Elder reproached his fellow citizens for demanding a (probably anachronistic) grain dole:
“It is a hard matter, my fellow citizens, to argue with the belly, since it has no ears.”

Source: Plutarch, Cato Maior 8.1; adapted by Sara E. Phang.

2. On the subject of women, Cato the Elder said:
“All other men rule their wives; we rule all other men, and our wives rule us.”

Source: Plutarch, Cato Maior 8.2; adapted by Sara E. Phang.

3. [When King Eumenes visited Rome and was welcomed, Cato was critical.] “Surely,” someone said to him, “he is an excellent man, and a friend of Rome.” “Granted,” said Cato, “but the animal known as king is by nature carnivorous.”

Source: Plutarch, Cato Maior 8.7–8; adapted by Sara E. Phang.

4. Cato the Elder said of his Spanish campaign:
“The war will be self-supporting.”

Source: Livy, History of Rome 34.9.12; adapted by Sara E. Phang.

5. Cato the Elder is said to have often ended speeches in the Senate with some variant of this expression:
“Carthage must be destroyed.”

Source: Plutarch, Cato Maior 27.1; adapted by Sara E. Phang.

Marius (157–86 BCE)

6. Marius exercised his army many kinds of running and long marches, and forced them to carry their own baggage and to cook their own food. Hence ... soldiers who enjoyed hard work and did whatever they had to do with contentment and without protest, were called Marius’ mules.

Source: Plutarch, Marius 13.1; adapted by Sara E. Phang.

7. After Marius defeated the Teutones at Aquae Sextiae (102 BCE) the Cimbri sent demands to the Romans, asking for land for their brothers. When Marius asked the [Cimbri] ambassadors whom they meant by their brothers, they said they meant the Teutones. At this, all the other Romans who heard them burst out laughing, and Marius scoffingly said: “Then don’t trouble yourself about your brothers, for they have land, and they will have it forever—land which we have given them.”

Source: Plutarch, Marius 24.3; adapted by Sara E. Phang.

8. The Marians took harsh reprisals on their enemies at Rome. Marius decided to kill Lutatius Catulus, formerly his fellow consul, and Catulus’ friends begged Marius to spare him. But Marius only replied: “He must die.”

Source: Plutarch, Marius 44.5; adapted by Sara E. Phang.

Sulla (138–78 BCE)

9. Sulla's epitaph:

"No man ever did more good for his friends or more harm to his enemies."

Source: Plutarch, Sulla 38.4; adapted by Sara E. Phang.

Crassus (115–53 BCE)

10. Crassus said:

"No man can call himself rich who cannot support an army from his own assets."

Source: Plutarch, Crassus 2.7; adapted by Sara E. Phang.

Pompey (106–48 BCE)

11. On raising troops against Caesar during the civil war, Pompey said:

"...wherever I stamp upon the ground in Italy, armies of cavalry and infantry spring up."

Source: Plutarch, Pompey 57.5; adapted by Sara E. Phang.

Cicero (106–43 BCE)

12. Cicero said of Octavian:

"He should be praised, honored, and removed."

Source: Cicero, Letters to His Friends 11.20.1; adapted by Sara E. Phang.

Caesar (100–44 BCE)

13. Allegedly said by Caesar:

"Sulla could do it, why can't I?"

Source: Cicero, Letters to Atticus 9.10.2; adapted by Sara E. Phang.

14. Caesar addressed the mutinous Tenth Legion as follows:

But with a single word, calling them “citizens,” instead of “soldiers,” he easily brought them round and bent them to his will; for they at once replied that they were his “soldiers” and insisted on following him to Africa.

Source: Suetonius, Julius Caesar 70; adapted by Sara E. Phang.

15. Caesar describes his war against Pharnaces, son of Mithridates VI:

“I came, I saw, I conquered.”

Source: Suetonius, Julius Caesar 37.2; adapted by Sara E. Phang.

16. Caesar’s alleged words, which the conspirators against him particularly resented:

“...the state was nothing, a mere name without body or form.”

Source: Suetonius, Julius Caesar 77; adapted by Sara E. Phang.

17. Caesar’s last words:

“This is violence!” and to Brutus, “You too, child?”

[There is probably no truth to the legend that Brutus was Caesar’s illegitimate son.]

Source: Suetonius, Julius Caesar 82; adapted by Sara E. Phang.

Sallust (86—ca. 35 BCE)

18. “At Rome all things are for sale.”

Source: Sallust, The Jugurthine War 8.1; adapted by Sara E. Phang.

Octavian/Augustus (63 BCE–14 CE)

19. When the Senate hesitated to confer the consulship on the 19-year-old Octavian, his centurion, Cornelius, leader of the embassy, threw back his cloak and showed them the hilt of his sword, and declared, “This will make him consul, if you do not.”

Source: Suetonius, Augustus 26.2; adapted by Sara E. Phang.

20. Octavian to the captives of the Perusine War:

“You must die!”

Source: Suetonius, Augustus 15.1; adapted by Sara E. Phang.

21. To a relative of a proscription victim who asked to bury the body, Octavian said:

“The birds will soon settle that question.”

Source: Suetonius, Augustus 13.2; adapted by Sara E. Phang.

22. After the Varian disaster in 9 CE, Augustus cried:

“Quintilius Varus, give me back my legions!”

Source: Suetonius, Augustus 23.2; adapted by Sara E. Phang.

23. Augustus’ last words (one variant):

“I found Rome a city of brick; I leave it to you of marble.”

Source: Cassius Dio History of Rome 56.30.3; adapted by Sara E. Phang.

Tiberius (42 BCE–37 CE)

24. Tiberius describes the Senate:

“How ready these men are for servitude!”

Source: Tacitus, Annals of Imperial Rome 3.65; adapted by Sara E. Phang.

Galba (3 BCE–69 CE)

25. Galba to the Praetorians:

“I levy my soldiers, I don’t buy them.”

Source: Tacitus, Histories 1.5; adapted by Sara E. Phang.

Vespasian (9–79 CE)

26. Vespasian speaking on his deathbed:
“Alas, I think I’m becoming a god!”

Source: Suetonius, Vespasian 23.4; adapted by Sara E. Phang.

Caligula (12–41 CE)

27. Caligula describes his subjects:
“Let them hate me, as long as they fear me”

Source: Suetonius, Caligula (Gaius) 30.1; adapted by Sara E. Phang.

Vitellius (15–69 CE)

28. Vitellius, visiting the site of the First Battle of Bedriacum:
“Only one thing smells sweeter than a dead enemy, and that’s a dead fellow citizen.”

Source: Suetonius, Vitellius 10; adapted by Sara E. Phang.

Domitius Corbulo (d. 67 CE)

29. Domitius Corbulo, after Claudius recalled him from the German frontier:
“Once they were fortunate, the generals of Rome”

Source: Tacitus, Annals of Imperial Rome 11.20; adapted by Sara E. Phang.

Antonius Primus (Active 69 CE)

30. After the Second Battle of Bedriacum, the Flavian general Antonius Primus went to use the baths at Cremona. Finding that the water was lukewarm, he said:
“They’ll soon be burning hot!”
[This allegedly touched off the sack of the city.]

Source: Tacitus, Histories 3.32; adapted by Sara E. Phang.

Domitian (51–96 CE)

31. Domitian said of the Nasamones, a Numidian tribe:

“I have forbidden the Nasamones to exist.”

Source: Cassius Dio History of Rome 67.5.6; adapted by Sara E. Phang.

Calgacus (active 80s CE)

32. The Scottish leader Calgacus exhorts his army against the Romans:

“They make a wasteland, and call it peace”

Source: Tacitus, Agricola 30; adapted by Sara E. Phang.

Trajan (53–117 CE)

33. Trajan to a praetorian prefect, handing him a sword:

“If I rule well, use this for me; if not, against me.”

Source: Cassius Dio History of Rome 68.16.1b; adapted by Sara E. Phang.

Hadrian (76–138 CE)

34. Hadrian was accosted by a woman with a petition. “I haven’t time,” he said, whereupon she retorted, “Then don’t be a king!”

Source: Cassius Dio History of Rome 69.6.3; adapted by Sara E. Phang.

Marcus Aurelius (121–180 CE)

35. Marcus Aurelius’ last words:

“Go to the rising sun; I am setting.”

Source: Cassius Dio History of Rome 72.34; adapted by Sara E. Phang.

Septimius Severus (ca. 145–211 CE)

36. Septimius Severus' praetorian prefect to the bandit chieftain Bulla:
"How did you become a bandit?" Bulla retorted, "How did you become a prefect?"

Source: Cassius Dio History of Rome 77.17.4; adapted by Sara E. Phang.

37. Septimius Severus' instructions to his sons:
"Be of one mind, reward the soldiers, and despise everybody else."

Source: Cassius Dio History of Rome 77.15.2; adapted by Sara E. Phang.

38. A variant on Septimius Severus' last words:
"Come, give it here, if there is anything to do."

Source: Cassius Dio History of Rome 77.17.4; adapted by Sara E. Phang.

Julian (331–363 CE)

39. Julian, appointed Caesar by Constantius II, who had elevated Julian's half-brother Gallus to Caesar and then executed him for suspected conspiracy:
"By purple death I'm seized and fate supreme."

Source: Ammianus Marcellinus History of Rome 15.8.17 (from Homer, Iliad 5.83); adapted by Sara E. Phang.

Primary Documents

The document selections in this section are ordered by author, with the content in rough chronological sequence. Excerpts from 21 works by 14 authors have been selected, plus two inscriptions from the *Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum*. With the exception of the inscriptions, all of the authors included here have a separate, more detailed entry in the body of this encyclopedia. Where a work is divided into books, chapters, and sections, the document is divided by chapters—a number in square brackets in the text indicates the book and chapter. Anything else in square brackets is an explanatory note inserted by the translator or editor and not part of the original work. A gap or omission in the document is indicated by The author's date is given in the author's main heading; the date of the event in the document is in the document heading.

See also Appendix: Quotable Quotes—Romans on War

Livy (59 BCE–17 CE)

Titus Livius, from Patavium in north Italy, wrote during the reign of Augustus (27 BCE– 14 CE), and was the author of the *Ab urbe condita* (*From the Founding of the City*), best known as the *History of Rome*. The *History* spans the period from the legendary founding of Rome (753 BCE) to the reign of Augustus, but only part of it is extant: the surviving text ends in the mid-second century BCE. Livy was a prolific writer and filled out sparse accounts of early Rome with vividly imagined detail.

1. Livy *History of Rome* 1.57, 2.1: Overthrow of the

Monarchy (510/509 BCE)

Introduction

According to Roman tradition, the last king of Rome, Tarquinius Superbus (534–510) ruled as a tyrant. His son Sextus Tarquinius raped Lucretia, the wife of Tarquinius Collatinus (a more distant relative of the king). Overcome by shame, Lucretia disclosed the rape to her father and husband, and then stabbed herself. The angry citizens, led by Lucius Junius Brutus, drove out the king and established the Republic (509). The Senate decreed the exile of all members of the house of Tarquin from Rome, and prepared for war with the Tarquins, who returned to Etruria. The following passage illustrates the traditional Roman hostility to monarchy.

Document

[1.57] While they were absorbed in grief, Brutus drew the knife from Lucretia's wound, and holding it ... in front of him, said, "By this blood ... I swear, and you, O gods, I call to witness that I will drive out Lucius Tarquinius Superbus, together with his cursed wife and his whole family, with fire and sword and every means in my power, and I will not permit them or anyone else to reign in Rome." Then he handed the knife to Collatinus and then to Lucretius and Valerius ... They swore as they were directed; all their grief changed to rage, and they followed the lead of Brutus, who summoned them to abolish the monarchy at once.

[2.1] [Lucius Junius Brutus'] first act [as consul] was to protect the people ... from being influenced by any entreaties or bribes from the king. He therefore made them take an oath that they would not permit any man to reign [as king] in Rome. The Senate had been thinned by the murderous cruelty of Tarquin, and Brutus' next goal was to strengthen its influence by selecting some of the leading equestrians to fill the vacancies; thus he brought it up to the old number of three hundred. The new members were known as "conscripti," the old ones retained their designation of "patres." This measure was remarkably effective at promoting public harmony and bringing the patricians and plebeians together.

Source: Livy. 1912. *The History of Rome*. Translated by W. M. Roberts. Everyman's Library. New York: E. P. Dutton & Company; adapted by Sara E. Phang.

2. Livy *History of Rome* 1.42–3: The Servian Constitution (Early Republic)

Introduction

Though attributed to King Servius Tullius (578–535 BCE), the organization of the early Roman army probably reflects the fifth-century BCE Republic. The description of the armor suggests the hoplite phalanx phase of Roman warfare (Etruscan Wars period). The aes (plural asses) denoted bronze or copper metal by weight, used as a precursor of coinage in the early Republic. The Servian arrangement persisted in the organization of the centuriate assembly (comitia centuriata), in which wealthier centuries voted first. It is unlikely that each “century” contained just 100 men; many must have contained far more.

Document

[1.42–3] From those whose property rating was 100,000 *asses* or above, he created eighty centuries, forty of men of military age (17–46) and forty of older men (47–60). All of these centuries were known as those of the first class. The older men were to be available for guarding the city and the younger for campaigns in the field. He ordered this class to equip themselves with helmet, a round shield (*clipeus*), greaves, and a breastplate, all of bronze. This would be their defensive equipment; against the enemy they would use the heavy thrusting spear (*hasta*) and the sword.

He added to this class two centuries of workmen who would perform their military service unarmed; they were assigned to construct engines of war.

The second class was formed of those whose rating was between 100,000 and 75,000 *asses* and from these were enrolled twenty centuries, ten of younger and ten of older men. They were to carry the rectangular shield (*scutum*) in place of the round one and except for the corselet all their other equipment matched that of the first class.

The rating of the third class was 50,000 to 75,000 *asses*. They were to have the same number of centuries as the second and the same distinction between younger and older men. Their armament was the same as the second except greaves were omitted.

The fourth class was rated at 25,000 to 50,000 *asses* and had the same number of centuries, but their equipment was different. They carried only

the heavy thrusting spear and the *verutum* [a short throwing spear].

The fifth class was larger as it consisted of thirty centuries and it carried slings with stones for missiles. Attendants, buglers, and trumpeters belonged to it and were divided into three centuries. The class was rated at 11,000 to 25,000 *asses*. The multitude whose property was rated at a lower value, were placed in one century and excused military service.

He [Servius Tullius] enrolled twelve centuries of cavalry from the leading men of the city. He likewise created six other centuries under the same names, which had been consecrated by augury, three of which had been established by Romulus. He gave the cavalrymen 10,000 *asses* each. Unmarried were assessed to pay 2,000 *asses* per year each to provide food for the mounts.

Source: Sage, Michael M., ed. 2008. *The Republican Roman Army: A Sourcebook*. London/New York: Routledge, pp. 21–22, 27. Used by permission of Taylor & Francis.

3. Livy *History of Rome* 8.8: Manipular Organization of the Legion (ca. 340 BCE)

Introduction

This description of the manipular organization of the legion is attributed to the Roman-Latin War, ca. 340 BCE, but is probably, as with Polybius' description of the Roman army, of third/second century BCE date. Of note is the tripartite division into ranks, hastati, principes, and triarii, which are also age classes (youngest, mature, and older men, respectively). The inclusion of rorarii and accensi with the triarii may represent an earlier phase of the manipular legion or simply Livy's confusion, as the manipular legion was obsolete by his day. The elaborate maneuver described in the last section was workable only on flat and level ground.

Document

[8.8] The foremost line consisted of the *hastati*, formed into fifteen maniples, stationed at a short distance from each other. These were called the light-armed maniples, as while one-third carried a long spear (*hasta*) and short iron javelins, the remainder carried shields. This front line consisted of very young men just old enough for service. Behind them were

stationed an equal number of maniples called *principes*, made up of mature men, all carrying shields and equipped with superior weapons. This body of thirty maniples were called the *antepilani*. Behind them were the standards under which were stationed fifteen *ordines*, which were divided into three sections called *vexillae*, the first section in each was called the *pilus*, and they consisted of 180 men to every standard (*vexillum*). The first *vexillum* was followed by the *triarii*, veterans of proved courage; the second by the *rorarii*, or “skirmishers,” younger men and less distinguished; the third by the *accensi*, who were least to be depended upon, and were therefore placed in the rearmost line.

When the battle formation of the army was completed, the *hastati* were the first to engage. If they failed to repulse the enemy, they slowly retired through the intervals between the *ordines* of the *principes* who then took up the fight, the *hastati* following in their rear.... If the *principes* were also unsuccessful, they slowly retired to the *triarii*, which has given rise to the proverbial saying, when people are in great difficulty “matters have come down to the *triarii*.” When the *triarii* had admitted the *hastati* and *principes* through the intervals separating their *ordines* they rose from their kneeling posture and instantly closing their *ordines* up they blocked all passage through them and in one compact mass fell on the enemy as the last hope of the army.

Source: Livy. 1912. *The History of Rome*. Translated by W. M. Roberts. Everyman’s Library. New York: E. P. Dutton & Company; adapted by Sara E. Phang.

4. Livy *History of Rome* 22.45–51: The Battle of Cannae (216 BCE)

Introduction

The battle of Cannae (216 BCE) was one of Rome’s worst defeats. Lucius Aemilius Paullus, the consul in this scene, was the father of the Aemilius Paullus who is featured in an entry in this encyclopedia. The Senate, refusing to ransom Roman prisoners, also repudiated as cowards the Roman soldiers who fled from the battle of Cannae.

Document

[22.45–51] On the right, nearest the river, the Roman cavalry were posted, then came the infantry; on the extreme left were the cavalry of the allies, their infantry were between them and the Roman legions. The javelin men with the rest of the light-armed auxiliaries formed the front line. The consuls took their stations on the wings, Terentius Varro on the left, Aemilius Paullus on the right.

At dawn Hannibal sent forward the Balearics and the other light infantry. He then crossed the river in person and as each division came across he assigned it its place in the line. The Gaulish and Spanish horse he posted near the bank on the left wing in front of the Roman cavalry; the right wing was assigned to the Numidian troopers. The center consisted of a strong force of infantry, the Gauls and Spaniards in the middle, the Africans at either end.... Hasdrubal was in command of the left wing, Maharbal of the right; Hannibal himself with his brother Mago commanded the center....

When the battle shout was raised the auxiliaries ran forward, and the battle began.... [Hannibal's Gallic and Spanish cavalry repelled the Roman cavalry.] Just as this cavalry battle was finished, the infantry became engaged, and as long as the Gauls and Spaniards kept their ranks unbroken, both sides were equally matched in strength and courage. At length after long and repeated efforts the Romans closed up their ranks, straightened out their front, and by the sheer weight of their deep column bore down the division of the enemy stationed in front of Hannibal's line, and which was too thin and weak to resist the pressure. Without a moment's pause they followed up their broken and hastily retreating foe till they fled headlong. Cutting their way through the mass of fugitives, who offered no resistance, they penetrated as far as the Africans who were stationed on both wings, somewhat further back than the Gauls and Spaniards who had formed the advanced center. As the latter fell back the whole front became level, and as they continued to give ground it became concave and crescent-shaped, the Africans at either end forming the horns. As the Romans rushed on incautiously between them, they were attacked by the two wings, which extended and closed round them in the rear. On this, the Romans, who had fought one battle to no purpose, left the Gauls and Spaniards, whose rear they had been slaughtering, and commenced a fresh struggle with the Africans. The contest was very one-sided, for not only were they surrounded on all sides, but tired by the previous fighting they encountered fresh and vigorous opponents.

[The Numidians staged a diversion. The fatally wounded consul Aemilius Paullus told Cn. Lentulus to return to Rome and warn the Senate and people, and returned to the battle, where he died; the other consul escaped.]

Such was the battle of Cannae, a battle as famous as the disastrous one at the Allia; not so serious in its results, owing to the inaction of the enemy, but more serious and more horrible in view of the slaughter of the army.

Source: Livy. 1912. *The History of Rome*. Translated by W. M. Roberts. Everyman's Library. New York: E. P. Dutton & Company; adapted by Sara E. Phang.

5. Livy *History of Rome* 28.24: Mutiny at Sucro (206 BCE)

Introduction

Late in the Second Punic War (218–201 BCE), Scipio Africanus (so termed to distinguish him from other Scipios in this encyclopedia, though the cognomen Africanus was given him after his victory over Hannibal) had taken command of the Roman army in Spain. While Scipio Africanus was ill, his soldiers mutinied over arrears in their pay. That idleness causes mutiny was a cultural stereotype.

Document

[28.24] ... The vague rumors of their commander's death were not however the primary cause of their mutiny. A long period of inactivity had, as usual, demoralized them, and they resented the restraints of peace after being accustomed to live on the plunder captured from the enemy. At first their discontent was confined to murmurs among themselves.... Then they demanded their unpaid wages with an insolence quite inconsistent with military discipline or the respect which soldiers should show towards their officers..... They drove the tribunes from their official seats, and then out of the camp, and amidst universal acclamation gave the supreme command to the chief ringleaders of the mutiny, two common soldiers whose names were [Gaius] Albius of Cales and [Gaius] Atrius, an Umbrian....

Source: Livy. 1912. *The History of Rome*. Translated by W. M. Roberts. Everyman's Library. New York: E. P. Dutton & Company; adapted by Sara

E. Phang.

6. Livy *History of Rome* 45.29: Rome Partitions Macedon (167 BCE)

Introduction

Following the defeat of King Perseus of Macedon's forces in the Battle of Pydna (168 BCE), the Roman consul Lucius Aemilius Paullus and 10 deputies from the Roman Senate reorganized Macedon. Another outcome of the Third Macedonian War was that from this time onward Roman citizens did not pay tributum (tax).

Document

[45.29] Aemilius [Paullus] ordered the councils of ten from all the cities to assemble at Amphipolis and to bring with them all their archives and documents, and all the money due to the royal treasury. When the day arrived he advanced to the tribunal, where he took his seat with the ten commissioners, surrounded by a vast crowd of Macedonians. Though they were accustomed to the display of royal power, this novel assertion of authority filled them with fear.... After the herald had called for silence Paullus, speaking in Latin, explained the arrangements decided upon by the Senate and by himself together with the ten commissioners; Gnaeus Octavius, who was also present, translated the address into Greek. First of all, the Macedonians were to be a free people, possessing their cities and fields as before, enjoying their own laws and customs and electing their annual magistrates. They were to pay to Rome half the tribute which they had been paying to the king. Secondly, Macedonia was to be broken up into four separate cantons.

Source: Livy. 1912. *The History of Rome*. Translated by W. M. Roberts. Everyman's Library. New York: E. P. Dutton & Company; adapted by Sara E. Phang.

Polybius (ca. 200–118 BCE)

Polybius of Megalopolis was a Greek politician and military officer who became a hostage of the Romans following the Third Macedonian War. He

befriended important Romans and was freed around 150. He wrote a history of Rome from the First Punic War (264–241 BCE) that emphasized Rome's growth into a world power in the ancient Mediterranean. His main focus is narrative, emphasizing military and diplomatic affairs, but his sixth chapter contains a long description of Roman political and military institutions.

7. Polybius *Histories* 6.19, 21, 26 (excerpts): Organization and Recruitment of the Legion (Third–Second Century BCE)

Introduction

Polybius describes how the Romans organized the dilectus (levy) and recruited officers and allied forces. His description of the division of the manipular legion into age-grouped ranks resembles that of Livy 8.8, but probably is more reliable than Livy, as Polybius was able to observe the manipular legion for himself, whereas it had been obsolete for almost a century when Livy wrote.

Document

[6.19] After electing the consuls, they appoint military tribunes, fourteen who have five years' service and ten who have ten. As for the rest, a cavalry soldier must serve for ten years in all and an infantry soldier for sixteen years before reaching the age of forty-six, with the exception of those whose census is under four hundred drachmae.... In emergencies twenty years' service is demanded from the infantry. No one may hold any political office before he has completed ten years' service.

Source: Polybius. 1923. *Histories*. Translated by W. R. Paton. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; adapted by Sara E. Phang.

[6.19, continued] When the consuls in office wish to hold a levy they announce to the people that day on which all men of military age must assemble. This is done each year. On the appointed day, when those fit for service have arrived in Rome and after they have assembled on the Capitoline, the more junior tribunes divide themselves up in the order in which they were elected or appointed by the consuls into four groups, because the primary division of their force is into four parts. They assign the

four tribunes elected first to the first legion, the next three to the second, the following four to the third and the last three to the fourth legion. The first two senior tribunes are assigned to the first legion, the next three to the second. Then two are assigned to the third and the last three to the fourth. Such is the division and assignment of the tribunes that each legion has the same number of tribunes.

After this, the tribunes have separated and been grouped according to the legion to which they are assigned. They summon the tribes one by one according to lot. From the first tribe they select four young men as like each other as possible in age and physical condition, The four are brought forward and the tribunes of the first legion select one of them, then those of the second legion choose the next, then the tribunes of the third legion make their choice and finally those of the fourth make their selection. Then another four are brought forward and the tribunes of the second legion have first choice and so forth with the tribunes of the first legion choosing last. After this another four men are brought forward and the tribunes of the third have first choice while those of the second have last choice. So with this rotation of choice it results that the men in each legion are approximately the same. They continue until they reach the required number of men, that is 4,200, sometimes 5,000, when the situation is especially serious. They used to choose the cavalry last; now they do it first, and the selection is now done by the censor on the basis of wealth, with 300 assigned to each legion.

...

[6.21] When the recruits arrive on the appointed day, they [the tribunes] divide them up. The youngest and poorest form the *velites* [light-armed]. The group next to them is assigned to the *hastati*. Those in the prime of life make up the *principes* and the oldest men are allotted to the *triarii*. These are the differences within the four groups in the Roman legion that differ in name, age, and equipment. They divide them in the following manner [in each legion]: the oldest men called the *triarii* number 600, the *principes* 1,200 and they assign an equal number to the *hastati*. The remainder who are the youngest are the *velites* [light-armed]. If a legion larger than 4,000 men is required they increase the number of men in each line in proportion except for the *triarii*. These always number 600.

Source: Sage, Michael M., ed. 2008. *The Republican Roman Army: A*

Sourcebook. London/New York: Routledge, pp. 122–23; 70–71. Used by permission of Taylor & Francis.

[6.26] The allies having now assembled also at the same places as the Romans, their organization and command are undertaken by the twelve officers appointed by the consuls known as *praefecti sociorum*. From all the assembled allies, they first of all select ... the horsemen and infantry most fitted for actual service, these being known as *extraordinarii*, that is “select.” The total number of allied infantry usually equals the Roman [infantry], while the cavalry are three times as many. Of these they assign about a third of the cavalry and a fifth of the infantry to the picked corps; the rest they divide into two bodies, the right wing and the left.

Source: Polybius. 1923. *Histories*. Translated by W. R. Paton. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; adapted by Sara E. Phang.

8. Polybius *Histories* 10.15–16: How the Romans Sacked Cities (209 BCE)

Introduction

Extreme violence was typical of the Roman sack of cities; see Ziolkowski 1993. The first excerpt depicts the sack of New Carthage by Scipio Africanus and his troops in 209 BCE; the second is Polybius’ description of Roman general practice. Polybius is tendentious in depicting Roman plundering as an entirely organized and controlled activity, and in general idealizes the Roman army.

Document

[10.15] When Scipio thought that enough troops had entered [New Carthage], he sent most of them, as is the Roman custom, against the inhabitants of the city with orders to kill all they encountered, sparing none, and not to start pillaging until the signal was given. They do this, I think, to inspire terror, so that when towns are captured by the Romans one may often see not only the corpses of human beings, but dogs cut in half, and the dismembered limbs of other animals.

Source: Polybius. 1925. *Histories*. Translated by W. R. Paton. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; adapted by Sara E. Phang.

[10.16] The following is a description of the Roman procedure after the capture of cities. Either a number of men in accordance with the size of the town are assigned to the collection of booty from each manipule or a number of maniples [from each legion] are allotted the task. They never assign more than half of the army to this duty. The rest remain on guard in formation, sometimes outside the town and at times within it at the ready. Their armies usually have two legions, as well as an equal number of allies; rarely, the armies have four Roman legions. Those assigned to gathering the booty take it to their respective legion, and after the booty has been sold the military tribunes distribute an equal share to each soldier, not only to those on guard but also those guarding the tents and to the sick and those on detached duty. I have already written in detail in my section on the Roman constitution about the fact that no one appropriates the booty for himself but keeps faith with the oath they all have sworn when they first assembled in camp at the point when they were setting out on campaign.

Source: Sage, Michael M., ed. 2008. *The Republican Roman Army: A Sourcebook*. London/New York: Routledge, pp. 210–11. Used by permission of Taylor & Francis.

9. Polybius *Histories* 6.37, 39, 53: Roman Military and Cultural Practices (Third–Second Century BCE)

Introduction

Besides describing Roman political and military institutions, Polybius also describes cultural practices that motivated soldiers and elite officers, including discipline (depicted as particularly harsh) and military decorations. His account of aristocratic funerals suggests the pressure felt by men of noble families to live up to their ancestors' heroic deeds.

Document

[6.37] If the mistake has been made by a member of the guard, the man in charge of the guard can immediately clear matters up by calling upon his

fellows as witnesses, and he is obligated to do this. If nothing of the kind has taken place the blame comes back upon him. Immediately, a tribunal composed of all the military tribunes is set up. It tries him and if he is found guilty he is beaten with a wooden club. A tribune picks up the club and only touches the condemned with it; then all the soldiers in the camp attack him with clubs and stones. They kill the majority of the condemned in the camp itself, but there is no safety for those who manage to escape. How could there be? They cannot return to their homeland. Would any of their relations dare to take them into their homes? As a result those who have once fallen victim to such misfortune are completely destroyed. The optio and the prefect of the cavalry squadron suffer the same punishment if they do not transmit the necessary orders at the specified time to the guard and to the commander of the next cavalry squadron. It is because the Romans punish so harshly and implacably that their night guard posts execute their duty without fault.

Common soldiers must obey the tribunes and they in turn the consuls. The tribune is also in charge of fines, holding goods as pledges and inflicting beatings, while the prefects do the same for the allies. Beating with clubs is also inflicted on those who steal from the camp, those who give false witness, and young men who are discovered abusing themselves. In addition, those who are convicted of a third offense on the same charge are punished in this way. These offenses are punished as crimes. But the following are held to be cowardly acts and shameful conduct in a soldier: if someone makes a false report to the tribunes of his courage in battle for the sake of obtaining reward; likewise if someone assigned to a reserve unit leaves his post for reasons of cowardice; also if someone throws away any of his equipment in fear. These are the reasons that men in reserve units often face certain death, refusing to leave their post though facing many times their number. Some who have discarded their shields or dagger or some other piece of equipment throw themselves upon the enemy without thought, hoping either to regain what they had thrown away or by dying to escape public shame and the mockery of their relatives.

Source: Sage, Michael M., ed. 2008. *The Republican Roman Army: A Sourcebook*. London/New York: Routledge, pp. 226–227. Used by permission of Taylor & Francis.

[6.39] They also have a commendable way of encouraging the young men to brave danger. Whenever there is a battle and some of their troops have distinguished themselves, the general calls an assembly of the army and brings forward those who he thinks have distinguished themselves. He first speaks in praise of each man's courage and mentions anything else they have done that merits mention. After this he gives a *gaision* to the man who has wounded the enemy; to the soldier who has taken an enemy prisoner and stripped him he gives a *phiale* if he belongs to the infantry, or *phalerae* if he is a cavalry trooper, though originally the award was a javelin. These awards are not made if the enemy is wounded or stripped in the course of a regular battle or in the storming of a city, but for actions in skirmishes or other such occasions when there is no need for single combat. The recipients must engage willingly and deliberately.

They give a gold crown to those who are the first to mount the wall during the capture of a city. In the same way, the consul marks out with gifts those who have shielded and saved the lives of citizens or allies.

Source: Sage, Michael M., ed. 2008. *The Republican Roman Army: A Sourcebook*. London/New York: Routledge, pp. 214–215. Used by permission of Taylor & Francis.

[6.53] Whenever any illustrious man dies, [his body] is carried at his funeral into the forum to the so-called Rostra [the speakers' platform].... Here with all the people standing round, a grown-up son ... or some other relative mounts the rostra and describes the virtues and successful achievements of the dead..... Next after the interment and the performance of the usual ceremonies, they place the image of the departed in the most conspicuous position in the house, enclosed in a wooden shrine. This image is a mask faithfully reproducing both the features and complexion of the deceased. On the occasion of public sacrifices they display these images, and decorate them with much care, and when any distinguished member of the family dies they take them to the funeral, putting them on men [of the family] who bear the closest resemblance to the original [men] in height and build. These representatives wear togas, with a purple border if the deceased was a consul or praetor, whole purple if he was a censor, and embroidered with gold if he had celebrated a triumph or achieved anything similar. They all ride in chariots preceded by the fasces, axes, and other

insignia associated with the magistracies which the ancestors held in their lifetimes, and when they arrive at the rostra they all seat themselves in a row on ivory chairs. There could not easily be a more ennobling spectacle for a young man who aspires to fame and virtue.

Source: Polybius. 1923. *Histories*. Translated by W. R. Paton. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; adapted by Sara E. Phang.

Appian (First Century CE)

Appian of Alexandria was a Greek author of the late first century CE who wrote a “History of Rome” that was subdivided into geographical regions, for which the surviving sections are named: *Punike* (The Punic Wars), *Iberike* (Spanish Wars), and so on. Part of this work, termed the *Bella Civilia* or Civil Wars, treated the civil wars of the Late Republic from c. 133 BCE to Actium. Continuous narrative of this period is otherwise unsatisfactory; Plutarch’s biographies survive, but Cassius Dio’s history of the late Republic survives only in summary (see Dio section below).

10. Appian, *Punic Wars* 76, 80–1, 132–33: The Third Punic War (149–146 BCE)

Introduction

In the Third Punic War (149–146 BCE), the Romans laid siege to Carthage (the state of Carthage had been reduced by the First and Second Punic Wars to little more than the city of Carthage) and destroyed it. The description of the initial negotiations illustrates formal elements of the Roman declaration of war, in which representatives presented their demands three ritual times, but also illustrates the cynical attitude of the Romans at this time in making demands they knew the Carthaginians could not meet.

Document

[76] The Senate was convened and it told the [Carthaginian envoys] that if, within thirty days, the Carthaginians gave to the consuls, who were still in Sicily, three hundred children of their noblest families as hostages, and obeyed their orders in other respects, the freedom and autonomy of

Carthage would be preserved and that they would retain their lands in Africa ... [The Carthaginian envoys returned to Carthage and sent the hostages. The envoys returned to the Roman army, now at Utica.]

....

[80–1] Then [consul Lucius Marcius] Censorinus rose and replied as follows: “Why should I tell you the causes of the war, O Carthaginians, when your ambassadors have been at Rome and have learned them from the Senate? What you have stated falsely, I will refute. The decree itself declared, and we notified you in Sicily when we received the hostages, that the rest of the conditions would be revealed to you at Utica. For your promptness in sending the hostages and your care in selecting them, you deserve praise. If you sincerely desire peace why do you need any arms? Bring all your weapons and engines of war, both public and private, and deliver them to us.”

When he had thus spoken the ambassadors said that they would also comply with this order, but that they did not know how they could defend themselves against Hasdrubal, whom they had condemned to death, and who was now leading 20,000 men against them, and was already encamped near Carthage. When the consul said that he would take care of Hasdrubal they promised to deliver up their arms.

[The Carthaginians complied with the Roman orders.]

[Consul Lucius Marcius Censorinus said to the Carthaginian envoys:] “Your ready obedience up to this point, O Carthaginians, in the matter of the hostages and the arms, is praiseworthy. In cases of necessity we must not multiply words. Bear bravely the remaining commands of the Senate. Yield Carthage to us, and go where you like within your own territory at a distance of at least fifteen kilometers from the sea, for we are resolved to raze your city to the ground.” [The Carthaginians refused and war ensued.]

...

[132–33] Scipio [Aemilianus]... beholding [the destruction of Carthage], is said to have wept and publicly lamented the fortune of the enemy.

After thinking by himself a long time and reflecting on the rise and fall of cities, nations, and empires, as well as of individuals, upon the fate of Troy, that once proud city, upon that of the Assyrians, the Medes, and the Persians, greatest of all, and later the splendid Macedonian empire, either voluntarily or otherwise the words of the poet escaped his lips:

The day shall come in which our sacred Troy
And Priam, and the people over whom
Spear-bearing Priam rules, shall perish all.

[Homer, *Iliad*, 6.448–449; from Bryant, W. C., trans. 1870. *The Iliad of Homer*. Boston: Fields, Osgood, and Company.]

Being asked by Polybius in private conversation (for Polybius had been his mentor) what he meant by using these words, [Scipio] said that he did not hesitate frankly to name his own country, for whose fate he feared when he considered the mutability of human affairs. And Polybius wrote this down just as he heard it.

Source: Appian. 1912. *Appian's Roman History*. Translated by Horace White. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; adapted by Sara E. Phang.

11. Appian, *Spanish Wars* 49–53, 82–83, 84–86: The Spanish Wars (Mid-Second Century BCE)

Introduction

These passages (probably based on Polybius) display the range of Roman motivations for imperialism. The consul of 151, Lucius Licinius Lucullus (an ancestor of the late Republican Lucullus), desired glory and plunder, probably because running for office had left him in debt; since Spain was far from Rome, the Senate could not control his actions. Scipio Aemilianus, a junior officer at this time, fought a duel with an enemy champion (see “monomachy”). The Spanish wars suffered numerous reverses, the surrender of Mancinus (App. Iber. 82–83) being among the most shameful. Now middle-aged and the victor of Carthage, Scipio Aemilianus was elected consul for 134 and sent to Spain to discipline a demoralized Roman army and inflict vengeance on the Numantines.

Document

[49–52] Lucullus desiring glory and needing money ... invaded the territory of the Vaccaeii, another Celtiberian tribe, neighbors of the Arevaci, against whom the Senate had not declared war.... Crossing the river Tagus he came to the settlement of Cauca, and pitched his camp near it. The citizens asked

him what he had come for and why he wanted war, and when he replied that he had come to aid the Carpetani whom the Vaccaeii had maltreated they retired inside their walls, from which they sallied out and attacked his woodcutters and foragers, killing many and pursuing the remainder to the camp. When battle was joined the Caucaeii, who resembled light-armed troops, had the advantage at first, but when they had expended all their spears they had to run away, not being accustomed to a pitched battle, and while forcing their way through the gates about 3,000 of them were killed.

The next day the elders of the settlement came out wearing wreaths on their heads and bearing olive-branches [as conventional suppliants], and asked Lucullus what they should do to establish friendly relations [with Rome]. He replied that they must give hostages and 100 talents of silver, and furnish a contingent of horse to the Roman army. When all these demands had been complied with, he asked that a Roman garrison should be admitted to the settlement. When the Caucaeii assented to this he brought in 2,000 picked soldiers, to whom he gave orders to occupy the walls after being admitted. When this was done, Lucullus introduced the rest of his army and ordered them at the sound of the trumpet to kill all the adult males of the Caucaeii..... Lucullus sacked the settlement and brought infamy upon the Roman name. The rest of the barbarians collecting together from the fields took refuge among inaccessible rocks or in the most strongly fortified towns, carrying away what they could, and burning everything else, to deprive Lucullus of plunder....

[53] There was a certain barbarian remarkable for his splendid armor, who frequently rode into the space between the armies and challenged the Romans to single combat, and when nobody accepted the challenge he jeered at them, made insulting gestures, and went back. After he had done this several times, Scipio [Aemilianus], who was still a young man, felt very much aggrieved, and springing forward accepted the challenge. Fortunately he won the victory over this giant although he was himself a man of small size.

....

[82-3] [The consul Gaius Hostilius] Mancinus had frequent encounters with the Numantines in which he was defeated, and finally, after great loss, took refuge in his camp. On a false rumor that the Cantabri and Vaccaeii were coming to the aid of the Numantines, he became alarmed, extinguished his fires, and fled in the darkness of night to a deserted place

where [Marcus Fulvius] Nobilior once had a camp. Being trapped in this place at daybreak without preparation or fortification and surrounded by Numantines, who threatened to kill them all unless he made peace, [Mancinus] agreed to terms.... To this agreement he bound himself by an oath.

When these things were known at Rome there was great indignation at this most shameful treaty, and the other consul, [Marcus] Aemilius Lepidus, was sent to Spain, Mancinus being called home to stand trial. The Numantine ambassadors followed him there.

....[The Senate] decided to deliver Mancinus to the Numantines for making a disgraceful treaty without their authorization.... Mancinus was taken to Spain by Furius, and delivered naked to the Numantines [as a slave], but they refused to receive him.

....

[84–86].... When [Scipio Aemilianus] arrived [at Numantia], he expelled all traders and prostitutes; also the soothsayers and diviners, whom the soldiers constantly consulted because they were demoralized by defeat. For the future he forbade the bringing in of anything unnecessary, or any victims for purposes of divination. He ordered all wagons and their superfluous contents to be sold, and all pack animals, except such as he designated, to remain. Their cooking utensils were restricted to only a [cooking] spit, a brass kettle, and one cup per man....

Thus in a short time he brought them back to good order....

[Scipio] did not venture to engage the enemy until he had trained his men by many strenuous exercises. He traversed all the neighboring plains, and daily fortified new camps one after another, and then demolished them, dug deep trenches and filled them up again, constructed high walls and overthrew them, personally overlooking the work from morning till night.

Source: Appian. 1912. *Appian's Roman History*. Translated by Horace White. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; adapted by Sara E. Phang.

12. Appian, *Mithridatic Wars* 51, 94, 96–7: The Mithridatic Wars (88–66 BCE)

Introduction

Rome's wars with King Mithridates VI of Pontus, an energetic ruler who overran Asia Minor and threatened Greece, lasted from the 80s to the 60s BCE. After his first march on Rome in 88, Lucius Cornelius Sulla transferred command of the Mithridatic War to himself and departed with his army to the East, enabling the Marians to take over at Rome (see "Marian-Sullan Conflict"). The Mithridatic Wars appear to have caused an epidemic of piracy in the Mediterranean, to combat which Pompey was voted special imperium in 67 BCE. Pompey was subsequently voted another extraordinary command against Mithridates.

Document

[51] As [Sulla] had no news of Lucullus he began to build ships for himself [for his expedition against Mithridates VI]. At this juncture [Lucius] Cornelius Cinna and Gaius Marius, his rivals at home, declared Sulla an enemy of the Roman people, destroyed his city and country houses, and murdered his friends. This, however, did not weaken [Sulla] in the least, since he had a zealous and devoted army.

[94, 96-7] When the Romans could no longer bear the damage and disgrace [of pirates infesting the Mediterranean Sea], they made Gnaeus Pompey, who was then their man of greatest reputation, commander by law for three years, with absolute power over the whole sea within the Pillars of Hercules, and of the land for a distance of 75 kilometers from the coast.

.... Never did any man before Pompey set forth with so great authority conferred upon him by the Romans. Presently he had an army of 120,000 foot and 4,000 horse, and 270 ships.... He had twenty-five legates ... among whom he divided the sea, giving ships, cavalry, and infantry to each, and investing them with the insignia of praetors, to give each man absolute authority over the part entrusted to him, while he, Pompey, like a king of kings, [oversaw their campaigns]....

Pompey [brought] ... forces of various kinds and many [siege] engines, as he expected to encounter every kind of fighting and every kind of siege against the rock-bound citadels [of the pirates]; but he needed nothing. The terror of his name and the greatness of his preparations caused the pirates to panic. They hoped that if they did not resist they might receive lenient treatment. [The pirates surrendered to Pompey, who burned their war material, confiscated their ships, and freed their captives.]

Thus the war against the pirates, which people thought would prove

very difficult, was brought to an end by Pompey in a few days.....

For this victory, so swiftly and unexpectedly gained, the Romans extolled Pompey beyond measure; and while he was still in Cilicia they chose him commander of the war against Mithridates, giving Pompey the same unlimited powers as before, to make war and peace as he liked, and to proclaim nations friends or enemies as he saw fit. They gave him command of all the forces beyond the borders of Italy. All these powers had never been given to any one general before.

Source: Appian. 1912. *Appian's Roman History*. Translated by Horace White. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; adapted by Sara E. Phang.

13. Appian, *Civil Wars* 1.57, 95, 100: The Marian-Sullan Conflict (88–82 BCE)

Introduction

The first excerpt below (1.57) describes Sulla's leadership of his army in his first march on Rome in 88; the second passage, after Sulla's second march on and capture of Rome in 82, describes how Sulla proceeded to inflict a purge on his enemies, proscribing them (see "Proscriptions"). The third passage describes Sulla's dictatorship and reform of the Roman state, increasing the power of the Senate and weakening the tribunes and assemblies.

Document

[1.57] ...[Sulla] resolved to decide the question by war, and called the army together to a conference. They were eager for the war against Mithridates because it promised much plunder, and they feared that Marius would enlist other soldiers instead of themselves. Sulla spoke of how Sulpicius and Marius had insulted him, and while he did not openly allude to anything else (for he did not dare as yet to mention this sort of [civil] war), he urged them to be ready to obey his orders. They understood what he meant, and as they feared missing the campaign, they uttered boldly what Sulla had in mind, and told him to be bold, and to lead them to Rome. Sulla was overjoyed and led six legions there at once; but all his superior officers, except one quaestor, left him and fled to [Rome], because they refused to lead an army against their country. Envoys met [Sulla] on the road and

asked him why he was marching with armed forces against his country. "To deliver her from tyrants," he replied.

[1.95] Sulla himself called the Roman people together in an assembly and orated to them, inflating his own exploits and making other menacing statements in order to inspire terror. He finished by saying that he would make changes which would be beneficial to the people if they obeyed him, but that he would spare none of his enemies, but would treat them with the utmost severity. He would take vengeance by strong measures on the praetors, quaestors, military tribunes, and everybody else who had committed any hostile act [against him].... After saying this he at once proscribed about forty senators and 1,600 knights. He seems to have been the first to make a formal list of those whom he punished, to offer prizes to assassins and rewards to informers, and to threaten with punishment those who concealed the proscribed. Shortly afterward he added the names other senators to the proscription. Some of these, taken unawares, were killed wherever they were caught, in their houses, in the streets, or in the temples.... Others were dragged through the city and trampled on, none of the spectators daring to utter a word of protest against these horrors. Banishment was inflicted upon some and confiscation upon others. Spies searched everywhere for those who had fled from the city, and those whom they caught they killed.

[1.100] Nevertheless, by way of maintaining the form of the republic he allowed them to appoint consuls.... But Sulla, like a reigning monarch, was dictator over the consuls. Twenty-four axes were carried in front of him as dictator, the same number that were carried before the ancient kings, and he also had a large bodyguard..... He forbade anybody to hold the office of praetor until after he had held that of quaestor, or to be consul before he had been praetor, and he prohibited any man from holding the same office a second time till after the lapse of ten years. He reduced the [power of tribunes] to almost nothing. He curtailed it by a law which provided that a tribune of the plebs should never afterward hold any other office; as a result, all men of reputation or family, who formerly competed for this office, avoided it thereafter.... To the Senate itself, which had been much thinned by the seditions and wars, he added about 300 members from the wealthiest equestrians, taking the vote of the tribes on each one..... [Sulla] distributed to the twenty-three legions that had served under him a great deal of land in the various communities ... some of which was public property and some

seized from the communities as fines.

Source: Appian. 1913. *Appian's Roman History*. Translated by Horace White. Loeb Classical Library. Vol. III. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; adapted by Sara E. Phang.

14. Appian, *Civil Wars* 1.pr.4, 2.47: Caesarian-Pompeian Civil War (49–45 BCE)

Introduction

The Caesarian-Pompeian civil war (49–45 BCE) and the triumviral wars (44–31 BCE) were afterward considered as one long period of civil war, which the Greco-Roman elite authors believed was driven by the greed of the soldiers as well as the ambition of their generals.

Document

[1.pr.4]... When ordered by the Senate to lay down his command [in Gaul, Caesar] excused himself on the ground that this was not the wish of the Senate, but of Pompey, his enemy, who commanded an army in Italy and planned to depose him. So he sent proposals that either both should retain their armies, so neither need fear the other's enmity, or that both he and Pompey also should dismiss their forces and live as private citizens under the laws. Both suggestions being refused, [Caesar] marched from Gaul against Pompey into Roman territory, entered Rome, and finding Pompey fled, pursued him into Thessaly, won a brilliant victory over him in a great battle [Pharsalus, 48 BCE], and followed him to Egypt. [Pompey was assassinated by the Egyptians.]

[2.47] Caesar's army mutinied at Placentia, reproaching their officers for prolonging the war and not paying them the five minae that Caesar had promised them as a donative while they were still at Brundisium. When Caesar heard of this he hurried from Massilia to Placentia and coming before the soldiers, who were still mutinous, [reproached them, saying: "... Witnessing my previous generosity to you, I shall now execute the law of our country by decimating the ninth legion, where this mutiny began." Straightway a cry went up from the whole legion, and the officers threw themselves at Caesar's feet in supplication. Caesar yielded little by little and so far remitted the punishment as to designate 120 only (the apparent

leaders of the revolt), and chose twelve of these by lot to be put to death. One of the twelve proved that he was absent when the conspiracy was formed, and Caesar put to death in his stead the centurion who had accompanied him.

Source: Appian. 1913. *Appian's Roman History*. Translated by Horace White. Loeb Classical Library. Vol. III. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; adapted by Sara E. Phang.

15. Appian, *Civil Wars* 3.11–12, 4.2, 6, 11, 5.12–13: The Triumviral Wars (44–31 BCE)

Introduction

As Caesar's heir, Octavian took the name Gaius Julius Caesar Octavianus (termed Caesar in Appian's text, but changed to Octavian to avoid confusion) and inherited the loyalty of Caesar's veterans, whose support he drew on in his unprecedented bids for power. Once Octavian, Antony, and Lepidus joined forces as triumvirs (passage 2), they began to purge their enemies (see "Proscriptions"). The decree in 4.11 (third passage) originally gave the prices for heads in denarii. In the fourth passage, Appian explains how the late Republic's warlords and armies were dependent on each other.

Document

[3.11–12] When more accurate information about the murder [of Caesar] and the public grief reached [Octavian], together with copies of Caesar's will and the decrees of the Senate, his relatives cautioned [Octavian] all the more to beware of Caesar's enemies, as he was the latter's adopted son and heir. They even advised him to renounce the adoption, together with the inheritance. But [Octavian] thought that to do so, and not to avenge Caesar, would be disgraceful. So he went to Brundisium, first sending in advance to see that none of the murderers had laid any trap for him. When the army there advanced to meet him, and received him as Caesar's son, he took courage and offered sacrifice.... Directly multitudes of men from all sides flocked to him as Caesar's son, some from friendship to Caesar, others his freedmen and slaves, and with them soldiers besides, who were either bringing supplies and money to the army in Macedonia, or bringing other money and tribute from other countries to Brundisium.

.... Caesar's veterans ... flocked from their settlements to greet the young man. They bewailed Caesar, and cursed Antony for not proceeding against the monstrous crime, and said that they would avenge it if anybody would lead them. Octavian praised them, but postponed the matter for the present and sent them away.

[4.2] Octavian and Antony reconciled their differences on a small, depressed islet in the river Lavinius, near the city of Mutina..... They conferred from morning till night for two days, and came to these decisions: that Octavian would resign the consulship and that Ventidius would take it for the remainder of the year; that a new magistracy for quieting the civil dissensions would be created by law, which Lepidus, Antony, and Octavian would hold for five years with consular power...; that these three would at once designate the yearly magistrates of the city for the five years; that they would divide the provinces, giving to Antony the whole of Gaul except the part bordering the Pyrenees Mountains, which was called Old Gaul; this, together with Spain, was assigned to Lepidus; while Octavian was to have Africa, Sardinia, and Sicily, and the other nearby islands.

[4.6, 11] [Octavian, Antony, and Lepidus] postponed the proscription of most of their victims, but they decided to send executioners in advance and without warning to kill twelve, or, as some say, seventeen, of the most important ones, among whom was Cicero. Four of these were killed immediately, either at banquets or as they were met on the streets; and when search was made for the others in temples and houses, there was a sudden panic which lasted through the night, and a running to and fro with cries and lamentation as in a captured city.

.... Let no one harbor any one of those whose names are hereto appended, or conceal them, or send them away, or be corrupted by their money. Whoever shall be detected in saving, or aiding, or conniving with them we will put on the list of the proscribed without allowing any excuse or pardon. Let those who kill the proscribed bring us their heads and receive the following rewards: to a free man 25,000 Attic drachmas per head; to a slave his freedom and 10,000 Attic drachmas and his master's right of citizenship. Informers shall receive the same rewards. In order that they may remain unknown the names of those who receive the rewards shall not be inscribed in our registers.

[5.12–13] The task of assigning the soldiers to their colonies and dividing the land was extremely difficult. For the soldiers demanded the

cities chosen for them before the war as prizes for their valor, and the cities demanded that the whole of Italy share the burden, or that the cities cast lots with the other cities, and that those who gave the land be paid its cash value; and there was no money....

Octavian explained to the cities the necessity of the case, but he knew that it would not satisfy them; and it did not. The soldiers encroached upon their neighbours, insolently seizing more than had been given to them and choosing the best lands; nor did they cease even when Octavian rebuked them and gave them numerous other gifts, since they despised their rulers in the knowledge that they needed them to confirm their power, for the five years' term of the triumvirate was nearly over, and army and rulers needed each other's services for mutual security. The leaders [of the late Republic] depended on the soldiers for the continuance of their government, while, in order to keep what they had received, the soldiers depended on the permanence of the regime which had given it. Believing that they could not retain [their property] unless the givers had a strong government, the [soldiers] fought for them, from necessity, with good will.

Source: Appian. 1913. *Appian's Roman History*. Translated by Horace White. Loeb Classical Library. Vol. III. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; adapted by Sara E. Phang.

Plutarch (Late First Century CE)

Plutarch of Chaeronea was a Greek philosopher and biographer who lived between ca. 50 and 120 CE. He wrote many philosophical works that have been collected as Plutarch's *Moralia*, but is most famous for the *Parallel Lives*, a large series of biographies of Greek and Roman leaders, pairing those he believed to be most similar in character and accomplishment (e.g., Alexander the Great and Julius Caesar).

16. Plutarch, *Tiberius Gracchus* 9–10, *Gaius Gracchus* 5, *Marius* 9: Excerpts from the Lives of Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus and Marius (ca. 133–100 BCE)

Introduction

To return to the 130s BCE, the wealthy opposed Tiberius Gracchus' land distribution program, which was intended to promote the recruitment of citizen soldiers. Whether there really was a shortage of citizen recruits rests on economic and demographic studies (see "Demography" and Ligt 2012). They may have been impoverished by a growth in the citizen population, as argued by Rosenstein 2004.

*Seeking reelection as tribune, Tiberius was killed in a riot in which he and his followers, preparing to defend themselves, were viewed as aggressors by Scipio Nasica and other senators, who beat the Gracchans to death with whatever was at hand (Plutarch, Ti. Gracchus 19). Gaius Gracchus, whose proposed policies were wider-ranging, was targeted by a more specific decree, the *senatus consultum ultimum* (see entry).*

*Another recruitment crisis supervened in the 110s, with the invasion of the Germanic Cimbri and Teutones into Roman territory. The Romans lost an alleged 80,000 men at Arausio (105 BCE). Marius took the step of recruiting the landless poor (*capite censi*), though exactly when in his string of consulships (107, 104–100 BCE) is uncertain.*

Plutarch's attitude toward the Gracchi and Marius, whose policies benefited the poor, is very disapproving in part because the imperial elite believed that such policies had brought about the civil wars of the late Republic.

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[Plutarch, *Ti. Gracchus* 9–10] But they accomplished nothing; for Tiberius, striving to support a measure which was honorable and just with an eloquence that would have adorned even a meaner cause, was formidable and invincible, whenever, with the people crowding around the rostra, he took his stand there and pleaded for the poor. "The wild beasts that roam over Italy," he would say, "have every one of them a cave or lair to lurk in; but the men who fight and die for Italy enjoy the common air and light, indeed, but nothing else; houseless and homeless they wander about with their wives and children. And it is with lying lips that their *imperators* exhort the soldiers in their battles to defend sepulchres and shrines from the enemy; for not a man of them has an hereditary altar, not one of all these many Romans an ancestral tomb, but they fight and die to support others in wealth and luxury, and though they are styled masters of the world, they have not a single clod of earth that is their own."

Such words as these, the product of a lofty spirit and genuine feeling, and falling upon the ears of a people profoundly moved and fully aroused to the speaker's support, no adversary of Tiberius could successfully withstand. Abandoning therefore all counter-pleading, they addressed themselves to Marcus Octavius, one of the popular tribunes.... On this account Octavius at first tried to hold himself aloof, out of regard for Tiberius; but he was forced from his position, as it were, by the prayers and supplications of many influential men, so he set himself in opposition to Tiberius and staved off the passage of the law.... Incensed at this procedure, Tiberius withdrew his moderate law, and introduced this time one which was more agreeable to the multitude and more severe against the wrongdoers, since it simply ordered them to vacate without compensation the land which they had acquired in violation of the earlier laws.

[Plutarch, *C. Gracchus* 5] Of the laws which [Gaius] proposed by way of gratifying the people and overthrowing the Senate, one was agrarian, and divided the public land among the poor citizens; another was military, and ordered that clothing should be furnished to the soldiers at the public cost, that nothing should be deducted from their pay to meet this charge, and that no one under seventeen should be enrolled as a soldier; another concerned the allies, and gave the Italians equal suffrage rights with Roman citizens; another related to the supplies of grain, and lowered the market price to the poor; and another dealt with the appointment of judges. This last law most of all curtailed the power of the senators; for they alone could serve as judges in criminal cases, and this privilege made them formidable both to the common people and to the equestrian order. The law of Gracchus, however, added to the membership of the Senate, which was three hundred, three hundred men from the equestrian order, and made service as judges a prerogative of the whole six hundred.

[Plutarch, *Marius* 9] [Marius] was triumphantly elected, and at once began to levy troops. Contrary to law and custom he enlisted many a poor and insignificant man, although former commanders had not accepted such persons, but bestowed arms, just as they would any other honor, only on those whose property assessment made them worthy to receive these, each soldier being supposed to put his substance in pledge to the state.

Source: Plutarch. 1920–1921. *Lives*. Translated by Bernadotte Perrin. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; adapted by

Sara E. Phang.

Sallust (ca. 86–35 BCE)

Gaius Sallustius Crispus (ca. 86–35 BCE) was a Roman politician and military officer, serving as a legate in Caesar's army and as proconsul of Africa. His political career was spotty and he retired to write history. His *Bellum Jugurthinum* (*The Jugurthine War*) and *Bellum Catilinae* (*The War with Catiline*) survive intact; his wider-ranging *Histories* survive only in fragments.

17. Sallust, *Bellum Catilinae* 29, 37–8; The Conspiracy of Catiline (63 BCE)

Introduction

Sallust depicts the followers of Catiline as including Sulla's veterans from the late 80s; at this time, since soldiers were recruited for shorter service than in the Principate, they might still be relatively young men in 63. Cicero, one of the consuls of 63, persuaded the Senate to take extreme measures and pass the senatus consultum ultimum (SCU) which empowered him to use summary measures in defense of the state. The Catilinarians were arrested. After a debate in the Senate in which Caesar advocated clemency and Cato Minor advocated severity, the Senate voted to put the conspirators to death (December 63). Catiline waited outside Rome with an army; in the spring of 62, the Senate sent an army to fight him, defeating him outside of Pistoia.

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[29] When these proceedings were reported to Cicero, he, alarmed by the twofold danger, since he could no longer secure the city against treachery by his private efforts, nor could he find out enough about the size or intentions of the army of Manlius, laid the matter, which was already debated among the people, before the Senate. The Senate, accordingly, as is usual in any crisis, decreed that "let the consuls see to it that the state suffers from no harm." According to Roman practice, the Senate grants this ultimate authority to the magistrate, which authorizes him to raise troops; to make war; to assume unlimited control over the allies and the citizens; to

exercise the chief command and jurisdiction at home and in the field, rights which, without an order of the people, the consul is not permitted to exercise.

[37–8] As for the populace of the city, they had become disaffected from various causes. In the first place, the leaders in crime and profligacy, with others who had squandered their fortunes in dissipation, and, in a word, all whom vice and villainy had driven from their homes, had flocked to Rome as a general cesspool. Furthermore, when they thought of the success of Sulla, which had raised some men from common soldiers to senators, and had enabled others to live in regal luxury and pomp, many hoped for similar results for themselves if they supported a revolt. In addition, young men earning a meager living in the countryside by farm labor, tempted by public and private handouts, preferred idleness in the city to unwelcome toil in the country. To these and all others of similar character, public disorder would furnish subsistence. It is no surprise, therefore, that desperate men, of dissolute principles and extravagant expectations, placed their personal goals above the public interest. Besides, those whose parents had been proscribed by Sulla's victory, whose property had been confiscated, and whose civil rights had been curtailed, looked forward to the event of a war with precisely the same feelings.

Source: Rolfe, John C. 1921. *Sallust*. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; adapted by Sara E. Phang.

Caesar (100–44 BCE)

Gaius Julius Caesar (100–44 BCE) is of course most famous as a politician, general, dictator, and assassination victim. In addition, Caesar was an accomplished writer. His *Gallic Wars* relate the conquest of Gaul in seven books (the eighth was probably written by his subordinate Aulus Hirtius). Caesar's *Civil War* (*Bellum Civile*) narrates his war with Pompey only down to Caesar's arrival in Alexandria after defeating Pompey in the battle of Pharsalus. The other works that finish the narrative of the Caesarian-Pompeian Civil War, the *Alexandrine War*, *African War*, and *Spanish War*, were written by others.

18. Caesar, *Gallic Wars* 2.20–25: Battle of the Sambre (57

BCE)

Introduction

Caesar's army was suddenly attacked by the Nervii, a Gallic people. His depiction of the battle of the Sambre illustrates the role of the Roman general in battle, the use of the standards to guide soldiers, and the emotions experienced in battle. On Caesar's depiction of battle, Lendon 1999; in general Goldsworthy 1996; Sabin 2000.

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[20–25] Caesar had to do everything at once—raise the flag, as signal of a general call to arms; sound the trumpet call; recall the troops from entrenching; bring in the men who had gone somewhat farther afield in search of stuff for the ramp; form the line; exhort the troops; give the signal [for battle]. A great part of these duties was prevented by the shortness of the time and the advance of the enemy. The stress of the moment was relieved by two things: the knowledge and experience of the troops—for their training in previous battles enabled them to decide for themselves what needed to be done as readily as others could have shown them—and the fact that Caesar had forbidden the several legates to leave the entrenching and their proper legions until the camp was fortified. These legates, seeing the nearness and the speed of the enemy, did not wait for a command from Caesar, but took on their own account the appropriate steps.

Caesar gave the necessary commands, and then ran down ... to exhort the troops, and came to the Tenth Legion. His speech to the troops was no more than a reminder to recall their ancient valor, to dismiss fear, and bravely to withstand the onslaught of the enemy; then, as the enemy were within missile range, he gave the signal to engage. He started off ... in the other direction to give a similar exhortation, and found them fighting. The time was so short, the temper of the enemy so ready for conflict, that there was no space not only to fit badges in their places, but even to put on helmets and draw covers from shields. In whichever direction each man happened to come in from the entrenching, whatever standard each first caught sight of, by that he stood, to lose no fighting time in seeking out his proper company.

The army was stationed rather as the character of the ground, the slope of the hill, and the needs of the moment required than according to regular

tactical formation. The legions were separated, and each resisted the enemy in a different quarter; while the view to the front was interrupted ... by a barrier of very thick hedges. Supports, therefore, could not be posted with certainty, nor could it be foreseen what would be needed anywhere, nor could all the commands be controlled by one man. Thus, with affairs in so grievous a difficulty, the issues of the day came likewise in varying sequence.

....

After exhorting the Tenth Legion Caesar started for the right wing. There he saw that his troops were struggling, and that the men of the Twelfth Legion, with their standards collected in one place, were so closely packed that they hampered each other for fighting. All the centurions of the fourth cohort had been killed.... The rest of the men were tiring, and some of the recruits, abandoning the fight, fell back to avoid the missiles; the enemy continued to move upwards in front from the lower ground, and were pressing hard on either flank. The condition of affairs, as he saw, was critical indeed, and there was no support that could be sent up. Taking therefore a shield from one of the recruits, as he himself came there without a shield, [Caesar] went forward into the first line, and, calling on the centurions by name, and urging on the rest, he bade them advance and extend the companies, that they might wield swords more easily. His coming brought hope to the troops and renewed their spirit; each man of his own accord, in sight of the commander-in-chief, however desperate his own case might be, strove to do his utmost. So the onslaught of the enemy was checked a little.

Source: Caesar. 1917. *The Gallic War*. Translated by H.J. Edwards. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Library; adapted by Sara E. Phang.

Augustus (63 BCE–14 CE)

Augustus was, of course, the first of the Roman emperors (reign 27 BCE–14 CE). See also the encyclopedia entries “Augustus,” “Civil War (II) (44–31 BCE),” “Octavian,” and “*princeps*, Principate.”

19. Excerpts from the *Res Gestae Divi Augusti* 1–3, 6, 15–

17, 25–26 (14 CE)

Introduction

Inscribed posthumously on stone in Latin and Greek versions in various cities, the Res Gestae Divi Augusti (RGDA) narrates Augustus' rise to power and accomplishments as ruler of the Roman world. It is extremely tendentious; his opponents led by Marcus Junius Brutus and Gaius Cassius are labeled a "faction," and Sextus Pompeius and his followers, who pursued a naval strategy against him, are termed "pirates." For recent editions and commentary see "Res Gestae Divi Augusti," Ridley 2003; Cooley 2009. The RGDA's consular dates have been converted to conventional dates.

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[1–3, 6, 15–17, 25–26] At the age of nineteen, on my own initiative and at my own expense, I raised an army by means of which I restored liberty to the republic, which had been oppressed by the tyranny of a faction. For which service the Senate, with complimentary resolutions, enrolled me in its order, in [45 BCE] giving me at the same time consular precedence in voting; it also gave me the imperium. As propraetor it ordered me, along with the consuls, "to see that the republic underwent no harm." In the same year, moreover, as both consuls had fallen in war, the people elected me consul and a triumvir for settling the constitution.

Those who slew my father, I drove into exile, punishing their deed by due process of law, and afterwards when they waged war upon the republic I twice defeated them in battle.

Wars, both civil and foreign, I undertook throughout the world, on sea and land, and when victorious I spared all citizens who sued for pardon. The foreign nations which could with safety be pardoned I preferred to save rather than to destroy. The number of Roman citizens who bound themselves to me by military oath was about 500,000. Of these I settled in colonies or sent back into their own towns, after their term of service, something more than 300,000, and to all I assigned lands, or gave money as a reward for military service. I captured six hundred ships, over and above those which were smaller than triremes.

....

In [19 BCE], and afterwards in [18 BCE], and a third time in [11 BCE], when the Senate and the Roman people unanimously agreed that I should be

elected overseer of laws and morals, without a colleague and with the fullest power, I refused to accept any power offered me which was contrary to the traditions of our ancestors. Those things which at that time the Senate wished me to administer I carried out by virtue of my tribunician power. And even in this office I five times received from the Senate a colleague at my own request.

.... In the colonies of my soldiers, [in 29 BCE], I gave one thousand sesterces to each man from the spoils of war; about one hundred and twenty thousand men in the colonies received this triumphal largesse.

To the municipal towns I paid money for the lands which I assigned to soldiers in [30 BCE] and afterwards in [14 BCE]. The sum which I paid for estates in Italy was about 600 million sesterces, and the amount which I paid for lands in the provinces was about 260 million. I was the first and only one to do this of all those who up to my time settled colonies of soldiers in Italy or in the provinces. And later, in [7, 6, 5 and 2 BCE] ... I paid cash gratuities to the soldiers whom I settled in their own towns at the expiration of their service, and for this purpose I expended four hundred million sesterces as an act of grace.

...And in I contributed 170 million sesterces out of my own patrimony to the military treasury, which was established on my advice that from it gratuities might be paid to soldiers who had seen twenty or more years of service.

....

I freed the sea from pirates.... The whole of Italy voluntarily took oath of allegiance to me and demanded me as its leader in the war in which I was victorious at Actium. The provinces of the Spains, the Gauls, Africa, Sicily, and Sardinia took the same oath of allegiance.

I extended the boundaries of all the provinces which were bordered by races not yet subject to our empire. The provinces of the Gauls, the Spains, and Germany, bounded by the ocean from Gades to the mouth of the Elbe, I reduced to a state of peace.

Source: Velleius Paterculus. 1924. *Res Gestae Divi Augusti*. Translated by Frederick W. Shipley. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; adapted by Sara E. Phang.

Tacitus (ca. 56–before 120 CE)

A Roman senator and the most famous Latin historian, Cornelius Tacitus lived from ca. 56 to just before 120 CE, and held a suffect consulship and governorship of Asia Minor. His surviving historical works are the *Agricola*, a biography of his father-in-law that focuses on the Roman conquest of Britain; the *Histories*, an account of the civil war of 69 CE; and the *Annals*, a history of the earlier empire from the death of Augustus through the downfall of Nero. Tacitus is noteworthy for his sardonic attitude toward the Principate and his depiction of the corrupting effects of absolute power on emperors such as Tiberius (14–37 CE).

20. Tacitus, *Annals* 1.2–3, 17, 2.55: The Early Principate (14–19 CE)

Introduction

In the first passage Tacitus describes (very cynically) how Augustus consolidated his power and focuses on the problem of the imperial succession. Augustus sought a prospective successor within his family, but the Principate was not a formal hereditary monarchy; he had many choices of successors, all of whom predeceased him, leaving Tiberius (his stepson, a middle-aged man in 14 CE).

Serious mutinies on the Rhine and Danube occurred after Augustus' death in 14 CE, quelled by Tiberius' son Drusus and nephew Germanicus. Assigned greater imperium for a tour of inspection in the East in 18–19 CE, Germanicus quarrelled with Gnaeus Calpurnius Piso, the governor of Syria, and attempted to depose him. Germanicus then died at Antioch of suspected magic/poison and Piso attempted to take back his province by force of arms. Piso was subsequently condemned for sedition and the alleged murder of Germanicus. Tacitus' insinuation that Tiberius and Livia urged on Piso and Plancina to poison Germanicus is not supported by the official SC de Cn. Pisone patre.

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[1.2] When the killing of Brutus and Cassius had disarmed the Republic; when [Sextus Pompeius] had been crushed in Sicily, and, with Lepidus thrown aside and Antony killed, even the Julian party was leaderless but for

the Caesar [Octavian]; after laying down his triumviral title and proclaiming himself a simple consul content with tribunician authority to safeguard the commons, [Octavian] first conciliated the army by gratuities, the populace by cheap grain, the world by the amenities of peace, then step by step began to make his ascent and to unite in his own person the functions of the Senate, the magistracy, and the legislature. There was no opposition: the boldest spirits had succumbed on battlefields or via the proscription lists; while the rest of the nobility found a cheerful acceptance of servitude [to the autocracy] the smoothest road to wealth and office, and, as they had thriven on revolution, stood now for the new order and safety in preference to the old order and adventure. Nor was the state of affairs unpopular in the provinces, where administration by the Senate and People had been discredited by the feuds of the magnates and the greed of the officials, against which there was but frail protection in a legal system for ever deranged by force, by favoritism, or (in the last resort) by gold.

[1.3] Meanwhile, to consolidate his power, Augustus raised Claudius Marcellus, his sister's son and a mere youth, to the pontificate and curule aedileship: Marcus Agrippa, no aristocrat, but a good soldier and his partner in victory, he honored with two successive consulates, and a little later, on the death of Marcellus, selected him as a son-inlaw. Each of [Augustus'] stepsons, Tiberius and Drusus, was given the title of Imperator, though his family proper was still intact: for he had admitted Agrippa's children, Gaius and Lucius, to the Caesarian hearth, and even during their minority had shown, under a veil of reluctance, a consuming desire to see them consuls designate with the title Princes of the Youth. When Agrippa died, untimely fate, or the treachery of their stepmother Livia, cut off both Lucius and Gaius Caesar, Lucius on his road to the Spanish armies, Gaius—wounded and sick—on his return from Armenia. Drusus had long been dead, and of the stepsons [Tiberius] survived alone. On him all centred. Adopted as son, as colleague in the empire, as sharer of the tribunician power, he was paraded through all the armies, not as before by the secret diplomacy of his mother, but openly at her injunction.

[1.17] At last, when the [soldiers] were ripe for action—some had now become his comrades in sedition—[the legionary agitator Percennius] put his question in something like a set speech:—“Why should they obey like slaves a few centurions and fewer tribunes? When would they dare to claim redress, if they shrank from carrying their petitions, or their swords, to the

still unstable throne of a new prince? Mistakes enough had been made in all the years of inaction, when white-haired men, many of whom had lost a limb by wounds, were making their thirtieth or fortieth campaign. Even after discharge their warfare was not accomplished: still serving as a reserve force, they endured the old drudgeries under an altered name. And suppose that a man survived this multitude of hazards: he was dragged once more to the ends of the earth to receive under the name of a “farm” some unhealthy swamp or barren mountainside. In fact, the whole trade of war was comfortless and profitless: ten *asses* a day was the assessment of body and soul: with that they had to buy clothes, weapons and tents, bribe the bullying centurion and purchase a respite from duty! But whip-cut and sword-cut, stern winter and harassed summer, red war or barren peace,—these, God knew, were always with them. Alleviation there would be none, till enlistment took place under a definite contract—the payment to be a denarius a day, the sixteenth year to end the term of service, no further period with the reserve to be required, but the gratuity to be paid in money in their old camp. Or did the praetorian cohorts, who had received two denarii a day—who were restored to hearth and home at the end of sixteen years—risk more danger? They did not disparage sentinel duty at Rome; still, their own lot was cast among savage clans, with the enemy visible from their very tents.”

[2.55]... [Gnaeus Calpurnius Piso, the governor of Syria] left Germanicus and completed the journey first. Then, the moment he reached Syria and the legions, by bounties and by bribery, by flattering the lowliest soldiers, by dismissals of the veteran centurions and the stricter commanding officers, whom he replaced by dependants of his own or by men of the worst character, by permitting indolence in the camp, license in the towns, and in the country a vagrant and riotous soldiery, he carried corruption to such a pitch that in popular parlance he was known as the Father of the Legions. Nor could Plancina contain herself within the limits of female decorum: she attended cavalry exercises and infantry maneuvers; she flung her gibes at Agrippina or Germanicus; some even of the loyal troops being ready to yield her a disloyal obedience; for a whispered rumor was gaining ground that these doings were not unacceptable to the emperor. The state of affairs was known to Germanicus, but his more immediate anxiety was to reach Armenia first.

Source: Tacitus. 1925–1927. *Annals*. Translated by J. Jackson. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; adapted by Sara E. Phang.

21. Tacitus, *Histories* 1.4, 18, 23–4, 36, 41, 3.33: The War of Four Emperors (69 CE)

Introduction

In the Histories, Tacitus depicts the cyclic process of usurpation and revolt. In the first passage he depicts the deterioration of Galba's relationship with the Praetorians. In his turn Otho exploited his patronage of the Praetorians to build a relationship with them, enabling them to support his coup. Otho's suicide following the first Battle of Bedriacum (April 14, 69 CE) is typical of Roman generals who lost civil wars. Vespasian subsequently revolted against Vitellius in July 69; the Flavian troops, led by Antonius Primus, defeated the Vitellians in the Second Battle of Bedriacum (Oct. 69) but brutally sacked the neighboring city of Cremona. The Histories originally also chronicled the Flavian dynasty, but are not extant after 70 CE.

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[1.4] Although Nero's death had at first been welcomed with outbursts of joy, it roused varying emotions, not only in the city among the senators and people and the city soldiery, but also among all the legions and generals; for the secret of empire was now revealed, that an emperor could be made elsewhere than at Rome.

...

[1.18] Before a crowded gathering of the soldiers, with the brevity that became an emperor, [Galba] announced that he was adopting [Lucius Calpurnius] Piso after the precedent set by the deified Augustus, and following the military custom by which one man chose another.... He added no flattery of the soldiers, nor made mention of a gift. Yet the tribunes, centurions, and soldiers nearest him answered in a satisfactory manner; but among all the rest of the soldiers there was a gloomy silence, for they felt that they had lost through war the right to a gift which had been theirs even in times of peace. There is no question that their loyalty could have been won by the slightest generosity on the part of this stingy old man. He was ruined by his old-fashioned strictness and excessive severity....

[Tacitus describes the bold temperament of Marcus Salvius Otho, a much younger man than Galba.]

[1.23–24] On the march, at review, or in camp [Otho] addressed all the oldest soldiers by name, and...called them messmates. Others he recognized, some he asked after and helped with money or influence; oftentimes he let drop words of complaint and remarks of a double meaning concerning Galba, and did other things that tended to disturb the common soldiery. For they were grumbling seriously over the toilsome marches, the lack of supplies, and the hard discipline....

[1.36] When the minds of the soldiers were already inflamed, Maevius Pudens, one of Tigellinus's nearest friends, added fuel to the fire. Winning over all who were of a restless temper or who needed money and were hot-headed for a revolution, he gradually came to the point, whenever Galba dined at Otho's house, of using the dinner as an excuse for distributing one hundred sesterces to each member of the cohort that stood on guard. This was a kind of gift from the state, but Otho added to its significance by secret gifts to individuals ...

[On the day of the coup, some of the praetorians carried Otho off to the praetorian camp and hailed him as emperor.]

[1.41]... [The soldiers] placed him on a platform where shortly before the gilded statue of Galba had stood, and surrounded him with the standards and ensigns.... They seized everyone they saw coming over to them, embraced them with their arms, placed them next to them, repeated the oath of allegiance, now recommending the emperor to the soldiers, now the soldiers to the emperor. Otho did not fail in his part: he stretched out his hands and did obeisance to the common soldiers, threw kisses, and played in every way the slave to secure the master's place.

[Other praetorians carried Galba off and assassinated him.]

... It was near the Lacus Curtius that Galba was thrown from his chair and rolled on the ground by his panic-stricken carriers. His last words have been variously reported according to the hatred or admiration of individuals; some say that he asked in an appealing tone what harm he had done and begged for a few days to pay the donative; many report that he voluntarily offered his throat to the assassins, telling them to strike quickly, if such actions were for the state's interest. His murderers cared nothing for what he said....[They] shamefully mutilated his legs and arms, for his breast was protected [with armor], and in their cruel savagery they continued to

inflict many wounds on his body even after his head had been cut off.

[3.33] Forty thousand armed men burst into the town [of Cremona]; the number of camp-followers and servants was even greater; and they were more ready to indulge in lust and cruelty. Neither rank nor years protected anyone; their assailants debauched and killed without distinction. Aged men and women near the end of life, though despised as booty, were dragged off to be the soldiers' sport. Whenever a young woman or a handsome youth fell into their hands, they were torn to pieces by the violent struggles of those who tried to secure them, and this in the end drove the despoilers to kill one another. Individuals tried to carry off for themselves money or the masses of gold dedicated in the temples, but they were assailed and killed by others stronger than themselves. Some, scorning the booty before their eyes, flogged and tortured the owners to discover hidden wealth and dug up buried treasure..... For four days did Cremona supply food for destruction.

Source: Tacitus. 1925–1927. *Histories*. Translated by C.H. Moore. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; adapted by Sara E. Phang.

Suetonius (ca. 70–after 130 CE)

Gaius Suetonius Tranquillus (ca. 7–after 130 CE) was a Roman equestrian and high-ranking bureaucrat with access to the imperial archives. His *Twelve Caesars* from Julius Caesar and Augustus through Domitian are topically arranged rather than strictly chronological, and illustrate good and bad examples of imperial conduct.

22. Suetonius, *Iulius* 80–82, *Augustus* 24.1–25.3, 26.1–2, 49.1–2: Julius Caesar and Augustus (44–43 BCE; ca. 13 BCE)

Introduction

These passages describe Caesar's assassination (Suetonius, Iulius 80–82); Octavian's conduct as civil warlord contrasts with the deeds of Augustus, whom Suetonius approves of; Augustus' reorganization of the army, intended to stabilize the imperial system, is described in the last two passages.

Document

Suetonius, *Iulius* 80–82] It was [Caesar's plans to campaign against Persia] that led the conspirators to hasten their plot, in order to avoid giving their assent to this proposal.... Some wrote on the base of Lucius [Junius] Brutus' statue, "Oh, that you were still alive"; and on that of Caesar himself:

"First of all was Brutus consul, since he drove the kings from Rome;
Since this man drove out the consuls, he at last is made our king."

More than sixty joined the conspiracy against him, led by Gaius Cassius and Marcus [Junius Brutus] and Decimus Brutus. At first they hesitated whether to [assassinate him] at the elections in the Campus Martius.... When, however, a meeting of the Senate was called for the Ides of March in the curia adjoining the Theater of Gnaeus Pompeius, they agreed to that time and place.

.... As Caesar took his seat, the conspirators gathered about him as if to greet him, and straightway Tillius Cimber, who had assumed the lead, came nearer as though to ask something; and when Caesar with a gesture put him off to another time, Cimber caught his toga by both shoulders; then as Caesar cried, "Why, this is violence!" one of the Cascas stabbed him from one side just below the throat. Caesar caught Casca's arm and ran it through with his stylus, but as he tried to leap to his feet, he was stopped by another wound. When Caesar saw that he was beset on every side by drawn daggers, he muffled his head in his toga, and at the same time covered his lower body with his toga. And thus he was stabbed with three and twenty wounds, uttering not a word, but merely a groan at the first stroke, though some have written that when Marcus Brutus rushed at him, he said in Greek, 'You too, my child?' [Brutus was probably not Caesar's child; Caesar had become the lover of Brutus' mother Servilia at a later date.]

[Suetonius, *Augustus* 26.1–2] Octavian received offices and honors before the usual age, and some of a new kind and for life. He usurped the consulship in the twentieth year of his age, leading his legions against the city as if it were an enemy, and sending messengers to demand the office for him in the name of his army; and when the Senate hesitated, his centurion, Cornelius, leader of the deputation, throwing back his cloak and showing the hilt of his sword, did not hesitate to say in the Senate house, "This will

make him consul, if you do not.”

[Suetonius, *Augustus* 24.1–25.3] Augustus made many changes and innovations in the army, besides reviving some usages of former times. He exacted the strictest discipline..... After the civil wars he never called any of the troops “comrades,” either in the assembly or in an edict, but always “soldiers”; and he would not allow them to be addressed otherwise, even by those of his sons or stepsons who held military commands, thinking the former term too flattering for the requirements of discipline, the peaceful state of the times, and his own dignity and that of his household....

As military prizes he was somewhat more ready to give trappings or collars, valuable for their gold and silver, than crowns for scaling ramparts or walls, which conferred high honor; the latter he gave as sparingly as possible and without favoritism, often even to the common soldiers.

[Suetonius, *Augustus* 49.1–2] Of his military forces he assigned legions and auxiliaries to the various provinces, stationed a fleet at Misenum and another at Ravenna, to defend the [Tyrrhenian and Adriatic] seas, and employed the remainder partly to defend the city and partly to defend his person.... However, he never allowed more than three cohorts to remain in the city and even those were without a permanent camp; the rest he regularly sent to winter or summer quarters in the towns near Rome. Furthermore, he restricted all the soldiery everywhere to a fixed scale of pay and allowances, designating the duration of their service and the rewards on its completion according to each man’s rank, in order to keep age or poverty from tempting them to revolution after their discharge. To always easily secure funds for maintaining the soldiers and paying their benefits, he established a military treasury, supported by new taxes.

Source: Suetonius. 1913. *Lives of the Caesars*. Translated by J. C. Rolfe. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; adapted by Sara E. Phang.

Inscription (128 CE)

**23. *Inscriptiones Latinae Selectae* 2487, 9133–9135:
Emperor Hadrian Addresses the Army (128 CE)**

Introduction

This inscription preserves the text of the speech (adlocutio) of Hadrian (117–138) to his army at Lambaesis in Numidia, North Africa. It displays the close relationship that Hadrian fostered with the imperial army; though he did not make any new conquests for the empire, his close relationship with his soldiers was intended to discourage revolt and usurpation; compare Cassius Dio 69.9, below.

Document

[ILS 2487; 9133–5] Emperor Caesar Trajan Hadrian Augustus addressed his very own Legion III Augusta after inspecting their maneuvers, in the words recorded below, in the consulship of Torquatus for the second time and Libo, 1 July.

To the chief centurions

[] your commander has himself told me on your behalf of numerous factors which would have excused you in my judgement, namely, that one cohort is absent which every year is sent in rotation to the office of the proconsul (of Africa), that two years ago you contributed a cohort and four men from each century to supplement your colleagues in the third legion (III Cyrenaica or Gallica), that many outposts in different locations keep you far apart, that in my own memory you have not only changed camp twice but also built new ones. For these reasons I would have excused you if the legion had been dilatory in its maneuvers for any length of time. But you have not been dilatory in any respect at all [] The chief centurions and the centurions were fit and strong as usual.

To the cavalry of the legion

Military maneuvers have their own rules so to speak and if anything is added or taken away from them the drill is made either less effective or more difficult. Indeed the more complications are added, the less impressive it appears. Of the difficult maneuvers you have completed the most difficult of all, throwing the javelin while wearing metal corslets []. Furthermore, I commend your morale

[To a cavalry cohort]

[Defences which] others build in several days, you have completed in one; you have constructed a wall which requires considerable work and which is normally built for permanent winter quarters in a time not much longer than is usually needed to build a turf wall. For this type of wall the

turf is cut to a regulation size, is easily carried and maneuvered, and is erected without trouble, for it is naturally pliable and level. But you used large, heavy, and uneven stones which no one can carry, lift, or fit in position without the stones catching on each other because of their uneven surface. You dug a ditch straight through hard and rough gravel and made it smooth by levelling it. When your work had been approved you entered the camp quickly and got your rations and weapons, and when you had followed the cavalry which had been sent out, with a great shout as it returned [

I commend [my legate] since he introduced you to this maneuver which has the appearance of real warfare and trains you in such a way that I can congratulate you. Cornelianus your prefect has performed his duties satisfactorily. However, the riding maneuvers do not win my approval [] The cavalryman should ride out from cover and engage in pursuit [cautiously, for if he cannot] see where he is going or if he cannot rein in his horse when he wishes, he will surely be exposed to hidden traps []

[] July, to the first ala of Pannonians

You did everything in order. You filled the plain with your exercises, you threw your javelins with a certain degree of style, although you were using rather short and stiff javelins; several of you hurled your lances with equal skill. Just now you mounted your horses agilely and yesterday you did it swiftly. If anything had been lacking in your performance I should have noted it, if anything had been obviously bad I should have mentioned it, but throughout the entire manoeuvre you satisfied me uniformly. Catullinus my legate, distinguished man, shows equal concern for all the units of which he is in command. [_ _ _] your prefect apparently looks after you conscientiously. I grant you a donative [as travelling expenses (?) _ _ _

To the cavalry of the sixth cohort of Commagenians

It is difficult for cavalry attached to a cohort to win approval even on their own, and more difficult still for them not to incur criticism after a maneuver by auxiliary cavalry; they cover a greater area of the plain, there are more men throwing javelins, they wheel right in close formation, they perform the Cantabrian manoeuvre in close array, the beauty of their horses and the splendor of their weapons are in keeping with their pay. But, despite the heat, you avoided any boredom by doing energetically what had to be done; in addition you fired stones from slings and fought with javelins; on every occasion you mounted speedily. The remarkable care taken by my

legate Catullinus, distinguished man, is obvious from the fact that he has men like you under [his command] _ _ _

Source: Campbell, Brian, ed. 1994. *The Roman Army 31 BC–AD 337: A Sourcebook*. London/New York; Routledge, pp. Campbell 1994: 18–20. Used by permission of Taylor & Francis.

Cassius Dio (ca. 155–235 CE)

Cassius Dio was a Greek senator from Bithynia in Asia Minor, whose *Roman History* spanned the early Republic to his own day in the 220s CE. However, Dio's *Roman History* is most valuable for contemporary events from the reign of Commodus (180–192) to the reign of Alexander Severus (222–235). Much of Dio is not extant in its original form, having been summarized by the Byzantine authors Zonaras and Xiphilinus; however, Dio is still a highly valuable source for the late second and early third centuries CE, and for what he believed about the late Republic and early empire.

24. Cassius Dio 52.27, 53.16–17, 56.18–22, 33: The Reign of Augustus (27 BCE–14 CE)

Introduction

Dio 52.27 is part of the fictional speech of Augustus' adviser Maecenas. This representation of the imperial army reflects Dio Cassius' contemporary concerns, but underlines the transition to a professional army. That emperors were autocratic in nature probably seemed more obvious to Dio, writing in the early third century CE, than to Augustus' contemporaries. Dio, who witnessed the renewed outbreak of civil war in 193–197 and 217–222, was highly critical of the emperor's relationship to the army, regarding soldiers as would-be brigands to be kept under strict discipline.

In 56.18–22 Dio vividly depicts the Varian disaster or Germanic revolt, in which three Roman legions were destroyed. Augustus' instructions to Tiberius (56.33) were not to extend the empire further, though emperors after Tiberius disregarded it.

Document

[52.27] ... While in general the men of military age should have nothing to do with arms and walled camps during their lives, the hardiest of them and those most in need of a livelihood should be enlisted as soldiers and given a military training.... Thus the most active and vigorous element of the population, which is generally obliged to gain its livelihood by brigandage, will support itself without harming others, while all the rest will live without risking danger.

[53.16] ... the name Augustus was at length bestowed upon him by the Senate and by the people. For when they wished to call him by some distinctive title, and men proposed one title after another and urging its selection, [Octavian] ... took the title of "Augustus," signifying that he was more than human; for all the most precious and sacred objects are termed *augusta*. Therefore they addressed him also in Greek as Sebastos, meaning an august personage, from the passive of the verb *sebazo*, "to revere."

In this way the power of both people and Senate passed entirely into the hands of Augustus, and from his time there was, strictly speaking, a monarch; for monarchy was the correct name for it, no matter if two or three men later held the power at the same time. The name of monarchy, to be sure, the Romans so detested that they called their emperors neither dictators nor kings ...; yet since the final authority for the government devolves upon them, they are *de facto* kings. The offices established by the laws, it is true, are maintained even now, except that of censor; but the entire direction and administration is dictated by the emperor. And yet, in order to preserve the appearance of having this power by virtue of the laws and not because of their own domination, the emperors have adopted all the functions, including the titles, of the offices which prevailed under the republic and by the free gift of the people, with the single exception of the dictatorship.

[56.18–22] The Romans were holding portions of [Roman Germany]—not entire regions, but the parts that were subdued... and soldiers of theirs wintered there and cities were being founded. The barbarians were adapting themselves to Roman ways ... and were meeting in peaceful assemblages. They had not, however, forgotten their ancestral habits, their native manners, their old independent life, or the power derived from arms. Thus, so long as they were unlearning these customs gradually ... and were becoming different without knowing it. But when Quintilius Varus became governor of the province of Germany, he ... strove to change them more

rapidly. Besides giving orders to them as if they were actually slaves of the Romans, he exacted money as he would from subject nations. To this they were in no mood to submit....

[The Germans, led by the treacherous auxiliary veterans Arminius and Flavus, stage a revolt in a relatively inaccessible area, leading Varus and his army deep into the Teutoburg Forest and ambush the Romans on the march.]

.... For the Romans did not proceed in any regular order, but were mixed in helter-skelter with the wagons and the unarmed, and so, being unable to take up military formation anywhere, and being fewer at every point than their assailants, they suffered greatly and could offer no resistance at all.

Accordingly they encamped on the spot, after securing a suitable place, so far as that was possible on a wooded mountain; and afterwards they either burned or abandoned most of their wagons and nearly all their baggage. The next day they advanced in a little better order, and even reached open country, though they still suffered losses. Upon setting out from there they plunged into the woods again, where they defended themselves against their assailants, but experienced their heaviest losses while doing so. [The Romans could not deploy easily in the woods, and were hampered by the heavy rain.].... Furthermore, the enemy's forces had greatly increased, as many of those who had at first wavered joined them, largely in the hope of plunder, and thus they could more easily encircle and strike down the Romans, whose ranks were now thinned, many having perished in the earlier fighting. Varus, therefore, and all the more prominent officers, fearing being captured alive or being killed by their bitterest foes (for they had already been wounded) ... took their own lives.

[56.33] Four books were then brought in and Drusus read them. The first contained detailed instructions regarding [Augustus'] funeral. The second recorded all the acts which he had performed, which he commanded also to be inscribed upon bronze columns to be set up around his shrine. The third contained an account of military matters, of the revenues, and of the public expenditures, the amount of money in the treasuries, and everything else pertaining to the administration of the empire. The fourth had injunctions and commands for Tiberius and for the public.... [Augustus] advised them to be satisfied with their present possessions and under no conditions to attempt to enlarge the empire. It would be hard to guard, he said, and this would risk losing what they already possessed.

Source: Dio Cassius. 1917. *Roman History*. Translated by Earnest Cary. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; adapted by Sara E. Phang.

25. Cassius Dio 68.3, 69.9, 20, 74(75).1–2: The Reigns of the “Five Good Emperors” vs. Severus (ca. 98; 117–138; 193)

Introduction

The elderly Nerva (96–98) adopted Trajan (98–117), one of the most highly regarded emperors both for his military conquests in Dacia and the East and for his affable relationship with the Senate. Trajan adopted Hadrian, who did not continue Trajan’s policies of conquest but emphasized the role of emperor as commander. Hadrian in his turn adopted Antoninus Pius (138–161). Dio regarded his own times as “an age of iron and rust,” depicting Septimius Severus in a more negative light. Severus punished the Italian praetorians for assassinating Pertinax in 193, but replaced them with worse Danubians (“barbarous” in this context means “uncultivated”).

Document

[68.3] Casperius Aelianus, who had become commander of the Praetorians under [Nerva] as he had been under Domitian, incited the soldiers to mutiny against him, after having induced them to demand certain persons for execution. Nerva resisted them stoutly, even to the point of baring his collarbone and presenting to them his throat; but he accomplished nothing, and those whom Aelianus wished were put out of the way. Nerva, therefore, finding himself held in such contempt because of his old age, ascended the Capitol and said in a loud voice: “May good success attend the Roman Senate and people and myself. I hereby adopt Marcus Ulpius Nerva Trajan.”

[69.9] Hadrian traveled through one province after another, visiting the various regions and cities and inspecting all the garrisons and forts. Some of these he removed to more desirable places, some he abolished, and he also established some new ones. He personally viewed and investigated absolutely everything, not merely the usual appurtenances of camps, such as weapons, engines, trenches, ramparts and palisades, but also the private affairs of every one, but of the men serving in the ranks and of the officers themselves,—their lives, their quarters and their habits,—and he reformed and corrected in many cases practices and arrangements for living that had

become too luxurious. He drilled the men for every kind of battle, honoring some and reproving others, and he taught them all what should be done. And so that they should be benefited by observing him, he everywhere led a rigorous life and either walked or rode on horseback on all occasions, never once at this period setting foot in either a chariot or a four-wheeled vehicle.... In short, both by his example and by his precepts he so trained and disciplined the whole military force throughout the entire empire that even today the methods then introduced by him are the soldiers' law of campaigning.

[69.20] [Hadrian] spoke to [the senators] as follows: "Nature has not permitted me to have a son, but you, my friends, have made it possible by legal enactment. Now these two methods [of designating a heir] differ—a biological son turns out to be whatever sort of person Heaven pleases, whereas a man adopts a son by deliberate selection..... I have found as emperor...the man [Antoninus Pius] whom I now give you, who is noble, mild, tractable, prudent, neither young enough to do anything reckless nor old enough to neglect anything, who has been brought up according to the laws and who has exercised authority in accordance with our traditions, so that he is not ignorant of any matters pertaining to the imperial office, but can handle them all effectively."

[74 (75).1–2] Severus, on becoming emperor..., inflicted the death penalty on the Praetorians who had taken part in the killing of Pertinax; and as for the others, he summoned them, before he came to Rome, and having surrounded them in the open while they were ignorant of the fate in store for them, denounced them bitterly for their lawless deed against their emperor, and then relieved them of their arms, took away their horses, and banished them from Rome.

....[Severus] ordered that any vacancies [in the Guard] should be filled from all the legions alike. Now he did this so as to have guards with a better knowledge of the soldier's duties, and also offering [promotion into the Guard as] a kind of prize for those who proved brave in war. But, as a matter of fact, it became only too apparent that he had incidentally ruined the youth of Italy, who turned to brigandage and gladiatorial fighting in place of their former service in the [Praetorians]. He also filled the city with a throng of motley soldiers most savage in appearance, most terrifying in speech, and most boorish in conversation.

Source: Dio Cassius. 1925–1927. *Roman History*. Translated by Earnest Cary and Herbert B. Foster. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; adapted by Sara E. Phang.

Herodian (Early Third Century CE)

Herodian was a Greek author, possibly an official in the imperial administration, of which little is known. He wrote a *Roman History* that covered the period from the death of Nerva in 98 to the reign of Gordian III (238). He is important as a contemporary voice depicting the onset of the third-century crisis.

26. Herodian 3.8: Septimius Severus and the Army (197 CE)

Introduction

Septimius Severus had just defeated his rival emperor Clodius Albinus, and decided to reward his army. Soldiers previously had not been permitted legal marriage with women. The description of these policies as harming discipline is a standard elite view that military service ought to entail hardship (thus repressing the army and downplaying the emperor's dependence on the army).

Document

[3.8] In honor of all his victories [Severus] made generous gifts to the people; distributing large sums of money to the soldiers, he granted them many privileges which they had not previously enjoyed. He was the first emperor to increase their food rations, to allow them to wear gold finger rings, and to permit them to live with their wives; these were indulgences hitherto considered harmful to military discipline and the proper conduct of war. Severus was also the first emperor to make a change in the harsh and healthy diet of the soldiers and to undermine their resolution in the face of severe hardships; moreover, he weakened their strict discipline and respect for their superiors by teaching them to covet money and by introducing them to luxurious living.

Source: Echols, Edward C., trans. 1961. *Herodian of Antioch's History of the Roman Empire*. Berkeley: University of California Press; also available

Inscription (238 CE)

27. *Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum* III 12336: Military Abuse of Civilians (238 CE)

Introduction

This petition to the emperor Gordian III (238) attests a common type of civil-military conflict, in which soldiers traveling through the provinces demanded goods and services, in particular transport animals, from civilians. Here they also made excessive use of a site with pleasant public baths (fed by the hot springs).

Document

[CIL III 12336] To Emperor Caesar Marcus Antonius Gordian Pius Fortunate Augustus, petition from the villagers of Scaptopara and of Griseia ... We live and have our property in the village mentioned above which is exposed to harm because it has the advantage of hot springs and is located between two of the army camps which are in your (province of) Thrace. Previously, as long as the inhabitants remained undisturbed and free from oppression, they reliably paid their tribute and met their other obligations. But when at times some persons started to become insolent and to use force, then the village started to decline. A famous festival is held two miles from our village, and those persons who stay there for fifteen days for the festival do not remain in the vicinity of the festival itself, but leave it and come down on our village, forcing us to provide them with hospitality and purvey many other items for their enjoyment without payment. In addition, to these persons, soldiers too, who have been despatched somewhere else, leave their proper routes and come to us, and similarly intimidate us into furnishing them with hospitality and provisions, and pay no money. [Rest omitted.]

Source: Campbell, Brian, ed. 1994. *The Roman Army 31 BC–AD 337: A Sourcebook*. London/New York; Routledge, pp. Campbell 1994: 180. Used by permission of Taylor & Francis.

Ammianus Marcellinus (ca. 325–after 390)

Ammianus Marcellinus was the last great Latin historian, a contemporary witness of most of the events in the extant part of his *Res Gestae* or *History of Rome*, from 353 to 379. He was a high-ranking military officer in the reigns of Constantius II (337–361) and Julian (361–363). He greatly admired Julian. The *Res Gestae* originally spanned the period from Nerva (96–98) through 379, but the earlier part is not extant.

28. Ammianus Marcellinus *History of Rome* 20.4, 31.12–13: The Revolt of Julian; Battle of Adrianople (361; 378 CE)

Introduction

Julian was elevated to Caesar in 355 by Constantius II (337–361) to hold down the German frontier while Constantius campaigned against Persia. Successful in his campaigns against the Germans, Julian was hailed emperor at Paris in 361. The battle of Adrianople occurred in August 378, after the Roman authorities mishandled a migration of the Goths across the Danube River, mistreating the Goths, who revolted and overran Moesia and Thrace. Rather than wait for additional troops sent by his young colleague Gratian, Valens decided to fight the Goths near Adrianople in Thrace. The Roman army was surrounded and two-thirds of it was destroyed.

Document

[20.4] But no sooner had night come on than they revolted openly, and... they turned to arms and action; with mighty tumult they all made for the palace, and wholly surrounding it, so that no one could possibly get out, with terrifying outcries they hailed Julian as Augustus, urgently demanding that he should show himself to them. They had to wait for the appearance of daylight, but finally forced him to come out; and as soon as they saw him, they redoubled their shouts and with determined unanimity hailed him as Augustus.

He, however, with unyielding resolution, opposed them one and all... [arguing] that after many happy victories nothing unseemly should be done, and that ill-timed rashness and folly should not stir up material for discord....

After this the shouts continued none the less on every side, and since all

insisted with one and the same ardor and with loud and urgent outcries mingled with abuse and insults, [Julian] was compelled to consent. Then, being placed upon an infantryman's shield and raised on high, he was hailed by all as Augustus and bidden to bring out a diadem. And when he declared that he had never had one, they called for an ornament from his wife's neck or head. But since he insisted that at the beginning of his reign it was not fitting for him to wear a woman's adornment, they looked about for a horse's trapping, so that being crowned with it he might display at least some obscure token of a loftier station. But when he declared that this also was shameful, a man called Maurus ... a standard-bearer of the Petulantes, took off the neck-chain which he wore as carrier of the dragon [banner] and boldly placed it on Julian's head. He, driven to the extremity of compulsion, and perceiving that he could not avoid imminent danger if he continued to resist, promised each man five gold pieces and a pound of silver.

[31.12–13] ... The army began its march with extreme haste, leaving all its baggage and packs near the walls of Adrianople with a suitable guard of legions; for the treasury, and the insignia of imperial dignity besides, with the prefect and the emperor's council, were kept within the circuit of the walls. So after hastening a long distance over rough ground, while the hot day was advancing towards noon, finally at the eighth hour they saw the wagons of the enemy.... And while the barbarian soldiers, according to their custom, uttered savage and dismal howls, the Roman leader so drew up their line of battle that the cavalry on the right wing were first pushed forward, while the greater part of the infantry waited in reserve. But the left wing of the horsemen (which was formed with the greatest difficulty, since very many of them were still scattered along the roads) was hastening to the spot at swift pace.... [The Romans draw up their battle line, already suffering from heat and thirst.]

... Our soldiers who were giving way rallied, exchanging many encouraging shouts, but the battle ... filled their hearts with terror, as numbers of them were pierced by strokes of whirling spears and arrows. Then the lines dashed together ... pushing each other back and forth in turn, and tossed about by alternate movements ...

And because the left wing, which had made its way as far as the very wagons, and would have gone farther if it had had any support, being deserted by the rest of the cavalry, was hard pressed by the enemy's

numbers, it was crushed, and overwhelmed.... The foot-soldiers thus stood unprotected, and their companies were so crowded together that hardly anyone could pull out his sword or draw back his arm.... But when the barbarians, pouring forth in huge hordes, trampled down horse and man, and in the press of ranks no room for retreat could be gained anywhere, and the increased crowding left no opportunity for escape, our soldiers also, showing extreme contempt of falling in the fight, received their death-blows, yet struck down their assailants; and on both sides the strokes of axes split helmet and breastplate..... Now the sun had risen higher, and ... scorched the Romans, who were more and more exhausted by hunger and worn out by thirst, as well as distressed by the heavy burden of their armor. Finally our line was broken by the onrushing weight of the barbarians, and since that was the only resort in their last extremity, they took to their heels in disorder as best they could.

While all scattered in flight over unknown paths, the emperor ... took refuge with the lancers and the *mattiarii*, who, so long as the vast numbers of the enemy could be sustained, had stood unshaken with bodies firmly planted....

At the first coming of darkness the emperor, amid the common soldiers as was supposed (for no one asserted that he had seen him or been with him), fell mortally wounded by an arrow, and presently breathed his last breath; and he was never afterwards found anywhere.

Source: Ammianus Marcellinus. 1935. *History*. Translated by J. C. Rolfe. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; adapted by Sara E. Phang.

Synesius (Late Fourth–Early Fifth Century CE)

Synesius of Cyrene was a Greek rhetorician in the early fifth century. His address *On Kingship* was a typical theme of Greek panegyric (praise of important personages, usually Hellenistic kings or Roman emperors).

29. Synesius, *On Kingship* 9–10: Criticism of Emperor Arcadius' Inaction (395–before 408)

Introduction

In a sharp reaction from third and fourth-century practice, the young emperors Arcadius and Honorius did not lead troops in battle or even in the field. Nonimperial commanders-in-chief dominated military policy. The Greek orator Synesius adopts the traditional view that emperors should at least play the role of commanders (compare Hadrian in Cassius Dio 69.9, above). For obvious reasons, it is unlikely that this oration was delivered in the extant form.

Document

[*On Kingship* 9–10] Maybe you resent it that we urge you to toil, but trust me that a king feels toil much less, because toil least of all conquers a man who toils openly. When a king exercises his body, campaigns in the field, and spends his youth in armor ... he draws the eyes of all, and no one can bear to look elsewhere when a king performs bold deeds; every act of a king that inspires a song rings in the ears of all men. Furthermore, this custom fosters loyalty towards him, because the presence of a king [as commander] amazes his troops, and his good will greatly raises their morale.

.... [Imperial] majesty and the fear of being reduced to the level of a human being by frequently appearing in public, has caused you to become cloistered, as it were besieged by your very self, seeing and hearing very little of those things that promote wisdom in action. You enjoy only the pleasures of the body, and the most material of these, all those which touch and taste provide you, and so you live the life of a marine invertebrate.

Source: Fitzgerald, Sir Augustine, ed. and trans. 1930. *The Essays and Hymns of Synesius of Cyrene: Including the Address to the Emperor Arcadius and the Political Speeches*. Vol. 1. Oxford: H. Milford. By permission of Oxford University Press, www.oup.com.

Zosimus (Late Fifth–Early Sixth Century CE)

Zosimus was a Greek historian who wrote at the end of the fifth century or in the early sixth century (after 498). He is the last pagan historian of note, and employed earlier pagan historians such as Eunapius, who wrote closer to events in the earlier fifth century CE.

30. Zosimus, *New History* 2.34, 4.59, 5.50–1: Constantine; Theodosius Represses Paganism; Prelude to the Sack of Rome (306–337; 394; 410)

Introduction

As a pagan polemic, the New History accordingly treats Constantine I (306–337) harshly as wasting imperial finances on the Church and damaging the army by created a central field army allegedly billeted in towns. In fact, the reorganization of the later Roman army may have taken decades and is difficult to attribute to solely Diocletian or Constantine. Forces stationed near frontiers, the limitanei, still existed. Zosimus draws on stereotypes of undisciplined armies seen in earlier authors (compare Herodian 3.8 on Septimius Severus' army).

In the second passage, Theodosius I (379–395) had just defeated the usurper Eugenius and his general Arbogast (Battle of the Frigidus, 394). Theodosius had already banned pagan sacrifice. He now defunded the pagan state religion; as a traditionalist pagan, Zosimus blames the fall of the Western empire on this policy.

The third passage depicts the Gothic leader Alaric's demands for subsidies from the Roman government. Honorius' commander-in-chief and power behind the throne, Stilicho, had been executed in 408 for suspected treason; Alaric took advantage of the power vacuum and escalated his demands, threatening the city of Rome. Honorius and his officials refused, leading to Alaric's sack of Rome (410).

Document

[2.34] Constantine likewise adopted another measure, which gave the barbarians free access into the Roman dominions. For the Roman empire, as I have related, was, by the care of Diocletian, protected on its remote frontiers by towns and fortresses, in which soldiers were placed; it was consequently impossible for the barbarians to pass them, there being always a sufficient force to oppose their inroads. But Constantine destroyed that security by removing the greater part of the soldiers from those barriers of the frontiers, and placing them in towns that had no need of defenders; thus depriving those who were exposed to the barbarians of all defence, and oppressing the towns that were quiet with so great a multitude of soldiers,

that many of them were totally forsaken by the inhabitants. He likewise rendered his soldiers effeminate by accustoming them to public spectacles and pleasures. To speak in plain terms, he was the first cause of the affairs of the empire declining to their present miserable state.


[4.59] Before his departure, [Theodosius I] convened the Senate, who firmly adhered to the ancient rites and customs of their country, and could not be induced to join with those who were inclined to contempt for the gods. In an oration he exhorted them to relinquish their former errors, as he termed them, and to embrace the Christian faith, which promises absolution from all sins and impieties. But not a single individual of them would be persuaded to this, nor recede from the ancient ceremonies, which had been handed down to them from the building of their city.... Theodosius, therefore, told them, that the treasury was too much exhausted by the expense of sacred rites and sacrifices, and that he should, therefore, abolish them.... The Senate in reply observed, that the sacrifices were not duly performed, unless the charges were defrayed from the public funds. Yet thus the [ancestral] laws for the performance of sacred rites and sacrifices were repealed and abolished.... By these means, the Roman empire, having been devastated by degrees, is become the habitation of barbarians, or rather having lost all its inhabitants, is reduced to such a form, that no person can distinguish where its cities formerly stood.

[5.50–1] Affairs having thus been concerted, the emperor [Honorius] called ten thousand Huns to his assistance in the war against Alaric. In order that he might have provisions ready for them on their arrival, he ordered the Dalmatians to bring grain, sheep, and oxen. He sent out scouts to gain information of the way by which Alaric intended to march to Rome. But Alaric, in the meantime, repented of his intention of proceeding against Rome, and sent the bishops of each city, not only as ambassadors, but also to advise the emperor not to suffer so noble a city, which for more than a thousand years had ruled over great part of the world, to be seized and destroyed by the barbarians ... but to prefer entering into a peace on some reasonable conditions. He instructed them to state to the emperor, that the Barbarians wanted no preferments, nor did he now desire the provinces which he had previously chosen as his residence, but only the two [small provinces of] Noricum.... Besides this he only demanded annually as much grain as the emperor should think proper to grant, and would remit the gold. And that a friendship and alliance should subsist between himself and


the Romans, against every one that should rise to oppose the empire. When Alaric had made these ... propositions ... Jovius, and the other ministers of the emperor, declared that his demands could not possibly be acceded to, since all persons, who held any commission, had sworn not to make peace with Alaric.

Source: Green, W., and T. Chaplin, eds. and trans. 1814. *The History of Count Zosimus, Sometime Advocate and Chancellor of the Roman Empire*. London: J. Davis; adapted by Sara E. Phang.

Maps




THE PUNIC WARS, 264-146 BCE



GAUL IN THE TIME OF JULIUS CAESAR



THE ROMAN REPUBLIC AT THE DEATH OF CAESAR, 44 BCE



Glossary

This glossary is intended to supplement the entries in the Roman section of *Conflict in Ancient Greece and Rome*, not to replace them; hence, some terms that have their own entries in the encyclopedia are not listed here.

Accession: The formal beginning of a new emperor's reign. Not every accession required acclamation (below) by the troops.

Acclamation: The hailing of a new emperor as *imperator* by the army; a legitimate ruler would also seek formal recognition by the Senate (normal before the third-century CE crisis).

Adlocutio (plural, **adlocutiones**): A formal speech by the emperor to the army.

Aedile: A junior magistracy at Rome, involving oversight of public works, the streets of Rome, the water supply, and the market. Not essential to the *Cursus Honorum*.

Ager Publicus: "Public land" annexed by Rome from conquered communities, chiefly in Italy; might be used (without actual ownership) by citizens.

Allies: Conquered peoples of Italy who formed treaties with the Roman Republic, requiring their contribution of allied manpower for Roman campaigns.

Antiquarians: Latin authors from the late first century BCE to the fifth century CE, who specialized in obscure information related to cult practices (see **Cult**), the Latin language, and so on. They pose problems as a historical source because they quote material out of context.

Augustus (title) (plural, Augusti): The emperors from Tiberius onward used the name of Augustus as a formal title, following their common

names (e.g., Nero Augustus, not Augustus Nero). Under the **Tetrarchy** (293-312 CE), Augustus denotes a senior emperor.

Benefaction: Gift-giving or philanthropy, usually from a leader or wealthy individual to the masses or to show favor to individuals or communities; yielded social prestige for the giver.

Caesar (title): A title given to the emperor's prospective heir; in the **Tetrarchy**, denotes deputy emperors with full powers, subordinate to the Augusti. Must be distinguished from Caesar as a family name of the **Julio-Claudian** dynasty.

Capite Censi: "Head count," the lowest social and economic stratum of the Roman Republic, synonymous with **Proletarii**. Originally excluded from the legions, but enlisted by Gaius Marius ca. 107 BCE.

Capitoline Temple: Temple of Jupiter Optimus Maximus ("Best and Greatest"), Juno, and Minerva, on the Capitoline hill of Rome; burned in civil strife in 83 BCE and 69 CE.

Censor: A senior Roman magistrate elected to take the *census* and evaluate membership of the **orders**. Two censors were elected by the centuriate assembly to hold office for 18 months. Only former consuls could be censors. The censors supervised the "surveillance of morals" (*regimen morum*).

Census: Held every four to five years, a register of Roman citizens determining rates of taxation and eligibility for military service. Held very irregularly in the late Republic and three times by Augustus; ceased to be held after the Flavian dynasty.

Centuria (military): The smallest unit of the Roman legion, usually 60 to 80 men rather than 100.

Centuriation: Land surveying with a right-angled grid pattern, carried out to determine assignment of land in the formation of colonies.

Centurion (Latin, *centurio*; plural, *centuriones*): The lowest-ranking officer in the Roman legion with significant authority; commanded a *centuria*.

City Prefect (Latin, *praefectus urbi*): The emperor's deputy at Rome in his absence; appointed by the emperor. A highly prestigious office held by senators who were former consuls.

Client (Latin, *cliens*; plural, *clientes*): Persons obligated to a **patron** who provides them with gifts, benefits, or other assistance. Unlike slaves and

freed persons, clients were not formal dependents of their patrons, but the social bond was a powerful one; clients were expected to display loyalty to their patrons and aid them if necessary.

Client King or Monarch: A ruler (usually in the eastern Mediterranean) of a region (**Client State**) dependent on Roman political support and military protection; owed tribute and loyalty to Rome.

Client State: A political entity (kingdom or ethnic group) in a patron-client relationship with Rome.

Code of Justinian: Compiled in the 530s CE, a compendium of Roman legal sources, mainly imperial decrees and judgments; in contrast with the **Digest of Justinian**, more of the Code dates from the fourth century and later.

Collegial Principle: The principle that two or more magistrates hold office at a time; best known in the Roman Republic (two consuls, etc.) but practiced by other ancient city-states such as Carthage.

Colonies (Latin, sg. *colonia*; plural, *coloniae*): Urban settlements that were formally founded and settled by emigrant citizens; most Roman colonization of Italy happened in the middle Republic; from the late Republic onward, colonies were founded outside Italy.

Comitia Centuriata: The centuriate assembly or main voting assembly of the Roman Republic; the right to vote was based on property qualification.

Comitia Tributa: The plebeian assembly of the Roman Republic; elected tribunes of the plebs.

Confiscation: Appropriation of an owner's property (movable wealth, land) as punishment or reprisal.

Conscription: A military levy or draft, in the Republic based on status and property qualification; distinct from volunteering.

Constitutio Antoniniana: An edict of the emperor Caracalla in 212 CE conferring the Roman citizenship on all inhabitants of the Roman Empire, except *dediticii*. After 212 most persons with the *nomen* Aurelius (see Nomenclature) can be assumed to have received their citizenship from the Constitutio Antoniniana.

Conubium: The legal right to marry, conferred on veterans of the Praetorian Guard, *auxilia*, and fleet during the empire down to

Septimius Severus' grant of the right of legal marriage to serving soldiers ca. 197.

Cult (Religion): The worship of a specific deity or deities. Does not imply that the worship was novel, bizarre, or illegitimate (connotations of "cult" in English).

Cursus Honorum: The sequence of magistracies held by politicians in the Roman Republic. A *cursus* for patricians might be quaestor, curule aedile, praetor, and consul; a plebeian might be quaestor, tribune of the plebs, plebeian aedile, praetor, and consul. The office of tribune of the plebs was not required by the *cursus*.

Denarius: Pl. *denarii*. A Roman silver coin, equal to 4 *sesterces*.

Dictator: A supreme magistrate of the Roman Republic, traditionally appointed by the Senate and consuls to cope with a crisis and/or for six months at a time; he was singular, with no colleague.

Digest of Justinian: A compilation, made in the 530s, of legal scholarship and imperial rulings that had the force of law. Most of the material in the Digest dates from the Principate. See **Jurists**; **Rescripts**.

Diplomas: Bronze tablets inscribed with the grant of Roman citizenship and other privileges (see *Conubium*) to veterans of the *auxilia* and fleet (also Praetorians and urban cohorts). The diplomas extant today were copies of originals kept in archives at Rome.

Edict (Imperial): A decree of the emperor, intended to be of general application, and thus distinct from a **rescript**, a judgment in an individual case; distinct from *Senatus Consulta* (decrees of the Senate) and from *lex*.

Epigraphy: The practice of engraving inscriptions on stone; also the modern discipline that collects, studies, and publishes such inscriptions.

Epitome, Epitomator: An epitome is a highly condensed or abbreviated historical narrative; its author is an epitomator. It may be original, as with Eutropius' *Breviarium* and Sextus Aurelius Victor's *Liber de Caesaribus* (mid-/late fourth century CE) or an abridgement of a longer work, as with the *Periochae* of Livy's *History of Rome*.

Equites: The social and economic stratum or order just below senators. Originally based on cavalry service in the Roman army, *equites* no longer needed to serve in the army by the late Republic. In the early

empire, *equites* (English: equestrians) had to possess a property qualification of 400,000 HS. See **Order, Ordines**.

Flavian Dynasty: The emperor Vespasian (69–79) and his sons Titus (79–81) and Domitian (81–96).

Forum: A public square in a Roman city; in Rome, the *Forum Romanum*, a major public area with important buildings (the Senate House, temples, etc.).

Games (Latin, *circenses* or *ludi*): These might be gladiatorial games, beast shows (in which animals fought or criminals were thrown to them), or reenactments of battles. First held at aristocratic funerals, games became a major **benefaction** by magistrates, triumphant generals, and emperors.

Governor: In the Republic, the governor of a Roman province might be a *propraetorian* or *proconsular* magistrate, and was elected; in the Principate, governors of frontier provinces had the title *legatus Augusti pro praetore* (though usually of consular rank) and governors of public provinces were titled *proconsuls*. Governors were senator until the mid-third century CE, except for Egypt which had an equestrian governor with the rank of *prefect*.

Honestiores: The “more honorable” upper orders (see **Order, Ordines**), including senators, equestrians, *decurions*, and probably veterans; exempted from degrading capital and corporal punishments except in cases of treason. In contrast, the *humiliores* were not exempt.

Humiliores: The “more lowly” lower *ordines*, including serving soldiers, common people, and slaves. They were subject, especially in the later empire, to degrading corporal and capital punishments, such as condemnation to hard labor or being thrown to wild beasts (Constantine outlawed crucifixion).

Imperator: The title given to a victorious general by his troops; the title of the emperor, who was acclaimed as *imperator* in a continuation of this tradition.

Imperial Cult: The worship of deified (usually deceased) emperors or the *genius* (spirit) of the living emperor. The imperial cult involved reverence of the imperial image (portraits and statues), including imperial images on Roman military standards (see **Standard**).

Invective: A literary genre involving exaggerated negative depictions of personages and their deeds and motivations.

Julio-Claudian Dynasty: The imperial dynasty from Augustus to Nero. Augustus represented the Julian branch; his descendants did not survive. His successor Tiberius represented the Claudian branch, to which Gaius (Caligula), Claudius, and Nero also belonged.

Jurists: Roman experts in legal affairs, who wrote treatises on law and debated specific cases. Their works survive mainly in the Digest and in a textbook, the *Institutes* of the jurist Gaius.

Legate (Latin, *legatus*; plural, *legati*): In the Republic, a legate was the “deputy” (the original meaning of the term) of the consuls, often commanding a legion. In the Principate, legates were governors of provinces (*legatus Augusti*) or commanders of legions (*legatus legionis*).

Lex (plural, *leges*): *Leges* were statutes voted on by the *comitia centuriata* or plebeian assembly. They were named after the *nomen* (see **Nomenclature**) of the magistrate who proposed them, for example, a *lex Sempronia agraria* proposed by Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus (tribune of the plebs in 133 BCE).

Lictors: Attendants of magistrates possessing *imperium*, that is, the consuls or dictator; they carried *fascēs*, bundles of sticks topped with axes, symbolizing the executive magistrate’s power to inflict capital punishment.

Limes (plural, *limites*): A boundary or frontier; the frontiers of the Roman Empire, in archaeology usually referring to frontier works.

Lorica: A cuirass. The *lorica hamata* was chain mail, worn more often in the Republic; the *lorica segmentata* was made from metal strips held together with leather; the *lorica squamata* or scale armor was made from overlapping metal scales.

Lustration: Ritual purification, for example, of weapons and military trumpets. A lustration frequently required a **sacrifice**.

Magistrate: General term for an elected official in the Roman Republic or in other city-states and ethnic groups (some of the Gallic communities had magistrates instead of kings).

Nomenclature (Roman): A Roman citizen traditionally had three names: his *praenomen*, of which there were only a few (the most frequently

encountered are Aulus, Gaius, Gnaeus, Lucius, Marcus, Manius, Publius, Quintus, Sextus, Tiberius, and Titus); his *nomen* or gentile name, which was the name of his family; and his *cognomen*, which originally was an individual nickname but became attached and passed down in some families. In the Encyclopedia, we follow the convention of giving a full name at first instance and then referring to the individual by his most common name, usually the cognomen. The *praenomen* is usually abbreviated. In the later empire these rules ceased to be followed strictly; aristocrats had long strings of names.

Oligarchy: Rule by the few (Greek, *oligoí*); a society with marked socioeconomic and political inequality. The elite of an oligarchy are oligarchs.

Optimates: Latin “the best people”: the faction in the late Republic that represented and sided with the wealthy (oligarchs). “Parties” in the modern sense, which elaborate organization, recruitment, polling, and canvassing, did not exist.

Oratory: The art of making speeches, particularly in a public context (legal or political).

Order, Orders (Latin, *ordo*; plural, *ordines*): Often the group is indicated as in *ordo equester*, the equestrian order or *equites*. Socioeconomic and status-based groups in Roman society, forming a steep hierarchy. Membership was both hereditary and dependent on wealth; culture and codes of behavior also contributed. Membership in the upper *ordines* (senators and equestrians) was surveilled by the censors in the Republic and by the emperors; they could demote individuals (usually for bad morals) or promote them (adlection) to a higher order. The system of orders was thus less rigid than a caste system, but more rigid than modern class systems. Some offices could only be held by senators; others by equestrians. By the late Republic, the distinction between patricians and plebeians in the senatorial order affected eligibility for some magistracies and priesthoods.

Panegyric: An oration praising a ruler (the Roman emperor) or other very important person. One famous panegyric is Pliny the Younger’s *Panegyricus* to the emperor Trajan (98–117 CE). Opposite is **Invective**.

Papyrus: A paper-like writing material made from the inner pith of the papyrus reed, cut into strips, pressed together, and dried.

Patronage: The relationship between a patron (Latin, *patronus*) and a client (see **Client**), in which the patron provides material assistance or benefits and expects the client to provide loyalty in return.

Petition: A document asking for legal or material assistance or redress, submitted by citizens of the empire to Roman governors and emperors; imperial responses on legal issues were treated as sources of law.

Pilum: A javelin, with a wooden shaft and iron spearpoint that bent easily if lodged in an enemy shield, preventing its reuse by the enemy.

Polytheism: The worship of multiple gods, including semidivine entities such as heroes or the living Roman emperor.

Populares: The “popular” faction in Roman politics in the late Republic, favoring the lower strata of society and more democratic policies; opposed to the *Optimates* or oligarchs.

Praetor: A mid-ranking magistrate in the Roman Republic. Praetors held *imperium* but they ranked below the consuls. Praetors might have their *imperium* prorogated (extended), making them propraetors, commanders or governors in the provinces. The urban praetor had a judicial role. Not directly related to Praetorian Guard.

Praetorian Prefect: The commander(s) of the Praetorian Guard in the Principate; there might be multiple prefects (usually two) or only one. The praetorian prefect took on more and more authority, becoming an administrative deputy of the emperor and less and less related to command of the Praetorians. In the Tetrarchy, each of the Augusti and Caesars had his own praetorian prefect. Despite the abolition of the Praetorian Guard after 312 by Constantine (306–337), the praetorian prefecture was preserved as a major administrative division.

Prefect (Latin, *praefectus*): A commander, in the Principate an equestrian commander of an auxiliary unit of cavalry (*praefectus alae*) or infantry (*praefectus cohortis*). Exceptions: *praefectus Aegypti* (the governor of Egypt); praetorian prefect; urban prefect.

Proconsul: In the middle and late Republic, a commander or governor of a province, who had previously been consul and undergone prorogation (the extension of a term of office). In the Principate, governors of “public” provinces were titled proconsuls out of prestige.

Promagistracies. See **Praetor**; **Proconsul**

Prosopography: The study of elite careers (senatorial and equestrian), supplementing literary with documentary sources such as career epitaphs.

Province (Latin, *provincia*): A *provincia* originally meant a military assignment given to a magistrate (consul or praetor); it did not then connote a discrete region to be governed. In the late Republic, the geography of *provinciae* became more defined and magistrates were expected to govern them, adjudicating disputes and collecting taxes.

Quaestor: A junior magistrate in the Roman Republic with fiscal responsibilities. Quaestors usually accompanied consuls (later proconsuls or propraeors) on campaigns to administer pay and the collection and disposal of plunder.

Quirites: Latin synonym for “citizens.”

Requisition: Official demands for food, supplies, lodging, and transport by Roman officials or military personnel; often uncompensated and abused.

Rescript: A response by a Roman emperor (or his legal officials) to a petition requesting legal advice or redress; rescripts were regarded as a form of law and were cited as such by the jurists. See **Digest; Jurists; Petition.**

Romanization: The process of acquisition of Roman linguistic, cultural, and political identity, usually as an effect of colonization. Romanization is now regarded as more problematic than when it was first theorized by Roman archaeologists in the late British Empire. The acquisition of Latin literacy, as seen in **epigraphy** and documents, is a rough index of Romanization.

Sacrifice (religious practice): The killing of an animal (cattle, sheep, pigs, or birds) or the offering of incense, wine, or cakes to a god in polytheistic **cult** practice.

Scribe: A person who wrote for others, whether for the wealthy or for illiterate people. Letters by soldiers may have been dictated by the soldiers to scribes.

Senate, Senator: The deliberative body of the Roman Republic and early empire, staffed by about 300 members of the senatorial order or highest status group. Senators were former magistrates (the lowest magistracy that was required was the quaestorship). They formed a semihereditary

aristocracy. They advised the magistrates but also effectively made many decisions. Certain decrees of the Senate (see ***Senatus Consultum***) had the force of law. In the Principate, the Senate advised the emperors, but had less and less real power. Nonetheless emperors who offended the Senate did not fare well in the historical record.

Senatus Consultum: A decree of the Senate with the force of law.

***Sesterce* (plural, *sesterces*; abbreviation, HS)**: A Roman silver coin. Four sesterces were worth one **denarius**.

Severan Dynasty: The imperial dynasty from Septimius Severus (193–211 CE) to Alexander Severus (222–235), although the connection of Elagabalus (218–222) and Alexander Severus to Septimius and his son Caracalla was not direct.

Standards: Staffs topped with symbols (often animals or eagles) and adorned with banners, carried by Roman soldiers in battle and on parade. At camp the standards were kept in a special shrine. In the Principate, images of the emperor were carried upon standards.

Stoicism: A form of Greek philosophy, developing in the Hellenistic era, that emphasized self-control and resignation to events. In the Principate, Stoicism was adopted by some aristocrats who opposed individual emperors.

Sumptuary Law: A law intended to restrict or regulate the purchase, display, or consumption of luxury goods.

Tablets: A Roman writing material, typically made from wood covered with wax; to write on a tablet, the wax was scratched with a stylus. Tablets without wax have also been found, written on directly with ink.

Tetrarchy, Tetrarchs: The system of four emperors (the Tetrarchs) created by Diocletian (284–305 CE) in 293, with two Augusti (Diocletian and Maximian) and two Caesars or deputy emperors (Constantius I and Galerius). The Second Tetrarchy was formed in 305, when Diocletian and Maximian abdicated, but soon fell into disarray and was abandoned.

Theodosian Code: A collection of edicts and laws mostly from the fourth and early fifth centuries CE, promulgated by Theodosius II (408–450).

Tradition (literary): The dominant and consistent mode of representation of an entity (person, war, nation, idea, etc.) in literary sources.

Tribune (military) (Latin, *tribunus*; plural, *tribuni*): High-ranking legionary officers in the Principate. The senatorial tribune (*tribunus laticlavus*) was a young man of senatorial status, ranking above an equestrian tribunes (*tribunus angusticlavus*). Distinct from **Tribune of the Plebs**.

Tribune of the Plebs (Latin, *tribunus plebis*): In the Roman Republic, a special magistracy held only by plebeians, elected by the *comitia tributa* or plebeian assembly. They had the power to propose and veto legislation.

Tribus: Tribe, a political and geographic subdivision of the citizen body in the Roman Republic; not to be confused with English “tribe” for a prestate ethnic group.

Tribute: Taxation levied upon provincial subjects of the empire. Roman citizens were exempt from *tributum* after 167 BCE.

Triumvir, Triumvirate: A triumvirate is a junta consisting of three members, the triumvirs. The unofficial First Triumvirate of Pompey the Great, Julius Caesar, and Crassus existed from ca. 60 to 53 BCE. The formally constituted Second Triumvirate of Mark Antony, Octavian, and Marcus Aemilius Lepidus formed in 43 BCE and ended in 33 BCE.

Twelve Tables: Usually abbreviated *XII Tables*. The oldest Roman laws; according to tradition, they were formulated by the Decemvirs in 451–450 BCE. They illustrate a rather primitive stage of the law and of society (e.g., the “eye for an eye” principle of retribution).

Tyranny, Tyrant: In Archaic Greece, the regime of a *turannos* or “boss,” not necessarily negative. “Tyrant” developed negative connotations due to the reputation of some of the Greek tyrants.

Urbs (Latin): The City of Rome.

Usurpation: A rival’s seizure of the throne or imperial power from an incumbent king or emperor.

Vestal Virgin: A priestess of the state religion at Rome, dedicated to remain virgin and unmarried.

Vexillation (Latin, *vexillatio*, plural, *vexillationes*): A detachment of legionaries.

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